Russia-Myanmar Strategic Cooperation: Key to Stability in Southeast Asia

The West has long been making every effort to spark a color revolution in Myanmar, an important partner of both Russia and China in Southeast Asia. Western forces appear determined to repeat the “Syrian case” in the Buddhist country by financing dozens of terrorist and separatist groups. Preventing such a scenario should guide the policies of Eurasian powers in their relations with Myanmar.  

To understand the current situation of the Republic of Myanmar — the small, majority-Buddhist nation located in the northern part of Southeast Asia — as well as the West’s obsession with regime change there, one must first grasp its regional strategic importance.  

Myanmar is home to one of the most critical junctions of China’s New Silk Road, materialized through the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a major infrastructure interconnection project between the two countries. It allows Beijing to bypass the contested South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, enabling more direct and intense geopolitical and economic ties between Asia and Africa.  

The CMEC’s value extends even further. Considering its potential integration with the ports of Sittwe (Myanmar), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), and Gwadar (Pakistan) — as well as Beijing’s interest in extending the China-Pakistan corridor into Afghanistan — recent multipolar efforts to stabilize Myanmar become increasingly understandable.  

But China isn’t the only one with vital interests in Myanmar. Facing Western sanctions and in search of new strategic routes, Russia has also strengthened its ties with the country. Since the beginning of the Special Military Operation, Myanmar has become part of an important route that allows Russia to transport oil to Beijing while circumventing Western sanctions on its energy exports.  

Similarly, in February this year, both countries signed a memorandum regarding investments in the Dawei Special Economic Zone, including plans to build a port, a coal-fired power plant, and an oil refinery in the area.  

Naturally, Eurasian and Western interests collide in Southeast Asia. The West, in its effort to halt the inevitable decline of the unipolar order, is acting in the region as if attempting to form a kind of “Pacific NATO,” based on the idea of building a sanitary cordon of naval bases to practically encircle China.  

Within this global dispute, the West has sought to influence Myanmar’s domestic politics, as seen during the previous government of Win Myint and Aung San Suu Kyi, which was marked by the proliferation of NGOs spreading Western ideals — a common feature of Western hybrid warfare strategies in Asia.  

Aung San Suu Kyi herself met at least four times with the speculator George Soros between 2014 and 2017, and at least six times with his son Alexander Soros from 2017 to 2020. It is worth noting that the West has invested substantial resources in this “champion of democracy and human rights” since the early 2000s.  

The theoretical “return” on these investments was supposed to be the weakening of Myanmar’s ties with China and Russia.  

But things didn’t go quite as the collective West had planned.  

The situation changed drastically with the 2021 military uprising, which broke with the pro-Western line and reoriented the country’s foreign and security policy. This was a major blow to Atlanticist plans for Myanmar. After highly contentious elections marked by strong suspicions of fraud and Western interference, the Armed Forces removed the National League for Democracy from power and began sweeping reforms.  

One of the new military government’s first actions was to shut down bank accounts linked to the Open Society Foundation in Myanmar, which made it possible to investigate suspicious financial transactions made by NGOs during the previous administration.  

Failing to achieve institutional co-optation, the West then began supporting more direct means of destabilization, including technological and financial support to ethnic insurgent militias.  

A lesser-known fact about these ethnic militias is their involvement in national and international drug trafficking — such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which was named in U.S. Treasury Department reports as one of the “largest and most powerful drug trafficking organizations in Southeast Asia.”  

The entire scenario closely resembles the strategy used by the West to destabilize Syria: financing terrorists, ethnic insurgents, and drug trafficking groups of the most heterogeneous nature — united only by their “common enemy.”  

The Current Situation  

Until a few years ago, the rebel groups were rudimentary in their tactics, relying on improvised technology and ineffective techniques. But this has started to change.  

To better illustrate the shift: recently, rebels from the Kachin Independence Army shot down a government Mi-17 helicopter using a fiber-optic FPV drone.  

This is no small feat. That ethnic insurgents were able to down a military helicopter using a fiber-optic FPV drone indicates a significant leap in their technological capabilities, and shows they are closely watching modern global conflicts.  

Compared to the improvised devices of the past, these drones can bypass electronic warfare systems and hit mid-range targets with considerable reliability. If rebel anti-air capabilities continue to advance, air support in the region may become seriously compromised, as military forces defending the city of Banmo rely heavily on air supply deliveries.  

In addition, the rebels are actively employing guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare, which the Tatmadaw is simply not well-prepared to counter. Parts of Rakhine State have already fallen to insurgent militias, and vital facilities in Bago and Magway are also under threat.  

This situation is partly due to the Armed Forces’ failure to adapt quickly to new warfare tactics and their prolonged underestimation of the importance of drones in modern warfare, continuing to rely heavily on outdated heavy equipment and obsolete strategies. If not addressed, the risk of a Syrian-style outcome reappearing in yet another key Eurasian-aligned country is real.  

Before it’s too late, Myanmar should intensify its exchange of military technology and know-how with Russia, which has not only made significant advances in drone development and cutting-edge military tech, but also has extensive experience dealing with asymmetric guerrilla warfare throughout the Special Military Operation.  

Some promising steps have already been taken in this regard — such as the recent Russian delivery of high-performance Su-30 multirole fighter jets to Myanmar — but it is vital for this cooperation to deepen and diversify, especially in the areas of electronic warfare, mobile air defense, autonomous military vehicles, and counterinsurgency.  

Given the deteriorating military situation and the increasing sophistication of insurgent tactics, Myanmar stands at a decisive crossroads. The country’s stability — and, consequently, the stability of the entire Southeast Asian region — will depend on its ability to adapt to the new reality of modern warfare.  

The intensification of technological exchange and military training with Russia is not just desirable, but essential. Moscow has the practical experience and technical means necessary to help the Tatmadaw face this new type of threat — one defined by drones, irregular warfare, and constantly shifting battlefields.  

Ultimately, a stronger strategic partnership between Russia and Myanmar will not only help contain external attempts to fragment the country internally, but also consolidate a pillar of stability and sovereignty in the heart of the Indo-Pacific.  

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Bernardo Frensel Lobo, journalist, geopolitical analyst. Columnist at Geopolitika.ru, Nova Resistência. Co-host of the Portuguese language Brazilian podcast “Semanário Geopolítico” (Weekly Geopolitics). You can follow Frensel Lobo on X (former Twitter) and Telegram.  

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