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U.S. Marines joined Filipino counterparts on May 5, 2024, for a mock battle at a telling location: a small, remote territory just 100 miles off the southern tip of the contested island of Taiwan.

The combat drill is part of the weekslong Exercise Balikatan that has brought together naval, air and ground forces of the Philippines and the United States, with Australia and France also joining some maneuvers.

With a planned “maritime strike” on May 8 in which a decommissioned ship will be sunk and exercises at repelling an advancing foreign army, the aim is to display a united front against China, which Washington and Manila perceive as a threat to the region. Balikatan is Tagalog for “shoulder to shoulder.”

Joint Philippines-U.S. naval drills have become an annual event. But as an expert in international relations, I believe this year’s drills mark an inflection point in the regional politics of the South China Sea.

For the first time, warships taking part in the exercise ventured outside the 12-mile boundary that demarcates the territorial waters of the Philippines. This extends military operations into the gray area where the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone rubs up against the territory claimed by China and designated by its “nine-dash line.”

Also for the first time, the U.S. deployed an advanced mobile launcher for medium-range ballistic and cruise missiles of a type that had been banned under the now-defunct Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. In addition, the Philippine navy is showing off its newest acquisition, a South Korean-built missile frigate.

The South China Sea has long been the source of maritime disputes between China, which claims the vast majority of its waters, and nations including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. In addition, heightened tensions over the status of Taiwan – a territory that the Biden administration has pledged to defend militarily in the event of a Chinese invasion – have made the South China Sea even more strategically important.

Containment at Sea

The latest joint maneuvers come amid two developments that could go some way to influence the future trajectory of tensions in the South China Sea. First, the Philippines has grown increasingly assertive in countering China’s claims in the region; and second, the U.S. is increasingly intent on building up regional alliances as part of a strategy to contain China.

The Philippines-U.S. alignment is more robust than ever. After a brief interval during the 2016-22 presidency of Rodrigo Duterte, U.S. warships and military aircraft once again operate out of bases in the Philippines.

Joint naval patrols resumed in early 2023. At the same time, Manila granted U.S. troops unprecedented access to facilities on the northern Batanes islands, which have become the focus of current joint operations.

Meanwhile, Washington has become more vocal in condemning challenges to the Philippines from China.

U.S. officials had carefully avoided promising to protect the far-flung islands, atolls and reefs claimed by Manila for seven decades following the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines in 1951.

Only in March 2019 did then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo assert that the treaty covers all of the geographical area over which the Philippines asserts sovereignty.

In February 2023, Presidents Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and Joe Biden doubled the number of bases in the Philippines open to the U.S. military. That May, the two leaders affirmed that the Mutual Defense Treaty applies to armed attacks that take place “anywhere in the South China Sea.”

Causing Waves, Rocking the Boat

Firmer ties to the U.S. have been accompanied by more combative behavior on the part of the Philippines. In May 2023, the Philippines coast guard introduced demarcation buoys around Whitsun Reef – the site of an intense confrontation with China’s maritime militia a year earlier.

Reports circulated three months later that Philippine marines planned to construct permanent outposts in the vicinity of the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. And a Philippine coast guard ship, with the commander of the country’s armed forces aboard, approached Scarborough Shoal in November, before being forced to retreat by Chinese maritime militia vessels.

Then in January 2024, the Philippines broke with its adherence to a prohibition on erecting structures on disputed territory, which was part of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, by installing electronic surveillance equipment on Thitu Island, which sits beyond Scarborough Shoal in the heart of a cluster of disputed formations. This was followed by announced plans to put water desalination plants on Thitu, Nanshan Island and Second Thomas Shoal, making it possible to maintain permanent garrisons on these isolated outposts.

Manila has continued to assert its maritime rights by announcing that armed forces would escort exploration and mining activities in the exclusive economic zone.

Further acts that could be seen as provocative in Beijing followed, including the stationing of a Philippine navy corvette at nearby Palawan Island and a joint flyover by Philippine warplanes and a U.S. Air Force B-52 heavy bomber.

A Raft of Chinese Responses

It is clear that the deepening of Philippines-U.S. ties has given Manila the confidence to undertake a variety of combative acts toward China. The question is, to what ends?

A more assertive Philippines may end up contributing to the U.S. strategy to deter Beijing from extending its presence in the South China Sea and launching what many in Washington fear: an invasion of Taiwan.

But it is possible that heightened truculence on the part of the Philippines will goad Beijing into being more aggressive, diminishing the prospects for regional stability.

As the Philippines-U.S. alignment has strengthened, Beijing has boosted the number of warships it deploys in the South China Sea and escalated maritime operations around Thitu Island, Second Thomas Shoal and Iroquois Reef – all of which the Philippines considers its sovereign territory.

In early March 2024, two Chinese research ships moved into Benham Rise, a resource-rich shelf situated on the eastern coast of the Philippines, outside the South China Sea. Weeks later, a Philippines coast guard cutter surveying a sandbar near Thitu was harassed not only by Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships but also by a missile frigate of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which for the first time launched a helicopter to shadow the cutter.

Washington has taken no public steps to dampen tensions between Manila and Beijing. Rather, Secretary of State Antony Blinken expressed full-throated support for “our ironclad defense commitments” during a mid-March 2024 stopover in Manila.

Reassured of U.S. backing, Marcos has amped up the rhetoric, proclaiming that Manila would respond to any troublemaking on Beijing’s part by implementing a “countermeasure package that is proportionate, deliberate and reasonable.” “Filipinos,” he added, “do not yield.”

Such an approach, according to Marcos, was now feasible due to the U.S. and its regional allies offering “to help us on what the Philippines requires to protect and secure our sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.”

The danger is that as the Philippines grows more assured by U.S. support, it may grow reckless in dealing with China.

Rather than deterring China from further expansion, the deepening Philippines-U.S. alignment and associated Filipino assertiveness may only ramp up Beijing’s apprehensiveness over its continued access to the South China Sea – through which virtually all of its energy imports and most of its exports flow.

And there is little reason to expect that Washington will be able to prevent an emboldened Manila from continuing down the path of confronting China in the South China Sea.

To Beijing, the prospect of an emboldened Philippines forging active strategic partnerships with Australia, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and – most troublesome of all – Taiwan makes the situation all the more perilous.

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is Professor of Government Emeritus, Northeastern University.

Featured image: Philippine Marines join with US Marine Corps during an exercise at Naval Base Camilo Osias in the Philippines in 2022. Photo: US Marine Corps

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By 2014 McBride had compiled a dossier into profound command failings that saw examples of potential war crimes in Afghanistan overlooked and other soldiers wrongly accused. On Tuesday he was sentenced to nearly six years in jail.

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Sometimes a whistleblower does everything right.  He or she makes a revelation that is clearly in the public interest.  The revelation is clearly a violation of the law.  And then he or she is even more clearly abused by the government. It would be great if these stories always had happy endings.  Unfortunately, they don’t.  

In this case, the whistleblower, the hero, Australian David McBride has been sentenced to five years and eight months in prison for telling the truth.  He will not be eligible for parole for 27 months.

David McBride is former British Army officer and a lawyer with the Australian Special Forces who blew the whistle on war crimes committed by Australian soldiers in Afghanistan, specifically the killing of 39 unarmed Afghan prisoners, farmers, and civilians in 2012. 

After failing to raise a response through official channels, McBride shared the information with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), which published a series of major reports based on the material. 

The ABC broadcasts in 2017 led to a major inquiry that upheld many of the allegations. Despite this, the ABC and its journalists themselves came under threat of prosecution for their work on the story.

The ABC offices in Sydney were raided by the national police, but in the end the government did not prosecute an ABC journalist because it was not in the public interest. McBride himself, however, was prosecuted for dissemination of official information.  

Two Tours in Afghanistan 

Let’s go back a few years.  McBride at the time already was a seasoned attorney. After studying for a second law degree at Oxford University, he joined the British military and eventually moved back to Australia where he became a lawyer in the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). In that role he had two tours in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2013. 

While on deployment, McBride became critical of the terms of engagement and other regulations that soldiers were working under, which he felt were endangering military personnel for the sake of political imperatives determined elsewhere. 

By 2014 McBride had compiled a dossier into profound command failings that saw examples of potential war crimes in Afghanistan overlooked and other soldiers wrongly accused. His internal complaints were suppressed and ignored. 

An Australian platoon on a foot patrol in a town in Uruzgan, Afghanistan, Aug. 16, 2008. (ISAF, John Collins, U.S. Navy)

McBride’s reports also looked at other matters, including the military’s handling of sexual abuse allegations. After his use of internal channels had proven ineffective, McBride gave his report to the police. And eventually, he contacted journalists at ABC.  

ABC’s Afghan Files documented several incidents of Australian soldiers killing unarmed civilians, including children, and questioned the prevalent “warrior culture” in the special forces. Subsequent to McBride’s disclosures, the behavior of other Coalition Special Forces in Afghanistan also came under sustained investigation. 

In many ways, McBride’s reports went further than the issues identified by ABC. Amid prevalent rumors that Australian troops were responsible for war crimes, questionable deaths in Afghanistan had led to calls for investigations. 

Report Vindicated McBride & ABC  

In November 2020, the Brereton report (formally called the Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force Afghan Inquiry report) was published, utterly vindicating McBride and the ABC.  Judge Paul Brereton found evidence of multiple incidents involving Australian personnel that had led to 39 deaths. Among his recommendations were the investigation of these incidents for possible future criminal charges.

There would be almost no criminal charges, however.  At least, there would be only one eventual criminal charge against one single soldier in the murder of Afghan civilians. There have been no charges against the officers who covered up the war crimes. 

Instead, though, there would be serious charges against McBride for “theft of government property” (the information) and for “sharing with members of the press documents classified as secret.”  He faced life in prison.

Main offices of the Australian Department of Defence in Canberra. (Nick Dowling, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0)

McBride’s sentence illustrates the challenges that Australian whistleblowers face when reporting evidence of waste, fraud, abuse, illegality, or threats to the public health or public safety.

First, just like in the United States, there are no protections for national security whistleblowers.  McBride took his career — indeed, his life — into his hands when he decided to go public with his revelations.  But what else could he do?  

Second, as in the United States, there is no affirmative defense.  McBride, like Edward Snowden, Jeffrey Sterling, Daniel Hale and like me, was forbidden from standing up in court and saying, “Yes, I gave the information to the media because I witnessed a war crime or a crime against humanity.  What I did was in the public interest.”  

Those words are never permitted to be spoken in a court in the United States or Australia.  

Recalling Nuremberg

Defendants at Nuremberg guarded by American Military Police, November 1945. (Raymond D’Addario, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

Third, Australia is in dire need of some legal reforms.  The judge in McBride’s case said at sentencing that McBride, “had no duty as an army officer beyond following orders.” That defense was attempted at Nuremberg and it failed. It’s time for the Australian judiciary to get into the 21st century.

There are a couple points of light in this whole fiasco. The Brereton Commission did indeed recommend that 19 members of the Australian Special Forces be prosecuted for war crimes.  So far, one has been charged with a crime.  He is accused of shooting and killing a civilian in a wheat field in Uruzgan Province in 2012.

And McBride will be allowed to appeal his conviction. Still any other light at the end of the tunnel is likely an oncoming train, rather than relief for the whistleblower.

But the bottom line is this: There is a war against whistleblowers in Australia just like there is in the United States. 

Indeed, Andrew Wilkie, a former Australian government intelligence analyst-turned-whistleblower, and now member of Parliament, says that “the Australian government hates whistleblowers” and that it wanted to punish David McBride and to send a signal to other government insiders to remain silent, even in the face of witnessing horrible crimes.  I would say exactly the same thing about the United States.

I’m proud to call David McBride a friend.  I know exactly what he’s going through right now.  But his sacrifice will not be in vain.  History will smile on him.  Yes, the next several years will be tough.  He’ll be a prisoner.  He’ll be separated from his family.  And when he gets out of prison, well into his 60s, he’ll have to begin rebuilding his life.  But he is right and his government is wrong.  And future generations will understand and appreciate what he did for them.

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John Kiriakou is a former C.I.A. counterterrorism officer and a former senior investigator with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. John became the sixth whistleblower indicted by the Obama administration under the Espionage Act — a law designed to punish spies. He served 23 months in prison as a result of his attempts to oppose the Bush administration’s torture program.

Featured image: David McBride outside the Supreme Court in Canberra in November 2023. (Cathy Vogan/Consortium News)

The Battle of Ðiên Biên Phú at 70

May 17th, 2024 by Patrick Lawrence

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I had the most salutary email the other day, a reviving lift amid these, humanity’s darkest days, surely, in the memory of anyone living. It was from George Burchett, an Australian painter who resides in Hanoi, the city of his birth.

George was born in Hanoi because he is the offspring of Wilfred Burchett, one of the towering greats among 20th century correspondents. Wilfred is celebrated for many things, one of which is his coverage of Vietnam’s anti-imperialist wars, of which there are two, from the North.

And George wanted to remind those who receive his privately distributed newsletter, People’s Information Bureau, that it is time to mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Viêt Minh, Ho Chi Minh’s revolutionary movement, over the French at Ðiên Biên Phú, a valley in the remote highlands hard by the Laotian border in northwestern Vietnam. 

The battle of Ðiên Biên Phú lasted 55 days, from March 13 to May 7, 1954. Two months after the French were catastrophically defeated they signed the Geneva Accords, wherein they agreed to withdraw all forces not only from Vietnam but also from Cambodia and Laos, France’s other colonial possessions in Indochina.

The Viêt Minh victory at Ðiên Biên Phú makes riveting history all by itself. John Prados, a lately departed friend, wrote my favorite among the many books on the topic. As the French grew desperate, he recounted in The Sky Would Fall (Dial, 1983), the Eisenhower administration made plans to intervene against the Viêt Minh — plans that included America’s second use of atomic bombs. 

Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers (John Foster at State, Allen at the C.I.A.), and others never got beyond an extensive but covert operation before the French forces under Christian de Castries went down. But we find in Prados’ book a suggestion of the madness and delusion that started the Second Indochina War and prolonged it for 21 years.

Washington’s policy cliques, not to mention certifiable paranoids such as the Dulles brothers, are incapable of learning anything from anything, so captive are they within our republic’s exceptionalist ideology. The post–Vietnam record of American foreign policy demonstrates this all too amply.

But there are lessons the rest of us can learn from the Vietnamese triumph at Ðiên Biên Phú and its defeat of the Americans in the two decades and a year of war that followed. Let us not miss these for the light they shed on the world we see out our windows and how we should act upon it.

Strategic Genius

Viet Minh troops planting their flag over the captured French headquarters at Dien Bien Phu, May 7, 1954. (Vietnam People’s Army – Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

General Võ Nguyên Giáp proved himself a strategic genius as he led the Viêt Minh forces to victory at Ðiên Biên Phú. He famously surrounded the French from the hills that enclosed de Castries’ garrison and made full use of guerrilla tactics as he deployed heavy artillery, carefully arranged for maximum impact, in an elaborate system of tunnels to evade French bombardments.

As is recounted in the histories, men and women in Ho’s revolutionary movement had to disassemble Giáp’s heavy guns to transport them, on foot and by bicycle, piece by piece, up the mountains surrounding the French, where they were put back together and into service. Giáp destroyed de Castries’ airstrip and, with heavy ground fighting, steadily reduced the French perimeter until the fighting was bloodily close.

The Viêt Minh had defeated and captured 12,000 surviving French troops in less than two months. Giáp had not lost a single piece of artillery. The French were at the table in Geneva on May 8, a day after de Castries surrendered. A month later the French government fell.

Thomas Meaney, in a brief but very good piece in the New Left Review’s Sidecar section, described Ðiên Biên Phú as “the Stalingrad of decolonization.” For historical perspective it does not get much pithier: Ðiên Biên Phú stands high among the non–West’s first decisive triumphs against the aggressions of the imperial powers during what we call “the independence era.”

How did the Vietnamese prevail at that world-historical moment? In this lies one lesson worth learning.

Meaney, a fellow at the Max Planck Society in Göttingen, Germany, points out that Vietnam’s anniversary celebrations of their victory last week included a full-dress reenactment of the battle, wherein the peasants and enlisted soldiers who hauled all that artillery up the mountains were prominently honored. Why? What were the Vietnamese saluting?

As Meaney rightly explains, the supply lines serving General Giáp were possible because Ho had, by 1954, created a shared identity among the Vietnamese, a common recognition and purpose, that made possible a national mobilization against the French. This was Ho’s sine qua non.

Võ Nguyên Giáp and Ho Chi Minh in 1945. (AP Photo, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

“What must we do to realize a Ðiên Biên Phú” Frantz Fanon wondered when he published The Wretched of the Earth seven years later. The answer that should interest those eager to learn from history and experience lies in the peasants and porters. They had a common consciousness, an awareness of who they were, their circumstances, and what they had to do about their circumstances. This enabled them to act.

And that, in turn, is what I mean by a lesson worth learning.

Blanket Indifference to Genocide

When you talk to people day in and day out about the Israeli–U.S. genocide in Gaza, you start to realize that this obscene crisis has pushed in the faces of those who oppose it a very raw reality from which most of us have tended to flinch.

All of the institutions through which citizens of the West are supposed to express their preferences and demands are broken. Among those purporting to lead the Western democracies we find a blanket indifference to those objecting to a genocide they witness daily in real time.

This is our shared circumstance. If we do not live in functioning democracies, as the West’s support of apartheid Israel makes rudely plain, it is only when we cultivate a common consciousness of this reality — no flinching — that people will know what mountains they have to climb and what they must carry with them.

George Burchett, who has dedicated considerable time over some years to archiving his father’s work, sent the most delightful photographs of Wilfred in the People’s Information Bureau mailing that marked the Ðiên Biên Phú anniversary.

There was Wilfred, in sandals and a pith helmet, working on a piece at Ho’s jungle headquarters in Thai Nguyen Province. In a piece published in Vietnam+, a Hanoi website, you see Wilfred talking to Ho over tea at what looks to me — I could be mistaken — the modest house Ho had built behind the grandiose palace where the colonial governor had lived.

The two reporters who interviewed George, Phan Hong Nhung and Pham Thu Huong, noted “the spirit of solidarity, self-reliance, the great leadership” abroad in the Vietnam of 1954. I have to say this landed hard, devoid of all three do most Americans seem today.

But George sent something else in his PIB missive that carries another lesson in it.

It is a digitized copy of a piece Wilfred filed on March 30, 1954, headlined, “A Great Disaster for the French Army.” Wilfred was done with the mainstream press by this time. This was his first file from Vietnam for The Daily Worker, the British daily, and marked, if I have this right, his arrival among independent media.

“The action now taking place at Ðiên Biên Phú is the most tragic failure for French arms in the whole disastrous fiasco of the Navarre Plan to crush the people of Viet Nam,” his lead reads. “To the heavy losses in manpower must be added the destruction of French air power which makes this battle one of the costliest of the whole ‘dirty war’ to the French.”

French troops seeking cover in trenches at Ðiên Biên Phú. (Stanley Karnow: Vietnam: A History, The Viking Press, New York 1983, Wikimedia Commons, Public domain)

You wouldn’t read anything like that in The Times of London or The Daily Express, for which Burchett has previously filed, at the end of March 1954.

The battle of Ðiên Biên Phú had begun just two weeks earlier. Burchett’s reference is to Henri Navarre, a professional soldier who was sent from Paris a year earlier to subdue the Vietnamese liberation movement.

Working From the ‘Other Side’

I see another lesson in Wilfred Burchett’s files from North Vietnam, beginning in 1954 and running all the way to the victory in 1975. It is the honor and worth of working from “the other side,” and the difference this can make in the formation of that motivating, mobilizing awareness I previously mentioned among people otherwise propagandized into acquiescent silence.

Burchett’s reports from the North are precisely a case in point. As anyone who lived through the Vietnam years will know, Wilfred’s work was essential to the coherence and determination of the antiwar movement, especially but not only in the U.S. The lesson here is that independent media — print, webcast, podcast, video, audio, all of it — is similarly essential to an informed understanding of events in our time.

(Disclosure at this point. I was fortunate enough to work with Wilfred in the mid–1970s, taking dictation and editing some of his files as the Vietnam war drew to a close. I detailed this relationship in Journalists and Their Shadows, Clarity Press brought out last autumn.)

Last weekend The Floutist, the Substack newsletter I publish and co-edit, posted a piece called “Report from Donbas,” written by a renowned Swiss journalist named Guy Mettan. It is based on a tour Mettan made last month of the two Donbas republics, Donetsk and Lugansk, which voted in referenda two years ago this September to join the Russian Federation.

Mettan’s report shows us a place and a people we are not supposed to see, just as Burchett began to do 70 years ago this spring. Mettan’s piece, another reportage from “the other side,” opened my astonished eyes very wide even as I edited it. And it is precisely another case in point.

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Patrick Lawrence, a correspondent abroad for many years, chiefly for The International Herald Tribune, is a columnist, essayist, lecturer and author, most recently of Journalists and Their Shadows, available from Clarity Press or via Amazon.  Other books include Time No Longer: Americans After the American Century. His Twitter account, @thefloutist, has been permanently censored. 

Featured image: Diorama of Peasants Assisting Struggle at the Dien Bien Phu Victory Museum in Vietnam. (Adam Jones, Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA 2.0)

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Sometimes, it’s best not to leave the issue of justice to the judges.  They do what they must: consult the statutes, test the rivers of power, and hope that their ruling will not be subject to appeal.  David McBride, the man who revealed that Australia’s special forces in Afghanistan had dimmed and muddied before exhaustion, committed atrocities and faced a compromised chain of command, was condemned on May 14 to a prison term of five years and eight months.

Without McBride’s feats, there would have been no Afghan Files published by the ABC.  The Brereton Inquiry, established to investigate alleged war crimes, would most likely have never been launched.  (That notable document subsequently identified 39 instances of alleged unlawful killings of Afghan civilians by members of the special forces.)

In an affidavit, McBride explained how he wished Australians to realise that “Afghan civilians were being murdered and that Australian military leaders were at the very least turning the other way and at worst tacitly approving this behaviour”.  Furthermore “soldiers were being improperly prosecuted as a smokescreen to cover [the leadership’s] inaction and failure to hold reprehensible conduct to account.”

For taking and disclosing 235 documents from defence offices mainly located in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the former military lawyer was charged with five national security offences.  He also found Australia’s whistleblowing laws feeble and fundamentally useless.  The Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013 (Cth) provided no immunity from prosecution, a fact aided by grave warnings from the Australian government that vital evidence would be excluded from court deliberation on national security grounds.

Through the process, the Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, could have intervened under Section 71 of the Judiciary Act 1903(Cth), vesting the top legal officer in the country with powers to drop prosecutions against individuals charged with “an indictable offence against the laws of the Commonwealth”.  Dreyfus refused, arguing that such powers were only exercised in “very unusual and exceptional circumstances”.

At trial, chief counsel Trish McDonald SC, representing the government, made the astonishing claim that McBride had an absolute duty to obey orders flowing from the oath sworn to the sovereign. No public interest test could modify such a duty, a claim that would have surprised anyone familiar with the Nuremberg War Crimes trials held in the aftermath of the Second World War. “A soldier does not serve the sovereign by promising to do whatever the soldier thinks is in the public interest, even if contrary to the laws made by parliament.” To justify such a specious argument, authorities from the 19th century were consulted: “There is nothing so dangerous to the civil establishment of the state as an undisciplined or reactionary army.”

ACT Justice David Mossop tended to agree, declaring that, “There is no aspect of duty that allows the accused to act in the public interest contrary to a lawful order”. A valiant effort was subsequently made by McBride’s counsel, Steven Odgers SC, to test the matter in the ACT Court of Appeal.  Chief Justice Lucy McCallum heard the following submission from Odgers:

“His only real argument is that what he did was the right thing. There was an order: don’t disclose this stuff, but he bled, and did the right thing, to use his language, and the question is does the fact that he’s in breach of orders mean that he’s in breach of his duty, so that he’s got no defence?” 

The answer from the Chief Justice was curt: Mossop’s ruling was “not obviously wrong.”

With few options, a guilty plea was entered to three charges.  Left at the mercy of Justice Mossop, the punitive sentence shocked many of McBride’s supporters.  The judge thought McBride of “good character” but possessed by a mania “with the correctness of his own opinions”.  He suffered from a “misguided self-belief” and “was unable to operate within the legal framework that his duty required him to do”.

The judge was cognisant of the Commonwealth’s concerns that disclosing such documents would damage Australia’s standing with “foreign partners”, making them less inclined to share information.  He also rebuked McBride for copying the documents and storing them insecurely, leaving them vulnerable to access from foreign powers.  For all that, none of the identifiable risks had eventuated, and the Australian Defence Force had “taken no steps” to investigate the matter.

This brutal flaying of McBride largely centres on clouding his personal reasons.  In a long tradition of mistreating whistleblowers, questions are asked as to why he decided to reveal the documents to the press.  Motivation has been muddled with effect and affect. The better question, asks Peter Greste, executive director of the Alliance for Journalists’ Freedom, is not examining the reasons for exposing such material but the revelations they disclose.  That, he argues, is where the public interest lies.  Unfortunately, in Australia, tests of public interest all too often morph into a weapon fashioned to fanatically defend government secrecy.

All that is left now is for McBride’s defence team to appeal on the crucial subject of duty, something so curiously rigid in Australian legal doctrine.  “We think it’s an issue of national importance, indeed international importance, that a western nation has such as a narrow definition of duty,” argued his defence lawyer, Mark Davis.

John Kiriakou, formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency, was the only figure to be convicted, not of torture inflicted by his colleagues during the clownishly named War on Terror, but of exposing its practice. McBride is the only one to be convicted in the context of alleged Australian war crimes in Afghanistan, not for their commission, but for furnishing documentation exposing them, including the connivance of a sullied leadership.  The world of whistleblowing abounds with its sick ironies.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

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Abstract

It was recently revealed that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces now designate China as a “hypothetical enemy”. This phrase has a controversial history that stretches back to the era of prewar militarism. In the 1930s, the Japanese military designated the US as a hypothetical enemy. After World War 2, this designation was identified as a reason for the militarists’ view of war as inevitable. A strong taboo against labeling other countries as hypothetical enemies therefore emerged. But as the collective memory of war has waned, so has the hypothetical enemy taboo. The fact that the label is now attached to China by Japan’s defense establishment does not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations.

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Introduction

In early February, Japanese media reported that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the US Forces had designated China as a hypothetical enemy during the military exercise Keen Edge (Nishi Nippon Shimbun 2024). The story garnered little attention, but if it had happened during the Cold War, it would have caused a major scandal, possibly leading to high-level resignations in the defense establishment. As we will see, this did, in fact, happen in the 1960s. After the defeat in World War 2, the practice of labeling other countries as hypothetical enemies became a powerful taboo in Japan. That was because this practice was closely associated with the prewar militarists who had openly viewed the US as the hypothetical enemy. It was commonly believed that the hypothetical enemy label had created a feeling among the militarists that war with this enemy was inevitable. In the postwar period, the label was therefore seen as dangerous and something that the reinvented Japanese “peace state” should avoid. Government officials went out of their way to stress that postwar Japan did not see any other state as its hypothetical enemy. The fact that the SDF is again using this controversial prewar label to describe China demonstrates the weakening of the hypothetical enemy taboo and the growing threat perceptions vis-à-vis China in the minds of Japanese defense planners. This development does not bode well for Sino-Japanese relations.  

In the following, we will examine how the term “hypothetical enemy”, or “kasō tekikoku” in Japanese, was used in the prewar period and how it turned into a taboo phrase in the postwar period. Many of the following quotes and episodes come from chapters 3 and 5 of my 2020 book, Temporal Identities and Security Policy in Postwar Japan, where I trace the history of the term.

The Myth of Inevitability

A hypothetical enemy refers to a country whose national interests are so incompatible with your own that military conflict with that country is deemed probable in the relatively near future. The first Japanese official document that designated other countries as hypothetical enemies was Japan’s first national defense plan of 1907 (Samuels 2007: 16). In this document, the US, Russia, Germany and France were given the label. In the beginning of the 20th century, the Japanese navy saw the US as the greatest threat whereas the army was more concerned about Russia, but in the 1930s, a consensus emerged within the military establishment that the US was by far the greatest hypothetical enemy. This was mainly due to American opposition to Japan’s territorial ambitions in China.

One potential risk with explicitly labeling another country as a hypothetical enemy is that the prospect of military conflict with that country could begin to take on an air of inevitability. This dynamic has been recognized in the field of psychology for a long time. Peace psychologist Ralph K. White (1968: 267) who studied the link between human perceptions and war, argued that the creation of a “diabolical enemy image” was “probably the most dangerous [perception] as a cause of unnecessary war”. That seems to have been the case in prewar Japan where every military decision was made in preparation for what many felt was an inevitable war with the US. It is of course impossible to measure the extent to which the hypothetical enemy label caused a belief in war as inevitable, but it is unquestionable that the Japanese leadership began to see the world in increasingly fatalistic terms throughout the 1930s (Miwa 1975). The clearest example of this is Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki’s irrational call for a war against the US in 1941 despite probably knowing that such a war was unwinnable. Tōjō famously declared that sometimes it was necessary to “jump with one’s eyes closed from the veranda of the Kiyomizu Temple” (Samuels 2007: 1).

This sentiment of destiny was not limited to the militarist clique that ruled Japan. It was also widespread among a public that was riled up with nationalist fervor. A look at the titles of some of the tremendously popular war-scare books in the early 20th century gives us an indication of how deep the inevitability belief ran: The Inevitable War between Japan and the United States (1911); The Next War (1913); Narrative of the Coming War between Japan and the United States (1920) (Saeki 1975).

These fanatical emotions ultimately hurled Japan into a war it had no chance of winning. With the Pearl Harbor attack in December 1941 the US transformed from a hypothetical enemy to a very real one. The war result was disastrous for Japan as millions of Japanese died and the country had to endure destruction, defeat, and foreign occupation.

The Hypothetical Enemy Taboo in Postwar Japan

After the war there was a near consensus in Japan that militarism had to be avoided at all costs. Responsibility for the war was placed squarely at the feet of the militarists and their political and bureaucratic enablers. Nearly a thousand of them were executed and about 200,000 were purged from public office during the American occupation from 1945 to 1952 (Hayes 2013: 34). There was broad agreement in the Japanese population that postwar Japan had to make a clean break with the past. If prewar Japan had been characterized by militarism, postwar Japan had to be characterized by the opposite, pacifism. One could say that the pacifist national identity that emerged in postwar Japan was founded on a negation of the militarist past (Hanssen 2020). This form of identity construction was also facilitated by the US occupation authorities which imposed a pacifist constitution on Japan and disbanded its military. This foreclosed the possibility of a more martial form of postwar identity. It should be said, however, that the pacification of Japan, both in terms of identity and military capability, never went as far as the most ardent pacifists would have liked. This was primarily due to a shift in US occupation policy that saw the rehabilitation of thousands of purged individuals and the establishment of a limited Japanese military. This created uncomfortable continuities between past and present, but an anti-militarist identity nonetheless managed to take root in postwar Japan (Berger 1993).

To prevent a repeat of the disastrous war, the militarists were scrutinized intensely. This naturally also led to an examination of the practices and beliefs that had driven their agenda. Emperor worship and state Shinto were obvious ideological underpinnings that had to be eradicated to prevent a repetition of the past. Eventually the militarists’ designation of other countries as hypothetical enemies was also identified as a dangerous practice. It was said to be dangerous because it had led the militarists to obsessively and fatalistically prepare for a war that many felt could have been avoided. As Communist Party member Iwama Masao stated in the Diet in 1951:

“If you look at the nature of Japan’s past offensive war, its imperialist offensive war, you will see that [the military], without fail, would create hypothetical enemies. They would claim that the enemy would invade us and, based on that premise, we were told that we would have to undertake various forms of armament. By strengthening our preparedness beyond our actual capacity and by invading other countries, Japanese imperialism brought today’s destruction on us” (Iwama 1951).

Through articulations like these, the hypothetical enemy label was closely linked to prewar fanaticism and became a taboo in the postwar period.

In the fierce security policy debates of the 1950s, the opposition parties on the Left, led by the Socialist Party, frequently accused the government of secretly having hypothetical enemies. This was a way of linking the government to the prewar militarists and thereby delegitimizing it. This strategy would come to a head during the tumultuous debates on the renewal of the security treaty with the US in 1960. The leftwing parties fiercely attacked the security treaty for treating the communist countries as hypothetical enemies (e.g. Tanaka 1960). The attempt at portraying the ruling Liberal Democratic Party as a continuation of prewar militarism was facilitated by the fact that it was led by Kishi Nobusuke, a man who had been arrested (and later released) by the American occupation authorities as a class A war criminal for his participation in the Tōjō War Cabinet.

The Kishi Government vehemently denied the charge of enemy hypothesizing, arguing that such an aggressive practice was obsolete in the modern age. Instead, what the government was seeking with the new security treaty, Kishi insisted, was general deterrence without any specific enemy in mind. His government tried to frame deterrence as a modern and far more benign form of security policy. Many of his statements during the 1960 Diet debates reveal how important it was for Kishi to try to dissociate himself from the military practices of the past:

“We are not thinking in terms of hypothetical enemies. In the past, in the prewar period, hypothetical enemies were given as the reason for the expansion of the army and the navy. […] But now we are not thinking in such terms when we are strengthening Japan’s self-defense capabilities” (Kishi 1960).

The Director-General of Japan’s Defense Agency (JDA), Akagi Munenori, echoed Kishi’s sentiment and stressed the difference between the aggressive, old practice of designating hypothetical enemies and the allegedly non-aggressive, new practice of deterrence.

“It is a fact that in the past there was military competition in which hypothetical enemies were singled out and one tried to find ways to destroy one’s enemies. But recently […] I think armaments have shifted towards deterrence. Accordingly, it is no longer a matter of hypothetical enemies, but a matter of deterring each other from going to war” (Akagi 1960).

This distinction between malign and obsolete enemy hypothesizing and benign and modern deterrence became a recurring argument by the Japanese government throughout the Cold War. What the statements above show is that, by 1960, designating other countries as hypothetical enemies had become a taboo. It evoked memories of a past that no one wanted to be associated with.

The 1960s would offer a couple of other examples of how strong the hypothetical enemy taboo had become. In 1965, Socialist Diet member Okada Haruo revealed a secret SDF contingency plan that singled out North Korea and China as specific hypothetical enemies. The plan, known as the Three Arrows Study, was criticized in the Japanese media for espousing “the wartime thinking of the past” (Asahi Shimbun1965). Prime Minister Satō Eisaku (1965), who was unaware of the plan, condemned it as “absolutely unacceptable”. JDA Director-General Koizumi Junya (1965) apologized in the Diet, stating that it had been “inappropriate to use the words ‘hypothetical enemies’”. He was later forced to resign.

Only three years later, Okada would again embarrass the defense establishment. This time he disclosed information about a couple of recent SDF exercises, Kiku and Hayabusa, where the Soviet Union had been designated as the hypothetical enemy. In the Diet, Okada grilled the new JDA Director-General Masuda Kaneshichi on the issue of hypothetical enemies. Masuda (1968), like his predecessor, had to apologize and promise that “from now on we will not conduct exercises that designate hypothetical enemies”.

These episodes demonstrate how strong the hypothetical enemy taboo was during the Cold War. They also demonstrate how difficult defense planning was under these conditions. The SDF was tasked with protecting Japan from external threats, but it was not allowed to hypothesize about where these threats might come from. As JDA Director-General Ōmura Jōji stated in the Diet in 1981, “Our national policy is peace diplomacy based on the philosophy of our constitution. In that sense, we are not permitted to regard any country as an enemy, as a hypothetical enemy” (Ōmura 1981).

The hypothetical enemy taboo had at least one significant effect on Japanese security policy: the self-imposed limitation on Japan’s defense budget. In 1976, the Japanese government made a cabinet decision to limit defense spending to one percent of GDP. As realists like to point out, this decision made no sense from a security perspective because defense spending became completely detached from analyses of the security environment and got pegged to the seemingly irrelevant metric of economic growth. From an objectively military perspective, this kind of self-limitation does indeed seem irrational. But linking defense spending to economic performance, which had been splendid for two decades, was one way of securing defense funding without having to designate other countries as threats or enemies. The policy was conceived in the context of growing concern inside and outside Japan that the country’s growing economic power would once again be transformed into military power. The one-percent ceiling was meant to alleviate these concerns and demonstrate that Japan had no such intentions because, unlike prewar Japan, postwar Japan did not regard anyone as its enemy.

The Weakening of the Hypothetical Enemy Taboo

During the rekindled Cold War tensions of the 1980s, the hypothetical enemy taboo clearly began to weaken. As threat perceptions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union increased, a new brand of defense experts, steeped in the realist tradition, began to emerge in Japan. They loudly called for the elimination of the “irrational” one-percent ceiling on defense spending and a more sober view of the Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japan’s security (e.g. Satō 1985). The best example of these new realists was perhaps Kurisu Hiroomi, a retired SDF general. In 1980, Kurisu wrote a book with the provocative title, The Soviet Hypothetical Enemy. In it he complained that Japanese defense planning was hamstrung by the idea that “the Soviet Union must not be seen as a hypothetical enemy”—an idea he regarded as unrealistic and dangerous for Japanese security (Kurisu 1980: 156).

The clearly most significant Japanese prime minister of the 1980s, Nakasone Yasuhiro, was also inspired by the realist trend and called for a “normalization” of Japan’s security policy, which he viewed as far too idealistic. He made it one of his personal goals to overturn the one-percent ceiling and base defense spending on analyses of the threat environment rather than on economic growth. He did manage to eclipse the one-percent mark in 1987, but only symbolically as defense spending constituted 1.004 percent of GDP that year (Hook 1988: 389).[1]

The Nakasone administration also began to describe the Soviet Union as a threat. It was not prepared to rehabilitate the controversial prewar signifier “hypothetical enemy”, but it did openly label the Soviet Union as a “potential threat” (“senzaiteki kyōi” in Japanese). This phrase was consistently used to describe the Soviet Union in the Japanese defense white papers throughout the 1980s (Hook 1988: 383). Nakasone resorted to linguistic acrobatics when trying to distinguish the acceptable term “potential threat” from the unacceptable term “hypothetical enemy”. He argued that a hypothetical enemy signified a country with both strong military capabilities and aggressive intent, whereas a potential threat only signified strong military capabilities. This, he argued, meant that the Soviet Union was not a hypothetical enemy:

“We do not regard the Soviet Union as a hypothetical enemy. We can speak of a hypothetical enemy in cases where there is a combination of aggressive intent and capability. From that perspective, the Soviet Union is not at present a hypothetical enemy” (Nakasone 1983).

Needless to say, the distinction between the two terms was problematic because if a potential threat was decoupled from intentions and simply meant a country with powerful military capabilities, even the US would fit that description. It was clear that the Nakasone government tried to find a way to talk about the Soviet threat without being accused of designating it as a hypothetical enemy. That even the relatively hawkish Nakasone government was so concerned about such accusations is proof that the hypothetical enemy taboo never fully disappeared during the 1980s. But the more hostile stance toward the Soviet Union indicates that it was weakened.

The Return of the Hypothetical Enemy Label

After the end of the Cold War, the taboo surrounding the hypothetical enemy label has been further weakened. This is perhaps natural as the collective memory of the prewar and wartime eras wanes. There does not appear to be any strong aversion against the hypothetical enemy label in today’s Japan. For most people, the label might appear unfamiliar and strange, but probably not repugnant or dangerous. But that does not mean that the Japanese government will start using the term in official documents anytime soon. After all, the usage of the term in the Keen Edge exercise, where China was singled out, was meant to be secret. We only know about it because of leaks to the media. In that regard, the recent revelation is similar to the Three Arrows Study and the Kiku and Hayabusa exercises in the 1960s. But a big difference can be seen in the public and media reaction. In the 1960s, revelations of secret usage of the hypothetical enemy label led to outrage, official apologies and even a resignation by the defense chief. In 2024, the public reaction was much milder and the media coverage of the story dissipated after a few days. In the Diet, not a single opposition politician questioned the defense minister about the SDF’s use of the term, much less urged him to resign. 

But now that it has been revealed that the SDF is regarding China as a hypothetical enemy in its military drills, it is worth recalling why a taboo developed around this label to begin with.

Firstly, the label became a taboo because it was closely associated with the military doctrine of the detested prewar militarists. If nothing else, the rehabilitation of the hypothetical enemy label today is yet another reminder of how the memories of World War 2 are weakening and losing their restraining power over Japanese security policy. Secondly, the label became a taboo because there was a widespread belief that singling out hypothetical enemies had created a psychological expectation of war as inevitable. It is not my intention to claim any direct causality between the use of a label and the decision to go to war. Surely, many material factors, such as the balance of power and suffocating US sanctions, played a major role in Japan’s fateful decision in 1941. On the other hand, I do not want to completely dismiss the Cold War conventional wisdom in Japan that the hypothetical enemy label had potentially dangerous effects. This is because, unlike a threat or a challenge, one cannot coexist with an enemy. One can easily argue that an enemy must be destroyed, otherwise they will destroy you. Designating enemies, even hypothetical ones, might therefore create expectations of coming conflict which could foreclose peaceful methods of conflict resolution.    

To prevent deterministic war expectations from taking root in Japan, the SDF should avoid designating specific countries as hypothetical enemies in its exercises. One might think that this is an unreasonable demand on the SDF that would weaken its preparedness for a contingency. But outside of extremely hostile country-to-country relations, avoidance of enemy designations is common practice in military exercises. As James Sheahan (2018: 106) notes, to reduce misunderstandings, “pseudonyms are used for participants” in exercises since this “gives a fragment of plausible distance from implying the opponent is any real-life nation”. Among Japan’s bilateral relations, China ranks second in importance only to the US. Tokyo should therefore make every effort to maintain a positive relationship with Beijing. Labeling China as a hypothetical enemy unnecessarily inflames mutual mistrust and could affect Japanese perceptions of China in dangerous ways. The hypothetical enemy label should remain buried in the dustbin of history.

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Sources

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Asahi Shimbun. 朝日新聞. 1965. ‘仮想敵国が問題 簡単でない責任論 [Hypothetical Enemies Are Problematic; the Difficult Debate on Responsibility]’. 11 February: 2.

Berger, Thomas U. 1993. ‘From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan’s Culture of Anti-militarism’. International Security 17(4): 119 – 50.

Hanssen, Ulv. 2020. Temporal Identities and Security Policy in Postwar Japan. London and New York: Routledge.

Hayes, Louis D. 2013. Introduction to Japanese Politics. Fifth edition. New York: Routledge.

Hook, Glenn D. 1988. ‘The Erosion of Anti-Militaristic Principles in Contemporary Japan’. Journal of Peace Research 25(4): 381-94.  

Iritani, Toshio. 1991. Group Psychology of the Japanese in Wartime. London and New York: Kegan Paul International.

Iwama, Masao. 岩間正男. 1951. Japanese Diet, Upper House, Budget Committee. March 22. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/101015261X01419510222/72

Kishi, Nobusuke. 岸信介. 1960. Japanese Diet, Upper House, Budget Committee. 29 March. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103415261X02119600329/220

Koizumi, Junya. 小泉純也. 1965. Japanese Diet, Lower House, Budget Committee. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104815261X01319650316/218

Kurisu, Hiroomi. 栗栖弘臣. 1980. 仮想敵国ソ連:我らこう迎え撃つ [The Soviet Hypothetical Enemy: This Is how We Confront Them]. Tokyo: Kōdansha.

Masuda, Kaneshichi. 増田甲子七. 1968. Japanese Diet, Lower House, Budget Committee. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/105805261X01719680316/348

Miwa, Kimitada. ‘Japanese Images of War with the United States’. In Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations, edited by Akira Iriye, 115-37. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Nakasone, Yasuhiro. 中曾根康弘. 1983. Japanese Diet, Upper House, Plenary Session. 28 January. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/109815254X00319830128/3

Nishi Nippon Shimbun. 西日本新聞. 2024. ‘日米、仮想敵国に「中国」明示 強い危機感、台湾有事想定し初演習 [Japan and the US Designate China as Hypothetical Enemy: First Taiwan Contingency Exercise amid Strong Threat Perceptions]’. 5 February. https://www.nishinippon.co.jp/item/o/1175577/

Ōmura, Jōji. 大村襄治. Japanese Diet, Upper House, Budget Committee. 11 March. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/109415261X00619810311/297

Samuels, Richard J. 2007. Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.

Saeki, Shōichi. 1975. ‘Images of the United States as a Hypothetical Enemy’. In Mutual Images: Essays in American-Japanese Relations, edited by Akira Iriye, 100-14. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.

Satō, Eisaku. 佐藤栄作. 1965. Japanese Diet, Lower House, Budget Committee. 10 February. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104805261X01019650210/127

Satō, Kinko. 1985. ‘The Irrational 1% Ceiling on Defense Spending’. Japan Echo 12(2): 22-26.

Sheahan, James. 2018. ‘NATO command post exercises in the 1970s and 1980s’. In Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact, edited by Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier and Guillaume Lasconjarias, 93 – 112. Rome: DeBooks.

Tanaka, Orinoshin. 田中織之進. 1960. Japanese Diet, Lower House, Budget Committee. 1 March. https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/103405261X01719600301/8

White, Ralph K. 1968. Nobody Wanted War: Misperception in Vietnam and Other Wars. New York: Doubleday and Company.

Note

[1] In 2022, the Kishida Fumio government decided to double Japan’s defense budget to two percent of GDP over the following five years. This was the first significant departure from the 1976 one-percent policy.

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Hundreds of students and supporters launched an encampment at the University of Queensland (UQ) on April 29.

They did this to show their support for the student encampments in the United States, to push for an end to Israel’s genocide and to press UQ to end its collaboration with weapons companies on campus.

After rallying, speakers and students marched on the Boeing Centre at UQ.

Palestine will be free: Student encampment begins at UQ

Palestine will be free: Student encampment begins at UQ. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

Weapons companies off UQ

Weapons companies off UQ. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

UQ students say: Hands off Rafah

UQ students say: Hands off Rafah. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

Stop funding genocide

Stop funding genocide. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

Socialist Alliance: Free Palestine

Socialist Alliance: Free Palestine. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

UQ students for Palestine

UQ students for Palestine. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

Liz Strakosch speaking

Liz Strakosch speaking. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

Protesting outside the Boeing Centre

Protesting outside the Boeing Centre. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

 

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Featured image: Palestine will never die. Photo: Alex Bainbridge

Nesting in Australia: Indian Spy Rings Take Root

May 6th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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In his 2021 annual threat assessment, the director-general of ASIO, the Australian domestic intelligence service, pointed to an active spy ring operating in the country, or what he chose to call a “nest of spies”.  The obvious conclusion drawn by information-starved pundits was that the nest was filled with the eggs and fledglings of Chinese intelligence or Russian troublemakers.  How awkward then, for the revelations to be focused on another country, one Australia is ingratiatingly disposed to in its efforts to keep China in its place.

At the start of this month, a number of anonymous security sources revealed to various outlets, including The Washington Post, the Sydney Morning Herald and the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, that the spies in question came from the Indian foreign intelligence agency, known rather benignly, even bookishly, as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). 

The range of their interests were expansive: gathering information on defence projects of a sensitive nature, the state of Australia’s airport security, and classified information covering Australia’s trade relationships.  The more sinister aspect of the RAW’s remit, and once it has extended to other countries, was monitoring members of the Indian diaspora, a habit it has fallen into over the years.  According to Burgess, “The spies developed targeted relationships with current and former politicians, a foreign embassy and a state police service.”  The particular “nest” of agents in question had also cultivated and recruited, with some success, an Australian government security clearance holder with access to “sensitive details of defence technology”.

In details supplied by Burgess, the agents in question, including “a number” of Indian officials, were subsequently removed by the Morrison government of the day.  The Washington Post also revealed that two members of the RAW were expelled from Australia in 2020 following a counter-intelligence operation by ASIO.

Given the recent exchanges between the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, and India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, all efforts to pursue the sacred cows of prosperity and security, this was something of an embarrassment.  But the embarrassment is more profound to Canberra, which continues to prove itself amateurish when it comes to understanding the thuggish inclinations of great powers.  Beijing and Moscow are condemned as authoritarian forces in the dark tussle between evil and good, while Washington and New Delhi are democratic, friendlier propositions on the right side of history.  Yet all have powerful interests, and Australia, being at best a lowly middle-power annexed to the US imperium, will always be vulnerable to the walkover by friends and adversaries alike. 

Grant Wyeth writes with cold clarity on the matter in The Diplomat

“With countries like Australia seeking to court India due to the wealth of opportunities it provides, New Delhi knows that actions like these won’t come with any significant consequences.” 

The lamentably defanged responses from Australian government ministers are solid proof of that proposition. 

“I don’t want to get into these kinds of operational issues in any way,” explained Australia’s Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, to the ABC.  “We’ve got a good relationship with India and with other countries in the region, it’s an important economic relationship, it’s become closer in recent years as a consequence of efforts on both sides, and that’s a good thing.”

Operational issues are exactly the sort of thing that should interest Chalmers and other government members.  In targeting dissidents and activists, Modi’s BJP government has taken to venturing afar, from proximate Pakistan to a more distant United States, particularly Sikh activists who are accused of demanding, and agitating, for a separate homeland known as Khalistan.  The methods used there have not just involved plodding research and cool analysis but outright murder.  The Indian PM, far from being a cuddly, statesmanlike sort, is a figure of ethnoreligious fanaticism keen on turning India into an exclusively Hindu state.

In September last year, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau spoke of “credible allegations” that Indian agents had murdered Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a prominent Khalistan advocate designated in 2020 by New Delhi to be a terrorist.  He had been slain in his truck on June 18, 2023 outside the Surrey temple, Guru Nanak Gurdwara. 

“Any involvement of a foreign government in the killing of a Canadian citizen on Canadian soil,” reasoned Trudeau, “is an unacceptable violation of our sovereignty.  It is contrary to the fundamental rules by which free, open and democratic societies conduct themselves.” 

This month, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced that three Indian citizens resident in Edmonton had been arrested in connection with the killing. 

“There are separate and distinct investigations,” stated the RCMP assistant commissioner, David Teboul. “These efforts include investigating connections to the government of India.”

Given that Australia has a Sikh population of around 200,000 or so, this should be a point of nail-biting concern.  Instead, Canberra’s tepid response is all too familiar, tolerant of violations of a sovereignty it keeps alienating it to the highest bidders.  Tellingly, Albanese went so far as to assure Modi during his May visit last year that “strict action” would be taken against Sikh separatist groups in Australia, whatever that entailed.  Modi had taken a particular interest in reports of vandalism against Hindu temples in Brisbane, Melbourne and Sydney featuring pro-Khalistan slogans.

Be it Washington’s seduction with its promise of nuclear-powered submarines and a security guarantee against manufactured and exaggerated threats, or India’s sweet undertakings for greater economic and military cooperation, Australia’s political and security cadres have been found wanting.  There has even been an open admission by Burgess – expressly made in his 2022 Annual Threat Assessment address – that “espionage is conducted by countries we consider friends – friends with sharp elbows and voracious intelligence requirements.”  The ABC similarly reports, citing unnamed government sources, “that friendly nations believed to be particularly active in espionage operations in Australia include Singapore, South Korea, Israel and India.”  Something to be proud of.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Research and Analysis Wing headquarters (Licensed under CC BY 3.0)

Pezzullo: The Warmonger Who Won’t Go Away

May 5th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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The compromised former top boss of the Australian civil service has the lick and smell of belligerence.  Begrudgingly conceding error and when in office, a bully and meddler in party politics, an incessant advocate of threats visible and invisible, Mike Pezzullo switches into a warmonger’s gear with ease.

The former secretary of the Department of Home Affairs was sacked last November after revelations that he had used WhatsApp to communicate with abandon with former New South Wales Liberal Party deputy director Scott Briggs.  Those messages, unearthed in a joint investigation by The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and 60 Minutes, confirmed what many already knew: Pezzullo’s voracious appetite for meddling in the party politics of the Coalition government while denigrating fellow public servants and a number of politicians.

In August 2018, for instance, Pezzullo offered Briggs his gamey views ahead of the Liberal Party revolt that would see the overthrow of Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. 

“I don’t want to interfere but you won’t be surprised to hear that in the event of Scomo [Scott Morrison] getting up I would like to see [Peter] Dutton come back to HA [Home Affairs].  No reason for him to stay on the backbench that I can see.”

An inquiry into his conduct led by Lynelle Briggs found Pezzullo in breach of the Public Service Code of Conduct on various grounds.  14 breaches were identified from five broader allegations, including failures to maintain confidentiality regarding sensitive government information, maintain an apolitical stance, and disclosing a conflict of interest. Most fundamentally, he had misused his offence and standing to benefit or advantage himself.

Last month heralded his return to the public arena, tinged by a sense of desperation that he wants to be taken seriously again.  On the ABC’s 7.30 program, he admitted to making “mistakes” and accepted “the finding that no matter how rough and tumble there is in a place like Canberra, that the gaining of influence and the personal advantage to be gained by way of certain channels of communication, whether it’s to the prime minister or anyone else, crosses the line in terms of conduct.”  Showing the mildest contrition, Pezzullo claimed he had “paid a price.”  Hardly.

With such preliminaries out of the way, he could return to one of his favourite pastimes: warning about the Yellow-Red threat emanating from Australia’s north. He accepted that the prospect of a war with China was “actually quite low [but] the consequences would be significant and indeed catastrophic.”  A meaningless percentage of such an eventuality was plucked out of thin air: 10 per cent.  Notwithstanding that statistic of potential conflict, it was “meaningful enough to plan for and indeed to be concerned about.”

Focus, he insisted, should be directed to the dangers of cyber and cognitive warfare. Cyber and critical infrastructure were “vulnerable” to malware threats that could burgeon in the event of a conflict.  Concerns held by FBI director Christopher Wray were cited (unsurprising – Pezzullo habitually fawns before the US national security state):

“that there is malware implanted in both US and allied networks, which is specifically designed to be activated in the lead up to or in the at the outset of a conflict.”

Dusted off, this Manchurian candidate vision of the world, with its hibernating potency, has been repurposed as a threat against the critical infrastructure.  “Director Wray has talked about the low blows that would be visited on the population at large … taking down hospitals, electricity grids, and the like.”

Close attention should be paid to the disfiguring way Pezzullo uses history.  When he was Canberra’s most powerful (un)civil servant, he liberally offered gobbets of historical readings that were hopelessly out of context.  Pezzullo has that charming sub-literate Wikipedia knowledge of the world that makes him tolerable in the company of other sub-literates.  As Home Secretary, he was not shy in spouting febrile nonsense about such topics as, “The prospect of Great Power War” that he claimed would “approach, but not reach, a level of probability”, or the use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons by actors that were not “readily identifiable”.

Such views were expressed an address to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in 2019, alongside those fears that have become boringly recycled for endless consumption: “the deliberate subversion of our democratic institutions and our social cohesion”; “the world’s ungoverned and dangerous territories”; “radical extremist Islamist terrorism”; and “transnational, serious and organised crime” of the “globalised” variety.

His 2021 ANZAC Day address made no secret of his lust for conflict, masquerading, as ever, under the cover of peaceful intentions. 

“Today, as free nations again hear the beating drums and watch worryingly the militarisation of issues that we had, until recent years, thought unlikely to be catalysts for war, let us continue to search unceasingly for the chance for peace while bracing again, yet again, for the curse of war”. 

The speech was notable for mangling the legacies of two US generals: Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Fascinatingly enough, Pezzullo omits mentioning the sacking of MacArthur by President Henry S. Truman for exceeding his brief in wishing to bomb China during the Korean War, with atomic weapons, if need be.

As long as Sinophobic nonsense growls and barks in Canberra, most of it under the close, cultivating eyes of US-funded think tanks, political converts to empire and the Pentagon itself, this demagogic eunuch will have an audience.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: DHS Photo by Sydney Phoenix

Anzac and the Pageantry of Deception

April 30th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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On April 25, along Melbourne’s arterial Swanston Street, the military parade can be witnessed with its bannered, medalled upholstery, crowds lost in metals, ribbons and commemorative decor.  Many, up on their feet since the dawn service, keen to show the decorations that say: “I turned up”.  Service personnel, marked by a sprig of rosemary.

The greater the pageantry, the greater the coloured, crimson deception.  In the giddy disruptions caused by war, this tendency can be all too readily found.  The dead are remembered on the appointed day, but the deskbound planners responsible for sending them to their fate, including the bunglers and the zealous, are rarely called out.  The memorial statements crow with amnesiac sweetness, and all the time, those same planners will be happy to add to the numbers of the fallen.

The events of April 25, known in Australia as Anzac Day, are saccharine and tinged about sacrifice, a way of explicating the unmentionable and the barely forgivable.  But make no mistake about it: this was the occasion when Australians, with their counterparts from New Zealand as part of the Australian New Zealand Corps, foolishly bled on Turkish soil in a doomed campaign.  Modern Australia, a country rarely threatened historically, has found itself in wars aplenty since the 19th century.

The Dardanelles campaign was conceived by the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, and, like many of his military ventures, ended in calamitous failure.  The Australian officers and politicians extolling the virtues of the Anzac soldiers tend to ignore that fact – alongside the inconvenient truth that Australians were responsible for a pre-emptive attack on the Ottoman Empire to supposedly shorten a war that lasted in murderous goriness till November 1918.  To this day, the Turks have been cunning enough to treat the defeated invaders with reverence, tending to the graves of the fallen Anzacs and raking in tourist cash every April.

For the Australian public, it was far better to focus on such words as those of British war correspondent Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett written on the occasion of the Gallipoli landings: “There has been no finer feat in this war than this sudden landing in the dark and the storming of the heights.”  Ashmead-Bartlett went on to note the views of General William Birdwood, British commander of the Anzac forces at Gallipoli: “he couldn’t sufficiently praise the courage, endurance and the soldierly qualities of the Colonials”. They “where happy because they had tried for the first time and not found wanting.”

In March 2003, these same “colonials” would again participate in the invasion of a sovereign state, claiming, spuriously, that they were ridding the world of a terrorist threat in the form of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, whose weapons of mass destruction were never found, and whose subsequent overthrow led to the fracturing of the Middle East. Far from being an act of bravery, the measure, in alliance with the United States and the United Kingdom, was a thuggish measure of gang violence against a country weakened by years of sanctions.

When options to pursue peace or diplomacy were there, Australian governments have been slavish and supine before the dictates and wishes of other powers keen on war.  War, in this context, is affirmation, assertion, cleansing.  War is also an admission to a certain chronic lack of imagination, and an admission to inferiority.

The occasion of Anzac Day in 2024 is one acrid with future conflict.  Australia has become, and is becoming increasingly, an armed camp for US interests for a war that will be waged by dunderheads over such island entities as Taiwan, or over patches of land that will signify which big power remains primary and ascendant in the Indo- and Asia-Pacific.  It is a view promoted with sickly enthusiasm by press outlets and thinktank enclaves across the country, funded by the Pentagon and military contractors who keep lining their pockets and bulking their accounts.

Central to this is the AUKUS security pact between Australia, the UK and the United States, which features a focus on nuclear powered submarines and technology exchange that further subordinates Australia, and its tax paying citizens, to the steering wishes of Washington.  Kurt Campbell, US Deputy Secretary of State, cast light on the role of the pact and what it is intended for in early April.  Such “additional capacity” was intended to play a deterrent role, always code for the capacity to wage war.  Having such “submarines from a number of countries operating in close coordination that could deliver conventional ordinance from long distances [would have] enormous implications in a variety of scenarios, including in cross-strait circumstances”.  That’s Taiwan sorted.

Ultimately, the Australian role in aiding and abetting empires has been impressive, long and dismal.  If it was not throwing in one’s lot with the British empire in its efforts to subjugate the Boer republics in South Africa, where many fought farmers not unlike their own, then it was in the paddy fields and jungles of Vietnam, doing much the same for the United States in its global quest to beat off atheistic communism.  Australians fought in countries they barely knew, in battles they barely understood, in countries they could barely name.

This occasion is often seen as one to commemorate the loss of life and the integrity of often needless sacrifice, when it should be one to understand that a country with choices in war and peace decided to neglect them.  The pattern risks repeating itself.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

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On 19 April 2024, the Philippines Supreme Court issued a cease-and-desist order on the commercial propagation of genetically modified (GM) Golden Rice and GM eggplant in the country.  

The Stop Golden Rice Network says that the court decision is a victory for farmers and consumers everywhere as the decision goes beyond Golden Rice and insecticidal eggplant and covers “any application for contained use, field testing, direct use as food or feed or processing, commercial propagation, and importation of GMOs.”

The court recognised that government agencies and other proponents of GM Golden Rice and GM eggplant “failed to submit proof of safety and compliance with all legal requirements.” The order remains indefinite until GMO proponents can fulfil all the mandated steps and provide concrete evidence that these GMOs are indeed safe.

A network of farmers, consumers and civil society organisations, Stop Golden Rice emphasises the need to address hunger and malnutrition through securing small farmers’ control over resources such as seed, appropriate technologies, water and land.

The campaign group says:

“We believe that GM crops are primarily pushed by global monopoly capitalists in food and agriculture… there is already irrevocable evidence of the failure of GM crops and how it has contributed to further indebtedness, crop failures, hunger and loss of biodiversity.”

It states that the court’s decision shows that ordinary people can prevail in the face of corporate power.

The Story of Golden Rice 

Vitamin A deficiency is a problem in many poor countries in the Global South and leaves millions at high risk of infection, diseases and other maladies, such as blindness.

The agritech industry has long argued that Golden Rice is a practical way to provide poor farmers in remote areas with a subsistence crop capable of adding much-needed vitamin A to local diets. Lobbyists say that Golden Rice, developed with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, could help save the lives of around 670,000 children who die each year from Vitamin A deficiency and another 350,000 who go blind.

Such claims, however, are based more on spin than reality, and, over the years, the interests behind Golden Rice have wasted no time in attacking anyone who questioned it.

As Britain’s Environment Secretary in 2013, the now disgraced Owen Paterson claimed that opponents of GM were “casting a dark shadow over attempts to feed the world”. He called for the rapid roll-out of vitamin A-enhanced rice to help prevent the cause of up to a third of the world’s child deaths. He claimed:

“It’s just disgusting that little children are allowed to go blind and die because of a hang-up by a small number of people about this technology. I feel really strongly about it. I think what they do is absolutely wicked.”

On Twitter, The Observer’s Nick Cohen chimed in with his support by tweeting:

“There is no greater example of ignorant Western privilege causing needless misery than the campaign against genetically modified golden rice.”

The rhetoric took the well-worn cynically devised PR line that anti-GM activists and environmentalists are little more than privileged, affluent people residing in rich countries and are denying the poor the supposed benefits of GM crops.

Despite these smears and emotional blackmail, in a 2016 article in the journal Agriculture & Human Values Glenn Stone and Dominic Glover found little evidence that activists were to blame for Golden Rice’s unfulfilled promises.

Researchers still had problems developing beta carotene-enriched strains that yield as well as non-GM strains already being grown by farmers. It was questionable whether the beta carotene in Golden Rice could even be converted to vitamin A in the bodies of badly undernourished children. There had also been little research on how well the beta carotene in Golden Rice would hold up when stored for long periods between harvest seasons or when cooked using traditional methods common in remote rural locations.

In the meantime, Glenn Stone noted that that, as the development of Golden Rice crept along, the Philippines had managed to slash the incidence of Vitamin A deficiency by non-GM methods.

So, whose interests were really being served in the push for Golden Rice?

In 2011, Marcia Ishii-Eiteman, a senior scientist with a background in insect ecology and pest management, answered this question:

“An elite, so-called Humanitarian Board where Syngenta sits – along with the inventors of Golden Rice, Rockefeller Foundation, USAID and public relations and marketing experts, among a handful of others. Not a single farmer, indigenous person or even an ecologist or sociologist to assess the huge political, social and ecological implications of this massive experiment. And the leader of IRRI’s Golden Rice project is none other than Gerald Barry, previously Director of Research at Monsanto.”

Sarojeni V Rengam, executive director of Pesticide Action Network Asia and the Pacific, called on the donors and scientists involved to wake up and do the right thing:

“Golden Rice is really a ‘Trojan horse’; a public relations stunt pulled by the agribusiness corporations to garner acceptance of genetically engineered (GE) crops and food… money and efforts would be better spent on restoring natural and agricultural biodiversity rather than destroying it by promoting monoculture plantations and GE food crops.”

 To tackle disease, malnutrition and poverty, you have to first understand the underlying causes – or indeed want to understand them.

Renowned academic Walden Bello notes that the complex of policies that pushed the Philippines into an economic quagmire over the past few decades is due to ‘structural adjustment’ that included the restructuring of agriculture and export-oriented production.

And that restructuring of the agrarian economy is something touched on by Claire Robinson of GMWatch who notes that leafy green vegetables used to be grown in backyards as well as in rice (paddy) fields on the banks between the flooded ditches in which the rice grew.

Ditches also contained fish, which ate pests. People thus had access to rice, green leafy veg and fish – a balanced diet that gave them a healthy mix of nutrients, including plenty of beta-carotene.

But indigenous crops and farming systems have been replaced by monocultures dependent on chemical inputs. Green leafy veg were killed off with pesticides, artificial fertilisers were introduced, and the fish could not live in the resulting chemically contaminated water. Moreover, decreased access to land meant that many people no longer had backyards containing leafy green veg.

Blindness in developing countries could have been eradicated years ago if only the money, research and publicity put into Golden Rice over the last 20 years had gone into proven ways of addressing Vitamin A deficiency. However, instead of pursuing genuine solutions, what we have seen is pro-GM spin in an attempt to close down debate.

Technology and Development 

If the discussion so far tells us anything, it is that technology is not neutral. It is developed and promoted by people who want to cement their control over a sector and stand to financially gain from its rollout.

All too often, politicians, corporations and the media equate new technology with ‘progress’. And those who question it, as we see with GMOs, are called Luddites or anti-science in order to prevent proper debate over the social, economic and ethical concerns of rolling out a given technology.

Take the Green Revolution, for instance. There was nothing progressive, inevitable or neutral about its seed, chemical and related infrastructure technology.

Despite it being rolled out under the banner of ‘progress’, it underperformed, was exploitative and has had devastating social, ecological and environmental impacts (see the writings of Prof. Glenn StoneVandana Shiva and Bhaskar Save). It served US geopolitical, financial and agribusiness interests and prioritised urban-industrial expansion at the expense of rural communities and a more diverse, healthy and nutrient-sufficient agriculture.

But the Green Revolution became integral to the ‘development’ agenda.

In a recent article on the Winter Oak website, Paul Cudenec says that ‘development’:

“… is the destruction of nature, now seen as a mere resource to be used for development or as an empty undeveloped space in which development could, should and, ultimately, must take place. It is the destruction of natural human communities, whose self-sufficiency gets in the way of the advance of development, and of authentic human culture and traditional values, which are incompatible with the dogma and domination of development.”

Cudenec argues that those behind ‘development’ have been destroying everything of real value in our natural world and our human societies in the pursuit of personal wealth and power. Moreover, they have concealed this crime behind all the positive-sounding rhetoric associated with development on every level.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in India.

The World Bank, the World Trade Organization, global agribusiness and financial capital are working to corporatise India’s agriculture sector. This ‘structural adjustment’ policy and process involves displacing the current food production system with contract farming and an industrial model of agriculture and food retail that serves the above interests.

The plan is to displace the peasantry, create a land market and amalgamate landholdings to form larger farms that are more suited to international land investors and export-oriented industrial farming.

The demand is that India sacrifice its farmers and its own food security for the benefit of a handful of billionaires. This is all passed off as ‘development’.

It involves the state facilitating the enrichment of a wealthy elite and privileging a certain model of social and economic development based on urban sprawl, centralised power and dependency on global finance, corporations, markets and supply chains. All legitimised under the banners of innovation, technological progress and ‘development’.

There are other pathways that humanity can take. Anthropologist Felix Padel and researcher Malvika Gupta offer some insights (based on their work with India’s Adivasi communities) into what the solutions or alternatives to ‘development’ might look like:

“Democracy as consensus politics rather than the Western model of liberal democracy that perpetuates division and corruption behind the scenes; exchange labour rather than the ruthless, anti-life logic of ‘the market’; law as reconciliation rather than judgements that depend on exorbitant legal fees and divide people into winners and losers… and learning as something to be shared, not competed over.”

However, we see more ‘development’ being proposed: more rural population displacement and human dislocation, more mining, port and other big infrastructure developments and the further entrenchment of corporate interests and their projects.

While many have a different vision for the future, self-interest and consumerism underpinned by economic neoliberal dogma continue to seduce the masses into accepting the prevailing ‘development’ agenda.

Corporate industrial agriculture is integral to that agenda. A model that took hold half a century ago in the Western nations and which has resulted in nutrient-deficient food, narrower diets, the massive use of agrochemicals, food contaminated by hormones, steroids, antibiotics and a wide range of chemical additives, the eradication of many smallholder farmers, spiralling rates of ill health, degraded soil and contaminated and depleted water supplies.

That’s ‘progress’? Well, agribusiness interests aside, perhaps so for the many private health clinics that have sprung up in India in recent years.

The introduction of GMOs represents a further entrenchment of the prevailing ‘development’ agenda.

The decision by the Philippines Supreme Court called out government agencies and those behind the Golden Rice agenda for key failures. This is important for India, whose Supreme Court is about to decide on whether to sanction the commercial cultivation of GM mustard. It would be India’s first GM food crop (of which there are many more in the pipeline).

Will India’s Supreme Court come down on the side of reason and stop GM mustard on the basis of there being no need for GMOs in Indian agriculture and the well-documented fraud and regulatory delinquency that has surrounded this issue for many years?

That remains to be seen.

Many of the issues presented above are discussed in the author’s free e-book below.

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Renowned author Colin Todhunter specialises in development, food and agriculture. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).  


Read Colin Todhunter’s e-Book entitled

Food, Dispossession and Dependency. Resisting the New World Order

We are currently seeing an acceleration of the corporate consolidation of the entire global agri-food chain. The high-tech/big data conglomerates, including Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook and Google, have joined traditional agribusiness giants, such as Corteva, Bayer, Cargill and Syngenta, in a quest to impose their model of food and agriculture on the world.

The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is also involved (documented in ‘Gates to a Global Empire‘ by Navdanya International), whether through buying up huge tracts of farmland, promoting a much-heralded (but failed) ‘green revolution’ for Africa, pushing biosynthetic food and genetic engineering technologies or more generally facilitating the aims of the mega agri-food corporations.

Click here to read.

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On April 16, Australia’s eSafety commissioner, Julie Inman Grant, issued with authoritarian glee legal notices to X Corp and Meta, which owns Facebook and Instagram, to remove material within 24 hours depicting what her office declared to be “gratuitous or offensive violence with a high degree of impact and detail”. The relevant material featured a livestreamed video of a stabbing attack by a 16-year-old youth at Sydney’s Assyrian Orthodox Christ the Good Shepherd Church the previous day. Two churchmen, Bishop Mar Mari Emmanuel and Rev. Isaac Royel, were injured.

Those at X, and its executive, Elon Musk, begged to differ, choosing to restrict general access to the graphic details of the video in Australia alone. Those outside Australia, and those with a virtual private network (VPN), would be able to access the video unimpeded. Ruffled and irritated by this, Grant rushed to the Australian Federal Court to secure an interim injunction requiring X to hide the posts from global users with a hygiene notice of warning pending final determination of the issue.  While his feet and mind are rarely grounded, Musk was far from insensible in calling Grant a “censorship commissar” in “demanding *global* content bans”. In court, the company will argue that Grant’s office has no authority to dictate what the online platform posts for global users.

This war of grinding, nannying censorship – which is what it is – was the prelude for other agents of information control and paranoia to join the fray.  The Labour Albanese government, for instance, with support from the conservative opposition, have rounded on Musk, blurring issues of expression with matters of personality. “This is an egotist,” fumed Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, “someone who’s totally out of touch with the values that Australian families have, and this is causing great distress.”

The values game, always suspicious and meretricious, is also being played by law enforcement authorities.  It is precisely their newfound presence in this debate that should get members of the general public worried.  You are to be lectured to, deemed immature and incapable of exercising your rights or abide by your obligations as citizens of Australian society.

We have the spluttering worries of Australian Police Commissioner Reece Kershaw in claiming that children (always handy to throw them in) and vulnerable groups (again, a convenient reference) are “being bewitched online by a cauldron of extremist poison on the open and dark web”.  These muddled words in his address to the National Press Club in Canberra are shots across the bow. “The very nature of social media allows that extremist poison to spray across the globe almost instantaneously.”

Importantly, Kershaw’s April 24 address has all the worrying signs of a heavy assault, not just on the content to be consumed on the internet, but on the way communications are shared.  And what better way to do so by using children as a policy crutch?  “We used to warn our children about stranger danger, but now we need to teach our kids about the digital-world deceivers.”  A matronly, slightly unhinged tone is unmistakable.  “We need to constantly reinforce that people are not always who they claim to be online; and that also applies to images and information.” True, but the same goes for government officials and front-line politicians who make mendacity their stock and trade.

Another sign of gathering storm clouds against the free sharing of information on technology platforms is the appearance of Australia’s domestic espionage agency, ASIO. Alongside Kershaw at the National Press Club, the agency’s chief, Mike Burgess, is also full of grave words about the dangerous imperium of encrypted chatter.  There are a number of Australians, warns Burgess, who are using chat platforms “to communicate with offshore extremists, sharing vile propaganda, posting tips about homemade weapons and discussing how to provoke a race war”.

The inevitable lament about obstacles and restrictions – the sorts of things to guard the general citizenry against encroachments of the police state – follows.  “ASIO’s ability to investigate is seriously compromised.  Obviously, we and our partners will do everything we can to prevent terrorism and sabotage, so we are expending significant resources to monitor the Australians involved.”  You may count yourselves amongst them, dear reader.

Kershaw is likewise not a fan of the encrypted platform.  In the timeless language of paternal policing, anything that enables messages to be communicated in a public sense must first receive the state’s approval. “We recognise the role that technologies like end-to-end encryption play in protecting personal data, privacy and cyber-security, but there is no absolute right to privacy.”

To make that very point, Burgess declares that “having lawful and targeted access to extremist communications” would make matters so much easier for the intelligence and security community.  Naturally, it will be up to the government to designate what it deems to be extremist and appropriate, a task it is often ill-suited for. Once the encryption key is broken, all communications will be fair game.

When it comes to governments, authoritarian regimes do not have a monopoly on suspicion and the fixation on keeping populations in check.  In an idyll of ignorance, peace can reign among the docile, the unquestioning, the cerebrally inactive.  The Australian approach to censorship and control, stemming from its origins as a tortured penal outpost of the British Empire, is drearily lengthy.  Its attitude to the Internet has been one of suspicion, concern, and complexes.

Government ministers in the antipodes see a world, not of mature participants searching for information, but inspired terrorists, active paedophiles and noisy extremists carousing in shadows and catching the unsuspecting.  Such officialdom is represented by such figures as former Labor Communications Minister Stephen Conroy, who thankfully failed to introduce a mandatory internet filter when in office, or such nasty products of regulatory intrusion as the Commonwealth Online Safety Act of 2021, zealously overseen by Commissar Grant and the subject of Musk’s ire.

The age of the internet and the world wide web is something to admire and loathe. Surveillance capitalism is very much of the loathsome, sinister variety.  But ASIO, the Australian Federal Police, and the Australian government and other agencies do not give a fig about that. The tech giants have actually corroded privacy in commodifying data but many still retain stubborn residual reminders of liberty in the form of encrypted communications and platforms for discussion. To have access to these means of public endeavour remains the holy grail of law enforcement officers, government bureaucrats and fearful politicians the world over.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Julie Inman Grant (Source: World Economic Forum/Manuel Lopez)

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The International Coalition for Human Rights in the Philippines (ICHRP) sends its warmest greetings of solidarity to delegates attending the 40th Anniversary of Cordillera Day on April 23 – 24, 2024. 

ICHRP joins with you to remember and celebrate the life of Macli-ing Dulag and the people’s victory against the Chico Dam project. We stand alongside you in your fight for self-determination, land and life. We salute the Cordillera Peoples Alliance and recommit to the Save Cordillera Campaign against repression by the US-Marcos Jr. regime.

On April 24, 1980, soldiers of the Philippine military under the Marcos Sr. regime assassinated Macli-ing Dulag, a tribal chieftain from the province of Kalinga renowned for his staunch opposition to the World Bank-funded Chico Dam Project. The project threatened to displace hundreds of thousands of indigenous peoples from their ancestral land in the mountainous region of northern Philippines.

Image source

The murder of Macli-ing Dulag was a watershed moment in the Cordillera peoples’ struggle for self-determination. As the mass movement against both the Chico Dam construction and Marcos Sr. dictatorship grew, the Macli-ing Memorial was held to commemorate the death of the slain tribal leader from 1981 to 1984.

Following the founding of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA) in June 1984, the commemoration’s name was changed to Cordillera Day in 1985. The mass movement broadened as it aimed to unite the struggle of indigenous peoples across different provinces in the Cordillera, while building solidarity with national and international advocates and supporters.

Since its inception, Cordillera Day has been a political solidarity event gathering thousands of indigenous peoples, advocates, supporters, and solidarity activists every year to discuss burning issues which plague not only indigenous communities but also the Filipino people at large.

The Cordillera Peoples Alliance’s international solidarity work led to a conference of indigenous leaders and advocates from different countries across the globe in November 2010, which subsequently founded the Indigenous Peoples Movement for Self-Determination and Liberation (IPMSDL), a global network committed to advancing the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination, land and life

As a solidarity organization committed to campaign for a just and lasting peace in the Philippines, ICHRP draws boundless inspiration from the Cordillera peoples’ valiant and historic struggle for self-determination amidst decades of attacks, discrimination, militarization, and oppression.

We wish you every success in the two-day celebration of the 40th anniversary of Cordillera Day.

Agbiag ti Kordilyera!
Long live the Cordilleran people’s struggle for self-determination!
Long live the martyrs and heroes of Cordillera!
Long live international solidarity!

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Universities for AUKUS: The Social License Confidence Trick

April 22nd, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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“Can we still see universities as places to learn and produce knowledge that, at the risk of sounding naïve, is for the greater good of humanity, independently transient of geopolitical skirmishes?” Wanning Sun from the University of Technology, Sydney, asks in hope. “The history of universities during the Cold War era tells us that it is precisely at such times that our government and our universities need to fight tooth and nail to preserve the precarious civil society that has taken millennia to construct.”

History can be a useful, if imperfect guide, but as its teary muse, Clio, will tell you, its lessons are almost always ignored. A recent investigative report published in Declassified Australia gives us every reason to be pessimistic about Sun’s green pastured hopes for universities untethered from compromise and corruption.  Far from preserving civil society, the Australian university sector is going the way of the US model of linking university research and innovation directly to a gluttonous military industrial complex.  More importantly, these developments are very much on the terms of the US imperium, in whose toxic embrace Australia finds itself.

Over 17 years, the authors of the report found, US defence funding to Australian universities had risen from (A)$1.7 million in 2007 to (A)$60 million annually by 2022”.  The funds in question “are backing research in fields of science that enhance US military development and the US national interest.”

To justify this effort, deskbound think tankers and money chasing propagandists have been enlisted to sanitise what is, at heart, a debauching enterprise. Take, for example, the views of the United States Studies Centre (USSC), based at the University of Sydney, where university-military collaboration under the shoddy cover of learning and teaching are being pursued in reverie.  For those lovely types, universities are “drivers of change within society.”

The trilateral security pact of AUKUS, an anti-China enterprise comprising Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, has added succour to the venture, drawing in wide-eyed university administrators, military toffs and consultancy seeking politicians keen to rake in the defence scented cash.

With salivating enthusiasm, a report by members of the USSC and the University of Nottingham from March 2024, noting the findings of a joint University of Sydney and Times Higher Education World Academic Summit, opens with a frank enlisting of the education and research sector “as enablers of operationalising the strategic intent around AUKUS.”  No less than a propagandising effort, this will entail “building social license for AUKUS” through “two primary inputs: (1) educating the workforce; and (2) Pillar II advanced capability research.”

This open embrace of overt militarisation entails the agreement of universities “across the three countries” to “add value to government through strategic messaging and building social license for AUKUS.”  This is no less an attempt to inculcate and normalise what is, at heart, a warring facility in the making.

The authors admit their soiling task is a challenging one.  “Stakeholders agree the challenge of building social license for AUKUS is particularly acute in the Australian context, where government discourse has been constrained by the need to reestablish diplomatic relations with China.”  Diplomacy is such a trying business for those in the business of conflict.

The raw note here is that the Australian populace is ignorant of the merits of the belligerent, anti-Beijing bacchanal between Canberra, Washington and London.  They are ignorant of “the nature of strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific and its place in Australian regional strategy for AUKUS”.  Concern is expressed about that most sensible of attitudes: a decline of popularity for the proposed and obscenely expensive acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines, costing A$368 billion.  “USSC’s own polling, released in late 2023, finds that support for Australia acquiring nuclear-powered submarines has fallen below majority (49 per cent).”

Such terrifying findings – at least from the USSC’s barking mad perspective – had also been “corroborated by other major Australian polls, including the Lowy Institute and The Guardian, which find that support has weakened, rather than firmed since the optimal pathway announcement.”  The Australian public, it would seem, know something these wonks don’t.

When the warmongers worry that their wares are failing to sell, peacemakers should cheer.  It then falls on the warmongers to think up a strategy to reverse the trend.  An imperfect, though tried method is to focus on the use of that most hideous of terms, “social license”, to bribe the naysayers and sceptics.

The notion of “social license”, framed in fictional, social contract terms, should propel those with a scintilla of integrity and wisdom to take arms and rage.  The official literature and pamphleteering on the subject points to its benign foundations.  The Ethics Centre, for instance, describes it as an informal arrangement whereby an informal license is “granted to a company by various stakeholders who may be affected by the company’s activities.”  Three requirements must be accordingly satisfied in this weasel-worded effort: legitimacy, by which the organisation “plays by the ‘rules of the game’”; credibility, by which the company furnishes “true and clear information to the community”; and trust, where the entity shows “the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of another.”  These terrible fictions, as they come together, enable the veil to be placed over the unspeakable.

When the flimsy faeces encasing such a formulation is scraped away, the term becomes more sinister.  Social licensing is nothing less than a tool of deceit and hoodwinking, a way for the bad to claim they are doing good, for the corrupt to claim they are clean.  Polluting entities excuse what they do by suggesting that the returns for society are, more broadly speaking, weightier than the costs.  Mining industries, even as they continue to pillage the earth’s innards, claim legitimacy for their operations as they add an ecologically friendly wash to them.  We all benefit in the harm and harming, so why fuss?

To reverse this trend, a few measures should be enacted with urgent and acceptable zeal.  Purging university vice chancellors and their simpering toadies is a healthy start.  Trimming the universities of the spreadsheeting grafters and the racketeers, percolating through departments, schools and colleges, would be another welcome measure.  All are accomplices in this project to destroy the humane mission of universities, preferring, in their place, brands, diluted syllabi, compliant staff, and morons for students.  All in all, a clear wall of separation between the civic goals of learning and knowledge should be built to shield students and staff from the rapacious, murderous goals of the military industrial complex that continues to draw sustenance from deception, delusion and fear.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: AUKUS nuclear submarine deal is already making ripples across the Indo-Pacific. Image: US Embassy in China

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The Australian Defence Formula: Spend! Spend! Spend!

April 19th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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The skin toasted Australian Minister of Defence, Richard Marles, who resembles, with each day, the product of an overly worked solarium, was adamant.  Not only will Australians be paying a bill up to and above A$368 billion for nuclear powered submarines it does not need; it will also be throwing A$100 billion into the coffers of the military industrial complex over the next decade to combat a needlessly inflated enemy.  Forget diplomacy and funding the cause (and course) of peace – it’s all about the weapons and the Yellow Peril, baby.

On April 18, Marles and Defence Industry Pat Conroy barraged the press with announcements that the defence budget would be bulked by A$50.3 billion by 2034, with a A$330 billion plan for weapons and equipment known as the Integrated Investment Program. The measures were intended to satisfy the findings of the Defence Strategic Review.  “This is a significant lift compared to the $270 billion allocated for the 10-year period to 2029-30 as part of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and 2020 Force Structure Plan,” crowed a statement from the Defence Department.

Such statements are often weighed down by jargon and buoyed by delusion. The press were not left disappointed by the insufferable fluff.  Australia will gain “an enhanced lethality surface fleet and conventionally-armed, nuclear-powered submarines”, an army with “littoral manoeuvre” capabilities “with a long-range land and maritime strike capability”, an air force capable of delivering “long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance” with “an enhanced maritime, land and air-strike capability” and “a strengthened and integrated space and cyber capability”.  The glaring omission here is the proviso that all such policies are being essentially steered by Washington’s defence interests, with Canberra very  much the obedient servant.

The defence minister was firmly of the view that all this was taking place with some speed. “We are acting very quickly in relation to [challenges],” Marles insists. “I mean, the acquiring of a general-purpose frigate going forward, for example, will be the most rapid acquisition of a platform that size that we’ve seen in decades.”  Anyone who uses the term “rapid” in a sentence on military acquisition is clearly a certified novice.

The ministers, along with the department interests they represent, are certainly fond of their expensive toys.  They are seeking a fourth squadron of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters as replacements for the F/A-18 Super Hornets.  The EA-18G Growler jets are also being replaced.  (That said, both sets of current fighters will see aging service till 2040.)  Three vessels will be purchased to advance undersea war capabilities, including the undersea drone prototype, the Ghost Shark.

The latter hopes to equip the Royal Australian Navy “with a stealthy, long-range autonomous undersea warfare capability that can conduct persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and strike.”  Importantly, such acquisitions and developments are always qualified by how well they will work in tandem with the imperial power in question. The media release from the Department of Defence prefers a more weasel-worded formula. The Ghost Shark, for instance, “will also enhance Navy’s ability to operate with allies and partners.”

The new militarisation strategy is also designed to improve levels of recruitment.  Personnel have been putting down their weapons in favour of other forms of employment, while recruitment numbers are falling, much to the consternation of the pro-war lobby.  A suggested answer: recruit non-Australian nationals.  This far from brilliant notion will, Marles suggests, take some years.  But a good place to start would be the hundreds of thousands of New Zealanders resident in Australia.  Sheer genius.

The announcement was also meant to offer budget trimmers a barely visible olive branch, promising “to divest, delay or re-scope projects that do not meet our strategic circumstances.” (They could start with the submarines.)  A$5 billion, for instance, will be saved from terminating naval transport and replenishment ships intended to refuel and resupply war vessels at sea.

Hardly appropriate, opined some military pundits keen to keep plucking the money tree.  Jennifer Parker of the National Security College suggested that, “The removal of the Joint Support ship means there is no future plan to expand Australia’s limited replenishment capability of two ships – which will in turn limit the force projection capability and reach of the expanded surface combatant fleet if the issue is not addressed.”

The focus, as ever, is on Wicked Oriental Authoritarianism which is very much in keeping with the traditional Australian fear of slanty-eyed devils moving in on the spoils and playground of the Anglosphere.  Former RAAF officer and executive director of the Air Power Institute, Chris McInnes, barks in aeronautical terms that Australia’s air power capability risks being “put in a holding pattern for the next 10 years.”  Despotic China, however, was facing no such prospects.  “There is a risk of putting everything on hold.  The People’s Liberal Army is not on hold.  They are going to keep progressing their aircraft.”  (The air force seems to do wonders for one’s grammar.)

China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian was cool in his response to the latest promises of indulgent military spending Down Under.

“We hope Australia will correctly view China’s development and strategic intentions, abandon the Cold War mentality, do more things to keep the region peaceful and stable and stop buzzing about China.” 

No harm in hoping.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Marles (center) speaks with US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin (left) and Japanese Minister of Defense Yasukazu Hamada (right) in 2022

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What is the significance of the Australian government signalling this week that it may finally recognise Palestinian statehood?

Though not universally popular, Foreign Minister Penny Wong’s diplomatic gesture towards Palestinian statehood has been welcomed in some quarters as a departure from Australia’s longstanding bipartisan consensus on the Middle East.

Formerly reluctant to interfere in the affairs of other nations, many countries have become frustrated by the lack of progress on a resolution to the decades-old question of Palestine and are moving to unilateral recognition of its statehood.

Yet, it is hard not to associate the timing of Wong’s speech with public outrage over the killing of Australian aid worker Zomi Frankcom and concern over the impact that Labor’s position on Palestine is having on its electoral prospects.

Why has this issue been so contentious for so long in Australia, and what could its recognition of Palestinian statehood mean?

Australia’s Role in the Creation of Israel

Australia played a key role in preparing the groundwork for Israeli statehood in the early 20th century.

As a loyal servant of the British empire, the Australian army actively participated in the destruction of the Ottoman empire during the first world war. Battles in which Australian troops played a decisive role – such as the 1917 Charge of the Light Horse Brigade in Beersheba and the Allied capturing of Damascus in 1918 – are remembered in Australian and Israeli history as milestones in the achievement of Israeli statehood.

“Self-determination” was a watchword coined by Leon Trotsky and popularised by US President Woodrow Wilson towards the end of the first world war. However, in the postwar settlement, self-determination was unequally applied.

Zionist claims to self-determination were endorsed by the British government’s Balfour Declaration of 1917. But under the terms of the mandate of Palestine administered by Britain under the new League of Nations charter, indigenous Palestinian Arabs were catalogued among the “peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world”.

Two decades later, Australia played a key role in the recognition of Israeli statehood at the United Nations. It is now well known that Australian Herbert Vere “Doc” Evatt, who presided over the UN Special Committee on Palestine, was instrumental in garnering international support for the proposed partition of Palestine. Australia was one of the first countries to recognise Israel in 1948.

In contrast, Britain initially maintained a policy of non-recognition of Israel, a position still held by some 30 countries.

The creation of Israel was also inextricably linked to the Palestinian Nakba, when an estimated 750,000 people were expelled during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. As former Knesset member Haneen Zoabi has observed, the Nakba is therefore indivisibly a part of the Jewish history of the land, as much as it is Palestinian history.

A Long History of Bipartisan Support for Israel

So, why has it been so difficult for Australia to recognise Palestinian aspirations for statehood?

The emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in the 1960s under the leadership of Yasser Arafat thrust the Palestine question back into the spotlight. For mainstream Australian politicians, the PLO was akin to the African National Congress in South Africa, seen at the time as an irredeemable terrorist organisation.

Yet, unlike the bipartisan position later adopted against South African apartheid in Australia during the 1980s, no such revision has come with regard to Israel’s treatment of Palestinians, which many observers in Israel and internationally also consider to be apartheid.

One South African observer, Andrew Feinstein, the son of a Holocaust survivor and former colleague of Nelson Mandela, has described Israeli apartheid as “far more brutal than anything we saw in South Africa”.

In recent years, Australian politicians on both sides have recommitted to their unwavering support of Israel. This is part of a broader phenomenon that US historian Ussama Makdisi has described as “philozionism” (or love of Zionism).

While the Rudd-Gillard government repositioned Australia’s relationship with Israel in a more critical light, the country’s politicians soon returned to the former bipartisan consensus around Israel. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was a cofounder of the Australian Parliamentary Friends of Palestine, though many have observed that his government has resiled from that affiliation. Prime ministers from both sides of the aisle have also had parks in Israel named in their honour.

The Palestine question has been a particularly tortured one for the Labor Party, as illustrated by Australia’s abstention in the 2012 vote at the United Nations to grant Palestinian observer status.

Labor’s Shifting Policy

The gradual move towards recognition of Palestinian statehood has followed Labor’s attempts to return to the fold of international consensus on the Israel-Palestinian issue after a decade of Coalition leadership. This has included reversing the Coalition stance on Israel’s West Bank settlements, recognising them as illegal under international law.

Though hubristic to imagine Australian diplomatic recognition will have any impact on Palestinian lives, the change in position of one of Israel’s historically staunch allies does coincide with a broader shift in the Western consensus.

Following Israel’s bombardment of Gaza during the 2014 Operation Protective Edge, lawmakers in Sweden and the United Kingdom voted to recognise the state of Palestine. These moves had little material impact but carried symbolic value.

It is important to recall that UN Resolution 194, recognising Israeli statehood, did so on the condition that Palestinians ethnically cleansed from their ancestral lands would be given the right of return, or be appropriately compensated. This resolution has been reaffirmed annually since 1949 and is fundamental to the question of a just peace.

Australia’s belated recognition of Palestinian statehood would be a welcome first step. It is the result of decades of grassroots activism by Palestinians and their allies in Australia. However, much work remains to be done if Australia is to be a constructive partner in the meaningful achievement of Palestinian self-determination.

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, Lecturer, History of Ideas, Trinity College, The University of Melbourne

, Lecturer in History, UNSW Sydney

Featured image: Palestine contingent at the Invasion Day march in Gadigal land/Sydney. Photo: Peter Boyle

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Sam Wainwright is a Socialist Alliance National Co-convenor and active in Stop AUKUS WA. He spoke with Green Left’s Federico Fuentes about Australian imperialism, its military alliance with the United States and prospects for working-class solidarity across borders.

Wainwright will feature at Ecosocialism 2024, speaking on the panel “Against war and imperialism: People-to-people solidarity in the Asia-Pacific region”.

Federico Fuentes (FF): Tensions between the US and China are of great concern. What is behind US military strategy in the region? How do you view China’s role in the conflict?

Sam Wainwright (SW): The US is determined to block China’s growth, both economically and militarily. This is the main driver of the escalation in tension.

While the US and Australian governments, together with the capitalist media in these countries, constantly hype up Chinese aggression, China’s response is fundamentally defensive. China is the one being encircled by US military bases, alliances and missile systems.

However, in its determination to break out of this encirclement and preserve access to its maritime trade routes, it has long ridden roughshod over its near neighbours in the South China Sea.

FF: Australia is clearly siding with the US in this conflict. Why is this the case, particularly given Australia’s trade connections with China. How do you view Australia’s role in the region?

SW: Shared global military interventions and projects of the Anglo-imperialist powers under US leadership — such as the Iraq invasion or Five Eyes intelligence alliance — do not just flow from a shared culture, although that is part of it, but from overlapping economic interests.

The US and Britain are the biggest sources of foreign direct investment in Australia and the biggest destinations for foreign direct investment by Australian capitalists.

When former Australian prime minister John Howard described Australia as the Deputy Sheriff in the Asia-Pacific, he accurately described its place in the region and its relation to its near neighbours.

For Australian capitalism there is a particular contradiction in joining this aggressive push to “contain” China, given it is Australia’s largest trading partner for both imports and exports.

Australian capitalism constitutes a mid-sized imperialist power in its own right. It could instead adopt a relatively neutral position and seek trade with China and the US on its own terms.

This is the position advocated by former Labor prime minister Paul Keating. How many big capitalists and senior policymakers share this view, I don’t know.

However, it seems clear that a decisive majority have fallen in behind the US plan. This has been accompanied by a call to reduce the country’s reliance on trade with China, though it is not clear how successful this will be.

Australian capitalists want the best of both worlds: to join the US in blocking China’s development — by force if necessary — while continuing to trade with China. China has recently reduced some of its tariffs on Australian imports, but the contradiction has surely not been resolved.

FF: How have these tensions impacted politics in Australia?

SW: The decision of the Australian ruling class and its political servants to embrace the US war drive against China fundamentally shapes Australian politics. Opposing it is a primary strategic task for socialists in this country.

The AUKUS plan to produce nuclear-powered submarines in conjunction with the US and Britain is coupled with the US-Australia Force Posture Agreement. The latter is Australia’s contribution to the US “Pivot to Asia” that began under President Barack Obama.

Among many things, it allows for a significant increase in interoperability of Australian and US armed forces, unimpeded US access to and use of Australian bases, B-52 bombers carrying nuclear warheads to be based on Australian soil, and US military intelligence personnel to be embedded within Australia’s defence intelligence organisations.

The announcement of the AUKUS deal was preceded by a concerted media scare campaign about a supposed threat from China. The notion that China has an interest in sabotaging its trade with Australia, let alone has the means to invade, is absurd.

Consequently, the China threat narrative rests a lot on the fear that China might invade Taiwan and the authoritarian surveillance features of the Chinese state.

FF: What stance has the Socialist Alliance taken on the issue of Taiwan?

SW: The Socialist Alliance believes that the US and its allies are the primary aggressors responsible for the rising military tensions. If anything, it is almost as if the US is trying to provoke China to launch military action against Taiwan.

However, that does not diminish our belief that the Taiwanese people have a right to self-determination and that any attempt by China to forcibly annex Taiwan would be a terrible mistake.

FF: What kind of initiatives could the left promote in striving for regional peace?

SW: In Australia it has to start with opposing AUKUS, the Force Posture Agreement and the entire military alliance with the US.

Unlike our South-East Asian neighbours, who are caught between demands to side with either the US or China, pushing back against our own government’s belligerence has to be our primary target.

We should also aim to rekindle a sense of working-class internationalism. Our job is to help Australian workers realise that our immediate enemies are our own ruling class, not working people in other countries.

Regionally, we need civil society peace initiatives that emphasise the need for cooperation and that build understanding and a sense of common humanity across borders. In doing so, we should emphasise that humanity will not be able to confront the existential threat posed by runaway global warming while pouring resources into a new Cold War.

Instead of further militarising the region, we need to push our governments to fund programs that develop people-to-people solidarity, something Cuba has done in the South Pacific with medical training.

Read the full interview at links.org.au.

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There is a prominent view in Australia that bilateral relations with China remain inherently “fragile”.

Canberra and Beijing might have started talking to each other again after Labor returned to power in May 2022. But some deep-seated differences remain, such as around the role the United States should play in the emerging regional order.

And at any moment these differences might see the Albanese government put in Beijing’s doghouse, just as the Morrison government was in 2020.

After the visit to Australia this week by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, however, we can be a little more confident the current positive trajectory in Australia-China relations has some resilience.

Wang’s main purpose for making the trip was to join Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong for the reinstated annual Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue, a regular, high-level meeting that was put on pause during the lowest point of China-Australia relations.

Following his meeting with Wong, Wang also had a roundtable discussion with a group of Australian business leaders, academics and think tank experts, hosted by the Australia-China Business Council. I was a part of this session.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Wang talked up China’s domestic and international achievements during this session, such as the fact that China’s economy consistently contributes to one-third of global economic growth.

He also defended Beijing’s positions on a range of issues, such as the introduction of a controversial national security law this week in Hong Kong. And there was more than one critical reference to the United States.

But when Wang explained how Beijing hoped to manage ties with Canberra moving forward – and what China wanted to get out of the relationship with Australia more broadly – it was striking that in both tone and substance his remarks were almost identical to those of Wong.

Wang’s tone was not exuberant. But it was unmistakably positive and assiduously forward-looking. The assertive, “wolf warrior”-style diplomacy that characterised China’s foreign policy in recent years was nowhere to be seen. And the “14 grievances” the Chinese embassy issued in 2020 to express the country’s frustrations with Australia remained in the drawer.

And like his Australian counterpart, Wang hoped that Beijing and Canberra would maintain “mature, stable and productive” relations. His aim was for the “diverse engagement” between the two countries to continue and the “untapped potential” of the relationship to be realised.

After all, Wang said, Australia and China had “more common interests than differences”. On the latter, the task was not to pretend they didn’t exist, but rather to “manage and rise above” them.

This sounded an awful lot like Wong’s exhortation in a press conference following her meeting with Wang that Australia and China need to “manage their differences wisely”.

Wang even managed a note of humour, joking to business leaders in the room that despite Australia running a massive bilateral trade surplus with China (more than $A100 billion in 2023), Beijing did not consider this a problem. He quipped he did not intend launching any “301 investigations” against Australia, name-checking the tactics that Washington has deployed to reduce its trade deficit with China.

Avoiding Diplomatic Pitfalls

Given Beijing’s previous behaviour toward Canberra, such as using trade restrictions to disrupt A$20 billion worth of Australian exports in 2020, Wang’s rhetoric this week could arouse some scepticism.

But recent events suggest more is at play – and the relationship is actually on firmer ground than might be expected.

Last November, a Chinese warship directed a powerful, hull-mounted sonar at an Australian naval vessel in the East China Sea, causing minor injuries to divers who had been removing fishing nets entangled in the ship’s propellers.

Neither side shied away from making clear their positions on the incident – and these were at odds.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described the Chinese actions as “dangerous, unsafe and unprofessional”.

China’s Ministry of National Defence, meanwhile, said Australia ought to “respect the facts” and “stop making reckless and irresponsible accusations”.

Despite this strong language, however, neither side prolonged or escalated the impact of the incident.

The same dynamic was apparent when Beijing announced last month that an Australian citizen, Yang Hengjun, had received a suspended death sentence in China for “espionage”.

Wong described the verdict as “appalling”. Albanese said his government had conveyed to Beijing “our dismay, our despair, our frustration, but to put it really simply, our outrage at this verdict”. She continued to advocate loudly on Yang’s behalf to Wang this week, as well.

Beijing took a very different position, saying the Chinese court respected Yang’s procedural rights.

But when asked whether Australia might take more extreme steps in response to the verdict, such as recall Australia’s ambassador to Beijing or rescind an invitation for a high-ranking Chinese official to visit, Wong quickly hosed down such suggestions. Chinese Premier Li Qiang is still expected to visit Australia this year, reciprocating Albanese’s trip to China last November.

And at the same time, Trade Minister Don Farrell continued to talk up areas of mutual benefit between the countries. He said just days after the verdict that while Australia already has a roaring A$300 billion trade relationship with China, this “doesn’t mean that figure can’t be A$400 billion”.

Evidently, neither side wishes to return to the dysfunction of 2020–21, when the response to political differences was megaphone diplomacy, cutting off dialogue and crimping areas of mutually beneficial cooperation.

None of the episodes of the last few months are proof positive that Australia-China relations could not be thrown off course again by a more extreme development. If Canberra walked away from adhering to the “One-China Policy”, for instance, or if Beijing ramped up its aggression towards Australian naval vessels in international waters, the future of the bilateral relationship would quickly darken.

But for the time being, the outlook is more stable and optimistic than it has been for a good while.

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, Director and Professor, Australia-China Relations Institute (ACRI), University of Technology Sydney.

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Aukusing for War: The Real Target Is China

April 8th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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***

The occasional burst of candour from US diplomats provides a striking, air clearing difference to their Australian and British counterparts.  Official statements about the AUKUS security pact between Washington, London and Canberra, rarely mention the target in so many words, except on the gossiping fringes.  Commentators and think tankers are essentially given free rein to speculate, masticating over such streaky and light terms as “new strategic environment”, “great power competition”, “rules-based order”.

On the occasion of his April 3 visit to Washington’s Center for a New American Security (CNAS), US Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell was refreshingly frank.  His presence as an emissary of US power in the Pacific has been notable since the AUKUS announcement in September 2021.

In March last year, Campbell, as Deputy Assistant to the US President and Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific National Security Council, was unfurling the US flag before various Pacific states, adamant that US policy was being reoriented from one of neglect to one of greater attentiveness.  The Solomon Islands, given its newly minted security pact with Beijing, was of particular concern. 

“We realise that we have to overcome in certain areas some amounts of distrust and uncertainty about follow through,” he explained to reporters in Wellington, New Zealand.  “We’re seeking to gain that trust and confidence as we go forward.”

In Honiara, Campbell conceded that the US had not done “enough before” and had to be “big enough to admit that we need to do more, and we need to do better.”  This entailed, in no small part, cornering the Solomon Islands Premier Manasseh Sogavare into affirming that Beijing would not be permitted to establish a military facility capable of supporting “power projection capabilities”.

In his discussion with the CNAS Chief Executive Officer, Richard Fontaine, Campbell did the usual runup, doffing the cap to the stock principles.  Banal generalities were discussed, for instance, as to whether the US should be the sole show in projecting power or seek support from like-minded sorts. 

“I would argue that as the United States and other nations confront a challenging security environment, that the best way to maintain peace and security is to work constructively and deeply with allies and partners.”  A less than stealthy rebuke was reserved for those who think “that the best that the United States can do is to act alone and to husband its resources and think about unilateral, individual steps it might take.”

The latter view has always been scorned by those calling themselves multilateralists, a cloaking term for waging war arm-in-arm with satellite states and vassals while ascribing to it peace keeping purposes in the name of stability.  Campbell is unsurprising in arguing “that working closely with other nations, not just diplomatically, but in defensive avenues [emphasis added], has the consequence of strengthening peace and stability more generally.”  The virtue with the unilateralists is the possibility that war should be resorted to sparingly.  If one is taking up arms alone, a sense of caution can moderate the bloodlust.

Campbell revealingly envisages “a number of areas of conflict and in a number of scenarios that countries acting together” in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, South Korea and India.  “I think that balance, the additional capacity will help strengthen deterrence more general [sic].”  The candid admission on the role played by the AUKUS submarines follows, with the boats having “the potential to have submarines from a number of countries operating in close coordination that could deliver conventional ordinance from long distances.  Those have enormous implications in a variety of scenarios, including in cross-strait circumstances”.  And so, we have the prospect of submarines associated with the AUKUS compact being engaged in a potential war with China over Taiwan.

When asked on what to do about the slow production rate of submarines on the part of the US Navy necessary to keep AUKUS afloat, Campbell acknowledged the constraints – the Covid pandemic, supply chain issues, the number of submarines in dry dock requiring or requiring servicing.  But like Don Quixote taking the reins of Rosinante to charge the windmills, he is undeterred in his optimism, insisting that “the urgent security demands in Europe and the Indo-Pacific require much more rapid ability to deliver both ordinance and other capabilities.”

To do so, the military industrial complex needs to be broadened (good news for the defence industry, terrible for the peacemakers).  “I think probably there is going to be a need over time for a larger number of vendors, both in the United States in Australia and Great Britain, involved in both AUKUS and other endeavours.”

There was also little by way of peace talk in Campbell’s confidence about the April 11 trilateral Washington summit between the US, Japan and the Philippines, following a bilateral summit to be held between President Joe Biden and Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida.  When terms such as “modernize” and “update” are bandied about in the context of an alliance, notably with an eye towards a rival power’s ambitions, the warring instincts must surely be stirred.  In the language of true encirclement, Campbell envisages a cooperative framework that will “help link the Indo-Pacific more effectively to Europe” while underscoring “our commitment to the region as a whole.”

A remarkably perverse reality is in the offing regarding AUKUS.  In terms of submarines, it will lag, possibly even sink, leaving the US and, to a lesser extent the UK, operating their fleets as Australians foot the bill and provide the refreshments.  Campbell may well mention Australia and the UK in the context of nuclear-powered submarines, but it remains clear where his focus is: the US program “which I would regard as the jewel in the crown of our defense industrial capacity.”  Not only is Australia effectively promising to finance and service that particular capacity, it will also do so in the service of a potentially catastrophic conflict which will see its automatic commitment.  A truly high price to pay for an abdication of sovereignty for the fiction of regional stability.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Countercurrents

Killing Aid Workers: Australia’s Muddled Policy on Israel

April 5th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Global Research Referral Drive: Our Readers Are Our Lifeline

***

The Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, was distraught and testy.  It seemed that, on this occasion, Israel had gone too far.  Not too far in killing over 32,000 Palestinians in Gaza, a staggering percentage of them being children.  Not too far in terms of using starvation as a weapon of war.  Not too far in bringing attention to the International Court of Justice that its actions are potentially genocidal.

Israel had overstepped in doing something it has done previously to other nationals: kill humanitarian workers in targeted strikes.  The difference for Albanese on this occasion was that one of the individuals among the seven World Central Kitchen charity workers killed during the midnight between April 1 and 2 was Australian national Lalzawmi “Zomi” Frankcom.

Frankcom and her colleagues had unloaded humanitarian food supplies from Cyprus that had been sent via a maritime route before leaving the Deir al-Balah warehouse.  The convoy, despite driving in a designated “deconflicted” zone, was subsequently attacked by three missiles fired from a Hermes 450 drone.  All vehicles had the WCK logo prominently displayed.  WCK had been closely coordinating the movements of their personnel with the IDF.

In a press conference on April 3, Albanese described the actions as “completely unacceptable.”  He noted that the Israeli government had accepted responsibility for the strikes, while Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu had conveyed his condolences to Frankcom’s family, with assurances that he would be “committed to full transparency”.

The next day, the Australian PM called the slaying of Frankcom a “catastrophic event”, reiterating Netanyahu’s promises from the previous day that he was “committed to a full and proper investigation.”  Albanese also wished that these findings be made public, and that accountability be shown for Israel’s actions, including for those directly responsible.  “What we know is that there have been too many innocent lives lost in Gaza.”

Australian Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, restated the need for “full accountability and transparency” and Australian cooperation with Israel “on the detail of this investigation.”  She further acknowledged the deaths of over 30,000 civilians, with some “half a million Palestinians” starving.

Beyond an investigation, mounted and therefore controlled by the Israeli forces themselves, nothing much else can be hoped for.  The Albanese approach has been one of copybook warnings and concerns to an ally it clearly fears affronting.  What would a ground invasion of Rafah do to the civilian population?  What of the continuing hardships in Gaza?  Push for a humanitarian ceasefire, but what else?

Australian anger at the government level must therefore be severely qualified.  Support roles, thereby rendering Australian companies complicit in Israeli’s military efforts, and in ancillary fashion the Australian government, continue to be an important feature. The F-35, a mainstay US-made fighter for the Israeli Air Force, is not manufactured or built in Australia, but is sustained through the supply of spare parts stored in a number of allied countries. According to the Australian Department of Defence, “more than 70 Australian companies have directly shared more than $4.13 billion in global F-35 production and sustainment contracts.”

The Australian government has previously stated that all export permit decisions “must assess any relevant human rights risks and Australia’s compliance with its international obligations”.  The refusal of a permit would be assured in cases where an exported product “might be used to facilitate human rights abuses”.  On paper, this seems solidly reasoned and consistent with international humanitarian law.  But Canberra has been a glutton for the Israeli military industry, approving 322 defence exports over the past six years. In 2022, it approved 49 export permits of a military nature bound for Israel; in the first three months of 2023, the number was 23.

The drone used in the strike that killed Frankcom is the pride and joy of Elbit Systems, which boasts a far from negligible presence in Australia.  In February, Elbit Systems received a A$917 million contract from the Australian Defence Department, despite previous national security concerns among Australian military personnel regarding its Battle Management System (BMS).

When confronted with the suggestion advanced by the Australian Greens that Australia end arms sales to Israel, given the presence of Australian spare parts in weaponry used by the IDF, Wong displayed her true plumage.  The Australian Greens, she sneered, were “trying to make this a partisan political issue”.  With weasel-minded persistence, Wong again quibbled that “we are not exporting arms to Israel” and claiming Australian complicity in Israeli actions was “detrimental to the fabric of Australian society.”

The Australian position on supplying Israel remains much like that of the United States, with one fundamental exception.  The White House, the Pentagon and the US Congress, despite increasing concerns about the arrangement, continue to bankroll and supply the Israeli war machine even as issue is taken about how that machine works.  That much is admitted.  The Australian line on this is even weaker.

The feeble argument made by such watery types as Foreign Minister Wong focus on matters of degree and semantics.  Israel is not being furnished with weapons; they are merely being furnished with weapon components.

Aside from ending arms sales, there is precedent for Australia taking the bull by the horns and charging into the mist of legal accountability regarding the killing of civilians in war.  It proved an enthusiastic participant in the Joint Investigation Team (JIT), charged with combing through the events leading to the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 over Ukraine in July 2014 by a Buk missile, killing all 298 on board.

Any such equivalent investigation into the IDF personnel responsible for the killing of Frankcom and her colleagues is unlikely.  When the IDF talks of comprehensive reviews, we know exactly how comprehensively slanted they will be.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name (only available in desktop version).

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

***

South Korea is trending away from economic dependence on China and increasing its trilateral interactions with Washington and Tokyo. Thus far, Beijing appears unsure of how to respond, beyond calls for “cooperation” and encouragement for Seoul to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy.

significant measure of the impact of South Korea’s evolution in geopolitical orientation is reflected in the shift in South Korea’s trade relations: The United States became South Korea’s number one export destination in December 2023, surpassing China for the first time since 2004.

South Korea also recorded an US$18 billion trade deficit with China, the first bilateral deficit with China in 31 years. South Korean exports to China in 2023 dropped 20% year-on-year, to $124.8 billion, while imports from China dipped 8% year-on-year, to $142.8 billion.

Strong investment flows to the United States by South Korea’s major conglomerates have resulted in a boost in South Korean car, automobile part and automotive battery exports. If such trends continue, South Korea in 2024 may have the distinction of being the only country adjacent to China for which China is not its number one trade partner.

Definitely affecting the bilateral relationship was the December 2023 announcement by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy of its 3050 Strategy initiative designed to stabilize South Korea’s supply chains and reduce dependence on China to less than 50% by 2030.

The trade ministry’s effort to reduce dependence on China in its supply chains responds to a deeper realization in South Korea of that country’s vulnerability to possible Chinese economic retaliation.

The impact of deepening geostrategic rivalry is clearly contributing to a reconfiguring of political and economic relationships in Northeast Asia.

South Korea appears to be drawing away from China’s geoeconomic orbit as South Korean investment in the United States reinforces the geopolitical choices of the Yoon administration.

Meanwhile, Chinese diplomacy toward Seoul has sputtered forward, driven more by multilateral gatherings involving the two countries than any sense of strategic purpose.

Ministerial and working-level economic dialogues on issues such as supply-chain stability, export controls, and trade facilitation continued between China and South Korea, but these exchanges did not generate the traction necessary for substantive bilateral meetings.

Bilateral and trilateral foreign ministerial meetings in Busan between South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin and counterparts Wang Yi and Kamikawa Yoko also failed to generate sufficient momentum to set a date for the resumption of China-Japan-South Korea summitry.

Mixed Signals

Prime Minister Han Duck-soo’s September 2023 visit to China was the first by a South Korean prime minister in over four years and generated expectations in South Korea that Chinese President Xi Jinping might make his first visit to Seoul since 2014.

Han requested China’s support for South Korea’s bid to host the 2030 World Expo in Busan and for the Yoon administration’s “audacious initiative” toward North Korea.

Xi emphasized the importance of “friendly cooperation” and expressed hope that South Korea “will work with China in the same direction, [and] take policies and actions that can reflect the importance it attaches to the development of China-ROK relations …”

However, Liaoning University Professor Lü Chao stated in the Global Times that political tensions generated by President Yoon’s pro-US approach and statements regarding Taiwan had “become a significant barrier to revive the three-way cooperation mechanism” between China, Japan, and South Korea.

Another development affecting the bilateral China-South Korea relationship was the announcement of a US-South Korea joint effort to counter disinformation.

The signing of the US-South Korea memorandum of understanding occurred on the occasion of US Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy Liz Allen’s visit to Seoul in December, reflecting South Korean concerns about false propaganda and global disinformation campaigns.

The signing of the MOU is even more salient in light of reports that the Chinese Ministry of State Security attempted to hack South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and infiltrated the computer network of the Presidential Office during the Moon Jae-in administration (2017-22).

Missed Opportunities

Annual ASEAN and APEC meetings have long provided opportunities for national leaders to hold summit meetings, such as when Yoon met Xi at the November 2022 G20 Summit in Bali. But the November 2023 APEC meeting in San Francisco generated only an exchange of greetings between Xi and Yoon.

Likewise, despite Xi’s expression of willingness to visit Seoul in his meeting with Han, South Korea’s preparations to host the first leader-level trilateral meeting with China and Japan yielded no fruit in 2023.

President Yoon and Premier Li Qiang held two brief encounters in quick succession on the sidelines of the ASEAN and G20 summits in early September. Yoon expressed hope that the North Korean nuclear issue would not be an obstacle to improved China-South Korea relations. Premier Li emphasized the need to expand cooperation to “seek mutual benefit and win-win results.”

Chinese scholar Zhan Debin has laid out the obstacles to the realization of a trilateral summit in a Global Times column pointedly titled “South Needs to Prove Sincerity for China-Japan-SK Summit.” The article takes issue with the proposition that South Korea will be able to induce greater respect from China based on closer relations with the United States and Japan, asserting that South Korea has instead weakened its “autonomy.”

Second, Zhan points to Yoon’s disavowal of the Moon-era “three nos and one restriction” understanding regarding THAAD missile defense and its disregard for Chinese “red lines” on Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Xinjiang. Zhan concludes that “if South Korea is pushing for the China-Japan-South Korea trilateral talk because of US instructions, it would be better not to hold the meeting at all.”

Trying Trilateral Summitry

Amid such rhetoric, China participated in the trilateral senior officials’ meeting in Seoul in late September and meetings with ROK Foreign Minister Park Jin. Those meetings were accompanied by a more optimistic tone from the Global Times, emphasizing the unchanged framework of “gain from cooperation, lose from confrontation” stemming from economic interdependence, economic development, and close geographical and cultural ties.

However, Chinese commentators responded negatively to the virtual US-Japan-South Korea defense ministerial meeting in mid-November alongside the US-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting in Seoul.

Liaoning University’s Lu Chao suggested that, following the Camp David Summit, enhanced United States-Japan-South Korea military cooperation contributed to a worsening of tensions on the Korean Peninsula. And China Foreign Affairs University’s Li Haidong asserted that such ties would make the Korean security situation more volatile.

Park Jin met Wang Yi on the sidelines of the trilateral China-Japan-South Korea foreign ministers’ meeting in Busan at the end of November. The South Korean readout from the bilateral meeting emphasized joint efforts to strengthen mutual understanding, strengthen strategic communication, and contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity through economic cooperation, promotion of people-to-people exchanges, and restoring and normalizing cooperation among China, Japan, and South Korea.

The Chinese readout reported Wang’s description of changes in the international and regional landscapes and their impact on China-South Korea relations in greater detail. Wang emphasized that “China and the ROK are neighbors … and this objective fact will never change,” arguing that cooperation is the only path through which to develop a mutually trusting and respectful relationship.

Chinese and South Korean readouts of the trilateral meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa emphasized efforts to institutionalize cooperation through a trilateral leader-level summit at the earliest possible time and deepen substantive trilateral cooperation.

In addition to the foreign ministerial meeting, the three countries successfully hosted the 16th trilateral health ministers’ meeting in early December, the first time the gathering had been held in four years.

Shifting Regional Orientation 

It remains to be seen how China grapples with closer Japan-South Korea relations and whether China will achieve the normalization of a “win-win-win” relationship among the three countries “with a particular emphasis on Tokyo and Seoul demonstrating more strategic autonomy” – or whether the Camp David Summit will create additional impediments and constraints on China’s ability to project its sphere of influence in the region.

With Yoon in office until 2027, Seoul’s emphasis on closer trilateral cooperation with Washington and Tokyo, as well as on reducing dependency on China’s market, appears likely to continue. If Beijing does not adopt a more proactive approach to the ROK, its ties may have atrophied considerably Seoul by then, even if a friendlier president has assumed office.

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Scott Snyder ([email protected]) will assume the role of president of the Korea Economic Institute of America in Washington, DC, in April 2024 and is a senior advisor for Pacific Forum.

See-Won Byun ([email protected]) is an assistant professor of international relations at San Francisco State University.

Featured image: South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol and Chinese Premier Li Qiang meet in Jakarta on the sidelines of ASEAN meetings. Photo: Xinhua

The AUKUS Cash Cow: Robbing the Australian Taxpayer

March 26th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

***

Two British ministers, the UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron and Defence Secretary Grant Shapps, paid a recent visit to Australia recently as part of the AUKMIN (Australia-United Kingdom Ministerial Consultations) talks. It showed, yet again, that Australia’s government loves being mugged. Stomped on. Mowed over. Beaten.

It was mugged, from the outset, in its unconditional surrender to the US military industrial complex with the AUKUS security agreement. It was mugged in throwing money (that of the Australian taxpayer) at the US submarine industry, which is lagging in its production schedule for both the Virginia-class boats and new designs such as the Columbia class. British shipyards were hardly going to miss out on this generous distribution of Australian money, largesse ill-deserved for a flagging production line.

A joint statement on the March 22 meeting, conducted with Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong, was packed with trite observations and lazy reflections about the nature of the “international order”. Ministers “agreed the contemporary [UK-Australian] relationship is responding in an agile and coordinated way to global challenges.” When it comes to matters of submarine finance and construction, agility is that last word that comes to mind.

Boxes were ticked with managerial, inconsequential rigour. Russia, condemned for its “full-scale, illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine”.  Encouragement offered for Australia in training Ukrainian personnel through Operation Kudu and joining the Drone Capability Coalition. Exaggerated “concern at the catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Gaza.” Praise for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and “respect of navigation.”

The relevant pointers were to be found later in the statement. The UK has been hoping for a greater engagement in the Indo-Pacific (those damn French take all the plaudits from the European power perspective), and the AUKUS bridge has been one excuse for doing so. Accordingly, this signalled a “commitment to a comprehensive and modern defence relationship, underlined by the signing of the updated Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Defence and Security Cooperation.”

When politicians need to justify opening the public wallet, such tired terms as “unprecedented”, “threat” and “changing” are used. These are the words of foreign minister Wong: “Australia and the United Kingdom are building on our longstanding strategic partnership to address our challenging and rapidly changing world”. Marles preferred the words “an increasingly complex strategic environment”. Shapps followed a similar line of thinking. “Nuclear-powered submarines are not cheap, but we live in a much more dangerous world, where we are seeing a much more assertive region [with] China, a much more dangerous world all around with what is happening in the Middle East and Europe.” Hardly a basis for the submarines, but the fetish is strong and gripping.

With dread, critics of AUKUS would have noted yet another round of promised disgorging. Britain’s submarine industry is even more lagging than that of the United States, and bringing Britannia aboard the subsidy truck is yet another signal that the AUKUS submarines, when and if they ever get off the design page and groan off the shipyards, are guaranteed well deserved obsolescence or glorious unworkability.

A separate statement released by all the partners of the AUKUS agreement glories in the SSN-AUKUS submarine, intended as a joint effort between BAE Systems and the Australian Submarine Corporation (ASC). (BAE Systems, it should be remembered, is behind the troubled Hunter-class frigate program, one plagued by difficulties in unproven capabilities.)

An already challenging series of ingredients is further complicated by the US role as well. “SSN-AUKUS is being trilaterally developed, based on the United Kingdom’s next designs and incorporation technology from all three nations, including cutting edge United States submarine technologies.” This fabled fiction “will be equipped for intelligence, surveillance, undersea warfare and strike missions, and will provide maximum interoperability among AUKUS partners.” The ink on this is clear: the Royal Australian Navy will, as with any of the promised second-hand Virginia-class boats, be a subordinate partner.

In this, a false sense of submarine construction is being conveyed through what is termed the “Optimal Pathway”, ostensibly to “create a stronger, more resilient trilateral submarine industrial base, supporting submarine production and maintenance in all three countries.”  In actual fact, the Australian leg of this entire effort is considerably greater in supporting the two partners, be it in terms of upgrading HMAS Stirling in Western Australia to permit UK and US SSNs to dock as part of Submarine Rotational Force West from 2027, and infrastructure upgrades in South Australia. It all has the appearance of garrisoning by foreign powers, a reality all the more startling given various upgrades to land and aerial platforms for the United States in the Northern Territory.

The eye-opener in the AUKMIN chatter is the promise from Canberra to send A$4.6 billion (£2.4 billion) to speed up lethargic construction at the Rolls-Royce nuclear reactor production line.  There are already questions that the reactor cores, being built at Derby, will be delayed for the UK’s own Dreadnought nuclear submarine. The amount, it was stated by the Australian government, was deemed “an appropriate and proportionate contribution to expand production and accommodate Australia’s requirements”. Hardly.

Ultimately, this absurd spectacle entails a windfall of cash, ill-deserved funding to two powers with little promise of returns and no guarantees of speedier boat construction.  The shipyards of both the UK and the United States can take much joy from this, as can those keen to further proliferate nuclear platforms, leaving the Australian voter with that terrible feeling of being, well, mugged.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Countercurrents

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the Translate Website button below the author’s name (only available in desktop version).

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

***

Legendary pilot turned freedom fighter Captain Graham Hood today urged the Australian government to stop the shots.

Having travelled widely and spoken to over 30000 people he gave the following testimony:

‘This country is in dire straights. The spirit of this country has been systematically destroyed. And I’ve witnessed it first hand. I’ve done what many of you don’t have the time to do. I’ve been face to face with people who’ve lost loved ones that they know were from vaccine injury.’

It is imperative that the coming Covid Royal Commission investigate the harms caused by the vaccines.

Click here to view the video.

 

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Dr. William Makis is a Canadian physician with expertise in Radiology, Oncology and Immunology. Governor General’s Medal, University of Toronto Scholar. Author of 100+ peer-reviewed medical publications.


The Worldwide Corona Crisis, Global Coup d’Etat Against Humanity

by Michel Chossudovsky

Michel Chossudovsky reviews in detail how this insidious project “destroys people’s lives”. He provides a comprehensive analysis of everything you need to know about the “pandemic” — from the medical dimensions to the economic and social repercussions, political underpinnings, and mental and psychological impacts.

“My objective as an author is to inform people worldwide and refute the official narrative which has been used as a justification to destabilize the economic and social fabric of entire countries, followed by the imposition of the “deadly” COVID-19 “vaccine”. This crisis affects humanity in its entirety: almost 8 billion people. We stand in solidarity with our fellow human beings and our children worldwide. Truth is a powerful instrument.”

Reviews

This is an in-depth resource of great interest if it is the wider perspective you are motivated to understand a little better, the author is very knowledgeable about geopolitics and this comes out in the way Covid is contextualized. —Dr. Mike Yeadon

In this war against humanity in which we find ourselves, in this singular, irregular and massive assault against liberty and the goodness of people, Chossudovsky’s book is a rock upon which to sustain our fight. –Dr. Emanuel Garcia

In fifteen concise science-based chapters, Michel traces the false covid pandemic, explaining how a PCR test, producing up to 97% proven false positives, combined with a relentless 24/7 fear campaign, was able to create a worldwide panic-laden “plandemic”; that this plandemic would never have been possible without the infamous DNA-modifying Polymerase Chain Reaction test – which to this day is being pushed on a majority of innocent people who have no clue. His conclusions are evidenced by renown scientists. —Peter Koenig 

Professor Chossudovsky exposes the truth that “there is no causal relationship between the virus and economic variables.” In other words, it was not COVID-19 but, rather, the deliberate implementation of the illogical, scientifically baseless lockdowns that caused the shutdown of the global economy. –David Skripac

A reading of  Chossudovsky’s book provides a comprehensive lesson in how there is a global coup d’état under way called “The Great Reset” that if not resisted and defeated by freedom loving people everywhere will result in a dystopian future not yet imagined. Pass on this free gift from Professor Chossudovsky before it’s too late.  You will not find so much valuable information and analysis in one place. –Edward Curtin

ISBN: 978-0-9879389-3-0,  Year: 2022,  PDF Ebook,  Pages: 164, 15 Chapters

Price: $11.50 FREE COPY! Click here (docsend) and download.

You may also access the online version of the e-Book by clicking here.

We encourage you to support the eBook project by making a donation through Global Research’s DonorBox “Worldwide Corona Crisis” Campaign Page

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

***

Archivists can be a dull if industrious lot. Christmas crackers are less important than the new year announcement in Canberra, when the National Archives of Australia releases documents like the newborn into the information world.  The event is not without irony, given that such documents are often aged and seasoned numbers, whiskered by storage and grey with cataloguing.

On January 1, the NAA diligently followed a long standing convention of releasing a stash of cabinet documents running into 240 from the Howard government, a period in Australian history when finance ruled with raffish vulgarity, and critical adventurers of conscience were anesthetised and told to get a mortgage. John Howard, Australia’s dull, waxwork prime minister, reminded his voters that Australia’s links to Asian countries were less important than the sigh-heavy attention from Washington.

What was particularly interesting in this disgorging of material was the focus on Australia’s foolish, negligent and even criminal contribution to the war on Iraq in 2003. Even more interesting was how little the files said about the reasons for Australia’s commitment to the invasion. Much of this was occasioned by the omission of 78 records that would otherwise have been in the original 2020 transfer to the archives.

Canberra is the city of smudged politicians, unnervingly clean air and endless meetings, but the omission of documents troubled Australia’s Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, given that they were concerned with the invasion. He even went so far as to order an inquiry. In true capital fashion, it was done with reserve and caution, the broom being of the “one of us” school. Dennis Richardson, former director of the Australian Secret Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and former head of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), not to mention being on the government’s retainer as a consultant, became the broom in question.

In subsequent recommendations as to why the omission of the documents had taken place, Richardson advanced the less than controversial thesis that the NAA include documents from the National Security Committee (NSC), a fixture of the Howard government.

On March 14, the Archives, as if prodded, released certain NSC documents relevant to the Iraq invasion. In the incomplete release, Australia as empire’s obedient, perfumed appendage becomes almost ridiculously evident. On January 10, 2003, the Defence Minister Robert Hill, along with the defence force chief, identified the need for deploying some personnel from the Australian Defence Force within a month “on the likely time-frame for possible military action against Iraq” as indicated by US Central Command. The meeting also reveals that ADF forward units were already designated from a list agreed upon by the NSC on August 26 and December 4, 2002.  The thrill for imminent war was palpable.

Howard, at the same meeting, promised that committing ADF forces required the consideration of all cabinet members, also noting that he had “foreshadowed to the governor-general the general direction of steps under consideration by the government in relation to Iraq”.  But the governor-general of the time, the eventually doomed Peter Hollingworth, was subsequently told by the prime minister that involving him in the decision to invade Iraq was needless; the ADF could be deployed under the provisions of the Defence Act.

A minute dated March 18, 2003 makes mention of the full cabinet’s authorisation of the invasion, though hardly anything else.  There is, however, a submission from the defence minister “circulated in the cabinet room on 17 and 18 March” intended to convince cabinet on possible military operations in Iraq. In anticipation of a formal request to commit troops, the ADF had already been authorised to pursue “prudent contingency planning” on the matter. The two stated war aims of Washington are outlined (vassal, take note): “regime change” and crippling Iraq’s “delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)”. On this point, the Howard government dawdles, if ever so slightly, notably on the issue of regime change, admitting, ultimately, that “this may be a desirable, even inevitable, outcome of military action”.

The now infamous memorandum of advice authored by the first assistant secretaries of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Attorney-General’s department is also to be found. The memorandum offers the shakiest of justifications for invading Iraq, also drawing from unsubstantiated reasons from their UK counterparts. It was subsequently and rightly excoriated by an irate Gavan Griffith, the then unconsulted Solicitor-General. Not only were both bits of legal advice “entirely untenable”, they were also “arrant nonsense”, furnishing “no threads for military clothes.” Nothing from President George W. Bush’s remarks had revealed any desire “to clothe American action with the authority of the Security Council.”  Thuggish unilateral action seemed the order of the day.

For Griffith, certain omissions were almost unpardonable.  What, for instance, of such authorities as Canberra’s veteran authority, Henry Burmester, the former head of the Office of International Law, subsequently appointed Chief Counsel of the AG’s department. Or for, that matter, of the now late James Crawford of Cambridge University, commonly retained for the giving of advice on international law.  Cautious experience had been elbowed out in favour of the gun.

The latest documents from the NSC are more sleet than snow. They do confirm that the parliamentary system, more than ever, should be involved in reining in the wild impulses of war makers. In the meantime, drawing up an indictment for Howard to stand trial in the International Criminal Court is overdue. The same goes for a number of his cabinet. We would not want them to go stale before justice.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

Featured image: An SAS patrol occupies a low-lying position to remain undetected by passing Iraqis. Patrols observing enemy movements could quickly call on the support of these vehicles if required. (Licensed under Fair Use)

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China, Myanmar Crisis to Dominate ASEAN Summit

March 12th, 2024 by TRT World

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Thailand’s Kra Land Bridge (Might) Reshape Asia

March 12th, 2024 by Brian Berletic

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

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[This article was originally published on NEO in December 2023.]

Thailand’s government has put together a serious proposal to build a land bridge across the Thai Kra Isthmus connecting ports on either side, providing an alternative for maritime shipping transiting the Malacca Strait, saving several days of travel in the process.

The project, if completed, would transform Asia’s economic and even security architecture. The land bridge, along with the still-under-construction Thai-Chinese high-speed railway, would solidify Thailand’s role as a regional logistics hub connecting the Indian Ocean with the Pacific Ocean, and also moving freight and people from across Southeast Asia to and from China and the rest of Eurasia.

The development would seriously undermine US economic and military dominance over the region, prompting Western commentators to disingenuously condemn the project as damaging and dangerous in a bid to generate opposition to it.

The Kra Canal and Land Bridge: Old Ideas, New Impetus 

The idea of creating a Panama or Suez-style canal across Thailand’s southern Kra Isthmus isn’t new. It has been proposed in many different forms over the years, with feasibility studies conducted periodically. Because of the difficulty of building a canal, the idea of building a land bridge instead has not only been proposed, but Thailand’s Highway 44 completed in 2003 was built as the first stage of a much more ambitious land bridge infrastructure project.

Highway 44 was constructed with a particularly large median to accommodate the future construction of rail tracks and pipelines. Ports on either side of the isthmus also have yet to be built. While the project remains incomplete, the roadway serves the dual purpose of connecting other forms of traffic crossing the isthmus.

Under the previous Thai administration of Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha, a new feasibility study was conducted along with the drafting of proposals. More recently, the current administration of Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin formally proposed the construction of a fully functioning land bridge during the 2023 APEC summit in San Francisco, United States.

In his statement at the summit, Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin discussed the growing congestion through the Malacca Strait and the need for alternative routes. He described the land bridge as “an additional important route to support transportation and an important option for resolving the problems of the Malacca Strait. This will be a cheaper, faster, and safer route.” 

The land bridge will reduce travel time by between 3 and 14 days, depending on the particular origin and destination of cargo.

The Thai prime minister’s statement also made it clear that the land bridge would not serve as a replacement for routes passing through the Malacca Strait, but rather as an alternative to existing routes, capable of moving up to 23% of the shipping currently passing through the Malacca Strait.

The new proposal, stretching from Ranong on the west coast to Chumphon on the east coast, would be constructed almost 150km north of the existing Highway 44 route.

In October, the Bangkok Post would report in an article titled, “China interested in Thai landbridge project,” that:

China Harbour Engineering Co (CHEC) is interested in a proposed 1-trillion-baht landbridge project that will link the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, according to the government. 

The Thai prime minister had been in Beijing at the time attending the Belt and Road Forum.

According to the same article, the current Thai administration will promote the project to investors between November 2023 to January 2024. Land expropriation would then take place between 2025 and 2026 with the project scheduled for completion by 2030.

Obstacles and Western Opposition 

The land bridge would clearly benefit Thailand through the creation of jobs, the building of dual-use infrastructure, and development that would take place adjacent to the project.

More importantly, the land bridge would signify a leap forward for both commerce across Asia and between Asia and the rest of the world. It would create an alternative route that would allow for even greater volumes of commerce to move through the region.

While there are lingering questions over the feasibility of the ambitious project, a growing amount of opposition is being expressed among Western commentators, focused instead on the impact it will have on the “environment” as well as concerns regarding “economic dependence” on China.

For those following the rise of China and the success of its Belt and Road Initiative, these “concerns” have become common smokescreens used by Western governments, the Western media, and commentators who simply oppose and attempt to obstruct both China’s and Eurasia’s development as part of a much larger effort by the collective West to contain the rise of China.

Projects already in operation or under construction such as the high-speed rail projects connecting Thailand and Laos to China, as well as both the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, have faced particularly stiff opposition from the US. Washington has done everything from backing political opposition parties vowing to cancel joint projects, to sponsoring armed terrorists who are physically attacking the projects and the personnel building, maintaining, and guarding them.

These projects represent China’s strategy in hedging against a US maritime blockade meant to contain and cripple China’s economy. By attacking these projects both politically and by armed proxies, the US seeks to eliminate them as alternatives, making any future US naval blockade as effective as possible.

The Kra land bridge in particular would complicate US plans to cut off Chinese maritime shipping, otherwise forced to travel exclusively through the Malacca Strait.

The Diplomat, a Western publication partnered with a network of Western government and corporate-funded policy institutes, in its article, “A Bad Idea Revisited: Thailand Pitches Prayut’s ‘Land Bridge’ to Beijing” by Mark Cogan, uses the common smokescreens of environmental concerns and fears of Thailand becoming overly dependent on China, to condemn the project and encourage opposition against it.

Cogan cites small environmental groups which suspiciously turn up to oppose the construction of any infrastructure project anywhere in Thailand, especially those including China as a partner. Cogan links to a Nikkei Asia article, “Thailand pushes dream of ‘land bridge’ to boost economy,” which claims:

Somboon Khamheng, a coordinator of the group, says environmentally destructive economic stimulus measures are unnecessary, adding that residents depend on the area’s natural resources to make their living.

Somboon Khamheng can be found promoted by US government-funded Thai language media outlet Prachatai in which he eagerly supports US-backed opposition party Move Forward. Move Forward’s politically-motivated opposition to Thailand’s cooperation with China is much less veiled than Cogan’s or Somboon’s.

Besides Somboon’s association with US interference in Thailand, it is also important to point out his claims are invalid. The “natural resources” locals “depend on” are often in the process of being depleted by unsustainable exploitation prompted by poverty, driven by a lack of local infrastructure, development, and access to modern economic opportunities – all of which would be resolved if construction of the land bridge moved forward.

The use of “activists” like Somboon and US government-funded organizations citing environmental and social concerns as grounds to oppose development is a strategy the US uses all across Southeast Asia in an attempt to block everything from roadways, rail projects, dams, and power plants, to factories, economic zones, and of course, the land bridge itself.

Western commentators like Cogan regularly cite these activists and organizations, deliberately ignoring the implications of the pervasive US government funding behind their activities. The narrative comes across to ordinary readers as genuine concern for natural resources and local communities, when in reality it is a malicious strategy meant to sabotage ties between China and other nations in the region and arrest badly needed development, thus perpetuating poverty.

Chinese Debt Trap Diplomacy?

Cogan then warns about the dangers of Chinese investment.

In his article, he claims:

Leaning so heavily on China would also be problematic. China’s reputation as an economic development partner in South and Southeast Asia is decidedly mixed. The financing of large-scale infrastructure projects has increased its sphere of influence in some areas, but has raised concerns both domestically and internationally. Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port is a prime example. With Colombo struggling to meet its international debt obligations, a controlling stake in the port was leased for $1.12 billion to a state-owned Chinese firm for 99 years. The Gwadar Port, funded by China in Pakistan, has raised similar concerns among Western countries, who worry about China using the facility for military purposes.

What Cogan does not mention is that Sri Lanka’s debt is owed primarily to Western financiers, not China, a fact that is pointed out even elsewhere within The Diplomat itself.

It should also be pointed out that Cogan’s claims of “worries” among Western countries of China using Pakistan’s Gwadar Port for “military purposes” are baseless. Even if China did, it would pale in comparison to the hundreds of military bases the US alone operates around the globe, including in nations the US is illegally occupying.

Cogan also says:

For the land bridge to not become a geopolitical concern, Srettha needs more than just Chinese investors; he needs to build assurance and confidence from Western partners as well. 

Cogan then complains about Thailand’s prime minister meeting with the leaders of Russia and Saudi Arabia, revealing the position of extreme Western chauvinism Cogan sees the world from.

In reality, Thailand does not need the West’s approval to build infrastructure within its own sovereign borders. It also doesn’t need the West’s permission to seek investment or cooperation from other nations, including China, Russia, or Saudi Arabia.

The only limiting factor for Thailand should be whether or not the project is actually beneficial.

The fact that the US and its vast global-spanning network of opposition groups oppose all development, feasible or otherwise, reveals the true threat to global peace and prosperity. It is not China who seeks to invest in and build around the globe, but the US who hides behind environmental and social concerns to obstruct national development, prevent the construction of badly needed infrastructure projects, and all in a bid to prevent the rise of Asia.

Developing nations, including across Southeast Asia, as well as newly industrialized nations like Thailand are rising because of industry and infrastructure, driven by growing trade with a rising China. Together this is creating a stronger Asia. In fact, this emerging Asia is so strong that it is clearly in the process of surpassing the collective West. Rather than corporate with and benefit from the rise of Asia, the collective West, led primarily by the United States, seeks to arrest development in Asia and thus arrest the rise of Asia.

The Kra Isthmus land bridge is just one of many projects that may or may not contribute toward a prosperous Thailand and a rising Asia, but the decision to construct it rests solely with Thailand and its chosen partners. Only time will tell whether or not the project is viable and whether Thailand and its partners move forward with its construction, or if the US will succeed in leveraging its network of opposition groups and political parties to obstruct it and other development projects, and hinder Thailand and the rest of Asia on the path toward prosperity.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

Featured image is from NEO

Matters of Revenue: Meta Abandons Australia’s Media Stable

March 12th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Global Research Fundraising: Stop the Pentagon’s Ides of March

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It was praised to the heavens as a work of negotiated and practical genius when it was struck. The then Australian treasurer, Josh Frydenberg, had finally gotten those titans of Big Tech into line on how revenue would be shared with media outlets for using such platforms as supplied by Facebook and Google.

Both companies initially baulked at the News Media Bargaining Code, which led to a very publicised spat between Facebook and the Morrison government. For a week in February 2021, users of Facebook in Australia were barred from sharing news. A number of government agencies, trade unions, media groups and charities found the restrictions oppressive.

Amendments were eventually made to the Code to make matters more palatable to the tech behemoths, notably on the arbitration mechanism and their algorithmic use of ranking news. Revenue sharing agreements with various media outlets were struck, most notably with members of the standard stable, including the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and News Corp.  With a degree of perversity, traditional news publications could now receive revenue for using free sharing platforms, having failed to address their own stuttering revenue models. (The fall in advertising revenue has been particularly punishing.)

With a jackal’s glee, Rupert Murdoch could claim to have made a fiendish pact with Facebook to prop up parts of his ailing News Corp empire, leaving Facebook’s approach to surveillance capitalism unchecked and uncritiqued.

Such agreements on sharing news were always conditional on continued approval by Facebook, which is now operating under the rebrand of Meta. Various countries have similarly tried to compel digital platforms to pay for news content that they permit, freely, to be shared. It is also clear that Meta is particularly keen to deprecate them and eventually let them lapse.

In February, a statement from Meta made it clear that these arrangements would not be renewed.

“The number of people using Facebook News in Australia and the US has dropped by over 80% last year. We know that people don’t come to Facebook for news and political content – they come to connect with people and discover new opportunities, passions and interests.”

Such jaw dropping observations would have surprised users who have foolishly made Facebook a central pitstop in their news journey – and what counts as “news” in the narrow, arid world of Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg. But according to Meta, news made up less than 3% of what people saw on their Facebook feed in 2023.

Meta’s public declaration of intent threatens various media companies with significant loss. In Australia, Nine Entertainment, Seven West Media and News Corp risk losing between 5 and 9% of net profit.

The entire field of revenue sharing between the digital platforms and media groups has been opaque. The Australian Financial Review managed to obtain two summaries of agreements signed by the Australian Network Ten, owned by Paramount, and Facebook, shedding some light on negotiation strategies. For the social media giant, videos are all the rage, and one of the summaries notes the insistence by Facebook that Network Ten share 18,000 videos on its platform while threatening termination of its contract in the event it was taken to arbitration.

The Albanese government, through Communications Minister Michelle Rowland and Assistant Treasurer Stephen Jones, described Meta’s decision to halt paying news outlets “a dereliction of its commitment to the sustainability of Australian news media.” But to have assumed it ever had such a commitment was surely naïve to begin with.

Michael Miller, Executive chairman of News Corp Australia, could not resist his own flourish of disingenuous exaggeration. “If content providers were farmers Meta would steal their crops and demand their victims thank them for the privilege.” Meta’s refusal to pay for news would create “shockwaves for Australia, our democracy, economy and way of life”. The vital question here is what, exactly, are these agreements doing?

For one thing, the Bargaining Code, which never stipulated how the money would be used, has done nothing to enliven a media scape that remains imperially confined to a handful of providers. A conspiracy of convenience arose between one set of giants furnishing the digital platforms, with another of giants claiming to provide the news. Smaller outlets have had little say in these arrangements. Facebook, for instance, showed no interest in reaching revenue sharing arrangements with the SBS broadcaster or The Conversation. And to consider such representatives as News Corp sterling examples of democratic protection is a view not only misplaced but deserving of ridicule.

The ABC’s Managing Director, David Anderson, has at least admitted that funding obtained through its arrangements with Meta has been useful in supporting 60 journalists. News Corp, Nine Entertainment and Seven News Media have been less than forthcoming, ever keen using the shield of commercial confidentiality. In terms of employees, Nine Entertainment reported a fall in the number of employees from 5254 at the end of the 2022 financial year to 4753 at the end of 2023. “It is likely,” suggests Kim Wingerie in Michael West Media, “that the A$50 million or more they receive annually from Meta and Google is used predominantly to prop up their net profit.”

Meta’s promise to abandon agreements reached with the media hacks is no reason to be gloomy. The company’s loathing of privacy, its delight in commodifying the data of its users, and its insistence on tinkering with human behaviour, make it a continuing societal menace. Governments and news outlets would do far better in critiquing and challenging those aspects, rather than taking revenue that seems to silence the critical instinct.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

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Big Tech’s Effort to Silence Truth-tellers: Global Research Online Referral Campaign

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Community leaders, including Palestinian Ahmed Abadla from the Palestine Justice Movement, called on Prime Minister Anthony Albanese to impose sanctions on Israel and stop the trade in weapons at a media conference at Port Botany on March 6.

They said they also wanted to “send a clear message” to ZIM shipping that it is not welcome in any of Sydney’s ports.

“It is time for Western societies and the entire world to act,” Ahmed said, adding sanctions and boycotts would send a very clear message that Australia was taking its responsibility seriously in the wake of the interim ruling by the International Criminal Tribunal.

Paul Keating, the Sydney branch secretary of the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) said: “Israel is an apartheid state; it is also a rouge state. We support the Palestinians’ right to resist.”

Keating issued a warning to all shipping corporations that they should not be doing business with Israel while it is committing genocide in Gaza. “If you don’t want protests, declare that you will not move Israel’s goods.”

Noting the big police presence at the media conference, he said NSW Labor needed to “abolish the anti-protest laws”.

NSW Greens Senator Mehreen Faruqi said it was not good enough for the Albanese government to be “aiding, abetting and arming Israel”, after 150 days genocide.

Mehreen Faruqi addressing the media conference, with Paul Keating to her right and Christy Cain to her left. Photo: Many King

 

She demanded that the $4 million in frozen aid to UN Works and Relief Agency (UNWRA) “without any evidence of Israel’s claims” showed that the Labor government is “an accessory to the genocide”.

“Our outrage at the massacre should not be underestimated”, she said adding, “Australia must sanction Netanyahu and his war cabinet”.

Greens Senator David Shoebridge said the reason that Albanese and Wong had been referred to the International Criminal court is “because of their actions make them complicit in genocide”.

He referred to the MUA’s “proud history” of stopping pig iron exports to Japan during World War II, military equipment designed to prevent Indonesia’s struggle for independence  and weapons shipments to Vietnam to aid the US war there against the North.

NSW Greens Senator David Shoebridge addresses the media conference. Photo: Mandy King

 

“Anthony Albanese has encouraged two-way weapons’ trade — bringing in billions of dollars of Israeli weapons that have been tested on Palestinians.

“It is permitting the trade in weapons and components to Israel — including drones, and parts for F35 fighter jets.”

Christy Cain, national Secretary of the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union, spoke last and made an impassioned plea to the union movement to do more to stop Israel’s genocide.

“This is not a war, it is a massacre,” he said. “To say I’m disappointed with the union movement would be an understatement. Every leader of the trade union movement has to play a role for peace.”

Cain added to the list of proud union moments saying:

“We have previously been a part of stopping apartheid in South Africa. Nelson Mandela came to Australia after 27 years in jail, to thank the seaman’s union and the WWF [Waterside Workers Federation].”

He also noted the MUA and the CFMEU’s support for the East Timorese struggle for independence from Indonesia.

“I say to [ACTU secretary] Sally McManus and to Anthony Albanese: ‘Show leadership’! Peace is union business.

“Unions must get out there: we all have a role to play in stopping this massacre,” Cain said.

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Featured image: Ahmed Abadla from the Palestine Justice Movement addresses the media conference at Port Botany. Photo: Mandy King

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There is little doubt the National-led coalition is showing greater interest in the AUKUS security agreement, with Australian officials due to visit New Zealand later this year to brief the government.

So far, much of the discussion and analysis of New Zealand potentially joining the so-called “pillar two” of AUKUS has focused on the usual geopolitical and security narratives.

Australia is New Zealand’s only formal ally, New Zealand is already part of the Five Eyes spy network, and there are shared historical ties and values between Western states.

Like Australia, too, New Zealand has been walking a tightrope between its close trading relationship with China and its security relationship with the United States, as tension grows between the two superpowers.

Of course, perceptions of the strategic environment play a role. But they are far from the only motivating factor. In comments from the relevant ministers, and in briefing notes from department officials, it is clear economic arguments are being made in favour of New Zealand joining pillar two.

The government was elected, in part, on a platform of cutting public spending. At the same time, New Zealand under-invests in the research and development the government sees as essential for economic growth.

Given AUKUS is already a controversial initiative, any incentive to use it as a means to subsidise inadequate research, science and innovation budgets needs greater public scrutiny.

A Change of Heart

Under the previous Labour government, New Zealand put up a relatively ambivalent front on AUKUS.

Any involvement in pillar one (which provides for Australia to buy at least eight nuclear-powered submarines from the US and UK) was immediately ruled out, given its impact on New Zealand’s nuclear-free policies.

While the government left the door open to pillar two – which allows for collaboration on advanced technologies and building connections between defence industrial bases – there were seemingly conflicting views within the Labour Party.

While former defence minister Andrew Little seemed more open to the discussion, former foreign minister Nanaia Mahuta raised concerns about the impact it could have on New Zealand’s independence and relationships in the Pacific.

In opposition, the National Party was critical of AUKUS. Its then foreign affairs spokesperson, Gerry Brownlee, said the deal would not make New Zealand safer.

Now in power, however, National and its coalition partners appear to have a newfound enthusiasm for AUKUS. Defence Minister Judith Collins made it clear the government was considering what benefits AUKUS could provide New Zealand, and what New Zealand could bring to the table.

With Foreign Minister Winston Peters, she raised these matters in their meeting with Australian ministerial counterparts at the inaugural Australia-New Zealand Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (ANZMIN) in early February.

Their joint statement said AUKUS makes “a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”.

AUKUS Economics

Economic factors appear to be playing a significant role in this tack towards AUKUS. A briefing by defence officials to the previous government listed eight “opportunities for New Zealand’s research community and industry”.

This focus on research is notable. Not only were the benefits outlined in the briefing, but it was also shared with the then minister of research, science and innovation.

As well as being defence minister, Collins is also minister for science, innovation and technology, as well as minister for space. It is unsurprising she would see harmony in these three portfolios when it comes to AUKUS. She has shown considerable enthusiasm for technology as a pathway to economic growth.

Collins has pointed to the space industry as a key sector in which New Zealand could make a contribution. Technology and space are also the areas that, in Collins’ words, “offer opportunities to New Zealand businesses and scientists”.

At the same time, the government has requested budget cuts from its departments, including a 7.5% reduction from defence. State funding for research and development has long been inadequate, and this seems unlikely to change.

Interest in AUKUS, then, exists in a broader economic context beyond the obvious strategic defence considerations.

Time for a Broader Debate

The government clearly hopes collaboration on AUKUS pillar two can help provide something of a cross-subsidy for both defence and related civilian research and industries.

Many of the technologies involved – including space-related technology such as that used by RocketLab – are dual-use, meaning they have both civilian and defence applications.

Indeed, for several years now Australia has been building closer links in emerging technologies between its academic sector, defence and civilian industries.

It is important to understand these economic motivations. The prospect of New Zealand joining pillar two of AUKUS is already controversial at a geo-strategic level. If one of the primary motivations is also economic, some harder questions need to be asked.

Does it make sense to fund research, science and innovation via a defence partnership? And would that justify joining a controversial defence arrangement that potentially compromises other important international relationships?

The AUKUS question in general now needs to be considered in the context of broader debates about New Zealand’s role in the world, and the role of government in society.

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is a Postdoctoral Fellow, Political Science and International Relations, University of Canterbury.

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Big Tech’s Effort to Silence Truth-tellers: Global Research Online Referral Campaign

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The Indonesian government is appealing to the private sector for investors to help transform 82,891 hectares (204,800 acres) of barren lands around the new capital of Nusantara into tropical rainforests.

Mining companies that are required to rehabilitate their concessions after their permits have expired will be able to count reforestation in the capital region toward their quota.

In addition, the government is offering significant tax deductions to companies that invest in rehabilitating degraded lands.

East Kalimantan, once covered in tropical forests and home to charismatic species and vast regions of biodiversity, is the country’s most intensely mined province with 7 million hectares (17.3 million acres) of coal mining concessions.

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As the Indonesian government embarks on a massive push to reforest the area around the country’s new capital city in Borneo, it is turning to the private sector in hopes that investors will help supply the labor and capital needed for the program.

In 2022, President Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, voiced his intention to transform 82,891 hectares (204,800 acres) of the barren lands that dominate the area where the new capital “Nusantara” will sit into lush tropical rainforests.

The Nusantara Capital City Authority (OIKN), a government agency that oversees the progress of the new city’s development, said it is currently designing guidelines for how the private sector can get involved in the reforestation program.

The government is looking for outside partners to speed up the implementation of the reforestation program, as the OIKN estimates that it will take 88 years to fully rehabilitate the new capital at the current pace with government efforts alone.

Private sector participation is needed to make the new capital forest city as the president promised, OIKN forest utilization and water resource development director Pungky Widiaryanto told Mongabay. “This is indeed a joint work that needs all stakeholders.”

There will be two categories of companies involved in the private sector rehabilitation scheme.

First is companies that are already legally obligated to rehabilitate their mining concessions once their permits have expired. Under the program, companies with reforestation obligations anywhere in Indonesia will be able to count reforestation in the capital region toward their quota.

Second is for any companies in any sector that are interested in rehabilitating degraded lands in the new capital site in exchange for significant tax benefits. Companies that undertake rehabilitation works voluntarily will be granted a tax deduction worth 200% of their outlay, Pungky said.

Pungky said the tax deduction scheme is stipulated in a 2023 government regulation on businesses in the new capital, which states that any business entities that donate or contribute to the development of facilities that don’t generate profit for the company in the new capital are eligible for a taxed gross income deduction of twice the amount of donation or cost incurred from the development of the facilities.

But the detailed investment scheme, which will include rehabilitation guidelines and specified areas available to be reforested by investors, is still being formulated, he said.

The regulation on the investment scheme will be issued by the head of the OIKN by May 2024, Pungky added.

Not all investors in the new capital are motivated solely by profit, Pungky told Mongabay at his office in Balikpapan, East Kalimantan in October 2023. Some, he said, are also interested in contributing to environmental protection and restoration. “In this case, there’s no profit,” so that’s why the tax deduction will be offered.

“Let’s say they [a company] want to rehabilitate 1,000 hectares [2,471 acres], which cost 100 billion rupiah [$6.4 million]. The tax deduction will be two times 100 billion rupiah, equal to 200 billion rupiah [$12.8 million],” Pungky said.

The government has previously implemented a similar super tax deduction scheme for research and development activities in Indonesia, with up to 300% reductions to gross revenue.

Myrna Asnawati Safitri, the deputy for environment and natural resources at the OIKN, said the Ministry of Finance is currently drafting a regulation on the tax deduction scheme that will allow companies to contribute to the reforestation program and enjoy tax deductions in the process.

“We’re still waiting for the regulation from the Ministry of Finance. I heard the drafting will finish soon,” she told Mongabay. Once the regulation is issued, she said, they will officially announce the tax deduction scheme for those who participate in the reforestation program.

Pungky said the finance ministry regulation will complement the regulation by the OIKN head.

While the OIKN hasn’t officially announced the tax deduction scheme, some companies have shown interest in doing voluntary rehabilitation work, Myrna said.

Furthermore, three companies that are legally obligated to rehabilitate their mining have voiced their intention to restore 2,300 hectares (5,683 acres) of watershed areas in the new capital, Pungky said.

Ahmad Saini, an activist at the Mining Advocacy Network (Jatam), an independent watchdog, pointed out that these represent a tiny percentage of areas that have been destroyed by mining activities in the region, calling the 2,300 hectares “so miniscule.”

East Kalimantan was once covered in vast tropical forests home to a wide range of biodiversity, including charismatic species of hornbills and orangutans that exist only on the island.

Today, it is the most intensively mined province in Indonesia.

There are 7 million hectares (17.3 million acres) of coal mining concessions in East Kalimantan, 55% of the province’s 12.7 million hectares (31.4 million acres) of area.

The rapid expansion of coal mining has driven forest degradation and deforestation in the region, with a total of 3.5 million hectares (8.6 million acres) of forest lost since 2001, according to data from Global Forest Watch. This leads to emissions of 2.48 gigatons of CO2 equivalent.

The Ministry of Environment and Forestry has identified more than 154,000 hectares (380,500 acres) of mining pits in East Kalimantan province, where the new capital sits, with 29,000 hectares (71,660 acres) of them falling within the boundaries of the new capital area — nearly half the size of the current capital of Jakarta.

In addition to blighting the landscape, these pits fill with water, creating a significant safety hazard. Since 2011, 40 people, mostly children, have drowned in such pits in Indonesia.

An active mine pit at the PT Singlurus Pratama coal mine in East Kalimantan, Indonesia. Image by David Woodbury.

Legal Obligation

While companies are required to restore their mining areas to their original state once they have finished operating in the area, many of them fail to do so due to a series of loopholes and blind spots in the country’s regulatory framework.

As of 2019, the most recent year for which data is available, only 282 of 4,726 companies with mining licenses in Indonesia, or just 6%, had deposited reclamation and post-mining funds with the government, both of which are mandatory,

These funds are to ensure that abandoned holes are filled in and trees planted after mining operations conclude.

Even when companies do deposit the money, there’s little transparency about how much they’ve paid and how much is subsequently used for reclamation activities.

And when they do carry out rehabilitation work, some observers are skeptical that they could restore the mining concessions to the original condition.

This is because most coal extraction in Indonesia is done with open-pit mining, one of the most destructive mining methods, as it uses heavy equipment and explosives to destroy vegetation, topsoil and rock to extract the ore deposits.

This process leaves behind vast and barren pits and produces a large amount of waste that dramatically changes the landscape, rendering it inhospitable for wildlife and native vegetation.

“How could you rehabilitate [a land] that has been greatly devastated? There’s no more fertile soil,” Saini of Jatam said. In land that has been destroyed by mining, “Not even a banana tree can grow.”

David Woodbury, a forest researcher from Yale University’s School of the Environment who has studied the rehabilitation of mining sites in East Kalimantan, noted that restoration is particularly complex here due to soil in the region already having relatively low levels of nutrients. Mining further degrades the soil, breaking up the natural layering that builds up stability while also contributing to soil acidity. With such substantial changes to the soil ecosystem, abandoned mining sites are inhospitable for many plants, Woodbury said. “Improving these conditions demands substantial inputs of costly fertilizer and lime to mitigate the harsh soil environment,” he said.

With the feasibility of rehabilitating mining concessions back to their original state questioned, Saini warned of the possibility of the new capital’s reforestation program being used a greenwashing attempt.

“It’s just a branding [attempt] that this is a green [program] with companies wanting to rehabilitate lands [in the new capital], even when it’s their legal responsibility [to do so],” he said.

Rehabilitation Mandate Watered Down

Saini also said companies’ legal obligations to restore their concessions to the original state has been watered down by a 2014 regulation issued by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.

The regulation gives companies the option to establish areas for residential, agriculture, tourism and water sources in former mining sites instead of rehabilitating them back into forests.

“So the concept of reclamation [of mining sites] has been skewed,” Saini said.

Environment and Forestry Minister Siti Nurbaya Bakar said the 2,415 mining pits in the new capital could be transformed not only to rainforest that serves as wildlife corridor, but also to agritourism spots and water sources.

“The former mining pits that are flooded should be able to be used as water sources for the new capital,” she said during a parliamentary hearing in March 2022.

However, it’s going to be a challenge to turn the mining pits into water sources since the water there has high levels of acidity, with pH levels between 2.6 and 3, according to Siti.

A pH of less than 7 indicates acidity, with U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidelines stating that the pH of tap water should be between 6.5 and 8.5.

With the definition of mining site rehabilitation widened to not only reforesting these sites, but also establishing areas for residential, agriculture, tourism and water sources, it’s important to clarify what the government means when it says mining companies have carried out rehabilitation work in the new capital.

“The definition of ‘rehabilitated’ warrants clarification,” Woodbury said.

A vehicle passes the industrial forest concession of PT Itci Hutani Manunggal (IHM) in Penajam Paser Utama district, East Kalimantan. Parts of PT IHM’s pulpwood concession overlaps with the site of the new capital city. Image courtesy of Trend Asia/Melvinas Priananda.

Resistance

While some companies have participated in the reforestation program in the new capital, others have shown resistance.

Pungky of the OIKN said pulpwood producer PT International Timber Corporation Indonesia Hutani Manunggal (ITCI HM) is among them.

The company is a subsidiary of Asia Pacific Resources International Holdings Ltd., Indonesia’s second-biggest pulp and paper company owned by billionaire Sukanto Tanoto. It currently manages a pulpwood plantation at the site of the new capital that overlaps with a 5,644-hectare (13,950-acre) lot where the government plans to build its new office complex.

ITCI HM had agreed to release parts of its concessions that overlapped with the new capital city, even though its permit is still valid until 2030. However, the company continued operating as usual as of February 2024, Pungky said.

“The company is still harvesting and cultivating [its pulpwood plantation]. They’re not willing [to let go of their concession] yet,” he said.

As a result, the authority can’t enter the concession and rehabilitate it.

The continued operation of ITCI HM has also prevented the three mining companies that planned to rehabilitate 2,300 hectares of area from doing so, as the area set to be rehabilitated overlapped with ITCI HM’s active concession, Pungky said.

ITCI HM’s permit has actually been revised, with parts of the concession that overlap with the new capital area taken out of the boundary in the permit.

Therefore, the company should’ve asked permission from the OIKN if it wanted to continue operating the plantation within the new capital area, Pungky said.

But ITCI HM decided to continue engaging with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, instead of the OIKN, and the ministry allowed the firm to continue operating the plantation, he added.

This highlights a lack of unity among policymakers that could hamper a program this ambitious.

Mongabay reached out to ITCI HM, its parent company, the Royal Golden Eagle group, and the environment ministry for comment, but they didn’t provide one, as of the publication of this story.

Pungky said the OIKN hadn’t reached an agreement with ITCI HM and the environment ministry on how to best proceed and thus will send a letter to remind the company that it is operating on land whose control has been handed over to the authority and to urge the company to stop operating.

There are also other lands earmarked to be rehabilitated that are still cultivated by local communities for palm oil, he said.

Mulawarman University vice president Sukartiningsih said the participation of all stakeholders, including the private sector, is important to ensure the success of the reforestation program, considering that it is estimated to cost a lot of money.

“The rehabilitation of watershed areas that involves companies greatly helps the government,” she told Mongabay. “That’s why we need to monitor [rehabilitation by the private sector] so that it is right on target.”

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Featured image: Jokowi visiting the location of Indonesia’s new capital Nusantara with the Governor of East Kalimantan in 2019. Image by BPMI President’s Secretariat/Muchlis Jr via Wikimedia Commons (Public domain).

Australia: When Scott Morrison Met Nemesis

February 16th, 2024 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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There are few surprises regarding the final episode of Nemesis, the three-part account on how the Australian Liberal Party, in partnership with the dozy Nationals, psychotically and convulsively disembowelled themselves from the time Tony Abbott won office in 2013. Over the muddy gore and violence concluding the tenures of Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull, one plotter rose, knife bloodied and brimming with confidence: Scott Morrison. As always, he claims to have done so without a trace.  That, dear readers, is the way of all advertising men.

The inconspicuous rise of Morrison heralded a bankrupt political culture, one of smeary gloss, smug grabs on complex issues, the insufferable slogan, the intelligence shaving brochure, the simplifying statement about worlds complex and abstract. No political environment can, nor should ever eschew the simple message, but Morrisons’s minute, unimaginative cosmos – that of the advertising man with his swill bucket sloshing away – had little to merit it.

With such a stunted Weltanschauung, Morrison’s misdeeds proved vast in spread and stench, the result of what former cabinet minister and creep-in-chief Christopher Pyne understatedly called a “lack of humility”. The makers of Nemesis could only dip their feet in the waters of his blighted stewardship. It would have taken several immersions alone to cover the despoiling of public life marked by stacking the Fair Work Commission and Administrative Appeals Tribunal with appointments friendly to the Coalition or the so-called “rorts” affairs, of which there were many cloacal instances of corruption.

While the library of Australian politics is shelf-heavy with misused funds to advance the fortunes of the party in government, the Morrison government proved exemplary. In the lead-up to the 2019 election, Nationals Senator Bridget McKenzie’s office was the happy recipient of $100 million worth of community sport infrastructure grants. Their destination was exclusively towards marginal seats, best typified by the mock presentation by Georgina Downer to the South Australian Yankalilla bowling club of a $127,373 grant. The novelty cheque from the Liberal candidate for Mayo was scorned by sitting member and independent Rebekha Sharkie at the time as unrivalled in its crassness and desperation.

Much the same story was repeated in the so-called “car parks rorts” affair, which saw hundreds of millions of dollars directed towards 47 car parks, largely located in the top 20 marginal seats selected by staffers working for the then infrastructure minister, Alan Tudge. The decision making by the staffers left the Department of Infrastructure a mere spectator to policy.

By 2022, Morrison’s crooked form on the issue of grants was complete and immortal. The Australian National Audit Office, when examining the Building Better Regions Fund (BBRF), found that “65 per cent of IP [infrastructure project] stream applications approved for funding were not those assessed as being the most meritorious in the assessment process.”

Other matters covered in the series finale continue to look baffling and uncomfortable. Authoritarian paranoia made its ugly appearance in Morrison’s decision to appoint himself, unbeknownst to his fellow ministers, to the departments of health, finance, treasury, home affairs and resources during the COVID-19 crisis. Despite the ravages of the pandemic and the risks of debility to his cabinet, there was no reason for doing so.

Excruciating clumsiness stood out with his handling of sexual assault allegations made by Liberal staffer Brittany Higgins (“Jenny [Morrison’s wife] and I spoke last night and she said to me, you have to think about this as a father”) while his abominable treatment of Christine Holgate, which resulted in the removal of Australia Post’s most successful CEO for approving Cartier watches for select staff, suggested what came to known as the government’s “woman problem”.  The Nationals leader, David Littleproud, could only draw the obvious conclusion: “[W]omen had lost faith in us because we didn’t handle those situations well. That was the real beginning, where Australians stopped listening, but particularly women stopped listening.”

Gross indifference over his clandestine family trip to Hawaii as Australia scorched and smouldered before furious bush fires, one which he hoped the then-Nationals leader Michael McCormack could keep mum about, suggested Morrison’s lack of maturity. “It looked as if there had been lies told to the [press] gallery,” Liberal Senator Andrew Bragg admitted. Liberal MP Russell Broadbent preferred to be “gobsmacked” about the whole affair.

On the issue of the AUKUS security pact between the US, UK and Australia, Morrison nails his colours firmly to the mast as a dangerously deluded pioneer. It was he, and only he, that suggested the submarine agreement with France’s Naval Group for twelve diesel-powered attack submarines be scratched in favour of a nuclear-propulsion option.

Given the incurably mendacious nature of the man, claims to having a monopoly on AUKUS must be regarded with caution. For one thing, it has since come to light that the Australian businessman Anthony Pratt already had former US President Donald Trump’s ear on the subject of nuclear-powered submarines when they met at the Mar-a-Lago club in April 2021. Pratt then allegedly shared the details of the discussion with three former Australian prime ministers, 10 Australian officials, 11 of Pratt’s employees and six journalists. The announcement of AUKUS only took place on September 15, 2021, suggesting a filtering of ideas through the Australian-US security apparatus. Trump may have left office by then, but the lingering interests of the US military industrial complex had not.

Morrison’s unspeakable treatment of the French president, Emmanuel Macron, proved diabolically amateurish and spiteful. To have dinner with the head of state of another country even as plans to terminate an agreement worth A$90 billion is underfoot, suggests some form of arrested mental development. “You don’t cancel a $90 billion contract and the other party is happy,” he merely shrugged. In any case, he did not want to see Macron deploy “the entire French diplomatic corps and [kill] the deal”. This was, in his mind, “the best” of decisions, “one that others had never sought to successfully undertake.”

If the best decision of an administration involves the renting of a country’s autonomy, the surrendering of land and facilities to be used by a nuclear-armed, clumsy goliath, the conversion of an entire state to the status of a garrisoned, forward defence base to police rivals, including a power with whom you have no historical animosity with, one is coming very close to confusing patriotic innovation and self-interest with treason.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

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China’s national champions for computer chip – or semiconductor – design and manufacturing, HiSilicon and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), are making waves in Washington.

SMIC was long considered a laggard. Despite being the recipient of billions of dollars from the Chinese government since its founding in 2000, it remained far from the technological frontier. But that perception — and the self-assurance it gave the US — is changing.

In August 2023, Huawei launched its high-end Huawei Mate 60 smartphone. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (an American think tank based in Washington DC), the launch “surprised the US” as the chip powering it showed that Chinese self-sufficiency in HiSilicon’s semiconductor design and SMIC’s manufacturing capabilities were catching up at an alarming pace.

More recent news that Huawei and SMIC are scheming to mass-produce so-called 5-nanometre processor chips in new Shanghai production facilities has only stoked further fears about leaps in their next-generation prowess. These chips remain a generation behind the current cutting-edge ones, but they show that China’s move to create more advanced chips is well on track, despite US export controls.

The US has long managed to maintain its clear position as the frontrunner in chip design, and has ensured it was close allies who were supplying the manufacturing of cutting-edge chips. But now it faces formidable competition from China, who’s technological advance carries profound economic, geopolitical and security implications.

Semiconductors Are a Big Business

For decades, chipmakers have sought to make ever more compact products. Smaller transistors result in lower energy consumption and faster processing speeds, so massively improve the performance of a microchip.

Moore’s Law — the expectation that the number of transistors on a microchip doubles every two years — has remained valid in chips designed in the Netherlands and the US, and manufactured in Korea and Taiwan. Chinese technology has therefore remained years behind. While the world’s frontier has moved to 3-nanometre chips, Huawei’s homemade chip is at 7 nanometres.

Maintaining this distance has been important for economic and security reasons. Semiconductors are the backbone of the modern economy. They are critical to telecommunications, defence and artificial intelligence.

The US push for “made in the USA” semiconductors has to do with this systemic importance. Chip shortages wreak havoc on global production since they power so many of the products that define contemporary life.

Today’s military prowess even directly relies on chips. In fact, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “all major US defence systems and platforms rely on semiconductors.”

The prospect of relying on Chinese-made chips — and the backdoors, Trojan horses and control over supply that would pose — are unacceptable to Washington and its allies.

Stifling China’s Chip Industry

Since the 1980s, the US has helped establish and maintain a distribution of chip manufacturing that is dominated by South Korea and Taiwan. But the US has recently sought to safeguard its technological supremacy and independence by bolstering its own manufacturing ability.

Through large-scale industrial policy, billions of dollars are being poured into US chip manufacturing facilities, including a multi-billion dollar plant in Arizona.

A large factory under construction on a clear, sunny day.

TSMC, the world’s largest chipmaker, building an advanced semiconductor factory in the US state of Arizona. Around the World Photos/Shutterstock

The second major tack is exclusion. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States has subjected numerous investment and acquisition deals to review, ultimately even blocking some in the name of US national security. This includes the high-profile case of Broadcom’s attempt to buy Qualcomm in 2018 due to its China links.

In 2023, the US government issued an executive order inhibiting the export of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment and technologies to China. By imposing stringent export controls, the US aims to impede China’s access to critical components.

The hypothesis has been that HiSilicon and SMIC would continue to stumble as they attempt self-sufficiency at the frontier. The US government has called on its friends to adopt a unified stance around excluding chip exports to China. Notably, ASML, a leading Dutch designer, has halted shipments of its hi-tech chips to China on account of US policy.

Washington has also limited talent flows to the Chinese semiconductor industry. The regulations to limit the movements of talent are motivated by the observation that even “godfathers” of semiconductor manufacturing in Japan, Korea and Taiwan went on to work for Chinese chipmakers — taking their know-how and connections with them.

This, and the recurring headlines about the need for more semiconductor talent in the US, has fuelled the clampdown on the outflow of American talent.

Finally, the US government has explicitly targeted China’s national champion firms: Huawei and SMIC. It banned the sale and import of equipment from Huawei in 2019 and has imposed sanctions on SMIC since 2020.

What’s at Stake?

The “chip war” is about economic and security dominance. Beijing’s ascent to the technological frontier would mean an economic boom for China and bust for the US. And it would have profound security implications.

Economically, China’s emergence as a major semiconductor player could disrupt existing supply chains, reshape the division of labour and distribution of human capital in the global electronics industry. From a security perspective, China’s rise poses a heightened risk of vulnerabilities in Chinese-made chips being exploited to compromise critical infrastructure or conduct cyber espionage.

Chinese self-sufficiency in semiconductor design and manufacturing would also undermine Taiwan’s “silicon shield”. Taiwan’s status as the leading manufacturer of semiconductors has so far deterred China from using force to attack the island.

China is advancing its semiconductor capabilities. The economic, geopolitical and security implications will be profound and far-reaching. Given the stakes that both superpowers face, what we can be sure about is that Washington will not easily acquiesce, nor will Beijing give up.

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North Korean leader Kim Jong-un said the country would not hesitate to use all of its military power to wipe out enemies if any of them used force against it as he marked the anniversary of the founding of its military, state media reported.

“If enemies try to use force against our country, we will make the bold decision to change history and not hesitate to use all our superpower to wipe them out,” KCNA quoted him as saying.

Kim repeated his vow to never hold dialogue or negotiations with South Korea, which he said was his country’s “enemy No. 1,” and said the policy of powerful military readiness was the only way to ensure peace and security for North Korea, KCNA said.

Kim declared at a major meeting of the ruling party at the end of 2023 that peaceful reunification is impossible and his country was making a policy change in how it deals with the South, in a major shift redefining its ties with Seoul.

The KCNA report said Kim made the visit to the Defence Ministry with his “respected daughter,” indicating he was accompanied by his daughter Ju Ae, who is expected by analysts to play a possible future role in the country’s leadership.

North Korea marked the foundation of its military on February 8, and last year, it held a large military parade at midnight showcasing its largest intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Kim’s remarks came after the North Korean parliament voted to abolish laws on economic cooperation with the South.

The parliament also unanimously approved a plan to abolish a special law on the operation of the Mount Kumgang tourism project, once a prominent symbol of inter-Korean cooperation.

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The family feud between the Duterte and Marcos dynasties reached a crescendo when the former and incumbent Philippine presidents publicly accused each other of drug addiction.

During a rally in his hometown of Davao in the southern Philippines, former President Rodrigo Duterte accused his successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, of being a longtime “drug addict.

“We have a drug addict president, son of a bitch,” the former president said amid escalating tensions with the ruling administration that has steadily purged elements from the former regime and squeezed the Duterte family’s access to public resources, including confidential funds for Vice President Sara Duterte as well as large-scale pork barrel funds for the Davao district under another Duterte offspring. 

Meanwhile, his son, Sebastian “Baste” Duterte, currently the mayor of Davao, called on the president to “resign” from office. In response, the comparatively urbane and soft-spoken Marcos Jr broke character and openly accused his predecessor of dependence on addictive painkillers.

“I think it’s the Fentanyl. Fentanyl is the strongest painkiller that you can buy. It is highly addictive and it has very serious side effects, and [former president Duterte] has been taking the drug for a very long time now,” the president claimed.

Beyond the personal insults, Duterte has also incited rebellion, openly calling for secession of his home island of Mindanao from the rest of the Philippines, and publicly threatened to depose Marcos Jr through popular revolt.

Just as worrying to top security officials, however, is the possibility that Duterte will serve as a vortex of opposition to Marcos Jr’s West-leaning foreign policy. Over the past year, Marcos Jr has adopted an increasingly proactive position in the South China Sea, culminating in several violent encounters between Philippine vessels and their Chinese counterparts.

Eager to balance against China’s superior military, the Filipino president has welcomed expanded security cooperation with the United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, India and Europe.

Both Duterte and top Filipino-Chinese businessmen have openly warned Marcos Jr against adopting an assertive stance against China, a top bilateral trading partner. In many ways, the escalating Duterte-Marcos feud is taking place against the backdrop of an intensified New Cold War between the US and China in the region.

Secession Threats

Duterte’s threats of secession and establishment of a “separate, independent” Mindanao have been met with condemnation from all quarters, including top leaders in the southern island province. Crucially, even former top generals who served in Duterte’s cabinet minced no words.

National Security Adviser Eduardo Año, who earlier served as interior secretary and chief of the Philippine military under Duterte, warned that the government “will not hesitate to use its authority and forces to quell and stop all attempts to dismember the Republic” since “there is only one Philippines.”

President Rodrigo Duterte fires a few rounds with a sniper rifle during the opening ceremony of the National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Challenge in Davao City, southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Photo: AFP/Presidential Photo Division/Joey Dalumpines

Then-president Rodrigo Duterte fires a few rounds with a sniper rifle during the opening ceremony of the National Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Challenge in Davao City, southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Photo: Presidential Photo Division /Joey Dalumpines

“Any attempt to secede any part of the Philippines will be met by the government with resolute force, as it remains steadfast in securing the sovereignty and integrity of the national territory,” the former top general and Duterte official added.

For his part,  presidential peace adviser Carlito Galvez Jr, also a former military chief who served in a similar capacity under Duterte, warned “this call for separation is anathema to the letter and spirit of the Philippine Constitution, which is the bulwark of our nation’s identity as a people.”

Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr, yet another former Duterte ally, was also quick to join in opposing a “separate and independent Mindanao.”

“The mandate of the Department of National Defense is to secure the sovereignty of the State and integrity of the national territory as enshrined in the Constitution…We will strictly enforce this mandate whether externally or internally,” Teodoro declared, underscoring the unanimous pushback from the defense establishment against the former president.

But while Duterte’s quixotic (if not treasonous) call for secession of his home island failed to gain any traction, his opposition to his successor’s pro-Western foreign policy has gained more currency among Philippine elites, especially the ruling business class.

“China is very close to us, we cannot be too antagonistic,” warned Teresita Sy-Coson, SM Investments Corp’s vice chairperson, during a major event for her company, which is the largest real estate and mall operator in the Philippines. “Even though we know what is happening, I guess we have to do it through a more peaceful negotiation,” she added.

Her views were echoed by other major Filipino-Chinese businessmen. Cecilio Pedro, president of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Inc, recently warned of investment opportunity costs caused by the deepening maritime row between the Philippines and China.

“The problem with the big [Chinese] companies is that they don’t want to invest until they are clear what are the relations between China and the Philippines moving forward. If the picture is not clear, they will not come,” Pedro told reporters during a recent interview. “To bring money in, they want to make sure that in the next five to 10 years we have a clear direction,” he added.

While China is the Philippines’ top trading partner, critics note that bilateral trade is deeply lopsided with the Philippines incurring huge trade deficits in recent years.

In December, China was responsible for a quarter of the Philippines’ total monthly imports, amounting to US$2.72 billion. In contrast, the Philippines’ exports to China were only $821.53 million, or around 13.3% of total shipments in the same period.

Moreover, there is no evidence that rising geopolitical tensions have had any major impact on bilateral economic ties. If anything, bilateral trade steadily increased during the Benigno Aquino III administration, which took China to international court over the two sides’ South China Sea disputes in 2016.

Meanwhile, the staunchly pro-Beijing Duterte administration failed to attract any big-ticket Chinese infrastructure investments during its six-year tenure despite a $26 billion pledge made on one occasion by China.

Meanwhile, critics of the incumbent are also questioning the true motivations behind Marcos Jr’s foreign policy pivot toward the West. Early in office, the namesake son of the former Filipino president vowed to pursue warmer ties with China but he progressively adopted a tougher stance in the past year amid deepening maritime feuds.

More Than Immunity

Pro-Beijing and other critics have implied that the US may have offered Marcos Jr, who faces multiple court cases in the US on allegations of massive corruption and human rights violations during his father’s dictatorship, more than “sovereign immunity.

President Ferdinand Marcos Jr meets US President Joe Biden in a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2022. Photo: Office of the Press Secretary / Handout

Some observers suspect that Washington may have relaxed its scrutiny of the Marcoses’ massive ill-gotten wealth, estimated at $10 billion, which is suspected to be hidden in various offshore accounts, in exchange for greater military base access and deeper security cooperation vis-a-vis China.

By all indications, though, Marcos Jr’s foreign policy is deeply popular among Filipinos, a majority of whom have consistently backed stronger cooperation with Western allies.

In many ways, the namesake son of the former Philippine dictator is having his cake of popularity at home and eating the benefits of warmer ties with the West. The China issue has also allowed him to gradually marginalize the once-powerful Dutertes, who are seemingly fighting a hopeless and erratic political war from an increasingly weakened position.

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Featured image: Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr (L) and his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte (R) increasingly don’t see eye to eye. Image: Twitter / ABS-CBN

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[This article was first published on APR in September 2021.]

The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have formed an alliance called “AUKUS” to create, in the words of Australia PM Scott Morrison, “a partnership where our technology, our scientists, our industry, our defense forces are all working together to deliver a safer and more secure region that ultimately benefits all.” AUKUS is primarily a military relationship but is said to include broad economic measures that undoubtedly seek to counter China’s rise in all spheres of development. The deal has been met with some opposition in the West. New Zealand has rejected the legitimacy of the alliance while the French ambassadors to the US and Australia were recalled after AUKUS essentially tore up a submarine agreement between France and Australia.

Another point of controversy is whether AUKUS violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The first major initiative of AUKUS is to develop Australia’s first nuclear submarine fleet in the Pacific. Each party in the alliance has denied the intention of developing a “civil” (read military) nuclear weapons capacity in Australia. However, the fact remains that the United States and the UK are sharing nuclear-powered technology for military purposes. Nuclear submarines require the mining of uranium and the development of nuclear plants on Australian soil, both of which are environmentally toxic and prone to accidents.

While neither US President Biden, UK PM Boris Johnson, or Australian PM Scott Morrison were willing to mention China in their announcement of AUKUS, it is no secret that China is the target of the alliance. This can first be deduced from the incoherent military strategy that AUKUS seeks to employ in the region. AUKUS has been presumed as a necessary step to curb “threats” to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific. CNN military analyst Cedric Leighton clarified that the identified “threat” to a “free” Pacific is indeed China. Leighton added that China has not yet done anything to indicate that its economic policy endangers AUKUS’s coveted trade routes in the Pacific.

This begs the question: If China is indeed not a “threat” to trade routes in the Pacific, then why was AUKUS formed? Surely AUKUS belies economic sense given that peace is an essential component of economic development. China is Australia’s largest trading partner in both imports and exports. China is also a top five trading partner to the United States and the UK. AUKUS is a subtle admission that the particular economic interests of Western nation-states ultimately run secondary to the long-term imperatives of militarism and hegemonism.

AUKUS is an expression of the broad agenda of the United States and its allies to exact white colonial revenge from China vis-à-vis military aggression. The alliance comes after more than a decade of aggressive acts led by the United States which have aptly been summarized as a New Cold War on China. The US “Pivot to Asia” has deployed hundreds of thousands of US troops and hundreds of military bases, aircraft, and warships to the Pacific since 2011. The UK, as part of its “special relationship” with the US, has followed suit by deploying its Royal Navy to patrol what it calls “its playground” which spans from the Indian ocean to the Pacific west coast of the United States.

Australia has also been a leading force in the increasingly aggressive posture taken by the West towards China. Australia is a member of the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) alliance of the US, India, and Japan which conducted its first joint military exercise in November of 2020. In the summer of 2020, PM Scott Morrison vowed to increase Australia’s military budget by $270 billion over the next ten years at the same time that the US was deploying three aircraft carriers to the South China Sea in a blatant act of military aggression against China. In April 2021, Morrison solidified these investments by pledging nearly $600 million in joint exercises and military basing projects with the United States.

Australia is also a home base for the US-led propaganda war on China, which itself possesses a racist and colonial character. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) is one of the leading think-tanks in anti-China propaganda. The ASPI’s work includes orientalist “research” into so-called human rights abuses in China’s Xinjiang province and direct attacks on outlets such as The Grayzone for countering their propaganda. The ASPI receives direct funding from the US State Department and the Australian Department of Defense. Other major funders include the three of the five biggest military contractors in the world: Northrup Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon.

The ASPI is a naked expression of the nexus between anti-China propaganda and military aggression. Just days after the formation of AUKUS, Australia’s Defense Minister Peter Dutton announced that ASPI would be opening an office in Washington DC. This move demonstrates clearly that a line in the sand is being drawn by US imperialism and its allies. Outright lies about China’s so-called “aggression” in its own seas or “human rights violations” within its own borders have sparked a racist flame within the white and Western-led imperialist order headed by the United States. Public opinion toward China has fallen dramatically within the imperialist countries in response to the non-stop propaganda blitz of a “China threat” led by think-tanks such as the ASPI.

What the US and its Western allies work hard to conceal is that the basis for their policy of colonial revenge toward China rests upon a state of decline. It’s not that China is a threat to the wellbeing of humanity, but that China has rapidly progressed to the point where its economic and political model is taking center stage in global development. China’s economic and technological growth does not merely threaten to supplant the US and its Western allies from a purely competitive standpoint. Rather, China’s model of development represents a clear break from the dictates of white supremacy and colonialism that underwrite the imperialist order. More than forty years of predatory neoliberal capitalism and US-led imperialist hegemony have demonstrated that the centuries-old Western colonial system has nothing left to offer humanity but austerity, climate catastrophe, and endless war.

China, on the other hand, offers the world’s impoverished majority in the Global South hope for a better future. China is more than willing to share lessons from its defeat of extreme poverty and rapid infrastructure development in the areas of high-speed rail and 5G technology by way of the Belt and Road Initiative—a massive China-led infrastructure cooperation agreement that has the active participation of more than 130 countries. Developing countries in the Global South have counted on China to provide concrete assistance in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. China also offers loans to developing countries on terms which are more favorable than the conditionalities of Western lending institutions. Furthermore, nations beleaguered by imperialism such as Syria, Cuba, the DPRK, and Iran have relied on China for political solidarity against barbaric US sanctions as well as much needed economic cooperation in the face of US aggression.

In the 20th century, the world was divided into two camps: a socialist camp led by the Soviet Union and a capitalist camp led by the United States. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the US and its Western partners enjoyed nearly free reign to dominate and exploit the planet in the interests of private shareholders and war profiteers. US and Western leaders hoped that China’s integration into the global economy would spell doom for its socialist system. AUKUS, and the New Cold War on China from which the alliance emerges, is rooted in a deepening desire among the historic white colonizers of the planet to exact revenge on China for refusing to relinquish its sovereignty and its world historic model of socialist development. The AUKUS alliance of white colonial states wishes for the evisceration of peaceful socialist development itself, especially when it is led by a nation of 1.4 billion non-white people who share core interests with the vast majority of humanity.

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[This article was originally published in March 2023.]

A recent US Chamber of Commerce InSTEP program hosted three empire managers to talk about Washington’s top three enemies, with the US ambassador to China Nicholas Burns discussing the PRC, the odious Victoria Nuland discussing Russia, and the US ambassador to Israel Tom Nides talking about Iran.

Toward the end of the hour-long discussion, Burns made the very interesting comment that Beijing must accept that the United States is “the leader” in the region and isn’t going anywhere.

“From my perspective sitting here in China looking out at the Indo-Pacific, our American position is stronger than it was five or ten years ago,” Burns said, citing the strength of US alliances, its private sector and its research institutions and big tech companies.

“And I do think that the Chinese now understand that the United States is staying in this region — we’re the leader in this region in many ways,” Burns added emphatically.

The “Indo-Pacific” is a term which has gained a lot of traction in geopolitical discourse in recent years, typically describing the vast multi-continental region between Australia to the south, Asia to the north, Africa to the west, and the middle of the Pacific Ocean to the east. It contains half the Earth’s population, and it very much includes China.

After making the rather audacious claim of being “the leader” of a region which China is a part of but the United States is not, Burns went on to claim the US does not want any kind of confrontation with the Chinese government.

“We want a future of peace with China,” Burns said. “As President Biden makes clear every time he talks about this, we don’t want conflict, but we’re gonna hold our own out here. And I feel optimistic, just concluding my first year as ambassador, about the American position in this country and in this region.”

Again, Burns is saying this from China, so by “in this country” he means in China.

Burns supported the Iraq war and is on record saying that “China is the greatest threat to the security of our country and of the democratic world,” and he was appointed to his current position for a reason. Though especially hawkish and American supremacist, his comments are entirely in alignment with official US foreign policy; here’s an excerpt from a White House strategy published last year titled “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States“:

The United States is an Indo-Pacific power. The region, stretching from our Pacific coastline to the Indian Ocean, is home to more than half of the world’s people, nearly two-thirds of the world’s economy, and seven of the world’s largest militaries. More members of the U.S. military are based in the region than in any other outside the United States. It supports more than three million American jobs and is the source of nearly $900 billion in foreign direct investment in the United States. In the years ahead, as the region drives as much as two-thirds of global economic growth, its influence will only grow—as will its importance to the United States.

In a quickly changing strategic landscape, we recognize that American interests can only be advanced if we firmly anchor the United States in the Indo-Pacific and strengthen the region itself, alongside our closest allies and partners.

This intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from the PRC. The PRC is combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological might as it pursues a sphere of influence in the Indo-Pacific and seeks to become the world’s most influential power. The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific. From the economic coercion of Australia to the conflict along the Line of Actual Control with India to the growing pressure on Taiwan and bullying of neighbors in the East and South China Seas, our allies and partners in the region bear much of the cost of the PRC’s harmful behavior. In the process, the PRC is also undermining human rights and international law, including freedom of navigation, as well as other principles that have brought stability and prosperity to the Indo-Pacific.

Our collective efforts over the next decade will determine whether the PRC succeeds in transforming the rules and norms that have benefitted the Indo-Pacific and the world. For our part, the United States is investing in the foundations of our strength at home, aligning our approach with those of our allies and partners abroad, and competing with the PRC to defend the interests and vision for the future that we share with others. We will strengthen the international system, keep it grounded in shared values, and update it to meet 21st-century challenges. Our objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment in which it operates, building a balance of influence in the world that is maximally favorable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.

As we discussed recently, history’s unfolding has shown us that the US empire’s plan to “shape the strategic environment” in which China operates has meant continuing to encircle China with war machinery in ways the US would never permit itself to be encircled. So when men like Joe Biden and Nicholas Burns claim the US does not seek a confrontation with China, what they really mean is that they hope China just sits back without responding to the confrontation the US is already inflicting upon it.

The way US empire managers talk about “leading” ostensibly sovereign states with ostensibly independent governments shows you they really do think they own the world. We see this in news stories like US officials admonishing Brazil for permitting Iran to harbor military ships thousands of miles away from the US coastline, while continually shrieking about China asserting a small sphere of influence over the South China Sea which the US continually transgresses by sailing and flying its own war machinery right through it.

We also see US empire managers claiming ownership of the entire planet in instances like when they drew a “red line” on China providing Russia with military assistance even as the US and its allies pour weapons into Ukraine, or the time Biden said that “everything south of the Mexican border is America’s front yard,” or the time then-Press Secretary Jen Psaki remarked on the mounting tensions around Ukraine that it is in America’s interest to support “our eastern flank countries”, suggesting that the eastern flank of the United States is eastern Europe and not its own geographic eastern coastline.

They claim ownership over the entire planet while pretending that they do not seek confrontation with the nations they try to subjugate, and interpret any refusal to be subjugated as an unprovoked act of aggression. This is taking our world in a very dangerous direction, and we need to do something to stop it.

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Itochu Corporation’s aviation unit will end its cooperation with Israeli defense contractor company Elbit Systems Ltd by the end of February following the ICJ ruling, the company announced on Monday.

Itochu Chief Financial Officer Tsuyoshi Hachimura said in a statement that Itochu plans to end the collaboration after the World Court ordered Israel last month to prevent acts of genocide against Palestinians and do more to help civilians.

“Taking into consideration the International Court of Justice’s order on January 26, and that the Japanese government supports the role of the Court, we have already suspended new activities related to the MOU, and plan to end the MOU by the end of February,” Hachimura said.

Itochu Aviation, Elbit Systems and Nippon Aircraft Supply (NAS) signed the strategic cooperation memorandum of understanding (MoU) in March 2023, seven months before Israel launched its genocidal war on Gaza.

The International Court of Justice ordered Israel on Friday to take measures to prevent and punish direct incitement of genocide in its ongoing war in Gaza.

An overwhelming majority of the ICJ’s 17-judge panel voted to order urgent measures, which covered most of South Africa’s request, aside from ordering a halt to the Israeli war on Gaza.

The court ordered Israel to refrain from any acts that could fall under the genocide convention and also ensure that the Israeli army do not commit any genocidal acts in Gaza.

According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health, 27,365 Palestinians have been killed, and 66,630 wounded in Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza starting on October 7. Palestinian and international estimates say that the majority of those killed and wounded are women and children.

Moreover, at least 8,000 people are unaccounted for, presumed dead under the rubble of their homes throughout the Strip. 

Palestinian and international estimates say that the majority of those killed and wounded are women and children.

The Israeli aggression has also resulted in the forceful displacement of nearly two million people from all of the Gaza Strip, with the vast majority of the displaced forced into the densely crowded southern city of Rafah near the border with Egypt – in what has become Palestine’s largest mass exodus since the 1948 Nakba.

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Featured image: Itochu headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. (Photo: Tokyo Watcher, via Wikimedia Commons)

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Strong First Nations-Palestinian solidarity was a prominent feature of the 2024 Invasion Day march on Gadigal Country (Sydney) on January 26.

This was reflected in banners, placards, contingents, speeches (including that by Palestinian activist Ahmed Abadla) and in a performance by Muruwari and Filipino rapper Dobby at the rally before the march.

Many marchers wore the keffiyeh as a statement of solidarity with Palestine.

Khaled Ghannam, who marched with fellow Palestinians in a contingent, told Green Left that Palestinians strongly identified with the First Nations peoples’ struggle against colonisation and the stealing of their land.

“The same thing is happening in Palestine,” he said.

“We talked to many Aboriginal comrades and they said to us: ‘Do not leave your land and do not stop fighting’.”

First Nations activists have spoken at all weekly rallies and marches against Israel’s genocide in Gaza, he said, and in this collaboration have shared many experiences.

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Featured image: Palestine contingent at the Invasion Day march in Gadigal land/Sydney. Photo: Peter Boyle

US Marines Rush Wonky Amphibious Vehicles to the Pacific

February 1st, 2024 by Gabriel Honrada

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The US Marine Corps (USMC) is set to deploy its advanced Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) to the Pacific despite questions about its readiness, maintenance and operation amid recent restrictions on surf-based use of the platform.

The ACV deployment, expected in or around March, aims to fill a looming amphibious warfare ship shortage amid rising tensions with China over Taiwan.

Defense News reported the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit will deploy with the ACVs aboard the US Navy’s Boxer Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) in phases, with the amphibious transport dock Somerset heading to the Pacific in the coming days for a six-month scheduled deployment.

The Defense News report says that the amphibious assault ship USS Boxer and the dock landing ship USS Harpers Ferry will deploy about two months later due to ship readiness and maintenance challenges.

The ACV is slated to replace the USMC’s aging Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAV), which have been in service since the 1970s. Defense News mentions that the eight-wheeled ACV can emerge from a ship, transit waves and then roll onto shore, allowing the military’s amphibious force to conduct amphibious operations.

However, ACV operations have been restricted for nearly 18 months after one rolled over in the water during training exercises in October 2022, prompting the USMC to halt nearly all surf-based operations, Defense News reports.

The ACV has also faced challenges on land, including a December 2023 rollover that killed a Marine aboard at a California USMC base.

The USMC has attributed the mishaps to training shortfalls and said it is on the process of recertifying vehicle operators and maintainers. But even the operators who have been recertified are not yet authorized to transit the surf zone with embarked troops or when the average height of the tallest waves is four feet or higher, Defense News reports.

A July 2020 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report mentions that the USMC’s AAVs have become increasingly challenging to operate, maintain and sustain. The report notes that even as the USMC’s AAVs have been upgraded over the years, they have capability shortfalls in land and water mobility, protection and network capability.

The CRS report also says that the AAV’s two-mile ship-to-shore range is viewed as a survivability issue for the vehicle and naval amphibious forces. Amphibious operations are considered among the most complex military operations, requiring planning across multiple domains amid significant operational challenges.

In a 2018 Marine Corps University Journal article, Steven Yeadon mentions that anti-ship missiles and tactical aircraft, submarines, mines, air defenses and opposing forces ashore pose significant challenges to modern amphibious operations.

Yeadon notes that while ARGs have several options for missile defense, potential adversaries can detect the force at over-the-horizon (OTH) ranges. Even though ARGs have sufficient missile defenses, Yeadon says, they become less effective as the force gets closer to shore as adversaries can deploy more missiles and the reaction time against these threats decreases.

Colin Smith and Stephen Webber mention in an October 2023 RAND think tank report that connectors such as AAVs are susceptible to multiple threats and vulnerable if engaged, noting that AAVs are exceptionally slow and must be launched close to shore.

While the ACV aims to address the AAV’s shortcomings, a March 2023 CRS report raises concerns about the ACV’s survivability against anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), noting for example the vulnerability of Russian armored vehicles against such weapons in the ongoing Ukraine war. 

Further to those survivability concerns, Karl Flynn notes in a November 2020 Proceedings article that the USMC’s relatively lightly armed and armored vehicles, such as the ACV, AAV, and Light Armored Vehicle (LAV), would be vulnerable in possible operations against China’s People’s Liberation Army-Marine Corps (PLA-MC) in a conflict over Taiwan.

Flynn notes that currently fielded AAVs and LAVs may be under-armored and under-gunned against the PLA-MC’s amphibious tanks, noting that the USMC’s decision to divest itself of M1 Abrams tanks has resulted in a situation where the PLA-MC outmatches USMC armor in terms of both firepower and protection.

The USMC may also struggle to keep its forces at sea as it contends with an amphibious warfare ship shortage.

In a Defense News article this month, Megan Eckstein mentions that USMC is considering alternate deployments to address the shortage, which Lieutenant General Karsten Heckl, deputy commandant for combat development and integration, has called the “single biggest existential threat” to the service.

Eckstein says the USMC has been forced to use other types of ships, such as the Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) and Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF), to fill the gap. But while the USMC has successfully used the EPF in the Pacific several times recently, the ship is not tailor-made for amphibious missions.

Bryan McGrath notes in a January 2023 Defense One article that the US is planning to acquire Light Amphibious Warships (LAW) that could also transport Marines from shore to shore, unlike traditional connectors such as AAVs.

However, McGrath points out that LAWs may not be survivable against anti-ship missiles, lack the capacity to resupply far-flung forces in remote islands and could be too slow and under-armed for combat. They are also costly, he notes.  

In contrast to the USMC’s woes, China is apparently making steady progress in modernizing the PLA-MC, expanding the force in quality and quantity.

In a Task and Purpose article this month, Jeff Schogol notes that as of 2022 the PLA-MC has expanded from two to eight combined arms brigades, noting in comparison a US Army brigade typically has 5,000 soldiers.

Schogol notes that while the PLA-MC would play a vital role in a potential invasion of Taiwan, the force is an enabler, not the main invasion force, as the PLA-Ground Force (PLA-GF) has specially trained amphibious assault troops for such an operation.

While the PLA-MC can contribute six battalions to support an invasion effort, Schogol says it is still hamstrung by its small size and lack of experience in expeditionary operations. 

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Featured image: The Marine Corps pulled the amphibious combat vehicle from most operations in the surf following nonfatal mishaps in 2022. Photo: Corporal Carl Matthew Ruppert / Marine Corps

Digest of Inter-Korean Tensions at the Turn of 2024

February 1st, 2024 by Dr. Konstantin Asmolov

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The author barely completed one digest, when events on the peninsula rapidly developed. The New Year vacations were not much different from work in terms of preparing materials for the New Eastern Outlook.

On December 17, mere thirty minutes after launching a short-range missile towards the Sea of Japan, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) released a statement from the military department. The statement claimed that the results of the second meeting of the South Korea-US Nuclear Security Consultative Group constituted an open declaration of nuclear confrontation. “Any attempt of the hostile forces to use armed forces against the DPRK will face a preemptive and deadly response.”

On December 18 at 8:24 a.m., North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan. The missile flew approximately 1,000 kilometers along a steep trajectory before falling into the East Sea, about 250 kilometers from the border of Japan’s exclusive economic zone. North Korea thus launched its fifth intercontinental ballistic missile in 2023.

On December 18, the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff announced that US Special Forces (Green Berets and SEALs) and South Korean Special Forces were conducting joint special operations exercises on the Korean Peninsula. Due to the nature and specifics of Special Forces’ activities, it is assumed that measures were taken to eliminate the military-political leadership and decapitate North Korea. The ROK military department did not confirm or deny this.

During a meeting with members of the Second Red Flag Company of the General Missile Bureau on December 20, Kim Jong-un stated that the launch of the Hwasong-18 solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile demonstrated the DPRK’s readiness to launch a nuclear strike without hesitation in the event of nuclear provocations by the enemy.

“It is the genuine defense capability… to have the real capability for preemptively attacking the enemy anywhere , making any enemy feel fear,” Kim Jong-un emphasized.

On December 20, in response to Pyongyang’s launch of the Hwasong-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, the air forces of South Korea, the United States, and Japan conducted a joint exercise. US B-1B strategic bombers, F-16 fighters, South Korean F-15K fighter jets, and Japanese F-2 fighters participated in the exercise. The exercise occurred above the sea to the east of Jeju Island, where the air defense identification zones of the Republic of Korea and Japan intersect. This was the second time the Air Force has conducted a trilateral exercise since the beginning of the year. The Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK Armed Forces aim to enhance their joint response capabilities to North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats.

As the new year approached, South Korea’s National Intelligence Service increased their duty hours due to potential provocations from North Korea. These provocations could include military actions, psychological operations such as spreading fake news to divide society, attempts to infiltrate South Korean territory, cyberattacks, drone incursions, and more. The intelligence agency stated on December 28 that there is a high likelihood of North Korea engaging in military provocations early next year, prior to major elections in South Korea and the United States. The return to power of three key North Korean officials, who are believed to be responsible for Pyongyang’s major provocations against the South, may indicate a concerning development.

On the same day, December 28, during a visit to the Fifth Army Infantry Division in the border county of Yeoncheon, 60 kilometers north of Seoul, Yoon Suk-yeol ordered the military to shoot first and report later in case of provocation.

“We should smash the enemy’s desire for provocations immediately on the ground.”

Yoon added that North Korea is the only country in the world that explicitly includes invasion and preventive use of nuclear weapons in its constitution. It is possible that North Korea could undertake provocations at any time.

At the same time, during the plenum of the WPK Central Committee, which the author covered in a separate text, Kim Jong-un suggested a fundamental departure from the current policy towards South Korea and described the current inter-Korean relations as ‘relations between two hostile countries.’ Kim stated that the DPRK Armed Forces should be prepared to restore order throughout the entire territory of the Republic of Korea in the event of an emergency, including the use of nuclear weapons.

On January 1, 2024, President Yoon Suk-yeol said in his New Year’s address that in the first half of 2024, South Korea and the United States will complete a strengthened “extended deterrence” regime to block North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, underscoring their commitment to building a “genuine and lasting peace” through strength. Shin Won-sik, Minister of National Defense, stated in his New Year’s message that North Korea must understand that provocative actions that threaten South Korea will only lead to its own destruction.

The rhetoric in the North was very similar. On December 31, 2023, Kim Jong-un met with top commanders of the Korean People’s Army, including commanders of major formations. The leader of the DPRK analyzed the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in detail. The possibility of an armed clash is becoming a reality by the hour. He said that “if the enemies opt for military confrontation and provocation against the DPRK, our army should deal a deadly blow to thoroughly annihilate them by mobilizing all the toughest means and potentialities without moment’s hesitation.”

On January 1, about 330 members of the artillery brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division of the South Korean Army fired about 150 artillery rounds during an exercise in the central part of the “presumed front line,” simulating a scenario in which the enemy opens fire first.

ROK ground forces conducted live-fire drills and mechanized unit maneuvers on January 2. The Capital Mechanized Infantry Division, the 2nd Quick Response Division, and other units, including those with K9 self-propelled howitzers and K2 tanks, held exercises in areas adjacent to the inter-Korean border. During the exercise, the soldiers practiced responding to enemy artillery provocations. Apache attack helicopters provided air support to ground troops.

On January 3, the ROK Navy conducted its first live-fire exercise of the year. The exercise involved 13 warships and three aircraft from the First, Second, and Third Fleets and took place in waters off the east, west, and south coasts of the country simultaneously.

On January 4, South Korea and the United States conducted a joint live-fire exercise near the border with North Korea to enhance their military readiness. The exercise simulated a precision strike by an A-10 combat aircraft against conditional targets, including firing by a K1A2 tank and integrated air defense tank firing.

North Korea strongly criticized the New Year’s exercises due to the use of live firing and a wide range of military assets, including K1A2 and K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers, Stryker infantry carrier vehicles, AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, A-10 attack aircraft, and RC-135V Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft. According to a statement, made on January 4 by KCNA, Seoul began the new year with “self-destructive” actions. “There will be the highest risk of clashes this year, as invading forces, such as the United States and Japan, will crawl into the peninsula under the South Korean puppet group’s plea and active cooperation, and they will likely stage unprecedented provocative war moves such as a nuclear strike,” the KCNA said. South Korean “warmongers” will only face the “most painful moments they cannot even imagine” if they continue to stage confrontational moves against the North, the statement said.

On January 4, KCNA released a commentary that contained offensive language, stating that “Confrontation maniacs will suffer most painful moments.” “The bellicose behaviors of the puppet group conducted under the provocative remarks “promptly, forcefully and persistently” make the world know what aspect and color the situation of the Korean peninsula will assume in 2024.”

The words were accompanied by deeds. On January 4, between 9:00 and 11:00 in the morning, North Korean artillery fired approximately 200 shells into the waters off its western coast. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea, the artillery shelling came from Cape Changsan and Cape Seongsan, north of the South Korean border islands of Baengnyeongdo and Yeonpyeong. The administration of Yeonpyeong Island ordered civilians to evacuate to underground shelters, but both South Korean military and civilians remained unharmed. All shells landed in the maritime buffer zone north of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, which serves as the inter-Korean maritime border.

In the world media, these shootings somehow caused a sensation because over time, or due to a translation error, the news about evacuating the population from possible shootings became news about evacuating because of shootings: “The DPRK shelled the Yeonpyeong and Baengnyeong islands.”

Naturally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea stated that the DPRK is fully responsible for the escalation of the crisis in the region and urged North Korea to cease what they consider provocative actions. It has been stated that the South Korean military, in close cooperation with the United States, is closely monitoring North Korea’s activities and is prepared to take retaliatory actions commensurate with Pyongyang’s “provocations”.

In the afternoon of January 4, the ROK military responded to the DPRK shelling with its own firing of K9 self-propelled artillery howitzers and tank guns, firing twice as many shells – about 400 vs over 200. At around 3 p.m., the 6th Marine Brigade forces deployed on Baengnyeong island and military units on Yeonpyeong participated in the exercises.

The General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, however, denied the ROK’s claim that the KPA had fired coastal artillery at the islands in the northern waters. Yes, “units and sub-units in charge of the southwestern coastal defense under the 4th Corps of the KPA staged a naval live-shell firing drill into five districts with 192 shells by mobilizing 47 cannons of various calibers of 13 companies and 1 platoon force from 09:00 to 11:00 on January 5.” The direction of firing doesn’t give even an indirect effect on ROK, but “it is a sort of natural countermeasure taken by the KPA against the military actions of the ROK military gangsters.”

On January 5, ROK media reported that North Korea appeared to have rebuilt some of its destroyed guard posts inside the DMZ with concrete structures and mined a road connecting South Korea to the now-shuttered Joint Industrial Complex in the border town of Kaesong.

On January 5, North Korean media reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited a military factory that produces mobile transport and launch units for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Accompanied by his daughter Kim Ju-ae and major party functionaries, Kim Jong-un inspected the factory. The leader of the DPRK commended the labor collective of the enterprise for exceeding the production plan. The leader also emphasized the importance of preparing for a potential “military conflict” due to the current difficult situation. According to Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalev, the total number of launchers can be determined by analyzing the footage in the report. There were eight Hwaseongpo-18 ICBMs and four Hwaseongpo-17 ICBMs.

On January 6, the South Korean government claimed that the North Korean military had fired approximately 60 artillery shells towards Yeonpyeong island. However, all of the shells fell in the buffer zone north of the Northern Limit Line in the Yellow Sea. This time, South Korea did not respond with the artillery firing, as, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Republic of Korea, North Korea fired all the shots toward its own territory.

On January 7, the DPRK fired about 90 artillery shells towards South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island. However, Kim Yo-jong of the DPRK stated that there was no firing on January 6. In her statement titled “Misjudgment, conjecture, obstinacy, and arrogance will invite irretrievable misfortune,” the First Sister highlighted that despite the media hype and the ROK military’s statements, “we conducted a deceptive operation in order to assess the real detecting ability of the ROK military gangsters engrossed in bravo and blind bravery while crying for “precision tracking and monitoring” and “striking origin” whenever an opportunity presents itself and give a burning shame to them, who will certainly make far-fetched assertions.” There were simulated bombings that the Southerners “misjudged … as the sound of gunfire and conjectured it as a provocation. And they even made a false and impudent statement that the shells dropped in the sea buffer zone north of the “northern limit line.” At the same time, Kim Yo-jong made herself clear once again that “the safety catch of the trigger of the KPA had already been slipped” and “the KPA will launch an immediate military strike if the enemy makes even a slight provocation.”

In addition to these statements, North Korean Central Television displayed sequential explosions of gunpowder charges in a field surrounded by hills. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected the statement, labeling it as ‘low-grade propaganda’ intended to erode the confidence of ROK residents in the armed forces. The spokesperson for ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff said that the South Korean armed forces’ detection system quickly identified the locations of artillery fire.

The media outlet reported that some shells fell just above the Northern Limit Line.

In conclusion, this is how experts and the population of the Republic of Korea view the upcoming year. According to data released by Opinion Research Justice in October 2023, 48.3 percent of respondents said they believe a surprise attack from the North is somewhat or very likely, while 47.4 percent said such a scenario is unlikely or impossible. The percentage of individuals concerned about war has increased from 37% in 2017 to 42.7% in 2020, according to the previous two surveys.

According to Cho Han-Bum, a senior research fellow at the Korea Institute for National Unification, Kim’s recent statements indicate the North’s decision to leave any peaceful talks with South Korea. Instead, the regime will achieve “its ultimate goal of unification through the use of force, not through peaceful means. It seeks the collapse of South Korea,” Cho explained, adding that South Korea should prepare for heightened military provocations.

Yang Moo-jin, president of the University of North Korean Studies, predicts that the conflict between North and South Korea will escalate in 2024, surpassing the levels seen in recent years. This is due to the increased tensions between South Korea, the US, and Japan on one side, and North Korea, Russia, and China on the other.

Oh Gyeong-Seob, the director at the state-funded Korea Institute for National Unification, said in his report that “The Kim regime is presumed to be using the strategy of heightening military tensions on the peninsula to be recognized as a nuclear state by the US government.”

Other analysts said North Korea will focus on improving its nuclear and missile programs to increase its leverage ahead of the US presidential election in November, hoping that former US President Donald Trump will be re-elected.

The security dilemma and the actions of the ROK and the US are not related. “North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un appears to have taken a more offensive policy stance toward South Korea to divert internal attention from economic difficulties and discontent over the hereditary power succession,” Seoul’s top point man on inter-Korean relations said on January 6.

According to guest experts invited by The Korea Times — Cha Du-hyeogn, a senior analyst at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, a think tank, and Kim Jin-ha, a researcher at the Korea Institute for National Unification, North Korea may be preparing for a nuclear weapons test. This could include an underground nuclear explosion, an explosion underwater, or an explosion in the atmosphere.

 North Korea is expected to avoid outright provocations due to fear of retaliation from the combined forces of Seoul and Washington, but well-calculated provocations may still occur. But it could be planning “something similar to the 2015 attack in which two South Korean soldiers were seriously wounded by a landmine in the Demilitarized Zone.” The details of this incident indicated otherwise, it should be added.

The JoongAng, a conservative newspaper, succinctly captured the overall sentiment of the comments with the phrase, “A strict but cautious response is needed”: “North Korea will surely escalate the level of provocation against South Korea. Our military must dampen its will to provoke South Korea through stern security posture and retaliation. At the same time, our military must demonstrate crisis management skills to prevent an unwanted armed clash. The government must be careful not to be exploited by North Korea to prompt our internal conflict ahead of the April 10 parliamentary elections.”

More importantly for the author, the risk of accidental clashes between the two Koreas has increased as the buffer zones established under the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement have become invalid.

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Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Leading research fellow of the Center for Korean Studies at the Institute of China and Modern Asia of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.

Featured image is from NEO

Korea’s Court Denies Japan’s State Immunity Again

January 29th, 2024 by Prof. Kim Chang-Rok

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Abstract

On November 23, 2023, the Seoul High Court issued a ruling excluding Japan’s state immunity and fully accepting the claims of Japanese military ‘comfort women’ victims, following the one made by the Seoul Central District Court to the same effect on January 8, 2021. The rulings of the Korean courts are groundbreaking, contributing to the establishment of customary international law by clearly declaring that state immunity does not apply when a sovereign act of the state constitutes a serious violation of human rights, and furthermore, when it constitutes a tort. The Korean courts’ rulings in turn reflect the international community’s legal judgment regarding Japanese military ‘comfort women’ over the past 30 years. The Japanese government did not respond to the lawsuits at all and condemned the rulings as violating international law, claiming state immunity. However, the Japanese government’s condemnation is just a self-contradiction, as it enacted an act embodying the customary international law that foreign countries are not exempt from jurisdiction over court proceedings in case of torts.

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This article was adapted by the author from an article he posted in Korean on the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy in Korea website, on December 26, 2023. 

On November 23, 2023, the 33rd Civil Affairs Division of the Seoul High Court (Judges Koo Hoe-geun, Hwang Seong-mi, and Heo Ik-soo) issued a ruling excluding Japan’s state immunity and fully accepting the claims of Japanese military ‘comfort women’ victims.1 This is the second ruling following the one made by the 34th Civil Affairs Division of the Seoul Central District Court (Judges Kim Jeong-gon, Kim Gyeong-seon, and Jeon Gyeong-se) to the same effect on January 8, 2021.2

In the previous case, a mediation application was filed in August 2013 by 12 Korean victims of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ system to demand compensation of 100 million won per person from the Japanese government. The mediation was not held because the Japanese government refused. It was thus referred to the Seoul Central District Court on January 28, 2016. The ruling in favor of the plaintiffs was finalized at 00:00 on January 23, 2021, as Japan did not appeal.

The more recent appeals court ruling is in response to a second lawsuit filed on December 28, 2016 by 11 Korean victims of the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ system and the bereaved families of five deceased victims, demanding compensation of 200 million won per person from the Japanese government. This ruling was also finalized at 00:00 on December 9, 2023, as Japan did not appeal.

The issues addressed in these lawsuits were diverse, but the core issue was whether the Korean court has jurisdiction over a lawsuit in which the Japanese government is the defendant, that is, whether Japan’s ‘state immunity’ would be recognized by Korea’s judiciary in ‘comfort women’ lawsuits. 

Rule of State Immunity

‘State immunity’ or ‘sovereign immunity’ is a rule in international law that states that a sovereign state does not submit to the jurisdiction of other states. It is a rule derived from the principle that all sovereign states are equal.

In the 19th century, when state immunity first appeared, it started out as an absolute immunity doctrine that applied to all acts of the state, but in the 20th century, it transformed into a limited immunity doctrine that recognizes exceptions, in cases where the actions are considered private actions and not sovereign acts of the state. In the 21st century, there has been a shift toward recognizing exceptions particularly in cases of serious human rights violations or torts.

A recent case that the international community has paid particular attention to regarding state immunity is the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling on February 3, 2012.3 The German government filed a suit with the ICJ, claiming that it was a violation of state immunity that the Italian Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in damages suits filed against Germany by victims of forced mobilization in Italy, including Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany.4 Even if the ICJ accepted Germany’s argument and declared Italy’s defeat, it left room for changes in the future. It stated in its ruling:

The Court concludes that, under customary international law as it presently stands, a State is not deprived of immunity by reason of the fact that it is accused of serious violations of international human rights law or the international law of armed conflict.5

The ICJ’s ruling was met with two contradictory actions by Italy’s legislative and judiciary. On the one hand, the Italian National Assembly accepted the ICJ ruling above and enacted Law No. 5/2013 that mandates the application of state immunity to judges. On the other hand, however, Italy’s Constitutional Court later ruled in 2014 that the law was unconstitutional because it violated the individuals’ fundamental right to judicial protection.6 The opening, created by the ICJ, was thus filled with a confusion on the status of state immunity.

The two rulings of the Korean courts are nothing but a response to the whirlwind of contention or change in the international community surrounding state immunity.

Significance of the Korean Courts’ Rulings

The Korean courts made their rulings on the premises that ‘international customary law on state immunity is not permanent or fixed’ and that ‘international customary law must be understood dynamically, taking into account the direction and flow of change.’ On the basis of these premises, they declared that regarding the damage suffered by Japanese military ‘comfort women’ victims, the government of Japan could not be given state immunity.

Despite their shared premises and verdicts, the two courts offered different reasons. In 2021, the Seoul Central District Court reasoned that state immunity must be waived “if the defendant state destroyed the universal values of the international community and inflicted extreme damage on the victims with anti-human rights acts.” Two years later the Seoul High Court took one step further: 

it is a valid international customary law at present that in the case of a tort committed against a national of the State of the forum within the territory of the State of the forum, state immunity is not recognized without asking whether the act is evaluated as a sovereign act.

The Seoul Central District Court ruling can be seen as one that reflects the trend of the international community moving from a state-centered worldview to a human rights-centered worldview, actively participating in the evolution of state immunity to include exceptions on behalf of human rights. This Seoul High Court ruling, going one step further, developed a trailblazing reasoning that state immunity must change in the direction of excluding it from all torts of the state.

The two Korean rulings were bridged by Brazil’s judiciary. On August 23, 2021, when the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court ruled in a case for damages filed against Germany by the families of victims of a fishing boat that sank after being attacked by a German submarine within Brazilian territorial waters during the Second World War, it decided that state immunity should be limited in cases of violations of jus cogensnorms (or torts that violate human rights within the territory of the State of the forum).7 In the ruling, it presented the 2021 Seoul Central District Court ruling as one of the precedents supporting its decision. The ruling of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court was in turn brought up by the Seoul High Court as one of the supports for its 2023 ruling. The transnational chain of changes sends a clear message to the international community about the direction of international law’s evolution.

The Korean courts’ rulings also reflect the international community’s legal judgment regarding Japanese military ‘comfort women.’ Since the issue of Japanese military ‘comfort women’ was first raised by Korean women’s groups in the late 1980s—and since Kim Hak-soon came forward on August 14, 1991, revealing the facts of the damage and appealing for relief—victims and citizens around the world have demanded recognition of the crime, apology, compensation, truth-finding, history education, commemoration, and punishment of those responsible. In addition, through reports from numerous international organizations such as the UN Human Rights Subcommittee, the ruling of ‘The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal for the Trial of Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery’ in 2000, and resolutions of national and local councils of numerous countries, including House Resolution 121 of the U.S. House of Representatives, violations of international law and Japan’s legal responsibility have been confirmed repeatedly. When the Korean courts ruled in favor of the demands of victims and citizens, therefore, they were following the legal common sense of the international community that accepted them. 

The Japanese Government’s Self-Contradiction

Just as in the first lawsuit, the Japanese government did not respond to the second lawsuit at all, claiming state immunity. Not only did it not appear in court, it even refused to receive the notice of the complaint. This attitude was in contrast to the German government’s appearance in the Italian court to argue for state immunity in the above-mentioned case.

The Japanese government issued, just as it did in the first lawsuit, a ‘Statement by Foreign Minister’ on the same day that the Seoul High Court ruling was pronounced, asserting that the ruling violated the “principle of State immunity under international law,” and was “clearly contrary to” the 1965 ‘Korea-Japan Claims Agreement’ and the 2015 press conference announcement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Korea and Japan regarding the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ (the so-called ‘2015 agreement’).8 It also asserted that the ruling was “extremely regrettable and absolutely unacceptable,” adding “Japan once again strongly urges the Republic of Korea to immediately take appropriate measures to remedy the status of its breaches of international law on its own responsibility as a country.”

First, since it was only in 1992 that the Japanese government first acknowledged the existence of the Japanese military ‘comfort women,’ it is logically inconsistent to say that the issue had been resolved in 1965, almost thirty years earlier, by the ‘Korea-Japan Claims Agreement.’ Second, since the Korean Constitutional Court ruled on December 27, 2019 that the ‘2015 Agreement’ was merely a political agreement that “has no legal effect or binding force,” the agreement cannot be used to challenge the rulings of the Korean courts regarding Japan’s legal responsibility.9

The Japanese government’s claim that these rulings are a violation of international law, furthermore, is also in contradiction with its own ‘Act on Japan’s Civil Jurisdiction Over Foreign Countries, etc.’ (Act No. 24 of 2009), adopted in 2009.

This act is an almost exact copy of the contents of the ‘United Nations Convention on the Judicial Immunity of States and Their Property,’10 which, according to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan ratified in 2009 “to take the initiative” in “promoting the establishment of international rules.”11 The preamble to the above ‘UN Convention’ states that the convention was concluded “taking into account developments in State practice with regard to the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property.” In other words, it declares that the UN Convention contains practices that have become customary international law. Having adopted a law that follows the UN Convention, Japan accepts customary international law on state immunity as domestic law.

Article 10 of the above Japanese act accordingly states, “in the case of death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property caused by an act which is alleged to be attributable to foreign countries, etc., the foreign countries, etc. are not exempt from jurisdiction over court proceedings which relates to pecuniary compensation for damage or loss arising therefrom, if the act occurred in whole or in part in the territory of Japan and if the author of the act was present in Japan at the time of the act.” Applying this provision to the cases in the Korean courts leads logically to the conclusion that state immunity is excluded for Japan’s tort of coercing Japanese military ‘comfort women’. In other words, the Korean rulings are in accordance with and conform to customary international law embodied in Japanese law.

The totality of its actions—its refusal to receive the notice of the complaint, appear in court to present its position, and comply with the ruling—would thus amount to the denigration, or even denial, of the judicial sovereignty of the Republic of Korea.

Since the Japanese government completely denies the Korean court’ rulings, it will accordingly not pay damages. If so, the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ victims who won the case have no choice but to carry out forcible execution. This recourse is allowed by the above Japanese act whose Article 18 stipulates:

foreign countries, etc. are not exempt from jurisdiction over civil execution procedures for property specifically in use or intended for use for purposes other than government non-commercial purposes, and owned by them.12

If forcible execution is carried out, however, the Japanese government is likely to criticize it once again as a violation of international law, only adding another self-contradiction. 

The Korean Rulings as a New Starting Point

Although customary international law has already established that state immunity does not apply to non-sovereign acts (private acts) of a state, customary international law regarding the application of state immunity to sovereign acts is still being formed.

The rulings of the Korean courts are groundbreaking, contributing to the establishment of customary international law by clearly declaring that state immunity does not apply when a sovereign act of the state constitutes a serious violation of human rights, and furthermore, when it constitutes a tort. The 2021 Seoul Central District Court ruling is already attracting the attention of lawyers and legal scholars around the world, and the 2023 Seoul High Court ruling will no doubt do the same.

This groundbreaking achievement was possible thanks to the earnest appeals of victims who have been crying out for justice for over 30 years. This was possible thanks to the hard work of citizens around the world who sympathized with their appeal. Even though the courts in Japan and the United States rejected their request, the courts in South Korea finally responded positively.

History is not simple. Its flow is unpredictable and unstoppable. Over the past 30 years, there have been numerous twists and turns where despair and hope intersected over the Japanese military ‘comfort women’ issue. We have gone through the turbulent history step by step and reached where we are now. We must take another step forward by using the historic rulings of the Korean courts as yet another stepping stone toward defending and expanding human rights.

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Kim Chang-Rok is a Professor at Kyungpook National University Law School, the Republic of Korea. He has taken a historical approach to the legal aspects of Korea-Japan relations and has published papers in this regard.

Notes

1 Republic of Korea, Seoul High Court, Case No. 2016가합505092, 23 November 2023. Korean version is available online at C:/Users/user/Dropbox/PC%20(2)/Downloads/곽예남외15vs일본군_판결21나2017165익명.pdf; Japanese version is available online at http://justice.skr.jp/koreajudgements/53-2.pdf. All internet sites cited in this article are based on search results as of December 22, 2023.

2 Republic of Korea, Seoul Central District Court, Case No. 2021나2017165, 8 January 2021. Korean version is available online at http://womenandwar.net/kr/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/판결문-일본군위안부피해자vs일본국_2016가합505092.pdf; Japanese version is available online at http://justice.skr.jp/koreajudgements/30-1.pdf; English version is available online at https://womenandwar.net/kr/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/ENG-2016_Ga_Hap_505092_30Jun2021.pdf.

3 ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, 3 February 2012, available online at https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/143/143-20120203-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.

4 Italy, Court of Cassation, Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, decision No. 5044/4, 11 March 2004, available online at https://documents.law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/ferrini_v._germany_-_italy_-_2004.pdf.

5 Ibid., para. 91. Emphasis added by the author.

6 Italy, Constitutional Court, Judgment No. 238, 22 October 2014, available online at https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/documenti/download/doc/recent_judgments/S238_2013_en.pdf.

7 Brazil, Federal Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), Recurso Extraordinario com Agravo 954.858 Rio de Janeiro, 23 August 2021, available online at http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/downloadPeca.asp?id=15347973404&ext=.pdf.

8 Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Regarding the Judgment of the Seoul High Court of the Republic of Korea in the Lawsuit Filed by Former Comfort Women and Others (Statement by Foreign Minister KAMIKAWA Yoko),” 23 November 2023, available online at https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press1e_000489.html.

9 Republic of Korea, Constitutional Court, Case No. 2016헌마253, 27 December 2019, available online at https://isearch.ccourt.go.kr/search.do#view.do?link=46771_010300.

10 United Nations, “United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property”, adopted on 2 December 2004, available online at https://treaties.un.org/doc/source/recenttexts/english_3_13.pdf.

11 日本国外務省, 「国及びその財産の裁判権からの免除に関する国際連合条約について」, March 2021, available online at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/treaty/shomei_23_gai.html.

12 According to Japanese lawyers and legal scholars, properties owned by foreign countries etc. in the State of the forum, for which state immunity over forcible execution is excluded by this provision, include real estate for lease to the general public, deposit claims related deposit accounts opened for fund management for commercial purposes, idle land, and merchant ships docked at ports in the State of the forum. See 西脇英司・米山朋宏, 「国等に対する我が国の民事裁判権に関する法律(対外国民事裁判権法)の概要」, 『NBL』 908, 2009, p.47 ; 村上正子, 「外国等に対する我が国の民事裁判権に関する法律(対外国民事裁判権法)」, 『ジュリスト』 1385, 2009, p.75. 

Philippines Pushing China’s Limits in South China Sea

January 18th, 2024 by Richard Javad Heydarian

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The Filipino military chief has announced new plans for massive construction activities across all Philippine-claimed land features in the South China Sea, a move that promises to intensify already hot tensions with China over contested territories.

General Romeo Brawner made the high-stakes announcement, which covers as many as nine disputed sea features, directly after a command conference with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr at the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) headquarters in Camp Aguinaldo.

“We’d like to improve all the nine, especially the islands we are occupying,” he added, referring to Thitu island, the second-largest naturally formed land feature in the Spratlys, as well as in Nanshan island, the fourth-largest in the area.”

The plan comes after earlier announcements that Manila plans to press ahead with fortifying its position in the Second Thomas Shoal – a disputed feature situated between the Spratlys and the island of Palawan — where a small Filipino marine detachment has been precariously stationed in a sinking vessel known as the Sierra Madre.

The Philippines maintains that this is largely for defensive purposes since rival claimants, especially China and to a lesser degree Vietnam, have been engaging in massive construction activities in the area over the past decade.

The Philippine defense establishment sees its new fortification plans as a desperately needed effort to catch up with rivals and make up for years of strategic passivity under the pro-Beijing Rodrigo Duterte presidency.

Nevertheless, Manila risks overcorrecting past mistakes by unduly provoking confrontation with China, which has adopted an increasingly bellicose stance in response to the radical reorientation in Philippine foreign policy under the Marcos Jr administration.

Catch-Up Time

In many ways, the Philippines is both a latecomer as well as a pioneer in the South China Sea scramble. Under the Ferdinand Marcos Sr. dictatorship, the Southeast Asian nation was at the forefront of building military and civilian facilities in the disputed areas, culminating in the establishment of a modern airstrip on Thitu Island in the late 1970s.

Subsequent Filipino presidents, however, lacked either strategic urgency or the resources to maintain and upgrade the country’s position in the maritime area as Vietnam, Malaysia and Taiwan also built substantial facilities on disputed South China Sea features.

But China’s massive reclamation activities, beginning in late 2013, jolted the Philippines out of its stupor. At the same time, Vietnam also pressed ahead with the militarization of land features under its control.

A satellite image from work on a 3.1-kilometer runway in disputed Spratlys Island in an artificial island at Mischief Reef in the South China Sea. Photo: Asia Times files / EyePress / Digital Globe

Even notoriously cautious Malaysia, known for its “quiet diplomacy”, has been unilaterally developing energy resources within Chinese and Vietnamese-claimed waters in recent years.

It was not until the late 2010s that the Philippines, under the guidance of independent-minded Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, began properly maintaining and upgrading its facilities in places such as Thitu Island, which hosts a relatively large civilian community along with military personnel.

The Marcos Jr administration has built on those earlier efforts by recently establishing a two-story facility on the island, which boasts “advanced systems” such as vessel traffic management, coast cameras, radars and satellite communication equipment.

Philippine National Security Council Advisor Eduardo Ano, a former military chief who supported Lorenzana’s efforts in the past, welcomed the new facilities as a means to “greatly enhance the PCG’s [Philippine Coast Guard’s] ability to monitor the movements of the Chinese maritime forces, other countries that might be coming here, and also as well as our own public vessels and aircraft.”

Pushing the Limits

The Philippine defense establishment, however, has even bigger plans for this year. In defiance of China, the AFP is set to fortify its de facto military base over the Second Thomas Shoal, which has been the site of multiple violent encounters between Filipino and Chinese maritime forces in recent months.

“What we are doing is we’re just trying to make it more livable, more habitable for our soldiers because their conditions are really difficult,”  the Philippine military chief said in a mixture of Filipino and English when asked about the purpose of the new project.

“We already have a budget. It is incorporated in the budget of the armed forces. Every year we have a budget for the improvement of facilities,” he added, underscoring the importance of the new construction project as part of a bigger strategic plan in the South China Sea.

While the Philippines sees its action is necessary for national defense, it could nonetheless provoke China into aggressive reprisals. The Asian superpower isn’t only opposed to the Philippine construction plans in the area, but also to the Marcos Jr administration’s overall foreign policy tilt toward the US and its allies.  

Much to China’s chagrin, the Philippines has quickly turned into a new hub for major wargames and joint exercises by Western powers. Last year, the Southeast Asian nation conducted the largest-ever Balikatan exercises, where the US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines simulated potential conflict with China.

Last year also saw the annual Kamandag exercises, at which as many as 2,749 participating troops from the Philippines, US, UK, Japan and South Korea conducted amphibious and naval exercises in a not-so-subtle signal to China.

This went hand in hand with the first-ever Philippine-US aerial patrols in the South China Sea as well as the first-ever quadrilateral Philippines, US, Australia and Japan naval drills in the disputed areas.

Philippine Marines observe their US counterparts conduct a fire mission at Colonel Ernesto Ravina Air Base, Philippines, during exercise Kamandag in 2019. Photo: Donald Holbert / US Marine Corps

The Philippines is also exploring a new Visiting Forces Agreement-style agreement with Japan and France while coordinating an emerging trilateral Japan-Philippine-US alliance known as JAPHUS.

Perhaps of biggest concern to China is the expansion of the Philippine-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) that will grant the Pentagon access to northernmost Philippine military facilities bordering near Taiwan.

The two allies are also rapidly upgrading a whole host of military facilities close to the South China Sea, thus dramatically expanding America’s forward deployment presence in the area.

The upshot of it all is a dangerous and volatile new dynamic, whereby efforts by the Philippines to enhance its position and defend its sovereign rights are reinforcing China’s fears of encirclement by a US-led network of allies.

Absent a robust diplomatic effort, the Philippines could be sleepwalking toward a direct confrontation with the increasingly jittery Asian superpower, a clash that could unintentionally set off a wider regional conflict.

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Japan has resumed construction work on a landfill for the relocation of a US military base in Okinawa despite strong opposition from the island’s governor and residents.

Japan’s central government overrode Okinawa Governor Denny Tamaki’s objections to resume the landfill work, a move Japanese media has described as “unprecedented.” Tamaki said the central government’s actions were “extremely regrettable.”

The landfill construction is part of a project to relocate US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from Ginowan, Okinawa, to Henoko, a coastal area on the east side of the island. In a 2019 referendum, 72% of Okinawan voters opposed the construction of the landfill, and a poll in 2022 found that 68% of Okinawans feel their opinions on US bases in their prefecture are being ignored.

While Okinawa only accounts for 0.6% of Japan’s territory, the prefecture hosts 70.6% of all US military bases in Japan. In total, 31 US military facilities are in Okinawa.

Map showing US bases in Okinawa (Source: Okinawa Prefectural Government)

 

According to Japanese officials, the landfill and work to reinforce soft ground in Henoko will take over nine years. Another three years will be needed to complete the transfer of the US military base, putting the date of the completed project in the mid-2030s.

There is a strong anti-base movement in Okinawa, but their concerns are being ignored as the US is building its military presence in the region to prepare for a future war with China. The US views Okinawa as key to the strategy and plans to deploy new units of anti-ship missile-armed Marines to the island by 2025.

The opposition to the US bases in Okinawa is due to environmental damage, the conduct of US troops on the island, and the dark history of World War II. According to a monument at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, 149,584 civilians were killed during the Battle of Okinawa between US and Japanese Imperial forces in 1945.

The US ended its formal occupation of Okinawa in 1972 and handed it back to Japan, but the population has continued to oppose the US military presence. Okinawa was previously part of the independent Ryukyu Kingdom but was annexed by Imperial Japan in 1879.

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Dave DeCamp is the news editor of Antiwar.com, follow him on Twitter @decampdave.

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The election on January 13th, of Taiwan’s next leader, will choose between Lai Chin-le (Taiwan’s current ‘Vice-President’) who favors war against the mainland, versus Hou Yu-ih, who favors continuation of the ambiguous status-quo that has maintained China’s peace for decades. A less likely third option in this contest is Ko Wen-je, who could draw off enough votes away from Hou Yu-ih so as to throw the ‘election’ to Lai Chin-le, much like Ralph Nader in the 2000 U.S. Presidential ‘election’ drew off enough votes away from Al Gore so as to throw the U.S. Presidential ‘election’ to George W. Bush (which caused the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and might even have caused the successful Saud-Bush 11 September 2001 attacks that Bush blamed on Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden and used as the ‘justification’ for invading Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003).

Lai Chin-le’s chosen running-mate, for ‘Vice President’, is Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s ‘Representative to the United States’ (serving as-if Taiwan were already an independent country instead of a Province of China — which it actually is — Taiwan’s virtual ‘Ambassador to the United States’), as his running mate; and, so, if Lai Chin-le, Taiwan’s current ‘Vice President’, wins, then Taiwan will be essentially owned by the U.S. Government, which requires war against China, and Taiwan will then declare itself to be an independent country, which China would then invade, and then WW III would almost certainly result if the U.S. then invades China.

The current situation, which has been the status-quo ever since 27 February 1972, is that the U.S. Government has had (and has) an agreement with China in which the U.S. says that the U.S. and China are in agreement that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” However, increasingly under both Trump and Biden, the U.S. Government has been encouraging Taiwan to break away from China; and the U.S. media’s publicized ‘experts’ on foreign affairs have been supporting and endorsing Biden’s extremely provocative actions to bring this break-away about, and to fool the U.S. public into believing that Taiwan actually is an independent country — so that Taiwan will become a colony of the U.S. empire.

So: if Lai Chin-le wins the ‘election’ on Saturday, then the danger of a war by the U.S. and its AUKUS ‘allies’ against China will skyrocket and will be higher than it has ever been. Furthermore, such a result on Saturday would immediately transform U.S.-China relations, because virtually the only danger that exists to China’s national security is the threat of an invasion by the U.S., and that threat would then skyrocket on Saturday, and China would immediately know this. Indeed: if Lai Chin-le wins, then  a war between China and the U.S. — a war which has always been widely viewed to be unlikely — would suddenly appear to be likely if not inevitable. So: such an ‘electoral’ win would be a transformative event.

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This article was originally published on The Duran.

Investigative historian Eric Zuesse’s latest book, AMERICA’S EMPIRE OF EVIL: Hitler’s Posthumous Victory, and Why the Social Sciences Need to Change, is about how America took over the world after World War II in order to enslave it to U.S.-and-allied billionaires. Their cartels extract the world’s wealth by control of not only their ‘news’ media but the social ‘sciences’ — duping the public. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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South Africa has filed a suit against Israel for committing genocide in Gaza in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention in the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

Charges of genocide include documentation of Israel’s killing of thousands of women and children, destruction of homes, denial to a population of water, food, power and medical supplies, the expulsion and displacement of citizens of Gaza.

South Africa’s evidence includes reference to Israeli President Isaac Herzog insisting that all Gazans are “Hamas”, therefore no distinction can be made between civilians and alleged combatants.

Despite Australia’s supposed enthusiasm for the rule of international law, it has shown no intention to support the South African initiative.

The Labor government has ignored requests from the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network to intervene on South Africa’s behalf. If Australia did support South Africa, it would aid legal intervention to cease the slaughter and destruction in Gaza and on the West Bank.

In terms of any prima facie judgment, Australia’s foreign policy appears hypocritical.

At the end last September, Australia, without hesitation, joined 31 other countries in support of a Ukrainian suit, filed in the ICJ, against Russia’s “immoral and illegal invasion of Ukraine”.

Australia then called on Russia to comply with an ICJ binding order to immediately withdraw its military forces from Ukraine. Foreign Minister Penny Wong insisted that “Russia must be held to account for its illegal and immoral invasion of Ukraine”.

The standards used to hold Russia to account are not being applied to Israel.

Developing countries view the West’s claims to uphold international law and common decency as deceitful, false and hypocritical.

Although the ICJ’s findings for the South African case may not be determined by the number of Gazans dead and the extent of the destruction, Australia’s government needs to be consistent.

United Nations figures show that Israeli forces have killed twice as many women and children in Gaza in two months as Russian forces killed in Ukraine in more than two years.

Satellite technology assessments of Israel’s bombing of Gaza show a far greater intensity than in Ukraine, Syria and in the World War II.

According to the Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, Israel dropped more than 25,000 tons of explosives in Gaza since October 7 — the equivalent to two nuclear bombs.

Labor must think again. Abandon hypocrisy, strive for consistency and make a contribution to humanity by supporting South Africa at the ICJ.

Lawyers with experience of pleading a case for genocide, notably in Bosnia, believe that South Africa’s case is strong and that the ICJ should rule in South Africa’s favour, with a declaration that war and genocide in Gaza must cease.

Rulings by the ICJ are legally binding on signatories to the Geneva Convention.

That leaves Australia, a supposed champion of international law, with two options: it could ignore an ICJ ruling and continue to encourage Israel to do what it likes; or it could adhere to the ICJ ruling.

If it did the latter, its claim to support international law, irrespective of what the US advises or how Israel behaves, would be bolstered.

A third option is not to wait for the ICJ ruling and, instead, abandon hypocrisy, and quickly declare support for South Africa’s ICJ initiative.

It’s not too late to save lives in Gaza and the West Bank.

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Stuart Rees is Professor Emeritus, University of Sydney and the author of Cruelty or Humanity: Challenges, Opportunities and Responsibilities. A version of this piece was published at Pearls and Irritations.

Featured image: At the 12th consecutive week protest for Palestine in Gadi/Sydne, January 6. Photo: Peter Boyle

A Merry AUKUS Surprise, Western Australia!

December 21st, 2023 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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The secretive Australian government just cannot help itself. Clamouring and hectoring of other countries and their secret arrangements (who can forget the criticism of the Solomon Islands over its security pact with China for that reason?) the Albanese government is a bit too keen on keeping a lid on things regarding the withering away of Australian independence before a powerful and spoiling friend.

A degree of this may be put down to basic lack of sensibility or competence. But there may also be an inadvertent confession in the works here: Australians may not be too keen on such arrangements once the proof gets out of the dense, floury pudding.

It took, as usual, those terrier-like efforts from Rex Patrick, Australia’s foremost transparency knight, forever tilting at the windmill of government secrecy, to discover that Western Australians are in for a real treat. The US imperium, it transpires from material produced by the Australian Department of Defence, will be deploying some 700 personnel, with their families, to the state. And to make matters more interesting, Western Australia will also host a site for low-level radioactive waste produced by US and UK submarines doing their rotational rounds under the AUKUS arrangements.

The briefing notes from the recently created Australian Submarine Agency reveal that the Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) will host as many as four US nuclear submarines of the US Navy Virginia-class at HMAS Stirling and one UK nuclear-powered boat from 2027. As part of what is designated the first phase of AUKUS, an Australian workforce of some 500-700 maintenance and support personnel is projected to grow in response to the program before Australia owns and operates its own US-made nuclear-powered boats. Once established and blooded by experience, “This workforce will then move to support our enduring nuclear-powered submarine program and will be a key enabler for SRF-West.”

The ASA documents go on to project that “over 700 United States Personnel could be living and working in Western Australia to support SRF-West, with some also bringing families.” The UK will not be getting the same treatment, largely because the contingent from the Royal Navy will be moving through on shorter rotations.

The stationing of the personnel in question finally puts to rest those contemptible apologetics that Australia is not a garrison for the US armed forces. At long last Australians can be reassured, if rather grimly, that these are not fleeting visits from great defenders, but the constant, and lingering presence of an imperial power jealously guarding its interests.

The issue of storing waste will have piqued some interest, given Australia’s current and reliably consistent failure to establish any long-term storage facility for any sort of nuclear waste, be it low, medium or high grade. But never fear, the doltish poseurs of the Defence Department are always willing to please and, as the department documents show, learn in their servile role.

As Patrick reveals, the documents released under FOI tell us that “operational waste” arising from the Submarine Rotational Force operation at HMAS Stirling will include the storage of low to intermediate level radioactive waste on Australian defence sites. One document notes that, “The rotational presence of United Kingdom and United States SSNs in Western Australia as part of the Submarine Rotational Force – West (SRF-West) will provide an opportunity to learn how these vessels operate, including the management of low-level radioactive waste from routine sustainment.”

The ASA also confirms with bold foolhardiness that, “All low and intermediate radioactive waste will be safely stored at Defence sites in Australia.” The storage facility in question is “being planned as part of the infrastructure works proposed for HMAS Stirling to support SRF-West.”

The Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles has retained a consultant, Steve Grzeskowiak, to the remunerative value of AU$396,000 from February to December this year to identify a suitable site on land owned by the Commonwealth. Absurdly, the same consultant, when Deputy Secretary of Defence Estates, conducted an analysis of over 200 Defence sites in terms of suitability for low-level waste management, finding none to pass muster.

In a troubling development, Patrick also notes that the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Bill 2023, in its current form, would permit the managing, storing or disposing of radioactive waste from an AUKUS submarine, which would include UK or US submarines. Importantly, that waste could well be of a high-level nature. “While the Albanese Government has made a commitment that it will not do so, the Bill leaves the legal door open for possible future agreement from the Australian Government to store high-level nuclear waste generated from US or UK nuclear-powered submarines.”

To round matters off, Australia’s citizenry was enlightened to the fact that they will be adding some $US3 billion (AU$4.45 billion) to the US submarine industrial base. In the words of the ASA, “Australia’s commitment to invest in the US submarine industrial base recognises the lift the United States is making to supporting Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.”  This will entail the pre-purchase of “submarine components and materials, so they are on hand at the start of the maintenance period” thereby “saving time” and “outsourcing less complex sustainment and expanding planning efforts for private sector overhauls, to reduce backlog”.

Decoding such naval, middle-management gibberish is a painful task, but nothing as painful as the implications for a country that has not only surrendered itself wholly and without qualification to Washington but is all too happy to subsidise it.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a Research Associate at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). Email: [email protected]

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Abstract

Rabson discusses the new book, Base Towns: Local Contestation of the U.S. Military in Korea and Japan with the author, Claudia Junghyun Kim, who traces contentious politics surrounding twenty U.S. military bases across Japan and Korea—two of the largest U.S. base hosts in the world. Kim’s book focuses on the municipalities hosting these bases and differing levels of community acceptance and resistance over time. The following excerpt from the book introduces key actors who shape base-community relations and their many twists and turns.

Introduction

Authors who write about U.S. military bases in Asia often depict either the negative impacts they impose on local communities that stir protests, or the “security” authors claim they provide. Claudia Junghyun Kim’s far more nuanced analysis explains how activists’ motivations and strategies range widely from appeals to national pride, opposition to war, or objections to vehicle accidents and aircraft noise; and she tells us why some local residents welcome the economic benefits bases bring either in business activity or government subsidies. She also notes that protest movements are not always static, evolving at times in their purposes and participants. Her on-the-scene observations (and photos) in the base towns of Korea and Japan, including interviews of residents, activists and local politicians, make for particularly compelling reading.

Steve Rabson (SR): Claudia, you say you went to graduate school to study alliance politics but wound up with a book about the local and human consequences of alliance politics. How? What happened along the way that brought you here? Do you have an anecdote or a lightbulb moment or something about your process that you can share? 

Claudia Junghyun Kim (CJK): While doing coursework in graduate school, I realized that I did not want to run regressions on the alliance dataset that contains every single alliance treaty that has ever existed in the world, which seemed to be one way to study alliance politics. I also did not feel well-equipped to write about international security in a grand, big-picture way, which seemed to be another way to study alliance politics. Almost all policy-oriented work on the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances seemed to come down to one metanarrative about how the alliances should always be strengthened at all times. All these approaches are useful, but I felt like something was missing. In what ways, I wondered, does alliance politics influence normal people like me? As an answer to that question, I came to write about Japanese and Korean base towns and the people living in them.

SR: As you traveled around these base towns, what did you experience? What surprised you?

CJK: It was interesting to observe both subtle and overt ways in which bases presented themselves in the localities I visited: a local chicken and beer place named “Camp Casey” in Dongducheon, SPAM onigiri at Okinawan convenience stores, a faint smell of oil at Noksapyeong Station in central Seoul, and military aircraft flying over my AirBnB place in Ginowan. 

There were many moments that reminded me that not everyone cared. I went to a party in Okinawa, and of the two-dozen people in their 20s and 30s there, nobody immediately recognized the name Ōta Masahide (governor of Okinawa prefecture, 1990-1998). The party host was a young man who said he never reads Ryukyu Shimpo or Okinawa Times. His choice was Nikkei, which he said was more “neutral.” At the same time, there were moments that made me think that not every activist cared about gaining more support from these apathetic people, either. I discuss resonance a lot in my book, and at least some of the activist rhetoric I encountered sounded surprisingly anachronistic and/or utopian. Many of the protest events I observed were highly ritualized ones that did not seem very inviting to those who were not already part of the protest group.

At least on one occasion, I experienced cynicism towards academics. The Korean activist who refused to meet me did so because, in her words, “What’s the point?” She did not want to speak to academics anymore. And who can blame her? While doing fieldwork, I began to question academic fieldwork itself. Am I just doing something that would, after all is said and done, contribute only to my own academic career? Is what I’m doing at least of some use to some of these people? What do we owe, if anything, to the people we interview and observe? Are academics “parasites”?

SR: What is new about your findings that complicates or challenges our current understanding of US military bases or the localities in which they exist? 

CJK: I wanted to challenge two different narratives about base politics and anti-base movements. The first narrative is the elite narrative that dismisses local discontent as something insignificant, powerless, and easily dismissible. The second narrative does the opposite by selectively presenting cases of powerful anti-base movements, which creates an image of universally beleaguered U.S. bases. In challenging the first narrative, I wanted to show that local movements can be powerful and efficacious at times. In challenging the second narrative, I wanted to show that a subnational approach reveals much more varied local responses to the U.S. presence. 

SR: What is the most important takeaway that you would like a reader of your book to leave with?

CJK: Military bases are often discussed in the abstract terms of global power projection. It would be great if a reader of this book can conjure up more concrete images of base towns and their residents next time there is a new high-level decision to move around troops and machinery.

Excerpt: U.S. Military Base Towns in Korea and Japan

Contentious politics surrounding American military bases abroad involves international, national, and subnational actors, including basing and host nations, central and local governments, host community residents, and activists. The following actors—with base opponents and local elites as central actors, and the rest in the background—shape the subnational base politics in Korea and Japan today.

(1) Base Opponents: I use this term to describe people who oppose U.S. military bases, either individually or as part of a group, and either as a full-time occupation or on a voluntary basis. The term incorporates both activists (i.e., those fully committed to acting upon the cause) and latent adherents (i.e., those who may occasionally join in opposition). Large-scale mobilization becomes possible when activists and latent adherents come together. The relative rarity of broad-based mobilization in turn attests to the difficulty of turning latent adherents into active opponents. 

Activists and police officers in Takae (Okinawa Prefecture, Japan)

(1-1) Activists: Activists hold deep convictions about anti-base causes and publicly express their views in various forms, including protests, marches, sit-ins, lawsuits, and petitions. Some build their entire professional careers around opposing bases; for example, Korea’s Base Peace Network (Giji pyeonghwa neteuwokeu), a loose network of five civic groups in Seoul, Gunsan, Pyeongtaek, and Uijeongbu, consists of full-time career activists. Japanese anti-base activism involves more grassroots organizations and non-career activists, but centralized professional organizations with explicit partisan allegiances do exist: the Japan Peace Committee, affiliated with the Japan Communist Party (JCP), and the Peace Movement Center, affiliated with the Social Democratic Party (SDP), both of which boast local branches throughout the country. Still, the very physical presence of bases in local communities means that these activists are mostly locally based themselves. Some are born-and-raised natives or have lived in base towns for decades, while others are transplants. What constitutes “local,” though, can be ambiguous at times. A Seoul-based activist on a mission to stop the expansion of a firing range in the Korean city of Paju, for example, once spent two years farming alongside locals in a rural village (Interview with Park Seok-jin, June 22, 2016). In Pyeongtaek, where a militant movement emerged in the mid-2000s against base expansion, dozens of activists officially moved their legal residence to the city to resist eviction. Although critics of anti-base activists like to cast these voluntary transplants as outside agitators, their very presence further attests to the primacy of the local in anti-base activism.

Variously motivated by nationalism, pacifist ideology, and practical concerns (Calder 2007, 84), activists assign different meanings to the imposing U.S. presence. Some explained to me that military bases are a militarist tool intended ultimately to “kill people,” and others told me that they are proof that “Japan is a slave of the United States.” These ideational differences, to be sure, do not necessarily preclude a coalitional movement; a national umbrella coalition against the expansion of Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek, for example, brought together activists of all stripes—indignant nationalists, visionary pacifists, and clear-eyed pragmatists. In propagating their anti-base beliefs, though, activists are mindful of the local resonance of such beliefs. In the words of one Korean activist, anti-base movements driven exclusively by professional activists, and not by “those who suffer the most, cannot sustain themselves; activists, in this sense, see their role as something limited to ‘helping’ latent adherents ‘take ownership’ of the movement” (Interview with Kim Pan-tei, June 15, 2016). In order to play this facilitating (if slightly paternalistic) role, activists serve as strategic frame entrepreneurs and filter out the kind of language that may alienate fellow local residents. Activists’ framing choices can therefore deviate from their true motivation: those spurred into action by radical anti-militarist beliefs, for example, may still find it easier to talk about tangible everyday grievances to mobilize the local communities.

A protest slogan seen in Takae (Okinawa Prefecture, Japan)

A protest slogan seen in Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan)

(1-2) Latent Adherents: U.S. military bases elicit a complex set of images and emotions in the minds of base town residents. Sometimes bases violently assert themselves into host communities, such as when a U.S. F-8 Crusader jet, en route to NAF Atsugi from Kadena Air Base, crashed and killed four civilians in 1964. Other times they insinuate themselves into the daily lives of local residents, as the Spam luncheon meat spotted in the local cuisine in Okinawa and Uijeongbu attest. Even the latest global pandemic linked U.S. forces to their host populations: American personnel, who continued to travel for their assignments in Pyeongtaek and Okinawa since pandemic-induced border shutdowns meant little to them, became part of the local Covid-19 statistics.

Base town residents may hold grievances about the U.S. presence, but they seldom get involved. Despite the belief that we live in a “movement society” where protests have become a routine part of conventional politics (Meyer and Tarrow 1997), many non-activists, suspicious of activists and their agenda, remain reluctant to get involved (Luke et al. 2018). In localities where many small businesses cater to the U.S. military, such as Korea’s Dongducheon or northern Pyeongtaek, anti-base proselytizing gets particularly tricky. “You may be able to demand a wholesale troop withdrawal in places without bases,” says Lee Cheol-hyeong, a longtime Pyeongtaek activist. “But you can’t do that in base towns. Locals get immediately skeptical” (Interview, June 18, 2016). In rural areas with elderly, conservative residents—downtown Gunsan might be a bustling shopping district, for example, but Okseo, a county abutting Kunsan Air Base, is a sleepy town heavily populated by the elderly—activists also tread carefully to fend off suspicions.

On rare occasions when social movement skeptics do mobilize, they portray their participation as a “reluctant” and “accidental” one (Gullion 2015; Arrington 2016; Luke et al. 2018). It is hardly surprising, then, that when latent adherents join anti-base movements, their opposition is often about a wide range of negative externalities military bases entail, rather than about American global hegemony: noise pollution, environmental contamination, accidents involving U.S. personnel, and insufficient government compensation. The practical nature of these everyday grievances often forces activists to subordinate their aspirations for radical changes—”a world without the military,” for example (Interview with Kang Sang-won, June 11, 2016)—to the more immediate, parochial goals that local residents pursue. In this sense, latent adherents are the ones who shape activist strategies, not the other way around—a finding that directly contradicts the frequent vilification of activists as agitators manipulating locals. But even then, some latent adherents still refuse to work with professional activists and instead form their own groups, often for fear that leftist politics will adulterate the supposed “purity” of local grassroots initiatives.

A view from a residential building in Daegu (Korea)

(2) Local Political Elites: Locals up in arms about U.S. military bases in their backyard often turn to their local—not national—representatives as a first resort, hoping for an intervention. Local governments are a channel of communication—what the Japanese would call madoguchi (literally, “window”)—for residents who wish to file complaints against the U.S. military. In the Okinawan city of Nago, for example, residents can still register base-related grievances with the city office after hours by dialing a direct- dial emergency number; city officials, whose mobile phones are connected to the emergency number, respond swiftly to these requests, sometimes in the middle of the night (Interview with Nago officials, September 15, 2016). 

Local elite support, however, is not easy to come by. Often, activists with maximalist goals and local elites prone to compromises fail to meet in the middle. Activists in Nago and the Korean city of Uijeongbu attempted to “recall” their pro-base mayors in 1998 and 2002, respectively, for the mayors’ apparent willingness to countenance U.S. military consolidation. The name of one Nago-based grassroots group at the time, the Association of Citizens Angry at Mayor Kishimoto (Kishimoto shichō ni okkotteiru shimin no kai), bespeaks the frustration with the city government that chose to dismiss the 1997 anti-base referendum. Mutual hostility is not uncommon. Uijeongbu mayor Kim Mun-won, facing pressure to keep his election promise to hold an anti-base referendum, called the police on activists multiple times (Interview, anonymous, July 12, 2016).

While the first instinct of local elites is to stay away from base politics, they sometimes become anti-base claimants themselves—either after much courting from activists or on their own initiatives. As municipal governments oversee the administrative units where bases are located, mayors and governors can influence bureaucratic and technical aspects of bases when it comes to their construction, relocation, and operation. When Okinawa’s late governor Ōta Masahide exercised his administrative authority and refused to grant land leases for U.S. bases in 1995, for example, Okinawan base issues quickly became politicized. Local elites’ obstructions of the allies’ basing policy often results in a conflict between the local and central governments, which creates elite cleavages that activists can exploit (even if ultimately to their detriment, as we shall see later). Base opponents in Japanese localities ranging from Iwakuni to Nago, for example, found their cause suddenly gain national and even international political salience when their mayors turned against base relocation. In rare instances, as in the Korean city of Dongducheon, local elites may actually be the ones leading mobilization in a top-down manner, as opposed to following activists. In typical Korean local government behavior, city-led anti-base initiatives mobilize politically conservative and pro-government—meaning noncontroversial—civic groups and exclude their traditional leftist—meaning controversial—counterparts. Elite preferences for politically moderate civic groups give activists another incentive to engage in impression management-and another reason that the movement’s supposedly radical ideas are tamed, at least in their public presentation.

An entertainment district in Dongducheon (Gyeonggi Province, Korea)

(3) The Public: The presence of oppositional mobilization does not equal the presence of general discontent. After all, the U.S. Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, a subject of universal antipathy among anti-base activists, boasts a “fan club” in none other than Okinawa—the place most frequently associated with anti-base sentiments. In Seoul’s Gwanghwamun, the political center of the country that is also home to the U.S. embassy, no one bats an eye at the sight of a gathering of anti-American activists just a stone’s throw away from another gathering of pro-American Korean War vets with a banner reading, in English, “Thanks Runs Forever?” At Camp Humphreys, once a magnet for protesters, many of whom are sympathetic to North Korea, a large banner makes a plea: “Bomb North Korea!” 

Unfortunately for base opponents, they are destined to belong to a movement where the “goal orientations of reference publics depart significantly, in direction or intensity, from the goals of protest groups” (Lipsky 1968, 1146). Nationwide public opinion polls in both countries have shown a majority supporting the continued U.S. military presence. An annual poll in Korea between 2012 and 2019 showed consistent support—ranging from 67 to 82 percent—for a continued U.S. presence (Asan Institute for Policy Studies 2019). Even in 2003, a survey that came on the heels of mass protests over a U.S. military accident that killed two teenagers showed an absolute majority holding favorable views of the United States (Moon 2012, 20). In Japan, various polls indicate a general acceptance of the U.S. presence, although clear divisions exist between mainlanders and Okinawans (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 2017). Even when we set aside the issue of the U.S. military, the Japanese public’s apparent aversion to social movements, which some allege borders on “phobia” (Higuchi 2021), bodes ill for activists. The public, in this sense, serves as an important background actor that further informs activist strategies.

A protest tent in Nago’s Henoko district (Okinawa Prefecture, Japan)

(4) Host State Governments: Host state governments—Korea and Japan in this study—facilitate the continued U.S. presence, widely considered an effective deterrent against North Korea and, increasingly, China. The two longtime U.S. allies are something of poster children for American interventionalist expansionism: stories of the former’s rags-to-riches success and the latter’s militarist-to-pacifist transformation serve to highlight salubrious aspects of American foreign policy, of which the forward military presence is an integral part.

The anti-base cause will rarely find a vocal champion among national political elites. The United States and its military loom disproportionately large in the worldview of host state political elites, almost as if Washington constitutes the entirety of foreign relations. From Syngman Rhee’s fixation with extracting U.S. security commitments in the form of a military alliance to the continued pleas to delay the transfer of wartime operational control that remains in the hands of Washington, Korean elites remain faithful to the American presence that they associate with security and prosperity. From the Yoshida doctrine of postwar security dependence to the increasing military ambition synchronized with the U.S. regional strategy, Japanese elites dutifully follow the rules set by their erstwhile enemy. It is unthinkable today, for example, that the term dōmei (alliance) was once such a loaded term in the context of Japan’s imposed anti-militarism that Japanese leaders actively avoided using it to describe U.S.-Japan relations until the 1990s (McCormack and Norimatsu 2012, 63).

As an agent of the U.S. military, host states are tasked with ensuring the continued cooperation of subnational localities. Although they increasingly feel compelled to seek local consent, such consent is often little more than a formality. Many base-related decisions follow the “decide-announce-defend” model (O’Hare, Bacow, and Sanderson 1983), in which the allies announce their decisions and then seek local understanding after the fact. What base scholars call compensation politics (Cooley and Marten 2006; Calder 2007) comes into the picture here, as the central government dangles monetary rewards—and the threat to withdraw them—in front of the financially vulnerable localities. Some get carrots, and others get sticks. Residents of Okseo, a rural county bordering Kunsan Air Base in the Korean city of Gunsan, frequent a public bathhouse and a small library housed together in a community building named soeum pihae bokjihoegwan—literally, “a welfare facility built as consideration for noise pollution.” Iwakuni residents saw a similar community hall built in the 1970s when U.S. bases in Japan served as a launchpad for the Vietnam War. More recently, though, they found themselves on the receiving end of the stick when the state subsidies earmarked for a half-built city office building evaporated as a punishment for the mayor’s opposition to the fortification of MCAS Iwakuni. Conversely, local governments may actively protest bases in the hope of extracting financial concessions from the central government. Pocheon, home to the Rodriguez firing range, is demanding a new subway line connecting the city to Seoul, citing the heavy American presence as a cause of the stagnant local economy. The host states, facing these varying local interests, continue to cajole and threaten as they seek to protect the most conspicuous symbol of U.S. security commitments.

(5) Basing State (U.S.): U.S. basing rights in Korea and Japan are codified in the two separate mutual defense treaties originating from the Korean War and World War II, respectively. Despite a few moments of disturbance—such as Jimmy Carter’s attempt in 1977 to withdraw all troops from Korea, and the mass movement that resisted the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960—the alliances and the U.S. military presence they institutionally guarantee remain incredibly stable. State visits by American presidents are newsworthy anywhere, but such visits to Korea and Japan often involve their grand appearances at major American bases—a home away from home. On his 2019 visit to Korea’s Osan Air Base, Donald Trump walked out of Marine One to greet the cheering crowd of troops, with Lee Greenwood’s song “God Bless the USA” playing in the background: “I’m proud to be an American where at least I know I’m free.”

Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in Pocheon (Gyeonggi Province, Korea)

American base officials rarely, if ever, interact directly with base opponents (Yeo 2011, 25). As those familiar with base-community relations say of protesters at Yongsan Garrison: “What happens at Gate 3 is outside (the USFK’s) jurisdiction” (Interview, anonymous, June 23, 2016). At the same time, the U.S. military exclusively oversees what goes on behind fences, although host communities often bear the brunt of such extraterritoriality. In one such example, information obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) shows that there were eighty-four cases of oil leaks at Yongsan Garrison between 1990 and 2015, most of which were never reported to Korea (Green Korea United 2017). Separate FOLA requests demonstrate that members of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa are advised not to inform the Japanese authorities of “nonemergency and/or politically sensitive incidents,” such as environmental accidents (Mitchell 2016). Host communities, as a result, are left to quarrel over remediation and redevelopment of base sites, even after bases close and American troops leave (C. J. Kim 2018). Most recently, as national borders were shut down amid the global pandemic, American troops proved that such borders, for them at least, remain porous. As troops continued to relocate to Korea and Japan, they shaped local health dynamics. On August 5, 2020, for example, 121 of 161 infection cases counted in Pyeongtaek were traced back to the USFK (Pyeongtaek City 2020). The conduct of the U.S. military, formulated internationally and implemented locally, has ripple effects on host communities in myriad ways.

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Steve Rabson was stationed as a U.S. Army draftee at the 137th Ordnance Company (SW) in Henoko, Okinawa from July, 1967 to June, 1968. He is professor emeritus of East Asian studies at Brown University and has published books and articles about Okinawa, and translations of Okinawan literature.

Claudia Junghyun Kim is the author of Base Towns: Local Contestation of the U.S. Military in Korea and Japan (Oxford University Press, 2023) and an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the City University of Hong Kong. She has written about U.S. military bases, social and transnational movements, global norms and transnational advocacy, and Korean and Japanese politics. 

Sources

Arrington, Celeste L. 2016. Accidental Activists: Victim Movements and Government Accountability in Japan and South Korea. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Asan Institute for Policy Studies. 2019. “Hanmidongmaenggwa juhanmigune daehan hanguginui insik.” September 2019. http://www.asaninst.org.

Calder, Kent E. 2007. Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Cooley, Alexander, and Kimberly Marten. 2006. “Base Motives: The Political Economy of Okinawa’s Antimilitarism.” Armed Forces & Society 32(4): 566–83.

Green Korea United. 2017. “Migonggae yongsan migungiji nae 84-geonui hwangyeongoyeom sago naeyeok ipsu.” April 3, 2017. http://www.greenkorea.org/?p=58155.

Gullion, Jessica Smartt. 2015. Fracking the Neighborhood: Reluctant Activists and Natural Gas Drilling. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Higuchi, Naoto. 2021. “Social Movement Studies in Post-3.11 Japan: A Sociological Analysis.” International Sociology 36(2): 183–93.

Kim, Claudia J. 2018. “Bases That Leave: Consequences of US Base Closures and Realignments in South Korea.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 48(2): 339–57.

Lipsky, Michael. 1968. “Protest as a Political Resource.” American Political Science Review 62 (4): 1144–58.

Luke, Hanabeth, Elisabet Dueholm Rasch, Darrick Evensen, and Michiel Köhne. 2018. “Is ‘Activist’ a Dirty Word? Place Identity, Activism and Unconventional Gas Development across Three Continents.” The Extractive Industries and Society 5(4): 524–34.

McCormack, Gavan, and Satoko Oka Norimatsu. 2012. Resistant Islands: Okinawa Confronts Japan and the United States. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Meyer, David S., and Sidney Tarrow, eds. 1997. The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Mitchell, Jon. 2016. “Contamination: Documents Reveal Hundreds of Unreported Environmental Accidents at Three U.S. Marine Corps Bases on Okinawa.” The Japan Times, November 19, 2016. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/11/19/national/contamination-documents-reveal-three-u-s-bases-okinawa-slow-disclose-environmental-accidents/.

Moon, Katharine H. S. 2012. Protesting America: Democracy and the U.S.-Korea Alliance. Berkeley: University of California Press.

NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute. 2017. “Okinawa beigunkichi o meguru ishiki Okinawa to zenkoku.” August 1, 2017. https://www.nhk.or.jp/bunken/research/yoron/20170801_7.html.

O’Hare, Michael, Lawrence Bacow, and Debra Sanderson. 1983. Facility Siting and Public Opposition. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Pyeongtaek City. 2020. “Pyeongtaek City: Covid-19 Emergency Measures.” 2020. https://www.pyeongtaek.go.kr/pyeongtaek/corona_index.jsp.

Yeo, Andrew. 2011. Activists, Alliances, and Anti-U.S. Base Protests. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Accidents of Eccentricity: Israel’s Pacific Hold

December 11th, 2023 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Cunning, subtle, understated. Israeli policy in the Pacific has seen United Nations votes cast in its favour, the foreign policies of certain countries adjusted, and favours switched. While China may be considered the big, threatening beast competing alongside that large, clumsy figure called the United States, the small state of Israel is directing its expertise, and charm, in very specific ways in the Indo-Pacific.

When it came to voting for a nonbinding resolution in the United Nations General Assembly on the subject of a “humanitarian truce” regarding the conflict in Gaza in October, 14 countries were steadfastly opposed. Of those were six Pacific Island states: Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Tonga, Nauru, Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia.

The same pattern could be seen in 2012, when a mere nine nations voted against the issue of recognising Palestinian statehood, among them being Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Palau and Nauru.

A few theories have been offered on this seemingly anomalous occurrence. Grant Wyeth suggests that the dynamics of power in this context may be less significant than that of faith and religious force. “Much of the Pacific is highly observant in their Christianity, and they have an eschatological understanding of humanity.” Wyeth emphasises those Protestant denominations that took a keen interest in the creation of Israel in 1948.

Much as with the hot fire evangelicals that helped Ronald Reagan win the White House in 1980, Israel’s creation was seen prophetically, the biblical step to religious finality.  Eschatologically speaking, the Jewish people needed to return to the Holy Land for the final rites of humanity to be read. (Previously antisemitic bible bashers now had a strategic reason to like Jewry, knowing that, in the Final Judgment, the inhabitants of Israel would be pegged to God’s finishing line.) “Support for Israel is therefore a deeply held spiritual belief, one that sits alongside Pacific Islands’ other considerations of interests and opportunities when forming foreign policies.”

Papua New Guinea offers one such example, having become one of just five countries to formally open an embassy in the contested city of Jerusalem. On the occasion of its opening in September, PNG Prime Minister James Marape effusively declared that, “We are here to give respect to the people of Israel to the fullest.” The embassy’s establishment had taken place “because of our shared heritage, acknowledging the creator God, the Yahweh God of Israel, the Yahweh God of Isaac and Abraham.”

The religious theme throbs throughout Marape’s justifications.

“Many nations choose not to open their embassies in Jerusalem but we made a conscious choice. This has been the universal capital of the nation and people of Israel. For us to call ourselves Christians, paying respect to God will not be complete without recognizing that Jerusalem is the universal capital of the people and nation of Israel.”

Never one to avoid an opportunistic flourish, Marape also revealed that Israel will be funding the cost of the embassy for the first three years of its operations.

“But going forward, they’ve indicated land available for us & we look forward to proceeding, setting up our permanent mission there.”

He also made it clear that God and matters divine are not taking exclusive billing on the policy slate of Port Moresby. The economic relationship between Israel and PNG is so small as to be barely worth a mention ($1 million per annum), but Israel’s bold prowess in various fields such as agriculture, education, finance and infrastructure is being eyed with relish. That aspect of foreign policy has been vigorously encouraged by Mashav, Israel’s foreign aid department otherwise known as the Centre for International Development and Cooperation.

Former ministerial advisor Sean Jacobs recalls, “as a junior attaché to PNG’s 2011 Commonwealth Heads of Government (CHOGM) delegation, supporting a very brief bilateral with Israeli representatives in the margins” the offer of Israeli assistance “where it matters most – in PNG’s health sector and through in-kind, small-scale on ground medical equipment and expertise.”

PNG’s opposition leader, Joseph Lelang, was less enthusiastic about Marape’s less than balletic manoeuvring.

“We have aroused the ire of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas has warned us in the strongest terms that PNG must reconsider that decision and move out.”

Lelang’s concern was for diplomatic personnel who could find themselves at risk.

“This is a serious warning and I feel for the foreign mission staff and the ambassador who will be based there.”

The Palestinian foreign ministry’s displeasure was also expressed in a statement accusing Port Moresby of being involved in “an aggression against the Palestinian people and their rights.” The move would, it alleged, cause “great harm to the chances of achieving peace on the basis of the two-state solution.”

Other Pacific Island countries have thrown in their lot with the Israeli State, softening the hungrily lethal retaliation in Gaza in favour of the country’s right to self-defence. There are such statements as those from Fiji’s foreign ministry on October 31, a bold, unabashed endorsement of Israel and its policies.

“Fiji affirms its solidarity with Israel and commitment to global peace in the midst of the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas.”

In explaining why the Pacific country voted against the UN resolution calling for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas War, issue was taken with “ground realities and correct factual omissions” regarding the role played by “Hamas for initiating the crisis, holding hostages, and using them and civilians as human shields since [the] October 7 2023 terrorist attack.” Banally and, in any operational sense meaningless, the statement goes on to claim “that Israel’s primary target is Hamas, not the Palestinian population.”

As Israel runs the wells of international empathy dry with its incessantly ruthless destruction of Gaza, it can continue, through a quirk of European colonial history, to rely on a measure of support among various Pacific Island states.  History, in that sense, is less cunning than teasingly eccentric.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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With the rise of China, so too rises Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia has slowly transformed in terms of economics, infrastructure, tourism, industry, and politically over the last two decades as Chinese influence increases and inevitably displaces US influence over the region.

At its height, US influence resulted in a major war spanning two decades, engulfing Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The US maintained military bases across the region, including in Thailand and the Philippines. However, when the US finally lost its war against Vietnam, it withdrew much of its military. And in the following decades, the region slowly shifted from depending heavily on trade with the US and its allies, including Japan, over to China.

Today, China stands as the largest trading partner, investor, source of tourism, and infrastructure partner for most of Southeast Asia. This includes the Philippines.

According to Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, China stood as the Philippines’ largest export market. Between the Chinese mainland and Hong Kong, over 30% of exports from the Philippines go to China. The US and Japan combined account for only around 25%.

China also stands as the largest source of imports into the Philippines at around 33% while the US accounts for around 6% and Japan around 8%. China is indisputably the Philippines’ largest trade partner.

China is also the Philippines’ best chance at developing badly needed modern infrastructure.

However, while other nations across Southeast Asia are expanding their relationship with China and building the region together, the Philippines finds itself irrationally cutting itself off from China, laying out a foreign policy demonstrably contradicting its own best interests.

The Philippines Sacrifices Progress to Become US Provocateur 

As Chinese-built high-speed rail networks begin operating in Laos and Indonesia and another continues construction in Thailand, the Philippines has recently canceled several joint-Chinese rail projects.

US government-funded Benar News reported in its recent article, “Philippines drops funding deal with China for 3 railway projects,” that not only will the Philippines no longer seek funding from China, it will also seek out alternative contractors to build the rail projects. Since no other nation is capable of building such projects in the region, the Philippines has for all intents and purposes put infrastructure investment on hold.

Earlier this year, the Philippines also signed a military basing agreement with the United States. The Washington Post in its article, “U.S. reaches military base access agreement in the Philippines,” would report that:

 U.S. military forces will be given access to four new military bases in the islands, solidifying a months-long U.S. effort to expand its strategic footprint across the Pacific region to counter threats from China.

Since then, the Philippines has also begun talks with the US for the development of a port dangerously close to China’s island province of Taiwan.

Reuters in its article,“ Exclusive: U.S. military in talks to develop port in Philippines facing Taiwan,” would report:

U.S. military involvement in the proposed port in the Batanes islands, less than 200 km (125 miles) from Taiwan, could stoke tensions at a time of growing friction with China and a drive by Washington to intensify its longstanding defence treaty engagement with the Philippines.

While the United States justifies its growing military presence in the Philippines by citing maritime disputes in the South China Sea, it should be noted that maritime disputes are common both around the world and particularly in Southeast Asia. Not only do many Southeast Asian states have disputes with China, they also have overlapping claims and resulting disputes with one another.

These disputes can result in sometimes dramatic public displays. Malaysia, for example, in 2017 sank nearly 300 foreign fishing boats seized amid these disputes, including fishing boats from the Philippines, Nikkei Asia reported. While these disputes become somewhat heated, they are always resolved bilaterally all while nations in the region, including China, maintain otherwise constructive and even close economic and diplomatic ties.

Thus, the US is using common maritime disputes as a pretext to insert itself militarily into the region, attempting to escalate ordinary disputes into a regional or even global crisis. In reality, the US is building up its military presence, not to defend its supposed allies, but to encircle and contain China while transforming host nations into battering rams against China.

This US strategy has had varying success across Southeast Asia, with the Philippines being by far its greatest success. This is owed to the unique and unfortunate history of the Philippines as a US colony from 1898-1946 and its defacto subordination to the US ever since.

The Philippines as an American Foothold 

The US State Department’s Office of the Historian in a publication titled, “The Philippine-American War, 1899–1902,” would admit that the US seized the Philippines as a US colony from Spain and then waged a brutal war of subjugation against the Philippine people.

The US State Department admits:

The ensuing Philippine-American War lasted three years and resulted in the death of over 4,200 American and over 20,000 Filipino combatants. As many as 200,000 Filipino civilians died from violence, famine, and disease.

It also admitted that:

U.S. forces at times burned villages, implemented civilian reconcentration policies, and employed torture on suspected guerrillas, while Filipino fighters also tortured captured soldiers and terrorized civilians who cooperated with American forces. Many civilians died during the conflict as a result of the fighting, cholera and malaria epidemics, and food shortages caused by several agricultural catastrophes.

While the US granted the Philippines “independence” in 1946, the US has maintained varying degrees of political and military control over the nation ever since. Under the presidential administration of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines attempted unsuccessfully to expel the US military presence. President Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has since rolled back the incremental gains in sovereignty and dignity achieved during Duterte’s term in office.

To explain the deep, institutional subordination of the Philippines to US interests, demonstrably at the cost of the Philippines’ own best interests including economic development, trade, and infrastructure, Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo would explain at a Washington-based April 2023 talk hosted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the core of his nation’s political leadership has been shaped by decades of US indoctrination.

Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo would explain:

Our partnership has thrived on other vibrant connections. And people are the throbbing core of our ties. This year marks the 75th anniversary of the Fulbright program in the Philippines, which has 8,000 alumni and is the longest continuing Fulbright program in the world. The seeds of the future of our alliance are born in the many platforms in our relations where our peoples, whether they are scientists, entrepreneurs, civil society partners, youths, and artists, incubate new ideas and contemplate on visions together.

The Fulbright program, created by the US State Department, claims on its website that it “expands perspectives through academic and professional advancement and cross-cultural dialogue.” By “expanding perspectives” it means indoctrinating potential leaders in politics, media, business, education, and culture to adopt a pro-US worldview and create a US-influenced cadre of administrators in nations around the world.

Together with other US government programs, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) which funds political parties, education programs, media platforms, and many of the “civil society partners” Philippine Foreign Secretary Enrique Manalo referred to in his speech, the Fulbright program is part of the toolset the US uses to politically capture a targeted nation.

An example of this is Maria Ressa. She is a 1986 Fulbright alumni who founded the media platform “Rappler” funded by the US government through the NED. Both Ressa and her Rappler media platform are loud advocates for greater US influence over the Philippines and the rolling back of relations with China. Rappler’s media content is indistinguishable from US government talking points because Rappler is an extension of US government influence.

In terms of political capture, the Philippines represents one of Washington’s success stories. Enduring US influence, first as the Philippines’ colonial master and then through decades of indoctrination and political interference via the NED and programs like Fulbright, Washington has convinced Manila to forego the benefits of trade and economic development together with China and the rest of Asia in exchange for positioning itself as Southeast Asia’s “Ukraine.”

Just as Kiev attempted to convince the Ukrainian people that the West would provide a superior substitute for the nation’s long-standing ties with Russia only to instead find itself abandoned at the end of a self-destructive proxy war, Manila is likewise attempting to convince the people of the Philippines that the US, Australia, and Japan will provide better alternatives to Chinese-driven trade, economic progress, and infrastructure development. In reality, all the US is building in the Philippines are military bases meant to drag both it and the region into greater instability, economic stagnation, and possibly even war.

Only time will tell if China’s patient rise and ability to build up the rest of the region will outlast America’s desire and ability to divide and destroy Asia. The Philippines, for its part, serves as an indicator of which direction the region may move in. Sadly, for now, it seems the US capacity for dividing and endangering the region is still very much intact.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”

Featured image is from NEO

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***

In most instances, the justice system of a liberal democracy presumes absence of arbitrary and cruel treatment by the State.  Punishment, when levelled, is finite. It might see out the term of a convict’s natural life, but that would only be for the most extreme cases. Even then, the whiff of parole, while far off, might still be possible.

On being released, the usual assumptions apply. Time served is time done. Past punishment will not be revisited upon you; the State will not send its hounds and officers of the thin blue line after you. This would only happen in instances of re-offending – recidivism remains a risky feature of the post-release citizen. But in Australia, a current hysteria, fed like a hungry gargoyle by politicians on both sides of the aisle, has come to roost over the federal Parliament.

The High Court of Australia, having had the good, just sense of finding the indefinite administrative detention of refugees an unwarranted excess of executive power, was always going to make matters challenging for the government. For one thing, few expected it. That same body had previously held in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) that such forms of indefinite confinement were perfectly legal, even if those refugees could never have a reasonable prospect of either settling in Australia or a third country.  But in November, it all changed.

In the NZYQ case, the High Court affirmed the constitutional principle that detention is a form of punishment and is a judicial power exercisable once a person is found guilty of a crime. Laws authorising the administrative detention of non-citizens by the executive arm of government could only be constitutionally valid if reasonably necessary for a legitimate non-punitive purpose. The law authorising the detention of NZYQ, a stateless Rohingya man, was not appropriately adapted to the purpose of his removal, given that he had “no real prospect of removal from Australia becoming practicable in a reasonably foreseeable future”.

Of particular concern to the Albanese government was the issue of what to do with those administrative detainees with convictions, but had, as such, done the time. On paper, it should not have been controversial.  With their sentence served, they would surely be permitted their liberty subject to the usual caveats of forfeiture. But those in immigration detention were seen as exceptional, the undesirable, unconventional sort who had come by boat. Rather than being permitted to disappear into Australia’s own version of legal purgatory, they were let out instead, posing an unacceptable risk. How that risk was unacceptable relative to that posed by other convicts was never explained.

Instead of finding a sober, mature approach to dealing with the matter, a quarry for hysterical rhetoric was opened. Heavy digging commenced with reports of a growing though small number of reoffenders, including an Afghan refugee who was charged with two counts of indecent assault in Adelaide.

The Liberal-National Coalition, led by the icy Peter Dutton, histrionically claimed that the released detainees posed exceptional risk. A media release from the Liberal Party wondered “why the Government panicked and urgently released in excess of 140 detainees when the [High Court] decision clearly applies to the single detainee NZYQ.” The insinuation was clear: irrespective of the High Court’s ruling, most of the detainees could still be confined, as long as the reason was sufficiently cooked.

Labor, historically vulnerable to the anti-refugee hysterics of the LNP, could only come up with a pale version of the same. It has attacked Dutton as a “protector of paedophiles” for opposing draft proposals for paedophile school ban zones.

“They came here,” raged Home Affairs Minister Clare O’Neil, “and instead of supporting Labor’s attempts to criminalise paedophiles, who loiter near daycare centres and schools, the leader of the opposition came in here and played politics instead.”

Immigration Minister Andrew Giles also lamented before his fellow parliamentarians that,

“The government did not choose to be in this position. The situation was imposed on this parliament by the High Court.”

Both sides of politics meet at a dubious apex: that refugees with convictions must be treated as a monstrous category. The important thing was identifying a suitable preventative regime to achieve that purpose.

The laws just rushed through parliament permit the immigration minister to seek a court order to detain individuals released from immigration detention. Two conditions must be met: that the person be convicted for a crime, be it in Australia or overseas, carrying a sentence of at least seven years’ imprisonment; and the court’s agreement that the person poses “an unacceptable risk of committing a serious violent or sexual offence” with “no less restrictive measure available” to maintain community safety.

Other impediments are also imposed upon those released into the community as part of what is known as the Bridging Visa R subclass. Many of these are repurposed from anti-terrorist legislation, with a focus on monitoring devices, regular reporting, curfews and restrictions on work and financial matters.

While the government has included the judiciary in the process of seeking re-detention, the process has a distinctly punitive flavour, constituting a form of secondary punishment. It is also especially discriminatory, applying to non-Australian citizens.  Yet again, the non-citizen is being treated as a non-person. As Michelle Peterie and Amy Nethery pertinently observe, “Australians with the same criminal histories and risk profiles will not be subject to the preventative detention regime under this legislation.” A potential legal challenge, for precisely that reason, may be in the offing.

The hideous spectacle leaves us a desperate, disturbing conclusion. Even after time is served behind bars, refugees will be subject to the very discriminatory and punitive regimes that the UN Refugee Convention guards against. The agenda here is to perpetrate a regime of permanent punishment and surveillance, using an actuarial model of justice. Released refugees are to be treated no less as potential terrorists, permanently menacing. And it is a conflation the government and the main opposition parties are willing to entertain.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

Calls were made for Labor to bring refugees held in offshore detention to safety at a Refugee Action Collective (RAC) organised speak-out on November 18.

Max Costello, from RAC, said about 14,000 refugees and asylum seekers remain in Indonesia after Coalition immigration minister Scott Morrison decided in 2014 that even people recognised as refugees by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees would never be allowed to come to Australia.

Hussain Shah Rezaie, a Hazara refugee from Afghanistan, who spoke by phone from Indonesia, said he was kept in detention for three and a half years before being released. He has been there for nine years and said refugees feel hopeless and abandoned.

About 60 refugees have died since 2014, 18 by suicide. “Your actions give us hope”, he said, adding that they hold weekly protests.

Margaret Sinclair, also from RAC, said refugees in Indonesia have no right to work, study or get a driver’s licence or bank account. Indonesia is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention.

Most live in accommodation blocks, that Sinclair described as “ghettos”. Whole families are in one room, 3 by 3 metres, and are subject to a curfew.

Those who arrived before March 2018 receive an Australian government allowance of $100 a month for adults and $50 for children. The money is distributed by the International Organisation for Migration. Those who arrived after March 2018 receive nothing.

Sinclair said that half the refugees in Indonesia are Hazaras, some of whom had helped the Australian Defence Force in Afghanistan.

She called on Labor to lift the ban on taking refugees from Indonesia and raise the humanitarian intake.

Sinclair said 62 sent by Australia to the former detention centre on Manus Island are still in Papua New Guinea, unable to obtain resettlement in the United States or New Zealand. Some are too sick to even apply.

They live in Port Moresby and face the threat of being thrown out of their accommodation.

Sinclair reported that 11 had recently been sent to Nauru, where the detention centre had been empty for some time. She said Labor should repeal the laws that make offshore detention possible.

Betelhem Tibebu Zeleke, a refugee from Ethiopia, who has finally been freed, spoke about the impact of detention on her and others’ mental health. She spent time in Indonesia, but seeing the hopelessness among refugees there she “decided to jump on a boat”.  She was sent to Nauru, where she “lost hope”. She said that prolonged detention “damages your brain”.

Eventually she was brought to Australia and, after a period of detention in Brisbane, set free.

Danae Bosler, representing the Victorian Trades Hall Council, called on the government to lift its ban on taking refugees from Indonesia. Tim Read, a Greens MP, criticised the policy of using Indonesia and PNG as a “dumping ground” for refugees. He said Labor should talk to the Greens rather than look to Peter Dutton for “inspiration”.

Greg Kiernan spoke about a project to raise money for refugees in Indonesia by selling artworks they have created.

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Featured image: Speaking out for refugees. Photo: Matt Hrkac

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One could earn a tidy sum the number of times the word “sovereignty” has been uttered or mentioned in public statements and briefings by the Australian Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese.

But such sovereignty has shown itself to be counterfeit. The net of dependency and control is being increasingly tightened around Australia, be it in terms of Washington’s access to rare commodities (nickel, cobalt, lithium), the proposed and ultimately fatuous nuclear-propelled submarine fleet, and the broader militarisation and garrisoning of the country by US military personnel and assets. (The latter includes the stationing of such nuclear-capable assets as B-52 bombers in the Northern Territory.)

The next notch on the belt of US control has been affirmed by new proposals that will effectively make technological access to the Australian defence industry by AUKUS partners (the United States and the United Kingdom) an even easier affair than it already is.  But in so doing, the intention is to restrict the supply of military and dual-use good technology from Australia to other foreign entities while privileging the concerns of the US and UK. In short, control is set to be wrested from Australia.

The issue of reforming US export controls, governed by the musty provisions of the US International Trade in Arms Regulations (ITAR), was always going to be a feature of any technology transfer, notably regarding nuclear-propulsion.  But even before the minting of AUKUS, Canberra and Washington had pondered the issue of industrial integration and sharing technology via such instruments as the Defense Cooperation Treaty of 2012 and Australia’s addition to the National Technology and Industrial Base in 2017.

This fundamentally failed enterprise risks being complicated further by the latest export reforms, though you would not think so, reading the guff streaming from the Australian Defence Department. A media release from Defence Minister Richard Marles tries to justify the changes by stating that “billions of dollars in investment” will be released. Bureaucratic red tape will be slashed – for the Australian Defence industry and the AUKUS partners.  “Under the legislation introduced today, Australia’s existing trade controls will be expanded to regulate the supply of controlled items and provision of services in the Defence and Strategic Goods List, ensuring our cutting-edge military technologies are protected.”

Central to the reforms is the introduction of a national exemption that will cover trade of defence goods and technologies with the US and UK, thereby “establishing a license-free environment for Australian industry, research and science.” But the broader object here is unmistakably directed, less to Australian capabilities than privileged access and a relinquishing of control to the paymasters in Washington. A closer read, and it’s all got to do with those wretched white elephants of the sea: the nuclear-powered submarine.

As the Minister for Defence Industry, Pat Conroy, states,

“This legislation is an important step in the Albanese Government’s strategy for acquiring the state-of-the-art nuclear-powered submarines that will be key to protecting Australians and our nation’s interests.”

In doing so, Conroy, Marles and company are offering Australia’s defence base to the State Department and the Pentagon.

With a mixture of hard sobriety and alarm, a number of expert voices have voiced concern regarding the implications of these new regulations. One is Bill Greenwalt, a figure much known in the field of US defence procurement, largely as a prominent drafter of its legal framework. He is unequivocal in his criticism of the US approach, and the keen willingness of Australian officials to capitulate. 

“After years of US State Department prodding, it appears that Australia signed up to the principles and specifics of the failed US export control system,” Greenwalt explained to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.  “Whenever it cooperates with the US it will surrender any sovereign capability it develops to the United States control and bureaucracy.”

The singular feature of these arrangements, Greenwalt continues to elaborate, is that Australia “got nothing except the hope that the US will remove process barriers that will allow the US to essentially steal and control Australian technology faster.”

In an email sent to Breaking Defense, Greenwalt was even more excoriating of the Australian effort. “It appears that the Australians adopted the US export control system lock, stock and barrel, and everything I wrote about in my USSC (US Studies Center) piece in the 8 deadly sins of ITAR section will now apply to Australian innovation.  I think they just put themselves back 50 years.”

The paper in question, co-authored with Tom Corben, identifies those deadly sins that risk impairing the success of AUKUS: “an outdated mindset; universality and non-materiality; extraterritoriality; anti-discrimination; transactional process compliance; knowledge taint; non-reciprocity; and unwarranted predictability.”

When such vulgar middle-management speech is decoded, much can be put down to the fact that dealing with Washington and its military-industrial complex can be an imperilling exercise.  The US imperium remains fixated, as Greenwalt and Corben write, with “an outdated superpower mindset” discouragingly inhibiting to its allies.  What constitutes a “defence article” within such export controls is very much left to the discretion of the executive. The archaic application of extraterritoriality means that recipient countries of US technology must request permission from the State Department if re-exporting to another end-user is required for any designated defence article.

The failure to reform such strictures, and the insistence that Australia make its own specific adjustments, alarms Chennupati Jagadish, president of the Australian Academy of Science. The new regulations may encourage unfettered collaboration between the US and UK, “but I would require an approved permit prior to collaborating with other foreign nationals.  Without it, my collaborations could see me jailed.”  The bleak conclusion: “it expands Australia’s backyard to include the US and UK, but it raises the fence.”  Or, more accurately, it incorporates, with a stern finality, Australia as a pliable satellite in an Anglo-American arrangement whose defence arrangements are controlled by Washington.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: HMAS Sheean (front left) and HMAS Collins (front right) at HMAS Stirling in 2006 (Licensed under CC BY 2.5 au)

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Abstract

Muslim migrants in Japan suffer from the lack of access to burial grounds when 99.9% of the nation is cremated. Muslims are usually met with opposition from the local community where cemetery construction is planned. Using ethnographic data, the study shows how Muslim associations inadvertently fail to respect the codes of Japanese rurality when seeking a cemetery in a community to which they do not have membership, leading to a conflict. This paper closes with policy prescriptions for the central government in ensuring the cultural rights of immigrant minorities in Japan.

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Introduction

Migration has been increasing in Japan over the last three decades (Immigration Services Agency of Japan, 2022; OECD, 2019). Given the population decline, the state frequently refers to increasing foreigners and accommodating cultural diversity as a way forward for promoting economic growth. Diversity (tayōsei) and “multicultural coexistence” (tabunka kyōsei) have now become buzzwords in many working groups discussing the shape of Japan’s future (e.g., Cabinet Office Japan, 2021). However, in a country that has historically imagined nationhood in terms of common descent (Liu-Farrer, 2020), the institutional transition into a multicultural society is slow to come by. Comparative research on multiculturalism assesses Japan’s approach to integration as “immigration without integration (Migration Integration Policy Index, 2020).” Another research institute rates Japan as trailing other countries in creating the legal frameworks academically known to accommodate the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream society (Multiculturalism Policy Index, 2020a). This paper examines the case of Muslim migrants and the hardships they face in accessing burial grounds. This shows how guaranteeing the cultural rights of immigrant minorities remains one of the primary challenges facing the Japanese government today despite its recent mantra of “multicultural co-existence.”

Muslim migrants are commonly known to suffer from exclusion and marginalization in many non-Muslim societies (Entzinger, 2006; Simon and Pala, 2010). In Japan in particular, Muslim migrants suffer from the lack of access to burial cemeteries where 99.9% of the deceased are cremated (MHLW, 2023). There are only 13 burial cemeteries accessible to Muslims nationwide, and many are forced to haul the remains across prefectures to bury the bodies in accordance with their religious teachings. Given the scarcity of burial cemeteries, especially in western Japan, Muslim associations are wanting to create more burial cemeteries, but have met with opposition from local communities. When there is opposition, the local governments are reluctant to issue permits, even when the cemetery construction plans abide by the local ordinances (jōrei) on cemetery construction and management. The shortage of burial grounds is especially an issue for Japanese Muslims who find Japan to be their home and do not have the choice of transporting the remains to their country of origin. By using ethnographic data from interviews and participant observation, this paper answers the questions of how and why Japanese Muslims face difficulties in creating burial cemeteries, and what the implications are of this empirical case to the discussions on multiculturalism in Japan.

The bulk of studies on the issue of multiculturalism focuses on how migrants face constraints in their everyday lives without paying much attention to the issues they face upon death. The same goes for studies on Muslim migrants in Japan. This study makes an empirical contribution by filling that gap in the existing literature. In addition, theoretical discussions on multiculturalism have primarily focused on identifying the legal-institutional policy arrangements that accommodate the inclusion and mainstreaming of immigrant minorities. This study advocates the importance of enforcement of such policies in promoting the well-being of immigrant minorities in host societies. 

Methodology

This paper is based on ethnographic data gathered over three years. Interviews were conducted with six Muslim associations and burial cemetery owners, namely the Japan Islamic Trust, Muslim Graveyard Ibaraki Japan, Shimizu Reien Islamic Graveyard, Hiroshima Islamic Cultural Center in late 2021, and the Kyoto Koraiji International Burial Cemetery and the Oita Trappist Monastery in July 2023. Interviews were semi-structured, and conducted in Japanese and English. Interviews in Japanese were translated into English by the author for quoting purposes. Each interview, conducted over Zoom, lasted between 90 minutes to 2 hours, while some were conducted over email as an “epistolary interview” (Debenham, 2007). In addition, two interviews were conducted in mid-2022 with the local residents in Hiji who opposed the cemetery. An additional interview was conducted in July 2023 with a Buddhist monk who has been playing an active role in supporting the BMA’s campaign. Real names are used for Muslim association representatives, cemetery owners, and politicians, but pseudonyms are used when referring to the local residents.

Participant observation was conducted to study the Beppu Muslim Association (BMA) and its campaign to acquire a cemetery construction permit from Hiji Town, Oita Prefecture. From 2020 until 2022, I played a supporting role for the BMA. I assisted in activities such as gathering an online petition to request the mayor of Hiji Town to issue a permit. I also attended meetings with the Hiji Town and the local communities in Hiji and Kitsuki as an interpreter. All data were audio-recorded when permissions were given. Notes were taken and turned into field notes for coding analysis. Other primary and secondary data include raw water test results from local governments with burial cemeteries, government statistics and legal documents, newspaper articles, and academic sources on burial and cemetery issues.

Background

Muslims in Japan 

Muslims residing in Japan have notably increased over the past decades, and are estimated to have reached approximately 230,000 in 2020 (Tanada 2021). This is more than a two-fold increase in ten years when the estimate was around 110,000 in 2010 (Tanada, 2013). Muslim migrants in the 1980s were recognized by the state as dekasegi workers staying only temporarily in the urban, metropolitan areas. Even though Muslims today are still concentrated in large cities, their settlement in Japanese society meant the growth of the Muslim population in areas beyond the metropolis and spread into the rural regions (Tanada, 2021, Okai 2009). In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the Japanese government suspended the visa-less entry agreements with Muslim-dominant countries such as Iran, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. This triggered a decrease in the pace of new entrants while Muslims with visa status continued to grow. Muslim migrant workers, who were predominantly single men, increasingly married in Japan and had families who became Muslims (Higuchi, 2017a). The globalization of tertiary education also generated an increase in Muslim students across the nation, some of whom decided to work in Japan after graduation. This trend was reinforced by the guest workers from Muslim-dominant countries under the Technical Internship Training Program (e.g., Indonesia) working in the rural regions suffering from labor shortage. The current Muslim population settling in Japan is characterized by diversity in the country of origin, nationality, ethnic identity, occupation, and place of residence. 

The increase in resident Muslims and their geographical spread is represented by the nationwide proliferation of mosques. Studies by experts on Muslim migrants show that there were only four mosques in the 1980s, mostly constructed as state-sponsored projects in urban cities (Tanada, 2015). By 2017, the number of mosques has increased to over 100, many of which were created by workers and students residing across Japan, typically by using apartment rooms and renovating existing buildings into places for prayer (Tanada and Okai, 2015; Okai, 2017). Muslim migrants commonly put in effort to secure their religiously-mandated foodways in addition to securing places for prayer. Halal food business in Japan dates back to the 1970s when a limited number of import businesses catered mostly to a rather small population of embassy employees and Muslim seamen. Since the early 1990s, halal food businesses and halal certification of local restaurants increased exponentially along with the growth of resident Muslims and their mosques (Higuchi, 2017b). At present, some Muslim associations are discussing the need to build their own schools where the values and teachings of Islam are delivered to the generations born and raised in Japan.

Muslim migrants have hitherto laid out their religious-institutional foundations primarily through self-help. The Japanese government’s initiative to promote multiculturalism under the banner of “multicultural coexistence” was launched in 2005, but religion had little place in the discussions on meeting the needs of foreign residents (Takahashi, 2015). The central government externalized the responsibilities of instituting multicultural policies to the local governments, and the undertakings by the local governments were mostly about providing multilingual services at city halls, assisting Japanese language education at public schools, and sponsoring cultural exchange events (Tanada, 2019; Takahashi, 2015). This is not to deny the local governments’ proactive measures to accommodate the needs of Muslim migrants. A handful of cities have sponsored Islamic culture classes, created prayer rooms in public spaces, and added halal menus to their emergency food stock (Tanada, 2019). However, very little has been done on emerging issues facing the resident Muslims, such as the need for burial cemeteries. 

The Dominance of Cremation and Regulations on Burial

The proportion of cremation has increased rapidly since the postwar period, making Japan a unique country where 99.97% of the remains are cremated (MHLW, 2023). However, burial continues to be an important mortuary practice for a minority of its population. First, burial is an important way to mourn the dead for parents who had a stillbirth. Statistics show that Yokohama City has a relatively large number of burials (MHLW, 2023). This is because of the presence of an institution that accepts dead fetuses from the Kanto region. For parents who neither choose the remains to be disposed of nor cremated, burial remains an important option. Second, burial is exercised in times of disaster. Statistics show that in 2011, a large number of burials were recorded in the Tohoku region (MHLW, 2012). The Great East Japan Earthquake on March 11 destroyed cremation facilities while deaths rose rapidly. Burial is an important means to maintain public hygiene at times of natural disasters. Finally, religious minorities conduct burials in contemporary Japan. There are Catholic monasteries that own and manage burial-based cemeteries. Jewish people also customarily exercise burial, along with Muslims whose presence is growing in Japan.

Despite the dominance of cremation, legal regulations allow for both burial and cremation. The Cemetery and Burial Act (MHLW, 1948) regulates mortuary practices, including the legal procedures required for exercising mortuary rituals and the conditions to acquire permits for cemetery construction, ownership, and management. The governor in each prefecture is authorized to issue permits for owning and managing a cemetery, which is usually delegated to mayors at the town and city levels. This is because the central government recognizes that funerary customs differ by region. According to the Act’s guideline (MHLW, 2000), it is desirable for the state to only set the broad legal framework and leave it to the local government and its mayors to stipulate regulations in its local ordinance (jōrei) that suit the customs and needs of each locality. As a result, local ordinances typically forbid the construction of burial cemeteries in the main urban areas (e.g., Tokyo’s 23 Wards), while it allows burial cemeteries in the rest of the areas with particular conditions, such as keeping a certain distance away from a residence or watercourse. This shows that the Act, the accompanying guidelines, and local ordinances are multicultural in spirit and purposefully designed to accommodate diversity in funerary customs. Yet, Muslim associations across Japan face difficulties in acquiring permission from local governments, because the construction plans are met by opposition from the local community.

The Beppu Mosque is frequented by Muslims of diverse nationalities. Photo by author.

Beppu Muslim Association and Its Struggle for a Burial Cemetery

The Beppu Muslim Association (BMA) has been seeking to acquire a burial cemetery since 2018. The BMA manages the Beppu Mosque, which is mostly frequented by foreign students, workers, and their families living in the city. Dr. Muhammad Tahir Abbas Khan, who is the head of BMA, came to Japan in 2001 from Pakistan to pursue a doctoral degree and landed a teaching position at a private university in Beppu City where he still teaches. Mr. Khan acquired Japanese nationality in 2010, and two out of his three children have been born and raised in Japan. Muslim migrants settling in a non-Muslim country typically seek to arrange institutions that enable a lifestyle true to the teachings of Islam. Mr. Khan played a central role in building the Beppu Mosque, and he has collaborated with the local governments in certifying halal restaurants. However, particularly in Japan, Muslim migrants are at some point made to realize that death is an issue for them, which triggers them to seek and acquire a burial cemetery.

In the case of BMA, Mr. Saeed Zafar and his wife had a stillbirth in the winter of 2010. Mr. Zafar graduated from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University where Mr. Khan teaches. He remained in Beppu City after graduation and acquired Japanese nationality in 2010. He is also a board member of the BMA. Mr. Zafar, still in grief and with his wife hospitalized, visited the Beppu City Hall to report and process his child’s death. He informed the civil servants that he cannot cremate for religious reasons. In reply, the city suggested him to contact a Muslim organization in Tokyo if he wanted to bury his child (Suzuki, 2023, p.20). Mr. Zafar was dismayed that he was asked to contact some organization 1,000 kilometers away just to bury his child. After hours of waiting, the city managed to find a Catholic Church in Beppu City that owned a burial cemetery, where the pastor kindly agreed to lend a space (Oita Godo Shimbun, 2023). This incident signaled the BMA that securing a burial cemetery for local Muslims is a primary issue to be resolved if they wish to live and die in Japan as Muslim.

The BMA began searching for a burial cemetery in 2017, together with a native Japanese Buddhist monk named Jikaku Daido, a chief priest of a Sotoshu temple located in the northern city of Nakatsu in Oita prefecture. They first met in 2015 to organize a study session on Islam for Buddhist monks when Islamic fundamentalism was a rising issue. Mr. Jikaku felt the need to promote mutual understanding across religions when the media reports on the Taliban and ISIS overpainted a negative image of Muslims in the Japanese mind. Mr. Jikaku came to know about the shortage of burial cemeteries through these activities. When I asked him in an interview about his reasons for joining the BMA’s effort, he elaborated on his background as an NPO officer working in Tokyo until 2014.

I took part in assisting [people from] Afghanistan, and I was also a board member of Religions for Peace Japan’s youth branch (an international NGO). So, I had experiences interacting with people of many religions, including Muslims, and I felt close to them. When I came to know that [the BMA] are facing a very serious issue with cemeteries, I felt I should do what I can to help them.

According to my observations, Mr. Jikaku has been leading the BMA’s campaign to secure a burial cemetery. Mr. Khan and the BMA board members can speak and listen to Japanese but not sufficiently enough to engage in legal-technical dialogue with the city hall who do not speak English well either. The BMA have difficulty reading and writing Japanese, which is an issue when they have to comprehend local ordinances and other legal texts. The BMA needed someone Japanese on their side to serve as a bridge between them and the Japanese community at large. Thus, Mr. Jikaku became the BMA’s contact person. Mr. Jikaku scheduled meetings with the city hall and led the dialogue with civil servants and members of the local community.

The very first step they took to acquire a burial cemetery was to search the city for a property, but to no avail. They extended their search to neighboring towns when they finally found a landowner in the town of Hiji who was willing to sell his property to the BMA. The landowner was introduced to the BMA by another religious figure who came to support the BMA, named Raphael Shioya, a native Japanese chief priest of the Oita Trappist Monastery (officially the Order of Cistercians of the Strict Observance, Our Lady of the Annunciation Monastery), located in Hiji. Mr. Shioya recollects that Mr. Jikaku and the BMA appeared at the monastery’s doorstep one day without an appointment. The group told Mr. Shioya that they are looking for a property to construct a burial cemetery, to whom Mr. Shioya introduced the property owner.

Since then, Mr. Shioya, sympathetic to the plights of the BMA, has been accepting Muslim bodies and burying them in the Monastery’s cemetery, free of charge, and by observing the Muslim ways of burial. Four Muslims have been buried until today at the request of the BMA. I asked Mr. Shioya why he is so cooperative. He humbly denied it’s not him personally who is accepting the Muslims but it was the board’s decision to sign an agreement with the BMA. He then gave a contemplative, historical reason for the significance of cooperating with the BMA. He stated,

The Cistercians date back to the 12th century in France, and since the French Revolution, the privileges we enjoyed in Catholic countries were rescinded, and people were exiled. We had to build monasteries in foreign lands without a Catholic tradition. Monasteries in Japan opening in the 19thcentury are a part of that history. So, for us, it’s natural that we too help other religions. And about 25 years ago, a Trappist monastery in Algeria was attacked by Islamic fundamentalists where seven were killed. This triggered our interest in Muslims back then and made us think about how we can coexist with other religions.

This shows how a transnational, inter-faith solidarity is formed among individuals from different religious groups in the process of resident Muslims struggling to secure a burial ground. Religious figures and organizations are actively involved in the politics of promoting multiculturalism at the local, grassroots level, while concomitantly exercising ‘multicultural coexistence’ in the course of collaborating in this particular campaign.

Once the BMA was assured of access to a property, they visited the Hiji Town Hall in the autumn of 2018 to inquire about the procedure for acquiring permission to construct and own a burial cemetery. The ordinance and the bylaws of Hiji Town did not forbid burial. They stipulated that cemeteries must be more than 110 meters away from infrastructure such as residences, schools, and commercial buildings (Hijimachi, 2007a). The property for sale was located away from the urbanized area in Hiji. The nearest residence was the Minamihata hamlet on the rural, mountainous hillside, which was 2.5 kilometers away. The nearest drinking water source was 2.3 kilometers away, and the nearby water course was a pond used for farming located 1.2 kilometers away. The BMA was informed by the town that issuing permission would not be a problem and that they should expect the process to take about three months. Given the optimistic response from the town, the BMA proceeded to purchase the land and officially embarked on the process to acquire permission from Hiji Town’s mayor.

Opposition from the Local Community

At the time of this writing in 2023, it has been four years since the BMA initiated the paperwork, but permission is yet to be issued. This is not because the BMA’s cemetery blueprint does not meet the town’s regulations. It is because the BMA was met with opposition from the local community of Minamihata residents, and in the face of opposition, the Hiji town and its mayor are reluctant to give permission, resulting in the delay and stalling of the administrative process. 

Since February 2020, the BMA held five meetings with the Minamihata hamlet residents. Their opposition grew into a formal political movement when a petition against the cemetery construction, with one hundred signatures by local residents attached, was officially submitted to the town assembly in August 2020. Analysis of local residents’ voices shows that there are largely three logics to the local residents’ opposition. The locals are opposed because (1) of concerns over public hygiene, primarily over the possibility of water contamination, (2) of being uninformed and excluded from the decision-making process, and (3) the BMA is an “outsider” who does not have membership in the community thereby lacking trust.

Concerns Over Water

Some residents of the Minamihata hamlet remember digging holes for burial when they were young, but the custom has gone extinct since their grandparents’ generation. They now find the practice outdated, unsanitary, and anxiety-raising. In a focus group interview with Minamihata’s mothers’ group, one of the residents said, “Our ancestors may be buried…but cremation is now the norm (atarimae).” When I asked if unfamiliarity with burial is at the root of opposition, they said,

Mrs. A: Yes. There is this image of burial being unsanitary.

The Group: Yes (nodding in agreement).

Mrs. B: It certainly does not make us feel good (laughter)

Mrs. A: That’s why we are anxious. How do the remains decompose? How would it affect the soil? How about the water? It’s concerning…

This anxiety over the possibility of environmental pollution was repeated by the local residents in interviews, in the news media, and at formal meetings with the BMA. The Hiji Town’s council member representing the Minamihata district, Mr. Eto, voiced his concern over the potential impact on the water at a tripartite meeting with the BMA and the Hiji town officials. The BMA replied by repeating their position that the closest water course from the site is a pond for farming that is 1.2 kilometers away. From the BMA’s standpoint, the distance not only abides by the town’s ordinance, but also signifies plenty of distance to assure safety. After all, the Trappist Monastery, located closer to the pond at 850 meters, has been exercising burial with a permit in hand since 1990. They routinely test the underground water they draw to bake cookies for sale, which has never tested positive for contaminants. In reply, Mr. Eto said, “It’s not that we are speaking in terms of science. It’s about our feeling, that when we turn the faucet, we cannot drink water with peace of mind.”

The concern for water safety is especially high in the Minamihata hamlet when their waterworks system is left unrenovated due to the town’s budgetary constraints. Mr. Watanabe (pseudonym) confessed in an interview that he too opposes the burial cemetery out of concern for water.

Our water system here is decrepit. Heavy rain used to be rare, but nowadays it rains hard frequently. And during heavy downpours, our water turns brown. The water from the faucet is not a little murky, but brown water.

He requested the town to renovate the waterworks system as a condition for permitting the burial cemetery construction, but his request was never accommodated by the town nor the BMA. This infrastructural vulnerability in a depopulated, aging hamlet located away from the urban center of Hiji town exacerbated the locals’ concern about water. They imagined the water from the cemetery may somehow seep into their drinking water when it turned brown with heavy rain. In response, the BMA routinely noted that it is completely normal to drink water from wells nearby cemeteries in Pakistan and that there is no evidence of contamination from existing burial cemeteries elsewhere in Japan. The residents were not convinced. They pointed out that the cumulative number of burials at the Trappist Monastery is far less than what is expected of BMA’s cemetery. Water test results from other prefectures are irrelevant when the constitution of soil may be different. The residents were also concerned about reputational damage, that their farm produce may incur damage in sales when consumers think the hamlet is using dirty water to grow their crops.

Whether it be damage to the soil, water, or farm produce, the anxieties were all about potentialities. The BMA and the residents were both asking for hard evidence of harm and safety from each other, which neither has managed to provide, leading to a standstill. After all, Article 10 of the Hiji Town ordinance on cemeteries states, “a cemetery must be located on high and dry ground where there is no possibility for contaminating drinking water,” which dovetailed with the residents’ concerns of “what if’s”. Zero possibility was impossible to prove, leading to a haphazard response by the Town in managing the conflict. The residents also voiced concerns over the remains possibly rolling out of the earth during an earthquake or a landslide. One of the voices of opposition notes, “Unless there is zero possibility of contamination, anxieties will remain (Hijichōgikai, 2021; Oita Godo Shimbun, 2022b).”

From the BMA’s standpoint, the residents’ anxieties are difficult to appreciate. Burial is familiar and ordinary to them, which has posed little hygienic threat empirically back home. Considering that Mr. Shioya’s Trappist Monastery, who are Japanese Christians, was given permission to bury the dead, they cannot help but think the local opposition may be Islamophobic. In the eyes of BMA, the opposition is perhaps not really about water, but ethnic and racial in nature, and the local community is voicing anxieties and concerns over water for the sake of opposition. Mr. Khan of BMA stated in an interview, “What kind of information can we provide if they are concerned about earthquakes and landslides?” The BMA has visited Mr. Shioya to borrow their water test results to convince the local residents with scientific evidence. But when the locals responded by saying that their opposition is more about feelings than science, they felt it was meaningless to provide additional evidence for environmental safety. They could have paid an engineer to conduct an environmental assessment, but they feared the residents may disregard the assessment report and shift the goalpost by raising a new concern.

Exclusion from the Decision-Making Process

The majority of the Minamihata residents were caught by surprise when they heard about the cemetery construction plan, and when they heard about the plan for the first time, the BMA came to the community with their decision to construct a cemetery already made and with the property already purchased. This angered the local residents. They felt the construction of a burial cemetery in their community was a big deal and that the local residents should have been informed and consulted before anyone made any decisions about their community. Mr. Watanabe (pseudonym) stated,

When I heard this, it was as if the cemetery is already decided to be built here. I felt, “What? Who made the decision? Who agreed?” I was clueless about how or when decisions were made. I was not informed. 

From the standpoint of the villagers, the BMA has broken the norm of a rural community by deciding to construct a cemetery without consulting the locals in prior. Mr. Watanabe continued to state, “You must follow the proper footsteps. That’s the premise. Unless, things do not move forward here.” The hamlet’s mothers’ group felt the same. The process the BMA took to engage the local community when they wanted to build something as unfamiliar and anxiety-raising as a burial cemetery in their backyard, ran against the community’s norm. One of the mothers in the focus group questioned,

Mrs. A: Why didn’t they consult us before purchasing the property? That is the biggest issue. 

Mrs. B: They should have asked all of us first.

Mrs. C: Yes. It’s pointless to come to us and have meetings when they have already made up their mind.

These statements imply that the BMA should have come to them first and shared with the community of their wish to construct a burial cemetery. Upon their first visit, they ought to have consulted the local community, with scientific evidence from experts in hand that there would be little risk to the water source. Instead, the BMA came to them empty-handed but only with the determination to construct a cemetery. For the locals, this was a sign of lacking respect for those who have lived in the community for many generations and who bear any potentially negative consequences of hosting a burial cemetery in their community.

The five meetings with the Minamihata residents were delivered by the BMA with the tone of “briefing the locals of our plan,” which frustrated the locals. However, the BMA was only abiding by the local ordinance and following the administrative guidance from the Hiji Town. According to the ordinance, those who seek to acquire permission from the mayor are required to hold a setsumeikai (a briefing session or presentation) to inform their plan to the kinrin jūmin (neighboring residents), defined as “property owners, building owners, and residents within a 110-meter radius as well as the head of adjacent districts” (Hijimachi, 2007b). And if there are any responses from the residents regarding public hygiene, the structure of the cemetery, or the construction work, the proprietor must put in effort to sincerely accommodate their opinions (Hijimachi, 2007b). The Minamihata district’s head of ward was the only applicable kinrin jūmin, and the BMA did acquire a signature of approval from the head of ward. However, the BMA received administrative guidance from the Hiji Town to hold a meeting with the residents, to which they agreed even though such a meeting was not prescribed in the ordinance. And when the meetings were held, the residents were already unhappy for not being informed, and even more so when the BMA presented their plan with a tone of briefing rather than consulting the residents about their plan. The residents’ anger resulted in replacing the head of the ward who had consented with another person who opposed the plan, leading to a bureaucratic standstill. 

Lack of Trust and Respect

Finally, the BMA was met with opposition from the local community because they are an “outsider” in multiple ways, thereby lacking trust in the eyes of the community members. The locals’ concerns over water, the anger over not being implicated in the decisions they made, and the status of the BMA as an outsider all fed into each other, shaping the opposition by the local community. The hamlet is anxious about the negative impacts on the community because it was brought to the community out of the blue by someone from outside the community. From the standpoint of the Minamihata residents, the BMA did not care to consult them or offer an empathetic explanation to their concerns because the BMA is an outsider who does not care for the community members as they care for their own people. The residents feel they are being disregarded and disrespected, which led to an emotional response of opposition.

Mr. Watanabe repeated the word “trust” (shinyō and shinrai kankei) ten times in a 110-minute interview. He said, “It’s not because [the BMA] are outsiders per se. It is about the steps they took in this whole process. It speaks a lot about their trustworthiness.” The residents found issues with the way the property was sold to someone outside the community without consulting the community. Mr. Watanabe continued to state, 

It’s already problematic when the property owner sold his property knowing about the plan but not consulting the community. From the very first step, you’re out-course already.

The property owner, Mr. Suzuki (a pseudonym), is a Hiji resident who migrated from Osaka in the 1990s. He acquired a large amount of property in Hiji that became available in the market when a local developer went bankrupt. The Minamihata residents understood why the residents were not informed before the sale of the property when they came to know it was Mr. Suzuki who sold the property. It was sold by an outsider who does not understand the ways of the rural community. The mothers stated,

Mrs. A: A local would not have sold the property.

Mrs. B: Especially when it is to build a burial cemetery.

Mrs. C: Yes, that’s why there is this much opposition.

Mrs. D: The property may have been sold, but the person would have consulted everyone before selling.

Everyone (voicing and nodding in agreement)

Mrs. E: If Mr. Suzuki was a local, he would have gathered everyone and discussed it first.

The Japanese Gemeinschaft

The reason why the local residents are generally wary of outsiders who do not respect their ways has much to do with the nature of a rural community in Japan. Rural communities in Japan are a gemeinschaftcharacterized by particular social norms and values. According to Tönnies, a gemeinschaft is a closely-knit community where “…division and sharing of duties and pleasures will be present or will develop and work reciprocally (Harris, 2001: 25).” There are three elements to a gemeinschaft based on the principles of sharing and reciprocity: Blood, indicating the unity of existence; Place, expressed by residence in proximity; and Spirit, indicating solidarity who “work together for the same end and purpose” (Harris, 2001: 27-28). Gemeinschaft is a tightly knit community that functions like a family where the intimacy of a blood-based kinship is extended to the local community.

Key elements that constitute a Japanese gemeinschaft are presence, participation, and mutuality, which is evident in the Japanese rurality (Iwamoto, 2003: 236-37; Takeda, 2020; Manzenreiter and Holthus, 2022). A rural hamlet is typically constituted of residents in close dwellings. In contrast to urban city centers where many of the residences are rented properties, signifying mobility and anonymity, rural residences are mostly houses owned and inherited across generations. Intimacy and trust are formed through collaborative, in-situ daily activities that serve to maintain a cohesive community, including the regular cleaning of communal space, firefighting drills, infrastructural repair, and festivities (Uchiyama, 2010: 73). The principle of mutuality is also an integral element that defines membership in a Japanese rural hamlet. Takeda (2020) states, “There is a reciprocal and non-monetary economy based on close and strong relationships among the residents (206).” In his study, residents shared food as a note of gratitude for replacing a lightbulb for an elderly neighbor. Uchiyama (2010) tells a story of a mountainous village in Gunma prefecture where villagers shared radish harvested in excess with their neighbors and received cabbages in return. The community is maintained through sharing and mutual help. When I visited the Minamihata hamlet for an interview, the mothers’ group was preparing lunch boxes to be distributed for free to the community’s elderly. Uchiyama states, “Herein lies the spirit and code of a community (2010: 36)”. It is through personal, regular, face-to-face interactions of mutual help, of caring for one another beyond individual households and returning favors, which assigns membership to residents and bestows trust in one another.

The socio-cultural characteristic of a rural village makes it difficult for the BMA or any outsider to construct a cemetery in a community where they do not have membership. They are not members of the rural community in terms of blood, place, and spirit. When the hamlet lives according to the codes of the Japanese gemeinschaft, a cemetery construction project by an outsider who was never present or has never contributed to the maintenance of the community is not welcomed. In addition, when the BMA pursues its campaign to construct a burial cemetery by following the regulations stipulated in the Hiji Town ordinance, they are in essence abiding by the logic of the gesellschaft where “juristic and administrative rationality and formal legislation (Harris, 2001: xix)” is the organizing principle of society. After all, the BMA are globally mobile city dwellers who are unaware of the codes and principles of the Japanese rurality. From their standpoint, Japan is a nation governed by the rule of law, and they feel permission should be issued as long as their plans abide by the local ordinance. However, from the standpoint of the local residents, the BMA are in a sense bulldozing their way into a community to take and use (but not give), which leads to emotional reactions of denial, rejection, and closure. The conflict between the BMA and the local residents represents the dissonant logic between the gemeinschaft and the gesellschaft. However, when the local government, which is responsible for administering ordinances according to the logic of the gesellschaft, is reluctant to issue permits in the face of local opposition, multicultural policies become ineffective in practice.

Working Around the Local Opposition

There are only thirteen burial cemeteries for Muslims in Japan, but they do exist. This is because Muslim associations have historically faced opposition similar to the BMA, but have improvised a way to work around the local opposition. Muslim associations have used a non-Muslim native Japanese as a proxy in gaining access to a burial cemetery. The proxy may be a native Japanese who already owns a burial cemetery, from whom the Muslim association purchases the right to use the plots for Muslim use. If the proxy does not own a burial cemetery, the proxy undergoes the bureaucratic process with the city hall to acquire a permit on the Muslim’s behalf. In either case, a non-Muslim native Japanese is the legal owner of the burial cemetery, from whom the Muslim association acquires burial plots in a business transaction. This proxy system works because the strategy serves to bridge the dissonance between the Japanese gemeinschaftand the gesellschaft. The proxy is a trusted member rooted in the local community who knows and follows the local ways. The local is not excluded, but are implicated in the burial cemetery. The fact that a local is constructing/managing a burial cemetery invites little opposition from the local community.

Monjuin Islam Reien is the first burial cemetery constructed for Muslims in Japan. Monjuin is a Buddhist temple in Yamanashi prefecture. When the Japan Muslim Association (JMA), which primarily organizes Muslims of Japanese descent, launched a project to acquire a burial cemetery in the early 1960s, they sought the assistance of Monjuin’s monk. In response, the monk offered to introduce the local property owners to JMA so they can negotiate themselves. What is noteworthy here is that JMA declined to negotiate directly with the local property owners but instead requested the monk to talk to the locals on JMA’s behalf. JMA was self-aware that it is a Tokyo-based organization without any ties to the local community where Monjuin is located, and JMA felt “they wouldn’t listen to us, it must be someone who is locally trusted” (Ikeda, 2005: 80). They knew how the local community politics work in Japan. The monk agreed to bear the task of convincing his community to sell their properties to construct a burial-based cemetery for Muslims. However, the local community raised environmental concerns and damage to their farming produce (Ikeda, 2005: 80; Higuchi, 2005: 68). Locals also felt emotionally uncomfortable, saying “It is spooky to imagine having a burial cemetery nearby” (Kawasaki, 2016: 99). It took the chief priest three years of dialogue to persuade the locals, who in the end consented to entrust the project to the temple. Then the Yamanashi Prefecture issued permission in 1969 for the construction and management of a burial cemetery (Ikeda, 2005: 80). The local opposition shares similarities with the BMA’s case, but was overcome by the presence of a local proxy. 

The use of a proxy is observed by other Muslim associations. Japan Islamic Trust (JIT) is a religious corporation that runs the Otsuka Mosque in Tokyo. Mr. Haroon Qureshi, the head of JIT, recollects that JIT had failed to acquire a cemetery in the past. In a city in Chiba prefecture, when JIT applied for permission, the city hall did not even accept their application documents. While the JIT was holding meetings with the city to figure out why the city is declining to accept their documents, the city assembly had re-written its ordinance to forbid burial. In an informal conversation, a city official expressed concerns over the high likelihood of local opposition that would negatively affect the city administration. The second attempt was in Ashikaga City in Tochigi prefecture where JIT had a mosque. JIT found a small mountain in a rural area where burial was practiced by the local residents, which made them optimistic about constructing a cemetery. JIT acquired signatures of approval from residents within a 300-meter radius of the site as regulated by the local ordinance. However, when the head of the local neighborhood association voiced opposition, the momentum of opposition mushroomed into a large social movement, which made JIT give up.

However, the JIT now has access to a burial cemetery in Jōsō city in Ibaraki prefecture. Mr. Qureshi says “We don’t have issues” and the acquisition of the cemetery was “easy” compared to the conflicts in Chiba and Tochigi. He says “the most important is the jūshoku (chief monk)” of Sanpukuji Temple who owns and manages the Yawara Gobyō Cemetery where JIT purchased the eternal right to use their 500 plots for burial. The chief priest was “welcoming to our religion” and agreed to sell the use rights to JIT. JIT came to know the chief priest through a mutual acquaintance, who was sympathetic to JIT’s need for a burial cemetery and introduced him to the chief priest. Similar to the case of JMA, this shows how getting connected to the right person who embodies the knowledge of the local community politics enabled JIT to work around the local opposition and gain access to a burial cemetery. 

Muslims Graveyard Ibaraki Japan (MGIJ) also chose to use a proxy. Mr. Syed Jawed Ali Zaidi is the head of the Madina Mosque in Ibaraki Prefecture that has been managing the MGIJ through a proxy since 2010. Mr. Zaidi states, “Even though we may think we are legally correct and locals’ consent is irrelevant by law, things just don’t work that way. You will clash with the locals,” pointing to the conflict between the BMA and Hiji. While Mr. Zaidi was in search of a local proxy, his business partner came across a Buddhist monk who was willing to offer help. After some negotiation, Mr. Zaidi purchased the right to use the plots for burial owned by the monk. He said in fluent Japanese, “Japan is a relatively easier place to live. And it is changing in the right direction. We want people to understand our ways, but we need to understand their ways too.” I asked what he meant. He elaborated,

Even in my country [Pakistan], if a foreigner comes to your community and says we want to build a cemetery, they will oppose. It’s probably common anywhere… 

Mr. Basem Abdulla of the Hiroshima Islamic Cultural Center (HICC) agrees with Mr. Zaidi. Instead of applying for permission himself, Mr. Basem sought a native Japanese who would acquire permission on HICC’s behalf. He managed to find a Buddhist monk in Mihara city where Mr. Basem does not reside. The two negotiated and agreed to have the monk submit paperwork to the city to acquire permission for a burial cemetery and sell the use right to the HICC. The city issued a permit to the monk in 6 months, and now the HICC has access to 150 burial plots. Mr. Basem feels the key to acquiring permission was the local’s consent when the monk went door to door in his community to explain his plan to transform a part of his cemetery into burial plots. Mr. Basem states,

It’s a rural area in Mihara city. They have no interaction with foreigners. Do you think if a foreigner you’ve never seen before comes to your door and asks for permission to build a burial cemetery 1 km away, they’d be happy to accept? No. Impossible. It’s atarimae (only natural).

He is an outsider in multiple layers, geographically, phenotypically, and ethnically. He says, “If there is a good relationship, people feel anshin (secure)… You need to forge en (bonds and ties) with the local residents.” Using the word en demonstrated how knowledgeable he was on how the Japanese mind and communal relationships work in rural Japan. It was the Buddhist monk who was rooted and trusted in the community, not him. These cases show how the arbitrary administrative responses by the local governments were overcome by the Muslim associations’ ingenuity to play by the rule books of the rural Japanese community.

The BMA did have a native Japanese Buddhist monk on their team, Mr. Jikaku Daido, as noted earlier. Mr. Khan had meant him to serve as a bridge between them and the Japanese community. However, Mr. Jikaku was not a Hiji local but a monk from the northern city of Nakatsu, which made him an outsider, thus failing to serve as a bridge. Mr. Jikaku also was not aware of how the proxy system works; he began the campaign by looking for property, not people (a local who is willing to create the BMA’s cemetery in his/her own backyard). In contrast, Mr. Khan knew about the proxy system. Mr. Qureshi of JIT and Mr. Basem of HICC are friends with Mr. Khan. I once asked why the BMA is not using a proxy. After all, it is the proven method that has enabled Muslim associations to acquire cemeteries without conflict. Mr. Khan answered, “If I use a proxy, I feel I’m not being honest.” He elaborated that you ought to show your face and inform the local residents directly on what exactly you are asking for, to which he continued to state, “But sometimes, we pay the price for that.”

Mr. Sai Heijun is sympathetic to Mr. Khan’s plight. Mr. Sai is a second-generation zainichi Korean and the chief executive board member of the Koraiji Temple located in the rural village of Minamiyamashiro in Kyoto Prefecture. He manages a large burial cemetery with 3,500 plots, making it one of the largest burial cemeteries accessible to Muslims. I met Mr. Sai when he visited the BMA in June 2023. He said to me in person, “Mr. Khan needs to live in Hiji if he wants to build a cemetery.” Mr. Sai was only half-joking when he said this, but I felt he was highlighting the significance of presence, participation, and mutuality, the dominating principles of the Japanese gemeinschaft, as the key to constructing a cemetery in a rural community where you do not belong. Mr. Sai is an ethnic minority who was originally not from the Minamiyamashiro village. By the time he acquired consent from the local villagers to building a burial cemetery, Mr. Sai had spent eight years building rapport with the local villagers. When he became a board member of the Koraiji Temple, he moved in to the temple. After moving in, he was rather ignored by the villagers at first but from the third year, the villagers began to invite him to the hamlet’s monthly meetings. The monks at the temple, including Mr. Sai, have been forging ties with the local villagers by participating in community-wide events such as rice planting and harvesting (Yoshida 2023). Mr. Sai had been regularly purchasing produce from the local farmers, including rice, vegetables, and tea. All of these efforts are about exercising presence, participation, and mutuality. When Mr. Sai decided to build a burial cemetery at the temple, he had already gained the trust of the local villagers, which significantly contributed to the locals consenting to the construction of a burial cemetery. 

At present, the BMA has successfully reached an agreement with the Minamihata residents on the burial cemetery construction. And Hiji Town is now positive about issuing permission given the agreement. The agreement was reached because the BMA, after many talks with the Minamihata locals over multiple years, agreed to move the cemetery’s location adjacent to the Trappist Monastery to a property owned by Hiji Town. Hiji Town is on the course of settling the conflict by selling the property to the BMA. In addition, the BMA has agreed to reduce the number of burial plots, limit the use of the cemetery to those who lived in the Kyushu Okinawa area, and leave twenty years between reusing the burial plots (i.e., to bury a new body in a used plot only after twenty years). The BMA has also agreed to bore holes for water quality tests. The Minamihata residents are now happy, not only because they believe their hygienic concerns were met by the above agreements (regardless of scientific grounds), but more importantly because the BMA has listened to their concerns and created a cemetery plan in dialogue with the local residents. The BMA listening to the locals and giving in to their requests is a sign of the BMA respecting the local community and implicating them in a decision that has to do with the community. The golden rule for instituting a project in Japanese rurality, from building a state-sponsored wave breaker on the coastlines in the Tohoku region (Miura, 2018) to protecting an endangered species by the Ministry of the Environment rangers (Maeda, 2009), is: one must involve the local community in deciding on what is done and how it’s done. This is why the proxy system has worked for Muslim associations when accessing burial grounds.

Absolute opposition against the construction of a large-scale burial cemetery. Photo by author.

However, the BMA has been met with new opposition, this time from the neighboring city of Kitsuki. The new location is now bordering a hamlet in Kitsuki city, where the hill is sloping towards Kitsuki city. The Minamihata residents felt it was safer for the cemetery to be constructed there given its location. However, it later came to light that there is a spring water source 550 meters away from the new site, which is used by the Kitsuki residents for drinking. The water course was created 50 years ago by the hamlet’s collective effort to survive a drought. The Kitsuki residents are angry for the same reason that angered the Minamihata residents, which is that the BMA (and Hiji Town for being complicit in the decision) is deciding on matters about the community without consulting the local residents. Kitsuki city feels that an institution rejected by Hiji Town was accepted by bringing it away from the town and closer to the Kitsuki border. For the BMA, the location did not matter as long as they can secure a permit, so they consented. Hiji Town is now trying hard to convince the Kitsuki City that there are no risks for environmental contamination, but they are met with a rebuttal from Kitsuki City that is hard to refute: “If there are no environmental concerns, why don’t you take it back to the original location?” (Oita Godo Shimbun, 2022a). After all, the original location was 1.2 km away from a pond used for farming, and the new location is 550 meters away from a drinking water course. The conflict seems to never end.

Conclusion

The hardships Muslims face in securing burial grounds in Japan represent how the cultural rights of immigrant minorities are not sufficiently guaranteed. Even when regulations allow for burial, local governments are unwilling to enforce and abide by the regulations when there is local opposition. This case reflects how Japan is falling short of creating a multicultural society, which is in line with existing studies that question Japan’s multiculturalism (Douglas and Roberts, 2000; Green, 2015; Imin Seisaku Gakkai, 2018; Nakamatsu, 2014). The fact that some Muslims have access to burial grounds while others do not also demonstrate how the Constitutional right to religion and religious practices is unequally distributed. I showed how the conflict between the Muslim association and the local community signifies the discord between the gemeinschaft and the gesellschaft. The BMA pursued the legal-rational approach by following the local ordinances while the local community found the BMA as disrespecting the codes of the local community. The conflict is complicated by the vague and badly-worded ordinances that were not only useless in quelling environmental concerns, but have triggered arbitrary and haphazard responses from the local government. Hiji Town’s ordinance states the cemetery “should not be close to” rivers or ponds, but it is entirely unclear how close is “close.” It also gives “110 meters” as the distance to be kept from infrastructures, but the scientific grounds of 110 meters remain a mystery when the distances outlined in ordinances differ by city. Finally, that there should be “no possibility” of water contamination distressed the BMA to respond to the never-ending concerns of “what if”s from the local residents, leaving the mayor reluctant to issue permits. 

Positive examples abound in imagining policy alternatives. Firstly, the Japanese government should take leadership in solving the cemetery issue faced by religious minorities. Neoliberalism has led the central government to actively externalize and outsource tasks and responsibilities to the local government. However, when migrant communities are structurally disadvantaged in preserving and practicing their culture in the host society, it is the responsibility of the state to institutionalize policies that correct the disadvantages and positively accommodate the cultural rights of immigrant minorities (Kymlicka, 1995; Ley, 2007; Rattansi, 2011). For example, the educational rights of the Japanese Brazilian community had well been eroded by the time the central government institutionalized an educational curriculum for “Japanese as a Second Language” courses. The local governments were heavily burdened to accommodate the educational needs of foreign children with little leadership from the central government. The same can be said with funerary practices. Muslim associations, local residents, and local governments are heavily burdened to solve this very difficult issue by themselves. Mr. Eto of the Hiji Town Assembly states, “Accepting human resources from abroad is a state policy. The current situation, in which the local is made to bear the brunt of conflicts, is an imposition of responsibility of the state to the local (Oita Godo Shimbun, 2023).” The state ought to acknowledge first that the cemetery issue is an issue to be dealt with by the central government.

Secondly, the Japanese government should stipulate the regulations for cemetery construction and management based on science. A good example is the U.K.’s regulation on cemetery construction (Environment Agency, 2022), which is in line with the World Health Organization’s meta-analysis report on the environmental impact of burial cemeteries (Üçisik and Rushbrook 1998). The report outlined what can be called a “250-30-10-meter rule,” which stipulates that burial cemeteries should be 250 meters from a drinking water source, 30 meters from any other watercourse, and 10 meters from any field drain to ensure safety, as well as the depth of the burial pit being 1-meter above the water table and 1 meter of soil cover on top (Üçisik and Rushbrook 1998). The U.K. Environment Agency has a particular way of “zoning” areas where burial cemeteries are not permitted for the high risk of drinking water contamination, as well as requiring cemetery proprietors to conduct environmental risk assessments depending on the levels of risk (Environment Agency, 2022). If similarly rigorous and science-based regulations are in place, they shall serve to quell hygienic concerns as well as enable the local governments to enforce regulations despite opposition. 

Finally, each prefecture could consider creating a public burial cemetery by following the above regulations. A cemetery is a basic human need, and this is why in every city there are public cemeteries and cremation facilities. Ensuring the Constitutional right to live a cultural life is reflected in the existence of public housing, public hospitals, public schools, and welfare support. However, public cemeteries only allow cremation except in a few cities like Kobe, with a history of active international exchange dating back to the pre-war period. Given the growing religious diversity in Japan, it is time for the local governments to provide public cemeteries that accommodate diversity in funerary practices. These multicultural policy arrangements are in line with the state’s interest in promoting economic growth with more foreign populations. The state and local governments ought to rearrange their policies to secure places for migrants to die in peace if they want immigrants to live and work in Japan.

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Shinji Kojima is an associate professor of sociology at the College of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. He primarily researches about globalization and inequality, with a particular focus on employment issues faced by non-regular workers in Japan and East Asia. He also researches on issues of migration and multiculturalism. His recent publications include “Litigating Equal Pay for Equal Work in Japan, 2012-2020” (Journal of Contemporary Asia, 2023), “Making Sense of Inequalities at Work: The Micropolitics of Everyday Negotiation Among Non-Regular Workers in Japan” (in Huiyan Fu ed., Temps and Giggers: The Changing World of Work in China and Japan, Oxford University Press, 2023) and “Social Movement Unionism in Contemporary Japan: Coalitions Within and Across Political Boundaries” (Economic and Industrial Democracy, 2020). A book chapter examining labor movements on precarious work in Japan is forthcoming from the University of Hawaii Press (May 2024). 

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Well-being in Rural Japan.” In Rethinking Locality in Japan, edited by Sonja Ganseforth and Hanno Jentzsch, 69–84. London: Routledge.

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 厚生労働省. 1948. “墓地、埋葬等に関する法律 昭和23年5月31日法律第48号 [Act on Cemeteries and Burials, Showa 23, May 31, Act Number 48].” https://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/kenkou/seikatsu-eisei15/

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Featured image: Graves for Muslims in Honjo Kodama Seichi Reien in Honjo, Saitama Prefecture (Saori Kuroda)

Rot in the Civil Service: Farewelling Mike Pezzullo

November 27th, 2023 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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There was no better example of Australia’s politicised public service than its Home Affairs Secretary, Mike Pezzullo.  In most other countries, he would have been the ideal conspirator in a coup, a tittletattler in the ranks and bound to brief against those he did not like.  Give him a dagger, and he was bound to use it.

His rise to power paralleled that of the emergence of that super amalgam of a ministry that arose during the Turnbull government.  Falling for the fatal error that centralising power assures the consolidation of efficiency, Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull was swayed by arguments that a broader ministry of home affairs was just the sort of thing Australia needed.  What the Commonwealth got in 2017, instead, was a monster run by the twin-headed beast of Home Affairs Minister Peter Dutton, and Secretary Pezzullo.

The extent of Pezzullo’s involvement in the machinations of government, and, it followed, party policy, was revealed by texts sent to Liberal Party lobbyist and former vice president of the NSW Liberals, Scott Briggs. These became the subject of a joint investigation mounted by The Age, The Sydney Morning Herald and 60 Minutes.

In August 2018, when the nation’s capital was privy to yet another potential palace coup against a sitting Prime Minister, Pezzullo was opening up to Briggs with indiscreet relish.  In one message he longed to be part of history.  “I don’t want to interfere but you won’t be surprised to hear that in the event of Scomo [Scott Morrison] getting up I would like to see [Peter] Dutton come back to HA [Home Affairs].  No reason for him to stay on the backbench that I can see.”  Briggs does not demur.

Pezzullo’s targets in the government varied.  Defence Minister Marise Payne was deemed “completely ineffectual” and a poor fit for office.  Former Liberal Attorney-General George Brandis was excoriated for befuddling public servants, though Pezzullo’s reasons for doing so are clear: it was Brandis, as Australia’s top legal officer, who expressed concerns that Canberra did not need a ministry of such size.

While the Coalition was in power, Pezzullo was coarsely candid about his feelings on war and conflict.  Fancying himself as something of a historian, he told gathered staff in his 2021 ANZAC Day address that Australians best prepare for war. 

“Today, as free nations again hear the beating drums and watch worryingly the militarisation of issues that we had, until recent years, thought unlikely to be catalysts for war, let us continue to search unceasingly for the chance for peace while bracing again, yet again, for the curse of war”. 

The speech is marked by a blatant misuse and misunderstanding of the legacies left by two US generals: Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower.  Fittingly, Pezzullo ignores one vital aspect of MacArthur: his sacking for being a bit too defiant of the commander-in-chief of the time, President Harry S. Truman.

Australia’s much more modest version of that commander, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, has now received the findings of an independent inquiry into Pezzullo’s conduct conducted by Lynnelle Briggs. In a short statement untroubled by any fuss, Albanese revealed that Pezzullo’s position as department secretary had been terminated.

We have little to go on regarding the substance of the findings. But press reports note that the now former secretary used his duty, power, status or authority to gain benefits and advantages for himself; engaged in gossip and disrespectful critique of ministers and public servants; failed to keep sensitive government information confidential; failed to remain apolitical in his office and failed to disclose any relevant conflicts of interest.

Unfortunately, the report itself will not be made public, an unsatisfactory state of affairs that does little to restore confidence in the civil service.  The argument advanced in this case is that publication will lead to the disclosure of personal information.  But what of it? The insinuation here is hard to avoid: keeping such an investigation buried suggests a closed shop, with officials keen to keep matters out of the public glare.  Given that Pezzullo was the most notable panjandrum in Canberra’s bureaucratic tangle, the rot is hardly likely to have remained at the head.  Who else, the question must be asked, breached protocol?  The list is likely to be ugly and long,

As former Senator Rex Patrick stated, Albanese “has done the right and necessary thing in terminating Mike Pezzullo’s appointment as Home Affairs Secretary. But in the interests of transparency and accountability he must also table Lynelle Briggs’s report in Parliament today.”

Having left the Australian Public Service Code in tatters, Pezzullo will undoubtedly find himself on the board of a defence or security company and take his place in the military-industrial complex. He might finally get a chance to join a thinktank. His sacking, however, was the culmination of a culture long in the making. Over the decades, the major parties have made political appointments a matter of course, subordinating expertise and fearless advice to party loyalties.  Perversely enough, Pezzullo was a perfect exponent of that tendency: a political civil servant.  The result: Canberra is awash and sinking with officialdom terrified to take a different stance to the political agenda of the day. Agree with those in government, or risk languishing, demotion or worse.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Mike Pezzullo (Licensed under the Public Domain)

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***

 

 

 

They can be a serious lot in New Zealand. They got upset at – forgive this author such reference – the use of a rule in cricket back in February 1981 which led to expressions of misty anger from the Prime Minister of the day, Robert Muldoon. While permissible within the laws of cricket, sides are generally not meant to bowl underarm. This, Greg Chappell’s Australians did. “I thought it most appropriate that the Australian team was dressed in yellow,” Muldoon fumed.

Recently, mild tempers were stirred by what could be regarded as a form of ballot interference, this time regarding the vote for the country’s most famous Bird of the Year competition. On this occasion, the competition, run by the conservation group Forest and Bird since 2005, had an elevated importance, being badged as a vote to identify New Zealand’s Bird of the Century.

While electoral and voter interference has become the stuff of mania since the 2016 US election, inducing fits of spluttering concern against those mischievous meddlers in Moscow and Beijing, some New Zealanders could be justified in showing irritation at the vigorous, external advocacy by the Anglo-American comedian, John Oliver, for the pūteketeke. Also known as the Australasian crested grebe, Oliver had detected a loophole in the voting rules, which permitted anyone with a valid email address to cast a vote.

Oliver made a stirring promotional pitch on Jimmy Fallon’s The Tonight Show, and expressed admiration on his own HBO show Last Week Tonight.

“They are weird puking birds with colourful mullets. What’s not to love there?” He also admired their “mating dance where both grab a clump of wet grass and chest bump each other before standing around unsure of what to do next.”

If billboards and an advertising campaign are measurements of love, then Oliver had it in feathery abundance as the bird’s self-appointed campaign manager. Billboards celebrating his special avian choice made their appearance in Wellington, Paris, Tokyo and Mumbai celebrating this “Lord of the Wings”.

The comedian’s background in this enterprise was, in many ways, fitting. Both the United Kingdom and the United States have made it something of a corrosive specialty swaying foreign elections and doctoring ballots over the decades. “This is what democracy is all about,” declared Oliver, “America interfering in foreign elections.”

Nor was Oliver venturing into a competition of virginal innocence. Fraud and idiosyncrasy have been prevalent themes. In 2018, 300 fraudulent votes were cast by Australians attempting to rig the result in favour of the shag. In 2019, accusations were made that Russian votes (of course) had played a spoiling role, though a spokesperson for Forest and Bird, Megan Hubscher, regarded them as legitimately cast by Russian ornithologists. “New Zealand actually shares birds with Russia,” she plausibly reasoned. In 2020, 1,500 fraudulent votes were cast for the kiwi. The following year, the competition was won by the long-tailed bat, prompting calls that the election had been stolen.

The voting that followed in 2023 was truly global in nature: 350,000 ballots cast from almost 200 countries during a frenzied bout of campaigning. At one point, the voting verification system crashed, delaying the result by two days.

There were also instances of blatant voter fraud. A supporter of the eastern rockhopper penguin (“hipster penguin” to Oliver) cast 40,000 votes for the bird. Another, based in Pennsylvania in the US cast 3,403 votes, with one arriving every three seconds. Both mercifully failed in having their efforts count.

The number for the pūteketeke was a lopsided tally of 290,000 votes, leaving the kiwi in second place with a paltry 12,904.  The next three placements were the kea, kākāpo and the fantail. Nicola Toki, the chief executive of Forest and Bird, was gingerly diplomatic about the result. She described the pūteketeke as being “an outside contender for Bird of the Century but was catapulted to the top spot thanks to its unique looks, adorable parenting style, and propensity for puking.” Toki and her colleagues were “not surprised these charming characteristics caught the eye of an influential bird enthusiast with a massive following.”

The incoming New Zealand Prime Minister, Christopher Luxon, did not seem too troubled either.

“Congratulations to the campaign manager @iamjohnoliver [John Oliver] and all those who gave their support to the pūteketeke,” he posted on the platform formally known as Twitter.

Many did not share that view. Umbrage was taken at Oliver’s derisory remark at one of the country’s most recognised birds, the kiwi, as “a rat carrying a toothpick.” Supporters of the kākāriki karaka, or orange-fronted parakeet, countered with their own billboard campaign sporting such lines as, “Dear John, don’t disrupt the pecking order.”

While the whole thing seemed like an indulgence, notably given the daily news digests of war, famine and societal failure, Toki could take heart at a bird campaign that had been globalised.  At home, the country’s native species (politicians, take note) are struggling; 80 percent have made their way to the dreaded threatened species list, and the Department of Conservation is having its budget cut. “We promised controversy but didn’t quite expect this! We’re stoked to see the outpouring of passion, creativity and debate this campaign has ignited.” Sadly, passion and awareness are not always politically convertible currencies.

*

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Great Crested Grebe (Podiceps cristatus), Lake Dulverton, Oatlands, Tasmania, Australia (Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0)

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The Politics of Indefinite Detention in Australia

November 16th, 2023 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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***

The High Court of Australia is not known for its zealotry in protecting human rights, and certainly not when considering the persuasive pull of international law and conventions. The Australian Parliament is usually given a generous hand in making policies that tend to outrage such conventions, a freedom made that much easier by an absence of any bill of rights.

A grim example of this was the 2004 High Court decision of Al-Kateb v Godwin, which gave the Commonwealth full assurance that policies on indefinitely detaining unwanted, designated “unlawful” arrivals were entirely within its power.  The case concerned the application of various provisions of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requiring an officer of the Commonwealth to detain those reasonably suspected to be unlawful citizens in the migration zone and held in immigration detention till their deportation or grant of a visa.

In such provisions, a pincer movement against such “unlawful citizens” had been enshrined with stunning cynicism. Once detained and having their status determined, such individuals might be found to be refugees. Accordingly, they might receive a visa, though not if they were those undesirables marooned in the offshore concentration camps of Nauru and Manus Island. Since 2013, Australian governments have proclaimed that those undocumented souls seeking refuge in Australia by boat would never be given the chance to settle in the country. Even in the event of being deemed refugees, they might still be refused a visa on character grounds or face the prospect of deportation to a third country, the latter being something of a favourite of Australian policy makers for two decades. (A gaggle of European states have also been impressed by this formula.)

What, then, of stateless citizens found to be refugees and without fault? Or those who would not be accepted by a third country? Or those who, having been convicted of an offence and served time for it, could be placed in a vicious limbo of de facto carceral administration for the rest of their natural lives, undesired by any country, and not allowed out in the Australian community for failing to meet visa requirements and deemed a threat to society?

To answer these questions, the facts of Al-Kateb are worth recounting. Ahmed Ali Al-Kateb was a stateless Palestinian born in Kuwait in 1976, having sought sanctuary in Australia in December 2000 without a passport or visa. He was duly detained under the Migration Act. Efforts to gain a protection visa proved futile.  The Refugee Review Tribunal and the Federal Court agreed with the decision makers. With Australia having ceased to be an option, Al-Kateb informed the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs that he wished to be transferred to Kuwait or Gaza. Those efforts also came to naught.

Al-Kateb’s cupboard of legal options started looking increasingly threadbare. With little else possible, he resorted to that immemorial principle of Britannic common law that he be released on habeas corpus grounds.  After all, the Australian authorities surely had no reason to continue detaining him. He had committed no crime, and there was “no real likelihood or prospect” of Al-Kateb’s removal outside the country in the reasonably foreseeable future, a point acknowledged by the Federal Court.

In a granite hard decision, the High Court rejected the claim. For one thing, the discretion was mandatory under the legislation, not discretionary. Nor was the exercise of such a detention power punitive, thereby violating the separation of powers. In Chief Justice Gleeson’s words:

“A person in the position of the appellant might be young or old, dangerous or harmless, likely or unlikely to abscond, recently in detention or someone who had been there for years, healthy or unhealthy, badly affected by incarceration or relatively unaffected. The considerations that might bear upon the reasonableness of a discretionary decision to detain such a person do not operate.”

Justice McHugh also reiterated the view that the Migration Act required “the indefinite detention of Mr Al-Kateb, notwithstanding that it is unlikely that any country in the foreseeable future will give him entry to that country. The words of the three sections [189, 196, 198] are too clear to read them as being subject to a purposive limitation or an intention not to affect fundamental rights.” With Australia lacking any express constitutional protection of habeas corpus, Al-Kateb was doomed.

Efforts to challenge this ghastly precedent over the years faltered. In the meantime, periods of lengthy immigration detention ballooned. Currently, the average period of time individuals held in immigration detention by Australian authorities is 708 days.  In May 2022, the detention period reached a dubious peak of 736 days, with 138 having spent time in detention for over five years.

All this has changed. On November 8, the High Court handed down a stunning decision in NZYQ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs & Anor, thereby archiving Al-Kateb as a dark, judicial episode.

NZYQ was a stateless Rohingya applicant who had fled Myanmar and journeyed to Australia by boat in September 2012. He received a bridging visa in September 2014. In January 2015, he was arrested and charged with a child sexual offence, his visa cancelled, and prison term imposed. Despite receiving parole in May 2018, he was immediately thrown into immigration detention. As a person regarded as stateless by Myanmar and facing a genuine risk of persecution on his return, NZYQ also faced the prospect of perennial detention for not having a visa. On character grounds, Australian authorities could continue to refuse granting it. It also seems that no third country option arose as a serious possibility, though this will only be known with certainty once the judgment is published.

Much to the surprise of those present, NZYQ’s legal team received the news after two days of oral argument that it was unconstitutional to detain a person where there was no real prospect of being removed from Australia. As a consequence, the court held that provisions under the Migration Act obliging the authorities to detain “unlawful non-citizens” for such inordinate periods should be read as beyond the immigration power of the Commonwealth.  NZYQ’s administrative detention, being deemed unlawful, necessitated his release.

The decision immediately affects 92 people in immigration detention. But as the Australian Human Rights Commission reminds us, the perverse cruelties of Australia’s detention system has, over the last two decades, affected “the lives of tens of thousands of people, most of whom came to this country seeking protection as refugees.”

Panicked, the Albanese government has tried dousing the fires of concern, though some of these have been lit by a few parliamentarians prone to pyromania. Public safety, it has been suggested, might be compromised by these reprobates newly Instead of acknowledging the human rights dimension of the case, the Home Secretary Claire O’Neil came close to slighting the High Court. “If I had any legal power to do it, I would keep every one of those people in detention.” This was irrespective of the fact that they had served time for any offences they had committed.

A government spokesperson was also quick to point out in the immediate aftermath of the High Court decision that, “Individuals released into the community from immigration detention may be subject to certain visa conditions.” But instead of waiting for the decision’s full publication, the government has cobbled a mash of legislative measures in a paroxysm of populism.

On November 16, Immigration Minister Andrew Giles introduced laws applicable to 83 released detainees, among them three murderers and a number of unspecified sex offenders. “The Australian community reasonably expects that all non-citizens in Australia will obey Australian laws.” Some would, for instance, be electronically tagged. Curfews could also be imposed. Attached visa conditions could also include notification requirements for changes of address, any illegal activities or change of address.“These measures,” Giles stated, “are consistent with the legitimate objective of community safety and the rights and interests of the public.” How these objectives square with such savage punishments as five-year prison terms in violation is hard to see.

The opposition leader, Peter Dutton, was left unsatisfied by the proposals.  As a proud, demagogic hater of civil liberties, he feels that prolonged punishment is the preferred formula. How this will be done constitutionally is not something that bothers his minute, vengeful imagination. But he proved enough of a fantasist to link the release of the detainees to the threat of rising antisemitism in Australia, a cavalier effort verging on the imbecilic.

In responding to Dutton’s conflating resolution, Prime Minister Albanese thundered that linking “antisemitism with the decision of the high court, is beyond contempt.” But the entire chapter had been beyond contempt. Instead of respecting the central tenets of a fair judicial system, the major parties have heaped scorn upon it. It affirms the penological fixation Australian politicians continue to suffer from when considering the plight of refugees and asylum seekers who dare arrive via unconventional channels. They are the pseudo-criminals who pay people traffickers, the indecent queue jumpers, the unprincipled, cashed up opportunists.

Given that Australia already has a suppressive regime of post-release control measures that effectively mock and caricature sentences served by prolonging state surveillance and control of society’s “most dangerous”, another set of legal measures seeking to achieve precisely the same purpose serves to deaden liberty that bit more.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Sexual Violence and Gender Inequality in Japan

November 15th, 2023 by Prof. Machiko Osawa

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Abstract

Raising awareness about the extent of sexual violence in Japan and the damage inflicted on individuals is essential to change the status quo.

This article draws on quantitative and qualitative data to reveal the reality of sexual violence and victimization, which has been poorly understood and largely ignored in Japanese society. The quantitative data is drawn from a landmark 2022 survey of sexual victims conducted by NHK that collected over 38,000 responses. Raising awareness about the harm caused by sexual violence is necessary, but not enough. It is a scourge that is symptomatic of Japan’s patriarchal social system where attitudes, norms, values, and practices render many people marginal and vulnerable to abuse. This includes the social norms of “masculinity” and “femininity,” the education system, the labor market structure, and a tax and social security system based on a division of labor that reinforces a strict division of gender roles.

Due to the harmful consequences of widespread sexual violence on people and the economy, it is incumbent on the government to offer more support for relevant services, especially civil society organizations that have been playing a key role in helping victims. In this pivotal transition from ignoring to addressing sexual violence, it is also essential to engage the police and judicial officials in ways that enhance sensitivity towards victims, and to take actions that increase accountability.

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Johnny & Associates, a Japanese talent agency, stands condemned for turning a blind eye to the sexual assaults committed against hundreds of aspiring boy prodigies by its founder, Johnny Kitagawa, who died in 2019, age 87. Although the company belatedly acknowledged the assaults, apologized to its numerous victims, and promised financial compensation, the revelations have indelibly tarnished its reputation and rendered it subject to a torrent of criticism for doing too little, too late. For a company that is in the PR and marketing business, nothing has exposed its core incompetence more than this sad saga of grudgingly, incrementally responding to the appalling crisis, thereby heightening the damage and reinforcing growing perceptions of its professional irresponsibility and heedlessness about the damage inflicted. The firm’s tardy name change announced in October 2023 to “Smile Up” invited more criticism for seeming to make light of the traumatic experiences of many men who find little to smile about due to the protracted trauma they suffer.

Overall, Japan lags G7 norms on issues related to sex and gender, but the government, lawmakers, business, and the general public are pressing for more robust action against sexual violence and abuse. Brand damage by association is driving a ‘Who’s Who’ of blue-chip firms to sever ties with a company that did nothing about its founder’s known predatory behavior over several decades. This complicity is a legacy that is isolating Johnny & Associates, a company that was once able to leverage its power to intimidate critics and victims, and yet now finds itself in an unforgiving spotlight (McNeill 2023).

Although it may be convenient to pin the blame on Johnny & Associates alone, the media shares responsibility for the collective averted eyes approach to this heinous behavior. Despite several chances to bring this to the attention of Japanese society, the Japanese media remained largely silent about this systematic violation of human rights. This silence added to the pain of Johnny’s victims. When Shukan Bunshun, a weekly magazine, broke ranks by publishing a series of articles in 1999 and 2000 about Kitagawa’ rampant sexual abuse, Johnny & Associates sued for defamation (Asahi 2023). The Tokyo district court ruled that the allegations of sexual harassment were not factual. Subsequently, the Tokyo High Court recognized the sexual harassment, and this ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2004. Yet it is the initial ruling that attracted attention while the reversals on appeal attracted very scant newspaper coverage, and no TV stations reported about the cases. Although this sordid scandal then became public domain, no Japanese media company investigated the credible reports of sexual abuse. It took the BBC documentary Predator: The Secret Scandal of J-Pop, which aired in March 2023, to goad the domestic media to investigate a scandal that was hidden in plain sight and acknowledge having remained silent too long. This media coverage has improved the context for all victims of sexual abuse and played a role in the government revising the rape law in 2023.

Nonetheless, the “rape myth” persists in Japan, meaning that there is a widespread assumption that the victims of rape and sexual assault are at fault. This institutionalized skepticism helps explain why only 5% of victims make a report, of which then police record only about half, denying them judicial recourse (Ito 2019; Johnson 2022). This patriarchal complacency about rape and sexual assault means that when someone is raped or violated sexually in some other way, that individual suffers both shame and self-doubt. As a result, a vicious cycle of silence, shame, unawareness, and inertia continues to allow this hidden plague to flourish. 

Making Violence Against Women Visible

Raising awareness about the extent of sexual violence and the damage inflicted on individuals is essential to change the status quo. My new book (Osawa 2023) discusses the myth of rape in Japan and uses quantitative and qualitative data to reveal the reality of sexual violence and victimization, which has been poorly understood and largely ignored in Japanese society. The quantitative data is drawn from a landmark survey of sexual victims conducted by NHK between March and April 2022 that collected over 38,000 responses. The qualitative data draws on information collected at a One Stop Sexual Violence Center operated in the Red Cross hospital in Nagoya by Nagomi, a local NPO, where victims can report the crime, get examined by forensic nurses, treated by physicians and psychologists, and connected with available social services.

Raising awareness about the harm caused by sexual violence is necessary, but not enough. It is a scourge that is symptomatic of Japan’s patriarchal social system where attitudes, norms, values and practices render many people marginal and vulnerable to abuse. This includes the social norm of “masculinity” and “femininity,” the education system, the labor market structure, and a tax and social security system based on a division of labor that reinforces a strict division of gender roles. This patriarchal system explains why Japan is ranked 125th in the World Economic Forum’s gender equality ranking in 2023. Here, I summarize the main arguments in my book about recent signs of change regarding policies and laws concerning sexual violence in Japan.

Pandemic Impact

The COVID-19 pandemic engulfed Japan in early 2020 and a national emergency was declared in April of that year. Japan did not impose draconian lockdown regulations, but did urge people to stay home, telework as much as possible and refrain from going out. This policy thrust households into the unusual situation of prolonged contact, often in cramped apartments, isolated from relatives, friends, and colleagues. This isolation was a hothouse for domestic violence (DV) and sexual abuse. In addition, many teenage girls sought an escape from this “family hell” through social media, putting them at risk of encounters with online predators. 

The National Women’s Shelter Network (NWSN) was called on to ramp up consultation services during the successive waves of the outbreak, a separate hotline from the government sponsored national DV Consultation hotline established after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. This new DV Consultation Plus hotline handled a surge in pandemic consultations as the government promoted awareness in its frequent public health press conferences. The phone consultations also generated data that the government could use in revising relevant legislation. The number of consultations regarding DV increased fourfold in 2020 compared to 2002, when consultation centers were first established, and more than doubled compared to 2011; in 2020 there were 180,000 consultations compared to 82,000 in 2011 (Gender Equality Bureau 2023). The global scourge of increased DV and sexual abuse during the pandemic prompted UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres to call on governments in 2020 to address such problems. In 2021, Japan’s Gender Equality Bureau reported that one in fourteen women in Japan had been raped or sexually assaulted, but less than one half of victims reported the crime (Gender Equality Bureau 2021). According to the National Police Agency, there has been a sharp rise in serious sex offenses in Japan with reports of forced intercourse jumping 19.3% from 1,388 in 2021 to 1,656 in 2022 (Kyodo 2023). The number of sexual assault cases also rose by 10%. Police attributed the surge of reports to “growing awareness about what constitutes a sex crime and the development of a dedicated system to accept reports and consultations.”

The starting point for the establishment of local shelters and support networks in Japan was the Fourth Women’s Conference in Beijing in 1995. Civil society activists and journalists returned to Japan and used various channels to raise awareness and to pressure policymakers into action. This effort gave birth to the National Women’s Shelter Network (NWSN). Through its lobbying activities, the movement had a major impact on the enactment of the Child Abuse Prevention Law in 2000 and the Domestic Violence Prevention Law in 2001 and subsequent amendments (Kamata 2018).

After the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, a domestic violence counseling service (Yorosoi Hotline) was established by the Ministry of Labour and Welfare to provide counseling to women suffering from domestic violence. At the same time, the Prime Minister’s office established Purple Dial that was operated by NWSN to provide similar services. This experience was the basis for providing counselling services during the COVID-19 pandemic. The government’s newly established DV Consultation Plus operated by NWSN received many requests for assistance and the data collected helped draw attention to the massive scale of women suffering from spousal and sexual violence. Based on this data, the media and civil society lobbied for legal changes regarding sexual violence.

Sexual Violence and the Penal Code 

Until 2017, Japan’s Penal Code regarding sexual violence had not been amended since enactment in 1907. The direct impetus for the revision dates back to 2014, when the Minster of Justice Midori Matsushima remarked that it was odd that the crime of rape was treated as less serious than the crime of robbery; the sentence for rape was typically three years, shorter than the norm for robbery convictions.

The 2017 revision included male victims and prohibits sexual and obscene acts against children under the age of 18. However, the law still stated that for a person to be convicted of a sexual or indecent act, it must be proven that such an act was committed by “assault or threat.” Perpetrators could not be prosecuted without evidence of vigorous resistance despite it being well known that victims often freeze and become unable to move, let alone resist.

Following the 2017 revision of the rape law, there was public outrage over four court verdicts in rape cases in 2019 that highlighted to what extent the judicial process was biased in the favor of rapists and in need of further amendment (Ito 2019). Perhaps the most notorious case involved a father charged with having sexual intercourse with his then 12-year-old daughter but acquitted on the grounds that he was in a small house and other family members could not have been unaware, so, the judge ruled there must not have been any resistance.

Flower Demonstrations

After the four dubious acquittals in 2019, a series of so-called flower demonstrations were held. Supporters gathered with flowers at Tokyo Station on April 11, 2019 to protest the verdicts and show sympathy and solidarity with the victims. The inadequacy of the law was on full display, making the women and the violence against them at least temporarily more visible. The demonstrations became an opportunity for victims of sexual violence to stand in public and share their experiences of victimization. Initially, the flower demonstrations were held only in Tokyo and Osaka, but by March 2020, every prefecture in Japan had set up support groups. This created an opportunity for Japanese society to learn about and discuss the reality of sexual violence. Another group, now operating as Spring, was established to support women, and it vigorously publicized the consequences of endemic sexual violence.

There were other ways that this plague became more visible. In 2017, before the flower demonstrations began, Shiori Ito published her book “Black Box,” in which she wrote about her rape and frustrations in seeking justice, drawing much media and public attention. Subsequently, a high-profile sexual harassment case at the Ministry of Finance involving a reporter became public knowledge, and sexual violence by a prominent photojournalist came to light, which inspired the publication of the novel “Raw Skin: A Scene of Sexual Harassment” (Inoue 2022). In addition, there were several high-profile accusations of sexual violence against film directors. The film industry responded with statements against sexual violence and harassment. Then there was Rina Gonoi, a Self Defense Force member who sued the SDF for turning a blind eye to a culture of sexual abuse. She bravely came forward and her actions led to an unprecedented investigation into the charges and the dismissal of several of her colleagues who had participated in the harassment and abuse. The public discourse around sexual violence is therefore evolving in Japan, with victims increasingly likely to speak out.

In 2023, there was a spate of legal reforms regarding rape and DV that had been the longstanding agenda of civic activists in Japan (Kaino 2017). In addition, external forces helped break the policy gridlock. Japan hosted the G7 Annual Summit in 2023, attracting the media limelight that included unfavorable coverage of Japan’s low international ranking on gender equality, gay rights, DV and sexual violence. This shaming of Japan generated pressure for change. In the case of gay rights, this was only cosmetic because many members of the ruling LDP oppose gay rights. The Diet only banned “unfair discrimination” targeting them, implying that some discrimination might be fair. But on rape, under pressure from civil society advocates and the mass media, the government revised the 2017 law in 2023 to change the name of the crime to “nonconsensual intercourse” and no longer require evidence of physical force. 

In addition, the scope of unlawful “sexual intercourse” has been expanded in several ways. Consent is no longer assumed to be intrinsic to marriage. The age of consent for sexual intercourse has been raised from 13 to 16; the act of groping a person under 16 years of age for the purpose of indecency and voyeuristic photography is also punishable. In addition, the statute of limitations for the crime of indecency has been extended by five years, from 7 to 12 years, as has the penalty for non-consensual sexual intercourse, from 10 to 15 years, and to 15 to 20 years for the crime of indecent assault. The legal landscape has thus shifted due to heightened awareness of, and public anger about, a crime that was off the radar for far too long. Survey data helped stoke this outrage.

NHK Survey 2022

NHK conducted a web-based survey of victims of sexual violence from March to April 2022. Over 38,000 responses were received from victims of sexual violence and their family members. When asked why they responded, some explained: “I want someone to know about this suffering,” and “I want people to know that sexual abuse exists in greater numbers than are being brought to light.” To put this survey in context, NHK typically elicits about 4,000 responses to its surveys, so this massive response is indicative of just how extensive sexual assault is and the degree of public interest in the issue.

I helped draft the questionnaire survey and got permission from NHK to publish the results of this data in my book. The demographics of the respondents show that 91.3% were female, 5.4% were X-gender, and 1.1% were male. The survey broadly defined sexual violence as being: unwillingly undressed (16.4%), being penetrated by genitals or other body parts (18.6%), being ejaculated on (8.9%), being forced to watch as someone masturbated (10.8%), being directly touched (39.6%), and being verbally harassed with sexually explicit language (40%). Many victims also report multiple experiences of assault and abuse. Most of the incidents were recent but some had taken place decades earlier, indicating how this is a trauma that lingers. 

Shockingly, over 54% of victims claim to suffer from PTSD, regardless of the nature of the sexual assault. However, only 3.3% of the victims were diagnosed as such, highlighting the dearth of specialists who can diagnose victims of sexual violence and provide treatment. Even 20 years after their experiences, 48.7% of the victims still exhibit symptoms corresponding to PTSD.

The most troubling finding is the youth of the victims; half were under the of age 15, while over 20% were victimized when they were under 10 years old. Overall, 74.6% of victims were under 20 years old. Sexual abuse of children tends to start with the act of touching the body and escalates gradually. It takes time to intensify because of the gradual domination of the child during the process. This also means that it usually takes some time for the abuse to be discovered. The data does not indicate how the long-term nature of the abuse and the lingering trauma affects victims, but the dark shadow of abuse appears to take a heavy toll.

Equally disturbing, the negative effects of these experiences on children are devastating. During this time, the child very often becomes emotionally unstable, suffers from insomnia, has feelings of hopelessness, suffers from low self-esteem, and feels that he or she has been defiled. In the survey, 36.7% blamed themselves, 29.7% thought they were unclean, 26% wanted to die, and 11.8% said they had tried to commit suicide.

As discussed above, prior to the 2023 revision, the victims’ willingness to resist sexual violence was an important requirement to charge the perpetrator with a crime. But the survey data shows that this was a highly unrealistic requirement. Only about 20% of the victims were able to physically resist during their assaults. Many reported that they fell into a “frozen state” and were “unable to understand what was happening to them” (58.3%), “unable to think straight” (32.5%), and were “unable to move” at all (38.8%), indicating that they were incapable of resisting.

The data also indicates that revictimization of individuals who asked for help was extremely common. When victims told others around them about their experiences, 23.5% were told that it was “no big deal” or “a common occurrence” and 14.9% were advised to forget about the incident and pretend that it had never happened. According to the respondents, 27.4% of the people who gave this advice were parents, 20.1% were friends, and 13.5% were work colleagues. Such attitudes and advice protect perpetrators, increase the likelihood of repeat offenses and make victims feel isolated. About a third, or 31.3%, told nobody at all about what happened (other than in this anonymous survey) because of the common tendency to portray sexual victimization as the victim’s fault. Indeed, many victims said they felt ashamed. Others felt vulnerable to retribution. One wrote, “Because the perpetrator is a relative, I am afraid of retaliation if I tell. I thought that talking about it would not solve anything. I don’t know where to go for help.”

Notably, only a few people reached out to professionals of any sort: 2.3% consulted a one-stop support center for sexual violence specialists or support groups, 2.2% a medical institution, 0.9% a lawyer or other legal specialist, and 10% the police, indicating that many victims suffer in silence. Of those who went to the police, in only 10% of these cases was the perpetrator found guilty, just 1% of the total number.

In Japan, the prevailing myth of rape assuming that the victim is at fault generates a vicious cycle in which the reality of serious harm is ignored, and then when victims speak out, they are subjected to bashing and even deeper psychological harm. Sadly, Japan as a whole has tolerated sexual violence and this abuse to a shocking degree, but there are signs of change. In the case of Johnny & Associates, the 2023 BBC documentary instigated an investigation by the United Nations Development Programme’s Business and Human Rights team that called for compensation and an apology to those who were abused as children by Johnny Kitagawa (AP 2023). Many companies have reportedly stopped using the firm’s talent in their advertisements in order not to be seen as complicit in the documented human rights violations.

The costs are not just psychological for many individual victims who are often unable to go to school or work, adversely impacting their lifelong human development and earnings. In the NHK survey, 7.5% of respondents said they had missed a significant number of school days and 2.2% quit school altogether. In addition, 24.3% of those affected in the workplace quit their jobs after being unable to go back to work at all (NHK 2023). Another 12.1% said they were no longer able to work full time. These numbers are significant. Based on NHK’s data, we estimated that these 11,526 responses of quitting jobs and full-time work involved economic losses amounting to some 2,534 billion yen. That’s how much income the victims could have earned if they had not been sexually victimized. Since the number of people who quit work or gave up full-time work is undoubtedly far larger than these 11,526 survey respondents, the overall costs to society are also much greater, especially in light of increasing labor shortages and the urgent need for firms to both recruit and retain more workers.

What Makes Sexual Violence Invisible?

It is an awkward topic that people refrain from bringing up, even to friends and family, almost as if discussing one’s traumatic experience becomes a self-inflicted scarlet letter. Coming out as a victim seems to elicit less empathy than it should and risks ostracism. Moreover, Shiori Ito reports that she became a target for vitriolic denunciations on social media following publication of her book about being raped by a prominent journalist linked to Shinzo Abe. Why would women want to report their case to police, knowing that, at the discretion of officers, their case will probably not be recorded and thus never prosecuted? And why engage in judicial proceedings knowing that one will be forced to relive the traumatic ordeal with a very small possibility of conviction, and even in cases where there is a guilty verdict, the sentences will be suspended or very light? Changing the law alone will not prevent sexual crimes unless the public, which has tolerated sexual crimes, also changes its awareness. It is important to reveal the true nature of what makes these victims invisible, even when the crimes they suffer are not.

For male victims, a key factor is the social norm that “men must be strong”—masculinity based on the patriarchal system. According to the NHK survey, 22.4% of the male victims first spoke about their experiences only more than 10 years afterwards and 31.4% of the total sample had not told anyone about their experience of sexual violence. Before NHK’s anonymous survey, 42.3 % of male victims suffered in silence. Miyazaki (2023) argues that male victims find it particularly difficult to talk to anyone about their emotional trauma due to the social norm that “a real man must be strong” and violation by another male undermines prevailing conceptions about masculinity. There is also no place for men to go for counseling about sexual violence or to get emotional support (NHK 2022).

Conclusion

Japan’s patriarchal education and social security and employment systems, based on a gendered division of labor, are mutually reinforcing and contribute to a culture of invisibility for victims of sexual violence. Changing such norms is an enormous challenge requiring persistence and collective will. Civil society activists and the media have propelled legal reform and greater awareness regarding sexual violence in Japan and, in consequence, the treatment of Japan’s vulnerable is improving slowly. However, when measured against the pain and losses endured, there is no room for complacency or further evasion of responsibility to enhance government protections for vulnerable citizens and residents. Whether the Johnny’s scandal will prove a turning point in media coverage of sexual violence remains to be seen, but without journalists shining a light into the dark corners of society and generating pressure on lawmakers and policymakers, there is a great risk of settling back into the familiar ruts of lurching from scandal to scandal without sustained focus or impact.

Due to the harmful consequences of widespread sexual violence on people and the economy, it is incumbent on the government to offer more support for relevant services, and to provide budgetary assistance for civil society organizations that have been playing a key role in helping victims. Many of these organizations operate with inadequate financial and human resource but are playing an essential role in cobbling together a threadbare safety net for victims of sexual violence. Expanding their capacity and ramping up social services addressing what is no longer an invisible plague should be prioritized in central government funding. There is also a dire need for nurturing expertise in diagnosing, treating, and counselling victims of sexual violence, as well as facilitating their access to such support. In this pivotal transition from ignoring to addressing sexual violence, it is also essential to engage the police and judicial officials in ways that enhance sensitivity towards victims, and to take actions that increase accountability. This is an overdue awakening and a time for bold countermeasures. 

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Machiko Osawa is professor emeritus and researcher at the Research Institute for Women and Careers at Japan Women’s University. She is author of several books including Building a Society Where Women Can Ask for Help: Sexual Violence and Gender Inequality in Japan (Nishinihon Shuppansha, 2023); Why There are so Few Women Managers in the Japanese Workplace (Seikyusya, 2019); Women and Work in the 21stcentury (Sayusya, 2018); and What’s Holding Back Japanese Women (Tokyo Keizai, 2015).

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Featured image: University students line up for a job fair at the Makuhari Messe convention center (Source: The Guardian)

Australia Is ‘Deeply Complicit’ in Gaza Genocide

November 15th, 2023 by Peter Boyle

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Federal Labor and scores of Australian corporations are deeply complicit in Israel’s genocidal attack on Gaza through intelligence feeds from the Pine Gap spy base and military exports.

This complicity goes hand-in-hand with their endorsement of the far-right Benjamin Netanyahu government’s bloody war on Palestinians, in lock-step with the United States and its imperial allies.

Declassified Australia published an article by investigative journalist Peter Cronau on November 3, which revealed that the Pine Gap US surveillance base, near Alice Springs, is “collecting an enormous range of communications and electronic intelligence from the brutal Gaza-Israel battlefield — and this data is being provided to the Israel Defence Forces”.

David Rosenberg, a former US National Security Agency employee, who worked as team leader of weapon signals analysis at Pine Gap for 18 years until 2008, told Cronau that it is “monitoring the Gaza Strip and surrounding areas with all its resources and gathering intelligence assessed to be useful to Israel”.

“Pine Gap has satellites overhead. Every one of those assets would be on those locations, looking for anything that could help them,” Rosenberg said.

This intelligence can then be used by the Israeli military to target its bombing campaigns, which have already flattened much of Gaza city and killed about 11,240 Palestinians between October 7 and November 13. Of these, two-thirds are women and children, according to the Gaza Health Ministry. Hospitals, schools, homes and refugee camps have been bombed by Israel.

Three human rights organisations — Al-Haq, Al Mezan, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights — have filed a lawsuit in the International Criminal Court claiming Israel’s actions amount to “war crimes” and “crimes against humanity”, including “genocide”.

Antony Loewenstein, independent journalist and author of The Palestine Laboratory, told Green Left that the Declassified Australia report was a “world exclusive” in detailing how Pine Gap is providing real time intelligence to Israel and to the US “that was being used to target alleged Hamas terrorists”.

“Israel claims to be pinpointing terrorists, but a blind person can see that’s an absolute lie,” he said.

“This shows that Australian officials at the highest level are deeply complicit and potentially exposed to war crimes trials in the future because the intelligence they are passing to the Israelis is being used to commit war crimes,” said Loewenstein, who co-founded Declassified Australia.

“So, on one hand, you have [foreign minister] Penny Wong and [PM Anthony] Albanese saying they support some kind of humanitarian pause and that the Israeli military should take care not to target Palestinian civilians while, at the same time, they know that Pine Gap is complicit in what they are doing.”

Declassified Australia’s expose went viral internationally, Loewenstein added, yet “not one mainstream media outlet in Australia has picked it up”.

“I don’t say this is a conspiracy — undoubtedly it’s in part down to some turf war because their journalists did not break the story — but there is generally very little reporting in Australia about Pine Gap, considering its importance.”

Loewenstein said Australia is willingly complicit in this and the other so-called “wars on terror”, and Pine Gap is only part of this complicity.

Bipartisan Support for US Military Expansion

“The project of the former Coalition and the current Labor government is to massively expand the US military footprint in the north of this country, to host more US military assets (both intelligence and actual troops),” Loewenstein said.

“What a lot of people don’t know is that, in 2016, there was a conscious decision to expand Australia’s weapons industry to try to make Australia one of the world’s biggest exporters of arms.”

This project began under the Malcolm Turnbull Coalition government, but since Labor came into government “nothing has changed”, he said.

One of the most concerning elements of this is the sale of weapons to Israel and Saudi Arabia, the latter which has been carrying out a brutal war against Yemen.

Loewenstein said that over the last few years there have been numerous efforts by some journalists, Greens MPs and anti-war activists to bring some transparency to this growing military exports industry, but “both the former and current government have been unwilling to do so”.

“Australia has one of the most unaccountable arms trading systems in the world,” he added. Even the US has a “more transparent system”.

Under questioning by Greens Senator David Shoebridge, the Department of Defence told Senate Estimates in late October that the government approved 350 defence export permits to Israel in the past five years, including 50 this year.

However, defence minister Richard Marles and his department have refused to reveal how the exports are being used by the Israeli military.

One significant military export to Israel is parts for Israel’s fleet of US funded F-35 stealth fighters, estimated to have cost US$3 billion so far.

Supplying F-35 Stealth Fighters

Israel has asked the US for more to bring its F-35 fleet up from 36 to 75. The aircraft are being used in its war on Gaza.

These hi-tech war planes are only supplied to the US’ closest allies, including Australia, and part of this deal involves contracts to Australian companies to join the global F-35 supply chain.

Defence boasted on October 30 that

“Australian industry is playing an increasingly important role in the production and sustainment of the global F-35 fleet, which has now reached over 975 aircraft of an expected global fleet of over 3000.

“To date more than 70 Australian companies have directly shared more than $4.13 billion in global F-35 production and sustainment contracts.”

The latest Australian company to win a contract in the F-35 supply chain was Rosebank Engineering, Defence said, which had “activated” its “wheels and brakes repair depot at its Bayswater facility in Melbourne” for F-35s “operating in, or deployed to, the Indo-Pacific Region”.

This latest contract may not service Israel’s F-35s, but Kellie Tranter, who investigated the F-35 supply chain, said earlier contracts have been supplied by Australian or Australian-based companies for: fuselage and airframe components; communication, navigation and identification systems and software; electro optical distributed aperture system components; landing gear and bomb bay locks; titanium, nickel, aluminium and steel alloys; and flares and magazines.

“Without Australia’s contribution to the F-35 global supply chain, the F-35 wouldn’t get off the ground in the Middle East let alone be capable of bombing civilians in Gaza,” Tranter, a lawyer and human rights activist, told GL.

“The F-35 is being used to commit war crimes, by bombing civilians, hospitals etc, and providing aerial support for a murderous ground invasion in Gaza.

“As a signatory to the Arms Trade Treaty, and as a responsible partner in the F-35 program that knows the uses to which these aircraft are being put in, there’s absolutely no excuse for the Australian government not to be calling for an immediate ceasefire.”

The companies with these military export contracts receive Australian government grants. For example, Rosebank Engineering received $2.26 million.

Michelle Fahy, a researcher on Australia’s growing military exports industry and who has written extensively on the subject, told GL that the government’s “blanket secrecy” about this industry goes beyond security concerns to “protect commercially sensitive information and opportunities for Australian companies”.

Zero Transparency

“With zero transparency, the Australian public has no idea whether our military exports could be being used to commit or facilitate human rights abuses.

“One obvious area of concern, given Australia’s large number of military exports to Israel, is that they likely include drones, components for drones, or related IT.

“Israel is a leader in this field and Australia is also focused on building an international reputation in drone technology and artificial intelligence. The federal government provides significant support for research and development in this area.

“Israel is using drones extensively in its current war on Gaza.”

Fahy has mapped the “revolving door between government and the weapons industry” in a series of articles published in Declassified Australia.

“Successive former Coalition governments granted weapons industry insiders preferential access — a situation that has continued under the Albanese Labor government. This story is also therefore about state capture: what happens when a corporation has the power to bend governments to its will.

“When combined with departmental incompetence, corruption, or both, the result is procurement projects that are billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule.”

In a bid to bust open the blanket secrecy on military exports, the Palestinian human rights groups, Al-Haq, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights have launched legal action in the Federal Court of Australia.

They are seeking access to all export permits of arms and weapons to Israel granted by the Minister for Defence since October 7. The application is supported by the Australian Centre for International Justice (ACIJ).

Rawan Arraf, ACIJ executive director and solicitor for the Palestinian human rights groups, said:

“Australia’s role in exporting arms material to Israel must be exposed. If Australian-made weapons are being used against Palestinian civilians, our clients and the public deserve to know.

“Countries providing arms to enable Israel’s brutal violence against the Palestinian people must be transparent. And Australia must not be complicit in that violence.”

Greens Senator David Shoebridge told GL that if Labor is serious about “taking steps towards a ceasefire, like Senator Wong suggests, then it can start by putting in place an arms embargo and doing an audit to ensure Australia is complying with human rights obligations and the humanitarian law of war.

“Whether it is parts for fighter planes or the direct provisions of artillery shells, it is disturbing that so little is known about Australia’s military support of the war in Gaza.”

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Featured image: Rallying for Palestine in Gadi/Sydney. Photo: Peter Boyle

Japan-Philippines Moving Toward US-led Trilateral Alliance

November 9th, 2023 by Richard Javad Heydarian

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“I am honored to have the opportunity to be the first Japanese Prime Minister to speak here at the Congress of the Philippines, which has a long tradition,” Fumio Kishida said before the Special Joint Session of Philippine legislature during his two-day official visit to Manila last week.

During the historic speech, the Japanese leader maintained that the two countries have now reached a “golden age” of bilateral relations amid an unprecedented convergence of strategic interests.

Barely a year after launching a new era in “realism diplomacy” and vowing to double Japan’s defense spending as a percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP), Kishida visited Southeast Asia to bolster defense ties with like-minded partners.

Already a top investor and leading export destination for the Philippines, Japan is now pursuing closer defense cooperation with the neighboring nation.

During his visit to Manila, Kishida unveiled a new security assistance package highlighted by a coastal radar surveillance system. Japan is also expected to providemore multi-role vessels to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) as part of burgeoning bilateral maritime security cooperation.

Crucially, Japan is also pursuing a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with the Philippines, which could lay the foundation for expanded bilateral defense exchanges including regular wargames and partial basing access in the future.

Kishida also visited Malaysia during his Southeast Asia trip, where he pushed for a “new vision of cooperation” centered on upholding a rules-based order in the region. 

Along with the Philippines, Bangladesh and Fiji, Malaysia has been selected as among the beneficiaries of Japan’s new Official Security Assistance (OSA) program with a focus on countering China’s naval assertiveness.

Cognizant of the geopolitical relevance of Kishida’s regional tour, China’s state-backed newspaper Global Times lambasted the Japanese leader’s visit as a “troublemaking journey” that offered “gift packs” that mainly contained “lethal weapons.”

All Weather Allies

This wasn’t Kishida’s first visit to the region. As former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s former top diplomat, he had regularly toured the region amid Tokyo’s booming strategic ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc.

Throughout the past decade, Kishida was one of the central figures in the steadily expanding strategic cooperation between Japan and the Philippines amid shared concerns over China.

Image: Then-president Rodrigo Duterte with Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping at the National Aquatics Center in Beijing, August 30, 2019. Photo: Philippine Presidential Photo / Robinson Ninal

Although Manila experienced dramatic shifts in its relations with the US and China under former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte, Japan successfully maintained a positive momentum in its relations with the Southeast Asian nation.

In fact, Duterte, who repeatedly lambasted the West in favor of China, quietly welcomed expanded military cooperation with Japan. Last year, the two countries held their first-ever “2+2” meeting, which saw Duterte’s top cabinet members, Foreign Secretary Teodoro Locsin and Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana, flying to Tokyo to meet their counterparts and, accordingly, “strengthen defense cooperation in light of the increasingly harsh security environment.”

Though Duterte was largely conciliatory in his rhetoric toward Beijing, his top diplomat and defense chief expressed “serious concern” over the Asian power’s maritime assertiveness and, together with their Japanese counterparts, “strongly opposed” any unilateral action that undermines regional peace and security.

Even as the then-Filipino president maintained “neutrality” on the Ukraine war, the Philippines broadly joined Western nations in condemning Russia’s actions and, similar to Japan, voted to suspend Russia’s membership in the United Nations Human Rights Council.

At the time, Japan had also steadily expanded ties with other like-minded regional states, most notably Vietnam and Malaysia, both of which also received maritime security assistance from Tokyo amid rising tensions with China in the South China Sea. 

During his latest Southeast Asian tour, Kishida invited Philippine and Malaysian leaders to attend the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation in Tokyo in December.

In many ways, however, the Philippines, a fellow US treaty ally strategically located between the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, represents a major prize for Japan.

During his keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last year, Kishida promised a new era in “realism diplomacy.” Japan, he promised at the time, “will be more proactive than ever in tackling the challenges and crises that face Japan, Asia and the world.”

Aside from a defense buildup at home, Japan is also expanding its networks of military cooperation overseas with a special focus on Southeast Asia, where Tokyo enjoys tremendous goodwill.

In annual surveys conducted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore, Japan has consistently topped the list of ASEAN’s preferred external partners among regional thought leaders.

This is especially true in the Philippines, where Japan is seen as an “all-weather ally” which has provided more economic benefits than any other nation and is now also exploring military cooperation like never before.

During his meeting with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Kishida announced a whole series of new agreements covering tourism, mining, environment, natural resources and construction in pursuit of a truly comprehensive partnership.

Japan, which is currently building Manila’s first subway among other multi-billion-dollar projects, also vowed to further assist infrastructure development under the supervision of a High Level Joint Committee on Infrastructure Development and Economic Cooperation. 

A senior Japanese cabinet member told the author that Japan is also exploring large-scale manufacturing investments that could potentially turn the Philippines into a regional automotive industry hub.

Toward a Trilateral Alliance

Kishida also officially unveiled Japan’s Official Security Assistance (OSA), beginning with a $4 million grant to provide a coastal radar system for the Philippine Navy in order to enhance the Southeast Asian nation’s maritime domain awareness capacity vis-à-vis China.

Japan is also expected to provide, at least, five more 97-meter-long vessels for the PCG to boost its maritime security capabilities.

This is, however, likely just the tip of the iceberg. The two sides also reaffirmed their commitment to finalize a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) to “further strengthen defense cooperation between the two countries.”

Once finalized, with Philippine legislative ratification, the Visiting Forces Agreement-style deal will likely facilitate even larger and more robust joint military exercises as well as the transfer of more sophisticated weapons systems to be aimed mainly at China.

Generals from the US, Japan and the Philippines pose at Camp Asaka, Japan, on December 11, 2022. Photo: Twitter Screengrab / Stars and Stripes

Standing before his Japanese guest, Marcos Jr confidently declared:

“We are cognizant of the benefits of having this arrangement both to our defense and military personnel and to maintaining peace and stability in our region.”

The two sides also signaled their commitment to developing a de facto trilateral alliance with the US, especially given the proximity of both Japan and the Philippines to Taiwan.

Japan views support from ASEAN nations, particularly the Philippines, as crucial to deterring any potential Chinese kinetic action against the self-ruling democratic island that Beijing views as a renegade province that must be “reunified” with the mainland.

Last year, foreign and defense ministers from both sides explicitly “underscored the importance of each country’s respective treaty alliance with the United States and that of enhancing cooperation with regional partner countries.” 

With Manila granting the US Pentagon access to prized bases close to Taiwan’s southern shores and now also exploring a VFA-style deal with Tokyo, a Japan-Philippine-US (JAPUS) trilateral alliance would likely be the logical next strategic step.

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Featured image: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr review an honor guard during a welcome ceremony in Manila on November 2, 2023. Image: Twitter Screengrab / Pool

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As US-Chinese tensions grow and as it becomes increasingly clear the US is unable to compete with China head-to-head in terms of development, trade, and investment, especially in regions along China’s periphery, the US is resorting increasingly to asymmetrical measures including political coercion, subversion, and even violence.

US military aggression and political subversion, particularly in Southeast Asia, spans many decades. Besides the Vietnam War and the related conflicts which raged across Laos, Cambodia, and even Thailand in the 20th century, more recently the United States has backed an increasingly unified regional bloc of opposition groups sometimes referred to as the “Milk Tea Alliance.”

The so-called alliance includes opposition groups promoted heavily across Western media in Myanmar, Thailand, and Hong Kong – all three of which have incorporated deadly violence on varying scales to advance both their own political ambitions as well as advance US foreign policy objectives. The US has also attempted to create similar opposition groups elsewhere in Southeast Asia, though with less success, receiving little media coverage, and thus are poorly understood by the general public if and when their violence does make headlines.

Two recent examples of terrorism in Southeast Asia highlight the enduring threat of US-backed violence in the region.

One attack was carried out by Myanmar’s opposition, a movement heavily-promoted by Western governments and the Western media. The other was carried out by extremists among a lesser-known ethnic group in Vietnam. Both attacks have been spun, whitewashed, and even justified by the Western media, and by doing so, encouraging future violence, illustrating a continued commitment by Washington to use violence and terrorism to advance its foreign policy objectives in the region versus China.

Myanmar’s “Freedom Fighters” Slaughter Singer Who Disagreed 

The BBC (is banned in Russia), in a June 8 article titled, “Lily Naing Kyaw: Killing of Myanmar singer unnerves pro-military celebrities,” in title alone, clearly is not condemning the violence. The article itself attempts to justify the actions of the terrorists who killed a singer, shot in the head, simply for opposing the US and British-sponsored opposition’s political views.

Nowhere in the article is the word terrorism used. Instead, the majority of the BBC’s article revolves around attempts to convince readers that the victim deserved to die for her “pro-military” political stance. The article also notes the chilling effect the opposition’s terrorism is having on free speech and freedom of expression among those in Myanmar supportive of the current government.

Source: BBC

The BBC (is banned in Russia) begins, claiming:

Myanmar singer Lily Naing Kyaw died in a Yangon hospital a week after being shot in the head – allegedly by gunmen opposed to the military she championed. 

Her death has not only shocked military supporters, but also celebrities working with the pro-military media. 

The 58-year-old was close to top junta leaders who seized power in 2021, plunging the country into war – she was also accused of being their informant.

The article admits the murder suspects were members of one of the many “armed resistance” groups fighting on behalf of the “National Unity Government” (NUG), a US-backed government-in-exile Washington wants to return to power.

The BBC (is banned in Russia) also noted how opposition figures gloated over and celebrated Lily Naing Kyaw’s murder on Facebook (is banned in Russia), a clear violation of Facebook’s terms of service and restrictions on hate, abuse, and the promotion of violence. This illustrates the double game US-based social media platforms continue to play, ignoring blatant abuse of their platforms when groups are helping advance US foreign policy objectives, versus censorship targeting any who challenge US interference around the globe.

The fact that Myanmar’s opposition includes militants carrying out terrorism and prominent voices leading the opposition cheering it on contradicts claims from across the Western media that they are fighting for Western values such as freedom, democracy, and human rights. Despite the fact that anyone cheering on terrorism is clearly incompatible with a movement supposedly fighting for freedom, democracy, and human rights, the BBC (is banned in Russia) continued throughout the article to refer to Myanmar’s opposition as being “pro-democracy.”

It’s clear, then, that terms like “pro-democracy” are used by the Western media simply to promote proxies of Western governments in the region even when their actions are clearly anti-democratic and even terroristic.

US-backed Separatists Kill Civilians Because they Feel “Oppressed, Cheated” 

US government-funded media platform, Radio Free Asia (RFA – is recognized by the media as a foreign agent in Russia), in a June 11 article titled, “Armed group attacks Vietnamese police stations, 39 people arrested,” quickly adds below the headline the caveat, “reasons behind attack in Central Highlands unclear, but people in region have felt oppressed, cheated.”

Once again, Western state media attempts to justify what is otherwise simply terrorism. Just as with the aforementioned British state media’s article, RFA (is recognized by the media as a foreign agent in Russia) fails to mention the word “terrorism” once in the entire article. Instead, it attempts to build a case to justify the violence carried out by the Montagnard ethnic minority.

RFA (is recognized by the media as a foreign agent in Russia) only briefly discusses the background of the Montagnard ethnic group, claiming:

During the Vietnam War, the Montagnards fought alongside U.S. Army Special Forces in the Central Highlands. 

Hundreds have crossed the border into Cambodia over the last few decades, citing oppression by the Vietnamese government, religious persecution of the mainly Christian minority, and expropriation of their land. Many have been forced home, ending their hopes for resettlement and a better life.

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Buôn Ma Thuột city square (Central Highlands, Vietnam) (Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0)

No mention is made of separatism among the Montagnard ethnic group, and certainly no mention is made of decades of US government support in pursuit of separatist goals.

In an article regarding the same terrorist attacks, AFP would, in fact, mention the separatist ambitions of the Montagnards, admitting:

Some tribes in the area, collectively known as Montagnards, sided with the US-backed south during Vietnam’s decades-long war. Some are calling for more autonomy, while others abroad advocate independence for the region.

Like the US has done elsewhere around the world, including within China itself in regards to armed separatist movements in both Xinjiang and Tibet, the Montagnards have been and still are supported by the US government specifically to undermine peace, stability, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam.

The US seeks to not only remove Vietnam’s current government from power, but to remove and replace its entire system of governance.

In a 2000 US House of Representatives hearing on “US-Vietnam Trade Relations” when asked “how can the US most effectively influence the pace and direction of economic and political reforms in Vietnam,” then US Representative Dana Rohrabacher responded:

The number one goal should be not to help them [Vietnam] grow economically. Because Ronald Reagan said about the Soviet Union, every week he would say, what have we done to undermine the Soviet Union economy, which eventually led to freedom in Russia.

What we must do instead is what Reagan did, support those people in Vietnam and in that region who seek democracy and support communications with the people of Vietnam themselves who are for a more free and open democratic society. We have lots of avenues open to us. We should have major efforts through our national Endowment for Democracy (is banned in Russia) and bolstering Radio Free Asia (is recognized by the media as a foreign agent in Russia), and so forth. That is the way to bring a better, more peaceful and freer Vietnam.

Both in question and answer, the US House of Representatives was clearly discussing political interference in Vietnam in violation of the UN Charter, its prohibition against foreign interference and its protection of political independence.

The plan was to blatantly support opposition groups directly through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED is banned in Russia) within Vietnam and to promote Vietnamese opposition groups through US government media organizations like RFA (is recognized by the media as a foreign agent in Russia) to destabilize and pressure the Vietnamese government, all while impeding Vietnam’s economic development in the hopes of swelling the ranks of these US-sponsored opposition movements.

During the same hearing, Montagnard representatives, including the assistant director of the US-based, US government-funded “Montagnard Human Rights Organization” (MHRO) would provide testimony.

The MHRO assistant director would conclude their comments, claiming:

The United States government is the only hope to get our Montagnard people out of Vietnam and help our Montagnard people who remain in the Central Highlands to have the rights to live and have the opportunity to develop their lives.

However, by “the rights to live and have the opportunity to develop their lives,” the MHRO means separatism.

The MHRO’s official website today includes a section titled, “Accomplishments,” filled with a long list of collaboration entirely with the US government. Under a subsection titled, “Event,” the organization claims:

A small group meeting with selected Montagnard participants and the Montagnard Human Rights Organization staff, United Montagnard Overseas (UMO), and guest speaker will share information, seek your ideas and encourage discussion about the topics of Montagnard Self-Determination, Self-Governance and Models of Autonomy around the world. MHRO will share information about its research and the development of the legal document, “The Montagnard Framework for Freedom” and its efforts with the National Endowment for Democracy (is banned in Russia) and the U.S. Institute of Peace. 

Essentially, the MHRO was part of a brainstorming event regarding Montagnard separatism, the results of which would then be promptly reported to the US government’s NED (is banned in Russia) for the obvious purpose of creating and funding the programs required to further pursue separatism.

With this added context of US-sponsored separatism among the Montagnard ethnic minority spanning decades, looking back at RFA’s article on the recent Montagnard extremist attacks killing police, administrators, and civilian bystanders clearly constitutes media support, along with the financial and political support Washington is already providing violent separatists in Vietnam.

US Violence Collectively Targets Southeast Asia – Southeast Asia Must Collectively Act 

That both US government-funded RFA and UK state-funded BBC are using the same approach to describe terrorism in both Myanmar and Vietnam illustrates how this effort is both deliberate and concerted across Western media and is targeting not one single country, but the entire region of Southeast Asia.

Considering the regional threat US-European sponsored sedition, separatism, violence, and even terrorism poses to Southeast Asia, it would not be unreasonable for Southeast Asia to consider region wide solutions.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as reported by South China Morning Post, has begun talking about a collective response to Western-organized “color revolutions.” Chinese President Xi Jinping had “urged countries to prevent foreign forces from instigating color revolutions.”

Southeast Asia is already organized into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) whose fundamental principles include non-interference. These principles can be augmented by regional measures to expose and combat foreign interference, both in the form of stopping the flow of foreign money flowing into opposition groups carrying out this interference and through securing ASEAN’s information space, which is still largely dominated by US-based social media platforms and an extensive network of media organizations in Southeast Asia funded by and working for Western interests.

Ultimately, these two recent terrorist attacks, whitewashed and justified by both US and UK state media, are just a small sample of a large and growing wave of political violence stemming from Western interference targeting the region.

As China continues to rise and bring the rest of Asia including Southeast Asia with it, and as the US continues to fade as a global unipolar power, Washington will increasingly resort to violence to first attempt to achieve regime change in the region, and failing that, disrupt and destabilize the region to inhibit both its rise, and the rise of China with it. Only time will tell whether or not the nations of Southeast Asia can work collectively to combat this violence that is intended to collectively target Southeast Asia.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Featured image is from NEO

Cultural Cover-Up: The Sydney Opera House Turns 50

October 24th, 2023 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Commemorative occasions are often draped in fatty platitudes. Within such platitudes lie excuses and apologies. People are celebrated after the fact, not for their faults but for their virtues. It’s just the polite thing to do. At the time of their achievement, they were ridiculed, condemned, and flayed. Buildings are also remembered, not for the blemishes they caused or the arguments they ignited, but the fact that they were (the pun is irresistible) foundational. After the fact, they stand as glorious fragments of culture.

Much of this can be seen in the horrendously treacle-covered slurry about the Sydney Opera House, which was opened on October 20, 1973 by Queen Elizabeth II.  After 50 years, it is arguably the most internationally recognisable symbol of Australia, leaving aside its astonishing collection of natural wonders.

The current tributes never deviate from admiration verging on wince worthy worship.  The ABC News Breakfast program diligently cobbled together a montage of events, performances and celebrations, with the edifice as star performer.  No mention of controversy; not mention of the efforts to kill it off.  For those versed in public relations, the following proved mandatory: The House functions as a multi-venue performing arts centre, hosting 1,500 performances each year receiving audiences of 1.2 million people.  The site around the building is visited by almost eight times that many people, with 350,000 taking guided tours around it.

The administrative wonks have also made sure to court and flatter artists to add their ingredients to the commemorative cake.  Nuance is not the name of the game here.  “I adore the Opera House,” says Australian singer and composer Tim Minchin.  Minchin can be relied upon to give us the sacerdotal worship befitting a son of the sunburnt land: “playing in and around this beautiful building”; doing so being “one of the great honours of my creative life” and, naturally, feeling “hugely flattered” when asked to write a celebratory piece for the five decade anniversary.  He sees this edifice as a reminder to Australians “that our not-entirely-mythological ‘larrikin’ spirit is the same spirit that allows us to be bold and brave and not care too much what other people think.”

This is sad nonsense.  It was brave to initially embark on the construction of a daring design, but there was little bravery in the construction phase of the Opera House, much of it marked by spite and exploitation.  And as for the larrikin spirit, Minchin is only right in so far as the decision to commence the project had much to do with a premier who felt that the city needed an Opera House as much as his party needed a change of image.  (The Australian Labor Party could be cultured too!)  The rest was up to a daring, immutably haughty Dane, and every imaginable obstacle put in his path.

Architecturally, the building is seen as a modernist expressionist masterpiece, one that germinated in the mind of architect Jørn Utzon who worked, not without difficulty, alongside the engineering exploits of Ove Arup.  In what can only be seen as a feat of unintended inspiration, the building was the result of Utzon’s winning design in 1957. His controversial, baffling genius led to the creation of a singular roof structure inspired by the peeling of an orange.  In terms of construction, the sail, or wing-like structure, is constituted of precast concrete panels which are, in turn, bolstered by precast concrete ribs.

But genius, notably when it comes to architecture, only functions in a narrow range, frail before global assault, rival designers and accountants.  It is viewed with abundant suspicion by the political and administrative mind, even more so by the budgetary minded.  Utzon proved no exception.  New South Wales Premier J.J. Cahill was bold enough to approve the project in 1958, but his death a year later, compounded by acrimony in the project itself, augured ill for the building.  The Liberal government of Robert Askin, which came into office after 24 years of Labor rule, proved hostile, and the Minister for Public Works David Hughes had little time for Utzon’s insistence on maintaining complete control over the project.

Costs began mounting. Estimated at 3.5 million pounds in 1959, the budget had blown out to 13.7 million pounds by 1962.  The NSW government began meddling in the construction phase, stating its own views on seating in the main hall.  Philistine did battle with Renaissance Man.  In July 1964, the observation was made in the publication Tharunka that the press, with the support of “political intrigue”, had achieved some success “in destroying the public image of the Opera House.”

Utzon would eventually throw in the towel with a heave of disgust, leaving the project, and country, after falling out with a plywood manufacturer who was retained to produce prototypes of the beams intended to support the ceilings and glass exterior walls.  The decision was also helped, in no small measure, by the tart response to Utzon from Hughes when they met at the latter’s office on February 28, 1966.  Seeking to be paid for outstanding fees regarding the stage machinery, Hughes cited a contrarian report from Arup.  “You are always threatening to quit,” Hughes said dismissively.  But quit, Utzon did.

Rage filled protests followed.  In March 1966, a 1,000 strong protest, armed with a petition of 3,000 signatures backing Utzon’s reinstatement, took place.  A sculptor went on hunger strike.  All of it was in vain.  The gold laying goose had fled.  Hughes, left without the guide for the design (or so he claimed), could only tell the public that it was “the Government’s intention to complete the Opera House, ensuring that the spirit of the original conception is fulfilled.”

The mangling, readjustments and cuts began, a point made by a despairing critic Laurie Thomas in September 1968.  Writing in The Australian, Thomas thought the small opera hall was passable, but the concert hall, “a disaster.  It has the air of an extraordinarily fussy Town Hall.  The ceiling is covered in knobs that can only be described as inverted teats.”  Hughes, ever the apologist, put much of this down to Utzon’s own defective approach, a state of affairs challenged with some severity by the 1994 exhibition The Unseen Utzon.  Even after almost three decades, the now knighted Davis would dismiss Utzon’s defenders such as architect Harry Seidler, his wife Penelope, along with Elias Duke-Cohen as partaking in an illusion.  “I wanted [Utzon] to produce something. I would have loved him to do it.”

For just a taster of the spray that came during the construction, there is no better source than Keith Dunstan’s 1972 gem Knockers.  The compiled comments are a delightful, acid corrective to the worshipful, after the fact responses that would follow the opening of the Opera House.  Sir John Barbirolli remarked bitchily that it was, “A piece of Danish pastry.” Sydney architect Walter Bunning savaged the design, claiming it would “be a second-rate building when compared with the Lincoln Center Opera House being built in New York”. Tenor Giuseppe Di Stefano admitted to knowing little about Australia, but knew more than a thing or two about opera.  “I think they are crazy to think opera can succeed in Sydney.”

When it comes to greatness in vision and pettiness in decision, the latter often wins out.  The appreciation, and the appreciative, can only come later.  Peter Hall duly stepped into Utzon’s shoes.  Costs soared further by some $102 million (or A$1 billion in today’s terms).  Only years later would the remarkable, though somewhat more wounded structure, assume the proportions of a fable.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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