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In the run-up to Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan’s April ouster in a parliamentary no-confidence motion, the elected leader explosively claimed that the United States was orchestrating a “foreign conspiracy” to drive him from power.

Those claims were rejected by the political opposition that toppled Khan and elevated Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as well as the military top brass that previously backed the cricket star turned politician in what many saw as a civil-military hybrid regime.

Washington also denied the conspiracy allegations, which Khan claimed were the upshot of his refusal to allow the US access to Pakistan military bases after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Khan was also notably in Moscow for talks with Vladimir Putin the same day Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian border.

So when Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum met this month in Washington with top officials including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Burns, some observers wondered if the US is indeed starting to have its way again in Pakistan.

According to Pakistani diplomatic sources, Anjum’s visit focused on Afghanistan’s security situation under nine months of Taliban rule, including in regard to the emergence of new, low-scale anti-Taliban armed resistance led by Ahmad Masoud’s National Resistance Front and a host of other groups.

ISI’s Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum and US CIA head William Burns reportedly see eye-to-eye on Afghanistan. Image: Screengrab / NDTV

Those same sources say Anjum’s top-level visit consolidated a new “Pak-US convergence” around Afghanistan – a merging of interests driven in part by Pakistan’s own deteriorating ties with the Taliban over its unwillingness to contain the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an insurgent group also known as the “Pakistan Taliban” that has recently ramped up attacks on Pakistani security forces from Afghan soil.

Anjum was in Washington just days before new Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit on May 17, where he met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and attended a food security conference organized in response to the chaos and inflation Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has wrought on global grain markets.

The Bilawal-Blinken meeting, where Afghanistan also reportedly dominated the agenda, marked a more symbolic show of warming US-Pakistan relations in the wake of Khan’s departure. It also raised new hope in Islamabad that Washington will lend its support to a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial package to avoid a national default.

Pakistan’s flagging ties with China, which has made major investments in the country via the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key plank of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has provided the US a diplomatic opening for re-engagement, the same Pakistani diplomatic sources say.

Bilateral relations have foundered largely over the CPEC, with Pakistan repeatedly asking Beijing to no avail for restructured terms on infrastructure-related loans, and China raising concerns about insurgent attacks on its nationals and in-country interests, including in restive Balochistan province where it holds a 40-year lease on the port at Gwadar.

Relations reportedly hit a new low when three Chinese tutors attached to a Beijing-sponsored Confucius Institute at Karachi University were killed in a suicide bomb attack on April 26. China has since withdrawn its nationals from all Confucius Institutes across the country due to security concerns.

“Chinese confidence in Pakistan’s security system’s ability to protect their citizens and their projects is seriously shaken,” said Pakistan Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, chairman of the Senate’s Defense Committee, after the Karachi attack. “It has caused serious concern and understandable indignation in China.

“More so, the pattern of attacks is so recurring and it’s clear the Pakistani promises of ‘foolproof security’ are mere words, not matched by countermeasures on the ground,” he told local media. Mushahid recently led a Pakistani delegation to the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan to address China’s growing security concerns.

China has withdrawn all of its staff from Confucius Institutes in Pakistan in reaction to rising attacks on its nationals. Image: Twitter

Tensions with top investor China come as Pakistan’s economy teeters towards collapse. On May 17, the Pakistani rupee hit an all-time low of 196 to the US dollar due to fast-falling foreign exchange reserves and big debts due to international lenders including Chinese financial institutions who refuse to reschedule the credits.

Recently snubbed by Pakistan’s traditional benefactors in Saudi Arabia and China, Sharif’s government is looking again to the US-influenced IMF for financial succor.

In one of his first acts in office, Sharif sent Finance Minister Miftah Ismail – who holds a PhD degree in public finance from the University of Pennsylvania – to Washington to revive Pakistan’s IMF program.

Miftah not only revived the IMF program, which stalled due to Khan’s refusal to meet its terms on fuel and other market-distorting subsidies, but also convinced the fund to expand its lending from $6 billion to $8 billion.

“The IMF program is crucial since we are not expecting any more help from the Chinese or the Saudis at the moment,” said a Pakistani diplomat who requested anonymity.

Significantly, Pakistan’s top brass are also reportedly supportive of improved ties with the US, its long-time partner until relations cratered over the Afghanistan war.

That’s in part because the Pakistan military, which backed the Khan regime for years and is now also being blamed for pushing the economy to the brink of bankruptcy, recognizes a US-backed IMF bailout is the likely the only way to avoid collapse.

That pro-US signal was loud and clear in early April when Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa said in an early April speech delivered at a security conference in Islamabad that Pakistan’s ties with the US were “long and excellent.”

Bajwa reminded his audience that the “best equipment” possessed by the Pakistan military comes from the US, spelled not China, and that Pakistan’s largest export market is the US, likewise not China.

“Pakistan – including the Pakistan military – has multiple reasons to rebuild its ties with the US,” the Pakistani diplomatic source said.

For the US, Pakistan’s troubled ties with the Taliban, its rising tensions with Beijing and its acute need for IMF financial assistance present a sudden and unique opportunity to recalibrate ties with Islamabad and develop a new, mutually beneficial strategy vis-a-vis the Taliban.

With the emergence of a low-scale armed resistance against the Taliban in Afghanistan by fighters – namely Ahmad Masoud and Amrullah Saleh – with past strong ties to the West, Pakistan could serve as a conduit for extending direct support to these resistance groups in hopes of destabilizing the Taliban.

As Bilawal stressed in an interview with US media, Pakistan has been pressing the Afghan Taliban to eliminate the TTP – which seeks to overthrow Pakistan’s secular government and establish an Islamic emirate as the Taliban has in Kabul – with no meaningful progress made so far.

Pakistan’s and China’s interests in Afghanistan diverge on the point.

Unlike the US, China supports the Taliban’s exclusive dominance in Afghanistan. That’s largely because its leadership has vowed not to allow the anti-China, Uighur-led East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to launch attacks on Chinese interests in Afghanistan and across the border in Xinjiang, China – where Beijing holds one million-plus Uighurs in so-called “vocational camps” some rights groups see as a campaign of “genocide.”

While the Taliban has assured Beijing it will contain ETIM, the militant group in Kabul has made no such assurances to Islamabad on the TTP. Instead, the Taliban acted as an intermediary in brokering a short-lived ceasefire between Khan’s government and the TTP.

With China’s interests increasingly aligned with a strong and stable Taliban, and with Pakistan’s ties with Beijing stressed and strained, it is logical for Sharif’s new government to look towards the US to bolster its security and save its economy as it teeters on the brink on both fronts.

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Featured image: New Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has the opportunity to reset Pakistan’s foreign relations. Image: Screengrab / NTV

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Southeast Asia’s largest economy Indonesia has been increasingly intimate in various sectors with the world’s second-largest economy, China.

China-Indonesia ties not only occur between governments and businesses. Several Indonesian political parties and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China’s founding and sole ruling party are also forging ties. This phenomenon is quite interesting given the world’s most populous Muslim majority has held a strong anti-communist position since the mid-1960s.

My ongoing research about the actors involved in China-Indonesia relations reveals the mutual benefits the Chinese Communist Party and Indonesia’s political parties gain from these collaborations.

From secular to Islamic parties

Indonesia banned communism in 1966; it was considered a threat following an alleged coup attempt by the country’s Communist Party (PKI). In the early 2000s, Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, failed in his attempt to revoke the ban. The stigma against communism in Indonesian society remains.

This is why most political parties in Indonesia do not want to be associated with China due to its communist ideology.

Unlike China’s one ruling party system, Indonesia is a multi-party country. There are two broad camps: secular and Islamic parties.

The first camp includes the current ruling party PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Golkar (Party of the Functional Groups), Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party) and NasDem (National Democrat).

The Islamic parties include PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), PAN (National Mandate Party), PPP (United Development Party) and PKB (National Awakening Party).

However, even Islamic parties that have had a long, tense history with communism since the early 1950s are reportedly pursuing ties with the Chinese Communist Party.

At least five Indonesian political parties have established ties with the CCP.

These include the country’s major parties the PDIP, Gerindra, the Democratic Party, Golkar, and the PKS.

The involvement of parties like the PKS and Gerindra is quite interesting, given these parties often regard China’s growing power as a communist threat.

It’s also been reported the Islamic party PPP (United Development Party) has developed a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party, although it has rejected such claims.

Wide scope

As early as 2008, Golkar’s members and Chinese Communist Party officials held a meeting to share experiences on party management. Since then, the two parties have been organising follow-up meetings between their high-ranking officials in Beijing and Jakarta.

Golkar politician Ace Hasan Syadzily said that many parties in Indonesia, not only Golkar, have cultivated collaborations with the Chinese Communist Party.

The scope of this party-to-party cooperation ranges from meetings, exchanges on party organising, to regeneration.

Golkar and the Chinese Communist Party’s meeting in 2008 resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) covering all aspects related to the regeneration and party organising.

Meanwhile, the PDIP and the CCP have organised several meetings to discuss cooperation to increase human and financial resources.

In 2013, the PDIP sent 15 of its cadres to visit Shanghai, Guiyang and Beijing to observe children’s health care centres and learn about the development of agricultural sectors in China’s rural areas.

In their visits to Guiyang, delegates from the PDIP learned about how local governments fostered the development of Small and Medium Enterprises in the health industry. They also attended a number of workshops on political party management.

In 2015, PDIP’s chairwoman and Indonesia’s former president Megawati Soekarnoputri visited Shenzhen to inaugurate the Indonesia-China Cooperation Center building. The building is named after her father, Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. This visit further enhanced the PDIP’s relationship with the CCP.

During the visit, Megawati spoke on a panels titled “Political Leadership: New Consensus for Political Party”, at the International Conference of Asian Political Parties forum in Beijing.

Chinese authorities also invited the PKS, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) to conduct comparative studies, especially on the Hui Muslim Ethnic Autonomous Region in Ningxia, in an effort to maintain a positive image of China’s Xinjiang policy.

The supporters of Islamic party PPP (United Development Party) stage a rally in Bandung, West Java. ANTARA/Rezza Estily/ss/ama/09

Mutual benefit

Political experts on the Chinese Communist Party, Julia Bader and Christine Hackenesch, argue that from the CCP’s perspective, strengthening party-to-party relations with Indonesia could be part of its soft-power approach to increasing the legitimacy of its growing economic interests in the country.

There have been criticism of China among certain parties’ members and supporters in Indonesia.

China sees this party-to-party cooperation as a way to improve its standing and a gateway for expanding its foothold.

The harmonious relationship will also bring opportunities for future Chinese investment in the country.

China wants to build a good relationship with Indonesia’s ruling coalition party, especially in the lead up to Indonesia’s 2024 general election.

From the perspective of Indonesian parties, the aim is more than just to maintain good relations but also to bring about projects in various sectors.

This also opens up opportunities for the Indonesian parties to become grant distributors, enabling them to gain political support from Islamic boarding schools and educational institutions.

With the 2024 election coming soon, collaborating with China may help them receive funding for their political activities and ensure Chinese investments in Indonesia in the future.

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 is Assistant Professor in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) Yogyakarta.

Featured image: Megawati Soekarnoputri, the chairwoman of Indonesia’s ruling political party, PDIP delivers her speech. OTO ANTARA/Alina/hp/08.

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***

Australia’s new ALP Government has gigantic green energy plans to be funded by electricity consumers and taxpayers.

They promise (with a straight face) that Australia’s electricity will be 82% renewable by 2030. They predict 43% reduction in emissions and “on track for net zero by 2050”. They threaten to litter the landscape with 400 community batteries, 85 solar banks and a $20B expansion of the electricity grid. This gigantic “green” electricity plan will need at least 150 million Chinese solar panels covering outback kingdoms of land, plus thousands of bird-slicing metal-hungry wind turbines, plus never-ending roads and powerlines – not friendly to grass or trees and with no room for native birds, bees, bats or marsupials – not green at all.

See our sterile future being constructed.

The whirling triffids are also invading our coastal seas. Sea birds are advised to migrate.

The ALP has also revived the hoary plan to run an extension cord to Tasmania. Naturally some greedy green Tasmanians want to keep all that wind, solar and hydro energy for themselves. Others dream of sending NT sunshine up a long cable from Darwin to Singapore.

With enthusiastic support from the new Parliament full of Climatists, Net Zeros, Teals and Greens (but very few engineers) we can expect a disorderly rush to plaster a mess of electrical machinery and appliances all over the face of Australia. They will also promote more demand for electricity for electric cars, many seeking overnight charging (despite having zero solar power and intermittent wind power at night). So we will need giant fire-prone batteries to recharge small fire-prone batteries.

When there is no sun on a single solar panel for 12 hours, no one notices; when all wind turbines sit idle for days under a slow-moving winter high, no one cares; but when one aging under-maintained coal plant falters, we notice; when three coal generators fail, we have a power crisis.

Yet we have green millionaires urging quicker closure of our few remaining 24/7 coal-powered generators.

The ALP/Green/Teal plan will clutter the countryside with solar panels, wind turbines, transmission lines, access roads (some bitumen), giant batteries and fire-prone National Parks.

Eastern Australia recently had several very windy days, which caused many blackouts as trees and powerlines were blown down. Imagine the outages and repair costs after a cyclone slices thru this continent-wide spider-web of fragile power lines connecting millions of wind/solar generators, fire-prone batteries and diverse markets. Picture the green energy network after the next big flood or bushfire.

Source: saltbushclub.com

Europeans can pretend to run a modern society with intermittent energy from windmills and sunbeams because they have life-lines to reliable energy from French nuclear, Scandinavian hydro, Polish and German coal, Iceland geothermal, North Sea natural gas and (sometimes) Russian gas, oil and coal.

Australia has no extension cord to neighbours with reliable energy – we are on our own.

We can have Renewable Energy, or Reliable Energy, but not both.

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Viv Forbes has technical and financial qualifications and experience. He has solar panels on his roof, but no vested interests in coal, oil or gas apart from diesel farm equipment and a diesel generator in the shed.

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There’s a lesson to be learned from Sri Lanka’s experience, which is that the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the enhanced sovereignty that it leads to enables countries to keep the largest number of options open during times of crisis.

The Indian Ocean island nation of Sri Lanka is being crushed by the worst economic crisis in it history, but it’s managed to survive this far due to its principled neutrality towards Russia’s ongoingspecial military operation in Ukraine. Instead of jumping on the US-led Western bandwagon by voting against Russia at the UN and subsequently sanctioning it like could have been expected from such an economically desperate country that’s urgently in need of IMF aid, its leaders wisely rejected that counterproductive path by instead abstaining twice from doing so.

Shortly after, it was revealed that it purchased a 90,000-metric-ton shipment of Russian oil in order to restart its refinery, after which Prime Minister Wickremesinghe told the Associated Press in an exclusive interview this weekend that he’s interested in buying more from it if he can’t find other suppliers and is also exploring the purchase of Russian wheat too. These two literally live-saving options might not have been available to his country had it compromised on its position of principled neutrality by submitting to the US-led West at the UN.

There’s a lesson to be learned from Sri Lanka’s experience, which is that the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the enhanced sovereignty that it leads to enables countries to keep the largest number of options open during times of crisis. Apart from its principled neutrality towards the Ukrainian Conflict, this island nation’s efforts to balance between China and India have also been beneficial for its interests since both Great Powers are trying to help it to varying extents as was predicted early last month. Had it chosen one over the other, then its options would have been limited.

That said, none of its multipolar partners are going to bail Sri Lanka out for free. What they’ll likely do, however, is offer it privileged support such as discounted resources in Russia’s case or grants and low-interest loans in China’s and India’s. Nevertheless, it’ll also probably turn out that this country will have to inevitably seek support from the US-led IMF at some point or another, though hopefully the support it’ll receive from its partners before then will reduce the amount of aid that it’ll be compelled to request. That can in turn result in the most minimal erosion of its sovereignty.

The Sri Lankan case is instructive for many Global South countries like Pakistan, which might soon find themselves in similar situations. The lingering economic consequences of the international community’s uncoordinated response to containing COVID coupled with the latest shocks caused by the US-led West’s unprecedented anti-Russian sanctions and the artificially manufactured food crisis that’s connected with them will deal a heavy blow to many developing countries’ economies. If they abandon their principled neutrality, then they’ll be entirely dependent on the US-led West for survival.

There’s no doubt that this bloc will exploit them by attaching political strings to the aid that they’re offered, which will inevitably lead to them losing their sovereignty and thus becoming neo-imperial colonies. By retaining their principled neutrality, however, these Global South states can reduce the amount of aid that they’ll request from the US-led West, which will lead to them preserving as much of their strategic autonomy and state sovereignty as possible. Considering this, while Sri Lanka is just a tiny developing country, the precedent that it establishes carries outsized influence among the Global South.

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This article was originally published on OneWorld.

Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from OneWorld

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An Appalling Slur on the Civilisation State That Is India

June 8th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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The outrage in the Muslim world over the transgression of the red line in anti-Muslim politics in India is understandable, although the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party acted swiftly for damage control. The point is, the world has taken note that anti-Muslim politics has reached a crescendo in India and is undermining the country’s democratic foundations.

The US state department last week flagged the gravity of the situation in India under the watch of the Modi government. Therefore, the big question is, whether the BJP’s damage control in the present case absolves the government of responsibility. That remains a grey zone.

True to a pattern, top government officials have disappeared. The Indian public is by now used to such a drama where the government distances itself ostentatiously in the downstream of the abhorrent behaviour of the ruling party’s cadres (“core constituency”), and life moves on.

But in this age of the Internet, the international community is erudite enough to form own opinions and would know that the Indian state and the Party do not live in different planets. 

The Indian establishment is in denial mode while it has been discernible that In West Asia, the tide of public opinion has perceptibly changed unfavourably for India in the recent years. This has profound geo-strategic implications that would be felt in due course inevitably, and could only be to the detriment of Indian interests and regional influence in the medium and long term. If that happens, do not sit upon the ground and lament that China has outpaced India in “soft power” in its extended neighbourhood.

The West Asian regimes have traditionally taken a pragmatic outlook. The UAE even allowed Prime Minister Modi to solemnise the opening of a Hindu temple in the Emirate. But then, the UAE is a strange country with only something like 7 or 8 percent of the country’s population comprising native Arabs and has nothing by way of “public opinion.” Suffice to say, the actual feelings in the hearts and minds of the Arab ruling elite toward India in the recent years are hard to tell. 

The entrenched opinion in India is that the Arab elites are rank opportunists and have scant regard for Islam themselves. Indians generally, including the expert opinion, viewed the Abraham Accords as a manifestation of the political chicanery of the ruling elites in the Muslim Middle East. This is of course a complete misunderstanding of the actual situation, as it basically confuses the Palestinian issue with the religiosity of the Muslim nations. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to join the UAE to recognise Israel signals the high level of sensitivity of the ruling family to domestic public opinion.

No doubt, such misunderstanding has wrought havoc with sections of the foreign and security policy elite and impacted the Indian policies over time. There is even a body of opinion that India should align with Israel and participate in its divisive politics in the Gulf region.

It stands to reason that such excessive behaviour by two BJP top officials last week would only have reflected a common perception in the high echelons of the party circles that so long as India does “win-win” business with the sheikhs, it can get away with anti-Muslim bigotry at home.  

But that is sheer naïveté. Pan-islamism is a fact of history. Thus, the government has been caught on the wrong foot by the strong backlash in the Muslim world. Most countries in the Gulf have reportedly made demarche at the diplomatic level. Even Jordan which has a stellar record of “moderate Islam” has denounced. The social media reports say the West Asian nations demand “public apology” from the Indian government. 

Surely, the stance of Saudi Arabia and Iran will be the key templates here. Both countries have not minced words in their condemnation. That said, it is also significant that the Saudi Foreign Ministry “welcomes the action taken by the BJP to suspend the spokeswoman from work.” Equally, Iran’s foreign ministry has taken note after a meeting with the Indian ambassador in Tehran that the latter “expressed regret over the issue and described as unacceptable any affront to Islam’s Prophet.”

It underscored, “The Indian envoy said this is not the stance of the Indian government which has utmost respect for all faiths. He added that the person who insulted the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) holds no government post and only had a position in a party from which he was sacked.” 

Clearly, both Riyadh and Tehran have gone the extra league to contain the acrimony from exacerbating at the hands of irascible or radical elements in the “Ummah”. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has jumped into the fray with alacrity. 

Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian was due to arrive in India later this week. Hopefully, the visit goes ahead as planned. India and Iran have an urgent need to reset their relationship against the backdrop of the high turbulence in the world order and the increasing fragility of the international system. 

Without doubt, Tehran has an obligation to speak up on Muslim issues anywhere in the world, per the country’s 1979 constitution embodying the legacy of the Islamic Revolution. But, that said, Iran has no record of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of India. On the contrary, Iran has been a willing partner in trying times. 

Even in 1992, following the events in Ayodhya and the downstream developments and communal violence, Tehran voiced its strong concerns and disquiet at the diplomatic level while the inter-state relationship continued to run its course. In fact, in August 1993, then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao undertook a historic visit to Iran during which he addressed the Majlis — first leader from a non-Islamic country to do so — and was accorded a reception at the Qom Seminary by the leading Muslim clerics and was received by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.  

Of course, the present situation is different since it crossed all the parameters of permissiveness and touched the most sacred strings of the Muslim psyche, but this also leaves a slur on India’s heritage as a “civilisation state.” Words are not sufficient to condemn the incident. The government should, without reservations, speak up. 

And that is best done by actions. First and foremost, this moment must be taken seriously as a wake-up call as regards the dangers of the BJP nurturing bigotry for reasons of political expediency. Second, India’s unique status as a country with one of the largest Muslim populations in the world (and yet its exclusion from the OIC) poses severe challenges to Indian diplomacy.

Our approach is insufficient and archaic — and episodic. Such excessive attention to Europe and America in South Block’s diplomacy is not only unwarranted but also risks neglect of India’s “near abroad” where India has vital interests. Surely, there must be some way India can take advantage of the Saudi and Iranian goodwill? Emulate Chinese and Russian diplomacy. 

Third, in such situations, the government must continue to act with the same decisiveness against the rogue elephants in the BJP tent. Alas, the buck stops with PM Modi. No matter his visions for a future India, the plain truth is that India cannot progress optimally so long as almost one-fifth of the country’s population stands excluded from development and alienated from national mainstream. Modi only can cut this Gordian knot.

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Featured image: Prime Minister Modi (R) and Jordan’s King Abdullah addressed the conference ‘Islamic Heritage: Promoting Understanding and Moderation’ in New Delhi on February 28, 2018 (Source: Indian Punchline)

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Ferdinand Marcos Jr., or commonly referred to as Bongbong Marcos, will take office as president of the Philippines on June 30. His accession to the presidency comes amid simmering debate over which way he will take his country’s relations with China. Many in the Philippines expect Marcos Jr. to pursue the same policy of relations with China as his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, but it is likely that he will actually be much tougher against Beijing.

Outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte improved relations with Beijing, projecting his country to enter a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation” with China. Despite the Chinese-Filipino territorial dispute, Duterte did not rely on the ruling of the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which even ruled that Beijing’s sovereign ambitions over the Spratly Islands were illegal. Duterte behaved as if there had never been any ruling from the International Court of Arbitration and took bilateral steps to improve relations with Beijing instead.

It is recalled that in 2017, the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea was agreed upon. Then, in 2018 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Manila, the two sides signed “The Philippines-China MoU on Cooperation in Oil and Gas Development.”

Now in the final months of Duterte’s presidency, the Filipino Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to Beijing against their ban on fishing in the South China Sea and against the Chinese coast guard violating the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. Most recently, there have been three new Filipino coast guard outposts on these islands.

Despite this, these issues are miniscule in the context of the friendly relations that the leaders of the Philippines and China currently have. The majority of Filipinos are not enthusiastic about such friendly expressions as there is a distrust for the Chinese, as well as strong patriotic sentiment. In this way, Marcos Jr. will have to take a tougher stance than Duterte against Beijing’s expansionist policy in the South China Sea.

However, some observers say that under Marcos Jr., the Philippines will become even closer to China as his family has a special relationship with the Asian Giant. Marcos Jr.’s father was the one to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1976, and his parents even met with Chairman Mao Zedong.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping congratulated Marcos Jr. on his victory shortly after the election. In his congratulations, Xi honored the new president-elect as “a figure in the creation, support and promotion of the China-Philippines friendship” and expressed his wish that the two sides would continue to develop close ties.

However, it does appear that his parents’ special relationship with Beijing will not interfere in his policy of maximizing Filipino demands in the South China Sea. On May 26, speaking to television reporters, Marcos Jr. vowed to rely on the 2016 International Court of Arbitration ruling to assert “our territorial sovereignty against Beijing’s ambitious claims in the South China Sea.”

At the time, he stressed: “Our sovereignty is sacred, and we will not give in in any way. We will not allow anyone to trample on even a square millimeter of our maritime sovereignty.” The president-elect added that he would resolve the issue through diplomacy, “consistently and firmly.”

Manila has always been a military ally of the United States, despite all of Duterte’s sometimes harsh statements against Washington. In this way, the Philippines enjoys a unique position where it can once again simply pivot back toward the United States in some global and/or regional issues. It is no coincidence that there are now hints from Beijing to Manila reminding of their previous methods of discussing territorial disputes whilst boosting economic cooperation.

As Beijing would rather minimize the importance of the territorial dispute in its bilateral relations with the Philippines, it could allow the US to re-establish its influence in the country as Manila finds far more importance in the issue. Whereas China can offer economic opportunity and benefit at the price of sidelining differences in maritime territory, the US could offer strong diplomatic support on the territorial dispute, something that would surely spark Manila’s interest.

It is clear that economic cooperation and joint exploitation of resources in the South China Sea is a good way to develop relations between countries. Although China could blame nationalist ambitions in the Philippines as hindering a long-term sustainable peace, stability and economic development in the region, Manila does have a right to make use of what it is entitled to. By ignoring such a major issue for the Philippines, Beijing is allowing a space for the US to exploit and therefore have a greater say in South China Sea matters.

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Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.

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The United States is openly talking about its arming of Taiwan no longer in general terms of ensuring “sufficient self-defense,” but rather specifically to “win against China,” thus confirming Beijing’s longstanding claims that Washington has been provoking conflict in what is China’s internal political affairs recognized as such by even the US and its official recognition of the One China Policy.

The New York Times in a May 7, 2022 article titled, “US Presses Taiwan to Buy Weapons More Suited to Win Against China,” would claim:

The Biden administration is quietly pressing the Taiwanese government to order American-made weapons that would help its small military repel a seaborne invasion by China rather than weapons designed for conventional set-piece warfare, current and former US and Taiwanese officials say.

The article also claims:

The US campaign to shape Taiwan’s defenses has grown in urgency since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine ordered in late February by President Vladimir V. Putin. The war has convinced Washington and Taipei that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the coming years is now a potential danger — and that a smaller military with the right weapons that has adopted a strategy of asymmetric warfare, in which it focuses on mobility and precision attacks, can beat back a larger foe.

In reality, after 8 years of intense training of over 23,000 Ukrainian forces and the transfer of billions of dollars worth of arms, Ukraine is no more able to repel Russian military operations amid the current conflict there than Taiwan will be able to do in any future conflict with the mainland even with Washington’s “re-examination” of Taiwan’s military capabilities and the adjustment of arms shipped to the breakaway island province.

The New York Times, like the vast majority of the Western media, claims that Ukraine has “defeated” Russia in critical battles, citing Kiev. In reality, the same Ukrainian military the US and NATO spent 8 years arming and training was unable to stop Russia from securing cities from Kherson in Ukraine’s south all the way to the Donbas region, creating a land bridge from Crimea to the Russian Federation’s borders. Among these cities includes Mariupol, presenting another example of Ukraine’s military failing in combat despite the extensive training and arms transfers the US military and its Western allies provided Ukraine since 2014.

Ukraine’s military is also clearly unable to prevent Russia from shaping the battlefield across the Donbas region, preparing for the encirclement and either destruction or capture of tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces along the line of contact between them and the militias of the Donbas region.

Taiwan is a fraction of the size, population, and military strength of Ukraine. Nothing the United States and its allies can do will ever change that nor the fact that each passing year the Chinese mainland’s military capabilities grow by leaps and bounds not only in terms of securing their own domestic objectives, but obtaining or surpassing military parity with the United States.

While Western publications like the New York Times claim that Washington’s strategy of arming and training Taiwanese forces is meant to defend the island, in reality it is merely meant to bleed China at Taiwan’s expense and entirely on Washington’s behalf – not unlike what is playing out in Ukraine right now.

While the White House publicly denies it is waging a proxy war with Russia through Ukraine it is abundantly obvious that from 2014 onward, that is precisely what Washington prepared for and exactly what Washington is doing now. This has been openly admitted by sitting US representatives.

US Congressman Daniel Crenshaw, for example, in response to criticism for his vote on $40 billion in aid to Ukraine openly claimed:

Investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea.

Thus, just as Washington attempts to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian in Eastern Europe, the US is openly preparing the battlefield in the Indo-Pacific region to fight China to the last inhabitant of Taiwan.

Washington’s Shifting “One China Policy” 

In May of last year and for many years before that, upon the US State Department’s own website (archived) regarding US-Taiwan relations, the US State Department would explicitly note:

The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The 1979 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Joint Communique, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

The same webpage would also note:

The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages both sides to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect.

Washington’s recognition of the One China Policy in 1979 was key in securing Beijing’s support against the Soviet Union. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union the US has incrementally backtracked on the agreement, blatantly violating it including through the placement of US troops on Taiwan.

The US government’s Voice of America platform in 2021 would report in their article, “US Nearly Doubled Military Personnel Stationed in Taiwan This Year,” that:

The United States has doubled its unofficial military presence in Taiwan over the past year in what specialists describe as the latest signal to China that Taiwan’s future remains a priority.

More recently, the US State Department has deleted key facts regarding its One China Policy. The edited version claims:

The United States has a longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three US-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.   Though the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have a robust unofficial relationship as well as an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available defense articles and services as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The United States continues to encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

Deliberately omitted is any admission or explanation as to what “the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances” actually represent or any explicit denouncement of US support for Taiwanese independence, creating both greater “ambiguity” regarding Wasington’s policy toward Taiwan and the mainland, as well as creating more diplomatic room for the US to eventually shift over to promoting Taiwanese independence.

The blatant provocation and deliberate threat America’s recent activities in and around Taiwan represent to Chinese national security is part of a familiar pattern of US encroachment – a similar pattern the US demonstrated along Russia’s peripheries in the aftermath of the Cold War ultimately leading to the conflict now unfolding within Ukraine’s borders.

Washington Preparing Asia’s “Ukraine War” 

A similar conflict with China either directly fought by the US or by proxy (or both) is more than mere speculation. It is the product of years of US foreign policy laid out in papers produced by and for the US government and its military.

One such paper, published in 2016 by the RAND Corporation titled, “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” commissioned by the Office of the Undersecretary of the Army and carried out by the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program noted:

We postulate that a war would be regional and conventional. It would be waged mainly by ships on and beneath the sea, by aircraft and missiles of many sorts, and in space (against satellites) and cyberspace (against computer systems). We assume that fighting would start and remain in East Asia, where potential Sino-US flash points and nearly all Chinese forces are located.

The window of opportunity for the US to fight a conflict with China and potentially win stretches from 2015 to 2025. Among the flash points mentioned in the paper is Taiwan.

The paper is confident that such warfare would not turn nuclear:

It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used: Even in an intensely violent conventional conflict, neither side would regard its losses as so serious, its prospects so dire, or the stakes so vital that it would run the risk of devastating nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons first. We also assume that China would not attack the US homeland, except via cyberspace, given its minimal capability to do so with conventional weapons. In contrast, US nonnuclear attacks against military targets in China could be extensive.

However, because of China’s growing military capabilities and the likelihood that fighting would grind into a stalemate, the paper examines non-military factors it anticipates would benefit the US over China:

The prospect of a military standoff means that war could eventually be decided by nonmilitary factors. These should favor the United States now and in the future. Although war would harm both economies, damage to China’s could be catastrophic and lasting: on the order of a 25–35 percent reduction in Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in a yearlong war, compared with a reduction in US GDP on the order of 5–10 percent. Even a mild conflict, unless ended promptly, could weaken China’s economy. A long and severe war could ravage China’s economy, stall its hard-earned development, and cause widespread hardship and dislocation.

Regarding Taiwan specifically, the RAND Corporation paper notes:

China might regard the price of losing a war with the United States over, say, Taiwan as so high that it would endure the costs of an intense, and perhaps lengthy, conflict. Broadly speaking, as prospects of either side clearly winning decline, as might be the case in coming years, both sides ought to place greater weight on the costs of fighting—a key reason why both must rigorously think through what consequences a war could have.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides a living laboratory to do precisely that, “rigorously think through what consequences a war could have,” especially in regards to a proxy war fought by the US through Taiwan.

The US government and the Western media claim that the unfolding conflict in Ukraine serves as a warning for China. They claim the conflict demonstrates Western resolve and the military potency of Western-trained troops. However, in reality, the only fact demonstrated is the danger Western proxies pose to the national security of targeted nations like Russia and China and the absolute necessity to decisively and completely eliminate those threats.

The Western media continues to portray Ukraine as “winning” when clearly it is not. This is done to continue hostilities and dissuade Kiev from pursuing peace long after any feasible chance passes of defeating Russia militarily (which passed before the conflict even began).

Upon careful examination of the above-mentioned New York Times article, there is no logical or convincing explanation as to how Taiwan would ever in any conceivable way “repel” a potential military operation launched from the mainland. What the US and its partners are preparing Taiwan for instead is a similarly vain proxy war meant to do as much damage to China as possible without the US ever having to get directly involved. Taiwan as it is known today, would disappear in the rubble of modern warfare.

Even if the US does eventually get involved, it hopes Chinese military capabilities will be significantly degraded when that happens because of the immense amount of military hardware transferred to Taiwan. An additional bonus for the US is the immense profits this will make its arms industry. As Washington continues pushing Taiwan closer and closer to conflict with the mainland, it is able to pressure other nations in the region, namely Japan and Australia, to likewise purchase a larger amount of US weaponry.

Ultimately, and as the conflict in Ukraine illustrates, the US is not underwriting peace and stability around the globe, it is undermining it. It is almost universally recognized, even across the West, that the current conflict in Ukraine stems from the US-led expansion of NATO after the Cold War ended. It is likewise obvious that Washington’s insistence on violating its own One China Policy agreement with Beijing, the flooding of Taiwan with weapons, and now a growing US military presence on and around the island, that it is the US raising the likelihood of war, daily, by deliberately and increasingly threatening Chinese national security in ways that if reciprocated would never be tolerated by Washington.

Only time will tell what final lessons the conflict in Ukraine will teach both the West who provoked it, or Russia who was dragged into it, and how it may shape US provocations in the Indo-Pacific region and more specifically, in regards to its Asian “Ukraine,” Taiwan.

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Extreme weather events are the new normal. The use of nuclear weapons by Vladimir Putin’s Russian military is now an unthinkable possibility. And Xi Jinping’s China, our largest trading partner and rising superpower is pulling down the shutters.

So no pressure then, for our freshly-minted 31st prime minister as he flies into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Tokyo this week.

The immediate challenge facing incoming Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong is to reassure allies and friends of continuity and certainty. But more than that, the change of government presents an opportunity to build confidence in Australia’s capacity, once taken for granted, for visionary leadership and humble decency.

The Quad involves India, Japan, the United States and Australia. It began in 2007, under George W Bush and John Howard, but during Kevin Rudd’s time, Australia pulled back because of concerns about America’s approach to China.

Prime Minister Turnbull revived the arrangement in 2017 as concerns mounted about China’s military expansion in the South China Sea. In March 2021 the Quad leaders issued a joint statement. “The Spirit of the Quad” spoke of a “rules-based maritime order in the East and South China seas” that supported a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

At this week’s meetings, Japan and India will be looking for signs Australia is serious about engaging with Asia. Another old friend with deep and long-established links in Asia, France, will be looking for signs of a reset.

The US will be reviewing its expectations of what Australia, under a Labor government, is prepared to contribute to both the Quad security dialogue and to the AUKUS trilateral security pact.

Albanese and Wong share much in common with US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Their face-to-face meetings this week in Tokyo have the potential to reset the allies’ approach to China and the Indo-Pacific well beyond what was ever likely or possible under Donald Trump and Scott Morrison.

The China question

One of the greatest challenges of our time is to reverse the slide in relations between China and the West. The stakes are immense, not just for defense and security, or trade and the economy, but also global responses to climate change, and the future course of Chinese society and the lives of 1.4 billion people.

Biden and Blinken will also be looking for signs that the new Albanese Labor government is as committed to AUKUS as was the Morrison government. The revelation last week that, contrary to expectations in Washington DC, Labor was not consulted about AUKUS, raised doubts about the functioning of the security pact.

The operational details of how AUKUS could transform our immediate security environment, have also not been fully spelled out. As with the Quad, the potential benefits, and threats, to Australia go well beyond hard-core defense and security issues.

New opportunities with Wong

For decades, Australia’s engagement with Asia has lacked the sustained investment of financial, political, and social capital that is needed. Albanese says that he wants to change this, singling out Indonesia as a key priority for his government.

Despite living on the edge of the largest and fastest developing economies and societies on the planet, Australia has been far too lazy, shortsighted, and miserly about truly engaging with Asia. Our current woes with Chinese trade bans point to a failure to engage more broadly with both China and the rest of Asia.

Under Penny Wong, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has the potential to play a critical role in securing Australia’s broader security interests. Wong’s personal backstory, as well as her formidable intellect, will be key assets in our engagement with Asia.

The challenges facing the new defense minister – understood to be Richard Marles – intersect tightly with those facing Wong. The shocking invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and the unexpected course of the war, contain many lessons for Australia.

The first is the importance of international alliances and institutions, such as NATO and the European Union. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was easy to be critical of NATO and the EU, and question their utility and substance. Not any more.

The Quad, AUKUS, ANZUS, and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, together with ASEAN, are very different entities to NATO and the EU, but the war in Ukraine casts them in a fresh light. Diplomacy, trust and relationship-building are as critically important to defense and security as tanks, trucks and planes.

Other lessons from Ukraine

Australia’s next Defence White Paper, likely to be released in 2023, is going to be shaped by both the rise of China and the decline of Russia. The experiences of the war in Ukraine, the critical role of logistics, the utility of certain kinds of equipment such as tanks, and the impact of organizational culture will be closely studied.

In all of this, there are challenges as well as great opportunities for Australia. Already it is clear that intelligence, IT and drones have played a critical role in defense of Ukraine. Australia has considerable capacity to innovate and develop related critical systems, hardware and technology, to the benefit of both national and regional security.

It should go without saying that Australia needs to both prepare for war and to do everything that it possibly can to avoid war. The latter depends very much on the former, together with diplomacy and relationship building.

Don’t forget climate change

War, in the worst-case scenario, constitutes an existential threat. So too does climate change.

The remarkable outcomes of the 2022 federal elections point to the realization of millions of Australians that more frequent and severe, fire, flood, drought and intense heat events represent an immediate security threat.

Neither the LNP nor Labor intended for this to be a climate election. But it clearly was. This was an instance of ordinary voters being well ahead of the leaders of the two larger parties.

The impacts of climate change will contribute directly to political and social stability in our region. Crises in food and water security, rising sea levels and severe weather events, and an increased impact of animal-to-human diseases such as Covid-19, mean that responses to climate change are integral to managing national and regional security.

The nation and the region are watching and looking to the new Australian government for leadership on security and this includes climate change.

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Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.

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Abstract

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) occupies an integral position in the memory politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In recent years, dominant representations of the war create a memory discourse which portrays the heroic triumph of the Chinese people led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over Japan. This article shows how the war has been remembered from the victory of the Communist revolution in 1949 to the present in the PRC. It contributes to the debate on the effectiveness and limitations of the monopoly of war memory by the CCP. 

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Introduction 

On 27 February 2014, China’s national legislature, the Standing Committee of the National Congress reached a landmark decision in the history of Chinese memory politics. It designated 13 December as the National Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre Victims. Since 2014, memorial ceremonies have been held annually on 13 December in the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, in which top members of the CCP leadership participate. On the same day, themes of war appear in national and regional newspapers, urging readers to carry on war memory by never forgetting the pain and suffering that Chinese went through in the war years. Throughout the same month, audiences can find similar themes in documentaries, television dramas, and films. The commemoration of the war through national ceremonial practices and media representations indicates that the PRC is committed to shaping a sense of victimhood in Chinese identity. At the same time, it also shows that the memory of the war is deeply embedded in the social discourse of the PRC.

This article analyzes the development of official discourse of the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1949 to the present in the PRC. The official memory discourse is defined as ways in which certain images, people and events associated with the war are remembered by performing official rituals or through official representations. In the PRC, as in most countries, the construction of official state discourse of war memory is a practice of political engineering, in which narratives are selected, institutionalized, legitimized, and delegitimized by state agents and individuals. In this process, state agents aim at establishing and maintaining the monopoly over the narratives of war, but also actively prevent the development of counter narratives. Individuals construct alternative ways of remembering the war that tend to question the accepted narratives, but they have not been successful in establishing counter memories of the war that deviate from the dominant narratives. The official state discourse ends up as closely controlled narratives that consist of heroic resistance and nationalist victimization. Alternative memory of the war largely falls into the scope of the controlled narratives. By surveying the evolution and structure of state war memory, this article contributes to our understanding of the dominant role of the state in shaping the official discourse of war memory in the PRC.

The article is structured into four main sections: state control, narrative, themes of war memory, and private memories of the war in the PRC. The article first introduces memory theory and presents a survey of existing scholarship as the basis of analysis, and it presents the ways in which the Chinese state extends its control over public commemoration and memorialization of the war. Then, the article outlines the structure of war memory, analyzing three types of narratives: the narrative of resistance, the victor narrative, and the victim narrative. The article continues to illustrate how the Communists, the Nationalists and Japan have been remembered in the public and the private spheres. The remainder of the article turns its attention to the memoirs and oral histories of Chinese veterans, and it discusses how these mechanisms function as a variation of the official memory of the war.

 

Theory and Literature

Memory studies has recently become a burgeoning field in the West and scholarly attention to the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War is gathering momentum. In the field of memory, the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in the 1920s developed the concept of “collective memory” which he defined as a shared perception of the past formed through the communication and interaction among members of social and cultural groups (Halbwachs 1992). The German Egyptologist Jan Assmann and the cultural studies scholar Aleida Assmann have introduced the term “cultural memory” into the debate. According to the Assmanns, cultural memory is determined by social conditions, political institutions, and power structures (Aleida Assmann 2011; Jan Assmann 2011). In this context, the study of the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the PRC has attracted some academic attention. Chan Yang assesses how the war memory evolved over time in the PRC, drawing particular attention to the roles of state and non-state actors in developing the discourse of war memory in the period between 1949 and 1982 (2018). Rana Mitter and Zheng Wang, among others, have explored the links among war memory, nationalism, and politics in the PRC (Mitter 2020; Wang 2012). Other studies focus on specific aspects of war memory in the PRC. Aaron William Moore’s study, though not exclusively focused on the PRC’s war memory, examines letters, postcards and memoirs written by Chinese servicemen in the war from 1937 to 1945 (Moore 2013). Kirk Denton analyzes the narratives of war and their political and ideological implications in the PRC’s state museums (Denton 2014). While these studies illustrate the extensive literature on the Chinese memory of the war, there remains, so far, no study that specifically examines the structure of the official state discourse of war memory in the PRC from 1949 to the present.

This article utilizes the theories of memory reconstruction by Halbwachs and the Assmanns to approach war memory in the PRC. It shows how central themes of the PRC’s war memory are sustained by the media and institutions, among which are artifacts like textbooks, memorial museums, and oral histories. This article contributes to the discussion of the PRC’s official state discourse of memory relating to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Since the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the discourses of war memory have been constantly subject to a high level of political manipulation, and war memory has been used as a political tool for the CCP to consolidate its legitimacy. This article also contributes to illustrating the periodization of war memory in the PRC. It suggests that the Chinese official discourse of war memory is divided into the Mao era (1949-1976) and the post-Mao era (1976 to present). In the Mao era, the CCP established a discourse of war memory that emphasized the victory of the Communist revolution and the anti-Japanese resistance led by the Communists. In the post-Mao era, the newly-emerging victim narrative that emphasized Japanese atrocities developed in parallel with the victor narrative of the Mao era in the discourse of war memory. The victim narrative tended to overshadow the victor narrative for thirty years from the 1980s to the 2000s. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, the victor narrative has made a strong comeback in the official discourse of war memory in the PRC.

 

State Monopoly of War Memory

The Second Sino-Japanese War is a major catastrophe and national struggle in Chinese history. The tragic and heroic nature of the war explains why it has been important for the PRC to commemorate and memorialize the war. On the one hand, the war is one of the most destructive episodes in modern Chinese history. It is estimated that during the war, approximately 100 million people were forced to become refugees and at least 20 million civilians were killed (Larry and MacKinnon 2001, 6). The human rights abuses during the war were so catastrophic that even after seventy years the scars have not yet been healed in contemporary Chinese society. On the other hand, the war was the most heroic moment in Chinese history. It reminds us of the victory of the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the exploitation of foreign imperialist powers. The CCP claims to have played a leading role in the war. Therefore, how the war is publicly remembered becomes relevant to the construction of Chinese nationalism and to the consolidation of the CCP’s legitimacy.

The PRC government uses a nationalist rhetoric to define the nature of the war. The official discourse refers to the war as the “Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War of Resistance,” rather than using a more neutral term such as the Second Sino-Japanese War. As indicated by the term “resistance,” China’s involvement in the war is framed in a nationalist fashion, emphasizing the defense and sacrifice of Chinese people for national liberation. The term “resistance” also serves to downplay Chinese collaboration with Japan, which widely existed as part of everyday life in many areas of wartime China.1

The PRC government has been seeking ways to create official memories of the war that serves to stabilize Communist rule. In this process, political considerations predominate in the efforts of constructing war memory. The processes of constructing war memory in the PRC impose exclusiveness. The official memory of the war should never be challenged, amended, or overturned. While the opportunities to generate memories of the war abound, the government spares no effort to suppress memories that deviate from the official memories, because this raises questions that are difficult for the government to answer. To be sure, the state is unable to completely deter alternative memories that exist in the private sphere. Alternative memories will inevitably coexist and compete with official memories. However, alternative memories are closely monitored by the government, and it is unlikely that they will prevail in the public domain and become an established way of remembering.

The state monopoly on the official discourse of war memory prescribes rules for what is to be remembered and what is to be forgotten. The commemoration and remembering of the war are repeatedly articulated through mass media, which facilitate public identification of China as the victor/victim and of Japan as the perpetrator. Stories of Japanese wartime atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and Unit 731 are retold in television dramas, films, and documentaries, reminding the Chinese public to never forget national grievances, deprivation, and humiliation at the hands of Japanese aggressors, as well as the hard-earned national liberation. Meanwhile, the state’s significant attention to remembering this war overshadows the collective remembering of other wars that China fought in the twentieth century, from the Sino-Soviet War (1929) and the Civil War (1945-1949) in the Republican era to the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) in the Communist era. The Sino-Soviet War and Sino-Vietnamese War, especially, have been almost forgotten in the social discourse of the PRC. While these military conflicts are certainly significant events that have received public attention, their legacies have not been remembered in the same way as the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The PRC facilitates memories of the war that clearly distinguishes between “self” and “other.” The Communists are always the “self.” The “other” could be the Nationalists as an internal foe or the Japanese as an external adversary. For much of the postwar period, both the Nationalists and the Japanese have been blamed for causing sufferings to the Chinese during the war. In the Mao era, the Nationalists were stigmatized as counterrevolutionaries who had oppressed the Chinese people. It is only since the 1980s that the PRC has begun to rehabilitate the Nationalist “other” and publicly acknowledge their contribution in the war. The reason for this change was that after the death of Mao, the PRC policy towards Taiwan shifted from confrontation to engagement, which was designed to woo the Nationalists in Taiwan to negotiate a reunification treaty. However, this gesture of rehabilitation avoided acknowledging the Nationalists’ critical role in the war. The Nationalists were still regarded as an internal “other,” rather than part of the “self.” For their part, the Japanese have been demonized as “devils” who committed appalling crimes against the Chinese. This model of dichotomy between self and other in the PRC’s war memory demonstrates the state manipulation of war memory, which honors the Communists, dismisses the Nationalists, and condemns the Japanese.

While the war occupies a significant position in the PRC’s national memory today, memories of the war have evolved from partial oblivion to full revival. In the first thirty years of Communist rule, the war was publicly remembered as a revolutionary victory of proletarian over imperialist exploitation. The “liberation” narrative dominated the official discourse of war memory, highlighting heroism and avoiding expressions of suffering. Representations of the war were limited to heroic triumph in the public sphere. After the death of Mao, the CCP abandoned Mao’s political line of class struggle, and loosened its control over narratives of the war memory. Accordingly, war memory entered the public sphere under the auspices of the state, and a discourse of suffering and humiliation evolved in this process.

The trends in the development of war memory in the PRC are most evident in the state initiative of building war and military museums across the country. In the Mao era, the state made only limited efforts to preserve war memory, and a very small number of museums were erected to commemorate the war. In the 1950s, the Chinese government established a military museum in Beijing to exhibit the victory of Chinese revolution under the leadership of the CCP. The narratives of museum exhibitions portrayed the war as a heroic triumph in the course of China’s revolutionary history. Due to the domestic political chaos, the museum remained closed for much of the 1960s and 1970s (Denton 2014, 121-132). The Chinese government set up another museum dedicated to Japanese war crimes in Fushun in1986. This museum served to preserve the memory of Japanese atrocities and to implement the political “re-education” of Japanese prisoners of war after 1945 (Mitter 2020, 112).

In the post-Mao era, public museums dedicated to the Second Sino-Japanese War mushroomed across the country. The Museum of War of Resistance against Japan was erected in the Beijing suburb of Wanping where the war had broken out in 1937, in July 1987, which soon became the national center for remembering and commemorating the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was completed on 15 August 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. The Nanjing Museum of the Site of Lijixiang Comfort Station opened as its branch in December 2015, housing the archival evidence of Chinese “sex slaves” (aka “comfort women”) who were forced to serve the Japanese military in Nanjing under the Japanese occupation. Other museums that the state has constructed to memorialize the war include the Museum of the Criminal Evidence of Japanese Imperial Army Unit 731 built outside of Harbin in 1985, and the September 18 Historical Museum built in Shenyang in 1991 to commemorate the 1931 “Mukden Incident.”

Figure 1: The Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
Photo by Fanghong, CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the CCP strengthened its control of the official war memory discourse. This is evident in the CCP’s initiative to redefine the nature of the war in textbooks. In January 2017, The Ministry of Education announced that the Second Sino-Japanese War would officially be dated as lasting for fourteen years instead of eight years, starting with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria on 18 September 1931 in what is known as the Mukden Incident (Zhao 2017, 12). The war had long been defined as an eight-year struggle lasting from 1937 to 1945, in which the start date is the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. The 2017 government edict declared that official interpretations of the war from now on would have to use the “fourteen-year” definition. Textbooks referring to the war would have to go through a comprehensive amendment. It is remarkable that not just history textbooks but also textbooks of other subjects such as Chinese and ethics would have to update the wording wherever the war is mentioned (Huanqiu, 2017).

 

Narrative: Resistance, Victor, and Victim 

The PRC’s war memory discourse consists of narratives of resistance, victor, and victim. The resistance narrative emphasizes national unity and solidarity in fighting for national liberation. Its focus is on the memorialization of heroes and battles. The government has designated many personalities as heroes for their contribution in the war. The officially designated heroes include not only civilians and Communist and Nationalist servicemen, but also foreign military officers, doctors and journalists who assisted China in fighting the Japanese. The battles fought by the Communists and Nationalists in the war are another theme in the war memory. In recent years, Chinese newspapers have reported numerous stories of battles during the war. For example, in 2014 the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), the mouthpiece of the CCP, reprinted documents relating to thirty battles that the Communists and the Nationalists fought during the war. The documents were temporarily published online by the National Archives Bureau in 2014. They are selected from many written records about the war in numerous historical archives across the country. These documents detail the course of the battles, the number of casualties and the intensity of resistance.

The resistance narrative is further consolidated by the CCP’s directive to redefine the length of the war in textbooks already touched upon. It has constructed a way of remembering the war that gives prominence to the resistance in China’s struggle against Japan. According to the People’s Daily, this decision aims to establish a way of remembering that the war is a long-term nationalist struggle led by the CCP. The revisionism is justified on the grounds of characterizing the war as an “uninterrupted” historical process and a “continuous” struggle. In this view, the “total” war of resistance at the national level (1937-1945) evolved from the “partial” war of resistance at the regional level (1931-1937). During this period, the CCP made unremitting efforts to mobilize national unity to resist Japanese aggression. The “partial” war of resistance is both the basis and preparation for the subsequent national struggle. These two periods are inseparable, forming an uninterrupted “historical chain” (Zhang 2017,11).

It must be pointed out, however, that Chinese resistance as such during 1931 to 1936 is a myth, and its significance should not be overestimated. From 1931 to 1936, the resistance activity was concentrated in Manchuria where Japan established a client state known as Manchukuo as early as 1932. The overall resistance during this period was relatively weak and sporadic. The highest estimate for membership in the resistance is around 300,000, accounting for approximately one percent of the 30 million population of Manchuria in the early 1930s (Mitter 2000, 200). When Manchukuo was established, the Japanese Kwantung Army launched a series of large military operations to eliminate resistance activity, and as a result, by 1933 the resistance had been largely suppressed. The anti-Japanese resistance cannot be simply understood through nationalism either. This has to do with the complex structure of resistance membership. The resistance members included Chinese and Korean Communists, soldiers of the reorganized army of the local warlord Zhang Xueliang, and former “bandits” who indulged in extortion and raids. The number of “bandits” is notably large, accounting for almost half of the total number of resistance fighters in Manchuria. Most resistance members were not motivated by nationalism. While it is true that the Communists took a nationalist stance in their resistance against Japan, it is debatable whether other resistance forces which had no particular political allegiance were motivated by nationalism and dedicated themselves to a nationalist cause (Mitter 2000, 190-203).

The victor narrative depicts the war as a Communist victory against Japanese imperialism. In the Mao era, the Communist leaders did not use the narrative of national humiliation; rather, they used a Marxist theory of class struggle to explain the national proletarian struggle against foreign imperialist foes. The victory of the Communist revolution was glorified as the great liberation of Chinese people from the oppression of Japanese imperialism and the counterrevolutionary Nationalist government, and Mao therefore became the great savior of the Chinese nation (Wang 2015, 229). The theory of class struggle enabled the development of a narrative in the PRC’s war memory that defined China as a victor and the war as a struggle that transcended the boundaries of race, nation, and state (Gao 2015, 81). The narrative of “China as a victor” continued into the post-Mao era. On 7 July 1987, the 50th Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Yang Shangkun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, reiterated the position that China was a victor in the war: the war is a “great turning point in the historical development of the Chinese nation from decline to rejuvenation,” China “for the first time achieved a complete victory against imperialist aggression,” and the Chinese “as a semi-colonial weak nation created a miracle of defeating an imperialist power” (Ren min ri bao 1987, 1). After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, this victory narrative was re-articulated as an integral part of the “Chinese Dream,” a discourse actively promoted by the CCP to reconstruct Chinese nationalism. To fulfill the “Chinese Dream,” China must take three steps of “standing up,” “growing rich,” and “becoming strong.” As the first step in the direction towards Chinese rejuvenation, the victory of the war takes on a symbolic significance.

Yet the death of Mao in 1976 not only marked the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, but also the beginning of the transition from class-based revolutionary ideology to nation-centered patriotism in China. One locus of this new patriotism has been an emphasis on China’s wartime victimization at the hands of the invading Japanese Imperial Army. This victim-centric view of history is not limited just to China but is also part of broader post-colonial and post-Cold War trends globally. In post-Mao China, narratives of victimization and national humiliation by the Japanese are often found in history textbooks and media coverage. And in textbooks approved after 1992, the “victim narrative” was expanded even further to blame Japan (and the West) for China’s traumatic and humiliating experiences in the past hundred years lasting from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In newspapers, too, reports about Chinese victimization far exceeded those on China’s victory in the war which prevailed in previous decades. The data of reports in newspapers from 2005 to 2015 shows that the number of reports about Chinese victimization such as the Nanjing Massacre was almost six times as many as reports about battles in the war (Wang 2016, 32-33). The victim narrative focuses on quantifying Chinese suffering in detail. Coverage of Japanese atrocities in the war tends to concentrate on the process of determining the number of victims, resembling what Coble has called “a numbers game,” in which the goal seems to maximize the number of victims (Coble 2007, 404). In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek announced that the war had killed 1.75 million Chinese. The official number of estimated casualties increased dramatically under Communist rule. In the Mao era, the CCP declared that 9.32 million Chinese were killed in the war. That number remained unchanged for many years. Then, in 1995, Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the CCP, raised the death toll to a rough estimate of 35 million, and this has been the official Chinese figure ever since (Gries 2004, 80). It should be noted that identifying the number of victims by the Chinese government reflects continuities between the pre- and post-1949 periods. The official number of 300,000 Nanjing Massacre victims claimed by the Communists, for instance, was not their own invention, but rather emerged from the war crimes trials conducted by the Nationalists in the late 1940s.

 

Thematic Focus: Communists, Nationalists and Japan in the War

The Communists, Nationalists and Japan are the main actors in the war, and each has been remembered in specific ways in the PRC. The Communists have been remembered as the national savior. This way of remembering the Communists is particularly evident in the “bulwark” (zhongliu dizhu) discourse that was first proposed by Mao in 1945 and is today actively promoted by the CCP. The CCP has so far produced numerous reports, books, and documentaries to construct a myth that the Communists served as the backbone force in the war. The “bulwark” narrative distinguishes between a front dominated by the Nationalists and a rear in which the Communists were dominant. It claims that these two battlefields are interrelated and interdependent. The rear outweighs the front in terms of the long-term outcome and significance of the war. The essential role of the Communists in the war is justified on the grounds of the political position that it took. This narrative asserts that the Communists actively proposed and defended the United Front, which was formally established in 1937, with the Nationalists throughout the war. Without their relentless efforts to unite with the Nationalists to fight Japan, it would have been impossible for China to eventually win the war (Liang 2005, 37-43). It appears that the “bulwark” narrative attributes the Communists’ contribution more to its political position and less to its military engagement during the war. There is no doubt that the Communists fought guerrilla warfare with Japan at the “rear,” but a comparison of the military engagement by the Communists and the Nationalists would indicate the prominent role of the Nationalists on the battlefield. The Communists launched one major military operation against Japan (Wang 2000, 166), while the Nationalists fought twenty-three campaigns between 1937 and 1945 (Van de Ven 2003, 210; Wang 2000, 166). To be sure, the “bulwark” narrative politicizes a way of remembering the war that honors the Communists for its contributions.

In contrast to the role of the Communists as national savior, the Nationalists have been remembered much less positively in the political discourse of the PRC. This was particularly the case in the Mao era when the central government systematically delegitimized memories of the Nationalists’ contributions to the war effort. The Nationalists were stigmatized as a class enemy that had betrayed the United Front, and their contribution in the war was dismissed as insignificant. Beginning in the 1950s, the government obstructed the public commemoration of the Nationalists by demolishing shrines, cemeteries, and monuments. These commemorative sites were initially built by the Nationalist government during the war in commemoration of the Nationalists’ soldiers who died during the war (Chang 2012, 1-46). Under the Communist regime, these sites were classified as counterrevolutionary relics and became immediately subject to systematic demolition. In consequence, cemeteries of Nationalist soldiers suffered severe damage. The tombstones of thousands of soldiers were vandalized, and the ashes were exhumed and thrown away (Tsui 2020).

Beginning in the 1980s, the CCP discarded the old narrative, which mainly focused on the purported Nationalist betrayal of the United Front. Instead, the new narrative gave a more positive evaluation of the Nationalists’ contribution in the war. This narrative no longer emphasized the ideological and political conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists, but it redefined the Nationalists as an indispensable force in the resistance that had made sacrifices for national liberation. Some Nationalist figures were rehabilitated, including Chiang Kai-shek and many generals who had been discredited by the CCP during the Mao years (Coble 2007, 402; Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 120). Textbooks published in the late 1980s for the first time included the Nationalists-led military campaigns against Japan. New war films also portrayed the Nationalists in a more positive light (He 2007, 57). Museums exhibited photographs and historical relics of former Nationalist generals and soldiers. One major reason for the change in narrative can be attributed to the PRC’s policy on Taiwan since the 1980s. Beijing adopted a conciliatory strategy to lure Taiwan into an agreement of reunification with the PRC. The Nationalists, then the ruling party in Taiwan, were regarded as an ally rather than a foe for Beijing as Taiwan emerged as a multiparty democracy. The reunification with Taiwan had now become a question of national pride. This strategy also aimed to forge a shared historical consciousness between mainland China and Taiwan and to counter the tendency among Taiwanese nationalists towards disconnecting Taiwan’s history and culture from that of the Chinese mainland.

The change in the PRC’s remembering of the Nationalists is also evident in the representation of the Nationalists in museums. In general, the exhibitions in public museums pay only limited attention to the role of Nationalists in the war. One of the few public museums in the PRC that acknowledge the Nationalists is the Museum of War of Resistance against Japan in Beijing. The hall of the museum acknowledges the role played by the Nationalists in the key battlefields of Taierzhuang, Taiyuan and Wuhan. Zhang Zizhong, Li Zongren and other lesser-known Nationalist generals are commended, and the Nationalists are praised for their participation in Burma. There is also a large Nationalist flag in one of the main halls right next to the picture of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 120). A museum dedicated specifically to the Nationalists’ war effort is one of the many museums included in the private Jianchuan Museum Cluster. It is located in a historic small town on the outskirts of Chengdu, in southwestern China. Among its thirty individual museums dedicated to a particular theme, the “Frontal Battlefield Hall” is built to honor the legacy of the Nationalists. However, this hall is overshadowed by the “Mainstay Hall,” which is built specifically for honoring the Communists’ war efforts. The space of the “Frontal Battlefield Hall” is only half of the “Mainstay Hall.” The latter has a much richer variety of exhibits than the former, housing historical photographs, documents, and materials in the war.

Memories of Japan’s role in the war have gone through a process of partial oblivion to resurrection in the PRC. In the Mao era, the state discouraged memories of the war and Japanese war atrocities in general. Instead, the CCP constructed a heroic narrative of the war in which revolutionary martyrs and the victory of the revolution were worshipped. Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre were rarely mentioned in popular publications such as textbooks and newspapers. Even Mao’s writings and speeches made no specific reference to the Nanjing Massacre (Seo 2008, 382). The government also discouraged serious investigation into it. In 1962, historians at Nanjing University completed a manuscript on the Nanjing Massacre, which put together photographs, statistics, and interviews with survivors. The Chinese authorities immediately classified the manuscript instead of allowing it to be published (Eykholt 2000, 25). It was not until 1979 that the authorities released the manuscript as an internal document that was circulated, but only among a small number of high-level government officials (Li and Huang 2017, 15). Yang holds a different view that the Nanjing Massacre was widely presented in such platforms as memoirs and museums in the Mao era (2018). While the Chinese government did not completely erase the Nanjing Massacre from public memory in the Mao era, it is true that they avoided explicitly exposing Japanese atrocities in public. There were hardly any published records of memoirs about the Nanjing Massacre during this period and the government did not build any museum to commemorate the victims of the Nanjing Massacre either. Further, it remains unclear whether the Nanjing Massacre was widely remembered in the private sphere. This is because many survivors of the Nanjing Massacre were killed by the persecution in the Mao era, and their cemeteries were demolished. It is plausible that in the first three decades of the Communist rule, the Nanjing Massacre was largely neglected, if not forgotten, in public memory.

In the Mao era, the PRC policy towards Japan was designed to shelve the question of Japan’s aggression. In the 1950s, the PRC was working to counteract the threat of the American containment policy against the Communist government in mainland China and its support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Beijing implemented “people’s diplomacy” towards Japan, a semi-official diplomatic campaign which was aimed to change Tokyo’s non-recognition of Beijing and undercut its security alliance with Washington (He 2007, 47). Towards the end of the 1960s, the PRC began to cooperate with Japan as part of Mao’s strategy to confront the Soviet Union (Reilly 2011, 469). Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, Beijing avoided historical disputes and reached a compromise with Tokyo over the issue of Japanese war responsibility-at least temporarily.

During this period, it appears that the Chinese government was reluctant to confront Japan with the question of Japanese war responsibility. Discourses of war memory drew a clear line between “a handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary “Japanese people.” School textbooks never denounced Japan and the Japanese people, but instead used the terms “Japanese imperialism” or “Japanese militarism” to refer to the bearer of Japan’s war responsibility in an attempt to develop a favorable impression of the PRC in Japan (He 2007, 47). To be sure, the differentiation between “good” Japanese and “bad” Japanese is a diplomatic tactic used by Beijing to facilitate the normalization of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan. It also corresponds to Mao’s lines of class struggle which denounced Japanese militarists as a class enemy and sympathized with ordinary Japanese and their status as victims of their government’s misguided imperialist ventures.

It was only the emergence of historical revisionism in 1980s Japan that triggered a change in the PRC’s policy. When the Japanese textbook controversy erupted in 1982 and again in 1986, Beijing condemned what they perceived as the revival of militarist tendencies among Japanese leaders, and pressed Tokyo to correct the historical interpretations of textbooks in question. The official visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, 1996 and 2001 also triggered vehement criticism from Beijing (Saito 2016, 62-67). From the 1980s on, Beijing contended with Tokyo over Japan’s approach to the commemoration of the war. Beijing’s confrontational approach to historical issues with Japan is clearly a departure from the conciliatory policy that the Chinese government pursued in the Mao era.

The PRC’s collective remembering of Japan’s role in the war fully revived in the post-Mao era. In the 1980s, the Chinese government lifted the restrictions on the memories of Japanese war atrocities. Debates over Japan’s war atrocities began to appear in academic research, in general publications and in popular culture. Many academic works on Japan’s aggression in wartime China were published to expose Japanese brutality in the war. Research on the Nanjing Massacre, in particular, has developed rapidly with generous government sponsorship. In 1984, a large-scale investigation of survivors and witnesses of the Nanjing Massacre was conducted for the first time, and several research institutes were set up in Nanjing to advance this research. A research institute was established in 2011 in Shanghai to investigate the Tokyo Trial and Japanese war crimes. Numerous books intended for the general readership have also been released to promote the memory of the Nanjing Massacre, including translations of works by the American journalist Iris Chang, Japanese historian Kasahara Tokushi, a leading authority of the Sino-Japanese War, and German businessman John Rabe, a witness of the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese veterans’ trips to China for confession have been frequently covered in Chinese television. The rejuvenation of remembering Japan’s role in the war in Chinese academia and mass media indicates the end of the class struggle-oriented policy adopted by the CCP during the Mao period. The CCP now no longer favors a class-based memory of the war that distinguishes between the Japanese people and the Japanese imperialists, but instead promotes a way of remembering Japanese war responsibility that transcends class boundaries. In other words, this new form of war memory assumes the unity of Japanese nation along national lines and transfers Japan’s war responsibility from the Japanese imperialists to the entire Japanese people.

 

Memoirs and Oral Histories of Veterans

The memoirs and oral accounts of Chinese veterans are private memories that describe the cruelty of the war and the human experiences in the war. This alternative form of memory is markedly different from the official war memory, which tends to emphasize heroism and nationalism and to neglect the personal experiences of ordinary people as well as their attitudes towards the Chinese wartime regime. While the discourse of veterans’ memoirs retains nationalist elements that emphasize collective sacrifice for national salvation in the war, it records some voices of family relationships and human affection. These narratives deviate from those of the official war memory, but they should not be viewed as a marginalized form of alternative memory that fundamentally challenges the official state discourse of war memory. It is true that these alternative narratives contradict the monolithic images of war portrayed in official memory discourses, but they are mostly products of state sponsorship that supports the official view of the war. Therefore, the accounts of memoirs and oral histories of veterans are essentially a variation or adjustment of the official war memory, which do not necessarily constitute counter memory that is produced to resist the official state discourse of war memory. In this sense, these private memories of the war are unreliable representations of war experience. They neither honestly reflect how veterans remember the war now nor truthfully record what happened on the battlefield in the war years.

Memoirs of veterans were absent in the PRC’s public sphere until the early 1980s. The lack of veterans’ memoirs in the early period of the Communist rule can be attributed to state repression. Since the victory of the Communist revolution in 1949, veterans, especially those who previously fought with the Nationalists, were not motivated to have their memoirs published because they were ostracized by the state. In the 1950s, the CCP launched nationwide campaigns to eliminate Nationalist veterans from public life, labeling many of them “rightists,” “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of people.” As a result, veterans suffered from persecution, discrimination, and contempt. Many of them were humiliated and tortured to death, or committed suicide (Diamant 2001, 162-163; Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 127-130 and 133-134). The veterans were in extremely difficult political circumstances, so it was highly unlikely for them to publish what they had been through in the war years.

After the death of Mao in 1976, the CCP gradually permitted state agencies to record the wartime experiences of veterans. Many institutions began to invest resources to collect testimonies of veterans. In the 1980s, compiling war testimonies of veterans was not an endeavor of national coordination, but mainly the work organized by local officials. Most compilations focused on the provincial or municipal experience of the war, so testimonies reflected more of a localized remembering of the war (Moore 2011, 411-412). In recent years, the CCP has emphasized the importance of unifying national identity and has come to regard the war as a historical turning point shifting the trajectory from national humiliation to national rejuvenation. Veterans’ testimony of the war would help build a common national narrative and help shape a shared national identity. Since 2015, the Chinese government has funded various government projects to collect and publish the testimonies of veterans. Thus far, the National Office of Social Sciences under the Ministry of Propaganda has funded numerous research projects of this sort, including an extensive project on the oral history of veterans, which was approved in 2016 and is expected to be completed in 2025. This project involves a wide range of government agencies, including the Historical Research Center of the Central Committee of the CCP, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, and the National Archives. Various propaganda departments and the history offices of the CCP in central and local governments also support these investigations.

Meanwhile, academic and cultural institutions across the country have put the collection of the oral testimonies of veterans on their research agenda. In 2015, a scholar from Nanjing Normal University launched a project that records veterans’ oral histories of the war. Two other similar projects were also launched in 2015 and 2018. These projects include forms of social engagement as part of their research agenda. The Nanjing Civil Anti-Japanese War Museum in collaboration with the research projects sponsored public participation through a series of workshops organized to teach the public how to collect oral histories (Li 2020, 33). Many students have been recruited as volunteers from universities across the country to interview veterans. This is not to say, however, that the voices of veterans are accurately reflected in the recorded findings of these projects. The state still closely monitors the research process, from selecting which veterans to interview to what interviewees are supposed to say for these projects (Li 2020, 33).

The state-sponsored oral history projects of veterans have also facilitated the publication of war memoirs. Since the 2000s, many former servicemen have published their war experiences. These works range from personal accounts of generals and soldiers to recollections of specific battles (Bai 2013; Fang 2013; Wen 2005; You 2011; Zhu 2010). There are also some works which record the experiences of veterans in specific provincial areas, such as Shanxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, and the northeastern provinces (Fang 2012; Hu nan tu shu guan 2013; Li 2012; Zhang 2005). It is worth noting that many of these works are written not by the veterans, but rather by members of the oral history projects on the behalf of veterans. While the Chinese government has lifted the ban on the publication of war memoirs, the narrative of memoirs is still subject to tight government censorship. Censors do not allow veterans to portray the war as they experienced it, but instead require them to toe the official line, which construes the war as a heroic struggle against Japanese imperialism. As a private form of war memory, however, the narratives in the memoirs of veterans inevitably clash with official historical narratives. Some memoirs lack accounts of the “heroism” of the Communists and the “cowardice” of the Nationalists which are often described in official war memories, and even express sympathy for the Nationalists (Moore 2011, 412). Such narratives have often been extensively edited or even excised altogether by the publisher. The censored memoirs tend to avoid descriptions of the effects of war on people, as well as expressions of veterans’ grief of personal loss and deprivation during the war. Thus, while the memoirs reflect to some extent the war experiences of the veterans, they are by no means genuine accounts that truthfully record how veterans remember the war, and even less so how they experienced the war.

In addition to the government efforts, the sense of urgency of the public to record and preserve wartime experiences resulted in an oral history documentary film project titled My War of Resistance (wode kangzhan) in the early 2010s, a period when some limited space became available for mild critical views of the official war memory to appear in Chinese media. The documentary was produced by Cui Yongyuan, a popular host who had worked for national television. My War of Resistance documents personal stories of many individuals during the period from 1931 to 1945. The project constitutes an enormous investment of time and energy. Cui Yongyuan spent eight years and more than 130 million yuan to produce the documentary. In the eight years since 2002, Cui interviewed more than 3,500 people with direct war experiences, including 400 Nationalist and Communist veterans (Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 124). The documentary has two seasons with a total of sixty-two episodes. The first season (thirty-two episodes) was screened on the Internet first, which allowed it to attract widespread attention. Then it was broadcast simultaneously on eighty-five TV stations across the country. The second season (thirty episodes) was released in 2011. Each episode has a thematic focus and lasts about thirty minutes.

My War of Resistance attempts to reproduce the overall situation of the Second Sino-Japanese War for the audience. The unique feature of the documentary is that it records the experiences of “little men,” or the ordinary individuals in the war. It tells the stories of different social groups such as veterans, civilians, and Chinese local collaborators who worked for the Japanese military in Japanese occupied zones. The focus of the documentary is the stories of Nationalist veterans, most of whom were soldiers and low-level officials. The documentary covers the daily life of Nationalist veterans in the war, including their love stories and suffering on the battlefield. The documentary reveals the veterans as unhappy men when they recount their painful experiences. In contrast to the heroic narratives of the official war memories, veterans’ memories of the war experience in My War of Resistance are invariably imbued with feelings of helplessness, frustration, and anguish.

 

Conclusion

Memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the PRC is an endeavor of myth-making. The main components of the myth are ways of remembering the Communists, the Nationalists and Japan. The Communists are the backbone force of anti-Japanese resistance; Japan represents evil; and the role of the Nationalists has gradually changed from evil to positive, but still subordinate to the CCP. The myth-making of the war is particularly evident in recent years when the PRC redefined the nature of the war by extending its time frame from eight years to fourteen years in school textbooks. The PRC’s war memory is a mix of narratives of resistance, victim, and victor. In the Mao era, the victor narrative dominated war memory. Narratives of resistance and victimhood gradually developed in the post-Mao era. The resistance narrative is constructed to cultivate a sense of national belonging and establish national identity. The victor narrative is essentially a revolutionary narrative of class struggle which often appears in official speeches at commemorative events. The victim narrative often appears in popular culture, newspapers, academic publications, and discussions in intellectual circles. It promotes a way of remembering Chinese suffering from the Japanese war atrocities in the war. The victor narrative is based on class struggle, while the resistance and victim narratives are based on nationalism. The PRC strictly controls the remembering and commemoration of the war, and the articulation of the war memory through media and institutions closely follows political conditions. In the Mao era, the state implemented a policy of amnesia about the war, which discouraged collective remembering of Japanese atrocities. The state banned the publication of research on this subject and silenced many veterans through political persecution. Since the 1980s, the ban has been lifted to a certain extent, but the narratives of war memory still largely conform to the official line of the CCP.

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Mo Tian is a lecturer of Japanese studies at Anshan Normal University, specializing in Sino-Japanese relations. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the Australian National University.

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Liang, Zhu. 2005. “Zhong guo gong chan dang shi quan min zu kang zhan de zhong liu di zhu,” [The Chinese Communist Party is the Bulwark in the National War of Resistance]. Sixiang lilun jiaoyu daokan 8: 37-43.

Mitter, Rana. 2000. The Manchurian Myth: Nationalism, Resistance, and Collaboration in Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Mitter, Rana. 2020. China’s Good War: How World War II is Shaping a New Nationalism. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Moore, Aaron William. 2011. “The Problem of Changing Language Communities Veterans and Memory Writing in China, Taiwan, and Japan.” In Modern Asian Studies 45 (2), China in World War II, 1937-1945: Experience, Memory, and Legacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 399-429.

Moore, Aaron William. 2013. Writing War: Soldiers Record the Japanese Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Reilly, James. 2011. “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan.” Modern Asian Studies 45 (2): 463-490.

Ren min ri bao. 1987. “Kang zhan sheng li shi zhong hua min zu tuan jie zhan dou de sheng li” [The Victory of the Anti-Japanese War is the Victory of the Unity and Struggle of the Chinese Nation]. Ren min ri bao, 7 July, p.1.

Saito, Hiro. 2016. The History Problem: The Politics of War Commemoration in East Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.

Seo, Jungmin. 2008. “Politics of Memory in Korea and China: Remembering the Comfort Women and the Nanjing Massacre.” New Political Science 30 (3): 369-392.

Tsui, Ignacio. 2020. Li yu ying feng: Guo jun kang zhan ji nian bei kao [Monuments of the Forgotten Soldiers of Nationalist Armed Forces for the Anti-Japanese War]. Taipei: Li ming chu ban.

Van de Ven, Hans. 2003. War and Nationalism in China, 1925-1945. London: Routledge.

Wang, Wenxie. 2020. Zhong guo kang ri zhan zheng zhen xiang [The Truth of China’s Anti-Japanese War]. Taipei: Zhong hua zhan lyue xue hui.

Wang, Wenyue. 2016. “Xin shi ji yi lai ‘ren min ri bao’ dui kang ri zhan zheng de mei jie zai xian yan jiu (2000-2015)” [A Study of the Media Representation of Anti-Japanese War in the People’s Daily in the New Century (2000-2015)]. Master’s thesis, Hubei University.

Wang, Zheng. 2012. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press.

Wang, Zheng. 2015. “The Legacy of Historical Memory and China’s Foreign Policy in the 2010s.” In Gilbert Rozman (ed.) Misunderstanding Asia: International Relations Theory and Asian Studies over Half a Century. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 227-239.

Weatherley, Robert, and Zhang, Qiang. 2017. History and National Legitimacy in Contemporary China: A Double-Edged Sword. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wen, Wen (ed.). 2005. Yuan guo min dang jiang ling kou shu kang zhan hui yi lu [A Memoir of the Narration of Anti-Japanese War by Former Kuomintang Generals]. Beijing: Zhong guo wen shi chu ban she.

Yang, Chan. 2018. World War Two Legacies in East Asia: China Remembers the War. London: Routledge.

Yick, Joseph. 2001. “Communist Puppet Collaboration in Japanese Occupied China: Pan Hannian and Li Shiqun, 1939-1949.” Intelligence and National Security 16 (4): 61-88.

You, Guangcai. 2011. Xue jian: Yi ge yuan zheng jun lao bing de hui yi lu [The Memoir of a Veteran in the Expeditionary Army of Anti-Japanese War]. Beijing: Tuan jie chu ban she.

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Zhao, Ena. 2017. “Zhong xiao xue jiao cai jiang luo shi ‘shi si nian kang zhan’ gai nian” [Elementary and High School Textbooks will Implement the Concept of “Fourteen-Year War of Resistance”]. Ren min ri bao, 11 January, 12.

Zhu, Xichun. 2010. Ye ren shan zhuan zhan ji [The Legend of the Savage Mountain]. Beijing: Xin shi jie chu ban she.

Notes

Various short-lived regimes existed as collaborators in wartime China. The most well-known cases are the Wang Jingwei government which was established in Nanjing in 1940 and collapsed at the end of the war in 1945, and Manchukuo which was a client state set up by the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in 1932 and ended with Japanese surrender in 1945. For a general survey of Chinese collaboration with Japanese, see Barrett and Shyu 2011 and Brook 2005.

Featured image: Japanese landing near Shanghai, November 1937 (Licensed under the public domain)

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Imran Khan, a cricketer-turned politician, former Prime Minister of Pakistan is found openly alleging the US administration for the fall of his elected government. In his interview to numerous national and international TV channels, he claims that his visit to Russia amid the Ukraine crisis in the month of February, 2022 was not fully digested by the US administration. On the other hand, he was found getting closer to China, an arch enemy of the USA. Liu Zongyi, secretary-general of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at the SIIS, also believes the West, and particularly the US, doesn’t want to see Khan remain in power since he has gotten tougher on them.

Imran Khan debunks allegations of corruption by the ruling coalition partners against him and his party men. Imran Khan claims that his government was receiving a good amount of foreign remittances, collected taxes and necessary reforms were instituted to uplift the poor people from poverty. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan`s economy under the leadership of Imran Khan was moving in the right direction. Imran Khan also told the media that under his Government export reached a historic high of 25.3 billion. Imran Khan also claims that he tried hard to repair bilateral relations with India minus the Kashmir issue. Despite all this, the US administration hatched a conspiracy and toppled his elected Government and handed over the reins of the Government to the current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Imran Khan`s ouster through no-confidence motion is, no doubt, a black spot on the political career of Imran Khan.  Since the fall of the Government, Imran Khan is clamoring for early National Assembly elections which are valid till next August (2023). Can Imran Khan win National Assembly elections with a thumping majority? Will the US administration allow the current Government under dynastic Shehbaz Sharif to continue? These questions are circulating in Pakistan as well as in other parts of the world.

At the domestic level, Imran Khan along with his party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) workers, sympathizers and supporters is seen mobilizing the masses against corrupt political dynasties through rallies and public speeches. People are coming to his rallies en masse and listening to him attentively assuring him that they will vote for him and his party. The current government is advancing its vicious agenda against Imran Khan`s domestic and international policies which are responsible for the worst condition of Pakistan. The current Government with the help of pro-government media houses are found flashing these points and trying hard to build anti- Imran Khan Propaganda. It is also a fact that Pakistan’s economy is suffocating and inflation is running high at 10%.

At the international level, Khan is seen coaxing Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other like-minded Middle East countries to support him in winning back Pakistan. As of today, Russia is busy winning Ukraine. The Russia- Ukraine war is prolonging as the West is assisting the Ukraine President by supplying modern weaponry and financial assistance so in such a situation, Russia`s priorities would be different than helping Imran Khan to occupy the seat of power in Pakistan.

China – Pakistan are tied up with the progress of USD 60 billion China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Newly appointed foreign minister of Pakistan – Bilawal Bhutto Zardari made a maiden visit to China in May 2022 and discussed economic coordination, industrialization and speeding up of the USD 60 billion CPEC. Nevertheless, the US administration under various US Presidents are against the CPEC. The reality is that the CPEC would remain  a stumbling block between the new government under Shehbaz Sharif  and the US administration under US President Joe Biden. So in such a situation when the US administration is against the CPEC, China would not be that helpful to Imran Khan in winning back the seat of power. The countries in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia might transfer their loyalty to the Sharif family as the former Prime Minister of Pakistan and his brother Nawaz Sharif still enjoys cordial relations with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries. So in such a situation Imran Khan might not get full political, financial support as it is expected. Above that, the US administration is so powerful as to put political pressure on the monarchies of the Middle East and would try hard to weaken personal relations of Imran Khan with the top leadership of the Middle East countries.

The current Government in Pakistan is run by a dozen multi-party coalition which are ideologically diverse. Imran Khan believes that this partnership is weak and surely breaks up sooner or later.  It is his  illusion. This is not going to happen. Money, power binds the enemies together. Imran Khan would not be able to bring back defectors to his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party as they are given assurances by the current government of plum posts. Another weak point with Imran Khan is that his relations with the powerful army of Pakistan have worsened and there is no chance that Imran Khan would ever become the darling of the Pakistan Army.  The friendship between the US administration and Imran Khan is broken now and US President Joe Biden thinks that he is no longer useful to the national interests of the USA. The CIA of the USA might pump funds to undermine the credibility of Imran Khan among the voters of Pakistan and influence the election . Therefore, Imran Khan and his party would not be able to win national assembly elections and form the next government. Possibly, Imran Khan might face consequences at the hands of the Pakistan Army. Imran Khan might be sent to prison sooner or later.

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Dr. Rahul Kumar, Ph.D. in Sociology from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi (India), is an independent researcher. His area of interest encompasses diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. The views expressed in this article are personal. 

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As one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, Indonesia has pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

However, rising living standards, population growth and massive electrification will increase Indonesia’s electricity demand 30-fold, to 9,000 Terawatt-hours (TWh) per year. This rapid increase in electricity consumption raises concerns about energy security and affordability, and environmental sustainability.

Our previous study shows the country could meet its energy needs by relying on its abundant solar energy. By installing billions of solar panels Indonesia could harvest about 190,000 TWh of solar energy per year. This amount of energy is larger than world’s electricity consumption in 2020.

However, relying on solar energy means Indonesia must be able to deal with the risk of shortage because the sun doesn’t shine all the time. To balance a solar-dominated electricity system overnight and during rainy periods, Indonesia will need large amounts of energy storage.

Fortunately, Indonesia has a nature-based solution to this problem: the country can use its enormous potential for off-river pumped hydro energy storage (PHES).

PHES is a technique to store energy by using excess power produced from solar panels during sunny days to pump water uphill to a higher reservoir. When power generation is low during cloudy weather or at night, electricity can then be dispatched on demand from PHES by releasing the stored water downhill to the lower reservoir through the turbine.

In our latest study, we have identified that excellent sites for PHES reservoirs are available all over the country, including the heavily populated islands of Java, Bali and Sumatra.

Off-river PHES for energy balancing

To develop an off-river PHES, we need two closely spaced lakes or reservoirs of about one square kilometres each that have an altitude difference of about 600 metres. They are connected by a tunnel containing a pump-turbine.

Pumped hydro energy storage in pumping mode. Image from pumpedhydro.com.au

Pumped hydro energy storage in generating mode. Image from pumpedhydro.com.au

Unlike conventional (river-based) PHES, we don’t need to build dams on rivers because the water flows through tunnels connecting two reservoirs. We can also use old mining sites, as well as existing lakes and reservoirs. This means off-river PHES systems can have low environmental and social impacts.

Two types of pumped-storage hydropower: river-based (left) and off-river (right). Image from NREL

The area of land required for an off-river PHES is also relatively small. A typical 150 gigawatt-hour (GWh) off-river pumped hydro requires about 8 hectares of land per GWh. In comparison, the river-based Upper Cisokan PHES project in West Java with 7 GWh of storage requires a flooded area of 340ha (50ha per GWh).

With a lifespan of 50-100 years, off-river PHES systems also could reduce our dependency on conventional batteries, which typically have a storage lifetime of 10-15 years. Batteries also contain materials that are in short supply such as lithium and cobalt.

How large is the potential?

Indonesia has 26,000 potential pumped hydro sites, which is far more than needed. We narrowed it down by choosing the best possible resources all over the country with the highest storage quality and the lowest cost with potential of 321 TWh.

Eastern Indonesian regions (Sulawesi, Maluku Papua, and Kalimantan) have the most potential, with low storage requirements. This contrasts with the western Indonesia region (Java and Sumatra), which is expected to have substantial future storage demands.

The following figure illustrates the size of best PHES potential in each Indonesian region compared with the requirements in 2060 for an affluent, decarbonised Indonesia.

Regional off-river PHES potential in Indonesia. Green and red circles represent PHES potential and required storage respectively.

In our future work, we will examine whether Indonesia needs to build strong electricity transmission links from east to west for a low-cost power grid or whether the system is better operated independently in each region.

Off-river PHES is affordable

Pumped hydro storage is by far the cheapest way of storing solar energy overnight, and has by far the largest share of the global energy storage market.

In our recent paper, we modelled a hypothetical 150 GWh site in Wonosobo Regency in Central Java with power capacity of 7.5 gigawatts – which is a large storage system. This system could run at full generating power for 20 hours. The site has a height difference between the reservoirs of 741 metres, a tunnel length of 4km and requires 4ha of flooded land per GWh.

We estimated a capital cost of US$9.4 billion to develop this site, including the cost of the initial water filling and land acquisition. For comparison, a Tesla utility-scale battery pack will require a capital cost of US$60 billion for the same capacity (150 GWh) – US$1.2 million per 3 MWh.

Hypothetical 150GWh PHES site in Wonosobo Regency, Central Java. Image from Australian National University Global Pumped Hydro Atlas

By knowing Indonesia’s off-river PHES potential, the government could plan to develop very large-scale solar generation with confidence. Thus, an energy transition towards carbon neutrality is a realistic target to achieve.

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Phd Candidate, School of Engineering, Australian National University.

Professor of Engineering, Australian National University.

Featured image: Menjer lake in Wonosobo, Central Java. (Anis Efizudin/Antara)

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China is preparing to launch the country’s third aircraft carrier, called the Type 003, amid increasing fears of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Last week, the Maritime Safety Administration announced a notice requesting that berths at the Jiangnan Shipyard on Changxing Island, where Type 003 has been under construction since 2017, be cleared, according to South China Morning Post (SCMP).

SCMP spoke with Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese Naval Academy, who said the launch would end dry dock work and then begin tests and equipment installations for sea trials.

A military insider suggested the launch of the new aircraft carrier could be seen as soon as this Friday, coinciding with Dragon Boat Festival

“The aircraft carrier needs to go into sea trials as soon as possible – it may take several years to achieve initial operational capability,” said the insider.

Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie explained that “time is precious” for Type 003, adding, “the installation of all of the weapon systems and the activation of its propulsion system will only start after the hull is proven to have no leaks once it goes into the water.”

Type 003 was supposed to be launched last month to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the Chinese Navy, but the event was postponed due to the widespread outbreak of COVID in Shanghai.

At 320 meters long, the new carrier will be outfitted with a high-tech electromagnetic catapult system, launching China’s stealth fighters with heavier weapon loads and more fuel. Here’s how the new aircraft carrier compares with others:

Sea trials and installation of equipment could take at least two years. The Pentagon doesn’t expect the carrier to become operational until 2024.

China is modernizing and expanding its maritime capabilities for dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and, more specifically, in the Taiwan Strait.

News of Type 003 about to launch comes as Beijing sent a massive group of fighters into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone on Monday.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Command recently denounced “collusion” between Taiwan and the US after President Biden pledged the West would defend Taiwan if under attack by Chinese forces; however, the White House was quick to follow by saying there’s been no change in the One China policy or its approach of “strategic ambiguity.”

And now, there will be three Chinese aircraft carriers the West and allies have to worry about. There are plans for a fourth carrier that could be nuclear-powered. This is an attempt by Beijing to project power and dominate the Indo-Pacific region as Thucydides Trap between China and the US inches closer.

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When Peter Dutton confirmed his candidacy for the leadership of the Liberal Party the public relations campaign to “soften” his image went into overdrive.

The so-called “hard man” says he is keen to show the public “the rest of my character, the side my family, friends and colleagues see”.

As traditional Liberal voters turn away from the party, Dutton wants us to know what he believes in. “We aren’t the Moderate party. We aren’t the Conservative party. We are Liberals. We are the Liberal party. We believe in families – whatever their composition”, he said.

Dutton’s leadership of the Liberal Party is a concern given his demonstrated commitment to eroding democratic principles including: the separation of powers; basic civil rights such as privacy; personal freedom and free speech; government transparency and accountability; as well as suppressing dissent and prosecuting state crime and corruption.

It would require a thesis to adequately detail the dozens of pieces of rights-eroding laws and hundreds of amendments to existing laws championed by Dutton in his various portfolios as minister for immigration, home affairs and defence.

Below is a thumbnail sketch of the slippery slope into authoritarianism, in which Dutton has played an instrumental part.

Building the surveillance state

Supporters of civil liberties, such as Edward Snowden, sometimes use the phrase “without privacy, there is no freedom” when discussing the proliferation of state surveillance in modern societies.

The ability to freely communicate without arbitrary monitoring and a fear of prosecution is essential to a healthy democracy.

However, supporters of privacy-eroding laws, under the guise of protection against perceived and, often exaggerated, threats will often use phrases such as “you have nothing to fear if you have nothing to hide”.

The “need” to protect us against terrorists has been used to justify many laws which have turned Australia into one which has the most pervasive surveillance laws of any Western democracy.

When Snowden exposed the United States National Security Agency’s illegal surveillance of its own citizens, the Coalition government passed many draconian laws giving the state and its agents more powers. Dutton played an integral role in their formulation, advocacy and passage into law.

Without a national bill or charter of rights there has been little to stand in the way of these laws being enacted.

These laws include:

1. Compelling internet service providers to store user data and hand it over on request.

The meta-data retention laws, passed in 2015, were marketed as necessary to protect against the threat of terrorism.

They require internet and phone service providers (ISPs) to store your personal data for two years and make it available to a range of law enforcement agencies without those agencies having to obtain a warrant.

Similar laws were proposed, but rejected, in Britain due to their arbitrary and pervasive nature. They have not been enacted in any other Western country.

You don’t have to be suspected of an offence for authorities to access and monitor at least two years of a range of your personal data.

Meta-data includes: telephone records; the time and length of phone calls; the internet protocol addresses (IP addresses) of computers from which messages are received or sent; location of parties making phone calls; to and from email addresses on emails; logs of visitors to chat rooms online; status of chat sites — whether they are active and how many people are participating; chat aliases or identifiers (the name a person uses in a chat room online); start and finish times of internet sessions; the location of an individual involved in communications, and the name of the application someone uses online and when, where and for how long used.

Meta data does not encompass the actual content of communications and ISPs have made it clear that filtering content, such as text in SMS transmissions, and emails for such a large number of users would be a mammoth and potentially impossible task.

The concern is that all of a user’s requested data would be provided to authorities and there is currently no information regarding whether or not this is happening.

There is no evidence to date that the laws have proven to be an effective mechanism against terrorists. There is, however, evidence that the laws are being used by a range of agencies not involved in the detection or prosecution of terrorism; agencies that can apply under the laws to access the personal data.

It was revealed that in 2018 more than 60 government agencies applied to the Attorney-General for metadata access. The list included the Australian Taxation Office, Department of Human Services and even local councils. Bankstown Council applied for metadata access in an attempt to catch illegal rubbish dumpers and those who breach by-laws. That access was granted.

The Queensland Police Service used the scheme to access the metadata of cadets in an attempt to determine whether they were sleeping with one another, or faking sick days.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has used meta-data laws to access information given to journalists and even doctors  to identify their sources — whistleblowers who expose crime and misconduct within government agencies.

Indeed, the AFP admitted in 2019 to accessing the meta-data of 20,000 people over the previous 12 months — without having to inform its targets, let alone justify its conduct.

2. Compelling technology companies to provide encryption keys to access user data

In another unprecedented move, Dutton championed laws enacted in 2017 which compel technology companies, such as Facebook, Google and Apple, to surrender their encryption keys to the accounts of Australian individuals and organisations upon service of a warrant and to even alter, or delete, the information.

The laws were passed with little public scrutiny, and have since been used to access the accounts of not only individuals, but news organisations.

The laws were condemned here as well as overseas, with ABC News executive editor John Lyons tweeting during the 2019 raids of its Sydney office: “I’m still staggered by the power of this warrant. It allows the AFP to ‘copy, delete or alter’ material in the ABC’s computers. All Australians, please think about that: as of this moment, the AFP has the power to delete material in the ABC’s computers. Australia 2019.”

A group of United Nations special rapporteurs expressed concern the law would “disproportionately chill the work of media outlets and journalists by exposing human rights campaigners, activists and academics to criminal charges and, in doing do, contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.

3. Increased search, seizure, detention and compelled disclosure powers at the border

Dutton played a pivotal role in the enactment of the Australian Border Force Act in 2015, which gave officers of the Australian Border Force (ABF) frighteningly broad and indeterminate powers “to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of his or her duties”. This includes broadened powers to search and detain travellers and to seize their personal items.

Dutton oversaw amendments in 2018 which made it a crime, punishable by up to five years in prison, for such persons to decline to provide passwords to their smartphones, computers or other electronic devices – enabling access to all the private information.

That same year, Australia made headlines when dual British and Australian citizen, 46-year software developer Nathan Hague, was detained for 90 minutes and had his devices seized at Sydney Airport, without being given a reason.

The devices were returned weeks later without further action being taken against him. Authorities refused to provide information about whether the digital data was copied and stored as the legislation permits.

An incensed Hague told the media at the time: “I have nothing to hide, but I value my privacy”.

4. Accessing overseas data

Home Affairs Minister Dutton in 2020 ensured the enactment of laws to empower the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to access the data of Australians stored overseas while, at the same time, allowing other members of the Five Eyes Alliance to have access to that data.

The laws established a regime of international production orders, which allow agents to directly require foreign designated communication providers to hand over stored communications and data, and even enable direct wiretapping.

According to Civil Liberties Australia CEO Bill Rowlings: “We’ve had nearly 20 years of draconian laws — many totally over the top – and most absolutely slashing personal privacy … Dutton and the henchmen have all the laws they need already. This is overkill … Without a federal charter of rights, there has been nothing protecting the basic rights of individual Australians.”

That’s the overriding problem: Australia is the only Western democracy without a national bill or charter of rights that could obstruct such intrusive invasions of privacy.

5. Identify and disrupt – power to hack accounts and delete, add or alter data

Described as “the nail in the coffin of democracy”, so-called “identify and disrupt” laws enacted last December 3 are perhaps Dutton’s pièce de résistance in terms of surveillance legislation.

The laws give the AFP and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission the power to collect intelligence online, including over the dark web, disrupt online activity by manipulating data and even to take over a person’s online account – locking them out of it –to “gather evidence”.

Again, this is unprecedented in the West. Authorities can now legally hack and enter accounts and essentially do whatever they please with the data contained therein — including delete, add or alter content.

The potential implications are frightening.

Rowlings said: “The new laws allow faceless federal agents to ‘target and destroy’ people, under what is officially called the Identify and Disrupt Bill. This awful law multiplies tenfold the powers and reach of government intrusion. Police have such an appalling record throughout Australia of planting evidence and wrongly locking up people for years and decades. Why wouldn’t they plant more ‘evidence’ to suit themselves now they are permitted to do that officially?”

Slippery slide into authoritarianism

These are just five of many surveillance laws overseen by the Liberal Party’s new leader.

The rapid degeneration into such a pervasive regime of surveillance — often under the threat of criminal sanctions — would have been the envy of past dictators.

It could not have been foreseen by authors such as George Orwell. Indeed, the “Thought Police” in Orwell’s iconic novel 1984, published in 1949, would have relished the ability to arbitrarily monitor and intercept information transmitted through and recorded on devices as integral to our daily lives as mobile phones and computers have become.

As Rowlings said: “The police and spooks of Australia now have more powers and can reach further inside people’s lives and minds than the notorious Stasi of East Germany ever could.”

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Ugur Nedim is a partner of Sydney Criminal Lawyers where a longer version of this article first appeared.

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Pakistan, a nuclear power with at least 165 warheads from short range to medium range, is facing potential economic collapse according to the country’s Finance Minister, Miftah Ismail.

With an official inflation rate of over 13.37% (double the official CPI to get a more accurate picture of true price inflation), the 2nd fastest rising rate in Asia, Pakistan has sought relief from foreign debt obligations and an IMF bailout deal. Initial arrangements for a three year deal with the IMF began in 2019, but Pakistan says that deal, originally for $6 billion USD, is ‘outdated’ due to the covid pandemic and new global financial pressures. The nation now says it is in ‘dire need’ of at least $36 billion in order to stay afloat.

Pakistan is slated to pay back over $21 billion USD in foreign debt within the next fiscal year. It is also struggling with extensive food inflation and supply chain disruptions as the government seeks to import at least 3 million tons of wheat and 4 million tons of cooking oil to alleviate shortages.

This is yet another example of the spread of global inflation/stagflation that is going largely ignored by western media outlets. Nations like Pakistan with already weakened economic conditions are canaries in the coal mine; leading indicators of what is likely to happen throughout more affluent first world nations should current conditions continue.

With globalist institutions like the UN, the IMF, the BIS, World Bank and the WEF all predicting major food shortages this year, the mainstream media has been noticeably quiet when it comes to nations where the crisis is already bubbling to the surface.

The reason the instability in Pakistan is particularly concerning is because it is one of nine countries in the world (officially) with a nuclear arsenal, not to mention an ongoing border conflict with India which sparked two wars in 1947 and 1965, as well as a limited war in 1999. As economic instability rises so does public discontent and rebellion. By extension, political elites commonly offer war as a “release valve” for public anger and a distraction from financial pain. Otherwise, the potential for widespread civil unrest grows daily.

To be sure, Pakistan is not the only country facing these conditions today, it is one of many. However, unlike many African or South American nations where the effects of inflationary collapse remain mitigated to domestic concerns, a collapse in Pakistan could have international implications.

Beyond the threats associated with sinking economies and regional conflicts, the IMF has become the go-to loan shark, circling struggling nations when it smells blood in the water. As more and more countries face declines associated with inflation/stagflation, it is not conspiratorial to suggest that the IMF greatly benefits. As the world breaks down, more nations become beholden to the IMF debt structure until eventually they are owned lock, stock and barrel by a handful of banking elites.

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***

When it comes to the tawdry, hideous business of politicising the right to asylum, and the refugees who arise from it, no country does it better than Australia.  A country proud of being a pioneer in women’s rights, the secret ballot, good pay conditions and tatty hardware (the Hills Hoist remains a famous suburban monstrosity) has also been responsible for jettisoning key principles of international law.

When it comes to policy Down Under, the United Nations Refugee Convention is barely worth a mention.  Politicians are proudly ignorant of it; the courts pay lip service to the idea while preferring rigid domestic interpretations of the Migration Act; and the United Nations is simply that foreign body which makes an occasional noise about such nasties as indefinite detention.

It should therefore have come as no surprise that, in the dying days of the Morrison government, another chance to stir the electorate by demonising refugees arose – somewhat conveniently.  As voters were, quite literally, heading to the polls, the commander of the Joint Agency Task Force Operation Sovereign Borders, Rear Admiral Justin Jones, revealed that a vessel had “been intercepted in a likely attempt to illegally enter Australia from Sri Lanka.”

The Rear Admiral’s statement insisted that Australian policy on such arrivals had not changed.  “We will intercept any vessel seeking to reach Australia illegally and to safely return those on board to their point of departure or country of origin.” Shallow formalities are observed: the implausible observance of international laws, consideration of safety of all those involved “including potential illegal immigrants”.  Nothing else is deemed worthy of mention.  “In line with long standing practice, we will make no further comment.”

With only a few more hours left being Australia’s most jingoistic Defence Minister in a generation, Peter Dutton tweeted a warning, referring to the statement from Jones: “Don’t risk Australia’s national security with Labor.”  In another comment, Dutton decided to peer into the minds of those aiding the asylum process.  “People smugglers have obviously decided who is going to win the election and the boats have already started.”

The Minister for Home Affairs, Karen Andrews, was also mining the message for its demagogic potential, raising the spectre of emboldened people smugglers.  They, she squeaked, “are targeting Australia.”  The “people smuggling vessel” had been intercepted “off Christmas Island.”

Andrews might as well have been using the same language to condemn drug traffickers and their commodities which, in terms of analogy, Australian politicians have implicitly done for decades. But for the occasion, the obvious target was the opposition vying for government.  “Labor’s flip flopping on border protection risks our border security.  You can’t trust them.”

The Liberal Party’s electioneering machinery picked up on the Sri Lankan connection, bombarding voters in marginal seats with text messages about this newfound discovery.  “Keep our borders secure by voting Liberal today,” came the prompt.  As things transpired, the entire operation, from Cabinet to the distribution of phone messages, had the full approval of Prime Minister Scott Morrison.

Revealing the existence of ships moving on mysteriously convenient schedules (another, according to the Saturday Newspaper, was also intercepted by Sri Lankan authorities) raised two burning questions.  The first goes to the troubling relationship with Sri Lanka, which the Australian government had gone some ways to promoting as a safeguard against asylum seekers.  Canberra has tended to skirt over issues of human rights, not least those associated with that country’s long civil war.  In fact, Australian officials have done their best to encourage Colombo to prevent individuals leaving Sri Lanka with a view of heading to Australia by boat.  In 2013, 2014 and 2017, Bay-class naval vessels were gifted to the Sri Lankan Navy to aid the interception of smuggling operations.

During his time in office, Dutton has made more than the odd trip to Colombo.  In May 2015, he made a visit as then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to discuss “continued cooperation regarding people smuggling and to further strengthen ties between our two countries.”  He duly rubbished people smugglers – they had been “cowardly and malicious” for aiding individuals to pursue their right to asylum – and praised the success of Operation Sovereign Borders.  “Since we started turning back boats there have been no known deaths at sea.”

In June 2019, he paid another visit to shore up the commitment.  It was prompted by a report that a vessel carrying 20 Sri Lankan asylum seekers had been intercepted off Australia’s north-west coast, with the possibility of six others on route.  Then, as now, Dutton could only blame his Labor opponents for somehow encouraging such journeys while reiterating the standard, draconian line.  “People are not coming here [to Australia] by boat and regardless of what people smugglers tell you, the Morrison government, under the Prime Minister and myself, will not allow those people to arrive by boat.”

The second question goes to the supposed success of Operation Sovereign Borders.  This military grade, secretive policy had supposedly “stopped the boats” and remains a favourite Coalition mantra.  But why reveal a chink in the armour, a breach in the fortress unless it was manufactured with the aid of the Sri Lankan authorities or a failure to being with?  As comedian and political commentator Dan Ilic observed in a pointed remark to Dutton: “This happened on your watch dude.”  The Sri Lankan revelation demonstrated, when it comes to such matters, mendacity oils the machine of border protection.

No side in Australian politics has been able to avoid politicising the issue of refugee and asylum arrivals via boat.  The moment Australia’s Labor government made the arrival of individuals without formal authorisation a breach of law warranting mandatory detention, the issue became a political matter.  It took the Liberal National Coalition led by Prime Minister John Howard to turn the issue into a form of feral, gonzo politics.

That form remains unforgettably marked by the use of SAS personnel against 400 individuals, rescued at sea by the Norwegian vessel, the MV Tampa, in August 2001.  In defiance of maritime conventions and in blatant disregard for human safety, the Howard government held the asylum seekers at sea off Christmas Island for almost ten days.  Those on the vessel were accused of piracy and economic opportunism.  From this barbarism issued the Pacific Solution, a tropical concentration camp system which has had a few iterations since.

Governments, both Coalition and Labor, have drawn political capital from harsh policies against unwanted naval arrivals, smearing the merits of asylum and ignoring the obligations of international refugee law.  The new Albanese government has the chance, however unlikely it is to pursue it, to extract the political and replace it with the humanitarian.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

 

The devastation wrought on Australia’s Coalition government on May 21 by the electorate had a stunning, cleansing effect.  Previously inconceivable scenarios were played out in safe, Liberal-held seats that had, for decades, seen few, if any challenges, from an alternative political force.  But the survival of one figure would have proved troubling, not only to the new Labor government, but to many Liberal colleagues lamenting the ruins.  The pugilists and head knockers, however, would have felt some relief.  Amidst the bloodletting, hope.

As he has done before, Peter Dutton, former Queensland policeman and failed university student, high priest of division and shorn of compassion, the face of Fortress Australia, survived the electoral challenge.  Earlier in the night, it did not seem that he would hold on to the Queensland seat of Dickson.  His opponent, Labor’s Ali France, looked ready to assume the reins.  But survive, he did, as he has done previously at several ballots.  His rival and obvious successor to take over the Liberal Party, Josh Frydenberg, did not.

Dutton, Australia’s new opposition leader, is a reactionary, though he must couch his ascent to the leadership in more accommodating terms.  He is a reminder of a brand of politics that Australia’s conservative Prime Minister John Howard made the norm: callous, self-centred, free of vision and hostile to outsiders. Under Howard, illegal wars were launched, a national security state created, and torturous offshore detention centres established in Pacific outposts.  His time in office was characterised by an oleaginous, ignorant smugness.

It was Dutton who seemingly wanted to stay on this mummified path.  In the tribal wars affecting his own party, which saw an ongoing battle between Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull, both eventually having spells as Liberal Prime Ministers, Dutton played his dagger’s hand. Towards Turnbull, he was particularly vicious, cultivating hard line support for his own leadership credentials.

It was Dutton who finally saw off the meeker and more moderate Turnbull in August 2018, signalling his own leadership challenge with the subtlety of a hangman and the graciousness of a prison escapee.  But his time to be leader had not come.  Within the Liberal Party, Dutton was seen as electoral bile in various seats in Victoria and New South Wales, an extreme and extremist’s choice.  He may have engineered the assassination in favour of conservative values, but the profits of leadership would go to Scott Morrison and his deputy Josh Frydenberg.

In his autobiography, A Bigger Picture, Turnbull explained why, in the palace coup, he preferred Morrison as his replacement.  “Dutton, were he to become prime minister, would run off to the right with a divisive, dog-whistling, anti-immigration agenda, written and directed by Sky News and 2GB.”

Turnbull’s reading of politics, for all his qualities as a legal advocate, seemed cock-eyed.  Morrison had his own penchant for division, dog-whistling and anti-immigration.  And the former merchant banker, intellectually superior as he was, never saw Dutton as a viable threat, having “assumed people have a reasonable amount of self-awareness”.  Given such awareness, Dutton never struck the defeated Turnbull “as being so self-delusional and narcissistic as to imagine that he could successfully lead the Liberal Party. More relevantly, it had never occurred to me that others would think he could either.”

Under Morrison, Dutton became all that is terrifying about the national security state and corrosive to democratic accountability.  He ruled over Australia’s new super Department of Home Affairs and showed every sign of loving it.  More national security legislation was passed, privacy protections eroded, surveillance encouraged.

Dutton also became the dour face of anti-China jingoism and bellicosity, often making spurious historical comparisons.  (The 1930s has been something of a favourite.)  When he found his way to the role of Defence Minister, he began trumpeting arguments for war, making it clear that Australia would unconditionally commit troops to a conflict against Beijing over Taiwan.

The process now is one of cosmetic tinkering: a nip here, a tuck there.  Unlike other leaders who speak of discovering inner steel, Dutton is keen to promote an inner, non-existent softness.  In a statement released to the press, he threatened to show Australians “the rest of my character, the side my family, friends and colleagues see.”  His wife, Kirilly, irrelevantly informs us of his remarkable skills as a father, his “great sense of humour” and his “incredible passion”.  His defenders claim to know a New World of intellect lurking like newly discovered permafrost.

West Australian premier Mark McGowan, and former Australian prime ministers Kevin Rudd and Paul Keating, see things rather differently.  For McGowan, Dutton is an “extremist”, incapable of listening, “extremely conservative” and not “that smart”.  Rudd sees an “idiot” who believes that more shouting and stitching of hair on the chest in the morning somehow improves “your overall strategic circumstances with China and the United States”.  Keating detects a “dangerous personality” intent on “injecting Australia into a potentially explosive situation in North Asia”.

In terms of where he sees his party going, Dutton is proving gnomic and unconvincing.  “We aren’t the Moderate party. We aren’t the Conservative party.  We are Liberals.  We are the Liberal party.  We believe in families – whatever their composition.”  He tautologically claimed to back businesses “small” and “micro’”, while standing for the “aspirational, hard-working ‘forgotten’ people across cities, suburbs, regions and in the bush.”

Media hacks are doing their bit to suggest a more nuanced man behind the thuggish visage.  Miraculously, veteran journalist Michelle Grattan can spot a “complicated” figure.  There are “two Peter Duttons: the public sword carrier and the mask-like face and the non-public person, who is routinely described as charming, with a sense of humour, and politically more granular than you think.”

Such a profile could be applied to many: the dedicated war criminal with a love of family, sunsets and fine wines; the concentration camp guard who went about his work with diligence and returned back to hearty stews and his rare stamp collection.  Look more closely, and there are always two sides.  But which one wins out, in the end?

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Defence Minister Peter Dutton. Image: Viv Miley/Green Left

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Free Antonio Tolentino

May 27th, 2022 by Dalena Tran

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Barangay captain and environmental defender Antonio Tolentino has been detained on trumped-up criminal and administrative charges for protecting farmers’ rights against Ayalaland’s land-grabbing for eight years. 

Tolentinto chaired the Aniban ng Nagkakaisang Mamamayan ng Hacienda Dolores (Association of the United Citizens of Hacienda Dolores, ANIBAN) under the nationwide organisation Kilusan Para sa Repormang Agraryo at Katarungang Panlipunan (Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice, KATARUNGAN).

He mobilized the community despite increasing violence. Together, they documented more than 30 cases of property destruction, victimisation, illegal arrests, trumped-up charges, threats and intimidation, forced surrender and waiver signing, and forced recruitment of local indigenous Ayta people to serve as guards and thugs.

Farming

Ayalaland Logistics Holdings Corp is associated with widespread violence against locals fighting for their land rights in Hacienda Dolores, including the imprisonment of village leader Antonio “Apung Tony” Tolentino.

The contested land is in Hacienda Dolores, a barangay in Porac, Pampanga. The site is ecologically important and sensitive, as it is in a forest upstream from a river.

Real estate developers including Ayalaland began buying and taking over farmers’ land as early as 2005. Ayalaland wanted to develop a luxury mixed-use commercial center branded as the next Makati, which is currently the Philippines’ top financial hub.

Locals requested protection for their land rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), but their land was ordered exempt without any prior consultation and notice.

A former Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regional director granted the exemption because the land was allegedly unsuitable for farming despite Dolores having been farmed for nearly 200 years.

Killing

Developers took complete control, forcefully denying access and ownership to the farmers despite their long history of tillage. Forcing their way onto the farms, corporations cleared out the land with heavy machinery with assistance of private armed security guards and hired thugs.

The police are also accused by protesters of physically harassing and criminalising land rights defenders. More than 300 farmers were forcibly evicted and many homes were burned down. Developers destroyed crops and livestock.

Security guards blocked farmers who were on their way to their farm lots on 13 January 2014. The guards, provoked, shot at the farmers, killing 34-year-old ANIBAN secretary Arman Padino and wounding two others – Noel Tumali and Antonio Tolentino.

Tumali and Tolentino had arrived on scene to support the farmers and were able to capture one of the security guards in a citizen’s arrest, but the others fled.

Then 30 combat personnel arrived at the barangay hall to arrest Tolentino under false charges because of his intervention in the killing on 16 April 2014.

Fear

The guards and Ayalaland conspired against Tolentino, filing kidnapping and carjacking cases against him, both non-bailable offenses, as well as other false charges. This also covered up one of the guard’s citizen’s arrest. Consequently, Tolentino was unable to put up bail.

Security guards also falsely charged 30 ANIBAN members with grave threats, grave coercion, and usurpation of real rights in real property.

Tolentino did not have due process because he was not informed of any charges and thus could not file a counter-affidavit. He is facing three cases for car-napping and malicious mischief, kidnapping with attempted murder, and administrative charges for misconduct.

But the violence continued to mount. Two hitmen riding tandem on motorcycle also shot 57-year-old ANIBAN leader Menelao “Ka Melon” Barcia on 2 May 2014, killing him instantly and injuring his wife Maria.

Barcia had been monitoring the administrative charges against Tolentino. Witnesses are afraid to speak for fear of further violent retaliation.

Terror

Farmers and their families have continued to protest and petition for years against the now-completed luxury development and its injustices despite forced displacement, criminalisation, and harassment by employees and security guards over the dispute.

However, no one is publicly informing the people about Tolentino’s continued imprisonment because Ayalaland is also one of the Philippine’s main advertisers and suppresses the news locally. Mainstream media does not want to cover Ayalaland’s secrets.

Tolentino, now more than 70 years old and unwell, is still detained in Angeles City Jail, unsure if he will ever be granted freedom by the Philippine justice system.

The need to condemn the entire elitist justice system is long overdue. It is important for the people to get their leader back because he sustained and encouraged the movement from the ground.

They are waiting for him and even re-elected him as leader while still behind bars. We must spread word of the story of this jailed leader so that terror does not continue to divide the community.

A spokesperson for AyalaLand Logistics Holdings Corp told The Ecologist: “We wish to clarify that Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and ALI subsidiary, AyalaLand Logistics Holdings Corp (ALLHC) have no participation in the alleged activities stated in the article. We are not involved in any case concerning Mr Antonio ‘Apung Tony’ Tolentino.”

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Dalena Tran is a PhD candidate at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a researcher with the Environmental Justice Atlas. She specializes in violence against environmental defenders during ecological conflicts.

Featured image: Environmental defender Antonio Tolentino with his family.  (Source: Environmental Justice Atlas)

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***

Recent elections in the Philippines have paved the way for Chinese-Philippine relations to continue growing. Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has expressed a desire to work with China more closely and resolve disputes bilaterally without US interference.

Already, the US is backing attempts to question the outcome of the election which saw its candidate of choice, Leni Rebredo lose.

The Philippines is one of America’s primary targets for militarization in both a proxy war with China as well as a direct US war with China.

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Brian Joseph Thomas Berletic, is an ex- US Marine Corps independent geopolitical researcher and writer based in Bangkok, writing under the pen name “ Tony Cartalucci ” along with several others.

Featured image is from TheAltWorld

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Abstract

Articles in this special issue re-examine Asia-Pacific War memories by taking a longer and broader view, geographically, temporally, and spatially. A diverse, global team of thirteen authors highlights subjects across a wide geographical area spanning the Asia-Pacific region especially. In the process, articles question common assumptions and narratives surrounding Asia-Pacific War memories by highlighting crucial, in-between spaces and remembrances. These range from Japanese military cemeteries in Malaysia, to the experiences of Filipino residents living near a Japanese POW camp, and to Japanese veterans’ personal narratives of guilt, trauma, and heroism. Articles also draw attention to the ongoing significance of Asia-Pacific war memories, partly as personal struggles to confront and to find meaning in the past, and partly through memory’s political instrumentalization in Cold War and post-Cold War power struggles.

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This special issue emerged from a conference titled “Re-examining Asia-Pacific War Memories: Towards a Cross Textual, Global Dialogue” held in December 2020 at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) in Kyoto. The year was notable not only for witnessing the worst pandemic in a century but also for being the 75th anniversary of the conclusion of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945). The simultaneous mandatory isolation in response to the virus, juxtaposed with the global nature of COVID-19 made the conference organizers and participants acutely aware of the paradoxical presence of national boundaries on the one hand and the urgent need for transnational cooperation on the other. This realization also mirrored conference presenters’ thoughts on the concurrent necessity for dialogue on the transnational nature of Asia-Pacific War memories.

Prior studies have noted the impossibility of grasping the consequences of a global war from purely national standpoints (Fujitani et al. 2001). Similarly, past research has shown how the effects of past and present empires and the memory regimes they engender continue to linger on long after conflict has officially ended (Yoneyama 2016). Articles in this special issue build on these findings by exploring the making of Asia-Pacific War memories as a complex trans-national, trans-Pacific and ongoing process of negotiation between private individuals, nation-states, and larger geopolitics. The editors were especially cognizant of three main re-examinations that essays in this special issue undertake.1

The first of these is geographical. Namely, the articles widen the scope of the war beyond just the United States and Japan, two hegemonic players who have tended to dominate postwar memory largely due to Cold War politics and maneuverings. The end of the Cold War and onset of a “transborder redress culture” wherein previously marginalized victims, groups, and regions have increasingly pressed for recognition and compensation for past historical injustices has gone a long way toward building a more transnational memory of the war (Yoneyama 2016, viii, also Frost, Schumacher, and Vickers 2019). Consequently, English-language scholarship has increasingly come to incorporate memories beyond Japan and the US, including China and South Korea and a range of other countries throughout East and South-East Asia and the Pacific (for example, Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama 2001; Morris-Suzuki et al. 2013; Saaler and Schwentker 2008; Twomey and Koh 2017). Articles in this special issue continue this trend by focusing on previously overlooked areas including Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the Philippines. They also examine the cross-border movement of people such as Japanese war brides to New Zealand in the immediate postwar, and marginal spaces including the perspectives of residents living near prisoner of war (POW) camps in the Japanese-occupied Philippines.

The second re-examination is temporal; specifically, it entails taking the Asia-Pacific War beyond the narrow confines of the years of combat and re-framing it in the longer process between the pre- and postwar continuum. Contrary to popular belief, the end of the Asia-Pacific War was in no way a radical rupture from the pre-war era. For many around the Asia-Pacific, rather, the war never really ended, but carried on in various forms such as anti-colonial struggles, personal battles with the scars of war, and ongoing civil war and democratization processes. Neither did empires disappear overnight—the process of decolonization was long and slow for many, while, speaking more generally, hegemonic dominance in the Asia-Pacific entered a period of neo-imperialist struggle between America and China especially. The history of colonialism and Cold War alliances provides an apt lens for observing historical continuity and the transforming utility of Asia-Pacific War memories. Though this special issue does not claim to be an extensive account of the history of decolonization in the region, individual papers do implicitly grapple with the issue. For example, Arnel Joven’s discussion of the changing contours of war memory at a Japanese POW camp in the Philippines reflects the country’s sometimes fraught relationship with both Japan and the United States. His findings especially resonate with scholars who have shown how US and Filipino elites utilized the idea of America as liberator from Japanese occupation to downplay its own history as colonizer there (Woods 2020).

Cognizant of these facets, articles in this special issue by Mahon Murphy, Mo Tian and Collin Rusneac tease out the changing contours of national and imperial commemorations of wars over decades. Similarly, the lasting memories of the war make central themes of several of our contributors. Justin Aukema and Ryōta Nishino highlight Japanese veterans’ writings as attempts to make sense of the war retrospectively from the present-day standpoints of Western (-inspired) civilization and liberal-capitalism while pitting them against putatively primitive forms of civilization. The long war in the minds of the veterans manifested itself in different guises in public realms such as commemorative sites whose exhibits and significance altered to meet the demands of the present as well as shifting geopolitical alliances (see articles by Arnel Joven, Daniel Milne and David Moreton, and Alison Starr). At the same time, Japanese veterans returning to former battlefields in New Guinea nearly twenty-five years later illustrated that processes of mourning and repair work were ongoing, lifelong projects for many (see Beatrice Trefalt’s article).

The third re-examination is spatial – in the sense of re-examining the nature of specific spaces of commemoration. Namely, the articles move discussion of war memory beyond traditional binaries and divisions that persist in the spaces of commemoration and narratives and propose interrogating the in-between spaces. In this way, too, they interrogate established dichotomies of “us vs. them” or “victim vs. perpetrator” to highlight problematic, often thorny grey areas and points of overlap and contention. In terms of memorial sites, as recent Japanese scholarship has argued, the point is not just to show how alternative sites of memory in Japan functioned simply as “mini-Yasukunis” (Shirakawa 2015, 8, 13).2 A more pressing concern is to examine how memorial sites expressed their own unique histories and problems vis-à-vis official, state-sanctioned ideology. Thus, building on this observation, essays in this special issue highlight cemeteries containing the bodies of Japanese and non-Japanese in the Asia Pacific (Rusneac, Starr), and of a privately built, ostensibly Buddhist site of memorialization for the war dead (Milne and Moreton) as examples that awkwardly juxtapose with the rather linear narrative of heroic glorification promoted by the state’s premier site of war-dead worship, the Yasukuni Shrine. Regarding narratives, another novel strategy that essays utilize is to focus on veterans’ experiences. Veterans are the key players in war, but their views in discussions of postwar memory are often glossed over because their actual experiences and trauma of seeing the effects of violence and death do not mesh well with beautified and sanitized narratives of the war. On top of this, veterans are often both victimizers (having committed acts of violence and killing) as well as victims (of the state-military apparatus and other institutional or social forms of exploitation) in war. But this can make their experiences problematic for monolithic or revisionist accounts which try to reframe the war as purely a black-and-white contest between “good” and “evil.” Thus, articles in this special issue examine how veterans maneuvered the complex landscape of competing ideologies and justifications of war (Aukema, Nishino); they examine veterans as active agents in shaping national narratives of mourning which both complemented and contradicted state attempts to use their sacrifices to beautify war (Trefalt); they show how veterans’ narratives can make uneasy bedfellows with state instrumentalization of war memory (Tian); and they demonstrate how past commemoration of military sacrifice often competes with contemporary notions of how to remember the war dead (Rusneac).

The Structure of this Special Issue

With these themes in mind, and in order to better flesh out important points of convergence and divergence between them, the articles in this special issue are not ordered geographically, chronologically, or according to well-established sites and binaries, but within three general, though overlapping, themes: (1) sites of mourning, (2) personal narratives, and (3) commemoration and memorialization.

Sites of Mourning

Jay Winter popularized the term “sites of mourning” in his pioneering study of personal grief and thecommemoration the First World War (2000; 2014). Modern nation states were unique in that they mobilized individual civilians to fight and die in their wars. To justify these actions, states created the “myth of the war experience” which often beautified and gave meaning to private citizens’ war deaths for the nation (Mosse 1990, 7). But the task from the outset was beset by an inherent tension and contradiction: the dual competing desires to publicly commemorate and to privately mourn. By managing memories of the war dead through publicly constructed monuments and memorial institutions, states were partly able to instrumentalize and channel private grief over lost loved ones into patriotic affect and nationalism. Yet personal sadness and suffering (Acton 2007; Choi 2001), including that expressed through resistance (Figal 2018; Fryer et al. 2021), often clashed with states’ inherent need to beautify and heroize war in support of national aims. As contributions in this special issue reveal, this tension has been most clearly apparent when bereaved family members and veterans negotiated with the state over how to handle the physical remains of the war dead. The arena for such negotiations, moreover, have included numerous “sites,” especially cemeteries for the war dead and at former battlefields where slain soldiers’ remains lay fallen. Articles in this special issue highlight such sites of mourning not only as spaces where personal grief becomes highly politicized, but also as potential transnational sites of either geopolitical dispute or reconciliation.

First, Collin Rusneac explores the notion of the national war cemetery as a transnational space of mourning, education, and memory. He concentrates on two Japanese war cemeteries, one within Japan’s national borders in Osaka, and the other outside, in Malaysia. Through his focus on these two sites, he posits an alternative to Japan’s national memorial landscape which is often dominated by the Yasukuni Shrine. While Japan has an official commemorative infrastructure, it is relatively decentralized and disjointed. Accordingly, Japanese war cemeteries built either inside Japan or elsewhere rely on local operational infrastructure. As Rusneac shows, this has allowed for a variety of commemorative practices and created spaces to discuss Japan’s wartime and imperial past away from the hegemonic narrative and political controversies of Japan’s more well-known sites of mourning.

The role of war cemeteries as sites of transnationalism and diplomacy is further developed in Alison Starr’s discussion of dual Japanese and Australian war cemeteries in Cowra, Australia. These cemeteries were originally built to inter over two-hundred Japanese and five Australians who died due to a breakout by Japanese prisoners from the nearby POW camp but were extended to include civilian and military Japanese who died in Australia during the war. As Starr explains, town leaders and visiting Japanese officials have developed these cemeteries and a series of interlinked memorial spaces and events to transform Cowra more widely into a space of grief and reconciliation for veterans, locals, and diplomats, and as a site of domestic and international tourism and binational diplomacy.

While cemeteries are emblematic sites of mourning for grieving veterans and public, Beatrice Trefalt’s article reminds us that former battle sites present another realm of mourning with immediacy especially to veterans and the bereaved. In teasing out the various symbolic meanings in visual representations of sites of mourning, Trefalt highlights acts of collective remembrance that help us understand what groups of people are trying to achieve, both politically and personally, when they act in public to conjure up the past. At the heart of her analysis is a photographic book compiled by a group of Japanese veterans who embarked on a bone collecting trip to New Guinea in 1969. Exploring how the book is designed to elicit emotional responses in the reader, Trefalt highlights the role of affect in war memory, specifically in efforts to arrest the forgetting of the war dead and of campaigns in the war not canonized in collective memory.

Personal Narratives

Articles in this section explore how the personal narratives of wartime survivors attempt to reconcile their experiences, memories, and senses of “self” against officially sanctioned remembrances. Various studies have highlighted both the importance of cognitively ordering individual experiences, i.e., memories, into coherent narratives for the construction and assertion of self-identity (Hunt 2010), and the necessity of transforming memories into narrative form to convey them to others and facilitate their cross-generational transmission (Assmann 2008). Moreover, wartime survivors have often been compelled by a “need to narrate,” not only to repair a psyche and identity fractured by traumatic past experiences, but also from various feelings of either obligation to the dead or other forms of “survivor guilt” (Aukema 2016). Working their experiences into coherent narratives frequently allows wartime survivors to make sense of and provide meaning to the past.

One of the most common ways wartime survivors have narrated their experiences has been through writing. For centuries literature, fictional or otherwise, has provided a means for individuals to articulate and represent the subjective and emotional aspects of war that are often masked by official histories and impersonal statistical data. In the modern era, diary writing became a nearly universalized tool for soldiers to record their battlefield experiences. These often provided the raw material for many subsequent veterans’ literary writings and tales (senkimono in Japanese) in the postwar (Moore 2013). Soldiers’ written narratives were highly complex, many times mixing platitudes and other common lingo from the era which seemingly glorified war on the one hand, with often brutal and horrifically vivid descriptions of battle, and at times probing accounts of personal responsibility on the other (Takahashi 1988; Yoshida 2005; Yoshida 2011). The mass-mobilization of total war meant that civilians also wrote about the Asia-Pacific War. Japan’s atomic-bomb literature as well as “war experience writings” (sensō taiken kiroku) are notable examples. The diversity of war experience writings makes generalized statements about a singular “war literature” difficult. Yet, as essays in this special issue remind us, it is perhaps more helpful to investigate each individual work as a unique attempt to situate the authors’ personal experiences in the context of the broader social construction of memory.

Not all wartime narratives are written down or published, however. Oral narratives voiced within familial or friendship groups or in public, such as when wartime survivors and victims give speeches or open testimony, are also significant forms of war narrative. Stories told within families, for instance, have formed a key part of the intergenerational transmission of wartime memories, and have enabled generations of “post-memory” wherein survivors’ children internalize their parents’ or relatives’ memories as their own (Hirsch 1992). Post-memories of war and atrocity, some have argued, can remain so strong in society that they even live on as kinds of cultural trauma (Hashimoto 2015). Oral histories can also shed invaluable light on hitherto unexplored or neglected aspects of the past, and can either challenge or reaffirm dominant, hegemonic historical narratives and memories of the past (Perks 1998). The academic researcher, too, through the process of recording and documenting oral histories, shares in this production process, and published oral-history compilations continue to inform our understanding of the Asia-Pacific War (e.g., Cook and Cook 2000).

Essays in this section explore these and other multifaceted aspects of Asia-Pacific War memories as expressed through personal narratives and literature. First, Justin Aukema’s article compares war-themed literary works written by two Japanese veterans Furukawa Shigemi and Kamiko Kiyoshi. In searching for hope in defeat and their Cold War-era presents, both authors deployed what Aukema identifies as a kind of literary “modernization theory” whereby they attributed the Japanese defeat to the pervasive feudal mindset of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). This message is symbolically emphasized and illustrated by the stories’ protagonists, Japanese soldiers whose disgust with what they see as the IJA’s outdated tactics and ethos leads them to desert mid-battle. In this way, Aukema argues, the novel’s protagonists function as what he calls “anti-hero heroes,” since, while their military desertion would have been considered shameful during the war, they were justified post hoc in the postwar when Japan’s military apparatus and empire were thoroughly disgraced and denounced. The ultimate objective of the anti-hero hero, therefore, in this milieu, is not to decry the horror of war, but rather to recast Japan’s substantial wartime defeat as a symbolic victory of the forces of “modernity” over those of a discredited feudalism-militarism.

While Aukema focuses on the political utility of modernization to support a proposal for national rehabilitation, Ryōta Nishino’s article illustrates the potential of the memoir to bring psychological healing to an individual veteran. Nishino, in his analysis of the writings of the Japanese veteran and memoirist, Ogawa Masatsugu, traces the personal trauma of war. For Japanese troops and other defeated soldiers coming to terms with the shift from winning to losing a war in which psychology, war memoir and life history converge was a difficult undertaking. Through tracing his initial personal trauma in China to his war experience in New Guinea, Ogawa’s memoir highlights an inner struggle between that of victim and perpetrator that troubled many veterans in Japan and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Matthew Allen looks at another personal struggle: this one a veteran-author’s grudge against the cynical ethos of the IJA. His source for textual analysis is Maetani Koremitsu’s 1962 comic, Robotto tokkōtai, whose protagonist, Robotto, is a clumsy robot who unwittingly joins Japan’s infamous unit of “kamikaze” Special Attack Force (tokkōtai) pilots. While these pilots were glorified and even deified during the war and by nationalists in the postwar, Maetani critically mocks this image through his humorous portrayals of Robotto’s follies. Namely, Robotto proves time and time again, often quite humorously, incapable of carrying out his “sacred” duty to sacrifice his life for nation and emperor. Yet the humor works because this military ethos was indeed discredited in the postwar period. In this way, Allen shows how Maetani’s Robotto character was not only an “anti-hero hero” but also how the comic compromises notions of “post-memory” by portraying the war itself as a tragic farce. Thus, he proposes the idea of “counter-post-memory” instead to characterize such works as Maetani’s.

Additionally, Elena Kolesova and Kanazawa Mutsumi highlight important aspects of women’s experiences of war and its aftermath. The authors ask how Japanese war brides in New Zealand responded to the challenges of international marriage in an era in which prejudice to a former foe lingered. The stories they told generally follow the arc of triumph over adversity in which the women found confidence as they gained more skills, expanded their social networks, and climbed the career ladder. Furthermore, the authors show how a few war brides were highly instrumental in the rapprochement and the reinvention of the New Zealand-Japan relationship, and that their new environment allowed them to exercise agency beyond the confines of the domestic realm. However, behind their “success stories,” the testimonies underline the internalization of Japanese gender expectations to be “good wives and wise mothers” (ryōsai kenbo) and of equivalent expectations in New Zealand. Most significantly, perhaps, the article points to the residual ambivalence beneath the veneer of putatively successful migrant stories told and heard across generations.

Commemoration and Memorialization

The third theme of the special issue pertains to commemoration and memorialization. While both these terms indicate the preservation of memory, here “commemoration” refers especially to intangible ceremonies and practices, and “memorialization” refers particularly to tangible objects such as memorial markers, monuments, and statues. Each indicates a form of what Maurice Halbwachs called “collective memory,” meaning that they extend beyond the individual, subjective psyche and contain public aspects as means of social remembering (1992). They are also forms of what Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka termed “cultural memory,” wherein memory becomes crystallized around objects, texts, and rituals as a prerequisite of its intergenerational transmission (1995). Additionally, they can serve as what Pierre Nora referred to as “sites of memory” (lieux de mémoire), specially designated spaces and places of remembrance that serve as loci and focal points of group memory and identity (1989). Commemoration and memorialization are closely related to mourning. Yet, unlike private gravestones or expressions of grief, commemoration and memorialization are especially and explicitly public expressions of remembrance. Moreover, memorials and rituals once they enter the cultural realm can facilitate the transmission of shared remembrances long after the actual events have passed and far beyond any single individual. Furthermore, while, for some, commemoration and memorialization may occur in tandem with expressions of grief, they are distinguished at the same time by their overt emphasis on honoring and celebrating the past.

Commemoration and memorialization are also highly contested. This is because they are commonly markers to reaffirm self-identity, celebrating and remembering either the pain or heroism of typically a single memory group, e.g., the heroism of the victors, or the suffering of the victims (Gillis 1996). Modern war monuments and ceremonies, for instance, have been especially tied to the nation-state and have therefore tended to focus on remembering only the national war and military dead rather than the transnational and civilian victims of conflicts (Mosse 1990). And commemoration and memorialization often reaffirm the nation as an “imagined community,” through shared remembrances (Anderson 2006). Within this process, nation-states wield their inordinate power to exercise what Ashplant et al. called a “hegemonic framing of memory,” wherein selective historical remembrances themselves are used to include or to preclude equal membership rights within the national body (2000, 53).

At the same time, commemoration and memorialization can also be sites of “counter-memories” used by civic or marginalized groups to challenge dominant narratives and discourses of the past (Misztal 2003, 64). Similarly, it has been the function of “counter-monuments” “not to console but to provoke” and “instead of monumentalizing […] rather encourage people to think for themselves and motivate them to constantly remember” (Young 1992, 276, 274). Furthermore, as John Bodnar noted, memorials always beautify and aestheticize the dark and painful aspects of war; yet at the same time they can never completely hide that fact that real people nevertheless died, a facet often reflected in the names of the dead that are carved on many memorials (2010, 123).

The essays in this special issue dealing with the general topic of “commemoration and memorialization” deal directly with these and other prescient questions and features as they relate to public remembrances of the Asia-Pacific War. First, Daniel Milne and David Moreton investigate Ryōzen Kannon, a giant statue of the Buddhist goddess of mercy built in Kyoto in 1955 by business entrepreneur Ishikawa Hirosuke to memorialize war dead of the Asia-Pacific War. Through the lens of Ryōzen Kannon, Milne and Moreton trace the shifting landscape of Japanese war memory and commemoration of the war dead, identifying points of convergence and divergence between the pre- and postwar eras, and tracing the complex relationship vis-a-vis memorialization between civic and state actors. In the authors’ analysis, Ishikawa and his pet project, Ryōzen Kannon, are a mini-drama for a larger transformation in Japanese nationalism and patriotism in general. On the one hand, Ishikawa and Ryōzen Kannon carried over from the prewar the desire to worship the war dead and to absolve them of wrongdoing via religious purification. Yet on the other hand, Ishikawa strove to distinguish his memorial from earlier forms of Yasukuni nationalism and to achieve a broader view that emphasized Japan’s commitment to postwar liberal internationalism. As the authors show, however, sites of memory such as Ryōzen Kannon are temporally bounded not only by the lifespan of their memory communities, but also broader geopolitical memory regimes, here specifically that of the Cold War.

Next, Arnel Joven shifts the focus to commemoration in the Philippines. Namely, he zooms in on the shifting historical remembrances of an American-Filipino POW camp, Camp O’Donnell, run by the Japanese military on Luzon Island. Like other articles in this special issue, Joven’s essay highlights the dominant role of Cold War geopolitics in shaping memories and narratives at the site. Namely, this was the construction of a “canonical narrative” which focused on the shared suffering of Filipino and American prisoners at the camp, a facet that resonated nicely with the ruling-class characterization the Cold War Philippine-American alliance as a joint and “equal” partnership. Yet as the Cold War geopolitical dynamics shifted and the regime of Ferdinand Marcos lost its popular legitimacy, local activists called for greater recognition of the suffering of Filipinos, who had outnumbered US POWs at the camp. But the influence of the geopolitical maneuverings of trans-Pacific empires had not yet dissipated. This was evidenced in 1991, when the pro-US Philippine President Corazon Aquino opened the Capas National Shrine to commemorate the Allied soldiers who died at Camp O’Donnell. As Joven shows, this too indicated the ongoing instrumentalization of historical memories and narratives for contemporary political purposes, since the construction of the shrine was partly used to silence widespread popular anti-America and anti-US-base sentiment.

Meanwhile, Mo Tian shows how the instrumentalization of Asia-Pacific War memories has been a trans-Pacific affair, and subject to neo-imperialist desires on both sides of the Asia-Pacific. Tian focuses on the ways in which Cold War and contemporary geopolitical alliances have influenced changes to official war remembrances and narratives in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). One is the way that the PRC has characterized the war, initially portraying it as a Communist-led “war of resistance” and victory of the proletariat class over imperialism, only later to abandon this in favor of an emphasis on shared national humiliation and suffering at the hands of the Japanese. Along with this, Japanese war crimes, which had initially been largely downplayed in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remembrances, eventually came to receive much more attention and to gain prominence amidst growing regional nationalism. And, in the same way, the representation of the role of the Kuomintang nationalists went from negative toward positive, reflecting the CCP’s desire to win support for Taiwanese reintegration with the Chinese mainland.

The last article in the special issue, by Mahon Murphy, points to future paths for research about commemorating the Asia-Pacific War through comparison with the twentieth century’s other “World War.” While most of our contributors reflect on the future of Asia-Pacific War memory, Murphy provides a vital intervention by urging us to look back in time to alert us to what we might have overlooked. Murphy’s article explores some common themes between commemoration of the First and Second World Wars, and the potential for linking historiographical developments in studies of both conflicts. The shift in the geographical lens of studies of the First World War away from the Western Front in France ushered in new ways of thinking about war, empire, and its impact on the so-called peripheries of the globe. Looking at modern commemoration practices from a comparative perspective of both world wars helps to not only understand the broader development of these practices but also to re-integrate the peripheries into a truly global narrative.

Conclusion

We began our introduction to this special issue under the heading of “re-examination” and highlighted three ways in which contributing essays go about this. We, therefore, would like to close by making a final appeal for the process of re-examination itself. Perhaps the main reason for re-examination is that once is never enough: memory is always changing and never static. We are constantly updating and revising our memories to meet contemporary needs and desires (Hunt 2010, 116; Lowenthal 1985, 348; Munslow 2006, ix). Moreover, as Viet Thanh Nguyen astutely noted in the title of his 2016 book on memories of the Vietnam War, with memory “nothing ever dies.” That is to say, battles for the ownership of the past continue on long after the original conflicts have ended. And this phenomenon is not limited just to recent events either; remembrances even of ancient events often continue to inform contemporaneous notions of identity and global geopolitics today. Much of this is tied up with social context, and what we remember and forget is constantly changing as generations pass and political regimes rise and fall. Yet still nothing is ever really “finished” nor even forgotten in this sense. As St. Augustine observed one and a half millennia ago, memory is a “vast, immeasurable sanctuary” whose depths can never be fully plumbed (1961, 216). It is the very present-day utility of memory in combination with its sheer limitlessness that makes it so: insofar as they have needs and desires to fulfill, future generations and groups will always find something to remember.

Still, the passage of time makes a difference for how we remember. In particular, time has the tendency to smooth over memory’s rough edges, and its most contested and problematic elements, into a generally simplified and easily condensed narrative. As memory scholars, thus, we must be particularly attentive to the granular details and to what precisely is lost along the long route of remembrance. Added to this, today, we can also note shifts in the ways in which remembrance occurs. For instance, Pierre Nora mused on the effects of modernity and technology on memory which he thought had led to an abundance of preservation and proliferation of memories (1989). Supercomputers, to take one contemporary example, enable us to preserve and record vast amounts of information. But we can also observe the opposite effects and trends. Globalization and technology have not just led to an abundance of memory but also a memory deficit. Just as capital and power are centralizing around a few tech giants, memories have undergone a process of centralization, concentration, and simplification. Twitter feeds for example amplify some messages to astounding proportions but the actual number of messages in fact decreases. We can see the same trend with Asia-Pacific War memories and narratives, which center around a few hot button issues that fan the Twitter flames. The effects of this mnemonic centralization are the marginalization and even erasure of alternative memories and narratives, especially ones which occupy complicated gray zones or are not easily reduced to simple messages such as “good vs. bad” or “us vs. them.”

Memory work, therefore, is a never-ending, infinite process that necessitates continued critical examination as contemporary technology, society, ideology, and geopolitics shift and transform. This is the salient point that we wish to highlight through this introduction and the broader special issue, as contributing essays open new avenues for exploration and highlight the ever-shifting contours of Asia-Pacific War memories.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank, first and foremost, all the special issue contributors for their continued patience with us throughout the editing process. We also extend our deep gratitude to Nichibunken for letting us use its space and facilities to expand our conference to a global reach. Additionally, we greatly appreciate the assistance of editors at the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, especially Tessa Morris-Suzuki for her expert advice, Sven Saaler for his insightful and detailed feedback, and Mark Selden for his early interest in our project and for helping us get it off the ground. Also, we are grateful to the help of outside reviewers including Morris Low, Kirk Denton, Jessica Jordan and others who cannot be named here but who provided invaluable comments and suggestions.

*

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Justin Aukema is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Economics at Osaka Metropolitan University.

Daniel Milne is Senior Lecturer at Kyoto University’s Institute for Liberals Arts and Sciences (ILAS).

Ryōta Nishino is Designated Assistant Professor at the School of Law, Nagoya University, Japan.

Mahon Murphy is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Kyoto University.

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Notes

Of the twelve papers presented at the conference, two could not be included in this issue. One was on war memorials in Thailand by Nipaporn Ratchatapattanakul and another by Caroline Norma on wartime Australian and Japanese sexual violence in New Guinea. We thank the vital contribution the two presenters made to the conference and to the evolution of this special issue and look forward to their future publication.

Shirakawa, in fact, uses, variously, the phrases “local versions of Yasukuni” (Yasukuni jinja no chihōban) and “village Yasukunis” (mura no Yasukuni) (2015, 8, 13). However, in keeping with Shirakawa’s original nuance, we have translated these together as the slightly more natural-sounding “mini-Yasukunis.”

Featured image: An image of Ryōzen Kannon in Kyoto’s Higashiyama area. The imposing structure is largely overshadowed by nearby World Heritage sites such as Kiyomizu Temple, while its function and history as a war memorial are perhaps even less well known. The complexities of the site are examined in detail in the essay by Daniel Milne and David Moreton in this special issue. Photo by David Moreton, 2017.

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***

On a dreary April day, agroforestry worker Jimmy Tablason frowns in the sweltering heat as he trudges through the ruins of forests protected for decades by his community.

Typhoon Rai, known as Odette in the Philippines, had struck almost four months ago, and the towering trees it toppled was still blocking trails, impeding access to forest resources that sustain villagers here in the community of Macatumbalen in the western Philippines’ Palawan province.

“In our agroforestry site, we had planted different species like banana, bamboo, breadfruit, lanzones and rambutan,” Tablason says. “Most of them fell down.” The sounds of birds and other wild animals that once greeted him in the forest have also gone, replaced with an eerie silence reminiscent of the heydays of commercial logging in the area.

As the Philippine government transitions to a new administration, no help seems to be coming from Manila, forcing the people of Macatumbalen to rely on themselves to  get back on their feet and restore the forests and their livelihoods. Once a logger himself, 53-year-old Tablason leads men in clearing debris from trails using a government-registered chainsaw.

The area’s natural forests were massively degraded by commercial logging that started in the 1980s. Respite came in 1991 when logging was banned across the entire country. In 1997, locals began organizing themselves into the Macatumbalen Community-Based Forest and Coastal Management Association, and in 2002 they were granted a 25-year agreement to conserve, protect and sustainably use 1,850 hectares (4,571 acres) of forest.

This agreement came under the Philippines’ Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) program, an approach formalized by executive order in 1995 as part of a national strategy for achieving sustainable forestry and social justice.

“When the area was awarded to us [two decades ago] under the CBFM program, forest safeguarding commenced,” association president Nida Collado says as she sits beside the community nursery where seedlings are raised until they are ready to be transplanted in the mountains.

Maintaining the Macatumbalen nursery and reforestation sites has been part of association’s commitments since its inception. These efforts ramped up after 2010, when the association received financial support though publicly funded reforestation programs under  the CBFM-Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and the National Greening Program. The local office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office said these NGP-funded projects posted at least 85% survival rates, rehabilitating more than 200 hectares (500 acres) of denuded forestland in Macatumbalen.

Although project funding ended in 2019, the Macatumbalen community, nationally awarded for its exemplary forestry practices, continued enriching the forests with indigenous tree species, especially in the area where its watershed sits.

“We’ve also self-initiated reforestation, aside from the ones we implemented with the local and national government, so that helped in forest regeneration,” Collado says. “The old logging roads closed as a result. The denuded forestland was restored and became intact again.”

But that all changed on Dec. 17, 2021, when Typhoon Rai made its ninth and final landfall in the Philippines, hitting northern Palawan. The storm struck a blow not only to the forests the villagers had worked to revive, but also to the forest-dependent enterprises that had sustained them for decades.

Hitting the restart button

For the Macatumbalen villagers, this large swath of forestland, the size of nearly 3,500 football fields, is a wellspring of life. The forests provide clean air and water, and also sustain the community with non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as honey, rattan, fruits and dammar resin, known locally as almaciga, which they sell at local markets to support their families.

Their access to these forest products is enshrined in the CBFM agreement the community association has with the DENR. “By protecting our forest resources, we’ve been able to reap all these benefits,” Collado says.

“With NTFPs, you’re not cutting down trees for its timber, because you’re just collecting, for instance, resins, leaves and fruits,” says Norli Colili, Palawan coordinator of the nonprofit NTFP-Exchange Programme, whose group provides Macatumbalen and other community organizations with knowledge and capacity-building support, as well as access to funding to scale up their forest-based enterprises.

“That way, the forest ecosystem health is maintained, while the Indigenous peoples and local communities that protect the forests continue to benefit,” Colili says.

But when the typhoon ravaged Macatumbalen’s forests, the once flourishing NTFPs were wiped out as well. According to an assessment by the local DENR, 70% of the sites reforested with support from the National Greening Program were damaged by the typhoon. Gloom fell over the village upon knowing that their fruit trees and other crops due for harvest had not been spared from the destruction.

“Families here struggle to make ends meet,” Tablason says. “Our household income was once good, but now it has declined. We’re starting all over again. As typhoon survivors, we’re going back to number one, as we don’t have livelihood options other than this.”

Village leader Nida Collado has been leading a community-initiated reforestation effort at Macatumbalen since the late 1990s. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Macatumbalen village leader Nida Collado sits at the government-funded honey processing house as she measures honey moisture content with a refractometer to ensure it meets market quality standards.

Macatumbalen village leader Nida Collado sits at the government-funded honey processing house as she measures honey moisture content with a refractometer to ensure it meets market quality standards. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Satellite images generated by USAID’s Sustainable Interventions for Biodiversity, Oceans and Landscapes project confirmed that the hardest-hit areas were the secondary forests in northern Palawan.

“The forests left in Palawan are the natural forests,” says ecosystem integration specialist Neil Aldrin Mallari, from the Center for Conservation Innovations. “The heavily damaged ones were second-growth forests or those planted by people, including the CBFMA areas, which had been reforested after logging.”

This, Mallari says, only suggests that the “forests made by nature not by people are more resilient,” and that the government should consider continuing its support to communities that engage in assisted natural regeneration of denuded forestlands.

Community-initiated reforestation at Macatumbalen gets a much-needed boost through the financial assistance from the government's flagship reforestation programs from 2010 to 2019.

Community-initiated reforestation at Macatumbalen gets a much-needed boost through the financial assistance from the government’s flagship reforestation programs from 2010 to 2019. Photo courtesy of CENRO Roxas.

Support slow, but conservation work continues

On March 2, the DENR issued an order allowing its field offices to issue permits for communities to exploit the wood from uprooted trees, in an effort to boost community rehabilitation efforts. “We did an inventory of fallen trees,” says Diogenes Esquillo, a forester with the local DENR office. “The report was already made and their recovery permit application is in process … We further wanted to help them rebound by conducting another inventory for their rattan, so that they can use it as an additional government livelihood assistance.” As of the time this article was published, however, no permits had been issued.

The delay, Esquillo says, is due to lack of staff in the local office, and difficulties in reaching remote community forests. “Our appeal to the national government is to increase our manpower for us to better respond to the order and swiftly deliver the services that the CBFM partner people organizations deserve,” he says.

Any hopes of hiring new staff or receiving funding to help restart reforestation efforts were further delayed by a nationwide ban on public spending during the election period, which ran from March 25 to May 8.

Despite the lack of support from outside, the community is continuing its conservation efforts.

“Even if we’re suffering from a lack of funds, we’re rising to the challenge because, in the end, we know we can survive this,” Tablason says.

Clearing paths has been a priority. Without clear trails, trips to monitor forests and water systems that previously took an hour can take as long as five hours. Obstructed trails also hamper forest patrols, putting forest resources at stake.

A man operates a government-registered chainsaw to clear a trail blocked by a fallen tree at the typhoon-hit forest of Macatumbalen.

A man operates a government-registered chainsaw to clear a trail blocked by a fallen tree in the typhoon-hit forest of Macatumbalen. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

“It’s important to guard the forests against people who want to do illegal activities there,” Tablason says. Over the past two decades, his group has seized 28 chainsaws from suspected illegal loggers and helped prosecute violators.

Back in the lowland, where the community nursery sits, the association has started remobilizing its members. Elders, mostly women, pot tree seedlings. Their children help by watering the seedlings to ensure their growth and survival. These seedlings are later transferred to holes dug by men in the mountains.

“Although we were hit by a typhoon, we have great hopes of recovery,” says Collado, who also serves as the provincial and regional president, and national vice president, of the federation of people’s organizations participating in the CBFM program. “We as people’s organizations don’t stop working.”

Signs of forest recovery keep the Macatumbalen villagers going. “We’re not losing hope because when we went up the mountain, we saw how the trees we had planted were standing up amid big tree debris. We geotagged them. We know they’re alive and will recover as long as support from the government continues,” Collado says.

‘Start forest rehab now’

The Philippine government, in its Master Plan for Climate Resilient Forestry Development, recognizes the adverse impacts of climate change on the country’s forest ecosystems and communities. Despite this, the CBFM program, a key element of the country’s strategy for sustainable forestry development, covering around 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres), has received only limited funding.

A bill on sustainable forest management that would ensure consistent government support for forest restoration and rehabilitation programs in partnership with nearly 2,000 community associations, has been proposed since the 2000s. At present, the bill is languishing in the Senate, largely due to lobbying by the real estate and miningindustries.

“Resources should be channeled toward making nature resilient,” says Mallari, who is also a professor of biology and ecology at De La Salle University. This, he adds, is especially urgent in Palawan, which has the most extensive forest cover in the Philippines.

“When another big one comes … having lost more than 60% of the natural forests in the northern Palawan puts us in a really precarious situation,” Mallari says. “So as much as possible, our fervent prayer to the government is to start rehabilitation now.”

A young man carries a bundle of rattan on his shoulder; for each pole collected from Macatumbalen's forest, he earns 5 to 12 pesos ($0.09 to $0.23) to support his family.

A young man carries a bundle of rattan on his shoulder; for each pole collected from Macatumbalen’s forest, he earns 5 to 12 pesos ($0.09 to $0.23) to support his family. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Delaying rehabilitation efforts would only make things worse for forest-dependent rural communities, which are among the country’s poorest, according to scientists and advocates.

“If their forests and fields are not stable, the cycle of pushing them even further to the margins becomes vicious,” Mallari says. “They will be further mired in poverty, because without forests, there’s no water and they will eventually lose their farms.”

A report published earlier this year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states with high confidence that agriculture and forestry are among the most climate-exposed sectors. In the context of the Philippines, Mallari says, this means the government should not be looking at frontline communities as mere victims, but as potent partners in the fight against climate change.

“The most powerful, effective and sustainable  solution is to let the communities strengthen and fortify their environment for them, for us,” Mallari says. “That’s the solution to secure our future, because we will not be OK if nature is not OK.”

Community-based forest management, Palawan.

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Featured image: A once-thriving agroforestry site, photographed before it was wiped out by Typhoon Odette. Photo courtesy of CENRO Roxas.

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***

Rarely in Australian history has a governing party suffered such loss in the face of an opponent unable to claim complete victory.  It said much about the disillusionment, and plain disgust, from that nebulous centre of the country’s politics.  That centre roared on May 21, consuming sitting government members and inflicting a bloody reckoning.

That reckoning was made in traditional inner-city seats that have never known anyone other than conservative members.  It was part of a “teal” electoral tsunami, comprising candidates who would not necessarily wish to vote for Labor or the Greens, but who had found the Liberal-National government of Scott Morrison impossible to stomach on matters ranging from gender equality to climate change.

In the Melbourne seat of Goldstein, held by the Liberal Party’s Tim Wilson, former ABC journalist Zoe Wilson stormed through.  It was a showing most fitting: the electorate is named after Vera Goldstein, feminist and women’s rights campaigner who, in 1903, was the first woman to stand for election in a national parliament.

“She ran as an independent several times,” Wilson said in a telling reminder, “because she was so independent that she couldn’t bring herself to run for either of the major parties.”

In the same city, the treasurer, Josh Frydenberg, was overwhelmed by Dr Monique Ryan in Kooyong.  (Postal votes are currently being tallied, but it does not seem likely that Ryan will lose.)  This loss for the Liberals will be keenly felt, given Frydenberg’s leadership aspirations.

The story was repeated in Sydney, with the same narrative directed like a dagger at the Morrison government: You, fossil fuel devotees, mocked climate change, disregarded gender equality, and sneered at policing corruption in federal politics.  Wentworth went to businesswoman Allegra Spender, who had, during the course of her campaign, managed to assemble an army of 1200 volunteers.

Spender’s team, comprising a number of company directors, many women, is a revealing sign that movements can take root in the arid soil of caution that is Australian politics.

“You said you were standing for the community, not the party,” she told supporters, “for taking responsibility, not blaming, for compassion, not division and for the future, not the past.”

In the seat of North Sydney, held by the mild-mannered Liberal Trent Zimmerman, a victorious Kylea Tink reiterated the laundry list issues that had motivated the teal revolution.

“The majority things for me,” she told Crikey, “are climate action, integrity and addressing inequality.”

The victory of the various independents was the Liberal Party’s version of the Trojan Horse, one that had found itself parked in their heartland seats and released on election night.  It was a triumph of community organisation, not rusted party politics, despite Wilson’s fulminations about sinister external forces at work. It was the apotheosis of a movement that began with Cathy McGowan, the Victorian independent who won the rural seat of Indi in 2013.

This was also an election which delivered the highest Greens vote ever.  Queensland, almost always the deciding state, may well furnish two, possibly three Greens members in the House of Representatives.  The Greens leader, Adam Bandt, put much it down to the turbulent, vicious weather of recent times.

“We’ve just had three years of droughts and then fires and then floods and then floods again and people can see that this is happening.”

Remarkably for the group, they managed to win the Liberal-held seat of Ryan in the process.  They are also on the hunt in the Labor-held Melbourne seat of Macnamara.

“We are now on planet Greensland,” exclaimed the Greens candidate Elizabeth Watson-Brown on realising her triumph in Ryan, “and we are taking it forward.”

While the Labor opposition have good reason to cheer the prospect of forming government in almost a decade, other facts are impossible to ignore.  The Greens continued their now established historical trend of eating away at Labor’s vote in inner suburban areas, notably in Queensland.

Across several states, the party actually suffered, along the Liberal National coalition, a precipitous fall in the primary vote.  To form government on such a low primary return is staggering and says much about the loss of appeal of the established parties.

“It would be an unusual win for Labor,” noted a sour editorial from the Australian Financial Review, “with no grand policy ambitions or sweeping difference from the incumbent Coalition government.”  Only Western Australia, keen to punish the Morrison government, arrested that tendency, and may end up giving Anthony Albanese a majority.

Labor also bungled in the previously safely held south-west Sydney seat of Fowler, where Kristina Keneally, who had only lived in the electorate for a brief spell, missed out to local grassroots independent, Dai Le. The swing of almost 18 per cent away from Labor shows that Keneally, when she suffers defeat, does so in grandly catastrophic fashion.  The story of this debacle is also salutary to major parties who parachute heavy weight politicians into seats as part of party and personal ambition, rather than the interests of voters.

While the bruised LNP will lick their wounds and rue their ignorance of the community movement that gathered pace under their noses, Australia’s major parties will have to consider a new phenomenon: the non-career parliamentarian, one who enters parliament, not for party allegiance and faction but for voter representation and change.  For the Westminster model of government, this is indeed a stunning novelty.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Anthony Albanese (Source: Republic World)

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***

 

A month after popular protests began in Sri Lanka, the government deployed its party members, loyalists and thugs to attack peaceful protesters on May 9 in Colombo. The protesters were demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, under the “go home Gota” slogan, and the removal of the corrupt ruling family regime that has led to mass suffering due to shortages and increases in the cost of basic necessities. 

Following a meeting with Rajapaksa at his official residence, his Sri Lanka People’s Front (Podujana Peramuna) party members, including elected officials in provincial councils, launched a violent offensive against the protesters. They assaulted protesters and destroyed the protesters’ stalls in front of Rajapaksa’s residence. Thugs — paid and provided with alcohol — with the tacit support of the police force, proceeded towards the main protest area, Gota go Gama (Go home Gota village), about a kilometre away.

The thugs destroyed stalls and tents and physically assaulted protesters. This act of state-supported violence was met with outrage from the masses who sympathised with the protesters. Local people surrounded party members, and destroyed some of the buses they were transported in with. This anger spread to other regional areas and local protesters targeted some elected officials’ personal residences.

Within hours, all-powerful Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa resigned.

Attacks condemned

Amidst the protests were former cricketing stars Kumar Sangakkara and Mahela Jayawardene, who condemned the attacks on the peaceful protesters.

Jayawardene tweeted:

“These thugs was [sic] assembled at prime minister’s official residence this morning and walked in numbers to assault innocent peaceful anti-government protesters. How can this happen? Police and others just watching this.”

When Mahinda Rajapaksa tweeted:

“While emotions are running high in #lka, I urge our general public to exercise restraint & remember that violence only begets violence,” Sangakkara responded, “The only violence was perpetrated by your “supporters” — goons and thugs who came to your office first before going on to assault the peaceful protestors”.

Former Sri Lankan national cricket captain Sanath Jayasuriya tweeted:

“I never thought that this type of thuggery will be unleashed on innocent protesters at Galle face in broad day and outside temple trees. The police must remember they are here to protect the PUBLIC of this country not corrupt politicians. This is the end of the Rajapaksas.”

Jayasuriya was also an elected party member from 2010–15.

The support of the popular protests from cricket celebrities overlaps with support from other national level athletes. Despite the merger of popular sports cultures with the media and entertainment industry, particularly since the mid-1990s, there is an institutional and cultural gap between popular athletes and artists. There is a significant difference in the exchange value of labour between artists and athletes. Unlike artists, the life of an athlete in the realm of competitive sports is limited and so are opportunities for alternative careers.

Military control

The expansion of neoliberal markets and the military over the past 40 years has transformed sports cultures. The integration of the military with sports institutions took place through authoritarian “security state” strategies under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1978 (PTA), which enabled torture and disappearances along with criminalising dissent and enforcing multiple forms of censorship.

While local business elite run the mass spectator sport of cricket and some popular sports — male football, rugby and basketball — the state coordinates all others. The Ministry of Sports is integrated with the military, subsidising national level sports workers and national level elite disabled athletes, who are mostly war veterans. The state coordination of sports, through the sports ministry and the military, links media and markets which shapes sports consumer culture and articulations of “sportive nationalism”. The links between the military and sports were strengthened after the anti-Tamil war in 2009.

As defence minister, Gotabhaya Rajapakse gained control of urban development after the Urban Development Authority — the agency responsible for planning and construction in urban areas — was brought under the purview of the military in 2011. The military expanded into commercial activities, such as tourism, especially in colonised Tamil and Muslim lands in the north and east.

The sports ministry targeted sports venues with its new urban development powers. It outsourced three international cricket stadiums, mainly in rural areas, to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces for maintenance in 2011. However, the military also contract out development projects to private firms, creating commissions for a range of deal-makers and middle-men.

More importantly, the military subsidises elite athletes in multiple sports, enabling the military to participate in and influence sports organisations. In the context of a lack of funding from the government for sports associations, many are reoriented by male oligarchies to build business networks, political alliances and short-term profits.

In the Sri Lankan professional football league, four teams out of the top 20 are from the military — army, navy and air force — and police. Most of the national women’s football team are enlisted in the military.

The military subsidises many track and field athletes. The Olympic silver medallist for the 200-metre race in the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Susanthika Jayasinghe, began her athletic career through the army. She also briefly joined Rajapakse’s party.

The institutional integration of sports with the military has reproduced authoritarian sports cultures. Most sports cultures are grounded in subordinating and silencing any dissent among sports labour. There is no union of sports workers. Male cricketers have a relatively weak players association, mostly focused on their wages. Multiple forms of violence and abuse of sports workers are maintained under these authoritarian sports cultures.

The absence of most athletes and sports labour from showing solidarity with the Galle Face protests highlights the need to demilitarise sports and the state.

Tamil communities in north and east Sri Lanka have struggled with the lack of essential goods under conditions of war for over 30 years. The military still occupies their homelands. Families of the disappeared continue to demand information about their missing loved ones. May Day rallies held across the Tamil homeland demanded the abolition of Sri Lanka’s PTA, demilitarisation of the North-East, the release of Tamil political prisoners and an international justice and accountability mechanism.

The popular protests demanding regime change are also about demilitarising the state, which can address the demands of the Tamil and Muslim communities in the north and east, as well as regain sports as a public civil democratic institution.

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Featured image: The meeting site for peaceful protesters, ‘Go home Gota’ village, was attacked. Photo: gohomegota.online

Cause to Fear a Remilitarized Japan

May 16th, 2022 by Ra Mason

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Japan is proposing to double its defense budget to around US$106 billion, or 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP). This move – like recent pledges by Germany to massively increase its military spending in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – brings the country full circle since it was militarily neutered following defeat in the second world war.

Japan’s Liberal Democrat government said the decision, which it announced at the end of April, had been prompted by the conflict in Ukraine, but also reflected growing regional pressure from China, North Korea and Russia. Defense minister Nobuo Kishi said the increase in spending was designed to give Japan “counterstrike capabilities” to defend against aggression in the region.

The US has been pressuring Japan for some time to increase its defense spending to share the security bill in the Asia-Pacific region. Doubling its defense budget brings Japan in line with the benchmark for NATO countries’ military spending and positions Japan increasingly more as a genuine ally, rather than dependent, of the US in the region – a position it has held since American occupation forces drafted a “pacifist” constitution to prevent any recurrence of Japanese imperial ambitions.

The constitution prohibited the use of force and the maintenance of armed forces, despite the later creation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). This was thereafter combined with a notional 1% of GDP cap on defense spending, as well as three non-nuclear principles banning nuclear weapons being “produced, possessed or permitted entry.”

To this day, the constitution and its anti-militarist Article 9 remain unchanged. But Japan is pacifist in name only. The process of Japan’s remilitarization has been going on since the immediate postwar period. But the timing and rationale behind this latest move are significant.

Since its rise to international prominence after the Meiji Restoration and victory in the first Sino-Japanese war (1895), Japan has gone through a series of foreign policy shifts. These have fluctuated dramatically, from imperial aggressor (1930s) to pacifist (1950s) and middle power (2000s).

In the current era, relations with Washington have been paramount. But with America seemingly overstretched and in decline, Tokyo’s move to strengthen its military and deepen the alliance poses questions about Japan’s security identity.

It also raises concerns of entrapment into American proxy wars and increasing economic involvement in the US “military-industrial complex”, the system by which the defense sector encourages arms spending and war.

Dubious motives

The latest rise in defense spending is combined with deepening interoperability between US military units and the JSDF. It also paves the way for Japan to contribute billions of dollars to an arms and security infrastructure industry that is booming in the wake of Russia’s invasion into Ukraine.

All this while Article 9 of the constitution remains unaltered in Japanese law. On paper this supposedly maintains a so-called “cap in the bottle” of militarisation. But since changes to the constitution’s interpretation ratified in 2015, Japan’s foreign policy has increasingly resembled that of a great power.

Japan’s Special Defense Forces could become more offensive with a change of the constitution. Image: Facebook

Today, Japan is fervently supporting the Biden administration’s package of punitive sanctions against Russia and increased aid to Ukraine. This includes further attempts to justify what already seemingly amount to violations of Article 9.

Japan’s military spending (already the ninth-highest on the planet) itself evidently contradicts the clause. Remarkably, the JSDF also now has permanent operations bases as far away as the Horn of Africa. And the Japanese defense ministry is effectively supplying logistical materials to Ukrainian forces in a combat zone.

Regional relations and US alliance

The key point of concern here is that Article 9, the 1% GDP defense budget cap and non-nuclear principles combined to allay the fears of regional powers that Japan might attempt to return to its colonial past.

Domestic debate over whether the clause should be reformed or scrapped has intensified, but Japan’s former Asian conquests, including China, resolutely oppose constitutional reform.

Article 9’s malleable reinterpretation, therefore, reflects Japan’s tricky position between Asia and the US. This is compounded by the political capriciousness of prime minister, Fumio Kishida. Touted as a liberal, his foreign policy has become almost as hawkish as his conservative predecessors. And he now leans towards a relationship so close to the US that it risks entanglement in overseas conflicts.

Tokyo’s increasingly well-funded military, backed by a coastguard that rivals many national navies, leaves no doubt as to the robust transformation of Japanese forces in material terms. But the question remains as to whether China’s rise and North Korea’s saber-rattling really amount to the “dangerous” and “dynamic” security environmentbeing used to justify these changes.

This is a question of identity as well as practicality. Japan should be clear about its regional and global roles. It has the third-largest economy, the ninth most expensive military and significant influence across many leading international institutions, such as the UN and IMF.

Yet almost half the Japanese public are against revising Article 9. They are proud of Japan’s peaceful society and certainly do not seek expansion or entanglement in American wars.

That was, at least, until now. By invoking suffering in Ukraine, Japan’s government and mainstream media appear to have hit upon a means by which to transform sympathy into action backed by popular support.

Tokyo has ramped up refugee intakes to unprecedented numbers, donations to Ukraine have dramatically increased and military spending has reached a level comparable to western allies.

Intuitively, this may seem like a positive indicator of how Japan would respond to a contingency closer to home, such as Chinese aggression directed towards Taiwan. In reality, however, this shift in Japan’s foreign policy should be cause for concern, for it risks stoking future conflicts.

As Beijing stalks Taipei in the wake of Moscow invading Ukraine, Japan should be thinking earnestly about restoring its pacifist identity before the faded pages of its aging constitution are torn up altogether.

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Ra Mason is Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia.

Featured image: Japan is moving to remilitarize despite its pacifist constitution. Image: Shutterstock via The Conversation

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***

As the war intensifies between Russia and Ukraine, United States President Joe Biden and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison have demanded Russia be excluded from the Group of Twenty (G20) annual meeting in Bali in November this year.

This demand has put host country Indonesia in hot water; since the beginning of the military invasion, Indonesia has taken a soft stance on Russia.

Until now, Indonesia has not imposed any sanctions against Russia, nor is it likely to do so. The country has clearly and firmly announced its position: to invite all G20 country leaders, with no exception, to come to Bali for the meeting.

Despite mounting criticisms, we believe Indonesia has taken the right decision to still invite Russia and resist demands from the US and its allies; excluding Russia from the G20 forum does not appear the best course of action. Here is why.

Russia has been expelled before

This will not be first time for Russia to be expelled from an international forum. The Group of Eight (G8) – now the G7 – expelled Russia from the forum over its annexation of Crimea.

In 2014, Russia took over the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine with Putin saying this was to protect the well-being of eastern Ukrainian citizens. This stirred global condemnation, Russia was hit with economic sanctions and subsequently removed from the G8.

These sanctions apparently did not deter Russia; Crimea remains under its control.

Russia doesn’t seem to be bothered about violating international law.

Violating international law typically leads to two types of sanctions: direct sanctions (such as economic sanctions) and reputational sanctions (targeting the reputation of the offender).

Exclusion from the G20 would mostly be a reputational sanction for Russia, not a direct sanction, as the country has been mostly cut off from the global economy anyway.

Any exclusion from the G20 would only function to further deteriorate Russia’s already tarnished global reputation, and will only have limited economic impact. While direct and reputational sanctions may be useful to deter potential offenders, they are less useful for punishing repeat offenders, particularly if they have proven to be ineffective in the past.

Like employing economic sanctions (which tends to be unsuccessful), expelling Russia from the G20 is merely doing the same thing over again but expecting different results.

Furthermore, since the G20 is a forum, not an international organisation, it has no specific regulations regarding formal membership.

The expulsion of a member state needs to be collectively agreed by all members. Thus, it may be difficult to expel Russia from the forum considering China, India and South Africa’s continued soft stance on Russia.

Forcing Russia’s exclusion could threaten the group’s harmony.

Where does Indonesia stand?

As host of the G20 summit this year, the Indonesian government has decided to still invite President Putin and has said it would maintain impartiality. This may come as a surprise given Indonesia’s disapproval of military action in Ukraine and its support for the UN General Assembly’s resolution for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

However, Indonesia’s disapproval of Russia’s actions does not mean Indonesia supports the position of the Western nations. Rather, it shows Indonesia has been consistent to implement its “free and active foreign policy”. Free means Indonesia is independent and does not side with any world powers, while active means Indonesia would take the initiative in a peace settlement.

This is a high-level task, and it is the responsibility of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to reach out to world leaders from both camps and convince them of Indonesia’s impartial position.

Indonesia has experience as a regional facilitator and mediator in Southeast Asian conflicts and can use this expertise to mediate the group’s polarisation.

Even if Indonesia cannot manage to handle this polarisation by November, it can still offer a side-line meeting for Russia-Ukraine peace talks during the summit, as President Biden has suggested.

G20 as Russia’s way out

In a way, the G20 forum can function as Russia’s way out to avoid prolonging the war, without losing face.

Russia has continuously claimed this war as a special operation to demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine. Demilitarisation of Ukraine may be plausible, but de-Nazification seems a bit far-fetched; Ukraine is not a fully democratic country, but it is hardly an autocratic one.

Russia is in a tight spot and pushing Putin to the limit may not end well. Russia is stuck in a dilemma of continuing the war, with human loss, material damage and economic recession. Yet, admitting defeat can also mean the weakening – and perhaps even downfall – of Putin’s regime. Neither scenario is favourable for him.

Therefore, President Putin can use the G20 forum to hold meetings with other world leaders. This could be a gesture to the world that he wants to end the war and focus on more crucial issues, such as economic recovery and climate change.

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 is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Brawijaya.

 is Head of department of Politics, Government, and International Relations of Universitas Brawijaya, Universitas Brawijaya

Featured image: Indonesia received the G20 presidency from Italy. Laily Rache/Antara Foto

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***

May 7 marks the last day of the campaign period. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates held the last round of their nationwide campaign rallies to secure votes for the May 9 elections. Of the ten presidential candidates, one man consistently leads in surveys: son of the late dictator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (BBM).

BBM gained popularity largely due to his (in)famous father and namesake, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled the Philippines from 1965-1986 under a dictatorship and placed the country under almost a decade of martial law, starting a year before the end of his second term in 1973. From 1972 until his ouster by People Power in 1986, the Marcos regime oversaw at least 11, 103 victims of human rights violations. His clan also amassed an ill-gotten wealth amounting to PHP299B, of which PHP174B has been recovered while the remaining PHP125B is yet to be returned.

But these historical facts were later on subject to modification as orchestrated by BBM himself through the expertise of Cambridge Analytica. By rebranding the family image on social media coupled with myth-making, accounts of the country’s worst case of corruption and disregard for human rights are essentially downplayed. Many people are buying this electoral propaganda which is being perpetuated on Facebook, Twitter, TikTok and YouTube by an army of trolls allegedly paid by the Marcos camp.

Screenshot from the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board

Besides being a direct descendant of the now-admired and celebrated Marcos Sr., BBM is closely linked to outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte whose authoritarian characteristics have been inspired by the late dictator. Trial awaits the incumbent president for extra-judicial killings resulting from his war on drugs. Like his political inspiration Marcos Sr., Duterte, by virtue of the concept of political incorporation, purged from society the “rotten apples” of the Filipino population, i.e. small-time drug dealers and rival drug lords. The strongman rule is also marked by excessive military and police authority which bolstered police brutality and killings in the last six years. Moreover, the US-Philippine relations is at its worst as Duterte pursued a flawed “independent” foreign policy which basically only entails realignment to China and Russia. Apparently, he has not directly endorsed a successor but insinuated support for BBM through the endorsement from his political party, PDP-Laban, of which he is a chairman.

BBM’s electoral ploy such as non-attendance in almost all presidential debates, refusal of media interviews, utilization of fake news and historical revisionism is characteristic of authoritarianism where accountability is nonexistent. A new era of corruption, reminiscent of the 70’s, is imminent. And by viewing a BBM presidency as an extension of the Duterte regime, supporters commit to another six years of strongman rule that threatens further democratic backsliding and marginalization of the poor and indigenous groups. Hostility towards the West is foreseeable given his ideological affiliation and unpleasant history with the US. Disengagement from the hegemon essentially resonates with many Filipinos who criticize its cold war mentality and warmongering activities. Consequently, his supporters welcome his expression of intent to continue Duterte’s pivot to China; but too much comfort will be detrimental to the Philippines’ claim in the South China Sea.

Much is at stake with a Marcos in power. The Philippines cannot afford a 70’s redux. But man can only do so much. May 9 will determine the trajectory of the country and its population.

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Jezile Torculas has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science. She is an Assistant Editor at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from Wikimedia Commons

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Children should not pay for the sins of their parents.  But in some cases, a healthy suspicion of the offspring is needed, notably when it comes to profiting off ill-gotten gains. It is certainly needed in the case of Filipino politician and presidential candidate Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, who stands to win on May 9.

Bongbong’s father was the notorious strongman Ferdinand Marcos, his mother, the avaricious, shoe-crazed Imelda.  Elected president in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos indulged in murder, torture and looting.  He thrived on the terrain of violent, corrupt oligarchic politics, characterised by a telling remark from the dejected Sergio Osmenã Jr, whom he defeated in 1969:

“We were outgunned, outgooned, and outgold.”

In 1972, martial law was imposed on the pretext of a failed assassination attempt against the defence secretary, an attack which saw no injuries nor apprehension of suspects.  It was only formally lifted in 1981.  Under the blood-soaked stewardship of the Marcos regime, 70,000 warrantless arrests were made, and 4,000 people killed.

The Philippines duly declined in the face of monstrous cronyism, institutional unaccountability and graft, becoming one of the poorest in South-East Asia.  While Marcos Sr’s own official salary never rose above $13,500 a year, he and his cronies made off with $10 billion.  (Estimates vary.)  When revolutionaries took over the Presidential palace, they found garishly ornate portraits, 15 mink coats, 508 couture gowns and over 3,000 pairs of Imelda’s designer shoes.

Fleeing the Philippines in the wake of the popular insurrection of 1986 led by Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the Marcoses found sanctuary in the bosom of US protection, taking up residence in Hawaii.

Opinion polls show that Bongbong is breezing his way to office, a phenomenon that has little to do with his personality, sense of mind, or presence.  A Pulse Asia survey conducted in February showed voter approval at an enviable 60 percent.  This would suggest that the various petitions seeking to disqualify him have had little effect on perceptions lost in the miasma of myth and speculation.

All this points to a dark concatenation of factors that have served to rehabilitate his family’s legacy.  For the student aware of the country’s oligarchic politics, this is unlikely to come as shocking.  For one, the Marcoses have inexorably found their way back into politics, making their way through the dynastic jungle.

Imelda, for all her thieving ways, found herself serving in the House of Representatives four times and unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in 1992.  Daughter Imee became governor of the province of Ilocos Norte in 2010, and has been serving as a senator since 2019.  Marcos Jr followed a similar trajectory, becoming a member of congress and senator and doing so with little distinction.  In 2016, he contested the vice presidency and lost.

Bongbong has already done his father proud at various levels, not least exhibiting a tendency to fabricate his past.  On the touchy issue of education, Oxford University has stated at various points that Marcos Jr, while matriculating at St. Edmund Hall in 1975, never took a degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.  According to the institution’s records, “he did not complete his degree, but was awarded a special diploma in Social Studies in 1978.”

A statement from the Oxford Philippines Society remarks that,

“Marcos failed his degree’s preliminary examinations at the first attempt.  Passing the preliminary examinations is a prerequisite for continuing one’s studies and completing a degree at Oxford University.”

The issue was known as far back as 1983, when a disturbed sister from the Religious of the Good Shepherd wrote to the university inquiring about the politician’s credentials and received a letter confirming that fact.

Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte, whose own rule has been characterised by populist violence and impunity, has played his role in the rehabilitative process.  In 2016, almost three decades after dying in Hawaii, Duterte gave permission for Ferdinand Marcos to be buried with full military honours in Manila’s National Heroes’ Cemetery.  The timing of the burial was kept secret, prompting Vice President Leni Robredo to describe the ceremony as “a thief in the night”.

A coalition of Jesuit groups claimed that the interring of Marcos in Manila “buries human dignity by legitimising the massive violations of human and civil rights… that took place under his regime.”  Duterte would have appreciated the mirror-effect of the move, a respectful nod from one human rights abuser to another.  Under his direction, thousands of drug suspects have been summarily butchered.

Bongbong has also taken the cue, rehabilitating his parents using a polished, digital campaign of re-invention that trucks in gold age nostalgia and delusion.  Political raw material has presented itself.  The gap between the wealthy and impoverished, which his father did everything to widen, has not been closed by successive governments.  According to 2021 figures from the Philippine Statistics Authority, 24 percent of Filipinos, some 26 million people, live below the poverty line.

Videos abound claiming that his parents were philanthropists rather than figures of predation.  The issue of martial law brutality has all but vanished in the narrative.  Social media and online influencers have managed the growth of this image through a coordinated campaign of disinformation waged across multiple platforms.

Gemma B. Mendoza of the Philippine news platform Rappler has noted the more sinister element of these efforts.  Even as the legacy of a family dictatorship is being burnished, the press and critics are being hounded.  The only movement standing in the way of Family Marcos is Vice President Robredo, who triumphed over Marcos Jr in 2016.  Her hope is a brand of politics nourished by grassroots participation rather than shameless patronage.

The same cannot be said of the political classes who operate on the central principle of Philippine politics: impunity. This, at least, is how the political scientist Aries Arugay of the University of Philippines sees it.

“We just don’t jail our politicians or make them accountable … we don’t punish them, unlike South Korean presidents.”

The opposite is the case, and as the voters make it to the ballot on Monday, the country, if polls are to be believed, will see another Marcos in the presidential palace.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Wikimedia Commons

Noise Matters: Wind Farms, Nuisance and the Law

May 4th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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***

For years, the Australian wind farm has been reviled as ugly, noisy and unendearing by a certain number of prominent figures.  Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott pathologized them, calling wind turbines the “dark satanic mills of the modern era”, being not merely aesthetically problematic but damaging to health.

The latter view has been rejected by the National Health and Medical Research Council, which found “no consistent evidence that wind farms cause adverse health effects in humans” though it accepted at the time “that further high quality research on the possible health effects of wind farms is required.”  Literature examining the nature of wind farm complaints also notes “large historical and geographical differences in the distribution of complainants in Australia.”

Current Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce is another figure who never misses a chance to question the broader use of wind power.  In New South Wales, where his electorate is based, he has warned the NSW government to “be careful” about using more turbines.  “It’s not a bowl of cherries in this space,” the Nationals leader gnomically observed, “and that’s why you’ve got to keep your base load power going.”

This has placed him at odds with the State government and its renewable energy agenda.  Criticism of the New England renewable energy zone as turning his electorate “into a sea of wind farms” did not impress NSW agriculture minister Adam Marshall in December 2020.  In The Land newspaper, Marshall, who is also a member of the Nationals, regarded such criticism as “banal and binary and prehistoric”.

On March 25, the Victorian Supreme Court gave private citizens some cause for joy, and policy makers and corporations a potential cause for concern, in challenging the way such farms operate.  The judgement found that the noise from the Bald Hills Wind Farm based at Tarwin Lower in South Gippsland, “caused substantial interference with both plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their land – specifically, their ability to sleep undisturbed at night, in their own beds in their own homes.”

There had been a sufficient nuisance to warrant the awarding of damages and an injunction on the company from continuing to cause the noise at night, Bald Hills having failed to establish “that the sound received at either [the plaintiffs’ houses] complied with noise conditions in the permit at any time.”  While the relevant Minister for Planning might “initiate enforcement action”, it was up to the court or tribunal to determine whether compliance had taken place.

The two individuals in question – John Zakula and Noel Uren – sued the wind farm in 2021 claiming the infliction of “roaring” noise by the wind turbines.  It transpires that Bald Hills had form of the most condescending sort.  Since commencing operations in 2015, it had received “many complaints from neighbouring residents and landowners about noise from wind turbines.”  In 2015 alone, the Bald Hill complaints register recorded 50 complaints, some from Uren and Zakula, and all about noise disruption.

The company’s behaviour in responding to the complaints did not impress the court.  Justice Melinda Richards decided that awarding aggravated damages was entirely appropriate.  “The manner in which Bald Hills dealt with the plaintiffs’ reasonable and legitimate complaints of noise, over many years, at least doubled the impact of the loss of amenity each of them suffered at their homes.”  The judge decided that Uren should receive $46,000 in aggravated damages, with Zakula to pocket $84,000.

Justice Richards was not amiss to the implications of such a decision.  Unlike the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, she showed no signs of pre-historic tendencies in her reasoning.  Wind power generation, she accepted, was “a socially beneficial activity”.  There was no reason, however, why it was not “possible to achieve both a good night’s sleep and power generation at the same time.”  The evidence presented to the court “did not suggest […] that there is a binary choice to be made between the generation of clean energy by the wind farm, and a good night’s sleep for its neighbours.”  The company could well have responded to the complaints of Uren and Zakula adequately “while continuing to generate renewable energy.”

When seen in its more specific context, the decision furnishes the renewable energy sector with a critical lesson.  Even when engaged in socially responsible activities – in this case, renewable energy production – companies must be mindful of the implications of their behaviour to neighbouring residents.  Being green and environmentally sound are noble ventures, but hardly enough when it comes to inflicting a nightmare upon residents.

Dominica Tannock, representing both plaintiffs, suggested after her clients’ victory that, “The implications are corporate Australia will have to be very careful about complaints.”  It was incumbent on the company to behave reasonably, fairly and “protect people’s sleep and if they don’t there is a precedent [now that] they can be shut down.”

The owner of the Bald Hills Wind Farm, Infrastructure Capital Group, said little in a statement response to the ruling, merely that it was “currently absorbing the judgment and its implications”.  They will not be the only ones.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: A July 2017 holiday at Walkerville allowed me to explore South Gippsland and views of Wilsons Promontory, the Bald Hills wind farm and Cape Liptrap coastal reserve. (Source: John Englart/Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0)

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***

He has been seen, not always accurately, as the more moderate in an otherwise conservative Liberal Party, which has governed Australia since 2013 in an at times troubled alliance with the Nationals.  He has served as party deputy to Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and proudly promotes his role as the country’s treasurer during the COVID-19 pandemic.

But Josh Frydenberg is nervous.  There is also reason to suggest that he might even be panicking.  The electorate he represents – that of Kooyong – is not quite so warm towards the sitting member as it has been in the past.  The sitting MP has resorted to his home party base for comfort.  “Incredible sea of Liberal blue at our Kooyong Campaign Launch, with more than 1,000 people present,” he tweeted on May 1.  “So much energy in the room.”

The sitting member was certainly correct about the energy, in so far as it went to the head of one of his supporters in attendance.  After voicing public approval for Frydenberg (“Liberals will win because of Josh”), volunteer Phil Elwood proceeded to become an impromptu “birdman”, imitating the sound of a Kookaburra and Sulphur-crested Cockatoo with gusto.  Many political candidates have feared the distractions of the eccentric, dedicated supporter.

The seat has also been given licks and lashings of Liberal blue, with posters, placards and paraphernalia saturating the suburb. But all this extravagant expense of reminder in a seat traditionally held by the Liberals, there is a nagging feeling that a rude shock awaits on May 21.

That rude shock comes in the form of independent candidate Monique Ryan.  “A vote for Dr Monique Ryan,” runs the standard line, “is a vote for climate action, integrity and a strong economy.”  From her perspective, and those of similar candidates in other safe Liberal Party seats – Goldstein, Wentworth, North Sydney – the first two priorities, which have tended to find their way at the bottom end of the government’s list, stand out.

The Morrison government has made a name for itself in the field of corruption and a lack of accountability verging on the grotesque.  Its members have shown little contrition on being exposed.  In December 2020, when it was revealed that Morrison and Frydenberg had run up a bill of almost $5,000 for using the PM’s jet to attend Lachlan Murdoch’s 2018 Christmas party, it barely stirred a murmur.

Writing with some disgust about the episode, Nick Feik asked the relevant question: “How did we get to the point where the misuse of public money by our two most senior politicians provoked neither contrition nor embarrassment, and it scarcely even registered as a scandal?”

This is certainly not the case for the “teal independents”, who are insisting that the Liberal Party account for its sins and call out scandals and sleaze.  They also support the establishment of an integrity commission with fangs, something which, according to a poll conducted by The Australia Institute, is endorsed by three in four Australians.

The momentum of such candidates has caused an outbreak of sweat among the sitting members.  Frydenberg, for one, has resorted to attacking Ryan in a coarse, personal way.  A central strategy, one fabulously juvenile and ill-informed, is to assume that an independent candidate can never, by definition, be independent.  She would, for instance, have been incapable of flirting with various sides of politics in the past, to have voted for different and differing parties at different elections.  She could not have been a swinging voter, but instead an unwavering member of a tribe from the outset.

This ossified veneration of the unchanging political mind came to the fore in remarks made by Frydenberg about Ryan’s own alleged lack of independence, telling his supporters that he was not “up against a true independent.  I’m up against a political party.”  Dark forces, he insinuates, lurk, and he risks being a victim of puppetry – the workings of the Climate 200 group created by clean energy advocate Simon Holmes à Court, or the “Voice of” movement.

He has even gone so far as to throw in anecdotes of desperation, including a chance meeting with the independent candidate’s mother-in-law, whom he had apparently bumped into at a “local café”.  On receiving the good news that she would be voting for him, he recalled the answer: “Because you know what you’re doing and you’re a nice person.”

This march of the independents has terrified other former politicians such as John Howard, Liberal Prime Minister of Australia between 1996 and 2007.  He has made it his personal mission to convince voters that the independent candidates are “anti-Liberal groupies” who do not represent the “middle ground”.

Showing a total lack of understanding as to how reactionary his own party became, largely due to his own demagogic handiwork, Howard could only wonder why the independent movement had not expressed an interest in running candidates against the Labor Party.  “The only consequence of a victory for one of these will be to reduce the prospects of the Liberal Party forming the next government.  It’s as simple as that.”  That, you would think, is the point of the matter.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from @JoshFrydenberg/Twitter

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***

The hysteria in Canberra and Washington over the Sino-Solomon Islands security pact has shown, again, how irrelevant the individual affairs of Pacific Island states are in the chess game of geopolitics. The one thing conspicuously missing has been the issue of climate change, near and dear to those whose lands are gradually being inundated by rising sea levels.

In a desperate attempt to understand why Honiara courted Chinese interest in defiance of Australian wishes, opposition Labor figures pointed the finger at climate change.  Australia’s sniffly approach to such a vital issue was key in pushing the country into the arms of Beijing.  According to the Shadow Education Minister Tanya Plibersek, Canberra had “left a vacuum” on the matter.  Senator Penny Wong stated the obvious in remarking that Pacific leaders had been less than impressed by the Morrison government’s indifference to climate change as the “number one economic and national issue”.

The indifference, even contempt shown by Canberra to that most existential of concerns has made itself present on several occasions.  In September 2015, banter ensued between Immigration Minister Peter Dutton waiting alongside Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Social Services Minister Scott Morrison.  Abbott recalled the rather casual approach to punctuality that had taken place at a Pacific Islands Forum meeting the previous day in Papua New Guinea.  “Time doesn’t mean anything,” remarked Dutton, “when you’re about to have water lapping at your door.”

In August 2019, Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama was already giving signals that a turning might well be in the offing.  After the Pacific Island nations summit held that month, Bainimarama noted how Morrison had been “very insulting, very condescending”, behaviour that had hardly been “good for the relationship” with Pacific Island states.  The Chinese, on the other hand, “don’t insult us.”  They did not “go down and tell the world that we’ve given this much money to the Pacific Islands.  They don’t do that.  They’re good people, definitely better than Morrison.”

Australia’s then Deputy Prime Minister, Michael McCormack, had also caught the attention of the Fijian PM for less than flattering observations.  In remarks published in the Guardian, Morrison’s deputy made light of the environmental threats posed to the region’s states.  They would continue to survive, he suggested, “because many of their workers come here to pick our fruit, pick our own fruit grown with hard Australian enterprise and endeavour”.  Such states would also “continue to survive on large aid assistance from Australia.”

The comments drew criticism from the former Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who stated the matter in terms the most simple, coal-loving politician could understand.  “If you are a Pacific Islander and your home is going to be washed away from rising sea levels caused by global warming then this is not a political issue, it’s an existential one.”

Despite such remarks, the Morrison government remained deaf.  In 2020, it was still hostile to the idea of committing to net zero carbon emissions by 2050.  Fourteen Pacific leaders responded by penning an open letter to the Prime Minister.  Made up of former presidents, prime ministers, archbishops and church leaders, the authors took issue with Australia’s “current Paris Agreement emission reduction target” as “one of the weakest among wealthy nations.”

The letter condemned Canberra’s practice of using Kyoto Protocol carryover credits “which legally cannot, and morally should not, be used to meet Australia’s 2030 Paris Agreement target”.  As the children and grandchildren of the region faced “unprecedented risks due to climate change, now is the time to stand together and work together to secure their future safety and prosperity.”

Wilful blindness to the region on the subject of climate security has persisted, with Dutton, now Defence Minister, adamant that Canberra had “a fantastic relationship with the Solomon Islands”.  Using the ugly, infantilising language of “the Pacific family,” which presumably is made up of hectoring parents and obedient children, who the children are is never in doubt.  “As part of the Pacific family, it is obvious we want to work together and we want to resolve the issues within that family, within our region.” Some issues are just bigger than others.

While Wong and Plibersek are trying to squeeze every bit of critical comment about the Sino-Solomon Islands pact, it was only one aspect of the broader condescension that powers have shown to the smaller states in the region.  In all the fuss and angst about the Honiara-Beijing agreement and whether it would permit the stationing of Chinese military personnel, the Pacific Elders’ Voice had to reiterate “that the primary security threat to the Pacific is climate change.”

The group also recalled the content of the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security: “We affirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitments to progress and the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

For the elders, the major powers “including the US, Japan and Australia, are developing strategies and policies for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ with little, if any, consultation with the Pacific Island countries.”  The Pacific region comprising states – known as the Moana – faced “a set of unique challenges.”  It was primarily those countries, not external powers, who should determine the security and future of the region.  Accordingly, all nations were called upon “to respect the sovereignty of all Pacific Island countries and the right of Pacific peoples to develop and implement their own security strategies without undue coercion from outsiders.”

The observation is well-reasoned and well-meant; but those same external powers, goggle-eyed about nuclear-powered submarines, the establishment of rival military bases and geopolitical strutting, have long ignored the sovereign wishes of those in the Pacific.  It is a nasty habit that persists, even as sea levels rise.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from USGS

Cambodia on Middle Path Between China and Vietnam

April 29th, 2022 by David Hutt

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In 2021, Cambodia’s trade with neighboring Vietnam rose 75% to US$9.3 billion, a little less than $2 billion away from the volume of trade between Cambodia and China. 

Vietnamese foreign minister Bui Thanh Son, who visited Phnom Penh in February, reckons bilateral trade could top the $10 billion mark in 2022, which seems a feasible objective. Last December, several important bilateral trade and cooperation agreements were signed during a visit from Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Vietnam’s president.

Cambodia’s trade with Vietnam was worth only $3.8 billion in 2017, meaning a 144% increase has been seen over the past five years. By comparison, Cambodia’s trade with China was worth $11.1 billion in 2021, up 91% from $5.8 billion in 2017.

“China and Vietnam strategic and economic competition in Cambodia has been ongoing for a long time, and will only intensify when both China and Vietnam want to maintain and strengthen their influence over Phnom Penh,” said Le Hong Hiep, a senior fellow at the Vietnam Studies Program at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

The Vietnamese invaded Cambodia in late 1978 to oust the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime, which was backed by Beijing. China responded by launching border incursions on Vietnam, while Hanoi continued to prop up the socialist-lite government in Cambodia throughout the 1980s.

Hun Sen, Cambodia’s prime minister since 1985, was tutored by Vietnamese diplomats. His ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) was founded by Khmer Rouge defectors, including himself, who returned to Cambodia alongside Vietnamese forces to oust the genocidal regime in January 1979.

But Vietnam’s leverage over Cambodia waned in the 1990s, as the country normalized its international relations. The US and Japan were key partners in that decade. By the early 2010s, however, China was in the hot seat. Today, Cambodia is regarded as Beijing’s most loyal partner in Southeast Asia.

This competition between China and Vietnam for influence “will be a good thing for Cambodia as long as it can maintain a fine balance between the two neighbors,” he added.

By one logic, 21st-century geopolitics is shaped by trade. It has, for some, become more “geoeconomics” than geopolitics: countries that trade heavily with both the US and China don’t want to pick sides, and trade mandates neutrality.

That theory finds difficulty with Cambodia, which has swung towards Beijing, and massively away from the US, in recent years.

Phnom Penh has not only cut military ties with the US, but also accused Washington of plotting a coup with the now-banned opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP).

Elite opinion in Cambodia is massively shifting towards China. In the latest State of Southeast Asia survey, released annually by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, respondents were asked if ASEAN was forced to align itself with one of the two strategic rivals, the US or China, which one should it choose?

Some 81.5% of Cambodian respondents reckon the regional bloc should choose China over the US. Only 46.2% said China in the 2021 survey. What’s more, 25.9% of Cambodian respondents now see China as “a benign and benevolent power,” compared with only 3.8% last year.

If Cambodia-Vietnam trade becomes more on par with Cambodia-China trade, can Phnom Penh be expected to take more into consideration Hanoi’s geopolitical sensibilities, which are often in direct opposition to Beijing’s?

Both Vietnam and China contest the same territory in the South China Sea. Chinese aggression against Vietnam has ratcheted up in recent years. Yet most analysts don’t think Phnom Penh is about to suddenly steer its interests away from Beijing and closer to Hanoi because of trade.

The Cambodia-Vietnam Friendship Monument in Phnom Penh has been vandalized a number of times over the years. Photo: WikiCommons

“The recent increase in trade reflects the regional economic integration and the level of development in the two countries, but I don’t think it can change the current course of Cambodian alignment with Beijing,” said Nguyen Khac Giang, an analyst at the Victoria University of Wellington.

The capacity for increasing influence is there, he added, noting that some of Vietnam’s largest companies, such as the military-run Viettel conglomerate, have a big presence in the Cambodian economy. “But I’m not convinced Hanoi can win over China in Cambodia,” Giang added.

According to some, it’s all too late in the game for Phnom Penh to scale back its associations with Beijing.

“If China actually is building a naval base at Ream and military-grade airfield at Dara Sakor, then that strongly suggests it has the inside track on Vietnam regardless of the economic angle,” said Derek Grossman, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.

He was referring to allegations that have been made since 2018, including by US officials, that Cambodia is planning to allow China to use its naval base near the coastal city of Sihanoukville, an assertion Phnom Penh denies.

And then there’s the much more complicated question of local politics.

Putting it politely, the Vietnamese are not well-liked in Cambodia, in part because of the Vietnamese occupation of the country after 1979, when Hanoi’s troops invaded to oust the genocidal Khmer Rouge.

That animosity goes back further in history. After the fall of the Khmer Empire in the 15th century, Cambodia was constantly threatened by its neighbors, Siam and Vietnam. Invasions were launched and Cambodia only retained its territory by switching allegiances between either side.

The government of Hun Sen, which has been in power since 1979, and was essentially installed by Hanoi, is still often accused of being a Vietnamese puppet. The now-banned CNRP, the main opposition party, made much political capital by railing against the influence of the yuon, a racist term in Cambodia for the Vietnamese.

A large number of Vietnamese communities in Cambodia, like this one on the Bassac River, have been forced to relocate. Photo: WikiCommons

Kimkong Heng, a visiting senior research fellow at the Cambodia Development Center, wrote in a recent essay for ISEAS that impediments to Cambodia-Vietnam relations remain.

One is land demarcation, a hot-button political issue in Cambodia as certain politicians claim the Vietnamese are still trying to encroach on Cambodian territory. Only 84% of their 1,270-kilometer border has been officially demarcated.

Another problem is ethnic Vietnamese migrants. Heng referenced a claim that there are between 400,000 and 700,000 ethnic Vietnamese in the country, of whom about 90% have no birth certificates or identity cards.

Even though the ruling CPP is less hostile to ethnic Vietnamese than some opposition parties, the government has still carried out forced relocations of entire Vietnamese communities.

There are two other things to watch out for. First, whether the US – which has come down hard on Cambodia in recent years at the same time as exerting much effort to gain leverage in Vietnam – will lobby Hanoi to use its influence in Phnom Penh to alter the Cambodian government’s geopolitical interests.

Cambodia and Vietnam loom large over Washington’s Southeast Asian policy, not least in personnel choices.

W Patrick Murphy, the US ambassador to Phnom Penh, was previously the acting deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Daniel J Kritenbrink, who now occupies that role, was ambassador to Vietnam between 2017 and 2021.

The second is whether the Vietnamese government tries to win over the younger Cambodian officials who are expected to move up the ranks when Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s eldest son, succeeds his father as prime minister sometime this decade, as is widely anticipated.

In December, Cambodia’s ruling party agreed to this dynastic handover and Manet was tasked with forming a “reserve cabinet” around him.

Cambodia’s position between China and Vietnam might undergo some changes as Manet’s dynastic succession slowly develops. It is likely to take on more formal pretenses after next year’s general election at which Manet is likely to be made a cabinet minister and take on more active political duties.

This could go two ways, Heng wrote in his recent essay. “If Hun Manet is to become prime minister and follows in his father’s footsteps to consolidate power and maintain stability in Cambodia’s ties with its neighbors, Cambodia and Vietnam are likely to remain on good terms,” Heng said.

But if Manet was to introduce political reforms and embrace liberal democracy, Cambodia-Vietnam relations “will take a new direction.” A Manet-led ruling party may attempt to compete with the opposition parties in their anti-Vietnamese nationalism.

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Fibbing on Anzac Day

April 26th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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***

April 25, 2022 was one of the less edifying days in the annals of commemorating the fallen.  The day is regarded as special for Australians and New Zealanders for being a solemn occasion, a moment to consider those who gave their lives up for King (or Queen) and country.  In recent decades, militarists and organisers of the occasion have found greater merit in focusing on that nebulous notion of “mateship” – friendship and collective spirit under fire.  This serves as a suitable distraction from those malignant ignoramuses who put them there in the first place.  Barely credible and competent commanders and politicians can be exempt from scrutiny so that the diggers can commune in memories of lost friends and valour.

But this day was a bit different.  There was an election to fight, and Australia’s Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, was going to make the most of the occasion.  There were fibs to be told, myths to hail.  This was no occasion to talk about interest rates, rubbish and roads.  There were veterans, families, and school children to convince or inculcate.  The message: go home, those who cherish peace, and prepare for war.  There were those who came before; there are more to come.

Yet again, it was a day for Morrison to use a naff analysis of the global political situation.  “An arc of autocracy is challenging the rules-based order our grandparents had secured, and democratic freedoms.”  An odd statement to make on a day born from a failed invasion of a sovereign entity, itself cooked up as part of a military gamble by the fiendishly adventurous Winston Churchill.

The dawn service in Darwin heard from the prime minister about another country suffering.  “The world has been reminded in recent weeks that the strength and defence of any nation starts with the citizens themselves.”  This reference was not to Tigray or Yemen.  There was only one war that exercised the Australian leader, one so clear and devoid of historical complexity as to be digestible even to him.  Ukraine, to put it simply, had produced the right sort of refugees – the fair-blue eyed sort – and the right sort of moral baggage to promote during an election campaign.

Then, a statement of the obvious, dressed up as a warning: the defence of a country depended on “the willingness of a people to give all”.  “The defence of Australia depends on us.” Not untrue, but hardly explains the fact that the Commonwealth has only ever genuinely needed to defend its own shores once during its short history.  Other conflicts have seen Australian soldiers as disposable pseudo-Gurkhas, mercenaries for empires, deployed without question and, it should be said, without wisdom, to conflict zones across the globe.  Theirs not to reason why.

Morrison recalled some of these engagements – many defeats in the Gallipoli tradition.  “From Gallipoli to Mosel, from the jungles of Vietnam to the sands of Afghanistan, from the skies above to the oceans below, what has compelled our soldiers, sailors, aviators, nurses and chaplains is the willingness to defend what they love.”  Or at least what they were told to love.

In a manner condescending to the modestly learned and well-studied, the prime minister suggested that veterans of previous conflicts were not “naïve”, appreciating Australia as having a “liberal democratic” system.  This came with freedom of speech, freedom of association, a free press and free elections.  The remark is astonishing, as concepts such as free speech or freedom of association do not exist in Australia in any meaningful way – certainly not constitutionally or as a personal right.  The only thing Australians can rely upon is a watered-down constraint on legislative power known as an implied right to communicate on political subjects.  There is no constitutional personal right vested in a citizen against the government or executive.

As for a free press, Australian federal authorities have raided the homes and offices of journalists, including that of the national broadcaster, the ABC, for publishing and writing about atrocities and violations of civil liberties.  The Australian Federal Police even went so far as to advise the Commonwealth Department of Public Prosecution that it could prosecute ABC journalist Dan Oakes, an important figure behind the publication of the Afghan Files.  A reluctant CDPP decided against it, citing “a range of public interest factors, including the role of public interest journalism in Australia’s democracy”.  Morrison’s idea of Australia as a political nirvana of freedom remains phantasm and fantasy.

Greater fibs then came from Australia’s Defence Minister, Peter Dutton, upon whom the muse of history, Clio, has never smiled sweetly.  This was the occasion to push erroneous comparisons, the sort that any half-competent logician would have dispelled with sour contempt.

On Channel 9, the Minister encouraged peace lovers to prepare for war before searching the historical record for an anchor.  “People like Hitler and others aren’t just a figment of our imagination or that they’re consigned to history,” he stated with implausible authority.  “We have in President [Vladimir] Putin somebody at the moment who is willing to kill women and children.  And that’s happening in the year 2022.”  The Australian-backed Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is also doing the same thing in Yemen, but the House of Saud did not offer useful material.

With Hitler now in the comparative mix, Dutton could expand with comic effect.  The People’s Republic of China, he suggested, could also be compared to Nazi Germany – at least in terms of the latter’s pre-Second World War guise.  Both countries annexed territory, and Germany did so ahead of its invasion of Poland in 1939.

Details were otherwise sketchy, the history student found wanting, but the moral of the tale was clear.  “We have to stand up with countries to stare down any act of aggression to make sure that we can keep peace in our region and for our country.”  No “curling up into a ball”, he advised.  To do so would result in repeating “the mistakes of history.”  With Dutton and Morrison holding the reins of power, such mistakes are guaranteed.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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Abstract

My book Nuclear Bodies: The Global Hibakusha has just been released by Yale University Press. The book is based on more than 10 years of research on the Global Hibakusha Project with my research collaborator Mick Broderick. This article provides a short overview of the book; you can learn more and watch some lectures at the book’s website: Nuclear Bodies: The Global Hibakusha.

Who are the “global hibakusha”? As many of us know, hibakusha is the Japanese word used to refer to those who survived the two nuclear attacks conducted by the United States against the people living in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Those attacks killed between 100,000 and 200,000 human beings instantly, and wounded as many. Hundreds of thousands of survivors were exposed to radiation from the attacks. In the face of this horror, we calm ourselves with the reassuring thought that nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. However, there have been over 2,000 nuclear weapon detonations since then, and because of the size of the weapons and the scale of their effects, millions of people have been exposed to radiation under their fallout clouds, even as the detonations are called “tests.” Millions more have been exposed from nuclear production and nuclear accidents. These millions are the global hibakusha.

Many think of the Cold War as a period in which nuclear weapons were never used. However, statistically, a nuclear weapon was detonated every 8.6 days between 1946 and 1989. In reality nuclear weapons were exploding constantly throughout the Cold War. Nuclear Bodies assesses the consequences for those living close to the locations of those detonations.

Global nuclear weapon test sites.

Nuclear weapons have been tested on every continent except South America and Antarctica. The site with the most nuclear weapon tests on Earth is the Nevada Test Site in the United States with over 900 nuclear weapon detonations. The primary nuclear testing site of the former Soviet Union was in modern day Kazakhstan, with almost 500 nuclear explosions. The people living near test sites have had profound experiences with radioactive fallout. Several nuclear weapon states have conducted tests in the Pacific, the U.S. in the Marshall Islands, the French in French Polynesia and the British in Kiribati. There were more than 200 tests in the Russian Arctic near Scandinavia, including the largest thermonuclear weapon ever detonated.

Distribution of nuclear tests by year.

Testing numbers rose quickly in the early Cold War when most detonations were conducted in the atmosphere, many distributing significant amounts of radioactive fallout far from the test sites. In 1962 there were 178 nuclear weapon tests—statistically, a nuclear detonation virtually every other day throughout that year, including massive hydrogen bomb tests.

While no population was directly attacked with nuclear weapons after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, exposure to radioactive fallout can be understood as an attack. To understand this, it is necessary to grasp how exposure to radioactive waves and radioactive particles differ. When a nuclear weapon is detonated, living creatures are exposed to radiation in two distinct ways. The detonation itself produces a burst of gamma and neutron waves that radiate out from the epicenter. This burst is only one form of the energies that radiate outward from the detonation; the other primary forms being blast and heat. These energies radiate from the epicenter and dissipate as they spread outward. The radioactive waves pass right through most matter they encounter, including buildings and bodies. In Hiroshima, for everyone within 3 kilometers of the detonation, large amounts of radioactive waves passed through your entire body, damaging cells and organs. This happened even if you were inside of a building, since they also passed through the structures. Beyond 3 km the energy of the waves dissipated to a less harmful level. The burst of radioactive waves lasts less than a minute: similar to an x-ray, it is turned on and then off, leaving no radiation behind. Those closest to ground zero may have died in hours, days or weeks. Others slowly developed diseases over the subsequent years and decades, and many experienced early mortality.

Many people were also exposed to radioactive fallout. This is radioactive material in the form of particles: stuff that sticks around. Some is unfissioned material (uranium-235 or plutonium) from the weapon, some are fission products produced by the detonation, and some are particles that are ionized (made radioactive) by the detonation. These particles rise up into the mushroom cloud, and as the cloud spreads downwind they “fall-out” of the cloud to the surface of the Earth. Unlike gamma waves these particles remain radioactive. Some are dangerous only for days or weeks, and some are dangerous for hundreds, or even hundreds of thousands of years. Once they deposit from the cloud to the ground, they can be internalized inside of and often retained by the body. Being chemicals, the body reacts to them as chemicals—it uses them. The body uses iodine in the thyroid gland, so if it internalizes iodine-131, the radioactive isotope of iodine, it puts that in the thyroid too. Strontium-90, produced in significant amounts by nuclear weapon explosions, is chemically similar to calcium, so once internalized the body uses it in the bones and teeth. In 1957, U.S. AEC Commissioner Willard Libby referred to strontium-90 as a “bone seeker.”1 These particles don’t give off large amounts of radiation, but once internalized into the body they emit this energy to the cells immediately around them 24 hours a day.

Where in the body common fallout from radionuclides tends to be retained.

In Hiroshima the mushroom cloud drifted to the northwest and large amounts of fallout came down with rain (precipitation strips particles from the atmosphere) and when combined with the soot from the burning city fell as “Black Rain.” Those who lived in the areas where the black rain fell also began to develop sickness from their exposure to radiation. Most Black Rain sufferers were too far from the city center to have experienced exposure to any of the energetic wave effects of the nuclear attack, blast, heat or radioactive waves. It took a long time for doctors to understand that those exposed to Black Rain were hibakusha—that they were suffering from exposure to radiation. It was just last year, 2021, that these sufferers had their legal rights as hibakusha in Japan recognized by a court decision after decades of litigation.

Why did it take more than 70 years to legally recognize those exposed to radioactive fallout as hibakusha in a country where the legal recognition of harm from radiation (designated status as a hibakusha) had been established 64 years earlier? Much of the invisibility of the Black Rain hibakusha, and of the global hibakusha, is rooted in medical models of harm from radiation.

Soon after the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki it was recognized that the existence of more than 100,000 hibakusha presented an unprecedented research opportunity. Beforehand, the number of people who had been understood to have been exposed to radiation numbered in the hundreds and were spread out over several decades. Medical information about the consequences to human health and mortality from radiation exposure had been extrapolated from these cases, animal studies, and probability models. Because of the use of nuclear weapons on human beings, there was now a massive cohort of radiation-exposed individuals who could be studied collectively to build a much more comprehensive model of what radiation does to human health. The United States established the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in 1946 in both Nagasaki and Hiroshima to begin research on the effects of their exposure to radiation on the hibakusha and their descendants. The most consequential of their studies was the Life Span Study (LSS), begun in 1950 and continuing today by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), the successor laboratory to the ABCC.

The LSS sought to establish a robust database which correlated radiation exposure to subsequent health outcomes. This database was built on two data points, determining how much radiation each participant was exposed to, and tracking their disease history and age of mortality. Building a database on this information for more than 200,000 people was intended to yield a powerful statistical tool to assess risk for anyone exposed to radiation in the future: if an exposure dose is known, the statistical probability for various health effects can be predicted. There are various problems in the design of the study, for example the fact that participants’ dose reconstruction was done based partly on memory and interviews (less than ideal sources for statistical data components). Nevertheless, it is a widely respected and globally cited study. It is often referred to as the “gold standard” of radiation health effects data.

For my work, the most important thing about the LSS is that it only considered external exposure. Participants’ dose is reconstructed wholly based on their estimated exposure to the burst of radioactive waves in the minute of the detonation. There is no information about harm from internalizing radionuclides. There are very good reasons for this parameter. In the 1950s it was not possible to determine whether someone had internalized a radioactive particle; whole body counters, which can make that assessment, each weighing 60 tons, only became available in 1964. Additionally, hundreds of thousands of people had been in the area affected by the massive burst of gamma rays, so working to compile information about their exposures and health outcomes was a massive research endeavor.

As Susan Lindee has pointed out, many imagined the future would be one in which many nuclear weapons would be used in warfare, feeling that “[A]ll conjectures about the nature of the imagined post-war world must be drawn on the experiences at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”2 But this was not what occurred. Nuclear weapons have never again been used directly in military conflict. The experiences of the hibakusha in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not become common. What did happen is that 520 nuclear weapons would be tested in the atmosphere and create fallout clouds that spread radionuclides downwind. What became common was the experiences of the people who endured the Black Rain—the people it has taken 76 years to recognize as victims of exposure to radiation in the country most legally accepting of such status. Internal exposures, not external exposures, is what the Cold War wrought.

When communities downwind from nuclear test sites claimed to be suffering from health problems because of their exposures, invariably the nation that irradiated them, and their local government (if separate), would cite the LSS to dismiss their claims. With rare exceptions, local externally measurable levels of radiation were not high enough to correlate with expected health problems when using the database. This was the wrong tool for the job. The LSS predicted health outcomes after exposures to a single massive exposure to external radiation. However, the people downwind from the test sites were internalizing particles, as had those in the areas of Black Rain. Measurable levels of radioactive rays may have been low, but the presence of radioactive particles in their ecosystems put them at risk, and for many, affected their health. The LSS tells us nothing about the risks to health from internalizing radiation. It was not useful for assessing or maintaining community health, but it was useful for dismissing the claims of fallout victims and deflecting monetary and political liability. This has been the screen behind which the nuclear weapon states maintained the brutality of their nuclear testing programs, and the invisibility of the harm caused to those beneath the fallout clouds.

Other cohorts of global hibakusha have experienced different modes of contamination, but the routes of exposure are similar: internalizing radioactive particles. Many uranium miners have inhaled uranium particles and it has long been known that there is a high incidence of lung cancer among them. The presence of immense piles of uranium tailings alongside mines, left behind by operators when mines are abandoned, have long polluted the water, food and homes of those living in the area. A 2019 studydetermined that more than 25% of mothers and infants born in the Navajo Nation had extremely high levels of uranium in their bodies, even though active mining had ceased there by the mid-1980s.

Those who live near plutonium production facilities (nuclear reactors and chemical separation plants) as at Hanford, Washington, or uranium processing facilities that play a role in the enrichment of uranium, find high levels of radionuclides in the water, food and soil of their ecosystems. The “Green Run” experiment at Hanford in 1949, in which nuclear fuel was processed to extract plutonium when it was “green,” (without waiting for short-lived radionuclides to decay) so that intelligence might be gathered that could help assessments of the plutonium production capacity of the Mayak facility (the Soviet Union’s Hanford site) led to a massive release of iodine-131 that contaminated most of Eastern Washington and Central Oregon (seriously, click the link and read about this). This radioiodine surely made it into the milk consumed by the majority of the children living in the region. A plume of radioactive water leaking from the Hanford Tank Farm has been migrating towards the Columbia River for decades. People live, farm and raise families in the area. Radioactive waste from the Mallinckrodt Company which operated uranium processing facilities in and around St. Louis during the Manhattan Project and the Cold War, was buried and abandoned in several locations. Several tons ended up in the West Lake Landfill in Coldwater Creek, Missouri. A 2014 report by the state of Missouri found that the presence of the waste had caused a significant increase in cancers to those living nearby, something which they had become viscerally aware of before the study. Even more concerning is that an underground fire has been burning in the landfill for years, moving steadily closer to the radioactive waste. If the waste was to catch fire, the risk for residents, and anyone downwind of the fire, would be catastrophic. This is not the first fire to have burned in the landfill. These are just two of more than 100 weapon production sites in the United States that require remediation from radiation and toxic chemicals, and that have harmed nearby populations.

Nuclear reactors were invented by the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons: they were developed before nuclear weapons. I have argued elsewhere that nuclear power was “born violent.” Since their invention, nuclear fuel melting has occurred roughly once per decade. There were two major nuclear accidents within 11 days in 1957 at military reactors used to manufacture plutonium (Mayak in the former Soviet Union and Windscale in the UK). In 1986, unit #4 exploded at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in Ukraine, in the former Soviet Union. A fire burned in the melted reactor core for over two weeks, belching radioactive fallout over vast sections of Europe. You can view a reconstruction of the spread of the fallout from the 1957 Windscale Fire over much of the UK and Northern Europe utilizing weather data and modern computer modeling here.

A map showing the distribution of cesium-137 from that fallout plume that remains measurable on the ground in Europe 30 years after the disaster.

This cesium-137 continues to show up in food products throughout Europe every year, especially jams, mushrooms and wild boar (who eat the mushrooms). While we think of Chernobyl as a disaster that occurred in the past, it continues to present risk to people living far from the site who were not yet born. The triple meltdowns at Fukushima spread radioactive clouds throughout the region, with the primary deposition of fallout being to the northwest of the plants. There too, cesium-137 continues to spreadthrough the ecosystem. As a chemical, cesium-137 is very adept at migrating in nature. It easily passes from air to soil to water to plants to biota. It remains radioactively dangerous for about 300 years, meaning that once it has deposited and embedded into an ecosystem, centuries of risk will follow. In towns affected by the fallout in Northern Japan from the 3.11 Fukushima nuclear meltdown, the government engages in “decontamination.” However, the towns being decontaminated are surrounded by contaminated mountains and forests. It cannot be separated from the larger ecosystem, so although soil can be placed in plastic bags and moved “somewhere else,” the particles embedded in the ecosystem surrounding the town will migrate back in with rain and wind and the natural dynamics of life. I argued last year in this journalthat you cannot draw a circle in nature which allows you to successfully isolate the inner circle from the natural world that envelopes it. We must understand such contaminations as holistic events that will affect a large ecosystem over a broad period of time. Human beings are a part of those ecosystems, we are also embedded in them.

Because the dangers from these radionuclides are widely dispersed in both space and time, we can have no certainty whether we or our loved ones will suffer, or will navigate between the raindrops of risk. This uncertainty can itself be destabilizing even if sickness never comes. For those who lived here in Hiroshima and in Nagasaki after the nuclear attacks, no one knew who might develop cancer or other radiogenic diseases, and who would live to old age: many who never got sick spent lifetimes worrying. Those living where the fallout deposited from Chernobyl, from Fukushima, and from the dozens of nuclear test sites can’t be certain what their risks are, and where dangers lie. Living in a particle rich environment can bring deep stress and anxiety, separate from illness. Everyone in such a situation worries about the health of their loved ones, especially children.

Defenders of nuclear technologies have pathologized such anxieties, calling them “radiophobia.” This they define as an “irrational” fear of radiation, and present it as a mental health diagnosis. I argue that when long-lived radioactive particles deposit into the ecosystem where you live, and from where your food is obtained, anxiety is a rational response. Chastising those living through such events as irrational because they are worried is cruel. It is victim blaming. People who find themselves downwind from nuclear fallout clouds, whether from weapon detonations or reactor accidents need support, not disdain.

This inclination to focus on public perceptions and relations in response to radiological contamination has been endemic throughout and since the Cold War. When former contaminated sites of U.S. nuclear weapons production are shut down, they are not simply remediated, they get a toxic make-over and are presented as pristine nature preserves. The Rocky Flats Plant outside Denver is where the U.S. deposited the plutonium produced at Hanford and Savannah River into pits—the fissile cores of nuclear weapons. It was the site of multiple fires that dispersed aerosolized plutonium across wide areas. In 1989, a task force made up of officials from the FBI and the EPA conducted an unprecedented raid on the DOE facility and found mind boggling violations of environmental regulations in the routine practices at Rocky Flats. The raid led to the end of pit production and the closure of the site. At the time operations ceased at the plant, there were 3 metric tons of plutonium onsite. Early estimates outlined a 65-year remediation process that would cost almost $40 billion, yet, just twenty years later the Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge opened to the public, sporting 18 km of hiking trails. Why this cosplay? Wasn’t it enough to simply close down the site and keep the public out? The Colorado Front Range, where the Refuge is located, is laden with beautiful and accessible nature reserves and hiking trails. The Rocky Flats National Wildlife Refuge offered nothing specifically new or valuable to the community. This was not just done at Rocky Flats, multiple former nuclear weapon production facilities experienced rhinoplasty to be returned to society as access points to the natural world in a spectacular effort at nuclear greenwashing. Nuclear weapon sites across the globe have also been greenwashed. Apparently, following the remediation of the sites is the remediation of our memories.

Writing in a 2018 report intended for internal distribution only, Roger and Linda Meade described how, “When Trinity’s radioactive debris contaminated the grain fields of the Midwest, the response was to move testing to the Marshall Islands, where the seemingly empty ocean that [sic] would swallow any radioactive fallout. This scheme worked until Bravo demonstrated that the world was not big enough to hide the radioactive fallout from thermonuclear detonations.”3 Throughout the history of nuclear weapon testing there has always been a careful selecting of the irradiated. As pointed out above, once it was understood that the Trinity Test had spread fallout inside the United States, the U.S. moved its nuclear testing program outside of the continental United States when testing resumed one year later. Not wanting to expose Americans to radioactive fallout, they selected the Marshallese as acceptable to irradiate.

All nations that tested nuclear weapons in the atmosphere made similar calculations. The Soviets chose Kazakhstan as their test site, a place that First Deputy Premier Beria claimed was “uninhabited.” The Kazakhs were both ethnically and religiously different than the dominant Russian population. Both the British and the French never tested one of their nuclear weapons inside their own countries; they conducted all of their weapons tests in former or current colonial spaces. The British first tested in Australia, far from the cities populated with white Australians, on the lands of several indigenous communities. Because of the scale of the fallout clouds from thermonuclear weapons, the Aussies refused to let them be tested in Australia, so the British conducted their H-bomb tests on Christmas Island in Kiribati. The French first tested in Algeria while it was still a colony, and during the Algerian War of Independence. Knowing that they were losing the war, even as they tested in Algeria they began to build a second site in a second colony, French Polynesia. The Chinese tested in the far western Xinjiang Province, the traditional home of the Uyghur people, again, both ethnically and religiously distinct from the Han Chinese population. Chinese hostility towards the Uyghur people continues today.

No nation tested nuclear weapons upwind from their own economically powerful and politically resourced populations. When the U.S. built a second test site in the continental United States it was placed amidst Native American and Hispanic communities, and just upwind from majority Mormon populations in Southern Utah. There was a protocol at the Nevada Test Site to not test when the wind was forecasted to blow to the south, which would carry the fallout clouds to Las Vegas and Los Angeles, but to test when the winds were forecast to blow to the east: again, selecting the irradiated.4

These decisions were made because it was clear that exposure to radioactive fallout was dangerous. This was understood militarily even before the Trinity Test. Both the U.S. and the Soviet military discussed dropping sand laden with uranium particles from airplanes to kill enemy troops and contaminate enemy territory during World War Two. When the Allied forces came ashore on Normandy Beach on D-Day in 1944, personnel carried Geiger Counters because of fears that the Nazis might have salted the beaches with uranium to contaminate and sicken the attackers.

The first postwar tests conducted in 1946 by the U.S. at Bikini Atoll in Operation Crossroads were an unmitigated radiological disaster. The second test, the Baker Test, was detonated underwater which meant that all of the radionuclides that would normally rise up into a cloud and be dispersed downwind simply remained in the water of the lagoon. As U.S. military personnel continued to work in the lagoon their exposure to radiation rose day after day until the Joint Task Force conducting the tests had to evacuate the 40,000 troops and scuttle the planned third test. This setback still enabled a detailed and extensive study of how radionuclides move through an ecosystem on the part of marine biologists working for the Atomic Energy Commission. Here is a film that they produced about their work in which they refer to Bikini Atoll as a “radiobiological laboratory.”

The top-secret 1947 report on Operation Crossroads included a chilling and clear understanding of the use of radioactive fallout as a weapon, and as a means of inducing terror in a population:

  1. Test Baker gave evidence that the detonation of a bomb in a body of water contiguous to a city would vastly enhance its radiation effects by the creation of a base surge whose mist, contaminated with fission products, and dispersed by wind over great areas, would have not only an immediately lethal effect, but would establish a long-term hazard through the contamination of structures by the deposition of radiological particles.
  2. We can form no adequate mental picture of the multiple disasters which would befall a modern city, blasted by one or more atomic bombs and enveloped with radioactive mists. Of the survivors in contaminated areas, some would be doomed to die of radiation sickness in hours, some in days, and others in years. But, these areas, irregular in size and shape, as wind and topography might form them, would have no visible boundaries. No survivor could be certain he was not among the doomed and so, added to every terror of the moment, thousands would be stricken with a fear of death and the uncertainty of the time of its arrival.5

There is no ambiguity in the understanding that the U.S. military had of the effects, and the military utility, of radioactive fallout immediately after the third of what would be more than 2,000 nuclear tests. Communities of people affected by the radioactive fallout from U.S. (and other nations’) nuclear tests would understand precisely what was being described in this report, even as the militaries that irradiated them dismissed their claims and concerns.

This is a question posed in the book: when is a test an attack? The massive cloud from the Bravo Test at Bikini Atoll in 1954 killed a Japanese fisherman located over 100 miles away from the hypocenter, and sickened hundreds on other fishing boats and multiple downwind atolls. American and Soviet nuclear war planners both recognized and integrated the capacity of large fallout clouds to kill both combatants and “laborers” downwind from detonation points into nuclear targeting strategies. This understanding of fallout clouds led President Kennedy to warn Americans in the fall of 1961 that the most damaging aspect of a potential Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would be deadly fallout clouds that extended for hundreds of miles. Yet, Kennedy approved 96 nuclear weapon tests for the following year, including those involving thermonuclear weapons. The thermonuclear tests were all kept in the Pacific to spare Americans from the deadly clouds Kennedy warned about. By selecting who would not be subjected to those clouds he was also selecting who would be.

The Cold War was a limited nuclear war. Since no population was attacked directly with the weapons, and no one was subjected to the blast and heat of the detonations, it was never classified as a nuclear war. However, millions of people were subjected to radioactive fallout and had their bodies, their land and seas contaminated with radionuclides. The Cold War nuclear war was limited—limited to this one effect, the fallout radiation—the effect that President Kennedy said “could account for the major part of the casualties.”6 But residents of the Kazakh villages located 30 km from the Polygon where more than one hundred atmospheric nuclear tests were conducted, including several H-bombs (and more than 300 underground tests) endured ongoing attacks from the effects of nuclear weapons.

Map of villages downwind of the Polygon in Kazakhstan.

The book concludes with some reframing of our understanding of nuclear waste. I make several arguments, the first being that we need to recognize that the deadliest of our high-level nuclear waste, the spent fuel from operating reactors or making weapons, is the most consequential thing ever produced by the human species. Long after our cities have crumbled, long after our languages are incomprehensible, long after our gods are dead, our spent nuclear fuel will still be here. Several hundred thousand metric tons (currently) of spent nuclear fuel, laden with uranium and plutonium, will still be intact and dangerous to living creatures for thousands of generations. It may be how our descendants know us: the people who made the nuclear waste that they have to live with.

We plan to build deep geological repositories (DGRs) to store this waste. This means making vast containment structures half a kilometer underground that must remain intact and dry for 100,000 years. A great deal of scientific planning and testing is going into this effort, and using the KBS-3 method developed in Sweden, the Onkalo site in Finland will soon be placing the first spent fuel in human history into “permanent” storage. Work has been done on the geological nature of the site itself, the construction of the copper canisters that will hold the spent fuel rods, and bentonite clay that will backfill the site upon completion, and multiple additional segments of the plan. This is all very solid and reliable research. However, what we can grasp in a few decades of research and what eventuates over 100,000 years are unlikely to line up perfectly. As for all human technological endeavors, we will probably get it a little bit right and a little bit wrong. Tremendous research has gone into the design and operation of nuclear reactors, and for the most part they have operated as intended. But not always. Even when we get it mostly right, and a little bit wrong, with technologies of this scale, and bearing risks of this magnitude, the little bit wrong part remains catastrophic.

When we approach problems of this magnitude, we remain embedded in our current moment, no matter the degree to which we think we are planning long-term. Firstly, we made this waste with no capacity to dispose of it. Now that we are proceeding with plans for disposal, they continue to reflect this limited perspective. Multiple countries that have begun construction of DGRs, and others in advanced planning stages, searched for the best locations for these millennia long repositories, and just happened to have found that the most ideal sites are already existing nuclear power plant sites, or military sites. Onkalo in Finland is located alongside one of Finland’s two nuclear complexes. Sweden plans to build its DGR at one of its existing nuclear complexes. In both cases, the land is already owned and the local population largely employed or dependent on the industry. Local political approval was far less contentious in such locales as they were far from industrial areas. What divine providence that the optimum sites are so convenient for local 21st century politics.

Many nations have operated nuclear reactors, and accrued spent fuel that it must dispose of, yet not every nation is anticipated to be geologically stable for millennia. A clear example is Japan, which operated 54 commercial nuclear reactors before most were powered down after the Fukushima meltdowns of March 2011. Japan has thousands of tons of spent nuclear fuel and is geologically unstable. It was an earthquake that sparked the Fukushima meltdowns. Geologically, Japan is a spiderweb of fault lines and volcanic zones. There is no good place to build a deep geological repository inside Japan. Yet, Japan will build one because the waste was generated by “Japan,” a construct that is likely to be meaningless to people sharing an ecosystem with buried Japanese waste in 40,000 years. Will we make choices with those people in mind? Or will we make choices based on the “necessities” of the politics of our current time? We all know the answer to that: we will bury our nuclear waste within the lines of our current political maps, all the while claiming we are focused on protecting future generations.

Another key site where we can see the dysfunction of our strategies for protecting future generations from harm from our radioactive waste is in the marking of our waste sites. Nuclear semiotics is a field drawing expertise from multiple disciplines to strategize how to warn future generations of the dangers of our nuclear waste being buried under their communities. Since the waste will remain dangerous beyond 100,000-years we are aware that language is not likely to be sufficient. All of our plans position us as teachers and future generations as minds and feelings that need to be shaped by us from our place of wisdom. We either have to sufficiently inform them about the waste using language or images, or scare them using monumental sculpture or barriers. We cannot grasp the most fundamental fact: that the presence of our radioactive and toxic waste in their world is the message. We had so little consideration for their ecosystem that we buried hundreds of thousands of tons of the most toxic material we could make there; material that only provided benefits to us. We think the information we give them about this act somehow makes the act acceptable. I argue that any message must begin with an apology. Without an apology from us for putting them in this position, why would they listen to anything else we say?

When we released massive amounts of radionuclides into the ecosystem during Cold War nuclear testing scientists used them as radioactive tracers to study the dynamics of global systems. This helped us to grasp atmospheric dynamics and global ocean flows. Once in the ecosystem these particles embed and migrate as do all other materials. We observed the Earth function as a single ecosystem. A 2021 study found cesium-137 from nuclear testing in Nevada in multiple samples of honey gathered on the East Coast of the U.S. 58 years after atmospheric testing there concluded. The global distribution and ubiquitous presence of these radionuclides help us to determine forgeries in the sale of paintings and vintage wines. The spread of radioactive fallout around the world is not something that happened, it is something that is still happening.

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All of these issues, and many more are explored in detail in my new book, Nuclear Bodies.

You can visit this website for the book, and find links to order it from numerous online booksellers: Nuclear Bodies: The Global Hibakusha.

Robert (Bo) Jacobs is a historian of science and technology at the Hiroshima Peace Institute and Graduate School of Peace Studies at Hiroshima City University. He has published widely on the interface of nuclear technologies with human beings and communities. His book, Nuclear Bodies: The Global Hibakusha, was published by Yale University Press in 2022. 

Notes

Willard K. Libby, “Radioactive Fallout,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 43 (1957): 765.

M. Susan Lindee, Suffering Made Real: American Science and Survivors at Hiroshima (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994): 4.

Roger A. Meade and Linda S. Meade, “The World, We Think She Start Over Again”: Nuclear Testing and the Marshall Islands, 1946–1958, internal distribution report no. LA-UR-18-30848 (Los Alamos, NM: LANL, 2018): 116.

James Rice, “Downwind of the Atomic State: US Continental Atmospheric Testing, Radioactive Fallout, and Organizational Deviance, 1951–1962,” Social Science History 39 (Winter 2015): 656.

“The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon,” The Final Report of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Evaluation Board for Operation Crossroads, Enclosure “A,” JCS 1691/3 (30 June 1947): 57–89.

John F. Kennedy, “Letter to the Members of the Committee on Civil Defense of the Governors’ Conference,” 6 October 1961 (accessed 10 March 2022).

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On Feb. 28, a landslide of earth and waste from mines in Myanmar’s Hpakant township engulfed dozens of miners and scavengers looking for jade in this remote, mountainous region. Official sources claim just two deaths resulted from the landslide, but residents and aid workers said at least 23 people were killed and 80 missing.

The fatal landslide earlier this year is just the latest in a series of deadly disasters in Hpakant, where no mining has occurred legally since 2020: at least three people were killed in a December 2021 landslide, while a 2020 landslide claimed 162 lives and another in 2015 killed 113.

Myanmar produces a wide range of high-quality gems and precious stones: jade, ruby, sapphire, spinel, diamond, tourmaline, peridot, topaz, garnet, moonstone, lapis lazuli, chrysoberyl, amber and quartz. Yet, despite the production of numerous gems, mismanagement and corruption in the industry ensure that the country remains economically underdeveloped and suffers from social and environmental deterioration.

Jade and gemstone market in Mandalay.

Jade and gemstone market in Mandalay. Image by John Sai Luu.

Risky business

Most of the country’s gemstone-mining sites are located in conflict areas such as Kachin state’s Hpakant area and Khamti township in the Sagaing region, where ethnic minority groups are waging armed struggles against the Myanmar government.

Jade from Myanmar, famous in the global market and especially prized by Chinese consumers, is primarily produced in Hpakant, a mountainous township in the northernmost part of Myanmar.

According to a local charity organization in Hpakant, more than 500 people have been killed in landslides since 2015. This string of fatalities is the result of a deadly combination of corruption, poor environmental management, conflict, and economic desperation. As the country battles an economic downturn and rising unemployment, people from across Myanmar flock to Hpakant hoping to scavenge gems left behind by large mining operations.

“Since the country’s economy is not functioning well, many people come to Hpakant, hoping to make riches from rags,” says Hpakant resident Ko Sai Han. “Dying during landslides becomes more common. I also have to run for my life when there’s a landslide. People are betting on their lives while searching for gemstones at the dumpsite. These problems will continue as long as there is mining. The gemstone mines in Myanmar only benefit a handful of people but not the local people like us.”

According to 2016 report of Myanmar Gems and Jewelry Enterprise, there were 21,000 gemstone mines in Hpakant and Khamti. In Hpakant alone, there are more than 500 companies mining using heavy machinery.

Companies use heavy machinery at jade mining sites in Hpakant.

Companies use heavy machinery at jade mining sites in Hpakant. Image by John Sai Luu.

Endemic corruption

To obtain a permit, mining companies have to pay fees to the mining ministry, as well as local authorities. These fees are vary depending on the size of a concession and its estimated gem reserves. However, the exact figures are a secret, and companies refuse to disclose how much they have paid, citing confidentiality agreements they have to sign with authorities. Corruption is rampant at every level in the process, and failure to pay kickbacks to the ministry and local authorities can cause unnecessary delays in getting a permit.

Myanmar’s Mining Law requires both authorities and miners to follow specific environmental conservation protocols, but enforcement is weak. In Hpakant, all mining licenses for companies expired in 2019 and 2020. Officially, the ruling junta has not granted mining licenses since the February 2021 coup. However, mining continues.

Moreover, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), an ethnic armed organization, controls some of the mine sites in Hpakant. An employee of a jade mining company, speaking on condition of anonymity for security reasons, says companies have to pay the KIA 10% of the total profit of mining sites under its control. As a result of deals like these, resource extraction is also a source of the conflict between the Myanmar army and ethnic armed groups.

“No jade mining license has been granted. But some people continue mining,” said another miner, also speaking on condition of anonymity. “Now, there are only Tatmadaw [Myanmar Armed Forces] and KIA. The mining continues under informal agreement, meaning you can continue if you have an understanding with them. Illegal mining was not fully regulated before. But now, illegal mining has become worse.”

Regardless of the specifics of their arrangement, companies have a limited period during which they can mine. As a result, they move as fast as they can, excavating mountainsides with heavy machinery, carving out massive man-made valleys and discarding the waste into huge piles. The speed and scale at which companies operate not only causes environmental damage, but also means that even high-quality gems may be missed, making these mining dumpsites a tempting target for scavengers.

In addition to the environmental problems it causes, the jade mining boom in Hpakant has brought with it a host of social and public health problems. Illegal drugs such as heroin, methamphetamines and opium are easily available in Hpakant. Some drug use is recreational, but the use of stimulants and analgesics allows miners and scavengers to endure long, brutal stints searching for gems. Intravenous drug use is also a driver of HIV transmission.

“Drugs are easy to find in Hpakant, just as jade is,” said a Hpakant resident, who also requested anonymity. “Many people got addicted while using drugs for fun. Before, local organizations against drug abuse could do actions against drug abuse. But now with pandemic and political instability, they can’t do much. Drug problems will continue as long as there are gemstone mines.”

Excessive mining of jade has caused occasional landfalls and sinkholes in Hpakant.

Excessive mining of jade has caused occasional landfalls and sinkholes in Hpakant. Image by John Sai Luu.

Resource and conflict

“Our area produces jade, but local people don’t benefit from jade mining,” said Hpakant resident Ko Naw Aung. “Local people made their living scavenging jade in the land dumpsite. The area is far from being developed because jade mining only benefits a handful of people. In fact, plenty of development works can be carried out using revenue earned from resource extraction. Years have passed, but the lives of local people remain the same.”

The same observation can be extended to the country as a whole. Despite its rich resources, Myanmar is struggling from both environmental deterioration and economic problems caused by conflict and a weak political system — a scenario often referred to as the resource curse. The promise of wealth from gems and other natural resources has driven a cycle of conflict and instability, rather than providing employment and funding investments that could improve citizens’ quality of life.

Myanmar’s government stands to derive significant revenue from jade mining. In addition to the share of profits agreed upon when a company is granted a mining concession, the government imposes taxes of 15-20% on jade and gems sold at emporiums. According to the Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (MEITI), the government received 708 billion kyat ($578 million) from jade and gems companies in the 2015-16 fiscal year.

However, this likely represents just a small portion of the true value of jade sales. The high tax motivates companies to underreport or undervalue their production. Many companies evade taxes by making covert payments to regulators.

The profits from the industry thus go to a handful of individuals, instead of contributing to national economic growth. It’s an open secret that the bulk of the revenue from jade mining and other forms of resource extraction flows into the pockets of corrupt officials and their cronies, as well as the Myanmar army and various armed non-state entities.

During the period of civilian rule from 2011 to 2021, lawmakers made some efforts to bring accountability to the sector and ensure revenue from mining went into the public budget. For example, in 2016, during the Thein Sein government, officials were dismissed from the customs department and commerce ministry for allowing mining vehicles to be illegally imported to Hpakant from China. Under the junta, even these small efforts have vanished.

Manual mining sites Myanmar’s ruby heartland of Mogok.

Manual mining sites in Myanmar’s ruby heartland of Mogok. Image by John Sai Luu.

The production of jade and gems is currently in decline due to both COVID-19 and political turmoil in the wake of the 2021 coup. There have been fewer international jade and gems emporiums as a result.

“The jade and gems business is slow in Myanmar,” said jade and gems merchant U Win Maung.  “The major buyer is China. Chinese buyers are pushing prices down, taking advantage of the political situation in Myanmar. We don’t have many options, so we have to sell at the prices they offer.”

Jade that isn’t sold at emporiums generally ends up being smuggled into China. But while mining companies evade government taxes, it doesn’t mean they aren’t paying fees for their extraction and export. As mines are located in contested areas and areas controlled by the Kachin Independence Army, they have to pay fees to the KIA as well as the government-backed militias that control the smuggling routes. And Myanmar’s military and the border guard are also involved in this widespread ring of corruption.

The fact that Myanmar lacks the technology to produce finished products from raw jade suits gem buyers in China. Myanmar has had to rely on China in political, economic and various other fields for decades. As a consequence, Myanmar’s jade and gems industry will remain a buyer’s market for China for many more years to come.

“Among other resources, jade and gemstones generate most of the revenue,” one anonymous gemstone expert said. “Our country is a resource-producing country. We need to go from producing raw materials to finished products. We need to make sure the resource-extracting industry benefits the local communities. Gemstone markets need to be built to benefit local people. To do that, everyone needs to work together. Because of the weak mechanism, local communities are not benefiting from resource extracting industry. It is important to install responsibility, accountability and transparency mechanism in the industry.”

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Featured image: A jade mining site in Myanmar’s Kachin state. Image by Yin_Min_Tun via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0).

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The U.S. is scrambling to check the growth of Chinese influence in the Pacific nation of the Solomon Islands after Beijing struck a security pact with the islands that would allow China to dock their ships, deploy security forces to protect Chinese-built infrastructure, and help the government restore order. 

The United States and Australia have been panicking ever since about a possible Chinese foothold. Washington has rushed top White House and State Department officials to Honiara to pressure their government to cancel the agreement, but this has served mostly to annoy them and signal that the U.S. doesn’t respect their sovereign decisions.

The United States routinely rails against the idea of spheres of influence when other states claim them, but in its rivalry with China the U.S. assumes that Pacific Island nations belong firmly in the American sphere of influence. U.S. entreaties are likely too late to change minds in the Solomon Islander government, and they show that the U.S. doesn’t really believe that small states get to make their own decisions when it comes to foreign policy.

The details of the final agreement with China are not yet public, but the pact is believed to be close to the leaked draft version that became available last month. According to that version, the government can request China to send police and military personnel in the event of local disorder. There was significant unrest in the country last year caused by longstanding internal divisions and resentment that the government switched its diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China three years ago.

Because of Australia’s traditional role as security provider for the country, news of the agreement with China has been received very poorly in Canberra. Australia’s Labor Party seized on the issue to criticize the coalition government and characterized it the “worst Australian foreign policy blunder in the Pacific” since WWII. There has even been some reckless talk from pundits that Australia should invade the country and bring down the government to halt the agreement.

While it is understandable that Australia has concerns about closer ties between China and one of its neighbors, the reaction to this agreement has been out of all proportion to its significance.

For its part, the U.S. has neglected the Solomon Islands and taken the country for granted for many years, and it is only when it seems to be drifting towards Beijing’s orbit that our government can be bothered to pay close attention. There hadn’t been a U.S. embassy in Honiara for almost 30 years until it announced it was being reopened earlier this year, and even that was justified as an anti-Chinese move. Washington says that it believes that small states should be able to decide for themselves about how to make their security arrangements and decide their foreign policy orientation, but it doesn’t adhere to that line when a government builds closer ties with China.

The Solomon Islands’ prime minister has assured the U.S. and Australia that its agreement with China does not pose a threat to any other state and won’t involve any China bases on their territory, but that has not stopped officials from both countries from opposing the agreement in the strongest terms.

Prime Minister Sogavare responded to the criticism by saying,

“We find it very insulting…to be branded as unfit to manage our sovereign affairs.”

International relations scholar Van Jackson correctly described the reaction in Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. to the agreement as “absolutely hyperbolic.” As he said,

“there is nothing about this document that represents making the Solomon Islands part of a Chinese sphere of influence.”

Jackson asks an important question about U.S. and allied goals in the broader “Indo-Pacific”:

“What kind of free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific are you building if you are literally going to try and constrain the foreign relations of independent, sovereign states?….That’s literally asserting a Western sphere of influence in trying to deny a Chinese one.”

The question of spheres of influence is a contentious one in U.S.-Chinese relations. Washington professes to abhor spheres of influence while insisting for all intents and purposes that the U.S. maintain one in the western Pacific. The U.S. casts spheres of influence as holdovers from an earlier era that have no place in the modern world, but it also carves out its own when it deems it necessary.

If the U.S. meant what it said about spheres of influence, it would not be so alarmed by the prospect of a modest security agreement between China and a small Pacific state, but by its actions our government shows just how desperately it clings to the idea that certain countries belong in the orbit of the U.S. and its allies no matter what the local government wants. If the U.S. hopes to win the trust and cooperation of Pacific and Asian nations in the coming decades, it cannot continue with a zero-sum approach that requires small countries to take sides against China.

Unfortunately, much of the commentary in the U.S. and Australia has been employing ridiculous Cold War-era rhetoric to discuss the Solomon Islands agreement. One article in Politico frames it as a “duel” between Xi and Biden that the latter has lost, and urges the U.S. to act before more “dominoes” start falling. “Who lost the Solomon Islands?” would be a premature question to ask if it weren’t so stupid, but this is what years of relentless hyping of “great power competition” encourages.

The alarmist response to China’s agreement with the Solomon Islands is reminiscent of other recent panics over developments involving China that either haven’t occurred yet or aren’t all that significant.

Many Western analysts grossly exaggerated the size and importance of an agreement between China and Iran last year with references to an “axis” or an “alliance” that doesn’t exist. More recently, the Pentagon has been sounding the alarm over a possible Chinese naval base in Equatorial Guinea that isn’t being built and wouldn’t pose much of a threat if it did exist.

China is expanding its economic and political influence, and over time that will likely include establishing more of an overseas military presence. That bears paying careful attention and requires assessing threats accurately, but it is absurd to fly into panicked fear over every modest agreement that China may be making with other countries.

The U.S. cannot neglect small nations and then expect them to fall in line when U.S. officials finally show up to complain about their relations with other states. If the U.S. wants to cultivate stronger ties with Pacific and Asian nations, it will have to make a consistent effort to work with these governments on issues of common interest. Insofar as the U.S. treats these states primarily as pawns in a rivalry with China, our government should not be surprised when some of them opt to cooperate more closely with China.

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Featured image: Chinese Embassy in Solomon Islands

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In terms of labyrinthine callousness and indifference to justice, the treatment of lawyer Bernard Collaery by the Australian government must be slotted alongside that of another noted Australian currently being held in the maximum-security facility of Belmarsh, London.  While Collaery has not suffered the same deprivations of liberty as publisher extraordinaire Julian Assange, both share the target status accorded them by the national security state.  They are both to be punished for dealing with, and revealing, national security information compromising to the state in question.

Assange’s case is notorious and grotesque enough: held in Belmarsh for three years without charge; facing extradition to the United States for a dubiously cobbled indictment bolted to the Espionage Act of 1917 – a US statute that is being extra-territorially expanded to target non-US nationals who publish classified information overseas.

Collaery’s is less internationally known, though it should banish any suggestions that Assange would necessarily face much fairer treatment in the Australian justice system.  The barrister is being prosecuted under section 39 of the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth) for conspiracy to reveal classified information.  He was consulted by now convicted former intelligence officer Witness K, who was responsible for leading a 2004 spying operation conducted by the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) that led to the bugging of cabinet offices used by the East Timorese government.

The operation was instigated in the predatory spirit of corporate greed: Australia was involved in treaty negotiations with Timor-Leste regarding access to oil and gas reserves at the time and wished to privilege its own resource companies through spying on their counterparts.  Former attorney general of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) Collaery came onto the scene after Witness K, on being involved in a workplace dispute in 2008, revealed that he had directed the bugging operation.  After going to the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, the ethically agitated Witness K consulted the ASIS-approved lawyer.

The bureaucrats of secrecy were hoping that things might have been contained.  Instead, a juggernaut of information began to leave the terminus of secrecy.  Collaery considered the spying operation a violation of ACT law.  In 2013, both men made themselves available for the East Timorese cause in testifying at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.  Australia’s illegal operation, and bad faith to a neighbour and purported friend, was being given an unwanted airing.  The case being made against Canberra was that the treaty, because of the bugging, had been rendered void.

An unimpressed Commonwealth responded by raiding the Canberra premises of the two individuals.  Nothing, however, was done till 2018, when the new and zealous Attorney General Christopher Porter commenced prosecutions against the pair.  The Kafkaesque clincher in the whole affair was the effort by Porter to make most of the trial proceedings inaccessible to the public. Porter also imposed a national security order without precedent, preventing the parties from divulging details of the prosecution to the public or press.

Witness K, after pleading guilty, received a three-month suspended sentence and was placed on a 12-month good behaviour bond.  Collaery has been left to counter five charges alleging that he communicated information to various ABC journalists prepared by or on behalf of ASIS and allegedly conspired with Witness K to communicate that same information to the Government of Timor-Leste.

In assessing the ongoing prosecution against him, Collaery observed in an interview with Sydney Criminal Lawyers, that he had been charged with conspiracy for giving “frank and fearless advice”.  The charge against Witness K meant that it was “a crime to report a crime.  Think about it.  That’s Australia at present.”

Since then, Collaery has waged a relentless campaign against efforts by the Australian government to muzzle proceedings to conceal both embarrassment and blatant criminality.  In June 2020, he had a stumble before the first judge, who made orders under the National Security Information (Criminal and Proceedings) Act 2004 (Cth) to prohibit the disclosure of compromising evidence that might be adduced by Collaery during the trial.  The court found that Collaery’s right to a fair hearing would not be compromised by the nondisclosure orders, and that the need to protect national security outweighed the desirability of conducting proceedings in public.

In October, ACT appeals court reversed the decision, finding that six “identified matters” in the Commonwealth case against him should be made publicly available.  The court found that the risk of damage to public confidence in the justice system was outweighed by any risk posed to national security.  The open hearings of criminal trials “deterred political prosecutions” and permitted “the public to scrutinise the actions of prosecutors, and permitted the public to properly assess the conduct of the accused person.”

While a summary of the decision was made available, the full reasons for the decision have not.  The current Attorney General, the otherwise invisible Michaelia Cash, has attempted to suppress the full publication of the judgment.  The ploy being used here is a particularly insidious one: that the case involves “court-only” evidence which Collaery and his defence team are not entitled to see.  The ploy, dressed up as an effort to update the evidence, is an attempt to introduce new material via the backdoor.  The Commonwealth, in its desperation, is running out of ideas.

In March, ACT Supreme Court Justice David Mossop found that the court could receive such evidence through the office of an appointed special counsel who might be able to access the documents.  The appointee would be able to advocate for Collaery thereby reducing “the disadvantage to the defendant arising from the non-disclosure of the material”.

This month, federal Solicitor-General Stephen Donoghue argued in the High Court that this modest compromise would not do.  Not even a special counsel should cast eyes over such evidence in the name of protecting national security.  “If this isn’t stopped, the (earlier ACT) judgment could be released without the redactions we need.”

The three High Court justices hearing the case did not conceal their puzzlement.  Justice Michelle Gordon observed with some tartness that this was “a fragmentation of proceedings at its worst”.  Justice James Edelman was bemused. “What you say is the error is that the [ACT] Chief Justice didn’t make the orders you wanted.”  Donoghue’s feeble reason: that publishing the full ACT judgment should be delayed till the dispute on “court-only” evidence could be resolved.

This charade now continues its ghastly way back to the ACT Supreme Court.  Even now, dates of the actual trial, times and so forth, have yet to be set.  This will no doubt give prosecutors further time to cook up something.  All rather galling coming from a government which has the temerity to complain about the way secret trials are conducted in other countries against its citizens.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Senator Nick Xenophon with Bernard Collaery and Nicholas Cowdery QC in 2015 calling for a royal commission into the Australia–East Timor spying scandal. (Licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0)

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Taiwan’s military took the dramatic step of issuing a public emergency handbook meant to prepare all citizens in the event of a Chinese invasion of the island. The 28-page booklet includes detailed instructions on bomb shelter locations and how to stockpile emergency supplies, as well as basic life-saving steps.

While introducing the handbook in a Tuesday online press conference, defense ministry spokesman Sun Li-fang explained that “the general public can use as an emergency response guideline in a military crisis or natural disaster.”

But of course, the only crisis or disaster looming on people’s minds is the potential for an all-out Chinese PLA military assault – fears that have ratcheted particularly since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which Beijing has at times appeared to defend, while also refusing to call Putin’s action an “invasion”.

A statement from the specific defense ministry department that authored the booklet, called the “All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency” had this to say: “The guide is for the public to better prepare themselves before a war or disaster happens.”

According to the AFP it’s been inspired of similar guides that the countries of Japan and Sweden have produced for their citizens, and includes info on “where to find bomb shelters via mobile phone apps and what to do in an emergency including how to distinguish air raid sirens.”

Or also there are emergency preparedness instructions which cover events like mass power outages and blackouts, large fires, building collapses, or devastating weather. Taiwan authorities express further, “We hope the public can familiarise themselves where the safety shelters are beforehand.”

While Taipei has lately accused China’s leaders of saber-rattling, also the PLA Air Force continues its weekly aircraft incursions of the islands Air Defense Identification Zone, Beijing has in turn pointed the finger over certain provocations. For example, it was revealed and confirmed last year that there has long been a contingency of US Marines and special forces on the island training Taiwanese forces.

The democratic island has also been hosting more and more US official delegations, and House Speaker Nancy Pelposi was expected earlier this month, but canceled the trip last-minute as she tested positive for Covid-19.

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The island nation of Sri Lanka is in the midst of one of the worst economic crises it’s ever seen. It has just defaulted on its foreign debts for the first time since its independence, and the country’s 22 million people are facing crippling 12-hour power cuts, and an extreme scarcity of food, fuel and other essential items such as medicines.

Inflation is at an all-time high of 17.5%, with prices of food items such as a kilogram of rice soaring to 500 Sri Lankan rupees (A$2.10) when it would normally cost around 80 rupees (A$0.34). Amid shortages, one 400g packet of milk powder is reported to cost over 250 rupees (A$1.05), when it usually costs around 60 rupees (A$0.25).

On April 1, President Gotabaya Rajpaksha declared a state of emergency. In less than a week, he withdrew it following massive protests by angry citizens over the government’s handling of the crisis.

The country relies on the import of many essential items including petrol, food items and medicines. Most countries will keep foreign currencies on hand in order to trade for these items, but a shortage of foreign exchange in Sri Lanka is being blamed for the sky-high prices.

Why are some people blaming China?

Many believe Sri Lanka’s economic relations with China are a main driver behind the crisis. The United States has called this phenomenon “debt-trap diplomacy”. This is where a creditor country or institution extends debt to a borrowing nation to increase the lender’s political leverage – if the borrower extends itself and cannot pay the money back, they are at the creditor’s mercy.

However, loans from China accounted for only about 10% of Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt in 2020. The largest portion – about 30% – can be attributed to international sovereign bonds. Japan actually accounts for a higher proportion of their foreign debt, at 11%.

Defaults over China’s infrastructure-related loans to Sri Lanka, especially the financing of the Hambantota port, are being cited as factors contributing to the crisis.

But these facts don’t add up. The construction of the Hambantota port was financed by the Chinese Exim Bank. The port was running losses, so Sri Lanka leased out the port for 99 years to the Chinese Merchant’s Group, which paid Sri Lanka US$1.12 billion.

So the Hambantota port fiasco did not lead to a balance of payments crisis (where more money or exports are going out than coming in), it actually bolstered Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange reserves by US$1.12 billion.

So what are the real reasons for the crisis?

Post-independence from the British in 1948, Sri Lanka’s agriculture was dominated by export-oriented crops such as tea, coffee, rubber and spices. A large share of its gross domestic product came from the foreign exchange earned from exporting these crops. That money was used to import essential food items.

Over the years, the country also began exporting garments, and earning foreign exchange from tourism and remittances (money sent into Sri Lanka from abroad, perhaps by family members). Any decline in exports would come as an economic shock, and put foreign exchange reserves under strain.

For this reason, Sri Lanka frequently encountered balance of payments crises. From 1965 onwards, it obtained 16 loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Each of these loans came with conditions including that once Sri Lanka received the loan they had to reduce their budget deficit, maintain a tight monetary policy, cut government subsidies for food for the people of Sri Lanka, and depreciate the currency (so exports would become more viable).

But usually in periods of economic downturns, good fiscal policy dictates governments should spend more to inject stimulus into the economy. This becomes impossible with the IMF conditions. Despite this situation, the IMF loans kept coming, and a beleaguered economy soaked up more and more debt.

The last IMF loan to Sri Lanka was in 2016. The country received US$1.5 billion for three years from 2016 to 2019. The conditions were familiar, and the economy’s health nosedived over this period. Growth, investments, savings and revenues fell, while the debt burden rose.

A bad situation turned worse with two economic shocks in 2019. First, there was a series of bomb blasts in churches and luxury hotels in Colombo in April 2019. The blasts led to a steep decline in tourist arrivals – with some reports stating up to an 80% drop– and drained foreign exchange reserves. Second, the new government under President Gotabaya Rajapaksa irrationally cut taxes.

Value-added tax rates (akin to some nations’ goods and services taxes) were cut from 15% to 8%. Other indirect taxes such as the nation building tax, the pay-as-you-earn tax and economic service charges were abolished. Corporate tax rates were reduced from 28% to 24%. About 2% of the gross domestic product was lostin revenues because of these tax cuts.

In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic struck. In April 2021, the Rajapaksa government made another fatal mistake. To prevent the drain of foreign exchange reserves, all fertiliser imports were completely banned. Sri Lanka was declared a 100% organic farming nation. This policy, which was withdrawn in November 2021, led to a drastic fall in agricultural production and more imports became necessary.

But foreign exchange reserves remained under strain. A fall in the productivity of tea and rubber due to the ban on fertiliser also led to lower export incomes. Due to lower export incomes, there was less money available to import food and food shortages arose.

Because there is less food and other items to buy, but no decrease in demand, the prices for these goods rise. In February 2022, inflation rose to 17.5%.

What will happen now?

In all probability, Sri Lanka will now obtain a 17th IMF loan to tide over the present crisis, which will come with fresh conditions.

A deflationary fiscal policy will be followed, which will further limit the prospects of economic revival and exacerbate the sufferings of the Sri Lankan people.

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 is Professor of Economics, Tata Institute of Social Sciences.

Featured image: Protests have erupted over the government’s handling of the economic crisis. AAP/CHAMILA KARUNARATHNE

The “China Threat” and the Solomon Islands

April 14th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Rarely has the Solomon Islands had as much attention as this. Despite being in caretaker mode as it battles the federal election, the government of Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison still had room to politicise its anti-China twitch.  The person given the task of doing so was the Minister for International Development and the Pacific, Senator Zed Seselja.

In a quick visit to Honiara to have discussions with Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, Seselja stated that Australia remained dedicated to supporting the security needs of the Solomon Islands, and would do so “swiftly, transparently and with full respect for its sovereignty”.  The Pacific country remained a friend, part of the “Pacific family”.

While not specifically condemning the waywardness of the Sogavare government in forging closer ties with Beijing, Seselja explicitly mentions that discussions included “the proposed Solomon Islands-China security agreement.”  Using the familiar talking point of pushing regional familial ties, the Minister insisted that “the Pacific family will always meet the security needs of our region.”  In a tone suggesting both plea and clenched fist, Seselja went on to claim that Solomon Islands had been “respectfully” asked to reject the pact and “consult the Pacific family in the spirit of regional openness and transparency, consistent with our region’s security frameworks.”

The origins of this badgering stem from the Sino-Solomon Islands draft security agreement published online by an adviser to the disgruntled Malaita Provincial Government of Premier Derek Suidani.  That, in of itself, was telling of local domestic tussles, given Suidani’s opposition to increasing influence from Beijing and his own tilt towards Taiwan.

According to Article 1 of the draft, the Solomon Islands may request China to “send police, police military personnel and other law enforcement and armed forces” for reasons of maintaining social order, protecting lives and property, providing humanitarian assistance, carrying out disaster response, or “providing assistance on other tasks agreed upon by the Parties”.

With the consent of Honiara, China may also “make ship visits to, carry out logistical replenishment in, and have stopover and transition in Solomon Islands”.  Chinese personnel may also be used in protecting Chinese personnel and projects on the islands.

Amongst Australia’s talking heads and hacks was a sense of horror.  Greg Sheridan, writing for The Australian, saw parallels with Japan’s aims during the Second World War “to isolate Australia from the US by occupying Pacific territories, specifically Guadalcanal in what is now the Solomons.” The same paper described the deal as “a nightmare in paradise.”

Canberra and Washington are also concerned by what is seen as a lack of candour on the part of Beijing, a tad rich coming from powers that mischievously formed the AUKUS pact in conditions of total secrecy.  Article 5 expressly notes that “neither party shall disclose the cooperation information to a third party” without written consent of the other party, which has been taken to mean that citizens of the Solomon Islands are not to know the content of the agreement.  That would put them in a similar position to Australians who have an incomplete picture on the role played by US military installations such as Pine Gap, or the broader expectations of AUKUS.

The extent Sogavare and his ministers are being badgered by Australian dignitaries is notable.  Their message: We acknowledge your independence as long as it is exercised in our national (read US) interest.  This was the theme of the visit earlier this month from Paul Symon, chief of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, and Andrew Shearer, Director-General of the Office of National Intelligence.

According to a note from Sogavare’s office, the visitors discussed “Australia’s core security concerns” about a potential Chinese military presence in the country.  Both Symon and Shearer were told that Honiara’s “security concerns are domestically focused and complements [the] current bilateral Agreement with Australia and the regional security architecture.”

This view is unlikely to have swayed officials tone deaf to local concerns.  The Biden administration, playing tag team to Australia’s efforts, has given Kurt Campbell, the US National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, the task of changing Sogavare’s mind.  He promises to visit the Pacific state along with Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel Kritenbrink, later this month.

US lawmakers are also keen to hold the fort against Chinese influence in the Pacific and are excited about the prospects of using Australian soil to do so.  Republican Senator Lindsey Graham sees the garrisoning of Australia with US troops as an answer.  “I see an opening in this part of the world to push back on China in a way that would fundamentally change the fear that you have of a very bad neighbour,” he told Sky News Australia on April 13.

The proposed Honiara-Beijing pact shows how neither Australia, nor the US, can hope to buy Honiara’s unqualified allegiance to its own policies.  It worried Australian Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews, who responded to the news of the draft by claiming that, “This is our neighbourhood and we are very concerned of any activity that is taking place in the Pacific Islands.”

To date, Solomon Islands has been treated as a failed state, a security risk in need of pacification, and a country distinctly incapable of exercising plenary power.  Australia has adopted an infantilising, charity-based approach, shovelling billions into the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).  Australian High Commissioner Lachlan Strahan was quick to reassure Sogavare that Canberra would be extending the mission till December 2023, while also providing $AU21.5 million in budget support, a second patrol boat outpost and a national radio network.

None of these ongoing factors have prevented discussions between Honiara and Beijing on security issues. Chinese police officers were sent to the Solomon Islands in February, forming the People’s Republic of China Public Security Bureau’s Solomon  Islands Policing Advisory Group.  Their mission: aiding the local police force in improving their “anti-riot capabilities”.

Local politics, deeply divisive as they are, will have to eventually dictate the extent with which various powers are permitted influence.  Solomon Islands Opposition Leader Matthew Wale is very much against the gravitational pull of China.  Last year, he attempted to convince Australian officials, including the High Commissioner, that the draft was a serious possibility.  With the prospect of further jockeying between Washington, Canberra and Beijing, Honiara promises to be a very interesting place.  Along the way, it might actually prove to its meddlesome sceptics that sovereignty is possible.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Australian troops, as part of the RAMSI peacekeeping mission, burn weapons confiscated from or surrendered by militias in 2003 (Licensed under CC BY 2.0)

Asian Fault Lines of Biden’s War on Russia

April 13th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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The tremors of the United States’ tensions with Russia playing out in Europe are being felt in different ways already in Asia. The hypothesis of Ukraine being in Europe and the conflict being all about European security is delusional.

From Kazakhstan to Myanmar, from Solomon Islands to the Kuril Islands, from North Korea to Cambodia, from China to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, the fault lines are appearing.

To be sure, extra-regional powers had a hand in the failed colour revolution recently to overthrow the established government in Kazakhstan, a hotly contested geopolitical landmass two-thirds the size of India, bordering both China and Russia, Washington’s sworn adversaries. Thanks to swift Russian intervention, supported by China, a regime change was averted. 

Equally, the Anglo-American project to embroil Myanmar, bordering China, in an armed insurgency has floundered for want of a sanctuary in India’s northeastern region and due to the perceived congruence of interests among the surrounding countries in Myanmar’s stability. 

In comparison, the North Korean fault line has aggravated. North Korea moves on its own timetable and has probably decided that the Ukraine crisis offers useful cover while it ramps up its testing program. Pyongyang explicitly supports Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, commenting that “the basic cause of the Ukraine incident lies in the high-handedness and arbitrariness of the United States, which has ignored Russia’s legitimate calls for security guarantees and only sought a global hegemony and military dominance while clinging to its sanctions campaigns.” 

North Korea’s objective is to enhance its security and leverage by increasing the quality and quantity of its deterrent capabilities and strengthening its bargaining position.  

On another plane, the Ukraine crisis injected a new urgency into the US efforts to cultivate new Asian partners. But Washington has run into headwinds and had to indefinitely postpone a special summit with the ten member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was initially scheduled for end-March. No new date has been proposed, although the US had hyped up the summit as “a top priority.” 

Showing some ire, Washington has since sanctioned Cambodia, currently the ASEAN Chair. Clearly, the southeast Asian countries are chary of taking sides between the US and China or of voicing criticism against Russia.

Perhaps, the most direct fallout of the Ukraine crisis in Asia so far is the sharp deterioration in Japan’s ties with Russia. It is an unwarranted development insofar as Tokyo simply did a cut and paste job, copying all the US sanctions against Russia (including against President Putin). Prime Minister Kishida wantonly destroyed what his predecessor Shinzo Abe had carefully cultivated as a cordial, friendly relationship. 

Japan now openly refers to Russian “occupation” of the Kuril Islands — something it hasn’t been doing in the past. Moscow retaliated by designating Japan as an “unfriendly” country. Yet, analysts were estimating until recently that Russia and Japan had congruent interests in blocking China’s Arctic ambitions and were, therefore, moving toward solving their dispute over Kuril.

Suffice to say, Kishida’s motivations in an abrupt turnaround to make an Kuril a potential flashpoint in relations with Russia are, to say the least, to be traced to the broader US strategy to isolate Russia.

Meanwhile, a contrarian development has also appeared in China’s challenge to the US’ Island Chain strategy in the Western Pacific by negotiating a new security deal with Solomon Islands. This game-changing development may have extensive consequences and is dangerously interwoven with the Taiwan issue. Biden is reportedly dispatching a top White House official to Solomon Islands to scuttle the deal with China. 

The Biden administration is now doubling down on India to roll back its ties with Russia as well. That becomes a fault line in the US-Indian strategic partnership. What must be particularly galling for Washington is the likelihood of India pursuing its trade and economic cooperation with Russia in local currencies. Indeed, China and India have taken a somewhat similar stance on the Ukraine crisis.  

Given the size of the Chinese economy and the high potential of growth for the Indian economy, their inclination to bypass the dollar would be a trend-setter for other countries. Russia, hit by Western sanctions, has called on the BRICS group of emerging economies to extend the use of national currencies and integrate payment systems.

Suffice to say, the “weaponised dollar” and the West’s abrasive move to freeze Russia’s reserves sends a chill down the spine of most developing countries. Nepal caved in to ratify the Millennium Challenge Corporation agreement following threat by a middle ranking US official! 

There is no conceivable reason why the NATO should become the provider of security for the Asian region. That is why Afghanistan’s future is of crucial importance. Without doubt, the regime change in Pakistan is partly at least related to Afghanistan. The Russian Foreign Ministry has disclosed certain details of the US interference in Pakistan’s internal affairs and its pressure on former Prime Minister Imran Khan. 

But time will show how realistic are Washington’s  expectations of inducting Pakistan into the US orbit and making it a surrogate to leverage the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Russia and China are making sure that the door remains closed to NATO’s return to Afghanistan. They have undercut Washington’s recent efforts to co-opt the Taliban leadership in Kabul. (See my blog US pips regional states at race for Kabul.) 

The message out of the recent Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the Afghan Issue Among the Neighbouring Countries of Afghanistan in Tunxi, China, is that in that country’s transition from chaos to order, the regional states hope to undertake a lead role. Thus, the regional states have incrementally marked their distance from the West’s exceptionalism and are instead adopting a persuasive track through constructive engagement. The joint statement issued at Tunxi reflects this new thinking. 

The developments over Afghanistan provide a signpost that any attempt at imposing Western dominance over Asia will be resisted by the regional states. Most Asian countries have had bitter experiences with colonialism in their history. (See my blog India’s dilemma over West vs. Russia

Although the American analysts underplay it, the fact remains that the conflict in Ukraine is bound to impact the “Asian Century” very significantly. The US is determined to transform the NATO as the global security organisation that will act beyond the purview of the United Nations to enforce the West’s “rules-based order.” 

The West’s desperate push to weaken Russia and tilt the global strategic balance in the US’ favour aims to clear the pathway leading to a unipolar world order in the 21st century. In a recent interview, Hal Brands, Henry Kissinger distinguished professor of global affairs at Johns Hopkins, put across the US strategy behind the war in Ukraine as very logical: 

“Well, there’s long been a debate in the United States over whether we should prioritise competing with Russia or China or treat them as co-equals. And that debate has flared up again in the context of this war. I think what the war indicates, though, is that the best way of putting pressure on China, which is the more dangerous and the more powerful of the two rivals, is actually to ensure that Russia is defeated, that it does not achieve its objectives in this war, because that will result in a weaker Russia, one that is less capable of putting pressure on the United States and its allies in Europe and thus less useful as a strategic partner for Beijing.

“The United States simply can’t avoid the reality that it has to contain both Russia and China simultaneously.” 

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Featured image is from Indian Punchline

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At a moment the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told Congressional leaders Tuesday that “significant international conflict between great powers” is now “increasing, not decreasing” – the US has announced approval of the sale of up to $95 million in new training and equipment for Taiwan.

Crucially and quite provocatively from Beijing’s perspective, this new sale is focused on supporting Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense system, seen as key to defending the island in the event of an invasion.

The Pentagon’s Defense Security Cooperation Agency confirmed in a statement, “The proposed sale will help to sustain (Taiwan’s) missile density and ensure readiness for air operations.”

The statement called the items important as a “deterrent to regional threats and to strengthen homeland defense,” and outlined it will include training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot system, associated equipment, and logistics support elements, as well as ground support equipment and spare parts, according to the DSCA statement.

Taiwan’s foreign ministry thanked the Biden administration and welcomed the deal, which marks the third such approved arms package of the Biden administration. Taipei emphasized it’s needed to defend against China’s “continuing military expansion and provocation.” 

“In the face of China’s continuing military expansion and provocation, Taiwan must fully demonstrate its strong determination to defend itself,” the foreign ministry said. “Our government will continue to strengthen our self-defense and asymmetric combat capabilities.”

Meanwhile, one top US Navy commander says China is watching the Russia-Ukraine war closely, with an eye on Taiwan:

As the Russia-Ukraine war continues, a senior US commander stated that Washington must remain vigilant on the Taiwan issue as China is increasing its capabilities and making adjustments to its plans to forcefully unite the island nation.

U.S. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Samuel J Paparo said,

“China is undoubtedly watching what’s happened in Ukraine, taking notes, and learning from it.”

“And there will be learning and there will be adjustments to the extent that they’re able to learn from it. And they will improve their capabilities based on what they learn at this time,” he told a gathering of Washington-based journalists from Indo-Pacific countries.

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Featured image is from New Eastern Outlook

First published in August 2014

Current US military space policy is primarily geared toward two countries, China and Russia.

In May 2000 the Washington Post published an article called “For Pentagon, Asia Moving to Forefront.” The article stated that, “The Pentagon is looking at Asia as the most likely arena for future military conflict, or at least competition.” The article said the US would double its military presence in the region and essentially attempt to manage China.

Missile-Defense-How-it-would-workThe Pentagon’s missile system.

The Pentagon has become the primary resource extraction service for corporate capital. Whether it is Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, rare earth minerals found in Africa, Libya’s oil deposits, or Venezuelan oil, the US’s increasingly high-tech military is on the case.

President Obama’s former National Security Adviser, Gen. James Jones had previously served as the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO. In 2006, Gen. Jones told the media,

“NATO is developing a special plan to safeguard oil and gas fields in the [Caspian Sea] region…. Our strategic goal is to expand to Eastern Europe and Africa.”

In a past quadrennial National Intelligence Strategy report, former U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair claimed that Russia “may continue to seek avenues for reasserting power and influence in ways that complicate U.S. interests…[and] China competes for the same resources the United States needs, and is in the process of rapidly modernizing its military.”

Using NATO as a military tool, the US is now surrounding Russia and easily dragged the supposedly European-based alliance into the Afghanistan war and Libya attack. The US is turning NATO into a global military alliance, even to be used in the Asian-Pacific region.

ENERGY & MISSILE OFFENSE

In mid-March of 2009 the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) held a conference in Washington. At that meeting Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) stated, “Missile defense is an important element of our nation’s defense. For example, it is a high priority to field effective defenses for our forward-deployed forces against the many hundreds of existing short- and medium-range missiles.”

patriot

Patriot missiles.

The Obama administration is currently deploying “missile defense” (MD) systems in Turkey, Romania, Poland and on Navy destroyers entering the Black Sea. The NATO military noose is tightening around Russia.

Russia has the world’s largest deposits of natural gas and significant supplies of oil. The US has recently built military bases in Romania and Bulgaria and will soon be adding more in Albania. NATO has expanded eastward into Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, right on Russia’s border. Georgia, Ukraine, Sweden and Finland are also on the list to become members of the cancerous NATO.

An Indian journalist observes,

“The arc of encirclement of Russia gets strengthened. NATO ties facilitate the [eventual] deployment of the US missile defense system in Georgia. The US aims to have a chain of countries tied to ‘partnerships’ with NATO brought into its missile defense system – stretching from its allies in the Baltic to those in Central Europe. The ultimate objective of this is to neutralize the strategic capability of Russia and China and to establish its nuclear superiority. The National Defense Strategy document, issued by the Pentagon on July 31, 2008, portrays Washington’s perception of a resurgent Russia and a rising China as potential adversaries.”

Just as we have seen the balkanization of Yugoslavia, Libya, and Iraq by US-NATO it appears that the same strategy has been developed for Russia. With NATO’s continuing military encirclement of Russia the plan appears to be to draw Moscow into a military quagmire in Ukraine that will weaken that nation. The Rand Corporation has studies that call for the break-up of Russia into many smaller pieces thus giving western corporations better access to the vast resource base available there.

The recent announcement by BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) that they have created a $100 billion international development bank to rival the IMF and World Bank has angered western corporate controlled governments who don’t want any challenge to their management of the global economy. Directly after the BRICS announcement we witnessed an escalation of the US-NATO funded and directed civil war in Ukraine.

The Harper government is now recommending that Canada join the US missile defense program. Canadian military corporations are itching to open the flood gates to the national treasury – the profits from a junior partnership with the US in an arms race in space are too much to pass up. But first more cuts must be made to the Canadian national health care program and other valuable social welfare programs. In the US the military industrial complex has targeted the “entitlement programs” – Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and what is left of “welfare” for defunding to help pay for the expensive military space technology agenda.

Canada has also undertaken the construction of “armed combat vessels” at the Irving Shipyard in Halifax. This $25 billion program, the largest military appropriation in Canadian history, was supported by every political party in the country. Why does Canada need such a monumental war ship building program?

THE NAVY’S EXPANDING ROLE

As ice melts in the Arctic, the US Navy anticipates that it will have to increase its presence in the region to “protect shipping”. Over the past 25 years, the Arctic has seen a 40% reduction in ice as a result of global warming. Maine’s Independent Senator Angus King recently wrote “gas and oil reserves that were previously inaccessible” will soon be available for extraction. Last spring Sen. King took a ride on a US nuclear submarine under the Arctic ice. Also along for the ride was Admiral Jonathan Greenert, the chief of naval operations, who told the New York Times: “We need to be sure that our sensors, weapons and people are proficient in this part of the world,” so that we can “own the undersea domain and get anywhere there.”

aegis

A new Navy report called “US Navy Arctic Roadmap: 2014-2030” states: “Ice in the Arctic has been receding faster than we previously thought…and offers an increase in activity.” The Arctic region holds a plethora of undiscovered fossil fuels and natural resources, including an estimated 90 billion barrels of oil, 1,669 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 44 billion barrels of natural gas liquids, the roadmap says.

The report warns that the Navy will face serious logistical challenges and will need to examine ways to distribute fuel in the region to “air and surface platforms”. Operating bases will be needed to host deployed military personnel. Partnerships with nations that border the Arctic and more warships will be needed to ensure that the undersea resources are kept in the hands of US-NATO and away from competitors like Russia.

US Secretary of War Chuck Hagel stated in late 2013 that, “By taking advantage of multilateral training opportunities with partners in the region, we will enhance our cold-weather operational experience, and strengthen our military-to-military ties with other Arctic nations.”

SCUPPERING PEACE

President Obama has in the past called for the abolition of nuclear weapons. The Russians, watching an advancing NATO and MD deployments near their borders, are telling the world that any real hopes for serious nuclear weapons reductions are in jeopardy.

images9J5XIP4U

Russia and China attempt to prohibit space weapons at the United Nations.

Former Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev delivered the opening address at the “Overcoming Nuclear Dangers” conference in Rome on April 16, 2009. He noted, “Unless we address the need to demilitarize international relations, reduce military budgets, put an end to the creation of new kinds of weapons and prevent weaponization of outer space, all talk about a nuclear-weapon-free world will be just inconsequential rhetoric.”

The entire US military empire is tied together using space technology. With military satellites in space the US can see virtually everything on the Earth, can intercept all communications on the planet, and can target virtually any place at any time. Russia and China understand that the US military goal is to achieve “full spectrum dominance” on behalf of corporate capital.

Using new space technologies to coordinate and direct modern warfare also enables the military industrial complex to reap massive profits as it constructs the architecture for what the aerospace industry claims will be the “largest industrial project” in Earth history.

TARGET: ASIA

The deployment of Navy Aegis destroyers in the Asian-Pacific region, with MD interceptors on-board, ostensibly to protect against North Korean missile launches, gives the US greater ability to launch preemptive first-strike attacks on China.

The US now has 30 ground-based MD interceptors deployed in South Korea. Many peace activists there maintain that the ultimate target of these systems is not North Korea, but China and Russia.Europian_Missile_Defense

Europe’s leaders are complicit in Full Spectrum Dominance.

The current US military expansion underway in Hawaii, South Korea, Japan, Guam, Okinawa, Taiwan, Australia, Philippines and other Pacific nations is indeed a key strategy in this offensive “pivot” to control China.

An additional US goal is to have the “host” countries make significant contributions toward helping the Pentagon cover the cost of this massively expensive escalation.

For many years the US Space Command has been annually war gaming a first-strike attack on China. Set in the year 2017 the Pentagon first launches the military space plan that flies through the heavens and unleashes a devastating first-strike attack on China’s nuclear forces – part of the new “Global Strike” program.

In the war game China then attempts to launch a retaliatory strike with its tens of nuclear missiles capable of hitting the west coast of the continental US. But US “missile defense” systems, currently deployed in Japan, South Korea, Australia, Guam and Taiwan, help take out China’s disabled nuclear response. base protest

Peaceful protestors, Japan.

Obama’s former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ comments were quite revealing in 2009 when he said, “We’re converting more Navy Aegis ships to have ballistic missile defense that would help against China.”

Missile defense, sold to the public as a purely defensive system, is really designed by the Pentagon to be the shield after the first-strike sword has lunged into the heart of a particular nation’s nuclear arsenal.

Living in Bath, Maine, I have a special perspective on this US-China military competition. In my town, the Navy builds the Aegis destroyers that are outfitted with MD systems. Congressional leaders from my state maintain that more Pentagon funds for Aegis shipbuilding are needed to “contain” China.

Renowned author Noam Chomsky says US foreign and military policy is now all about controlling most of the world’s oil supply as a “lever of world domination.” One way to keep Europe, China, India and other emerging markets dependent on the US and in sync with its policies is to maintain control of the fossil fuel supply they’re reliant on. Even as the US economy is collapsing, the Pentagon appears to be saying, whoever controls the keys to the world’s economic engine still remains in charge.

China, for example, imports up to 80% of its oil on ships through the Yellow Sea. If any competitor nation was able to militarily control that transit route and choke off China’s oil supply, its economy could be held hostage.

One is able to see how the Pentagon will use the South Korean Navy base on Jeju Island, now being constructed despite a seven-year determined non-violent campaign opposing the base, to support fallujahthe potential coastal blockade of China.

Victim of Anglo-American nuclear weapons: Fallujah, 2004.

CONCLUSIONS

For many years Russia and China have introduced resolutions at the UN calling for negotiations on a new treaty that would ban weapons in space.

Since the mid-‘80s every UN member nation has supported the “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) resolution, with the exception of the US, Israel, and Micronesia.

This was true during the Clinton presidency as well as during the reign of George W. Bush and now under Obama as well.

hiroshimaVictim of US nuclear weapons: Hiroshima, 1945.

A full-blown arms race between the US, Russia and China will be a disaster for the world and would make life on Earth less secure. At the very time that global resources are urgently needed to deal with the coming harsh realities of climate change and growing poverty, we can hardly afford to see more money wasted on the further militarization of space and greater superpower conflict.

The Pentagon actually has the largest carbon boot print on the planet. The US insisted that the Pentagon be excluded from the Kyoto climate change protocols and refused to sign the agreements unless the Pentagon was exempted.

As the US undertakes arming the world to the benefit of corporate globalization our local communities have become addicted to military spending. As we oppose the aggressive US military empire overseas we must also talk about the job issue back at home. Calling for conversion of the military industrial complex, demanding that our industrial base be transformed to create a renewable energy infrastructure for the 21st century, helps us come into coalition with weapons production workers who must now support the killing machine if they hope to feed their families.nuclear explosion

Image: UK Ministry of Defence warns of new technologies’ potential to trigger a ‘doomsday scenario’

Studies have long shown that conversion from military production to creating needed systems like rail, solar or wind turbines not only help deal with the challenges of climate change but also create many more jobs.

It’s ultimately a question about the soul of the nation – what does it say about us as a people when we continue to build weapons to kill people around the world so workers can put food on the table back home?

What is needed now more than ever is unified global campaigning across issue lines. Peace, social justice, environment, labor and other movements must work harder to link our issues and build integrated grassroots movements against the destructive power of the corporate oligarchies that run most of our western governments. The rush to privatize social welfare and the privatization of foreign and military policy must be challenged if we are to successfully protect the future generations.

 Bruce K. Gagnon is the Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space and is author of the book Come Together Right Now: Organizing Stories from a Fading Empire. He lives in Bath, Maine.   www.space4peace.org

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Thailand to Pay $45M Over Vaccine Side-effects

April 6th, 2022 by Asia News Network

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This was first published on APR on March 15, 2022

Thailand’s National Health Security Office (NHSO) has so far paid 1.509 billion baht ($45.65 million) as compensation to 12,714 people who developed side-effects after they received Covid-19 vaccines.

The NHSO on March 9 reported that from May 19, 2021 to March 8 this year, a total of 15,933 people had filed complaints of negative reactions to Covid-19 vaccines.

The NHSO said 2,328 complaints were rejected after it ruled that the side-effects were not related to the vaccinations.

Of the rejected cases, 875 complainants are appealing against the earlier decision of the NHSO.

It added that 891 cases were pending consideration.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of Public Health reported on the morning of March 10 that in the past 24 hours there were 22,984 new patients who tested positive for Covid-19, 47 of whom have arrived in Thailand from abroad.

The death toll increased by 74, while 24,161 patients recovered and were allowed to leave hospitals.

The cumulative number of cases in the country stands at 3,111,857, of which 888,422 (28.55 per cent) were recorded this year alone.

The health ministry had reported on the morning of March 9 that another 55,820 people were given their first Covid shot in the last 24 hours, 18,227 their second shot and 88,932 a booster, bringing the total number of Covid-19 vaccine doses administered nationwide to 125,199,011.

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Featured image: A Thai health worker administers a Covid-19 shot to a man. THE NATION (THAILAND)

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Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III Scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research does not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The history of this war must be understood.

The bombing and shelling led by Ukraine’s Armed Forces directed against the people of Donbass started eight years ago, resulting in the destruction of residential areas and more than 10,000 civilian casualties.

A  bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


First published on APR on March 15, 2022

Accompanying his comments were the flags of the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and Canada among others who visited Thailand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to lecture Thailand over what its reaction to the growing crisis should be.

A Bangkok Post article titled, “Neutral on Russia-Ukraine: PM,” would note, however, that Thailand would remain neutral. The article reported:

Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha has insisted Thailand will maintain its neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, a government source said.

The article also noted:

Speaking after the cabinet meeting, Gen Prayut [Chan-o-cha] said Thailand will adhere to Asean’s stance on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine as the grouping has called for dialogue among parties concerned to resolve the Ukraine crisis.

Thailand’s position mirrors that of China – Thailand largest investor, trade partner, and infrastructure partner.

Thailand’s relationship with Russia, like many Southeast Asian countries, is also close and long-standing. The Russian Federation represents for the region a reliable counter-balance to Western influence and interference.

In recent years Thailand has begun replacing aging American aircraft with European and Russian alternatives. This includes 3 Sukhoi Superjets used by the Royal Thai Airforce for transportation, as well as several Mil Mi-17 and Kamov Ka-32 helicopters used for military transport, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response.

Conversely, ties with the West have frayed particularly with the United States who for years now funded and encouraged violent protesters in their bid to overthrow the current China (and also Russia) friendly government from power and replace it with leadership backed by and working for Washington, London, and Brussels.

These same representatives recently lecturing Thailand on its stance regarding Russia and Ukraine have regularly injected themselves into the internal political affairs of Thailand, meeting with opposition leaders, accompanying them to police stations, and regularly condemning the Thai government for policing the often violent protests the Western-backed opposition organizes in Bangkok’s streets.

A 2019 Bangkok Post article titled, “Don slams diplomats for accompanying Thanathorn,” would note:

Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai has accused foreign envoys of breaching diplomatic protocol and intervening in the justice system by being present when Future Forward Party leader Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit reported to Pathumwan police on a sedition charge.

“That could not happen in their own countries, but they did it in our country. We will ask them to cooperate and not to do that again. It was against the diplomatic protocols of the United Nations,” Mr Don said at Government House on Tuesday.

These same representatives blatantly violating Thailand’s sovereignty and interfering in the nation’s internal political affairs in recent years, now want to recruit Thailand to support them and their efforts to do likewise – undermine peace, stability, and sovereignty – in Eastern Europe.

In a bid to pressure the Thai government over Ukraine and Russia, the same Western-backed opposition groups and media platforms attempting to overthrow the current Thai government for years, is now being mobilized to poison the Thai public against Russia and the Thai government for not taking a firm stance alongside (or perhaps at the feet of) the West.

This includes Prachatai, funded by the US government through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and whose director is an NED fellow. Prachatai has published multiple articles promoting recent anti-Russian protests carried out by US-backed opposition groups and Ukrainian expatriates.

However, the Western-backed opposition in Thailand has made itself incredibly unpopular, particularly from 2019 onward. The fact that the Thai opposition is compromised by its Western backers and financiers is widely known among politically-conscious Thais and the reality behind Ukraine-Russian tensions is openly discussed from a Russian point of view among at least some prominent Thai media platforms.

While US-funded and influenced media will parrot Western talking points regarding Russia, much of Thailand’s media will remain neutral with at least some prominent media platforms presenting the conflict from Russia’s points of view. This includes a recent interview by Thai journalist Suthichai Yoon of Russian Ambassador to Thailand Evgeny Tomikhin.

Thailand’s political and information space could have been more favorably positioned ahead of the current conflict to protect Thai neutrality from Western pressure but for the time being, the hysteria sweeping the West has so far not made any significant inroads in Thailand.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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A Nine-Year Obscenity: The Australia-NZ Resettlement Deal

March 31st, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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Obscenities occupy the annals of State behaviour, revolting reminders about what governments can do. One of Australia’s most pronounced and undeniable obscenities is its continuing effort to gut and empty international refugee law of its relevant foundations.  Instead of being treated as a scandal, populists and governments the world over have expressed admiration, even envy: If they can get away with that, what might we do?

Along the way, Australia has also made its greatest contribution to deterring unwanted arrivals, creating the most ruthless, tropical detention network for individuals who, unblessed by paperwork, arrive by boat with the aid of people traffickers and are duly told they will never settle in Australia.  These “unlawful” arrivals – language itself in contravention of the UN Refugee Convention – are duly passed on the refugee camp conveyor belt, where they face ruination, despair and sadistic prison wardens.  To Manus Island or Nauru they go, awaiting settlement in another country.

The Manus Regional Processing Centre on Los Negros Island Manus Province Papua New Guinea on Friday 11 September 2015. Photo: Andrew Meares

In 2013, New Zealand offered some mitigation to these ghastly conditions.  Australia might have expressed no interest in resettling such arrivals, but New Zealand did.  Thus, that great tradition of outsourcing obligations and responsibilities was continued, with Australia preferring to let others do the heavy lifting.

That agreement involved Australia’s neighbour accepting 150 of its annual intake of refugees from Australian detention centres.  But the fall of the Labor government, and the coming to power of a conservative Coalition crazed by “turning back the boats”, all but killed the arrangement.

This did not stop other inglorious attempts on Canberra’s part to abdicate human rights responsibilities with the connivance of other countries.  In 2014, a resettlement deal was struck with Cambodia costing in the order of AU$55 million.  Unsurprisingly, only a few refugees availed themselves of this less than impressive arrangement.  The next year, Australia tried, in vain, to coax the Philippines with an offer worth AU$150 million.

The 2016 agreement with the United States, hammered out in the last days of the Obama administration, was seen as a diplomatic coup, obliging Washington to take between 1,250 to 2,000 refugees.  All would be subject to stringent US vetting.  Australia, in turn, would accept a much smaller complement of refugees from Central America.

These arrangements, with much justification, were rubbished by the newly arrived President Donald J. Trump.  In a now notorious phone call between Trump and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, the President suggested that this “stupid deal” might facilitate the import of terrorists into the United States.

“I do not want to have more San Bernadinos or World Trade Centres.  I could name 30 others, but I do not have enough time.”

In another action that could only be seen as ingratiating, Australia agreed, in 2017, to resettle 17 Cubans who were found desperately clinging to a lighthouse off the Florida Keys.  The pattern here should be obvious: Australia will do everything it can to evade, circumvent and subvert a refugee processing scheme that is humane and generous.

Under the current, revived understanding, New Zealand will accept 150 refugees from Australia each year for three years, but only those who are already in detention.  Canberra has made it clear that the deal will not apply to those subsequently making an effort to travel to Australia by sea.

“Australia remains firm,” stated Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews, “illegal maritime arrivals will not settle here permanently.  Anyone who attempts to breach our borders will be turned back or sent to Nauru.”

Another nasty proviso is also applicable.  Those refugees resettled in New Zealand will be looked at as a special category should they wish to enter Australia.  According to the Australian Department of Home Affairs, they will be allowed “to apply for visas to enter Australia on a short-term or temporary stay basis only”. This would also apply even after the grant of New Zealand citizenship.

Government acceptance of this plan was only reached after what were described as “bullish” and “intimidating” negotiations between Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and non-government parliamentarians in 2019.  Independent Tasmanian Senator Jacqui Lambie even claims that she was threatened with jail were she to reveal any details of the plan.  “So, for the sake of humanity, I had no other choice but to shut up anyway to make sure that job was done.”

Lambie’s sense of humanity should not be exaggerated.  Negotiations with the government centred on securing her support for the repeal of laws permitting the evacuation of gravely ill refugees to the Australian mainland for medical treatment.  Compassion for refugees tends to be in short supply in the nation’s capital.

The opposition Labor Party, hardly a shining light in the refugee debates, have tried to make hay from the Morrison government’s change of heart.

“This is an absolutely humiliating backflip,” cheered Shadow Assistant Minister for Immigration, Andrew Giles.  “It should not have taken nine years and that is the other big thought in my mind, the cost to those individual lives and the cost to all of us in this pointless, cruel intransigence by Mr Morrison.”

While Australian Labor mocked, New Zealand Immigration Minister Kris Faafoi was self-congratulatory and business-like of his country’s record.  “New Zealand has a long and proud history of refugee resettlement and this arrangement is another example of how we are fulfilling our humanitarian international commitment.”  In marketing speak, Faafoi expressed his pleasure that NZ could “provide resettlement outcomes for refugees who would otherwise have continued to face uncertain futures.”

While 450 refugees will find safety and sanctuary in New Zealand, that does little for 500 others.  The beastly, cruel system remains in place, and promises to cost AU$2 billion next year.  If anything, this revived agreement shows how far countries have pitifully fallen in their responsibilities in providing safety for the vulnerable and damaged.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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The call for a 2 day national level strike by workers given by 10 central trade unions and other supporting organizations in India drew a strong response by  over 200 million (20 crore) workers on March 28 and 29, according to organizers. These workers included those from ports and mines, railways and transport, banking and insurance, refineries and telecom, public as well as private sector (including multinational companies). There was a significant presence of women in the strike, particularly those employed in various development schemes, often at very low wages.

The strike was in addition supported by the Samyukta Kisan Morcha, an umbrella organization of 40 farmers’ organizations which had spearheaded a massive and successful farmers’ protest movement last year.

This strike call was given at a time of increasing reports of the twin burdens of unemployment and inflation. Rates of urban unemployment have been at high levels, while the price of essential goods has been increasing. In the process most worker households have faced increasing difficulties in making basic needs. Reports of workers being made to work for longer hours in more difficult conditions have appeared increasingly, resulting in several industrial and construction site accidents.

The demands voiced by these workers include the protection of labor rights won by years of struggle as several of these rights are likely to get diluted or pushed back in the course of the government’s insistence on ‘consolidating’ them in 4 labor codes. For example there has been increasing uncertainty that important gains achieved by construction workers from two laws made specifically for them may be diluted even though efforts made in recent years for their better implementation have resulted in favorable decisions even from the Supreme Court. Just when they were thinking that the proper implementation of the directives of the Supreme Court of India will provide them significant, overdue gains resulting from the two existing laws, construction workers are faced with the uncertainty of the new labor codes. As several labor activists point out, the uncertainties at the ground level are much more compared to what the government cares to admit.

There are increasing apprehensions of workers losing jobs and rights in the course of policies of relentlessly increasing privatization under different names and schemes. Instead of striving to rapidly increasing social security cover to unorganized sector workers who are largely deprived of this, the policies of the government are widely seen to be creating more uncertain and difficult conditions for workers. Millions of unorganized works including women in recent years have been devastated in recent years by the combined impact of prolonged lockdowns as well as arbitrary, adverse government policy decisions like the one on demonetization which suddenly put out of circulation 86% of the currency at one blow.

This strike call was also accompanied by demands for increasing allocation for rural employment guarantee scheme (MGNREGA). This is seen as a very helpful scheme, started by the previous UPA government, which has attracted much attention outside India as well. However those monitoring the scheme have pointed out repeatedly that its  budget needs to be increased significantly beyond the present allocation to cope with compelling needs of recent times. An urban employment guarantee scheme has also been demanded in recent years and in fact has already been initiated by some state governments in smaller ways, more particularly by the Rajasthan government very recently. However a bigger initiative by the central government regarding this is still awaited.

Much higher allocations for social sector including health, nutrition and education are widely regarded as long overdue, with a strong prioritization for meeting the needs of weaker sections. This should include significant increase in the allocations for important schemes which should also include provision for increasing the wages of workers employed in these schemes, most of whom are women and have toiled for long hours daily at less than the legal minimum wage rate. In remote villages I have met cooks, often elderly women, who have been preparing meals for around 100 or more school children  while getting around Rs. 40  a day on average ( about half a dollar), and even this payment often gets delayed.

All these demands have been raised in the course of this strike call. These demands include old demands like those relating to regularization of contract workers but also involve relatively new ones like those relating to the much better protection and remuneration of those health and sanitation workers who have been in the forefront of the COVID 19 efforts.

There are also much debated issues relating to the restoration of the old pension scheme. Reforms which can protect worker and employee interests while also accommodating fiscal concerns have also been proposed. In such contexts perhaps a middle path can be explored with broad-based consultations.

However most of the demands of the workers voiced at the time of this recent strike call are well-justified and it is heartening to see that workers are agitating not just for protecting their own interests but also for protecting the wider interests of people in such crucial areas as banking, insurance and health. There should be adequate follow-up efforts after the strike to reach out to more people so that with greater public education on these significant issues, a broader base of support around these important demands can be created.

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Bharat Dogra is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Man Over Machine and Planet in Peril.

Featured image is from Countercurrents

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the “Translate Website” drop down menu on the top banner of our home page (Desktop version).

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Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III Scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research does not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The history of this war must be understood.

The bombing and shelling led by Ukraine’s Armed Forces directed against the people of Donbass started eight years ago, resulting in the destruction of residential areas and more than 10,000 civilian casualties.

A  bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


Even those who casually follow South Asian affairs know that Prime Minister Khan despises the Hindu nationalist policies of India’s ruling BJP, which he’s described as fascist, Islamophobic, and regionally destabilizing. He’s also personally criticized Prime Minister Narendra Modi on multiple occasions. That’s why nobody could have expected that he’d praise India of all countries during a rally ahead of what’s shaping out to be the most pivotal week of his political career.

Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan unexpectedly praised rival India’s foreign policy towards Russia during a rally on Sunday ahead of a scheduled no-confidence motion later this week that some observers suspect is secretly orchestrated by the US. He said that “I salute India today. It has an independent foreign policy. India is a member of Quad alliance which also has United States as a member. But it is importing oil from Russia which is facing sanctions. It calls itself neutral. India has a foreign policy dedicated to its people.” These surprising remarks deserve to be interpreted.

Even those who casually follow South Asian affairs know that Prime Minister Khan despises the Hindu nationalist policies of India’s ruling BJP, which he’s described as fascist, Islamophobic, and regionally destabilizing. He’s also personally criticized Prime Minister Narendra Modi on multiple occasions. That’s why nobody could have expected that he’d praise India of all countries during a rally ahead of what’s shaping out to be the most pivotal week of his political career. The purpose behind doing so was severalfold, though, which will now be explained.

First, Prime Minister Khan is showing that he’s objective enough of a national leader to give credit where it’s due despite his multiple problems with India and its leadership. Like that neighboring country, his has also impressively practiced a policy of principled neutrality following the onset of Russia’s ongoing special military operation in Ukraine. He also condemned those nearly two dozen Western ambassadors in Islamabad who recently broke protocol by publishing a letter demanding that Pakistan turn against Russia in spite of this indisputably being against that South Asian state’s national interests.

Building upon the above, the second purpose behind his praise of India is to explain how a country can properly balance between rival partners like Russia and the US. Pakistan is in a similar position vis-à-vis those two Great Powers as well as China and the US. Under the visionary leadership of Prime Minister Khan and his patriotic team, Pakistan released its first-ever National Security Policy in January that officially promulgated the policy of refusing to participate in bloc politics. It’s doing its best to put this into practice but that entire strategy might be threatened if a US-backed opposition comes to power.

Third, Prime Minister Khan is implying the international legal reality that India and Pakistan are equal members of the community of nations that shouldn’t be treated differently despite practicing the same policy vis-à-vis Russia. American-affiliated India is still importing oil from US-sanctioned Russia without any consequences thus far from Washington so it follows that similarly American-affiliated Pakistan shouldn’t be faced with any consequences either for going through with its reported gas and wheat deals with US-sanctioned Russia.

The fourth purpose of the Prime Minister’s praise of India was to draw global attention to the concept of principled neutrality being practiced by that country and his own. He likely knew that his words would generate headlines across the world and thus wanted to ensure that everyone is aware that neutrality still exists despite unprecedented pressure by the US-led West to side with it in that declining unipolar hegemon’s Hybrid Wars on Russia and China. India’s stance towards Russia is the perfect example of principled neutrality since it’s the largest and most populous country in the world that’s practicing it.

And finally, the last point that the Pakistani leader wanted to convey is that principled neutrality is a foreign policy dedicated to one’s people and which advances its practitioner’s objective national interests. Those states like India and Pakistan that practice it are proudly rebuffing unprecedented US-led Western pressure to surrender their strategic sovereignty at the expense of their people’s interests. Capitulating to such foreign forces would be an unforgiveable dereliction of their leaders’ duty to their citizens. Prime Ministers Khan and Modi are therefore practicing the most pragmatic policies possible.

Having explained the severalfold strategic purposes behind Prime Minister Khan’s praise of India’s foreign policy towards Russia, observers should hopefully have a better understanding of what motivated his unexpected remarks. It all makes sense when considering the larger contexts in which they were made connected to this week’s no-confidence motion against his government, the recent intensification in the New Cold War’s Western Eurasian theater between Russia and the US, and the policy of principled neutrality being practiced by his country, India, and many other Global South states.

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This article was originally published on OneWorld.

Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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India Should Quit Quad Now!

March 21st, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III Scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research does not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The history of this war must be understood. 

The bombing and shelling led by Ukraine’s Armed Forces directed against the people of Donbass started eight years ago, resulting in the destruction of residential areas and more than 10,000 civilian casualties.

A  bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


Hedging between superpowers — United States, Russia and China — was never the smart thing to do. India should have known that the contradictions are simply irreconcilable. 

This is a moment of truth, therefore, as the US unsheathes the sword to bleed and dismember Russia, and gives an ultimatum to China to stay out of it. 

The gravity of the situation is sinking in, finally. That is the message coming out of the Cabinet Committee on Security meeting convened by PM Modi on Sunday “to review India’s security preparedness, and the prevailing global scenario in the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine,” where he was briefed “on latest developments and different aspects of India’s security preparedness in the border areas as well as in the maritime and air domain.” 

The US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s meeting with China’s top diplomat and Politburo member Yang Jiechi in Rome later today promises to be a defining moment in world politics. 

Yesterday, Sullivan explicitly threatened China in an interview with CNN. He said: 

“We are communicating directly, privately to Beijing, that there will absolutely be consequences for large-scale sanctions evasion efforts or support to Russia to backfill them. We will not allow that to go forward and allow there to be a lifeline to Russia from these economic sanctions from any country, anywhere in the world.”

The warning to China is that it should conform to the US sanctions against Russia and desist from providing support (“lifeline”) to Russia in any form.

The cutting edge of Sullivan’s statement is that it also applies to India. The implications are very, very severe. Simply put, Washington’s demand is also be that India should abandon its relationship with Russia. 

That means principally, that India should freeze the defence relationship. Considering that something like 60-70% of weaponry for our armed forces is of Russian origin, this will render a crippling blow to India’s defence preparedness. 

Essentially, this is going to be baptism by fire for the Indian leadership. It stands to reason that the Americans have already conveyed their charter of demands to the government, and PM’s hurried move to convene the CCS ensued. 

Last week, the Russian minister of energy had a call with his Indian counterpart where he not only offered oil at concessional rates but also invited Indian companies to step up investments in Russian oil and gas fields on a preferential basis. At a time when oil price crossed $130 a barrel and spot market price for gas is approaching $4000 per thousand cubic meters, the Russian offer came as a gift from God.

But the fact that the government downplayed it shows a state of paranoia — symptomatic of the same pusillanimity that characterised the UPA mindset, prompting the rollback of ties with Iran. 

The Americans have experienced that our elite are largely men of straw. Given the scale of corruption, there are all kinds of interest groups in our country. Besides, the comprador elements within our elite are stakeholders in the American agenda. That is a tragic fact of life. 

However, the difference today is that the looming American threat would have vital bearing on India’s defence capabilities, and national security. For a government that proclaims the nationalist credo, the choice ought to be clear. 

The Modi government should refuse to comply with the American legislations regarding Russia. Period. In all likelihood, Americans are bluffing. Or, if there is going to be a price to pay, the leadership should take the nation into confidence and explain the long-term imperative of safeguarding the country’s core interests at whatever cost. Indians are a patriotic people.  

To my understanding, in the world of today, American hegemony is unsustainable. The US bullies those who are susceptible to bullying and blackmails those ruling elites who are vulnerable to blackmail, individually or collectively. Hopefully, our ruling elite do not fall into such a pitiable category.

Freedom struggle was so much more arduous. The predicament today is also about the country’s independence. The nation will rally under an inspiring leader.  

Things have come to such a sorry pass today largely due to the flawed foreign policies through the past two decades or so when the American lobbyists began expounding that India’s interests are best served in an alliance with the US. 

‘Non-Alignment’ and ‘strategic autonomy’ became archaic concepts. Thus, circa 2000 or so, India ‘crossed the Rubicon’, to borrow the title of an infamous book of those times, to be with our ‘natural allies’. Where has it brought the country today after 21 years? 

The self-styled foreign policy gurus in the media and the strategic immunity proved horribly wrong in their assessment of international politics. Beyond the Rubicon, what we saw and experienced was a bleached landscape of parched earth and birds of prey, so different from the El Dorado that we were promised by the carpetbaggers.

Indian foreign policy needs a strategic course correction. India should distance itself completely from the self-centred US polices whose aim is the preservation of its global hegemony. The first step in that direction should be to quit Quad. 

Make no mistake, a US-China showdown is in the making sooner than one might have expected it, and it will be calamitous for India to get sucked into it. The visit by Japanese prime minister Kishida to India this weekend causes disquiet. 

By the colour of our skin, our religion, our culture, our geography, our political economy, we will never be accepted by the West as ‘one of us’. Do not be mesmerised by promises of equal partnerships. Look at the US’ track record — selfish, cynical and ruthless in the pursuit of its interests. 

History didn’t end with the eclipse of the Cold War. Fundamentally, what the Western powers are planning is a form of neo-colonialism borne out of the desperate need to arrest the decline of their economies through a massive transfer of wealth from the rest of the world inhabited by 88 percent of mankind — Asia, in particular. To that end, the West has unceremoniously buried ‘globalisation’ and turned its back on multilateralism. 

Quintessentially, what is unfolding is no different from 19th century colonial era. Therefore, India should work together with like-minded countries that are stakeholders in the preservation of their sovereignty, hard-won independence and most important, their cherished freedom to choose their paths of development insulated from interference in internal affairs or attempts at ‘regime change’. 

A peaceful external environment is an imperative need and the foreign policy should prioritise that objective. It means a revamp of India’s policies toward China and Pakistan. We are stuck in a groove cut decades ago largely for propaganda purposes, unable to disown our self-serving narratives. Fortunately, there are incipient signs of rethink lately. Do not let Washington queer the pitch of India’s crucial relationships with China or Pakistan.

A nation has no future if it is incapable of introspection. Mistakes have been made but it is false pride and hubris not to make amends. Indians are a forgiving people. And as for the present government at least, it only inherited the false narratives.  

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Japan’s Concern for Ukraine: Crocodile Tears?

March 21st, 2022 by Dr. Brian Victoria

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Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III Scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research does not support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The history of this war must be understood. 

The bombing and shelling led by Ukraine’s Armed Forces directed against the people of Donbass started eight years ago, resulting in the destruction of residential areas and more than 10,000 civilian casualties.

A  bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


To watch Japanese television news, including numerous news specials, is to be reminded morning, noon and night of the war in the Ukraine and the suffering of the Ukrainian people. Needless to say, there is nothing wrong with this inasmuch as the suffering, death and destruction caused by the war is all too real and ought to be of concern to all who cherish life and value peace. There is, further, no question that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is responsible for the current situation even though, as many observers have noted, the US, NATO and Ukrainian leaders deliberately provoked Russia into taking military action.

Nevertheless, in concert with the Japanese public’s genuine concern for the plight of the Ukrainians, there is another movement taking place in Japan that is using the Ukrainian crisis as a pretext to further expand the Japanese military and strengthen its military alliance with the US. In a Reuter’s article, dated March 17th, Kono Taro, a leading conservative politician, former defense chief and ex-foreign minister said, “We need to tell the people in Japan that in order to protect ourselves we need to help the others too. If there is any aggression anywhere on this planet, we need to stop them.”

On the surface, this seems an eminently reasonable and positive statement. Who does not believe that war anytime and anyplace ought to be stopped! However, the question must be asked, is this really Japan’s position? Are the expressions of concern on the part of Japan’s conservative leaders genuine or do they consist of “crocodile tears,” i.e. hiding their satisfaction with the turn of events in that they strengthen their case for convincing the Japanese people to further rearm while revising Japan’s “peace constitution”?

Readers may recall that at the time of America’s second invasion of Iraq in 2003, Japan did nothing to stop, let alone even criticize, the US invasion. If Japan is opposed to “aggression anywhere on this planet” why did it do nothing to stop the US?

The answer, of course, is that the two countries have had a robust military alliance since 1952. US influence in the alliance is so powerful that in 2003 Japan dispatched more than 1,000 soldiers to an allegedly “non-combat” zone in Iraq. This marked the first time in Japan’s postwar history that it sent troops abroad other than UN-sponsored peace-keeping operations. Further, it was done in spite of the provisions of Article Nine of its constitution that forbids Japan’s military from waging war overseas. Non-combat zone or not, Japan’s troops were well prepared with anti-tank rocket launchers and recoilless guns, all deemed necessary to protect against suicide bombers.

At the time, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro justified Japan’s military support for the US invasion as follows: “America has made many sacrifices to create a viable democracy in Iraq, therefore Japan must be a trustworthy ally for the United States.” In 2016 I had the opportunity to personally ask the former prime minister if, in retrospect, he had any regrets about his support for the US invasion based, as it was, entirely on falsehoods. Koizumi replied, “I have none.” Koizumi then changed the subject and told me how much he had enjoyed his visit to Graceland, Elvis Presley’s home, with President George W. Bush in June 2006.

The March 17th Reuters article introduced above went on to explain that Japan now counts neighboring China as its top national security threat, closely followed by North Korea and Russia. Some officials in Tokyo, including Kono, worry that Russia’s attack on Ukraine may encourage China to attack Taiwan inasmuch as China considers Taiwan a renegade province. Separated by only about 100 kilometers from the nearest Japanese island, Japan claims that were Taiwan to be taken over by Beijing, Chinese forces would be in a position to interfere with its maritime trade routes.

Kono Taro noted that China’s “spending on forces is four times more than our national defense budget. Japan alone couldn’t fight against the Chinese forces if they invade Japan.” Why China would invade Japan, even if it were to invade Taiwan, is something Kono failed to explain. But such an explanation may not be necessary since Japan’s conservative politicians never tire of “telling the people in Japan that in order to protect ourselves we need to help the others too.” The “others” begin, of course, with the US but recently have grown to include Australia, and possibly India, as well as Japan.

It is important to realize that the current financial and military bleeding of Russia in Ukraine has long been a cherished goal of the US. For example, in 2019, long before the current Ukrainian crisis, the conservative and very influential Rand Corporation in the US published a report entitled, “Overextending and Unbalancing Russia: Assessing the impact of Cost-imposing Options.” Its stated purpose was to “impose options that the United States and its allies could pursue across economic, political, and military areas to stress, overextend and unbalance— Russia’s economy and armed forces and the regime’s political standing at home and abroad.”

Concretely, its recommendations included: “Providing lethal aid to Ukraine so as to exploit Russia’s greatest point of external vulnerability.” In doing so, the report noted that while the likelihood of success in extending Russia was only “moderate,” the benefits were “high” even though the costs and risks were also “high.” The reason the cost and risks were labelled “high” was because “any increase in US military arms and advice to Ukraine would need to be carefully calibrated to increase the costs to Russia of sustaining its existing commitment without provoking a much wider conflict in which Russia, by reason of proximity, would have significant advantages.”

The same report also encouraged the US government to “undermine Russia’s image abroad; encourage domestic protests; impose deeper trade and financial sanctions. . . to degrade the Russian economy, and increase Europe’s ability to import gas from suppliers other than Russia.” The report went so far as to recommend “encouraging the emigration from Russia of skilled labor and well-educated youth.” Seen from the perspective of this report, if not the US government, the current war in Ukraine is nothing short of ‘mana from heaven’ at least for those who are not dying or becoming refugees in foreign lands. It is not only conservative politicians in Japan who are crying “crocodile tears.”

The question is, will China be next in line for similar treatment, this time at the hands of both Japan and the US, supported by Australia and possibly India, a group collectively known as the “Quad”?

Readers of my previous article, “Pearl Harbor Comes to Taiwan” will recall a March 2021 report I introduced from the Hoover Institution, a second influential conservative US thinktank. Interested readers will find the previous article here. The report’s authors, Robert D. Blackwill and Philip D. Zelikow, expressed their belief that as the US continues to pour weapons into Taiwan, just as it has in Ukraine, the Chinese side will, at some point, say enough is enough and either establish a quarantine of additional weapons or even conduct a siege and assault of the island.

Blackwill and Zelikow assert that once China has acted the US should “establish a carefully orchestrated military challenge of a PRC quarantine or siege and assault. The coordinated military challenge would be calibrated to present Chinese forces with the choice to either let these military forces through, or shoot down planes and sink ships, in a clash that would kill numbers of Americans or Japanese, or both. The Chinese would thus either initiate a local war (in the quarantine scenario) or widen it by choosing to attack these neutral vessels or aircraft. (Italics mine)

As for the Japanese, Blackwill and Zelikow write, “Many Japanese prefer peace and abhor the militarism of the past. But this could change. Outsiders should not underestimate just how fast and how far Japanese society could move, and change, once a consensus has been formed about the need to act. This part of the joint US-Japan campaign plan should develop, in advance, the scale and character of how Japan should prepare to defend itself in the aftermath of a local war.”

On December 23, 2021 the Japan Times reported: “The Self-Defense Forces [SDF] and the US military have drawn up a draft joint operation plan that would enable the setup of an attack base along the southwest Nansei island chain in the event of a Taiwan contingency, according to Japanese government sources. . . . Under the draft plan, US Marines will set up a temporary attack base at the initial stage of contingency on the Nansei Islands, a chain stretching southwest from the prefectures of Kagoshima and Okinawa toward Taiwan. The US military will get support from the SDF to send troops to the islands if a Taiwan contingency appears imminent, the sources said.”

During a Taiwan thinktank event in early December 2021, former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo said any Taiwan contingency would also be an emergency for Japan and for the Japan-US security alliance. Abe’s words indicate that while the Japanese people may not yet support armed conflict with China, Abe and conservative politicians like him, including Kono, are in agreement with America’s military plans.

While we all hope and pray the Ukraine crisis will come to an end as soon as possible, we must not allow ourselves to be lulled into thinking ‘all is now well’ if and when it does. Assuming that Russia comes out of its invasion of Ukraine weakened both militarily and economically, it is clearly one down and one to go. Thus, if the world allows it, China will be next in line. Vanquishing both Russia and China will enable the US to retain its hegemonic position in the world for perhaps another fifty years or even longer. However, in the meantime, climate change continues unabated, on what is rapidly becoming ‘a path of no return.’ Will humanity wake up before it’s too late?

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Brian Victoria, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies.

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The pandemic added 4.7 million more people to Southeast Asia’s most extreme poor in 2021, reversing gains made in fighting poverty, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) said on Wednesday (March 16), while urging governments to take steps to boost economic growth.

The number of people in extreme poverty – defined as those living on less than US$1.90 (S$2.60) a day – was 24.3 million last year, or 3.7 per cent of South-east Asia’s collective 650 million population, the ADB said in a report.

Before the pandemic, figures for those in extreme poverty in South-east Asia had been on the decline, with 14.9 million in 2019, down from 18 million in 2018 and 21.2 million in 2017.

“The pandemic has led to widespread unemployment, worsening inequality, and rising poverty levels, especially among women, younger workers, and the elderly in South-east Asia,” said ADB President Masatsugu Asakawa.

Mr Asakawa urged governments to improve health systems, streamline regulations to boost business competitiveness, invest in smart, green infrastructure and adopt technology to speed up growth.

Click here to read the full article.

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Abstract

Japan has nominated the Sado Gold Mine for UNESECO World Heritage inscription despite South Korean opposition due to Japan’s refusal to recognize the role of wartime Korean forced labor at this location. Japan’s previous industrial World Heritage inscription is criticized for similar denials of forced labor history. In this way, the Japanese government has embarked on a “history war” against Korea and the memories of the wartime victims of forced labor. In addition to providing victim testimony, historical sources and local and Korean research reveals that Mitsubishi forced Korean laborers to work in deadly conditions in the Sado mines. Korean forced laborers were taken to Sado Island where they faced racial discrimination and abuse. This article explains why Japan chose to worsen relations with Korea by nominating the Sado mines for World Heritage inscription while concealing the use of forced Korean labor and examines evidence of forced labor at the site.

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On January 28th 2022, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio announced plans to proceed with the UNESCO World Heritage nomination of the “Sado Gold Mine”, or more accurately the “Sado complex of heritage mines, primarily gold mines” (hereafter Sado mines).[1] The announcement further soured Japan-South Korea relations, as Korea strongly opposes the nomination due to Japan’s denials of Korean forced labor at Sado and other sites during wartime. Kishida’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government was considering postponing the nomination due to Korea’s protests, but the decision to go ahead immediately was made at the insistence of former Prime Minister Abe Shinzō.[2] Abe, who still heavily influences the LDP, stated officially on January 20th 2022 that it would be a mistake not to nominate the Sado mines in order to avoid controversy.[3] Following Abe’s bidding, Kishida established a “history war team” within the cabinet with the purpose of “collecting facts for inspection to gain understanding from the international community based on the [Japanese] government’s perception of history.”[4] Foreign Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa announced that the Japanese government “is not giving any diplomatic consideration to South Korea” in this matter. [5]

The Sado mines were bought from the government in 1896 by Mitsubishi, which operated the mines during wartime and until their closure in 1989. In an interview published on the first page of Shūkan Fuji, January 26th 2022, Abe Shinzō again denied the wartime use of Korean forced labor at the Sado mines, citing two history books by Mitsubishi.[6] One of these books had a week earlier been cited to disprove the use of forced labor by a member of parliament representing Niigata.[7] Needless to say, history written by the perpetrator is not adequate for disproving allegations of victims.

Dōyū nowarito outcrop in Aikawa, Sado. The mountain was split by Edo period surface mining.
Photo by Muramasa (CC), Wikimedia Commons, 2013.

“The Second Battleship Island”

The announcement of plans to nominate the Sado mines for UNESCO World Heritage inscription in 2023 came in the middle of another ongoing dispute over Korean forced labor history at Japanese industrial heritage sites. The Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining (hereafter the Meiji Industrial Sites), were inscribed by UNESCO in 2015, on the agreed condition that Japan acknowledge that “a large number of Koreans and others […] were brought against their will and forced to work under harsh conditions in the 1940s at some of the sites.”[8] However, the Industrial Heritage Information Centre that opened in Tokyo ostensibly with the purpose of acknowledging these victims instead denies the history of forced labor and even discrimination against Koreans at the inscribed sites.

Like the Sado mines, five of the inscribed Meiji Industrial Sites with Korean forced labor history, including the infamous “Battleship Island/Gunkanjima” (Hashima), were owned and operated by the Mitsubishi group during the war. Previous examination of the nomination process and development of the controversial Industrial Heritage Information Centre revealed that its historical negationism was backed and encouraged by Abe Shinzō, and that his close friend Kato Kōko along with elite businesspeople within and/or with close ties to Mitsubishi were directly responsible for the data collection which formed the basis for the center’s exhibitions.[9] UNESCO has given Japan a deadline of December 1st 2022 to report updated steps to improve the historical narratives at the center.

Pushing for the World Heritage inscription of yet another industrial site with a history of wartime Korean forced labor naturally attracts unwanted attention in Japan concerning its dark colonial history. Recent South Korean media reports frequently refer to the Sado mines as “the second Battleship Island.”[10] Why nominate the Sado mines for World Heritage inscription when it attracts attention to a history Japan would like to forget?

 

Behind the World Heritage Nomination of the Sado Mines

Sado Island is located in Niigata Prefecture about 30 km from the mainland and is roughly two thirds the size of Okinawa Island (855 km²). The population is approximately 56,000 (as of 2018).[11] Sado is known for agriculture and fishing, but the Sado mines were also domestically well-known before its World Heritage nomination. Even so, the number of visitors to Sado have steadily declined since the 1990’s. While about 1,144,000 people travelled across to Sado in the fiscal year of 1994, only about 500,000 people crossed over to the island annually in the fiscal years of 2019 and 2020.[12] This number was further halved in 2021 by the Coronavirus pandemic. In recent news reports broadcasted in Japan, people working in the Sado tourism industry have expressed their high hopes and expectations for a World Heritage inscription that could revitalize tourism on the island.

Google map with Sado Island encircled, Feb. 2022.

In order for any country to nominate a site for World Heritage inscription, the site must first be included in the country’s Tentative List.[13] The first application to register the Sado mines was filed jointly by Sado City and Niigata Prefecture in 2006.[14] This was the very first year it become possible for local governments to do so in Japan, as it had previously been up to the national government.[15] As the initial underdeveloped application failed, the prefectural government established an official Niigata World Heritage registration promotion office.

“The Sado complex of heritage mines, primarily gold mines” was approved for the Tentative List by the Agency of Cultural Affairs in 2010. The focus was now on primarily on gold, in contrast to the first application which was titled “Sado, the island of gold and silver: mining and culture.” Over a period of about 400 years of mining, the Sado mines produced 2300 tons of silver, and 78 tons of gold.[16] The approved application did not ignore Sado’s silver production, but goldmining was made central to the claim that the mines have Outstanding Universal Value (OUV)—an essential criteria for World Heritage recognition.

Japan’s claims for OUV of the Sado mines in 2010 included the culture that developed there for over 400 years of goldmining and “the constant introduction of mining techniques and technical expertise from both Japan and abroad […].” The OUV justification specifies “the Nishimikawa alluvial gold deposits and the Dōyū-nowarito outcrop” as “outstanding example[s] of a technological ensemble.” Emphasis is put on the Edo-period “gold coinage system manufactured at the Sado Mines” and the Sado mines’ historical influence on international economy.

 

Value of the Sado mines as Industrial Heritage

The uniqueness of the Sado mines as an industrial heritage site can be disputed.[18] Japan’s interpretation of the mines’ history is selective and celebratory, but arguably, the mines are cultural and historical assets worthy of preservation for future generations. In 1601, two years before the Tokugawa Shogunate started its 265 year long military rule of Japan (the Edo-period), Tokugawa started developing the Sado Aikawa gold and silver mine. Miners from all over Japan gathered on Sado which became the biggest and most important gold and silver mines in the country. Although generally primitive, endogenous mining techniques developed on Sado.[19] The Sado mining community spawned unique cultural aspects, such as “demon drums” (Onidaiko).[20] Since the Edo-period, locals with demon masks and mining chisels have danced to traditional taiko drums on Sado during festivals, a custom continued and highly valued to this day.[21]

The Sado mines are also important heritage sites due to their iconic history of prison labor. In his introduction to Japanese prison labor, Tanaka Mitsuo asserts that “prison labor history [in Japan] is extensive, and the most famous example is the Sado mines,” referring to the Edo-period.[22] Since 1778, homeless people in Edo and other cities were rounded up and transported to the Sado mines for slave labor. Illegal gambling rings were raided to catch groups of prisoners for mining. The Japanese word “dosakusa,” meaning “a confusing and chaotic situation,” is said to stem from “dosa”—Edo-period slang referring to illegal gamblers escaping in all directions and sent to the Sado mines (“do-sa” is “Sa-do” spelt backwards in Japanese).[23] Records show that lung disease due to inhalation of silica dust significantly shortened the lives of Edo-period Sado mine laborers.[24] Most of the prison laborers pumped water out of the mines which were susceptible to flooding, and it is estimated that 1,800 laborers died in the Sado mines in the last 100 years of the Edo-period.[25]

At the beginning of the Meiji Era, the Meiji government took control of the mine. To remedy decreased production, foreign mining experts from England, Germany and the US were brought to Sado to set up Western modernized mining facilities.[26] The foreign mining experts advised the discontinuation of ineffective endogenous techniques, many of which had been developed by the miners themselves.[27]

 

Mitsubishi’s Sado Mines

Mitsubishi purchased the Sado mines from the Meiji government in 1896, which was excellent timing.[28]The demand for gold soared when Japan placed the Yen on the gold-standard in 1897, meaning that the value of the Yen was based on a fixed amount of gold. The background was that Japan mainly bought warships, munitions, and machinery from gold-standard countries like Britain, which was becoming increasingly expensive for Japan due to the global depreciation of silver. After the first Sino-Japanese war (1894-95) in which Japan gained power in Korea by defeating China, Japan received from China an indemnity in gold worth £38 million British Pounds. With this indemnity Japan obtained sufficient reserves to satisfy the Bank of England and to switch to the gold standard.[29] Mitsubishi’s Sado gold could then be exchanged for Western warships and weapons helping Japan win the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Russia’s defeat removed the final obstacle to making Korea a Japanese Protectorate (1905-1910) and subsequently a colony of Japan (1910-1945).

By 1897, 2224 laborers at Mitsubishi’s Sado mines produced gold, silver, and copper.[30] The majority of workers were Japanese, recruited from outside Sado Island by contractors.[31] Rather than paying the laborers directly, Mitsubishi paid the contractors who provided food and dormitory (takobeya) space and became wealthy from deducting fees from their contracted workers’ wages. Around the turn of the century, Mitsubishi was notorious for its mistreatment of contracted laborers after journalists worked undercover in their coal mines and exposed the lack of freedom of movement and violent punishments inflicted by overseers.[32] Also in the Sado mines, hundreds of miners launched disputes and strikes between 1899-1922 to protest unacceptable conditions.[33] From 1926, a new system was implemented in the Sado mines in which laborers were directly employed and paid by Mitsubishi, but the previous system was not completely phased out until 1935.[34]

Mitsubishi[35] centered all its efforts in the Sado mines on gold from 1931 when Japan instigated the second Sino-Japanese war. The company group built new facilities to produce additional gold on Sado, in order to meet the government’s rising demands. Japan needed funding for the purchase and transport of military supplies to its forces invading China.[36] The Kitazawa Floating Plant, the only floating plant in East Asia at the time, was expanded for this purpose in 1938.[37] The Kitazawa Floating Plant is the visually most impressive industrial ruins in the Sado mine complex, and its image is frequently used to promote the Sado mines. Sado’s most successful year in terms of gold production was 1940 when, in the midst of the Asia-Pacific War, 1537kg of gold were produced. This was almost double that of 1938, made possible with the use of Korean forced laborers whose massive mobilization was initiated in 1939.[38]

In 1952, Mitsubishi closed many of the Sado mine tunnels and reduced the number of employees to one tenth.[39] In 1962, the company opened parts of the mines for commercial tourism. Mining operations were closed permanently in 1989, as minerals were deemed depleted. Ownership was passed to Golden Sado Inc. which to the present manages the mines for tourism. In addition to an exhibition hall and outdoor industrial heritage, tourists can join tours inside mines including the Edo-period Sōdayū-tunnel and the Meiji-period Dōyū-tunnel.[40] Golden Sado Inc. is a Mitsubishi subsidiary which is owned 100% by the Mitsubishi Materials Corporation.[41] The World Heritage nomination is thus another golden opportunity for Mitsubishi itself, as the conglomerate can pocket increased revenues through the tourism boost a World Heritage inscription will facilitate without having to acknowledge the role of forced labor in the wartime mines.

The Kitazawa Floating Plant. Photo by Itō Yoshiyuki (CC), Wikimedia Commons, 2013.

Absorbed into the History Wars

The reason behind Japan’s insistence on inscribing yet another site of Korean forced labor for World Heritage now, is that local Sado Island tourism promotion has peaked at the same time that Japanese efforts to deny forced labor at “Battleship Island” and other Meiji Industrial Sites inscribed as World Heritage peaked since 2015.[42] The National Congress of Industrial Heritage (managed by Katō) has received great sums of money from the LDP government spent on the Industrial Heritage Information Centre (also managed by Katō), which despite criticism from UNESCO continues to deny both Korean forced labor and discrimination against Koreans at the Meiji Industrial Heritage Sites. As Abe has correctly implied, hesitating to nominate the Sado mines could send a signal that Japan acknowledges the need to scrutinize its wartime forced labor history.

At the same time, Mitsubishi is facing many lawsuits by descendants of victims of forced labor at a multitude of the company’s sites across Japan. The fact that Mitsubishi itself is still deeply involved with both the Meiji Industrial Sites and the Sado mines is one reason that acknowledging forced labor history is not considered an option by Japan.

In the case of the Meiji Industrial Sites, testimony from many Korean and Chinese victims as well as from Western POWs are known. In the case of the Sado mines, there are no known foreign victims except Koreans, and only a single direct Korean testimony of forced labor in the Sado mines is known. Japan may not perceive the Sado mines nomination as posing any new problems—it may only exacerbate already tense Japan-Korea relations. However, Japan is wrong to assume that only Koreans value the memories of Korean victims.

 

Im T’aeho’s Memories of Forced Labor in the Sado Mines

The aforementioned single Korean testimony was given by Im T’aeho (임태호/林泰鍋) in May 1997, a few months before he passed away. His oral testimony was recorded by his third daughter, Im Kyŏngsuk, and published in Japan in 2002.[43] Recent interviews with Im Kyŏngsuk and Im T’aeho’s oldest daughter, Im Kanran, provide new details not recorded in his testimony.[44]

Im Kyŏngsuk and Im Kanran with pictures of their father, Im T’aeho. Picture captured from the Chosun Ilbo website, 20 Jan. 2022.

Im T’aeho was born December 20th 1919 in Nonsan, Korea, where he married and lived until recruiters working for Mitsubishi came in 1940. Im T’aeho’s wife gave birth to their first daughter Im Kanran in Nonsan the same year. Nonsan was impoverished and Im T’aeho could not find work there to support his new family. He was enticed by the promises of the recruiters and saw no other option but to relocate his family to Japan where family housing, food, and work was guaranteed by Mitsubishi. 20-year-old Im T’aeho crossed the ocean first on a narrow boat crammed full of others like him, and his family followed soon after.

Upon arrival at Sado Island in November 1940, Im T’aeho was taken deep into the mountains of Aikawa. Far from a comfortable family apartment, he was placed in a remote and crammed dormitory (hamba). His testimony states he realized that he would be mining minerals for Mitsubishi in the Sado mines and that he had lost his freedom. His wife and infant daughter also lived in the dormitory together with many other miners. Im T’aeho’s wife gave birth to two more daughters while living there.

Im T’aeho worked every day from morning until night, mining for minerals deep inside the dusty mines. He stated that cave-ins happened almost every day and that remains of Koreans who died were not treated with any respect by Mitsubishi. This heightened his constant death anxiety. The approximately 90-minute walk back from the mines to the dormitory at night were excruciating. It was a difficult and mountainous path with heavy snowfall in winter, reaching high above Im T’aeho’s knees.

Im T’aeho sustained serious injuries due to two accidents in the mines. The first time, a ladder inside the mines fell as he was climbing it, causing permanent injuries to his hip and leg. Im T’aeho regained consciousness after being carried back to the dormitory—not the hospital. According to his testimony, he was not offered any treatment and was unable to walk to the hospital himself. He was forced back into the mines as soon as he could stand up after about ten days in the dormitory. Soon after, he sustained another injury rendering his hand unusable. At that point, he realized that he could not survive the rigors of the labor much longer.

Im T’aeho managed to escape from Sado Island with his wife and three young daughters.[45] Korean forced laborers only received a fraction of their promised wages, and Im T’aeho had no money after the escape. Im and his family wandered around Japan, and were in Kawasaki when the war ended in August 1945. He was emotionally overwhelmed and could only shed tears of relief upon hearing the news that Korea had been liberated and he was freed from the chains of imperial Japan.

Despite suffering from trauma, mining injuries and silicosis, Im T’aeho lived until the age of 77. Silicosis is a lung decease caused by prolonged inhalation of mineral dust (silica) that makes it progressively harder to breath, decades after first exposure.[46] According to his daughter Im Kyŏngsuk, Im T’aeho developed lumps in his lungs the size of marbles, which eventually caused his slow and agonizing death in 1997. His stated hope of someday receiving an apology from Japan was futile. Im T’aeho’s children oppose the World Heritage nomination of the Sado mines because Japan selectively presents celebratory narratives while concealing shameful parts of history, including the story of their father.

Historical documents and previous research prove that Mitsubishi used Korean forced laborers at the Sado mines during wartime. An extensive Korean investigation report on Mitsubishi’s wartime forced labor in the Sado mines from 2019, headed by Chŏng Hyekyŏng for the Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan, confirms this history building on multiple primary and secondary sources.[47] These include Japanese colonial police reports, newspapers, name lists, interviews with seven families of deceased victims, as well as earlier Japanese academic investigations.[48] One of the latter is Hirose Teizō’s research conducted in the 1980’s.[49] Hirose, a local historian at Niigata University fluent in Korean, has interviewed both elderly local Sado residents as well as Korean victims of forced labor in the Sado mines.[50] Official Japanese local history books from Sado City and Niigata Prefecture also describe Korean forced labor in the Sado mines.[51] Numerous publications document Korean forced labor at other Mitsubishi sites, adding context for interpreting the case of the Sado Mines.[52]

 

Korean Colonial Subjects in Pre-War Niigata

Korean laborers already worked in the Sado mines before forced mobilization and forced labor programs for Koreans were initiated by the Japanese government in 1939. Following Japan’s annexation of Korea in 1910, the number of Koreans in Japan started to increase rapidly. The Korean population of Niigata Prefecture was 11 in 1913, climbing to 1,061 in 1927, reaching 3,368 by 1938.[53] By 1929, 21 Koreans had accepted work in the Sado mines under employment by Mitsubishi.[54] Although life in Japan was not easy, some of the Korean families that lived on Sado Island in the 1930’s before the war saw the work as an opportunity.[55] Koreans were citizens of the Japanese empire. However, xenophobia and racism against Koreans was already systematic and widespread when Korean forced labor became common during wartime (from 1939) as numerous Japanese laborers were drafted into the military.

The independence movement, which began in Korea on March 1st 1919, provoked anti-Korean sentiment in Japan. On July 29th 1922, the Yomiuri Shimbun newspaper reported that a great number of “corpses of massacred Koreans” were floating down the Shinano river in Niigata.[56] The background was the Shinano river incident, in which up to 100 Korean laborers at the Nakatsu Power Plant no. 1 of Shin’etsu Electric Power (currently Tokyo Electric Power Company) were massacred for attempting escape.[57] Forced labor and violent exploitation of Korean laborers was not common in Japan at this time, but according to the newspaper article, Korean laborers at the Niigata Nakatsu Power Plant were forced to work 16 hours a day by Japanese supervisors.[58] It is noteworthy that both the Niigata and Tokyo police denied that any massacre of Koreans had taken place, and media coverage immediately ceased. Locals subsequently confirmed the sightings of a large number of Korean corpses, a fact included in Niigata’s official history.[59]After the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake, false reports of Koreans using the aftermath as an opportunity to plunder Japanese villages continued to be spread by newspapers, despite lack of evidence.[60] In Niigata, groups of Japanese vigilantes were guarding villages with dynamite in hand, terrified of what even the official prefectural history subsequently confirmed were “hoaxes” against Korean residents.[61] In imperial Japan, Koreans were not treated the same as Japanese.

 

Wartime Mobilization of Korean Forced Laborers 

Mitsubishi was struggling with labor shortages in the Sado mines when the Japanese government in 1938 implemented regulations for increased production of minerals to support the war against China.[62]Japan’s National General Labor Mobilization Law, implemented in 1938, was adjusted the next year allowing Japanese companies to mobilize laborers from Korea with the aid of colonial police and authorities.[63] This wartime mobilization of Korean laborers officially started in September 1939, but Mitsubishi started mass recruitment from Korea to Sado already in February the same year. Mitsubishi’s Human Resources staff explained that “production targets [could] not be met because many of the Japanese laborers working inside the mine [were] suffering from silicosis, and more and more young Japanese [were] conscripted for military service”.[64] No known records show how many Sado mine laborers suffered from silicosis, but a Taishō-era (1912-1926) name list for the Yasuda dormitory noted 10 “suspicious deaths,” 2 deaths due to suffocation, and 122 deaths due to unknown causes.[65]

From February 1939, Mitsubishi’s recruiters for the Sado mines travelled around villages in Korea’s South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, where Im T’aeho’s hometown of Nonsan is located. Up to 40 men from each village were made to sign three-year working contracts for labor in Japan.[66] Deception and coercion was common during the recruitment process, and force was used to keep laborers at work against their will.[67]In addition to Im T’aeho and many others, Kang Sinto, Kim Chongwŏn, and Hong Tongch’ŏl were taken from Nonsan to the Sado mines by Mitsubishi with support from the Japanese government during wartime. The aforementioned 2019 Korean investigation report, based on interviews with their families, explained that the latter three were sent back to Korea with silicosis in 1943.[68] Kang Sinto, Kim Chongwŏn, and Hong Tongch’ŏl all received disability-related financial support from the Korean government until their deaths due to their fatal decease.[69]

The 2015 survey report by the Sado City World Heritage Promotional Division gives a few more details on the February 1939 mobilization of Korean laborers for the Sado mines, based on Mitsubishi’s records.[70] It states that drought had continued for two years in a row in South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province, and suggests that this made it easy to recruit a large (unspecified) number of Korean workers. It further states that many Koreans “escaped” in Japan on the way to Sado Island because “they wanted other types of jobs from acquaintances already in Japan”. However, as we know from the context, these exploited Koreans were escaping their forced mobilization.

The forced mobilization of Korean laborers to Japan officially went through three different phases— “recruitment” (Sep. 1939-Feb. 1942), “official mediation” (until Sep. 1944), and “conscription” (until Aug. 1945).[71] It is well-known that despite misleading terms, all three periods were planned by the Japanese state and involved coercion and force by police and military when necessary. Niigata’s official history also asserts for the same reasons that “the fact that Koreans were mobilized with force” applies to all three phases.[72] During the “recruitment” period, the threat of violence was used by recruiters who worked with Korean officials. During the “official mediation” period, the Korean Labor Association handled recruitment on behalf of Japanese companies, using coercion to meet the Japanese government’s demands. Once contracts were signed by the often illiterate Korean recruits, they were taken to their place of work where they lost freedom of movement. During the “conscription” period, Japanese military police openly used violence against Koreans who had no legal way to avoid recruitment.[73]

When the first three-year contracts were about to end in 1942, Sado labor managers implemented a policy to make “everyone continue working.”[74] Mitsubishi’s records noted that local authorities and police in Korea should be consulted before sending back those that were too sick, or for other reasons could not be made to continue.[75] The official history of Niigata prefecture states that the contracts were renewed by force.[76] In February 1944, Mitsubishi built a sanatorium especially for Korean laborers, for the purpose of providing “early treatment of disease and ideological training.”[77] Rather than sending laborers back to Korea, symptoms of silicosis could sometimes be eased with medical treatment and “ideological training” could motivate, or force, sick Korean laborers to return to the mines.

In December 1944, the government issued official orders of labor conscription to all Korean and Japanese laborers in the Sado mines.[78] This officially voided end dates in contracts and made it illegal for laborers to protest. While conscripted labor during wartime is usually not legally considered forced labor, South Korea asserts that Japan’s colonial occupation of Korea was illegal and against the will of its people, and therefore the conscription of Koreans as subjects of colonial Japan was also illegal.[79]

 

Numbers of Korean Forced Laborers

Takeuchi Yasuto is widely cited for his statistics and calculations of numbers of Korean forced laborers in Japan, based on primary sources. He estimates that out of the approximately 800,000 Koreans forced to work in Japan during wartime, more than 100,000 worked for Mitsubishi.[80] Mitsubishi also used wartime foreign forced labor in mines and factories outside the Japanese mainland, in countries like Korea, China, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines.[81] In addition to its many famous factories and coalmines located throughout the empire, Mitsubishi used Korean forced labor for mineral mining across mainland Japan, including in their Sado mines, Ikuno mines, Akenobe mines, Osarizawa mines, Obira mines, Makine mines, Hosokura mines, Teine mines, and Shin-Shimokawa mines.[82] These mineral mines benefitted from the slave labor of approximately 60,000 Koreans.[83] About 5,000 Korean forced laborers were working in 40 different sites in Niigata Prefecture when the war ended—the Sado mines having the highest ratio.[84] Takeuchi calculates that in the Sado mines specifically, at least 1,519 Koreans were forced to work in the period from February 1940 until the end of the war.[85] This number is based on Mitsubishi’s own records, but may not include all Koreans mobilized between February 1939 and February 1940 for which period no detailed records are known.

Mitsubishi documented its mobilization of a total of 1,005 Korean laborers for the Sado mines between February 1940 and March 1942, of which 584 were still there in June 1943 (together with 709 Japanese).[86]New recruits were needed as the Korean labor force was continuously decreasing. Reasons for this includes silicosis, but also a large number of escapes and possibly unrecorded deaths. Mitsubishi’s own statistics from 1943 record 148 successful escapes (逃走) of Korean laborers between February 1940 and June 1943.[87] Mitsubishi recorded that for the same period 6 Koreans were sent home due to working injuries, and 30 more due to “personal illness”. 130 were transferred to other labor sites. The same statistics record 10 deaths of Korean laborers during this period. However, the Korean investigation report published in 2019 states that at least two deaths during this period were not recorded by Mitsubishi and suggests there may be many more. The two unrecorded deaths specifically referred to in this Korean report occurred on December 20th 1942, when falling rocks inside the mines fractured the skull of Kim Chuhwan, killing him along with another unnamed Korean laborer.[88]

Today, the names of over 500 Korean forced laborers at the Sado mines are known from a combination of name lists, including notes of distribution of tobacco rations which also included the age of laborers.[89]The 2019 Korean investigation report calculates, based on a combined list of 355 names and ages of Korean forced laborers at the Sado mines, that the average age was 28.8.[90] The ages ranged from 16 to 48, and 53% were in their twenties. Mitsubishi’s aforementioned records of Korean laborers recruited between February 1940 and March 1942 documents that 80% were from South Ch’ungch’ŏng Province (including Nonsan) and 20% from North Chŏlla Province, both in southern Korea.[91] However, other sources such as the tobacco ration list inform us that the Sado mines also recruited Koreans from South Chŏlla Province, North Kyŏngsang Province and North Ch’ungch’ŏng Province in the south, as well as from South Hamgyŏng Province which today is part of North Korea.[92]

 

Living Conditions

Korean forced laborers are known to have been placed in at least five different residences on Sado Island. These were Yamanogami company residence (for families) in Shimoyamagami-machi, Sōai Dormitory no.1 in Shin-Gorōno-machi, Sōai Dormitory no.3 in Suwa-chō, Sōai Dormitory no.4 in Chisuke-machi and a final dormitory referred to as Kŭmgangnyo in the 2019 Korean investigation report (possibly “Kanagawa” Dormitory in Japanese).[93] Mitsubishi’s records listed 117 Korean laborers residing in the company residence for families, and 185, 157, and 124 Koreans residing in Sōai Dormitory No. 1, 3 and 4, respectively.[94] According to the 2015 survey report by the Sado City World Heritage Promotional Division, Korean laborers were also placed in Sōai Dormitory no.2 in Shimoyamagami-machi as well as in houses in Shimoaikawa.[95] According to Sakaue Torakichi who worked as a dormitory chief for Koreans on Sado during wartime, each person was allocated the space of one tatami mat (less than 2 m²).[96]

Citing an April 14th 1941 Niigata Shimbun newspaper article, Hirose Teizō states that, in 1941, about 50 out of 600 Korean laborers on Sado lived in family apartments. However, the 2019 Korean report which included findings of investigations in Nonsan revealed that several families of now deceased Korean forced laborers lived in dormitories with other laborers on Sado island.[97] It is unclear why Mitsubishi placed several families from Nonsan in dormitories despite having family apartments on Sado, but this discovery is significant for corroborating Im T’aeho’s testimony.

Mitsubishi’s laborers did not pay for housing on Sado Island, but amongst various compulsory fees 50 zen was deducted daily for food prepared by the company, yet food was in short supply.[98] Lack of food is one of the reasons for Korean laborers attempting to escape Sado Island.[99] The Niigata Shimbun newspaper reported on April 8 1942, that hundreds of “Koreans and others” employed at Mitsubishi’s Sado mines were cultivating large amounts of vegetables in the Aikawa mountain fields, while also raising several pigs to provide fertilizer to secure sufficient food.[100] Mitsubishi’s records list vegetable and pig farming as a countermeasure for food shortage, suggesting that the vegetable fields referred to in the newspaper article were managed by Mitsubishi.[101]

The Korean laborers at the Sado mines were constantly reminded how their work supported Japanese warfare. Mitsubishi’s main gates on Sado bore the slogan: “Final victory will be achieved from exceeding production targets day by day; increase production with indomitable fighting spirit (戦意); destroy USA and England with labor and accident-prevention.”[102] Japanese students lined up in the morning greeting laborers on the way to the mines: “Good morning everyone[!] Please increase production today as well so that we can defeat our enemies, the USA and England.”[103] The week after Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th 1941, a “prayer festival for the war victory of migrant Korean laborers” was held at a Shinto shrine near the Sado mines, in which about 200 Koreans were made to pray and worship the Japanese emperor.[104]

Newly arrived Korean laborers at the Sado mines received three months of language education and ideological training.[105] Many of the Korean farmers selected for mining could not speak Japanese, but in contrast to the coal mines, comprehension of instructions was essential in the mineral mines. The ideological training was also spiritual or religious in nature. A central part of the “Japanification” of Koreans was Shintoism and worship of the Japanese emperor as a descendant of Shinto deities. The fact that such training continued even in the Korean sanatorium illustrates the extent of proselytism. Korean resistance to Shintoism is evident in the fact that large groups of Koreans tore down the Japanese shrines in their country very soon after liberation.

 

Working Conditions

Korean forced laborers in the Sado mines faced extreme discrimination with potentially fatal outcomes. The majority of the toughest and most dangerous positions deep in the mines, where cave-ins were common and constant inhalation of silica dust was unavoidable, were filled by Koreans.[106] Records of most cave-ins are not available, but a 1935 Niigata Shimbun newspaper article states that on average one laborer per day was injured from accidents in the Sado mines, which is consistent with Im T’aeho’s memories of wartime labor there.[107]

As Niigata’s prefectural history documents, job assignments at the Sado mines were discriminatory towards Koreans.[108] Underground rock drilling, tunnel underpinning, and underground transporting of produced minerals were especially dangerous jobs.[109] According to the Mitsubishi report from June 1943, 76% of laborers assigned to these positions were Korean (146 Japanese versus 473 Koreans).[110] 82% of rock drillers were Korean (27 Japanese versus 123 Koreans). Only 18% of smelters, who did not work inside the mines, were Korean (85 Japanese versus 19 Koreans). Some of Mitsubishi’s job categories are vague, such as those of kōsaku (possible interpretations include craftsmen and machinists) and zatsufu/zōfu (helper, or literally someone who does various jobs). Only 26% of laborers assigned these positions were Korean (69 Japanese versus 24 Koreans). The only assignment outside the mines which had a majority of Korean laborers was outside mineral transportation (17 Japanese versus 49 Koreans). There was also a job category of “other” to which 321 Japanese and no Koreans were assigned. Hirose Teizō suggests this may refer to female mineral separators working outside the mines.[111] There was no category for farming.

Laborers were divided into three work shifts of officially 7-9 hours: 6am to 3pm, 2:30pm to 11pm, and 11pm to 6am.[112] However, a Niigata Shimbun journalist who experienced working in the Torigoe-tunnel of the Sado mines reported that the majority of miners had to work overtime, making each shift about 12 hours long.[113] The distance between dormitories and working stations could potentially add hours of walking and/or hiking to the daily schedule. In the month of July 1941, Sado mine laborers worked an average of 28 days.[114]

Mitsubishi’s record of job assignments for Korean and Japanese laborers in the Sado mines, June 1943.

Wages

In principle, wages of Korean forced laborers were equal to that of Japanese employees. This was not actually the case, however, due to skewed job assignments with varying wages and incentives, discriminatory deductions, and Korean wages being withheld during and after Japan’s defeat. Wages were calculated based on each laborer’s quotas varying by job assignments.[115] Regardless of wage levels, deductions were made for food and working gear including clothing and tools.[116] Deductions continued even during food shortages that forced Korean laborers to farm and pay for extra rice to supplement their miniscule rations.[117]

Calculations of average monthly wages for wartime Korean forced laborers in the Sado mines range from 67 to 84 Yen.[118] However, only a fraction of these wages were paid because discriminatory deductions were applied exclusively to Koreans. Sado City’s World Heritage promotional report states that “for the purpose of life improvement,” Korean laborers were “prohibited from wasting their money.”[119] In order to prevent Korean laborers from accumulating cash, parts of their wages were put into compulsory national saving schemes.[120] Parts of Korean wages were also sent to Korea, possibly to prevent escapes, sometimes ending up with colonial government agencies and other times reaching laborers’ relatives.[121]

At the end of the Asia-Pacific War in August 1945, Mitsubishi held a total of 231,059.56 yen in salaries and severance pay for 1,141 Korean forced laborers at the Sado mines, on average 203 yen per worker.[122]Rather than transferring these wages to the workers, in 1949 Mitsubishi deposited them with Niigata Prefecture. After ten years, these Korean funds passed to the Japanese government.[123] No outstanding salaries for Japanese laborers were deposited by Mitsubishi. The 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea stipulates that unpaid wartime salaries can no longer be requested by South Koreans. Japan is still legally required to pay forced laborers from today’s North Korea, but there is no evidence that Japan recognizes any such obligation or that it has provided the funds.

 

Escapes and Institutional Racism

The large number of Korean escapes (148 out of 1,005) from the Sado mines underlines their lack of freedom. There were also large numbers of strikes for reasons including lack of food and unpaid wages.[124] One of Mitsubishi’s wartime labor managers on Sado commented that strikes also occurred due to the “extreme racism” of some of the Japanese managers.[125] According to the records of Niigata prefecture, the Japanese managers did not hide their view of Koreans as racially inferior.[126] They said that strikes occurred because the “intelligence level of Koreans (知能程度)” was lower than first estimated, pointing out “a unique Korean deviousness (半島人特有の狡猾性)” and “tendency to blindly follow crowds without personal judgement (付和雷同性).”[127]

Mitsubishi did not improve the conditions of Korean forced laborers to reduce strikes and escapes. Instead, the company decided to strengthen ties with local police, reduce sympathy for Korean laborers and punish those who helped them escape.[128] When Koreans escapees were caught, they were sent to a police station for interrogation, sometimes fined, and returned to Mitsubishi.[129] According to Sakaue Torakichi, the Mitsubishi dormitory boss, policemen beating and kicking Korean laborers was common.[130]

 

Towards Liberation

In order to center all mining efforts on copper, which was needed in large amounts for weapons and munitions, the Japanese government closed all goldmines in the country that did not also produce copper from April 1943. In 1944 Mitsubishi produced 890 tons of copper compared with 531kg of gold.[131] As the shift to copper made the Sado mines’ labor force excessive, 408 Korean forced laborers were transferred to underground military construction sites in Saitama and Fukushima prefectures in 1945.[132]

When Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, Korean forced laborers knew that they would soon be free. Mitsubishi’s Sado mine managers, however, held a meeting the next day with the Sado Aikawa chief of police to prevent the loss of Korean laborers.[133] Mitsubishi recorded another seven Korean escapes between August 15th and September 11th.[134] Korean laborers refused to continue mining, and Mitsubishi responded by blocking their access to food. At that point, some 40 Koreans broke into the main kitchen to secure food.[135] Korean forced laborers on Sado island were finally returned to Korea in the period from October to December 1945—the last returns from Niigata Prefecture.[136]

 

What is Forced Labor?

Japan often argues that because wartime Korean laborers received wages, they cannot be classified as forced laborers. This constitutes denial of the actual conditions and circumstances of wartime Korean labor.[137] Japan has a long history of various forms of slave labor. For example, prison laborers received wages even as they were required to pay for their own work equipment and sometimes for food. For example, Meiji Era prison laborers in the coalmines received wages equivalent on average to 25% of a contracted miner.[138] Koreans forced to work in the Sado mines during wartime were also waged, but they did not receive the amounts promised, nor could they spend their money freely. Wages were used as a means of control with payments deducted for their equipment and food. Most important, as documented earlier, Mitsubishi retained much of the wages they had earned and never transferred them to the laborers even after Japan’s surrender and their return to Korea. It is true that the system which allowed forced laborers to live with non-working family members is different from traditional chattel slavery, but it was still a system for forced labor. In order to feed and protect their families, forced laborers, like Im T’aeho, had to follow orders or risk their families’ safety by attempting dangerous escapes. The problem remains that the most influential historical narratives describing Japan’s industrial heritage sites have been constructed mostly by corporations and politicians, rather than historians.[139]

The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Forced Labor Convention of 1930, ratified by Japan, defines forced labor as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”[140] Article 2 makes an exception for emergencies like war in which the labor is necessary not to “endanger the existence or the well-being of the whole or part of the population.” However, there was no legal basis for forcing hundreds of thousands of Koreans to work in Japan under abysmal conditions that condemned many to death. The ILO “considers that the massive conscription of labour to work for private industry in Japan under such deplorable conditions was a violation of the [1930 Forced Labor] Convention.”[141]

Systems of forced labor are not necessarily identical to those of chattel slavery. Koreans working in Mitsubishi’s Sado mines and elsewhere during wartime were abused as forced laborers under a discriminatory system organized and enforced by corporations such as Mitsubishi with support of the Japanese state. Recognition of the true character of this history would greatly elevate the universal value of the Sado mines as a UNESCO World Heritage site. They cannot be suppressed for the sake of instilling pride in future Japanese generations to the neglect of the victims.

 

Between Nomination and Inscription

 

“Sado is filled with every sort of story of people seeking gold. We want to tell their unwritten stories to the future. That is the ultimate goal of seeking World Heritage [inscription].”[142]

 

The above is a quote from June 2016 by Hamano Hiroshi, Sado City instructor of Niigata Prefecture’s World Heritage Promotion Section, from the prefecture’s official video about the modern history of the Sado mines. The narrator of the same video states that the “start of the Showa-era was to become the most prosperous period ever for Sado mine,” and that “the creativity and inventiveness of many people” lies behind the mines’ great success. Neither the war nor the plight of Korean laborers are mentioned. By contrast, in 1996 Sado Island tour guides described the Sado mines as “a hell of cold and damp where half-starved prisoners picked, shoveled, and clawed gold ore from the walls of freezing rock galleries until they shivered to death from pneumonia.”[143] Even the Edo period narratives of prison labor are now presented in the form of celebratory narratives of superior goldmining techniques.[144] It appears that as a potential World Heritage inscription draws nearer, more and more stories of “people seeking gold” are being censored and forgotten.

The Japanese government has implied that the Sado mines’ nomination will be limited to the Edo period.[145] The nomination, filed February 1st 2022, has not at this writing been made public. It is likely to state that the Outstanding Universal Value of the mines comes from Edo-period innovations and events. This way, Mitsubishi and its Korean forced laborers could be completely omitted from the narrative. UNESCO, however, did not accept Japan’s proposed limited historical range for the Meiji Industrial Sites, concluding that the full story should be told. The Sado mines nomination is likely to follow the same pattern.

For the Sado mines to become World Heritage in 2023, 14 out of 21 UNESCO World Heritage Committee member countries must support its inscription. Prior to the inscription of the Meiji Industrial Sites, Korean and Japanese representatives travelled around the world to convince committee member countries of their respective historical interpretations.[146] With the Sado nomination, Japan is again using UNESCO as an international battlefield for their “history war,” attempting to convince other countries to legitimize its benign interpretation of the history of the mine and Korean forced labor. Since the 2015 Meiji Industrial Sites’ World Heritage inscription, Japan has broken its promise to tell the stories of Korean victims. It similarly effectively blocked Korea’s registration of “Voices of the ‘Comfort Women’” in the UNESCO Memory of the World Program, insisting that victims of Japan’s military system of sexual slavery were professional prostitutes.[147] In terms of heritage politics, Japan has become a rogue nation. Japan’s “history war” has entered the global arena and threatens the spirit of UNESCO. UNESCO should not accept Japan’s World Heritage nomination for the Sado mines unless Japan pledges to provide forthright discussion of the plight of Korean victims in historical interpretation of the Meiji Industrial Sites and clearly recognizes the forced labor that took place in the Sado mines.

Inside a Sado mine tunnel with display mannequins. Photo by imp98 (CC), flickr, 2016.

Acknowledgements

Global travel disruptions in Covid times have prevented visits to Japan while preparing this article. Some of the cited sources have been obtained through membership in the Network for Research on Forced Labor Mobilization. I would like to express my thanks to David Palmer for his support including extensive advice on the presentation of arguments and detailed comments on earlier drafts; Mark Selden for copy-editing; Kobayashi Hisatomo for advice and for sharing sources; and Takeuchi Yasuto for sharing sources.

*

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Nikolai Johnsen is currently undertaking his Ph.D. in Korean and Japanese studies at SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London. His dissertation research is focused on how dark tourism trends visualises marginalised memories of colonialism in South Korea and Japan. An avid traveller, Nikolai has work experience leading tours to North Korea and Japan. He is the author of a two-part article on “Kato Joko’s Meiji Industrial Revolution – Forgetting forced labor to celebrate Japan’s World Heritage” in The Asia-Pacific Journal. Nikolai Johnsen can be contacted at [email protected]

Notes

Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO, The Sado complex of heritage mines, primarily gold mines, 11 Nov. 2010; Nikkei staff writers, “Japan goes forward with Sado gold mine World Heritage bid”, Nikkei Asia, 28 Jan. 2022.

ANN News, “‘佐渡島の金山’世界遺産に推薦へ 方針一転の背景に安倍元総理か”(“‘Sadogashima no kinzan’ sekai isan ni suisen e – Hōshin itten no haikei ni Abe moto sōri ka”), 28 Jan. 2022; Abe Ryūtarō, “「どうするかなぁ」佐渡金山推薦 悩んだ首相が安倍氏に電話した理由” (“’Dō suru kanā’ Sado kinzan suisen – Nayanda shushō ga Abe shi ni denwa shita riyū”), Asahi Shimbun Digital, 29 Jan. 2022.

ANN News, “‘Sadogashima no kinzan.’

NHK, “シブ5時 ”(“Jibu go-ji”) broadcast 27 January 2022. Search Twitter for #歴史戦チーム for the captured video.

Nikkei, “Japan goes forward”.

Uematsu Seiji, “佐渡金山の世界遺産推薦問題に「歴史戦」とやらの余地はない” (“Sado kinzan no sekai isan suisen mondai ni ‘rekishisen’ to yara no yochi wa nai”), Asahi Shimbun Digital – Ronza, 7 Feb. 2022. The books were 『佐渡鉱山史』 (大平鉱業佐渡鉱業所)and 佐渡鉱業所『半島労務管理ニ付テ(“Sado kōzanshi” (Ōhira kōgyō sado kōgyōsho) and Sado kōgyōsho “Hantō rōmu kanri ni tsuite”). For details on these books, see Takeuchi Yasuto, “佐渡鉱山での朝鮮人強制労働 – 強制労働否定論批判”(“Sado kōzan de no Chōsenjin kyōsei rōdō – Kyōsei rōdō hiteiron hihan”), 4 Feb. 2022.

Takatori Shūichi, “歴史戦を闘い抜く”(“rekishisen wo tatakainuku”), personal blog, 20 Jan.

WHC.15 /39.COM /INF.19, Summary Records from the World Heritage Committee’s 39th Session, 28 June – 8 July 2015, pp 222.

Nikolai Johnsen, “Katō Kōko’s Meiji Industrial Revolution – Forgetting forced labor to celebrate Japan’s World Heritage Sites, Part 1”, The Asia Pacific Journal / Japan Focus, vol. 19, issue 23, no. 1, Dec. 1, 2021; Johnsen, “Katō Kōko’s Meiji Industrial Revolution…, Part 2”, vol. 19, issue 24, no. 5, Dec. 15, 2021.

10 For example Yi Chinyŏng, “[횡설수설/이진영]‘2 군함도 사도광산 (“[Hoengsŏlssusŏl/Yi Jinyŏng]‘Che 2 ŭi Kunhamdo’ Sadogwangsan”), The Dong-A Ilbo, 30 Dec. 2021; An Sangu, 정부, ‘2 군함도‘ 日 사도광산등재 시도 강력 항의(Chŏngbu, ‘che 2 ŭi Kunhamdo’ Il sadogwangsan tŭngjae sido kangnyŏk hangŭi”), SBS News, 29 Dec. 2021.

11 Sado kankō kōryū kikō, 佐渡とは (Sado to wa), 22 Aug. 2018

12 Sado kankō kōryū kikō, 2020年度佐渡観光データ調査分析業務報告書 (2020 nendo Sado kankō dēta chōsa bunseki gyōmu hōkokusho), 29 March 2021.

13 UNESCO, Tentative Lists, n.d.

14 Niigata Prefucture and Sado City, 2006 application for registering Sado mines for Japan’s Tentative List; Niigata World Heritage registration promotion office and Sado City World Heritage Promotional Division, “佐渡金銀山の世界遺産登録を目指して”(“Sado kinginzan no sekai isan tōroku wo mezashite”), The World of Cultural Heritage, 13 Jan. 2016.

15 Tabiris, “「明治日本の産業革命遺産」世界遺産候補の政治的な決定は残念。 推薦決定過程の透明化を”(“Meiji Nippon no sangyō kakumei isan” sekai isan kōho no seiji tekina kettei wa zannen – Suisen kettei katei no tōmei ka wo”), 4 October 2013.

16 Niigata Prefectural government, “Modern Period – The Exquisite Isle – Sado Mine, Road to World Heritage”, YouTube, 24 June 2016.

17 Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO, The Sado complex.

18 David Palmer, “Kishida’s Sado Mines Nomination: Leaving out Meiji industrialization, Mitsubishi, and Koreans”, Korea on Point, 14 Feb. 2022.

19 Fumio Yoshiki, “Metal Mining and Foreign Employees,” The Developing Economies (14), 1979.

20 Sado City, 佐渡相川の鉱山及び鉱山町の文化的景観 (Sado Aikawa no kōzan oyobi kōzan machi no bunka teki keikan). March 2020.

21 Sado Television, “鬼太鼓シリーズ 新穂青木(2021年4月15日)”(“Onidaiko shirīsu Niihoaoki (2021-nen 4-gatsu 15-nichi”), YouTube, 26 April 2021.

22 Tanaka Mitsuo, “炭鉱における囚人労働”(“ Tankō ni okeru shūjin rōdō”), Dai-ichi keizaidaigaku keizai kenkyūkai (3), 3 Jan. 1974 pp. 43-128.

23 ISM Publishing Lab, “どさ-くさ”(“Dosa-kusa”), Hanashi no neta ni Naru! Gogen Dai-jisho (digital) 2013.

24 Nakagawa Takao, “Pneumoconiosis recorded in 1840 at Aikawa Mine, Sado Island, Northeast Japan (Part 4)”, Nippon chishitsu gakkai dai-125-nen gakujutsu taikai (2018 Sapporo – Tsukubai), Sept. 2018.

25 Angus Waycott quoted this number in 1996 from a stone memorial located at the end of a footpath beginning about 200 yards below the main Aikawa mine entrance. See Angus Waycott, Sado: Japan’s Island in Exile (Berkeley: Stonebridge Press 1996), pp.63-64.

26 Yoshiki, “Metal Mining”; Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan; Niigata Prefecture and Sado City, 再発見!!佐渡金銀山 (Saihakken!! Sado kinginzan), Sept. 2015.

27 Yoshiki, “Metal Mining”; Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan.

28 Mitsubishi Materials, Sado Gold Mine.

29 Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan(Berkeley & London: University of California Press, 2006) pp. 14-29.

30 Hirose, The Sado Mine.

31 Ibid.

32 Ōyama Shikitarō, “高島炭坑に見る明治前期の親方制度の実態 (“Takashima tankō ni miru meiji zenki no oyakata seido no jittai”), Ritsumeikan Keizaigaku 4 (2), 1955, pp. 178-221; Miura Toyohiko, “労働観私論 (VI) 20世紀初頭の日本の労働観” (“Rōdōkan shiron (VI) – 20-seiki shotō no nippon no rōdōkan”), Rōdō kagaku 70 (7), 1994, pp. 316-333.

33 Hirose, The Sado Mine.

34 Ibid pp. 4.

35 Specifically, Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, of the Mitsubishi Group. Mitsubishi Materials Corporation, previously Mitsubishi Mining, owned the Sado mines from 1918-1989. Hashima (“Battleship Island”) was also owned and operated by Mitsubishi Materials Corporation.

36 Hirose, The Sado Mine. Pp. 4-7; Niigata Prefecture and Sado City, Saihakken!!

37 Hirose, The Sado Mine.

38 Ibid.

39 Niigata Prefecture and Sado City, Saihakken!!

40 Golden Sado,コース概要 (Kōsu gaiyō), n.d.

41 Golden Sado, 株式会社 ゴールデン佐渡 会社案内 (Kabushikigaisha Gōruden Sado kaisha annai), 2015.

42 Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 1”; Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 2”.

43 Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō shinsō chōsa-dan, “佐渡鉱山へ連行されて 林泰鍋”( Sado kōzan he renkō sarete – Rimu Teho), Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō no kiroku – Kantō-hen (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2002) pp. 301-302.

44 Ch’oe Ŭn’gyŏng, “日 사도광산 가치 인정받고 싶다면 역사 왜곡 멈춰야” (“Il Sadogwangsan kach’i injŏngbatko sip’tamyŏn yŏksa waegok mŏmch’wŏya”), Chosun Ilbo, 20 Jan. 2022; Ko Hyŏnsŭng, 사도광산 유족강제동원 유네스코 등재는 거짓’” (“Sadogwangsan yujok ‘kangjedongwŏn” ppaen yunesŭk’o tŭngjaenŭn kŏjit’”), MBC News, 6 Jan. 2022; Ko Hyŏnsŭng, “‘살아서 나갈 있을까사도광산의 참혹한 기록” (“‘sarasŏ nagal su issŭlkka’ Sadogwangsanŭi ch’amhokhan kirok”), MBC News, 30 Dec. 2021.

45 Year of escape unclear.

46 American Lung Association, Learn About Silicosis, 23 March 2020.

47 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, 일본지역 탄광 · 광산 조선인 강제동원 실태미쓰비시 (三菱) 광업 () 사도(佐渡) 광산을 중심으로 (“Ilbonjiyŏk t’an’gwang · kwangsan Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn silt’ae -missŭbisi kwangŏp (chu) Sado kwangsanŭl chungsimŭro”), The Foundation for Victims of Forced Mobilization by Imperial Japan, Dec. 2019.

48 Ibid, pp. 9-10.

49 Hirose, The Sado Mine.

50 Gregory Hadley and James Oglethorpe, “MacKay’s Betrayal: Solving the Mystery of the ‘Sado Island Prisoner-of-War Massacre’, The Journal of Military History 71(2), April 2007, pp. 441-464.

51 Niigata Prefecture, 新潟県史 通史編8 (Niigata kenshi – Tsūshi-hen 8), 1988, pp.772-786; Aikawa-machi-shi hensan iinkai, 佐渡相川の歴史 通史編 近・現代 (Sado Aikawa no rekishi – Tsūshihen – Kin/ Gendai), 1995.

52 See for example Takeuchi Yasuto, 調査・朝鮮人強制労働2 財閥・鉱山編 (Chōsa – Chōsenjin kyōsei rōdō 2 – Zaibatsu/ kōzan-hen), (Tokyo: Shakai hyōronsha, 2014); Nagasaki zainichi Chōsenjin no jinken wo mamoru kai, 軍艦島に耳をすませば・端島に強制連行された朝鮮人・中国人の記録 (Gunkanjima ni mimi wo sumaseba: Hashima ni kyōsei renkōsareta Chōsenjin Chūgokuin no kiroku), (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2016); Tonomura Masaru, 朝鮮人強制連行 (Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō), (Tokyo: Iwanami shinsho, 2012).

53 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 773.

54 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp 3-4.

55 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”.

56 Yomiuri Shimbun, “信濃川を頻々流れ下がる鮮人の虐殺死體” (“Shinanogawa wo hinpin nagare sagaru senjin no gyakusatsu shitai”), 29 July 1922 pp. 5.

57 Michael Weiner, The Origins of the Korean Community in Japan, 1910-1923, Manchester University Press, 1989) pp 104-105.

58 Ibid.

59 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 772-76.

60 Ibid; Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 776-78.

61 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 776.

62 Sado City World Heritage Promotional Division, 佐渡相川の鉱山都市景観保存調査報告書 (Sado Aikawa no kōzan toshi keikan hozon chōsa hōkokusho), pp.68-69.

63 See for example Tonomura, Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō.

64 Aikawa-machi-shi hensan iinkai, 佐渡相川の歴史 通史編 近・現代 (Sado Aikawa no rekishi – Tsūshihen – Kin/ Gendai), 1995, pp. 680, as cited by Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 7 and Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 105

65 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 13. It is not clear whether the name list included deaths from before the Taishō-era.

66 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 96.

67 See for example Takeuchi Yasuto, 明治日本の産業革命遺産・強制労働Q&A (Meiji Nippon no sangyō kakumei isan / kyōsei rōdō Q&A), (Tokyo: Shakai Hyōronsha, 2018), pp18-20.

68 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 98; 104.

69 Ibid, pp. 104.

70 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

71 See for example Tonomura, Chōsenjin kyōsei renkō; Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 1”

72 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 782.

73 David Palmer, “Foreign Forced Labor at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima Shipyards: Big Business, Militarized Government, and the Absence of Shipbuilding Workers’ Rights in World War II,” in Marcel van der Linden and Magaly Rodríguez García, eds, On Coerced Labor: Work and Compulsion after Chattel Slavery (Leiden: Brill, 2016), pp. 169-77.

74 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 12.

75 Ibid; Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 111.

76 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 783-85.

77 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 13

78 Ibid pp. 11.

79 Seokwoo Lee and Seryon Lee, “Yeo Woon Taek v. New Nippon Steel Corporation,” American Journal of International Law 113 (3), 11 July 2019, pp. 592-599.

80 Takeuchi, Q&A pp. 18-9; Takeuchi, Zaibatsu/ kōzan-hen pp. 15-18

81 Takeuchi, Q&A pp. 86

82 Ibid, pp. 85.

83 Ibid, pp. 85.

84 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 1

85 Takeuchi, “Sado kōzan.

86 Sado kōgyōsho (Mitsubishi Materials), 半島労務管理ニ付テ(“Hantō rōmu kanri ni tsuite”). (Sado, 1943), copy from Zainichi Chōsenjin rekishi kenkyū 32-gō shoshū, pp. 432-448.

87 Sado kōgyōsho, Hantō rōmu, pp. 439; 440.

88 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 104.

89 Takeuchi, “Sado kōzan.

90 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 71.

91 Sado kōgyōsho, Hantō rōmu, pp. 439

92 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn” pp. 98-99.

93 Ibid, pp. 107.

94 Ibid, pp. 107; Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 15

95 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

96 Isono Tamotsu, “[にいがた人模様]強制連行された朝鮮人を語る・坂上寅吉さん” (“Niigata hitomoyō – Kyōsei renkō sareta Chōsenjin wo kataru Sakaue Torakichi-san”), Mainichi Shimbun Niigata edition, 24 Feb. 2002 pp.23

97 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 108.

98 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp. 15

99 Ibid, pp. 14

100 Cited by Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp 108; Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 15.

101 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.15

102 Ibid, pp. 10

103 Ibid

104 Ibid

105 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

106 Sado kōgyōsho, Hantō rōmu, pp. 440.

107 Niigata Shimbun, “佐渡鑛山夫の事故減少” (“Sado Kōzanbu no jiko genshō”), 9 July 1935, as cited by Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 104.

108 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 785

109 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.10

110 Sado kōgyōsho, Hantō rōmu, pp. 440.

111 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.10

112 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

113 Niigata Shimbun, “現地報告12” (“Genchi hōkoku 12”), 22 August 1943, as cited by Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn” pp. 100.

114 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

115 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 101.

116 Ibid, pp. 101; 111; Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp. 13-14; Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

117 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

118 Ibid; Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 101.

119 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69.

120 Ibid.

121 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.16

122 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 74-76

123 E-mail correspondence with Kobayashi Hisatomo of the Network for Research on Forced Labor Mobilization on February 18th 2022; Official written response by Niigata Prefecture to Kobayashi Hisatomo dated 6 Dec. 2021.

124 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.13-15; Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 111

125 Aikawa-machi-shi hensan iinkai, Sado Aikawa no rekishi, as cited by Uematsu Seiji, “Sado kinzan”

126 Niigata Prefecture, Niigata kenshi…8, pp. 783.

127 Ibid.

128 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.15.

129 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 112.

130 Isono, “Sakaue Torakichi-san”.

131 Hirose, The Sado Mine,pp.6; Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 89.

132 Sado City, Sado Aikawa no kōzan, pp.68-69. Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 105.

133 Hirose, The Sado Mine pp. 20.

134 Ibid.

135 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 113.

136 Hirose, The Sado Mine, pp. 22.

137 Chŏng Hyekyŏng, “Chosŏnin kangjedongwŏn”, pp. 103

138 Tanaka, “Tankō”, pp. 47.

139 Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 1”; Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 2”.

140 International Labour Organization, Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), pp. 1.

141 ILO, Observation (CEACR) – adopted 1998, published 87th ILC session (1999).

142 Niigata Prefectural government, “Modern Period”.

143 Waycott, Sado, pp. 63.

144 Permanent Delegation of Japan to UNESCO, The Sado complex.

145 Asahi Shimbun Digital, “佐渡金山の世界文化遺産登録、政府が一転推薦へ 韓国は反発か” (“Sado kinzan no sekai bunka isan tōroku, seifu ga itten suisen he – Kankoku wa hanpatsu ka”), 28 Jan. 2021.

146 Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 1”; Johnsen, “Katō Kōko 2”.

147 Heisoo Shin, “Voices of the ‘Comfort Women’: The Power Politics Surrounding the UNESCO Documentary Heritage”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 19, 5, 8, 1 March 2021

India Faces Dilemma in Russia-Ukraine Conflict

March 11th, 2022 by Wang Siyuan

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Today, the dangers of military escalation are beyond description.

What is now happening in Ukraine has serious geopolitical implications. It could lead us into a World War III scenario.

It is important that a peace process be initiated with a view to preventing escalation. 

Global Research condemns Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

A Bilateral Peace Agreement is required.


“I stand with Russia.”

“I stand with Putin”

After Europe and the United States expressed dissatisfaction with India’s “neutral” attitude in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, netizens from India quickly put those two tags on the top of the Indian list.

For many Indian netizens, Russia is the “biggest ally” of India while Indians should support their old friend Putin, who is rebelling against the West, and maintain diplomatic and defense relations with Russia.

But for the Modi government, supporting Russia is not an easy decision.

Detachment to dilemma

As a frequent non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, India is also an important partner that the US and Russia have been competing for over the years. Its attitude is extremely critical to both parties. Although India’s attitude remained generally neutral, there were some changes before and after the Ukraine conflict.

Specifically, before the conflict, India’s attitude was relatively detached, and it tried its best to avoid discussions on relevant issues.

On January 19, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman called Indian Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla to discuss the Russia-Ukraine issue and tried to coordinate with the Indian side. But India abstained from voting on the UN Security Council resolution on the Ukraine-Russia issue on January 29.

File photo shows an earlier confab:: Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla held consultations with US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman on October 7, 2021. Image: @DeputySecState/Twitter

India’s permanent ambassador to the UN Security Council, TS Tirumurti, stressed at the meeting on Ukraine that, taking into account the legitimate security interests of all countries, it is best for all parties to avoid any actions that would increase tensions and jointly ensure long-term peace and stability in the region.

At the following QUAD foreign ministers’ meeting, India also became the only member state that did not criticize Russia’s position. There was no statement concerning the Russia-Ukraine issue in the joint statement of the meeting.

All these words and deeds showed that India was trying to stay neutral on the issue and avoid provoking Russia and the US. However, India’s position avoided the relevant issues on Russia. At that time, Tanvi Madan, director of the India Project at the Brookings Institution, said India would be trapped in diplomatic passivity if Moscow started taking military action against Ukraine:

First, China and Russia would form a closer tie, threatening the situation around India. Second, the intensified conflict between the US and Russia would create huge pressure on India-Russia relations and make it difficult for India to maintain a balance. The third would be the weakening of the anti-China alliance. The US and the West would seek to improve their relations with China amid their worsening relationship with Russia. Such a trend would weaken India’s ability to seek international allies against China.

After Russia started its military action against Ukraine, India still tried to stay neutral but more subtly. On the one hand, the US and Ukraine repeatedly demanded support from India. On February 24, Ukraine’s ambassador to India, Igor Polikha, “demanded and earnestly requested” India’s support. US President Joe Biden also said the US and India were still discussing an alignment on the Ukraine-Russia crisis.

However, India remained neutral. On February 26, it abstained for the second time in a vote at the United Nations on a US-sponsored resolution condemning Russia. On February 27, it abstained for the third time when the United Nations Security Council voted on a resolution calling for a rare emergency special session to discuss Russia’s “aggression” in Ukraine. These abstentions have fully demonstrated India’s neutral attitude between the US and Russia.

On the other hand, shortly after learning that Putin approved the march on Ukraine on February 24, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called Putin on the phone and called on Russia to immediately stop the violence. Modi emphasized that only through honest and sincere dialogue could the differences between Russia and NATO be resolved. At the same time, India also began to provide humanitarian aid to Ukraine.

According to Indian media reports, on March 2 Foreign Secretary Shringla said at a press conference about the “Operation Ganges” evacuation from Ukraine that India had sent two batches of humanitarian relief supplies to Ukraine through Poland to help it overcome its difficulty. The two tons of supplies reportedly included medicine, blankets, tents, tarpaulins, goggles, water storage tanks, sleeping pads, and surgical gloves. Polikha thanked India for providing aid to Ukraine.

But since then, India has faced a dilemma in its relations with both the US and Russia.

Strategic considerations

India’s neutral stance in the United Nations has drawn criticism from the US and Ukraine. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “urged” India to give political support in the UN Security Council. At a press conference, US State Department spokesman Ned Price reiterated that the Biden administration “requested” all countries to constructively exert influence on Russia.

Before the Security Council vote, India had been repeatedly lobbied by the US and Ukraine and warned of some serious consequences. The US government was reportedly considering whether to impose sanctions on India under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) because India had previously purchased the S-400 missile air defense system from Russia.

However, India still stood firm, sticking to its neutrality while offering help to Ukraine.

There are three considerations here:

The first is the practical consideration of India’s balanced diplomacy.

India maintains an important partnership with the US to compete with China in the Asia-Pacific region, but it also has a traditional strategic relationship with Russia. India sources 60% of its defense equipment from Russia, and it also has many areas of high-tech cooperation with Russia, including nuclear energy, space and the joint production of certain weapons systems, such as BrahMos missiles.

Hence, India has always sought to keep good relations with both the US and Russia without having to take sides, even though the developments in Ukraine have made it more complicated for India to continue navigating between the two powers.

In addition, the Russia-Ukraine conflict will probably put the US in a difficult position in Europe in the context of the long-standing hostility in Sino-Indian relations. This would force the US to shift its focus from the Indo-Pacific region to Europe and hurt India’s security interests in the long run. Therefore, India must take a more nuanced stance on the crisis by supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity while emphasizing and supporting Russia’s security concerns.

The second consideration is India’s relative confidence in its economic importance.

Some Indian elites believe that the West must rely on India in many ways due to the country’s huge population, broad market prospects and advantageous geographical location. Global businesses want to sell their products and services in India, and the US military-industrial complex also wants to tap into such a huge market as India.

For the western countries that treat China as a long-term and strategic partner, India is also an irreplaceable strategic partner. The Modi government wants Washington’s elites to understand the calculations and the trade-offs that India faces. As the struggle between great powers intensifies and the international political environment becomes more volatile, the US needs to increase its attention to Europe and further strengthen its cooperation with India in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, the Modi government believes that it will not have to pay a real price for its wait-and-see approach to Russia.

The third consideration is India’s urgent need to evacuate its citizens from Ukraine. Since some time ago, the evacuation of overseas Indians has become a very important “show” for the Modi government’s diplomatic work.

Indians being evacuated from Ukraine. Photo: News18

From the evacuation of Indian nationals from Yemen in 2015 to the “Vande Bharat” operation during the pandemic in 2020, the so-called largest evacuation in history, the Modi government has paid more and more attention to demonstrating to the Indian people its concern for their overseas compatriots, as well as the execution capability and responsibility of its administration and army.

The Modi government cannot afford to lose any ground in the important elections in Uttar Pradesh between February 10 and March 7. It will not pass up any opportunity to show its achievements, and the opposition parties will not let pass any mistakes that might weaken the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party.

There are 20,000 Indians in Ukraine, including more than 18,000 students. After the conflict broke out, Modi asked Putin to ensure the safety of international students in Ukraine, held special meetings for three consecutive days to deploy rescue matters and sent four senior minister-level officials to the front to take charge of related work.

On March 1, India’s Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that an Indian citizen was killed in a military conflict in Ukraine. Modi immediately held a high-level meeting and expressed condolences to the victim’s family. The Indian National Congress, the opposition party, still slammed the Modi government for failing to evacuate the Indian students stranded in Ukraine in time. Therefore, staying “neutral” but providing humanitarian supplies to Ukraine has remained the best choice for India to carry out its evacuation work.

Has China won?

Regardless of these considerations, Indian officials still hope to play a “neutral” role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. But at the same time, some Indian strategists have been aware that it is increasingly difficult to maintain a “balance” between the US and Russia. Some Indian experts have started thinking about India’s future prospects. Interestingly, no matter how hard they try, these Indian experts have not changed their old mindset but continue to treat China as India’s main competitor.

Many Indian experts are worried that China will become the biggest winner while India will face a more difficult situation after the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

According to some Indian experts, the conflict has further increased tensions between Russia and Europe, and the United States. Such tensions are unlikely to ease in the short term and have forced Russia to turn to China to offset the West’s sanctions. Undoubtedly, the new market in Russia will also help China resolve its overcapacity problems. This is especially important for China in its ongoing trade war with the US, its largest trading partner.

Due to these two factors, Russia may lean toward China in Sino-India disputes, reducing India’s bargaining chips. In the context of the unresolved Sino-Indian border issue, Russia’s choice between China and India is inevitably worrying the Indian experts.

Some Indian experts have also realized that long-term tension with Russia is not conducive to the stability and peace of Europe – while breaking up with China and Russia simultaneously also does not fulfill EU countries’ interests. Thus, Europe’s break-up with Russia has given China a window of opportunity to draw closer to Europe.

It is obvious that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has forced the US to focus on Eastern Europe, reduce its involvement in the Indo-Pacific region and even use the QUAD, a tailor-made anti-China platform, to criticize Russia. All these developments not only favor China but also expose India to a very dangerous situation.

Although India can consider many different diplomatic options in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, it will feel insecure if it still has a mindset of confronting China. With such anxiety, India is worried that it won’t be able to enjoy anymore the support needed from both the US and Russia to balance China.

This kind of mentality of “wanting both” may be the real underlying logic of India’s neutrality on the issue of Russia and Ukraine. However, as the US-Russia conflict has escalated, it is worthwhile for India to think about whether, by staying neutral, it will win both – or lose both.

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This article first appeared in the news and policy site Guancha.cn (The Observer), whose editors note: “The content of the article is entirely  the authors’ personal opinion, and does not represent the platform’s opinion.”  It is translated and published by Asia Times with permission. Wang Siyuan and Zhang Zhengyang are columnists at Guancha.cn.

Featured image is from FGN News

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***

As the Ukraine crisis escalates, Taipei welcomed a high-level visit by former top U.S. defense officials, which indicates “rock-solid relations” between Taiwanand the United States, a Taiwanese official said.

The unannounced delegation arrived in Taipei at 4:13 p.m. local time on March 1, according to Taiwan’s state-run Central News Agency (CNA). The group, led by retired Admiral Mike Mullen, former chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will meet President Tsai Ing-wen in the following morning, and attend a banquet later that day.

The two-day visit underscores bipartisan support from Washington and “will even more clearly highlight the rock-solid relations between Taiwan and the United States, especially at a time of the Ukraine crisis,” Taiwan’s presidential office spokesperson Chang Tun-han said a day earlier, CNA reported.

Mullen, a former top U.S. military officer, will be accompanied by Meghan O’Sullivan, a former deputy national security adviser, Michèle Flournoy, former undersecretary of defense, and Mike Green and Evan Medeiros, both of whom were senior directors for the Asia affairs office of the National Security Council.

A senior official of the Biden administration told Reuters that the selection of the five flagged “an important signal about the bipartisan U.S. commitment to Taiwan and its democracy.”

The two sides are also looking to exchange views on bilateral cooperation, Taiwan-U.S. relations, and regional peace and stability, said Chang.

Click here to read the full article.

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Philippine Frontrunner Marcos Favors China Over US

February 24th, 2022 by Jason Castaneda

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***

The race for the Philippine presidency will be contested on various emotive issues but the frontrunner so far is setting himself apart from rivals on perhaps the most sensitive of them all: China.

Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, the son of a former dictator and ally of outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte, is the only presidential candidate to have openly vowed to continue Duterte’s pro-Beijing foreign policy while downplaying the nation’s alliance with the United States.

In a series of press interviews, Marcos has laid out clearly his position on China, saying in one he would set aside the landmark 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague ruling on the South China Sea in favor of the Philippines over China, which effectively ruled Beijing’s nine-dash line claim to the sea had no legal basis under the UNCLOS.

In a recent DZRH radio interview, Marcos said the Philippines’ arbitral win against China was “not effective” and that the “only practical option” for resolving the sea disputes was a bilateral agreement with China. He said, “I think we can come to an agreement. As a matter of fact, people from the Chinese embassy are my friends, we have been talking about that.”

“Let’s not talk about war, because that’s not really an option. We must continue to engage the Chinese,” he said, echoing a frequent line from Duterte’s pronouncements on the South China Sea disputes.

In another ABS-CBN network interview, Marcos went further in saying he would dismiss any potential offer of assistance from the United States in negotiating with China, saying,

“The problem is between China and us. If Americans come in, it is bound to fail.”

With the campaign season ready to start in earnest, Marcos’ rivals are expected to step up their portrayal of the frontrunner as a pro-China Manchurian candidate who, like Duterte, will supposedly sell out the country to Beijing in exchange for economic deals and other financial inducements.

All of the other major candidates, including Vice-President Leni Robredo, Senators Manny Pacquiao and Panfilo Lacson, and Manila Mayor Isko Moreno, have all taken overtly hawkish and nationalistic positions on China’s pressure on Philippine-claimed features and territory in the South China Sea.

When it comes to China relations, history is on Marcos’ side. Of all the major Philippine political dynasties, the Marcoses have the longest ties with China’s communist leadership.

At the height of the Cold War, then-dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Bongbong’s father, was among the first Asian leaders to ditch the US-aligned government in Taipei in favor of establishing formal bilateral relations with Communist China.

During the dictator’s official visit to Beijing in 1974, which reinforced the Sino-American détente and Beijing’s charm offensive across Southeast Asia, Marcos was accompanied by his entire family, including then heir-apparent Bongbong, who met and greeted Chinese paramount leader Mao Zedong.

Over the years, the Marcoses’ relations with the US, a treaty ally, turned increasingly contentious amid disagreements over human rights issues and strategic rents for America’s large-scale bases in the Philippines.

The Marcoses are known to hold a grudge against the Americans for abandoning them during the 1986 People Power revolt, which forced them into temporary exile in Hawaii.

Since their return in 1991, the Marcoses have gradually worked their way back to the center of Philippine politics by exploiting weaknesses in the country’s elite-driven democracy and building powerful cartels with other political dynasties, including the Dutertes.

The Marcoses, who have had almost uninterrupted control over the northern province of Ilocos Norte, also maintain warm relations with the Chinese-Filipino business community and have courted investment ties with China in their bailiwicks.

Marcos Jr is now running in tandem with presidential daughter Sara Duterte, who decided to withdraw her presidential bid to head off a direct clash with the son of the former dictator.

Marcos Jr has presented himself as a candidate of continuity, vowing to protect the current president from any future prosecution over human rights-related issues, including over his lethal war on drugs campaign, as well as building on Duterte’s policies, including his China embrace.

At the same time, Marcos has barely mentioned the Philippines’ alliance with the US and its historically warm relations with Western countries, perhaps reflecting the family’s lingering resentment toward the US.

Some suggest the urbane and softly-spoken Marcos Jr could prove more successful in appeasing Beijing’s ambitions in the South China Sea without the Duterte administration’s frequent resort to pugnacious language and threats.

Frontrunner Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr with his sister Maria Josefa Imelda ‘Imee’ Marcos. Photo: WikiCommons

Last year, during a public event only weeks ahead of his official registration for the presidential race, Marcos Jr indicated his preference for staying the course of maintaining friendly ties with Beijing regardless of intensifying disputes in the South China Sea.

“The policy of engagement, which the Duterte government is implementing, although it is criticized, it is the right way to go. Because whatever we do, we can’t go to war,” said Marcos Jr, regurgitating the incumbent president’s insistence on strategic subservience towards the Asian superpower.

“We don’t want to do that, I don’t think the Chinese want to go to war with us. Certainly, we don’t want to go to war with China,” he added, insisting that adopting a friendly posture was the only viable option for the Philippines.

Marcos Jr’s stance has clearly already pleased Beijing. During a meeting with the presidential candidate last year, China’s ambassador to Manila Huang Xilian was full of praises for the Marcoses.

“Hanging on the wall are photographs recording historic moments of China-Philippines relations, one of which on the top has depicted the historic scene of then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and then Philippine President Ferdinand E Marcos signing the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between our two counties on June 9, 1975,” Huang said, referring to the background picture during his high-profile meeting with Marcos Jr.

The Chinese envoy emphasized the need for maintaining friendly relations “so as to bring more benefits to our two peoples and pass on our traditional friendship from generation to generation.”

Beijing will likely take less kindly to Vice-President Robredo’s candidacy. She recently said if elected she would “leverage” the 2016 arbitral win “to form a coalition of nations” supportive of the ruling to form a coalition against “ongoing militarization of the West Philippine Sea.”

The language of coalition-building to counter China’s regional ambitions, including in the South China Sea, obviously echoes that of the Biden administration.

President Rodrigo Duterte and Xi Jinping in 2019. Photo: WikiCommons / Robinson Ninal Jr

That would appear to put Marcos and Robredo on opposite sides of US-China rivalry for influence in the Philippines, presenting voters with a stark choice on foreign policy matters.

“We must understand that we are a tiny tiny nation caught in between two superpowers,” Marcos said in a mixture of Filipino and Tagalog in a recent press interview where he ruled out tighter security cooperation with Washington to check China’s ambitions

During the lengthy interview, observers noticed he barely mentioned the Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty, which obliges Washington to come to the Philippines’ assistance in the event of any armed conflict in the South China Sea.

In the DZRH radio interview, Marcos echoed the same position, arguing that leveraging defense ties with the US is a “recipe for disaster, which would ensure that China will not listen to us anymore.”

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Featured image: Philippine presidential hopeful Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos is reaching out to China on the campaign trail. Image: Twitter / Rappler

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A few dragons have been breathing fire of late, and these need to be slayed.  One is the notion that Australia has had some miraculous sense of bipartisan understanding about national security, its politicians well briefed, cooperative and objective on the subject.  The second is that politicising intelligence and national security are aberrations.

The Morrison government has made its own modest contribution to sinking these assumptions.  It is, after all, an election year.  There is a schoolboy simplicity to the effort: scream various words such as “appeasement” often enough, and it will take hold.  Reiterate the term “Manchurian Candidate”, and hope it cakes opponents.

In the Australian Parliament, Prime Minister Scott Morrison demonstrated this month that accusation as politics without evidence governs his operating rationale.  As he has done previously in attempting to paint the Labor opposition as stacked with pro-China stooges, he told the chamber that the Labor Deputy Opposition leader Richard Marles was a “Manchurian Candidate”.

Ever helpful, the Defence Minister Peter Dutton went one position higher with his claim that the Labor leader, Anthony Albanese, was well favoured in Beijing.  “We now see evidence that the Chinese Communist Party, the Chinese government has also made a decision about who they will back in the next federal election, and that is open and obvious.”

Not exactly a masterpiece of literary narrative (a “wild, vigorous, curiously readable melange,” was a description offered by Frederic Morton), the 1959 novel by Richard Condon of that same name captured the Cold War zeitgeist of paranoia.  It features the deeds of a sleeper agent, one Sergeant Raymond Shaw, who returns from service in the Korean War.  With ten other men, Shaw served in an Intelligence and Reconnaissance patrol subsequently captured and brainwashed by the Chinese.  On their release, they are convinced that Shaw saved them, bare two.  The seed is laid.

The brainwashed Shaw becomes, in effect, a manipulable assassin, his mind able to be triggered by a game of solitaire and the queen of diamonds.  The chief brainwasher explains the reason for picking this stepson of a US Senator.  “Although the paranoiacs make the great leaders, it is the resenters who make their best instruments because the resenters, those men with cancer of the psyche, make the great assassins.”

Shaw also has the misfortune of being controlled by his devilishly scheming mother Eleanor Iselin, intent on seeing the US morph into an authoritarian state even as she pushes the vice-presidential aspirations of her husband, Shaw’s lacklustre stepfather.

John Frankenheimer’s 1962 film adaptation of the book, featuring Lawrence Harvey as Shaw, Frank Sinatra as Major Bennett Marco, with Angela Lansbury in the role of Eleanor Iselin, has been considered a classic despite failing at the box office.  A preposterous plotline is rendered seductive through aesthetic sequences and visualisation.  Film historian David Thomson saw the link between pulp and celluloid; Condon’s book was “written so that an idiot could film it.”

Even if most Australian politicians would have only a nodding acquaintance with the work and its filmography, the cultural, denigrative baggage of the term remains.  Morrison’s resort to it even smoked out the chief of ASIO, the Australian domestic intelligence service.  “I’ll leave the politics to the politicians,” Mike Burgess observed in his interview with the 7.30 Report, “but I am very clear with everyone that I need to be, that that is not helpful for us.”

Former senior diplomat and head of the Office of National Assessments, Allan Gyngell, is dismissive about any significant differences between the Labor opposition and the governing Coalition on China.  “An effective wedge has to be made out of something more than wishful thinking,” he surmises.  “The language will differ person to person, but on the key policy issues, which is what matters – the Quad, foreign interference, 5G – I think it’s clear.”

Gyngell arcs up at the use of the word “appeasement” in current debates, given that “it has a very specific meaning in international relations, and none in which it is being used here seem applicable.”

Former ASIO director-general Dennis Richardson, in reproaching any effort to create “artificial” differences between the Coalition and Labor on the issue of China, proceeds to claim an artificial construction of his own.  “The tradition in Australia has been that governments seek to promote bipartisanship on critical national security issues.”

Constant airing of the view that Australian politics remains, at its centre, in agreement about security threats has been repeatedly shown to be fable and nonsense.  Australia’s history of politicising intelligence and security threats is extensive and disturbingly remarkable. As Justin McPhee shows in his landmark study Spinning the Secrets of State, Australian politicians have been habitually addicted to politicising matters regarding intelligence to undermine causes and adversaries since the origins of the Commonwealth.

The number of instances McPhee notes are too numerous to mention here, but it is worth recalling the use of intelligence by the ruthlessly wily Prime Minister Billy Hughes during the conscription debates of 1916 and 1917 and the close links between ASIO and Conservative Coalition governments that kept progressive politics at bay for a generation.  Hardly bipartisan.

And who can ever forget the glacial relationship between the intelligence services and the Labor government of Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, culminating in the police raid of ASIO headquarters on orders by the Attorney General Lionel Murphy?  Murphy had suspected ASIO of being less than frank about a possible security threat to the invited Yugoslav Prime Minister Džemal Bijedić from disgruntled Croatian nationalists.  Right wing nationalist movements were less interesting to ASIO than godless Soviet communism.

This inglorious record existed prior to the sexed-up dossiers of dubious intelligence that were the hallmark of justifying the unlawful invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Such monstrously cooked accounts were based on the dubious premise that Saddam Hussein constituted a mortally grave threat to the interests of Canberra, Washington and London, and had intimate links with al-Qaeda.  Yet Saddam is dead, and the likes of George W. Bush, Tony Blair and John Howard live with shameless vigour.  To the politicising cadres go the electoral spoils, and Morrison is trying to down to that noxious legacy.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Canberra Freedom Convoy Demands, ‘Sack Them All!’

February 21st, 2022 by Flat White

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The Canberra Freedom Convoy is an awful lot bigger than the mainstream press would like you to believe. Although they have been in Canberra for nearly two weeks, today’s rally grew to an extraordinary size with the lawn outside Parliament House filling to hold tens of thousands.

Trucks – adorned with banners, messages, and flags – meandered slowly through the pedestrians. Their playful horns had to compete with cheers and wolf-whistles from a crowd in high spirits.

‘No more mandates!’ read one sign. ‘End tyranny. Free Australia!’ said another. ‘Freedom convoy to Canberra. Since 2020 I’ve lost my business.’

And there it is – the heart of the issue. People have joined the Canberra Freedom Convoy because they have lost more than they can tolerate. It is not a piece of clever political incitement, or some kind of alt-right witchcraft.

Organic movements like this rise for the same reason Australian politics is awash with minor parties – Labor and Liberal have lost touch. By cracking down on Covid, those in charge constructed cages of safety that not everybody wants to live in.

The frantic search for something better has spawned political diversity. If left to its own devices, these parties and rallies will condense into a coherent opposition and cause the ‘big two’ some serious problems at the federal election.

One Nation Senator Pauline Hanson was on the ground amongst protesters, while United Australia Leader Craig Kelly signed protesters into Parliament House four days ago so that they could deliver their demands to the Prime Minister. Nationals MP George Christensen livestreamed from Canberra last week, calling for an independent federal investigative body to address misconduct during Covid which led to people losing their jobs due to vaccine mandates. Liberal Democrats candidates have also been busy, voicing their admiration for the convoy on social media.

Prime Minister Scott Morrison re-iterated that he supports mandatory vaccination only for workers in high-risk situations with vulnerable people, yet during National Cabinet he has done nothing whatsoever to stop state premiers and chief ministers mandating three shots for almost all workers – including the implementation of vaccine passports which effectively leaves the unvaccinated locked out of their own economy.

Despite what the Prime Minister says, vaccines are mandatory unless you want to live on the street.

Why hasn’t Morrison been pressed on this question by reporters with access? Where is the journalistic integrity of ‘trusted’ news organisations who fail – repeatedly – to point out the obvious untruth in the Prime Minister’s words? Indeed, why haven’t they asked the state premiers to justify vaccine mandates when their workforces are full of double-dosed, Covid-infected staff? Australians do not require a medical degree or strings of letters after their names to sense that something has gone amiss.

This silence from the press is one of the reasons ordinary people made their way down the avenue leading toward the lawn where a stage had been set up to host the afternoon’s events. Independent press and livestreamers shot footage revealing protesters peacefully waving thousands of Australian flags in the perfect Summer weather in scenes that looked more like a music festival than a ‘terrorist event’.

Their message was clear.

‘Sack them all!’ blared out in front of Parliament House, shouted at such volume that it must have been audible through the foundations.

Politicians should be worried. Even in Canberra, a city dominated by public servants supposedly loyal to those ensconced in the halls of power, there were plenty of vehicles honking and tooting in support of the rally. Could it be that the silent majority are a lot louder when they have a horn beneath their palm?

What may have started out as a few brave ‘fringe dwellers’ has gathered speed, spurred on in no small part by the enormous truck protest taking place in Ottawa.

The crowd was littered with ‘solidarity’ banners, flown in sympathy with their Canadian counterparts. Another wave of cheers erupted for them. Canadian truck drivers have suffered through freezing conditions after police confiscated their fuel, their crowdfunding money, and then threatened to take away their children.

Livestreamers and independent media reported poor service coverage in Canberra, with most enduring constant interruptions to their broadcast. With so many people in attendance, the towers could not handle the traffic. It didn’t matter. The beauty of social media means that technical difficulties and selective reporting from the legacy press can no longer stifle coverage. While they put up pictures and say ‘thousands’, the audience flocks to Twitter and Facebook to count tens of thousands.

If anything, the spread of Omicron appears to have loosened the shackles of fear. Even with most states over 93 per cent double-dosed, it does not mean that the figure was achieved ‘freely’. The Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation’s decision to reclassify ‘fully vaccinated’ as three shots last week, after lobbying from state premiers, has exasperated the spirit of rebellion.

‘Enough is enough!’ reads a common placard.

People are fed up. Let’s be honest, Australians have never liked politicians very much and after two years of wall-to-wall Covid control, they want their lives back.

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Featured image is from The Spectator Australia

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Partido Lakas ng Masa (Party of the Labouring Masses, PLM) and Laban ng Masa (Fight of the Masses) are jointly contesting the May 9 national elections in the Philippines.

PLM militant and labour leader Leody de Guzman is running for president and activist parliamentarian and Laban ng Masa chairperson Walden Bello is running for vice-president.

Bello gave the following speech at the rally to launch the PLM/Laban ng Masa election platform, held in the capital Manila on February 8:

Among all the economies of Southeast Asia, the Philippines has the highest poverty rate, at 25% or more of the population. Inequality is also among the highest in the region, with less than 5% of the people controlling 50% or more of total wealth. Let us have no illusions: the Philippines is still the sick man of Asia.

Indiscriminate opening up of the economy, demanded by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization and imposed by compliant technocrats, has irreparably damaged our manufacturing and agriculture, resulting in loss of livelihoods and leaving large numbers of Filipinos with little choice but to go abroad to improve their lot.

We are caught in a vicious circle of underdevelopment, and unless we adopt truly radical measures, our downward spiral will gather speed.

Presidential candidate Leody de Guzman and I do not offer a superficial diagnosis of the causes of our national malaise and simply attribute all problems to corruption or bad governance or the weakening of our values as a people.

We offer no easy, deceptive solutions like “forge national unity” (Marcos-Duterte), “reinvigorate our values” (Leni), “reform government” (Lacson), or “abolish corruption” (Manny). These are slogans, not solutions.

There are sectors of the population — the ultra-rich — that will be hurt by the structural changes we propose, like a wealth tax and truly comprehensive agrarian reform.

There are powerful external forces, such as the big foreign banks, the United States and the European Union, which will not be pleased with the measures we propose to protect our economy from total ruin, such as ending the dumping of super cheap (state-subsidised) foreign goods and stanching the massive outflow of much needed capital in the form of debt service payments.

There are very influential local and international business interests that want to keep wages low to extract even greater profits and prevent the more equal distribution of wealth that is not only an imperative of justice but also a precondition for the creation of a truly dynamic, prosperous national market. They will brand us as “reds”.

There are political dynasties that see government mainly as an institution to be plundered for private wealth accumulation rather than an agent of national development via planning and wealth redistribution. They will dismiss us as “enemies of the free market” or “promoters of a totalitarian state”.

Yes, the program we offer will hurt; there is no use denying that. But it will hurt the very few ultra-rich and ultra-powerful for the benefit of the vast majority. The interests of this handful of families contradict the interests of the Filipino people.

Finally, there are those that say the most urgent task is to prevent a Marcos-Duterte restoration. Yes, we agree that we must prevent the Marcos-Duterte axis of evil from coming to power. But the best way to do that is not by simply changing the yellow wrapper that covered up the discredited practices of the last 35 years of a failed elite democracy with a wrapper of another colour — be this blue, green, white or pink. That is a dead end.

The only way to prevent a desperate people from being seduced into going back to a nightmarish authoritarian past is by offering them a program that would make them participants in the creation of the future they deserve: a truly democratic Philippines.

So what is this program? In two words: democratic socialism.

In conclusion, comrades, the elections in May are not just regular elections. They are an electoral insurgency for democratic socialism. Win or lose, this democratic socialist insurgency will go on after the May elections and, indeed, become more intense.

Long live socialism! Long live our common struggle!

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Featured image: Vice Presidential candidate Walden Bello. Photo: Laban ng Masa/Facebook

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Scott Morrison on Tuesday will announce $804.4 million over a decade to strengthen Australia’s strategic and scientific capabilities in the Antarctic.

The funding, including for drones, helicopters and vehicles, will enable Australia’s to penetrate inland areas of its claimed territory of East Antartica previously unreachable.

In strategic terms, Australia has had a watchful eye on China’s increasing involvement in recent years in the Antarctic and in Antarctic politics.

The money includes $136.6 million for inland travel capability, mapping, mobile stations, environmental protection, and other core activities.

Another $109 million will fund drone fleets and vehicles to map “inaccessible and fragile areas of East Antartica”, establishing an “Antarctic Eye” with integrated censors and cameras feeding real-time information back.

It will also purchase four new medium-lift helicopters with a range of 550 kilometres when launched from the RSV Nuyina that will give access to areas which have been beyond reach. Helicopters provide more landing flexibility than fixed-wing aircraft.

The Nuyina was launched late last year, when it was described by the government as “the most advanced polar research vessel in the world”.

Other funds in the package will go into shipping support, marine science (including a new krill aquarium in Hobart), environment management including cleaning up “legacy waste”, research on Antarctic ice sheet science to improve understanding of climate change, and international engagement.

Morrison said the Antarctic investment would support jobs in Australia – with Australian businesses, contractors, medical suppliers and other providers benefiting.

Foreign Minister Marise Payne said the government’s proposed investments “are a clear marker of our enduring commitment to the Antarctic Treaty system, its scientific foundations, and Australia’s leadership within it”.

Environment Minister Sussan Ley said: “When I sit down with world leaders to discuss the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean in the face of increasing pressures, the strategic importance of our scientific leadership is clear.

“We need to ensure that the Antarctic remains a place of science and conservation, one that is free from conflict and which is protected from exploitation.”

Australia was a founding member of the Antarctic Treaty, signed by the Menzies government in 1959.

Seven countries have made territorial claims in Antarctica. Apart from Australia, the others are Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.

Other countries including China, India, Italy, Pakistan, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States have stations there.

Australia’s claimed territory  covers 42% of the continent and includes the vast majority of East Antarctica.

Under the Hawke government Australia together with France led the successful push to have an international agreement reached to prevent mining in the Antarctic.

Ley has been pushing for the expansion of marine protected areas but getting consensus is hard, with China and Russia being difficult.

Last year the government abandoned a proposal to build a 2700 metre concrete runway at Australia’s Davis research station, following a detailed environmental and economic assessment.

Ley said then that “higher projected costs, potential environmental impacts, and the complexity of a 20-year construction process in an extreme and sensitive environment, are such that we will now focus on alternative options for expanding our wider Antarctic Program capability”.

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 is a Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra.

Featured image is from AUSTRALIAN ANTARCTIC DIVISION/AAP

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The US-backed opposition in Myanmar continues pressing on with the division and destruction of the Southeast Asian country – and key player in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

Let’s take a look at how bad the propaganda is and how directly the West is involved in creating a fiction around events unfolding inside Myanmar. This includes the so-called National Unity Government consisting of US proxies being nominated for a “Nobel Peace Prize” despite openly declaring war on their own country.

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Thousands of people have occupied streets outside the Australian parliament in the capital Canberra as days-long rallies continue against Covid-19 vaccine mandates. 

Australian police have protesters until the end of Sunday to leave occupied areas.

Several thousand protesters remained in place at Canberra’s major showgrounds, while fewer than 100 demonstrators were gathered near the federal parliament building, an Australian Capital Territory (ACT) police spokesperson told Reuters.

No protesters in Canberra had been arrested so far on Sunday after three were detained on Saturday.

“They must be out by today,” the police spokesperson said, declining to say what action authorities would take if protesters refused to comply with demands to leave.

Meanwhile, in New Zealand’s Wellington, demonstrators protesting Covid-19 mandates gathered for a sixth day, despite heavy rain and strong winds lashing the city.

Inspiration from Canada

Inspired by truckers’ rallies in Canada, social media vision showed protesters occupying Wellington streets outside the city’s parliament building with tents, trucks and vans.

Authorities played songs, including Baby Shark, Macarena and hits by Barry Manilow over loudspeakers in a bid to disperse the demonstration, amid the wild weather caused by the remnants of a tropical cyclone.

The storm on Sunday moved across New Zealand’s North Island, causing heavy rain and gale-force winds in many parts, the country’s weather bureau said on its website.

Anti-vaccine protests remain relatively small in highly vaccinated New Zealand and Australia, where most people support inoculations.

Australia logged 22,750 new Covid-19 cases in the last 24 hours, while the number of new cases in New Zealand almost doubled to a daily record of 810.

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Sri Lanka is a democracy only in its most slovenly application, and even if it is a full, blazing beacon of a democracy, the category offers no protection or excuse for what that “democracy” so gruesomely did to Tamils by using banned cluster bombs and phosphorous to wipe out the Tamils trapped inside the war zone.

Most unfortunate for all Tamils is the continued cynical silence of the international community on this troubling ongoing ethnic conflict. Tamils all over the world around 96 Millions watch the silence of the UN, UN Security Council and the International Community for their inaction for the genocide of more than 147,000 civilians during the war from 2006-2009 and the continuing structural genocide of Tamils – continuing state sponsored colonization of Sinhalese in the Tamils homeland to change the demography of the Tamils traditional and historical homeland.

It is very important that the truth about the actual use of WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION [WMD] be independently verified and investigated by the United Nations, UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC] International Community and Human Rights Organizations to bring the truth to light and initiate prosecution of the highest functionaries of the Sri Lankan State.

See this.

The denial of the use of cluster munitions and the destruction of forensic evidence over the past several years illustrated exactly why it is critical that international investigators and forensic experts be included in any future war crimes prosecution mechanism.

The International Truth and Justice Project on its Press Release on 28th September titled PRESIDENT OF THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS, SRI LANKA MUST COME CLEAN ON PAST USE.

See this.

The Press Release further stated as follows:

“In Sri Lanka’s case they have driven many de-miners and UN staff out of the country and effectively silenced the witnesses. There are also many victims among recent refugees outside Sri Lanka in countries like Switzerland; their geographic dislocation should not diminish their rights as victims,” said Ms. Sooka. “The Convention requires Sri Lanka to undertake a victim survey which should include victims abroad subject to internationally recognised witness protection provisions.”

Witness155: saw them used in Vishwamadu

“The artillery of the Security Forces would shoot the cluster munitions. However, there would not be a huge noise at this point. There would be a huge noise when the cluster bomb exploded. The main cluster munition would explode high in the air and then small bomblets would flower out from it. I personally witnessed this. When the bomblets started flowering out they would sound like heavy rain. The bomblets would all explode separately over a fairly large area. When the bomblets fell and exploded they would hurt and kill people. Some bomblets would fall to the ground, but not explode. The bomblets from the cluster munitions were bell-shaped and very attractively packaged. The bomblets had a red ribbon on them, which made children mistake the unexploded bomblets for a toy. Sometimes, children would see the bomblets and try to play with them. On one occasion in Vallipunam, I personally witnessed a little girl pick up a bomblet and get injured. The little girl died and two or three children nearby were injured”.

Cluster bombs found in Sri Lanka, UN expert says – BBC News

A 2011 report by the UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts cited allegations that the Sri Lankan Army used cluster munitions, especially around Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK) town and in the second “No Fire Zone”. It also described witness accounts that referred to large explosions, followed by numerous smaller explosions consistent with the sound of cluster bombs.

UN Expert Panel Report on Accountability in Sri Lanka had also presented the allegation of Sri Lankan Army using cluster bomb munitions or white phosphorous or other chemical substances against civilians during the war. Since the panel was not able to reach any conclusion regarding their credibility, it recommended further investigation into this allegation. The Sri Lankan Government refused to conduct any such investigation and on the contrary, it regularly tries to silence anybody who wants to initiate any independent investigation into this matter.

According to the wife of Prageeth Ekneligoda, the political columnist and cartoonist who has been missing since 24 January, 2010, the main reason for his disappearance is an investigation he carried out on the alleged use of chemical weapons by the Sri Lanka forces in 2008.

See this.

War Without Witness [WWW] reports:

Sri Lankan Government uses Chemical Weapons in Vanni (Northern part of Sri Lanka) Warfront Initial results of Independent investigations conducted by “War Without Witness” confirms that Sri Lankan Government uses Chemical Weapons in Vanni (Northern Part of Sri Lanka) war front both on civilians and its enemy combatants. Two victims were examined by a qualified independent doctor in Vanni ‘Safe Zone’ on 05th April and the initial results have been peer-reviewed by an experienced doctor in United Kingdom. Since the Government of Sri Lanka has banned access for all the Independent monitors, Humanitarian Workers including UN and the media, the combat zone is being isolated from the outside world; War Without Witness regrets that a comprehensive forensic/chemical analysis report could not be produced at this point of time.

Salem-News.com reports:

Sri Lankan ‘Soldier’ Claims Chemical Attack on Tamil Civilians

In the video, a Sri Lankan soldier claims LTTE cadres trapped on the beach were eliminated with the use of chemicals.

(COLOMBO) – NewsX accesses chilling visual evidence of death and of destruction in Sri Lanka.

NewsX accesses chilling visuals evidence that death and destruction in Lanka – YouTube

The video report below reveals a chilling account of a Sri Lankan soldier confessing to war crimes. The Sinhala Buddhist government of Sri Lanka has waged a long war against Tamil culture.

While the fighting ceased with the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009, the abuse of the population did not end.

Sri Lanka has denied its role in the Genocide of Tamils for five years, now they are in Geneva in front of the United Nations Human Rights Council answering to a long list of egregious crimes against humanity, almost all of which were perpetrated upon the Tamil people, who are Hindus, Christians and Muslims.

The United Nations state that roughly 40,000 Tamils died, but other sources place the number of dead and disappeared at 160,000.

The Sri Lankan soldier says the army used chemical weapons on trapped civilians at the end of the country’s civil war.

Soldiers boast of burning skin of Tamilians with a substance similar to white phosphorus.

White phosphorus is forbidden from use on civilian populations under international law.

It is still far from certain that Sri Lanka will face proper punishment for its flagrant use of banned cluster munitions on the un-armed civilians.

 

Continue reading here…

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Kumarathasan Rasingam, Secretary, Tamil Canadian Elders for Human Rights Org.

Featured image is from Countercurrents

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