Asia Pacific Research

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August memories

August in Japan is a time of remembrance—of family dead (honoured in the festival of Obon) and of war dead (those of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in particular). Seventy-five years after the end of the war, the ranks of those who remember it have grown thin, but in August 2020 one story caught my eye. It was the story of Yi (or Lee) Hak-nae, born in the then Japanese colony of Chosen (Korea) in 1925 and known during the war and during his trials by his Japanese name, Hiromura Kakurai. Now aged in his nineties, Yi is the last survivor of 148 Koreans convicted of war crimes in the Allied trials that followed the East Asian and Pacific wars and continued to 1947. His story, published by Reuters in 2020, was headed ‘The Survivor: Last Korean War Criminal in Japan Wants Recognition’.¹

Yi, tried by an Australian court in Singapore, was first found guilty of war crimes and sentenced to death. Similarly convicted, twenty-three others were in due course executed. Yi’s sentence, however, was commuted to twenty years’ imprisonment. He was transferred in 1951 from Singapore’s Changi prison to Tokyo’s Sugamo, and eventually released in 1956, after ten years in prison. The guilty verdict cast a shadow over his subsequent life.

Following the Reuters account on 5 August, the story was retold in Japanese two days later, introduced by Yi himself on the NHK Morning show to a nationwide television audience, there focusing not so much on the ‘war crimes’ and the allegations of brutality as on the injustice of the discriminatory treatment afforded to ‘non-Japanese’ former convicted ‘war criminals’ (senpan) after the war.² On 14 August the daily Tokyo shimbun carried a further story focusing on that problem and on the movement Yi had long spearheaded demanding of the Japanese government equal treatment for non-Japanese (Korean) and Japanese ex-prisoners.³ At around the same time, Japan’s monthly journal Sekai published an interview with Yi and an article addressing his case by a leading scholar in the field of war and treatment of prisoners.⁴

I researched and wrote about the Burma–Thailand railway and the Yi Hak-nae case almost thirty years ago,⁵ so these stories in this August month of remembering, seventy-five years since the war’s end, drove me to reflect once again: what was the Burma–Thailand railway? Why was a Korean, Yi Hak-nae, working there as a POW camp guard? How had he been punished and on what grounds? What ‘recognition’ does he seek, and with what right? In pondering these questions, I also felt that it was time to pay some attention to the recent work of Australian military historians on the Australian war-crimes trials, notably resulting in the 2016 publication of a substantial tome on the subject.⁶

Building the railway

During the crucial war years of 1942–43, Japan’s Imperial Army command attached high priority to the construction of a railway linking Thailand to Burma (as Myanmar was then known). The ‘Burma–Thailand Railway’, crossing 414.9 kilometres of jungle and mountain terrain between Ban Pong in Thailand (about 88 kilometres from Bangkok) and Thanbyuzayat in Burma, was designed to open a secure overland route for the transport of troops and supplies to Burma for the war against British India.

It was Japan’s first large-scale, multinational engineering and construction project. A massive labour force was organised. Two regiments of the Imperial Japanese Army, some 10,000 men, were assigned around 55,000 Allied POWs from the roughly 250,000 who had fallen into Japanese hands since war began in December 1941, plus 70,000 or so locally recruited civilian Southeast Asian (Tamil Indian, Burmese, Thai, Malay) romusha (labourers), and even a squad of 300 elephants, for work in the jungle.⁷ To guard the prisoners Japan recruited some 3000 Koreans from Chosen. Work commenced in November 1942.

The task was hard enough, given the jungle and mountain conditions, but it was made even harder by the early and unusually severe onset of the monsoon and the afflictions that ravaged the workforce (cholera, malaria, dysentery, beriberi, ulcers). In February 1943 the projected construction time was cut from twelve months to eight and a ‘speedo’ campaign was launched that forced prisoners to work longer days with less rest. As the pace was stepped up, more than 12,000 Allied prisoners died, including 2646 of about 13,000 Australians, and a much greater but unknown number of romusha. They died of starvation, exhaustion, illness (cholera in particular) and general ill-treatment. There was said to have been one death for every sleeper laid for the line. At Hintok construction camp (adjacent to the infamous Hellfire Pass and about 150 kilometres from Banpong), where Yi was one of six Korean civilian camp guards, about 100 of 800 prisoners died. On the camp’s worst days in mid-1943, that meant up to six each day.

No sooner was the line opened, in October 1943, than it was smashed by Allied bombing. Few trains ever ran on the line, and those that did carried defeated, wounded and sick Japanese troops back after the Battle of Imphal in India (which commenced in March 1944).

In Australia in particular, once the war ended and POWs returned home, war-crime trials, with their stories of forced heavy labour, beatings, general ill-treatment, hunger and disease, fed bitter, lasting negative images of Japan. In 1991, my Australian National University (ANU) colleague Hank Nelson, a specialist on the war experience in Australia, and I, a modern Japanese historian, together with Utsumi Aiko, a Japanese academic specialist on the war and Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbours, convened a conference in Canberra that sought to bring together as many survivors as possible, i.e. including formerly hostile parties, to reflect on the episode across the gulf of half a century.

Notable former Australian POWs included Edward (‘Weary’) Dunlop (1907–93), Tom Uren (1921–2015) and Hugh Clarke (1919–96). Dunlop was already a distinguished surgeon and widely revered national figure, Uren a prominent politician and former deputy prime minister, and Clarke a highly regarded novelist. From the ‘other’ side just the Korean, ‘civilian auxiliary’ or gunzoku,Yi Hak-nae, confronted and sought forgiveness from and reconciliation with his former charges. The book of this conference was published in English in 1993 and in Japanese in 1994.

The trials

In 1946–47, Australia conducted twenty-three war-crimes trials in Singapore, with sixty-two defendants. It found eighteen guilty and sentenced them to death, acquitted eleven, and sentenced an additional thirty-three to varying prison terms. Yi was tried on 18 and 20 March 1947. The charges were that during part of the period March to August 1943 Yi had ‘occupied the position of Camp Commandant’ and during that period:

The prisoners of war lived under the most appalling conditions, shelter and accommodation were totally inadequate and most primitive. They were also denied sufficient food, medical supplies, clothing and footwear… [while being] forced to perform heavy manual labour on the railway line for which they were totally unfit by reason of their physical and medical condition… As a result of this treatment sickness and disease among the prisoners of war became rife and by the end of April 43.2% of the camp strength were in hospital…out of 800 Australian prisoners of war who went into the camp over 100 of them died there, and that the accused was responsible for their death.⁸

Found guilty of having ‘inhumanely [sic] treated prisoners of war’—in effect, guilty of mass murder—Yi was sentenced to death. His defence counsel petitioned the court and in October his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment.

Yi’s trial was marked by multiple irregularities, but the overwhelming one was the assumption that he had been ‘Camp Commandant’, himself responsible for the ‘appalling conditions’. It was a major mistake that should have been corrected at the outset. Because guards such as Yi were the principal point of contact between prisoners and camp authorities they tended to be seen as responsible, but they had zero control over the conditions of the camp, their status was lower than a private and they were themselves subjected to multiple abuses and discrimination from the Japanese military. Tasked with forcing POWs to work on the line construction, and under tremendous pressure from the Japanese army camp command to meet daily prisoner work norms, Yi had to maximize the labour force, while Dunlop, then a 36-year-old Australian army surgeon and the senior prisoner commander, had to minimize it, doing what he could to prevent prisoners who were ill or enfeebled from starvation or disease from being allocated to work detachments.

For some weeks in March-April 1943, in the absence or illness of regular Japanese authorities, Yi did indeed serve as acting camp commandant, but he was obliged to implement policy, not determine it. Though Yi was charged over matters to do with his having ‘occupied the position of Camp Superintendent’, a status that continued until August, in his account (discussed below) Colonel Dunlop made no such claim. He referred only to the very different charge, that in April-May 1943 ‘while in charge of works parade arrangements (italics added) [Yi was] forcing doctors to discharge patients from hospital to work’. He was clear and specific as to time, and made no reference to any beatings or brutality, or to any act of Yi’s causing death. He added the names of two other prisoners from whom details could be sought.⁹ Since no statement from either appears in the file it would seem either that they were not asked or that they declined to answer.

Yi’s account to the court confirmed Dunlop’s statement. His spell as acting commander of the camp was indeed brief (March-April 1943). ‘After May’, he told the court (which did not dispute the fact), ‘I was ordered to assist in the orderly room so I did not have any connection whatever with the work parade’. Dunlop’s own diary, not published until much later but meticulous in its detail, makes clear his hatred for Yi as ‘a proper little bastard’ (17 March 1943), ‘a terrible thorn in the side’ (6 April 1943), who ‘against all medical judgment, forced more sick men out to work’ (12 April 1943), but he made no reference to ever having been beaten or personally ill-treated by him.¹⁰ He also confirms that Yi’s spell as acting camp commandant ended in April. The indictment was therefore fundamentally flawed by falsely charging Yi with overall responsibility for camp conditions continuing to August.

Much later, to the Canberra conference of 1991 and as if to settle the matter, Dunlop said:

I was bashed by others…but [Hiromura/Yi] he wasn’t a basher. I didn’t regard him as a major criminal. I regarded him as a pawn. His powers were very limited. Most of my real fights were with the Japanese engineers.¹¹

Not only that but, far from being camp commandant at the time he was accused of committing the offences, Yi was an 18-year-old boy (born 1925), a fact that Colonel Dunlop and other former prisoners in the camp were shocked to learn when they re-met him in Canberra in 1991.

Perhaps even more remarkable, when Yi was arrested and put on trial in 1947 it was on the same charges—ill-treatment of prisoners—over which he had been arrested and imprisoned, but then released, the previous year. On 17 October 1946, Lieutenant-Colonel Robert C. Smith, commander of 1st War Crimes section, Singapore, had minuted the Yi file: ‘Case not serious enough to warrant trial. Close file’. He then wrote to headquarters, Singapore district, to say: ‘It is now advised that the case against the above-named has been dropped as it is only of a minor nature’.

That should have been the end of the matter. Charges against him dismissed, Yi was duly released on 10 December 1946. Boarding a repatriation vessel, he got only as far as Hong Kong before being removed from the ship, re-arrested, and subjected to the same charges as those Lieutenant-Colonel Smith a year earlier had thought ‘minor’. The major difference in charges was the addition of the following words: ‘…out of 800 Australian prisoners of war who went into the camp over 100 of them died there, and that the accused was responsible for their death’. In short, with Yi being found guilty in 1947 of the charge of mass murder that had been dismissed in 1946, the trial offended against the fundamental legal principle of autrefois acquit. Astonishingly, the court in 1947 was unaware of those 1946 proceedings until they were brought to its attention by Yi’s counsel after the 1947 judgment and sentence.

The proceedings were brief, even summary in character, no small matter when the accused is facing a capital charge. There were no witnesses to be called or cross-examined, and just eight pieces of written testimony—seven sworn affidavits and one unsworn ‘Q’ form, discussed below. Yi estimates (and the transcript suggests that the figure is about right) that he confronted the tribunal for about forty minutes. Yi understood little of the proceedings save the three heavy words with which they concluded: ‘death by hanging’.

The evidence was thin. Of the 600 or so former prisoners from Hintok camp, just seven (two majors, two captains, one lieutenant, one sergeant-major and one private) submitted sworn affidavits. Three in particular made serious allegations against Yi. Captain Cecil George Brettingham-Moore referred to ‘one classic occasion’ sometime between 25 May and 14 July, when conditions at Hintok were at their worst, on which Yi had beaten Dunlop with a bamboo stick after the latter had interceded to try to prevent sick men from being assigned to work brigades. Sergeant-Major Austen Adam Fyfe testified that Yi had often beaten him and he had witnessed one occasion in around July 1943 on which he had seen Yi bashing Colonel Dunlop severely across the head and body. Major Hector George Greiner referred in particular to an incident some days after Dunlop’s arrival in the camp (i.e. April 1943) in which Yi had attacked and beaten him. He also referred to Yi as having been ‘in charge’, and described him as ‘one of the most brutal guards I had experiences with’, the very phrase that in 2020 Reuters stretched into a general prisoner consensus: ‘Trial records reviewed by Reuters show prisoners [sic] remembered Lee (Yi/Hiromura), known as the Lizard, as one of the most brutal guards on the railway’. Although the Greiner charge was plausible, the problem with the Fyfe and Brettingham-Moore testimony is that it refers to a July bashing (Fyfe), and a ‘classic occasion’ between late May and July that Brettingham-Moore remembered, neither of which could have occurred on Yi’s watch.

Three other former prisoners made some mention of Yi. Major John Chauncy Champion de Crespigny said that Colonel Dunlop suffered abuse, slapping and humiliation at Yi’s hands practically daily but had no recollection of any ‘severe’ beating. Captain Richard Hastings Allen described Yi as ‘no worse than most of the camp staff where beating of PW was a daily occurrence’. Lieutenant Reginald Gilbert Houston referred to Dunlop having been frequently ‘ill-treated’ by Hiromura/Yi, but he mentioned no specific incident. One further ex-prisoner was Private Harry Ashley Hugal. Though present at the camp throughout the period in question, and the only ordinary soldier to lay any complaint over his treatment there, Hugal made no mention of Yi at all in his affidavit.

The evidence was thus far from decisive, and Dunlop’s testimony, as senior officer in the camp and himself the subject of alleged beatings at Yi’s hands, was plainly crucial to the prosecution case. Yet there was no sworn statement from him but simply a pencilled ‘Q’ form (‘a piece of unsworn paper’, as defence counsel put it). The fact of his declining (or refusing) to submit any sworn accusation or to give direct evidence amounted, in this capital trial, to pointed silence. The only explanation for why the trial’s ‘Exhibit One’ was being presented in such an unsworn format would seem to be that the war was over and Dunlop had no interest in retribution.¹² The court likewise gave no explanation as to why the ‘Q’ forms of other prisoners were not before it.¹³

In an affidavit dated 27 June 1946, Dunlop referred to a Lieutenant Hirota [Eiji], a young engineer attached to the railway corps who had been responsible for work parties, ‘enjoyed a reputation for ruthlessness’, and was ‘directly responsible for many deaths’.¹⁴ Brettingham-Moore and Hugal also mention Hirota in their depositions, and at one point in Brettingham-Moore’s deposition the letters ‘ta’ (of Hirota) have been crossed out and replaced by ‘mura’ (of Hiromura), so the possibility of mistaken identity in the judicial process, the confusion of Hiromura and Hirota, is real. Hirota, tried in September 1946 on charges of ill-treatment of prisoners, was found guilty, and executed on 21 January 1947.¹⁵

After the 1947 tribunal returned its guilty verdict (‘inhumane treatment of prisoners, causing death of more than one hundred’) and sentence against Yi, however, both in Singapore and in Canberra doubt seems to have persisted. The case lacked a decisive piece of evidence. Exhibit One, Dunlop’s Q form, was a remarkably thin basis upon which to warrant a death penalty. When the tribunal referred the file to the judge advocate-general in Canberra, L. B. Simpson, for advice, Simpson on 2 June wrote an initial opinion in which he saw ‘no reason in the proceedings why the finding and sentence should not be legally confirmed’ but then went on to add, almost as an afterthought, the following, contradictory, comment: ‘In comparison with the other cases, this is not a particularly bad one, and I strongly urge the confirming authority to mitigate the sentence to imprisonment for a long period’.

Had Dunlop in 1947 added his voice to make serious accusations against Yi, either by a sworn deposition or by an appearance in person before the tribunal in Singapore, the death sentence would almost certainly have been confirmed and carried out. On the other hand, had he appeared in person and made clear—in either format—that Yi had been an underling rather than camp commandant and that several of the affidavits were problematic, it is conceivable that Yi might have been found not guilty, or guilty of some lesser charges. At least Dunlop’s non-cooperation meant a reprieve for Yi. On 7 November 1947, after almost eight months on death row, he was advised that his sentence had been commuted to twenty years. In due course he served ten before release.

The aftermath

The Japan into which Yi and other Koreans emerged after his release in 1956 was a country that they had never known, where they had no family or friends. Since in Korea they were thought of as Japanese ‘collaborating’ war criminals, and since the peninsula had been devastated by the Korean War while they were in prison, they could not go home.

By a bizarre irony, very soon after Yi emerged from Tokyo’s Sugamo prison Japan came to be headed by a former A-class (major war crimes) prisoner, Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987). Where B- and C-class Koreans at the lowest level of the Japanese military system, regularly bashed and beaten themselves, with zero power or authority to delay or block orders, were required to serve out their sentences until 1956, Kishi, an undisputed member of Japan’s militarist elite as architect of colonial policy and signatory to the declaration of war on the West in 1941, together with other A-class prisoners, was released in December 1948. Escaping the gallows and being suddenly freed on the very day that seven others of the A group were executed, Kishi went on to become prime minister in 1957, an invaluable US asset as occupation policy shifted from punishment to recovery and incorporation of Japan into the Cold War system.

Once freed, Yi organised a group of around seventy former Korean B- and C-class senpan into a mutual welfare society, setting up and running a taxi company in Tokyo. Yi became leader of the movement to secure compensation for the Koreans equivalent to that enjoyed by regular Japanese ex-soldier senpan (beginning in 1954 and in today’s terms around $41,000 a year), but since Japan’s claims to Korea and Taiwan had been extinguished with the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, Koreans and Taiwanese, suddenly ‘non-Japanese’, were excluded from compensation. Today Yi is the last representative of those Koreans who were first mobilised and then punished as ‘Japanese’ but then involuntarily stripped of their ‘Japaneseness’ upon dissolution of the Japanese empire. He has been seeking recognition for more than sixty years since then.

In 1991, in an unforgettable scene, meeting for the first time in over fifty years on the campus of the Australian National University, Yi proffered, and Dunlop graciously accepted, an apology:

From the bottom of my heart I wanted to apologise profoundly, as one of the aggressor side, to Colonel Dunlop and all the former POWs, for the bitterness and pain of the loss of so many of their comrades under such harsh circumstances. Before you all, I apologise from my heart.¹⁶

Two things in retrospect are notable about the Yi apology. First, he was clear and unambiguous about his share of responsibility for the pain and suffering caused to Allied prisoners. Second, he sought their understanding for the plight of the Korean senpan, powerless to influence the oppressive, violent nature of the war system, of which they, like the Australians, were victims. He asked them to understand that he, too, as a POW of the Allied forces, especially in Singapore, had been treated cruelly. Former POWs listening to Yi’s talk to the 1991 conference were left surprised and uncomfortable by his insistence on the second of these points.

Yi was so overwhelmed by the 1991 meeting that he made one further trip to Australia a year later, visiting Dunlop at his Melbourne home to present him with a gold watch inscribed ‘No More Hintok, No More War’.¹⁷ Dunlop died shortly afterwards.

‘The Apology’, Australian National University, August 1991 (Yi Hak-nae, Edward (‘Weary’) Dunlop, Tom Uren, and author Gavan McCormack as interpreter. Photograph courtesy Utsumi Aiko.

Seeking recognition

In November 1991, months after the Canberra conference, a group of seven compatriot senpan, including Yi, launched a suit in the Tokyo district court seeking compensation from the government of Japan equivalent to the emoluments they would have been entitled to had they been Japanese. Their suit was rejected in successive actions, but the Tokyo High Court in July 1998 added to its judgment a rider to the effect that it was up to ‘those in charge of political affairs’ to strive for an early and proper legislative resolution of the Korean claims. In December 1999 the Supreme Court again rejected their claim, but, while leaving it to the legislature, expressed understanding of their discontent at the lack of any legislative measures to resolve their grievances.

In 2008, responding to the urgings of the courts and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, the (opposition) Democratic Party of Japan framed a bill for the economic relief of the Korean senpan, prescribing a payment of three million yen each (about $28,000).¹⁸ However, it failed to persuade the then governing Liberal-Democratic Party and was dropped without debate. Another bill, setting a slightly lower figure of 2.6 million yen per head, was proposed by the Japan-South Korea Parliamentarians League but got nowhere. Yi Hak-Nae, the last survivor, continues to press the B- and C-groups’ case and the legislature continues to drag its feet.¹⁹ ‘Not a day passes’, said Yi in 2020, ‘without my thinking of the pitiable fate of those B- and C-class senpan who have already passed away. I insist that Japan respond properly to our claims’.

Guilt and reconciliation

Shortly before he died in 1993, Dunlop took me aside during a function at the Australian War Memorial to ask about Yi. Whenever he looked at the gold watch Yi had presented to him, he said, he felt a certain ‘guilt’. Surprised at his use of the word guilt, I put it to him that, given what he and other prisoners had been through at the hands of their captors, it was surely not for him to feel guilty. He gently demurred. Leading me to a nearby chair, he sat me down and told me the following story. It is one that, it seems, he had not told before, and one that many might find shocking, as did I.

I quote here from the Sydney Morning Herald of 10 July 1993 (though I am the source of this story):²⁰

Sir Edward Dunlop died with guilt in a corner of his heart. ‘Weary’, the Australian hero who knew there was no future in hatred, revealed a few months before he died…that he had once hated a man so intensely that he had planned to kill him. On the Burma–Thailand railway 50 years ago, the Australian surgeon had fashioned a club to kill the Korean guard known as the Lizard, whom Dunlop called in his diaries ‘a proper little bastard’. Dunlop planned to ambush the Lizard and ‘beat his brains out’. The moment Dunlop planned to go to the ambush site, however, he was summoned to attend to business in the prisoner-of-war camp.

It was an astonishing revelation. It should be corrected now in just one detail. As I recall the conversation, Dunlop had actually taken up a position to carry out his plan, hiding behind a rock or a tree near the camp entrance to await Yi’s return, when he was suddenly called to the camp office. Dunlop would have known very well that the act he contemplated would, had he carried it out, have attracted savage retaliation, not just on himself but on all POWs. Yet he was, he implied, so boiling with rage and hatred as to be temporarily blind to such consequences. The moment passed, but it left a weight on his conscience.

Worlds apart in culture, status and life experience, Dunlop and Yi were linked by fate and shared humanity, each touched by the encounter with the other. Meeting Yi first at Hintok in early 1943, Dunlop conceived of a hatred for him that he could only barely contain. Four years later, by choosing not to cooperate with the Singapore tribunal, he ‘spared’ (or, it could be said, re-spared) Yi, his non-cooperation mute testimony to his disquiet. Eventually, in 1991, the two were reconciled, with an apology offered by Yi and accepted by Dunlop. The reconciliation was sealed the following year by the gold watch.

On learning of Dunlop’s death, Yi sent a message of condolence:

…I owe you my life…you were gracious enough to accept those apologies…and you showed understanding of the position of Koreans under Japanese imperialism. After speaking together of the unhappiness of war, you shook hands with me and the warmth of your large hand still remains with me. From my heart I thank you, and I pray that you may rest in peace.²¹

The history

Yi is one of a tiny minority in Japan to apologise for his role in the war and to seek out those towards whom he feels particular guilt, even though his responsibility for what happened in the camp, including the deaths of ‘over 100’ Australians, was at least attenuated by the fact that he was at the time an 18-year-old discriminated-against menial at the lowest level of the Japanese military machine. That he was non-Japanese should also have been taken into consideration. For the Koreans, Japan’s defeat in war spelt liberation and liquidation of Japan’s colonial empire. Yi’s defence counsel at the 1947 trial attempted to make the defence that as an allied national he should not be tried as a Japanese (enemy) subject,²² but the court briskly dismissed that objection. It was no more interested in the oppressive, colonial nature of the Japanese–Korean relationship than it was in Yi’s being a juvenile.

Today, Weary’s statue stands in front of the Australian War Memorial in Canberra. Seeing his image, recollecting his grasp of history, his personal warmth and his sense of justice, I bow in respect and remembrance. In 1995 the government of Australia conferred upon him the extraordinary honour of minting 16 million 50-cent coins with Queen Elizabeth on one side and Weary on the other. I recall him speaking to the Canberra gathering in 1991, saying:

I personally felt that the Japanese had an excuse for getting involved in the last war. I think the Americans put them down as a tinpot economy and really screwed them down as a minor power. [But] As one who was quite prepared to forgive the Japanese and get on with business with them in the world, one thing has just irritated me a little: they do not seem to me to really teach history.²³

Edward (‘Weary’) Dunlop, statue by Peter Corlett, 1995, Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Photograph: Gavan McCormack, March 2021

On 23 April 1993, the book of the 1991 conference was launched at the Australian National University by Prime Minister Paul Keating, who spoke memorably and movingly to the assembled former POWs of his own family’s experience of wartime loss, his uncle having been a casualty of the Sandakan Death Marches in the Philippines in early 1945. Only long after the expiry of his allocated time could his minders detach the prime minister from his intimate conversations and shared family stories with the former soldiers. These were years in which Hellfire Pass was gradually taking its place alongside Gallipoli and Kokoda as a key site in the formation of the modern Australian identity.

In the years since that 1991 conference and the 1993 book publication, one by one the participants, especially the old soldiers, have passed away. The last survivor, Yi Hak-nae, cannot be far behind. Since the publication of the 1991 conference proceedings, at least two major books have been published; one was subsequently turned into a film and the other, Richard Flanagan’s Narrow Road to the Deep North, won the Booker Prize.²⁴

The most substantial (865-page) tome, however, has been the 2016 publication of Australia’s War Crimes Trials 1945–1951. Enjoying the financial backing of the Australian War Memorial, the Australian Research Council and the Australian Department of Defence’s Legal Division, it might be seen as the considered opinion of official Australia on the Singapore trials, a comprehensive ‘not guilty’ (to any suggestion of impropriety by Australia) verdict. However, while one might reasonably have expected that important cases such as that of Yi would be given thorough analysis, that is not the case. The trial is briefly outlined, but no mention is made of the fact that Yi was convicted in 1947 on charges that had been dismissed in 1946, or of the contradictions and flimsy, hearsay character of the evidence. Other surely significant cases pass without analysis, including the ‘F’ Force trials over matters arising from the camps on the Burma side of the railway, which recorded the highest of all prisoner death rates (29 per cent, or 1060 deaths among 3600 prisoners),²⁵ in which four death sentences were handed down (although all were later commuted). Another large trial, of Lieutenant-Colonel Nagatomo Yoshitada and others, led to the execution of three Japanese, including Nagatomo, and three Koreans, one of whom, Cho Mun-san (Japanese name: Hirahara Moritsune), was the subject of a documentary film by the national broadcaster, NHK, in August 1991.²⁶ It too escapes mention.

Three Korean Guards, Hiromura/Yi on left, Thailand, 1943

Posing the question ‘Were the Australian trials fair?’, two of the editors of this volume offer their own answer, saying: ‘en masse, the Australian trials were as fair as might be expected given the particular circumstances of the immediate postwar period and in comparison to other Allied military practices’²⁷and ‘There is a certain satisfaction, as we come to the end of our project on the Australian war crimes trials, in attaining our conviction that no systematic abuse occurred in these trials’.²⁸

Such a conclusion can only be reconciled with the Yi case (and the F Force, Nagatomo and other cases) by putting heavy weight on the words ‘en masse’, ‘as might be expected’, and ‘systematic’. It is a formula for forgiving abuses that were somehow less than en masse or ‘systematic’, while the phrase ‘as might be expected’ is too conveniently exculpatory and too readily allows Australian responsibility to be diminished. For what is clearly intended to be the ‘official history’, such equivocation is not good enough. The conclusion of this volume that the trials were basically fair hangs as a heavily begged question over the promised ‘comprehensive law report for each of the 300 trials conducted by Australia’ yet to come.

I formed the view in 1991, after reading the available documents and talking with survivors, that the trial of Yi (and others, especially other Koreans) was a travesty. Now, thirty years later, and contrary to the 2016 Australian volume, I see nothing to make me change my mind. Furthermore, reflecting on Yi Hak-nae’s long struggle to gain recognition and compensation from the government of Japan, I have a further, troubling concern: should he not also have a claim of some sort against the government of Australia over the deeply flawed judicial hearings to which it subjected him more than seventy years ago?

Note: As this article was being revised for publication in March 2021, Yi Hak-nae died in Tokyo, aged 96, after a short illness. A slightly earlier version of this paper, without notes, was published in the Autumn 2021 issue of the Melbourne journal, Arena, pp. 72-78. A Japanese version, translated by Yoshinaga Fusako, was published in the July 2021 issue of Sekai, No 946, pp. 227-238.

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Gavan McCormack is an emeritus professor of Australian National University (ANU). A graduate of the University of Melbourne (arts and law, MA in history) and SOAS University of London (PhD 1974), he taught at the Universities of Leeds, La Trobe and Adelaide before joining ANU. He is also an editor of the web journal Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus and the author of many books and articles on aspects of modern East Asian, mostly Japanese, history, many of them published also in Japanese, Korean and Chinese translation.

Notes

¹ Ju-min Park, ‘The Survivor: Last Korean War Criminal in Japan Wants Recognition’, Thomson Reuters, 5 August 2020.

² ‘Moto BC-kyu senpan no gaikokujin 95-sai kokunai saigo no shogensha’, ‘Ohayo Nippon’, NHK 7 August 2020. NHK published the same story in English a month later: ‘Seeking Answers to Clarify Wartime Chaos’, NHK World, 14 September 2020.

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On July 29, Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte decided to cancel his plans to end the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) – an important defense treaty with the United States. He said that the legal conditions for the temporary U.S. military presence in the Philippines has existed since 1998, on which the two sides conducted joint exercises on land, air and sea. Duterte informed Washington of his intention to cancel the agreement in February 2020, but withdrew the decision at a meeting with U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in the Filipino capital of Manila on Friday. 

“There is no request to terminate the VFA pending and we are back on track,” Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana told reporters.

The head of the Pentagon welcomed Duterte’s decision, which as he said, would help strengthen defense ties between the two countries. Austin said that it gives confidence in the future of their bilateral relations, especially now that the U.S. can make long-term plans for the Asia-Pacific region and conduct a variety of training activities aimed at containing China.

Several other defense agreements between the Philippines and the U.S. are contingent on the VFA. For Washington, the VFA agreement is strategically important because it provides the legal framework for the movement of thousands of American troops to the Philippines as part of their pressure campaign against China in the region.

Amidst rising tensions with China over the Taiwan issue, it was important for the U.S. to uphold the deal with the Philippines, an archipelago of 7,640 islands. The Philippines is all the more crucial for U.S. strategic planning as it is located just south of Taiwan, an island that Beijing considers a rebel province. If Washington loses leverage over Taiwan to exert military pressure, it means that they will fail in their pursuit to dominate the Asia-Pacific region. Washington wants to enlist the support of the Philippines and other partners in the region to maintain and strengthen its ability to confront China, the U.S.’ main economic adversary in the 21st century.

Almost all of the top generals in the Filipino military have trained in the U.S. The Filipino military is focused on developing their relations with the U.S., which is one of the most important conditions for consolidating the military’s power and influence in civil society. Therefore, Duterte’s decision is a compromise with the military’s elite ahead of the 2022 presidential election.

According to the Philippine constitution, a person who is elected president cannot be re-elected after the end of their 6-year term. The current president cannot be re-elected in 2022, but most local observers point out that his daughter, Sara Duterte, is a leading candidate to succeed him.

Interestingly however, the day Duterte held talks with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, he attended the inauguration ceremony of a bridge project connecting Makati and Mandaluyong cities. The bridge, built with Chinese financial support, is expected to reduce congestion on major highways in Greater Manila and should contribute to the economic development of the metropolitan area.

Perhaps it is no coincidence that the bridge opening ceremony coincided with the meeting between the Philippine President and Austin. Manila could be showing that despite continuing with VFA, it wants to maintain a balance with Washington and Beijing.

The U.S. traditionally forces its partners in the region to make a choice – the U.S. or China. This vector was particularly pursued under the previous Trump administration. President Joe Biden still implements this policy, although not as openly or publicly aggressive compared to his predecessor.

Southeast Asian countries generally want to have independent policies that do not force them into the American or Chinese orbits. However, historical animosities are in fact pushing some countries, such as Vietnam, to lean more towards the U.S. rather than China. However, even Vietnam cannot completely divorce from China as it is an irreplaceable export-import partner. Vietnamese exports to China were worth $48.88 billion in 2020 and Filipino exports to China were worth $9.81 Billion in 2019.

In the midst of a global health crisis, breaking or damaging relationships with an important economic partner is unwise, just as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro had to learn the hard way. Therefore, it is very likely that by taking this step, Duterte wants to show that the Philippines has its own interest in ensuring security and developing the country’s economy with the support of China, but without breaking military ties with the U.S.

Speaking at the opening ceremony of the bridge, the Philippine President thanked the Chinese leadership for funding the construction and called the project a demonstration of the goodwill of the Chinese people and government.

Under this context, it appears that Duterte is not prepared to make his military truly independent from Washington. At the same time, the Philippines acknowledges that its development is hinged on its economic cooperation with China. Manila is now trying to find a balance without being consumed by either major power.

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Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.

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Shamefully, Australia has one of the highest extinction rates in the world. And the number one threat to our species is invasive or “alien” plants and animals.

But invasive species don’t just cause extinctions and biodiversity loss – they also create a serious economic burden. Our research, published today, reveals invasive species have cost the Australian economy at least A$390 billion in the last 60 years alone.

Our paper – the most detailed assessment of its type ever published in this country – also reveals feral cats are the worst invasive species in terms of total costs, followed by rabbits and fire ants.

Without urgent action, Australia will continue to lose billions of dollars every year on invasive species.

Huge economic burden

Invasive species are those not native to a particular ecosystem. They are introduced either by accident or on purpose and become pests.

Some costs involve direct damage to agriculture, such as insects or fungi destroying fruit. Other examples include measures to control invasive species like feral cats and cane toads, such as paying field staff and buying fuel, ammunition, traps and poisons.

Our previous research put the global cost of invasive species at A$1.7 trillion. But this is most certainly a gross underestimate because so many data are missing.

As a wealthy nation, Australia has accumulated more reliable cost data than most other regions. These costs have increased exponentially over time – up to sixfold each decade since the 1970s.

We found invasive species now cost Australia around A$24.5 billion a year, or an average 1.26% of the nation’s gross domestic product. The costs total at least A$390 billion in the past 60 years.

Increase in annual costs of invasive species in Australia from 1960 to 2020. The predicted range for 2020 is shown in the upper left quadrant. Note the logarithmic scale of the vertical axis. CJA Bradshaw

Worst of the worst

Our analysis found feral cats have been the most economically costly species since 1960. Their A$18.7 billion bill is mainly associated with attempts to control their abundance and access, such as fencing, trapping, baiting and shooting.

Feral cats are a main driver of extinctions in Australia, and so perhaps investment to limit their damage is worth the price tag.

As a group, the management and control of invasive plants proved the worst of all, collectively costing about A$200 billion. Of these, annual ryegrass, parthenium and ragwort were the costliest culprits because of the great effort needed to eradicate them from croplands.

Invasive mammals were the next biggest burdens, costing Australia A$63 billion.

The 10 costliest invasive species in Australia. CJA Bradshaw

Variation across regions

For costs that can be attributed to particular states or territories, New South Wales had the highest costs, followed by Western Australia then Victoria.

Red imported fire ants are the costliest species in Queensland, and ragwort is the economic bane of Tasmania.

The common heliotrope is the costliest species in both South Australia and Victoria, and annual ryegrass tops the list in WA.

In the Northern Territory, the dothideomycete fungus that causes banana freckle disease brings the greatest economic burden, whereas cats and foxes are the costliest species in the ACT and NSW.

The three costliest species by Australian state/territory. CJA Bradshaw

Better assessments needed

Our study is one of 19 region-specific analyses released today. Because the message about invasive species must get out to as many people as possible, our article’s abstract was translated into 24 languages.

This includes Pitjantjatjara, a widely spoken Indigenous language.

Even the massive costs we reported are an underestimate. This is because of we haven’t yet surveyed all the places these species occur, and there is a lack of standardised reporting by management authorities and other agencies.

For example, our database lists several fungal plant pathogens. But no cost data exist for some of the worst offenders, such as the widespread Phytophthora cinnamomi pathogen that causes major crop losses and damage to biodiversity.

Developing better methods to estimate the environmental impacts of invasive species, and the benefit of management actions, will allow us to use limited resources more efficiently.

Phytophthora cinnamomi, a widespread, but largely uncosted, fungal pathogen. Adobe Stock/272252666

A constant threat

Many species damaging to agriculture and the environment are yet to make it to our shores.

The recent arrival in Australia of fall armyworm, a major agriculture pest, reminds us how invasive species will continue their spread here and elsewhere.

As well as the economic damage, invasive species also bring intangible costs we have yet to measure adequately. These include the true extent of ecological damage, human health consequences, erosion of ecosystem services and the loss of cultural values.

Without better data, increased investment, a stronger biosecurity system and interventions such as animal culls, invasive species will continue to wreak havoc across Australia.

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Corey J. A. Bradshaw is Matthew Flinders Professor of Global Ecology and Models Theme Leader for the ARC Centre of Excellence for Australian Biodiversity and Heritage, Flinders University

Andrew Hoskins is Research scientist CSIRO Health and Biosecurity, CSIRO

Featured image: Feral cats are Australia’s costliest invasive species. Adobe Stock/240188862

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China’s growing capabilities and ambitions have alarmed all the states which border with this giant. However, among these countries, there are those with which the PRC has a particularly complicated relationship. For example, Japan is one of them. On the one hand, China and Japan, as the two most economically developed states in Asia, cannot help but cooperate. On the other hand, there is competition between the countries, territorial issues, and a heavy memory of the events of World War II, dubbed the Nanjing Massacre when the Japanese military seized part of the Chinese territory and showed incredible cruelty to the civilian population there.

Nevertheless, cooperation between the countries is ongoing and very active. For example, in 2019, before the economic crisis associated with the COVID-19 pandemic gripped the world, Sino-Japanese trade was about $280 billion. Despite all contradictions, the PRC is currently Japan’s second trading partner after its main ally, the United States.

Today’s primary role in all of Beijing’s economic policy is played by One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), which aims to connect China with as many countries as possible through a single transport infrastructure. This will allow Beijing to maximize its commodity flows worldwide and bring its global economic influence to unprecedented heights. That is why the PRC is now particularly eager to cooperate with other countries in the transport sector. Around the world, the Celestial Empire supports the construction of roads, ports, and the development of international routes to incorporate them into the OBOR system. China also has joint transportation projects with Japan.

For example, a new water route between the two states began operating in 2019. After reaching the east coast of China, cargo ships from Japan sail up China’s largest river, the Yangtze, until they reach the city of Wuhan in Hubei Province, PRC, which is a major river port and one of the most important transport hubs in Central China. In the first five months of 2021 alone, 36 flights were made, and 2,799 containers were delivered from Japan to Wuhan.

At the end of June 2021, another cargo ship sailed from the Port of Nagoya in Japan to Wuhan. He brought a shipment of cars in his containers for onward shipment to Mongolia. At the same time, another ship was dispatched from Japan with the same cargo, also for shipment to Mongolia, but in a much larger volume.

Soon Chinese media reported on the launch of a new cargo route to connect Japan and Mongolia via PRC territory. The route with a total length of more than 5,000 km includes the above-described water route from Japan along the Yangtze to Wuhan. Wuhan will begin the overland railroad section of the route, ending in the Mongolian capital Ulaanbaatar.

The cars from both ships are expected to arrive at their destination in the second half of July 2021. At this point, the Japan-Wuhan-Mongolia route can be considered fully operational. Thanks to it, the delivery time from Japan to Mongolia will now be only 20 days.

From a purely economic point of view, the new route seems convenient and profitable for all three countries united by it. However, it should be remembered that the underlying differences between Japan and China and general tensions throughout the region have not gone away. As mentioned above, there is a territorial dispute between the Land of the Rising Sun and the PRC. The subject of the dispute is the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. Both sides believe that these eight small islands are worth fighting for because they are considered to have oil and gas reserves in their area.

While politicians in Beijing think about territory and resources, the memory of the Nanjing Massacre and its tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of innocent victims (the exact number of victims is still unknown) is still alive among ordinary Chinese. Although no serious conflict between China and Japan has yet been portended, if it does occur, the Chinese people and the Chinese army, which already rivals the US armed forces in size and equipment, may perceive such development with great enthusiasm. In turn, Japan is trying to remove references to Nanjing from its history textbooks. Japanese ruling circles are increasingly raising the question of repealing Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits the country from having a full-fledged army and navy, limiting its military potential to self-defense forces. In addition, Japan continues to cling to its military alliance with the United States and has not removed American military bases from its territory, despite years of discussions about this step. The USA, which is also one of China’s main competitors, is also doing everything to secure Japan’s place in the anti-China axis that Washington is trying to build with India and Australia.

Thus, despite the enormous mutual benefits that Japan and the PRC derive from their economic cooperation, the long-term prospects of their relationship remain unclear.

In addition, it should be noted that China’s relations with Mongolia are also ambiguous. On the one hand, Mongolia is greatly influenced by China, to the extent that even many essential positions in the country are held by ethnic Chinese. On the other hand, there are also forces in Mongolia that want more independence from the PRC.

It should be recalled that Mongolia was dependent on the Chinese Empire until the beginning of the twentieth century. The Mongolian Revolution occurred in 1911, due to which Mongolia tried to become an independent state. This was only partially successful: most of the population in the southern part of the country were ethnic Chinese who wished to remain part of China. As a result, Mongolia split into two parts: southern Inner Mongolia and northern Outer Mongolia. Outer Mongolia became the independent state of Mongolia, while Inner Mongolia remained part of the Chinese Empire, later becoming part of the PRC. In 1949, the PRC and Mongolia officially recognized each other. However, there were people on both sides of the border who were dissatisfied with the situation. Some Chinese believe that Mongolia should be part of the PRC, and some Mongolians feel that Chinese Inner Mongolia should be reunited with Mongolia. Thus, the ground for a Sino-Mongolian conflict exists. Whether it is destined to develop depends on the socio-economic situation in the two countries, politicians’ interests, and the international climate.

Of course, all well-meaning forces in the region are in favor of maintaining good-neighborly relations. However, conducting mutually beneficial cooperation, states should keep in mind the differences mentioned above and be prepared for various surprises.

The Japan-China-Mongolia route is convenient and vital for these countries, but it will instantly stop working in case of discord. Mongolia, which is landlocked and sandwiched between two neighbors: China and Russia, could be particularly affected. In principle, Japan is also a somewhat isolated country, from which it is relatively easy to reach China, Korea, and Russia by water or air. At the same time, the other parts of the world are not short trips across the ocean. Both Japan and Mongolia need overland connections to Eurasia, and if they lose the ability to do so through China, then the most logical option is the Russian territory.

Japan understands this, and for several years has been gradually mastering the Russian Trans-Siberian railroad, which connects the Russian Far East to the western part of the country, where it connects to the railroads going to Europe. In May 2019, a ceremony was held in the Japanese port city of Yokohama to mark the start of shipments to Europe via Russia: having crossed the sea leg between Japan and Russia, goods from the Land of the Rising Sun are heading west along the Trans-Siberian Railway.

As for Russian-Mongolian relations, news about their development has so far rarely appeared in the media. However, due to Mongolia’s geographic location and the growing power of the PRC, the conclusion can be drawn that strengthening cooperation with Russia is the only way for the country to balance China’s influence.

Thus, even though China’s global adversary is the United States and its regional rivals are Japan, India, and others, Russia, which has good relations with China, should play the role of mediator and maintain the balance of power in Central and East Asia.

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Petr Konovalov is a political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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The overnight visit by US Secretary of State Antony Blinken to New Delhi has been an eye-opener in many ways. It highlighted how much India has changed through the searing pain and suffering it underwent in the past one-year period and how that tumultuous period also led to a reset in the government’s calculus. 

A rethink in the foreign policies became inevitable. The ‘body language’ of the joint press conference by Blinken and his Indian host External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on Wednesday testifies to it. 

The US-Indian relationship remains fundamentally strong insofar it enjoys bipartisan support in both countries that it is a consequential relationship. But beneath that threshold, fault lines have appeared. 

First and foremost, the Biden administration’s neoconservative ideology obliges it to adopt intrusive policies on issues of democracy, human rights and rule of law, which grates on the Modi government’s sensitivities. 

Paradoxically, some of the most pro-American sections of Indian opinion also happen to be the harshest critics of the Modi government today. Their alienation is so deep that they won’t even mind joining hands with the Indian left in berating the Modi government. 

Blinken’s move  to hold a ‘civil society roundtable’ discussion with a group of Indians conveyed a powerful message to the Modi Government that things may not be as bad as in Belarus or Myanmar, but India is being perceived by the Biden Administration more or less the same way as Recep Erdogan’s Turkey — an ally who is straying toward post-modern authoritarianism. An AFP dispatch from Delhi reported that at the discussion, Blinken “issued a veiled warning… about Indian democracy backsliding.” read more

No amount of wordplay by Blinken could cover up the reality that he had no word of praise for the Modi Government. Nor did Jaishankar appear particularly perturbed by that. 

Estimating correctly that the Biden Administration is unlikely to easily abandon the goals it has been pursuing, Jaishankar was in no mood to apologise, either. 

And at one point, he interjected at the press conference to defiantly point out that “the quest for a more perfect union applies as much to the Indian democracy as it does to the American one.” Jaishankar asserted that “it is the moral obligation of all polities to right wrongs when they have been done, including historically. And many of the decisions and policies you’ve seen in the last few years fall in that category.” 

He held the ground that “freedoms are important, we value them, but never equate freedom with non-governance or lack of governance or poor governance. They are two completely different things.” It is difficult to recall an Indian minister in modern times pushing back at the US publicly. read more

The press conference also highlighted the deep disillusionment in Delhi over the irresponsible manner in which the US cut loose and exited Afghanistan, leaving that country in shambles and jeopardising regional security — and stability and billions of dollars worth Indian investment in that country, both in financial support and technical assistance and in engineering projects. 

Jaishankar noted bitterly that outcomes are being decided in the battlefield in Afghanistan and alluded to continuing Pakistani interference. He didn’t take Blinken’s easy route to put the blame on the Taliban and instead underscored the “broad consensus, deep consensus” among most of the neighbours of Afghanistan that there should be a political settlement. 

Certainly, Washington’s clumsy rearguard action to create another QUAD (Quadrilateral Diplomatic Platform) comprising the US, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan with a view to remaining embedded in the region even after the humiliating defeat in the 20-year war would have come as a nasty surprise to Delhi and prompted it to slam the door shut on any form of bandwagoning with America in the Hindu Kush. The dryness in Jaishankar’s tone had a tinge of contempt.   

As regards the all-important Covid-19 vaccines, Blinken didn’t say a word about TRIPS waiver, which was an Indian initiative. Quite obviously, Biden who initially supported the initiative since quietly backtracked under pressure from the powerful Pharma companies and their political lobby and is now accepting their argument that the real solution lies in quickly relieving the global COVID-19 vaccine imbalance by pushing a package of interventions, including limiting export restrictions, improving vaccine manufacturing in the global south, and issuing voluntary licenses that would allow specific manufacturers to avoid intellectual property restrictions, but without instituting a universal waiver. 

So, at the end of the day, Blinken made a grand announcement that US will supply 25 million doses of vaccine to India! From past experience, India is unsure whether even this paltry donation isn’t another empty promise. Jaishankar didn’t react.  

Blinken also avoided making any assurances to give India full access to the raw materials for vaccine production. Did Blinken make any trade concessions to ease India’s post-pandemic economy recovery? Will the US help us to avoid another apocalyptic scenario when the 3rd Wave arrives? Did he promise to invest in India to create jobs? Did he have any advice how Indian Army can resume patrolling on Depsang Plains? No, none of that. 

Blinken’s real mission was without doubt to stop India from drifting away from the US-led anti-China coalition. The Biden Administration is worried that without India, the QUAD would unravel and the containment strategy against China wouldn’t gain traction in Asia. 

Thus, in the typical American way to hustle difficult partners, Blinken began with a bang by meeting Tibetan representatives — the first of its kind in India or in a third country by US officials — which was a calculated move to create misleading optics that would queer the pitch of India-China tensions. 

This is no way to treat a hospitable friend — undercutting his standing while enjoying his hospitality at his home. It only shows how testy the Blinken administration is nowadays when it comes to China.  

But Blinken underestimated the fault lines in the US-Indian relationship and the widening chasm between the two countries over the range of issues concerning Afghanistan, vaccine distribution and human rights issues. This was a rare India-US high-level exchange where there was hardly any rhetoric directed against China. 

Having said that, the strong likelihood is that India may take part in the face-to-face meet to discuss QUAD, which President Biden plans to convene. That will be a defining moment, as the US intention is to create a regional mechanism to strategically contain and exert pressure on China — simply put, to institutionalise the QUAD, where all four countries have their own reasons to address the perceived pressures and challenges posed by China’s rise. 

The Quad’s record so far is dismal — be it on Covid vaccines, supply chains on rare earths or as counter to China’s Belt and Road. Yet, the way forward in US-China relations is expected to be rocky and the Biden Administration hopes to suppress China. 

Indeed, the strategic contradictions are self-evident insofar as all the QUAD countries, including the US, also have need for bilateral economic cooperation and even regional cooperation with China. When the top dog in the QUAD slyly keeps the door open for cooperation, the choice for the three subalterns couldn’t be clearer.

India needs to continue to walk the fine line both to avoid collateral damage from the Biden administration’s zigzagging policies on China as well as to keep its own autonomy to negotiate with China bilaterally. Biden is a highly experienced politician and if he gets to realise the futility of trying to suppress China, a pattern of co-existence may well emerge. 

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Featured image: Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar (R) welcomes the US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, New Delhi, July 28, 2021. (Source: Indian External Affairs Ministry / ANADOLU AGENCY / Anadolu Agency via AFP)

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When Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso said on July 5 that Tokyo would come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a Chinese invasion, Beijing’s sharp response was predictable.

“We will never allow anyone to meddle in the Taiwan question in any way,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said the day after Aso made his surprise remark.

“No one should underestimate the resolve, the will, and the ability of the Chinese people to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

But Aso’s statement was no slip of the tongue. A week later, on July 13, Japan released its annual defense report, which for the first time mentioned the importance of maintaining “stability” around Taiwan because it “is important for Japan’s security.”

China’s response, again, was sharp and immediate. The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece Global Times ran an op-ed stating that “Japan will ‘lose badly’ if it defends Taiwan secessionists.”

The piece quoted an anonymous Beijing-based military analyst as saying, “Even the US could not defeat China militarily in the West Pacific region now, so what makes Japan believe it’s able to challenge China with force?”

While the motivations behind Tokyo’s recent statements are unclear, Japan and Taiwan are openly on the same side in Asia’s intensifying new Cold War, where an increasingly assertive and militarily powerful China is the obvious but usually unspoken adversary.

Japan and Taiwan do not share official diplomatic relations — Tokyo recognizes Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China — but the two sides are known to share intelligence through back channels.

In May last year, as Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen began her second term in office, then-chief Cabinet secretary, now prime minister, Yoshihide Suga said that Japan is eager to develop its ties with Taiwan.

Japan’s annual foreign policy report, known as the Diplomatic Bluebook, describes Taiwan in its latest edition released on April 27 this year as an “important partner and friend.” It also said Japan backs Taiwan’s campaign to attend the World Health Assembly, the decision-making body of the World Health Organization (WHO).

The Bluebook stated diplomatically that Taiwan had been successful in fighting the Covid-19 virus and “there should be no blank spaces on the world map.” China, which considers Taiwan a renegade province that should be “reunited” with the mainland, strongly opposes Taiwan’s participation in any international bodies.

The Bluebook also said that Japan would cooperate with “more countries” to promote freedom of navigation and the rule of law in the Asia-Pacific region. In matters of geostrategic importance, Japan already works closely with the US, India and Australia under the so-called “Quad.”

Taiwan could be seen as a silent partner, or at least an ally, to the strategic grouping because it is a vital link in the China-focused island chain of defense which stretches from Japan’s main islands to Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines and the Malaysian part of Borneo.

However, the bigger question remains: what exactly would Japan be prepared to do if China did try to invade Taiwan? Whatever the anonymous military analyst quoted in the Global Times might think, Japan certainly has the means to challenge China militarily.

On December 21, 2020, the Japanese government approved the ninth consecutive rise in military spending, marking a historic record of 5.34 trillion yen (US$51.7 billion.)

Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), as they are formally known, are comprised of nearly 250,000 active personnel and another 50,000 in reserve, and are equipped with the latest weaponry and technology procured mainly from the US.

The Japanese Navy is believed by military analysts to be the strongest in the region after America’s and thus superior to China’s still underdeveloped but steadily growing naval forces. China now has two combat-ready aircraft carriers.

According to the Washington-based think tank the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Beijing has made substantial progress in the construction of a third known as Type 003, which is “slated to become the largest surface combatant in the Chinese People’s Army Navy (PLAN) and significantly upgrade China’s naval capabilities.”

But the crux of the strategic matter is that Article 9 of Japan’s supposedly pacifist, post-World War II constitution outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes and its JSDF are therefore legally only allowed to defend the country if it comes under attack.

But Aso has argued that Taiwan is situated only 112 kilometers from some islands that are part of Okinawa prefecture and therefore a Chinese invasion could represent an “existential threat” to Japan’s security.

In that direction, the Japanese navy’s first aircraft carrier since World War II is nearly ready to deploy. It is designed to carry up to 28 light or 14 larger aircraft.

Jeffrey Hornung, a political scientist at the US-based Rand Corporation, wrote in a May 10 paper that Japan would not need to get directly involved in a military conflict over Taiwan.

But, he suggests, if Washington sought to defend the democratic, self-ruled island, “at a minimum, the United States would require access to its bases in Japan, which would execute combat operations in, over and around Taiwan.”

The JSDF would in that way “act as a force multiplier for any US-led operation. That means US requests for Japanese involvement would be almost certain.” In other words, Japan’s involvement would be limited to “non-combatant, rear-area support roles” in fields such as “supply, maintenance, transportation, engineering and medical services,” Hornung writes.

Okinawa is proximal to Taiwan and the US base there would be at the front of any military action against China.

If China decided to attack Okinawa, or for argument’s sake any base on Japanese territory, such an attack could be interpreted as an act of aggression and Japan would have the right to act in self-defense.

But that scenario also raises another important question: would the US be prepared to intervene and defend Taiwan? The US and Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, shared a defense treaty before Washington established diplomatic relations with China on January 1, 1979.

On that day, the US withdrew its recognition of the Republic of China and terminated the 1955 “Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China.” Because either party had to notify the other about the termination a year in advance, the treaty remained in place – at least nominally – until January 1, 1980.

The now null-and-void 1955 treaty, which stipulated that if one country came under attack the other would provide military support, was in certain aspects replaced by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act.

Under the Act, the US was no longer be obliged to defend Taiwan, the US embassy in Taiwan was closed and relations were maintained through a non-profit corporation registered in the District of Columbia known as the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which functions as a de facto embassy.

The ambiguity of the relationship is evident in a Taiwan Relations Act clause that says that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.”

The Act’s intention appears to be to dissuade Taiwan from declaring independence from China, while at the same time discouraging China from invading Taiwan. But that all came into force when Jimmy Carter was America’s president and China was still a fairly poor country, not the regional superpower it has become today.

As Beijing celebrated the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party on July 1, President Xi Jinping reiterated his pledge to incorporate Taiwan into the mainland.

Chinese President Xi Jinping reviews a military display of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy in the South China Sea on April 12, 2018. Photo: Xinhua

“Solving the Taiwan question and realizing the complete reunification of the motherland are the unswerving historical tasks of the Chinese Communist Party and the common aspiration of all Chinese people,” Xi said in a speech.

Every Chinese must work together, “resolutely smashing any ‘Taiwan independence plots,’” the Chinese leader added. China has recently flexed its muscles in that direction with air force jets and bombers making frequent incursions into Taiwan’s airspace.

In this new geopolitical environment, it would be impossible for the US to stay idle if Xi turned his tough rhetoric into military action and actually sent forces to invade Taiwan.

In that scenario, Japan could and would not stay neutral.

To be sure, Deputy Defense Minister Aso is known for his public gaffes, which are often corrected or denied by the government after being uttered.

But as Corey Wallace, a foreign policy expert at Kanagawa University in Yokohama was quoted saying in the July 12 issue of Foreign Policy, the slip this time may have been deliberate and reflect what Japanese officials have long believed privately.

Either way, Xi is playing with certain fire by talking about Taiwan’s “reunification” with the mainland. Even with China’s recent military and naval build-up, Beijing still faces formidable odds in invading Taiwan, which would almost inevitably result in a wider conflict – one Japan would inevitably play a crucial, military role.

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The present government’s aggressive push for privatisation, corporatisation and automation – deviously dubbed ‘economic reforms’ – is undoing the gains made backward communities in recent decades, and must be resisted at all costs.

‘Economic reforms’ – it’s a catchphrase that India’s media pundits have repeated for three decades like a mantra, a sleight of hand meant to suggest that these are but the economic equivalent of ‘social reforms,’ the celebrated transformative efforts led by the towering figures of modern India, from Jotiba Phule to Sree Narayana Guru.

In reality, they stand for a socially and environmentally disastrous policy package (consisting of Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation) that was implemented top-down in many countries in the fourth quarter of the 20^th century, and in India in early 1990s. This dubious set of policies – dubbed neo-liberalism by critics – has a singular purpose: to facilitate the unrestricted entry of big corporations into every sphere of life, with the state acting as private capital’s protector and agent of dispossession. In fact, India’s ‘economic reforms’ may even have undone some of the hard-won gains achieved by its social reformers, our recent research suggests.

Our research study, undertaken on behalf of our organisation Swadeshi Andolan, found that not a single SC or ST person is present on the board of directors of India’s top 25 private corporations, while only six from OBC communities are present. Of the total of 270 executives on the boards of directors of these companies, 86 (31%) are Brahmin, 52 are Bania (19%) while other savarnas like Khatris and Kayasthas (12%), middle castes like Patels and Reddys (5%), and a handful of minorities like Jains, Parsis and Muslims make up the rest. (Another notable factor is the relatively high number (38) of foreign citizens, who form 14% of the total; while women number 37, some of whom are foreign citizens.)

According to the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) 61st Rounds (2004–05) survey, forward castes account for about 31% of the population based on Schedule 10 of available data. However, our findings reveal an overwhelming savarna dominance of Indian business, who account for more than 90% of these roles if you leave the foreign citizens out. Interestingly, while business in India is widely perceived to be the stronghold of the bania communities, the numbers show that Brahmins dominate the top decision-making roles in the country’s leading corporations.

Further, the boards of the top 25 corporations are chaired overwhelmingly by savarnas; Brahmins and Banias occupy nine each of these positions, while Khatris occupy four. Of the remaining three positions, two are shared respectively by a Shia Muslim (Wipro), and a foreign citizen (Nayara Energy), while Shiva Nadar of HCL Technologies is the only non-savarna on this list.

Growing disparity

Study after study has confirmed the deeply discriminatory nature of the Indian business and industry, and particularly the world of big corporations. They have also revealed the role of ‘economic reforms’ in worsening economic inequality and in creating new forms of disparity. One such study, titled Wealth Ownership and Inequality in India: A Socio-religious Analysis, was jointly conducted by the Savitribai Phule Pune University (SPPU), Jawaharlal Nehru University and Indian Institute of Dalit Studies from 2015 to 2017, and is based on NSSO data from 1.10 lakh households across various states.

According to this study, the savarnas – dubbed ‘Hindu High Castes’ or HHCs – boast four times more wealth than those classified as Scheduled Castes (SCs). Moreover, HHCs hold 41% of the total wealth in the country, which is almost double their population size of 22.28%. The next biggest slice of the wealth pie is cornered by Hindu Other Backward Classes (HOBCs) at close to 31%, a little less than their population size (35.66%). Muslims own 8% of the country’s total assets while their share of households stands at nearly 12%. And, as expected, SCs and STs own a substantially less share of assets (11.3% combined) as compared to their population (over 27%).

Another comprehensive research study published in the Economic & Political Weekly in 2012 found that “The average board size of the top 1,000 companies in India was found to be nine members; nearly 88% of them were insiders and 12% were independent directors. The distribution of board members according to caste shows that nearly 93% were forward caste members; 46% Vaishya and 44% Brahmin. The OBCs and SCs /STs were a meagre 3.8% and 3.5% respectively.

These numbers are a stark illustration of the fact that highest echelons of corporate India lack even a semblance of diversity and equality, and is essentially a savarna club; indeed, a savarna men’s club at that. Our findings show that not only has very little has changed in the caste constitution of India’s economic hierarchy in the decade since. In fact, the higher you go up that hierarchy – the top 25 corporations as opposed to the top 1000 – the greater the concentration of corporate power in the hands of savarnas.

Given the fact that backward communities comprise the overwhelming majority of India’s population, this extremely skewed representation reveals a systematic bias in the corporate world, where the board of directors are the highest decision makers. Since reservation is mandatory only for government jobs, these findings are an indicator of the fate that awaits backward communities if they allow the Modi government to go ahead with its policy of privatising every sector.

Privatisation peril

The present government has announced a series of moves for privatisation of Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs). Given the excessively corporate-friendly attitude of this government – which has become obvious on many fronts – it’s safe to say that its privatisation drive is essentially a euphemism for the wholesale transfer of publicly owned assets to private hands for a pittance.

The PSUs have historically played a stellar role in nation building, and social and economic development of the country, but now more than 25 of them are in line for privatisation. These include such high profile firms as Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL), Air India, Bharat Earth Movers Limited (BEML), the steel plants of Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), National Mineral Development Corporation (NMDC), Indian Medicine & Pharmaceuticals Corporation Ltd. (IMPCL), Shipping Corporation of India (SCI), Container Corporation of India (CONCOR) and Neelachal Ispat Nigam Ltd (NINL), apart from the iconic Indian Railways. Not only companies, but essential services like water supply and health services too have been proposed to be privatised. The 2020-21 Union Budget has suggested private participation (PPP) even in district hospitals.

In a recent report to the UN general assembly, the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Philip Alston stated that “Widespread privatisation of public goods is systematically eliminating human rights protections and further marginalising the interests of low income earners and those living in poverty.” Experiences of other countries show that left unchecked, privatisation eventually spreads to social protection and welfare services, school education, pension systems, parks and libraries, policing, criminal justice and the military sector, leading to extremely harmful consequences for the public, and especially for those already disadvantaged.

In India, privatisation holds serious implications for the future of SCs, STs and Other Backward Communities, who stand to lose most from such policies. Privatisation marginalises low income earners, the majority of whom in India are from backward communities. The reservation policies implemented by PSUs and public services played a big role in creating employment opportunities for the backward communities and facilitated their economical and social development. When these are privatised, these opportunities are lost permanently, undoing the progress made by these communities in recent decades. It also implies that the educated youth in these communities will permanently lose any opportunity to get high status and high income jobs that have helped their communities advance in recent times.

Corporatisation as exclusion

After Independence, backward communities got reservation in education and in government services, which also helped them start enterprises, especially in agriculture and retail trade, apart from small scale industries. Many OBCs and SCs started such ventures, and have demonstrated themselves capable of thriving in industry. And because they would often employ people from their own community in these firms, this helped their communities as a whole to progress.

Now that the Modi government has allowed FDI in every sector, it is leading to the corporatisation of each of these sectors. In tune with the WTO and Free Trade Agreements, India has reduced import duties across sectors, which has severely impacted small scale industries.  A.B. Vajpayee-led NDA government which de-reserved many small scale industries. These policies opened up these sectors for big corporations, most of who are run by savarnas, and which therefore invariably employ upper caste staff at higher salaries. In fact, these policies have already led to the closure of many small scale industries run by entrepreneurs from backward communities.

Another way government helps corporations is through external commercial borrowing (ECB), which is an instrument to facilitate extremely low interest loans for these big companies. When the corporations fail to repay such loans – mostly taken from public sector banks – it is termed ‘NPA’ (Non Performing Assets) which is often forfeited. The loss is adjusted by compensating the banks by injecting taxpayers’ money into them through a process called ‘bank recapitalisation’.

A report by leading financial firm Credit Suisse says that in the first five years of Modi government, it adjusted NPAs worth Rs 7,77,800 crore that was owned to public sector banks by corporations. But the same government failed to offer any relief to India’s struggling agriculture and small scale industries sectors where the majority of backward communities find employment. This, despite these sectors being already in bad shape due to ill-conceived policies such as GST and demonetisation, which hit small scale industries and retail traders the hardest. These were body blows delivered to backward communities, who are already victims of a lack of access to education, credit etc.

The three new farm laws are yet another attempt by Modi government to facilitate corporatisation in agriculture and retail trade.  If these sectors are corporatized, then most of the enterprises started by backward communities in these sectors will perish, severely impacting the members of these communities who derive their income and employment from them.

The threat of automation

As the data shows, the world of big corporations is almost exclusively controlled by the upper castes. The few backward community members who enter this world must be content with lower grade and blue collar jobs. To make matters worse, increasing levels of automation – a policy embraced by the present government on behalf of big corporations – is threatening to wipe out not just jobs, but whole industries. According to a World Bank research paper, “Automation threatens 69 per cent of the jobs in India, and 77 per cent in China”.

Automation threatens even those areas where backward communities have recently found employment, such as industrial manufacturing. As for those sectors where automation poses no significant threat, the government’s new labour code ensures that workers will be reduced to the status of slaves.

How to resist

For backward communities, these trends sound a clear warning. In simple terms, privatisation means more corporatisation, which leads to greater automation and destruction of small scale businesses and trades, which in turn means greater job loss.

After three decades of ‘economic reforms,’ it’s clear that who has gained from these policies and who has lost. The governments in power have consistently brought in tax regimes, fiscal measures and policies such as land acquisition laws designed to favour the savarna-dominated corporate world, while the backward communities are crushed under the weight of these policies, or are locked into desperate struggles to protect their land and livelihoods from being stolen by these polices. It is time those community organisations, various Left groups and Gandhian organisations like Ekta Parishad who lead these struggles take stock of these policies and their impacts, and join hands to effectively mobilise against them.

It may be recalled that Sree Narayana Guru of Kerala, the spiritual teacher who was also one of the most influential social reformers in the state’s and the nation’s history, took the initiative to collect funds from the community so that enterprising members of the backward communities could start their own ventures. This initiative helped tremendously in enabling the social and economic progress made by these communities in the state in the second half of the 20^th century.

It is time all backward communities come together pool their resources to start their own enterprises while simultaneously resisting these reforms which threaten their very existence. This resistance must be two-fold: on the one hand, they must push back against savarna-dominated corporatisation in favour of small scale industries where backward communities can once again find a footing; on the other, they must aim for nothing less than the elimination of the political parties which are championing such destructive ‘reforms.’

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K.V. Biju is All India Organising Secretary of Swadeshi Andolan.

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In April a terrorist bombing targeted a hotel in Pakistan’s southwest Baluchistan province hosting China’s ambassador to Pakistan, Nong Rong. Ambassador Nong Rong was not at the hotel at the time of the bombing, but the attack still ended up killing 4 and wounding several more.

In July an explosion targeted a bus carrying Chinese engineers working on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), part of China’s wider Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This attack killed 13 including 9 of the Chinese engineers.

Such attacks are not new. They are merely the most recent acts of violence amid a long-standing effort by the US and armed militants it has openly supported for years to thwart China’s partnership with Pakistan and to sabotage the BRI.

While US President Joe Biden had unveiled his “Build Back Better World” (B3W) initiative at the February 2021 G7 meeting as America’s answer to China’s BRI, it was clearly a smokescreen behind which the US would continue a campaign of global destabilization and militancy aimed at nations cooperating with Beijing and hosting various BRI projects.

Pakistan is among many nations now facing America’s true answer to the BRI – state-sponsored terrorism, militancy, and political subversion. Joining Pakistan is also Southeast Asian nations like Thailand and Myanmar which have both suffered from US-sponsored anti-government protests in recent years – the latter of the two having protests transform into now ongoing armed conflict.

The US has also targeted China internally, focusing its efforts on radicalizing Uyghur separatists in China’s western Xinjiang region, then undermining Beijing’s efforts to contain the resulting terrorism. Xinjiang serves, without coincidence, as a critical juncture for several BRI routes.

More than Mere Speculation: America’s “Free Baluchistan” Campaign

Much of Washington’s efforts to “free Baluchistan” have been copied and pasted from both US efforts to carve up the Middle East through granting the region’s Kurds defacto autonomous territory, or the US-backed push for a “free East Turkestan” in China’s Xinjiang region. This latter effort is reflected on the US National Endowment for Democracy’s (NED) own official website which lists its programs for Xinjiang, China as “Xinjiang/East Turkestan (China),” deliberately including the name given to the region by separatists.

Beyond mere speculation, the US has openly supported armed separatists in Pakistan’s southwest Baluchistan province for years. This includes entire hearings within the US Congress discussing US support for a “free Baluchistan,” publicly published op-eds written by US-based corporate-funded policy think tanks, and Congressional bills specifically calling for an independent Baluchistan.

As early as 2011, The National Interest would publish a piece by Selig Harrison, director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, titled, “Free Baluchistan.”

In it, Harrison would argue (emphasis added):

While doing less elsewhere in Pakistan, the United States should do more to support anti-Islamist forces along the southern Arabian Sea coast. First, it should support anti-Islamist Sindhi leaders of the Sufi variant of Islam with their network of 124,000 shrines. Most important, it should aid the 6 million Baluch insurgents fighting for independence from Pakistan in the face of growing ISI repression. Pakistan has given China a base at Gwadar in the heart of Baluch territory. So an independent Baluchistan would serve U.S. strategic interests in addition to the immediate goal of countering Islamist forces.

In reality, “supporting anti-Islamist forces” was (and still is) the pretext the US uses to maintain involvement not only in Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, but also across North Africa and the Middle East. Often times the US is actually both sponsoring these extremist forces, while also posing as in support of those fighting them.

The real reason the US was and is interested in Baluchistan was stated in Harrison’s very last sentence, alluding to the fact that an independent Baluchistan would complicate or even entirely expel Chinese interests from the region.

Baluchistan’s Gwadar Port is a crucial checkpoint along China’s BRI. It serves as the terminal destination of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and allows China to ship energy and goods from China to the Arabian Sea, bypassing all of Southeast Asia for shipping to and from the Middle East, Africa, and beyond.

In 2012, the US House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs would focus specifically on supporting an “independent Baluchistan.”

It would include a prepared statement from retired US Army Lt. Colonel Ralph Peters who would claim:

Baluchistan is occupied territory. It never willingly acceded to Pakistan, does not now wish to be part of Pakistan. If a plebiscite or referendum were held tomorrow, it would vote to leave Pakistan, as would every province and territory west of the Indus River.

He would then denounce US-Pakistan cooperation and compare Pakistan to “pirates,” claiming:

Two hundred years ago, one of our greatest Presidents faced a problem. The Barbary pirates refused to let our ships pass in peace, so we paid tribute money to let our goods pass. Thomas Jefferson put a stop to that. Today, we are paying tribute money again, this time to the Pakistani pirates to let our goods pass to Afghanistan. Mr. Chairman, I am looking for a Thomas Jefferson.

Peters’ statement would reveal a US desire to carve off most, if not all of Pakistan’s territory west of the Indus River – which without coincidence is also where the entirety of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor passes through. A successful bid for independence by US-backed separatists would effectively end CPEC indefinitely.

The establishment of Baluchistan as a US client regime would also mean both US-occupied Afghanistan and this bordering rump state would combine into a single US-controlled region in the heart of Central Asia with access to the sea, vastly enhancing Washington’s ability to project military power – both conventional and asymmetric – throughout the region.

Also in 2012, a US House of Representatives resolution titled unambiguously, “Expressing the sense of Congress that the people of Baluchistan, currently divided between Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan, have the right to self-determination and to their own sovereign country,” would be introduced. Even though it did not pass, it indicates the very open and ongoing support within certain circles of US power to promote an “independent Baluchistan.”

As the US has done with other ongoing separatist projects around the globe, it and its European allies cultivate a government in exile for the imagined nation of Baluchistan.

The favored leader of this imagined nation is the “Khan of Kalat,” Mir Suleman Dawood. In one event hosted by “Democracy Forum” at the UK House of Lords in 2017, Mir Suleman Dawood would claim China’s investments and development of Baluchistan would only heighten tensions.

One of the main complaints made by separatists in Baluchistan is perceived neglect by Islamabad. However, it is very clear that infrastructure development driven by CPEC would alleviate this, meaning opposition to CPEC is in actuality prolonging this neglect – even actively preventing it from being addressed.

During this talk in 2017 in London, it was even made clear that if CPEC projects continued toward completion, the prospect of an “independent Baluchistan” would only become more remote. While it was never stated directly why during the discussion, it is clear that a developed and more prosperous Baluchistan would undermine and overcome separatist extremism in precisely the same way development in China’s Tibet and Xinjiang regions did.

Realistic or Not, US Will Continue Supporting Militancy

While these circles of US and European power promote independence for Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, they also admit the separatist groups themselves are unlikely to achieve independence and would – if ever achieving it – likely devolve into a fractured failed state.

Ralph Peters himself was included in a 2012 Huffington Post article titled, “Serious Internal Issues Undermining Baloch Insurgency And Independence Movement,” where he depicted the independence movement in less than optimistic terms.

The article would note:

According to Peters, one of the most serious issues with the Baloch independence movement is “deeply troubling” infighting. In fact, he is emphatic in his condemnation of such bickering; going so far as to assert: “they are quickly becoming their own worst enemies.”

In his view, individual Baloch simply don’t understand that their personal feuding undermines the larger movement: “Certain Baloch fail to understand that their only hope in gaining independence is if they put their own egos and vanity aside and work together. This is the cold hard fact. They are already outgunned and outmanned. Pakistan will continue to to exploit their differences until they realize this.”

So long as the Baloch continue to engage in “petty infighting,” including “savaging each other in emails,” Peters is pessimistic they can garner widespread support in the West. In fact, he warns that such infighting could eventually put off even their staunchest supporters.

Ultimately, however, whether or not the US can achieve their primary objective of carving off Pakistani territory and outright stopping CPEC, the US will continue supporting militancy in Baluchistan and elsewhere west of the Indus River.

Just as we’ve seen this year with attacks targeting Chinese engineers working on CPEC or an assassination attempt on the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan himself – the militancy will still serve as a significant obstacle in both finishing CPEC and utilizing it to its maximum potential.

President Biden’s B3W proposal was, at face value, an empty proposition lacking even the most basic details – because just like a screen of smoke – it is not meant to do anything except obfuscate. In this case, B3W is obfuscating a campaign of state-sponsored terrorism used by the West as its actual answer to China’s BRI – using armed militants to block or destroy BRI projects rather than present to the world a compelling and constructive alternative to these projects.

What Does the Future Hold for CPEC?

China has demonstrated a significantly compelling solution to US-sponsored separatism in both Tibet and Xinjiang where Chinese security measures coupled with infrastructure projects, job programs, and other means of addressing the root causes of extremism effectively smothered the long-burning fires lit by Washington.

A similar plan for addressing security, poverty, and perceived neglect in Baluchistan would stand the best chance of succeeding there as well.

We can anticipate any security operation or economic program implemented by Pakistan with China’s help will be met by the West’s industrialized “human rights” complex and Western media campaigns to depict it in the same nefarious manner China’s efforts in Tibet and Xinjiang have been depicted – as “genocide.”

The foundations have already been laid, with US NED programs focused specifically on Baluchistan province for years to build up fronts posing as human rights monitoring groups apt at fabricating reports regarding Islamabad’s “abuses” in the region. This localized propaganda campaign could – just as it was in Xinjiang – be internationalized if and when the conditions are deemed right.

It will be a race between Beijing and Islamabad’s ability to develop Baluchistan faster than the US and its allies can undermine and destabilize it, but it is a race that has already clearly begun, and a race that is both dangerous and deadly.

The US “withdrawal” from Afghanistan means that covert operations can be run out of Afghanistan’s territory by US contractors or special operations forces with a better sense of plausible deniability. The UK has also recently vowed to use its special forces for “higher risk” tasks against “big state adversaries” – clearly meaning China (as well as Russia).

Whether or not US and British operators will be plucked by local security forces from covert activities in western Pakistan remains to be seen, but the long-standing support by the West of armed extremists in this region is well established – support that still benefits and fulfills Western foreign policy objectives – so support that will undoubtedly continue well into the foreseeable future.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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A South China Morning Post (SCMP) article citing US corporate and government institution “associates” inadvertently gave away the entire game unfolding in Southeast Asia’s Myanmar.

 It is a conflict where US-backed armed opposition groups (previously depicted by the Western media as “peaceful” “pro-democracy” activists) are fighting Myanmar’s central government, police and military for control of the country.

The conflict clearly threatens both existing Chinese investments and the future of further investment and development projects. The resulting violence benefits neither China nor Myanmar, but most certainly benefits China’s chief rival, the United States.

Background of Myanmar’s Current Crisis 

In February of this year Myanmar’s military ousted the government of Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) political party. While the West depicts this as a coup against a democratically elected government, Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD were created by and for Western special interests with virtually every aspect of the party funded and supported by US and British government money and with Suu Kyi herself maintaining an entourage of foreign advisors.

The purpose of installing a US client regime in power in Myanmar was part of a much wider long-standing effort to encircle and contain China. Myanmar shares a border with China and counts China as its largest and most important trade partner. For Beijing, Myanmar is a crucial partner in extending its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with pipelines, ports, and roads all aready in use or under construction.

With the US client regime ousted from power, a secondary objective of burning the nation to the ground, thus blocking China’s BRI and leaving a failed state on China’s border to contend with has taken precedence.

Armed ethnic groups, originally part of the British Empire’s colonial army in then Burma, armed and trained by both the US and UK during World War 2 and ever since maintained to destabilise Myanmar since achieving independence from Britain in 1948, have stepped up hostilities against Myanmar’s current government, police and military.

These ethnic groups are also allegedly providing arms and training to “pro-democracy activists” who have since transformed into what are being called “people’s defence forces” (PDF).

PDF militants are not only attacking military positions but are also carrying out a campaign of terrorism, attacking schools, electricity offices and court buildings, according to even opposition media outlets like US government-funded Myanmar Now.

Death Squads Seek to Derail Myanmar-China Relations

With this all in mind, SCMP’s article, “As the West leaves a void in Myanmar, China ignores its own advice to invest,” ultimately reveals US ambitions in fanning the flames of armed conflict in Myanmar are designed to block Chinese investments, cripple Myanmar’s economy and ultimately derail indefinitely China’s BRI ambitions in the country.

The article cites associates from the United States Institute of Peace, the Wilson Centre and the Stimson Centre, each either directly tied to the US government, or funded by Western corporate-financier interests including arms manufacturers, energy giants, banks and industrial conglomerates.

Their collective narrative is one where China risks investing in a destabilised nation with escalating violence, a narrative well suited for Washington and is encirclement/containment policy toward China.

Little treatment or insight is given to who is fuelling this violence. Weapons do not spring from the ground nor grow on trees. They are manufactured and shipped to the battlefield.

With many militants sporting what are clearly US-manufactured M-16 assault rifles and Eastern Bloc weapons, questions about how they ended up in Myanamr’s jungles and on the streets of its towns and cities remain unasked by the Western media.

The US has been revealed to have shipped weapons around the globe to support militancy elsewhere (most notably in Syria). There, Eastern Bloc weapons were procured by the US Central Intelligence Agency and then airlifted to militants operating along and within Syria’s borders.

The New York Times in an article titled, “Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From CIA,” noted:

From offices at secret locations, American intelligence officers have helped the Arab governments shop for weapons, including a large procurement from Croatia, and have vetted rebel commanders and groups to determine who should receive the weapons as they arrive, according to American officials speaking on the condition of anonymity.

There are also US-linked groups operating inside Myanmar’s borders including the “Free Burma Rangers” led by former US special operations soldier David Eubank. US diplomatic cables published by Wikileaks reveal that David Eubank and his “Free Burma Rangers” are in regular contact with the US Embassy in Myanmar as well as the US Consulate in neighbouring Chiang Mai, Thailand.

The “Free Burma Rangers” openly provide military training and non-lethal logistical support to ethnic armed groups across Myanmar, according to Small Wars Journal. Videos freely available online show Westerners participating in armed patrols inside of Myanmar suggesting that weapons are also being brought in through these supposed “aid” groups. The participation of “Free Burma Rangers” in Iraq and Syria makes it even clearer that it serves as a front working adjacent to or fully within US foreign policy objectives.

Since February, many of these US-backed armed ethnic groups have taken what was a low-intensity conflict with the central government to a campaign of armed terrorism including within Myanmar’s urban centres.

Myanmar Now has daily headlines of murders carried out by PDF militants against local administrators as well as civilians “suspected” of collaborating with the government.

A recent article from July 5, 2021 titled, “Resistance fighters in Bago kill man accused of helping military crush protest stronghold,” would admit:

Local resistance fighters have claimed responsibility for the killing of a man accused of helping the military carry out its deadly assault against a protest stronghold in Bago in April.

The same article also admitted:

Shortly before the assassination, the Bago branch of the People’s Defense Force (PDF) also set off bombs at the Hantharwaddy Township administration office and the township electricity office in Nyaung Wine.

Western “human rights” groups used to politically undermine Myanmar’s current government and military have at the same time been deafeningly silent over the campaign of concerted terrorism used by US-backed opposition groups in their attempt at paralysing Myanmar on a local level.

This violence will make control over the country difficult and in turn, make it difficult to implement joint projects with China or even protect existing Chinese-built infrastructure and investments.

While China is depicted by the West as a growing threat to global peace and stability, it was China that was building bridges connecting the divided people of Myanmar together and building dams to power cities like Mandalay, driving development, opening markets and creating opportunities.

Washington’s contribution to the region will be deliberately rendering Myanmar a failed state at the heart of Asia, presenting a security threat to its neighbours and a blackhole where once there were economic opportunities and the promise of development.

The SCMP article would note the quandary Washington was presenting Beijing:

Arguing that the situation was now at a crossroads, [Jason] Tower from the US Institute Peace said Beijing could either work with the international community to find a political solution or move forward with economic corridor projects in the face of increasingly militarised opposition.

When we realise “political solution” equates to reinstalling the US-backed client regime to power and continuing a policy of pivoting toward Western “liberalisation” and the replacement of real development with IMF and World Bank predatory capital, and that the “increasingly militarised opposition” is a product of a US proxy war with both Myanmar’s government and ultimately Chinese interests in the region, we then fully realise this is the US demanding it gets its way with Myanmar, or there will be no Myanmar.

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Joseph Thomas is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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***

Abstract

The Navy ship containing nuclear bombs that a junior officer saw anchored off Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in 1959 was only the most notorious of many U.S. violations of Japan’s official policy banning nuclear weapons. The Japanese government has a long history of secretly agreeing to their deployments, and feigning ignorance when they were revealed. The outrage that erupted in the press and in the Diet when former American Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, spoke publicly in 1981 about nuclear-armed warships in Japan’s ports came close to bringing down an LDP government. In Okinawa local residents protested the large numbers and types of nuclear weapons based there during the U.S. military occupation (1945-72). Breaking its promise that they be permanently removed, the Japanese government concluded a secret nuclear understanding as part of the 1969 Okinawa Reversion Agreement that the U.S. government could bring them back whenever it decided there was “a great emergency.” In 2009 a high Japanese government official advocated their return to Okinawa in testimony before a U.S. Congressional Commission.

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Stewart Engel was a Navy junior officer in late 1959 when his assigned ship, USS Carpenter, made a port call at Iwakuni Marine Corps Air Station in Yamaguchi Prefecture, Japan.

Off our beam, moored or anchored, was an LST [“Landing Ship, Tank” or tank landing ship]. It was by far the worst rust bucket I saw in my three years of active duty. Any C.O. [commanding officer] would have been mightily embarrassed to command it. Its condition convinced me that it had not been to sea with a Navy crew for a while.

During our entire stay at Iwakuni I never saw a sailor on the ship. I did always see two Marines, one forward and one aft. Sometimes Marines are used as decorative base gate guards in their pressed uniforms with perhaps a sidearm. These were not. They were dressed for combat and heavily armed accordingly.

The peculiar arrangement caused me to inquire about the LST’s purpose and I was told it was to repair electronics. That made no sense. Anybody with equipment to repair would have carried it to a dock and scheduled a boat to go out to the LST. In addition, I saw no accommodation ladder on the side of the LST.

Clearly there was some hanky-panky going on. At the time I speculated on what it might be. My first choice was that it was actually a brig for really, really bad military personnel. A distant second choice was that it was being used to house victims of extraordinary rendition, a floating precursor to Gitmo. Both choices meant that the guards were there to keep people from escaping from the LST. Regardless of the LST’s actual function, the foolishness of the cover story seemed to ensure that Iwakuni would draw more than its fair share of attention from Soviet or Chinese spies. I learned later that the hold was full of amtracs [armored tracked vehicles] packed with nuclear bombs. 

In 1981 former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Edwin Reischauer, revealed publicly that the U.S. had been bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese ports for decades contrary to the government’s stated policies and public understanding.¹

In fact, Reischauer had negotiated an agreement with Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi in April, 1963, to accept the transit of nuclear armed warships in Japanese waters which only formalized what had been going on already. “I’ve long suspected,” wrote Stewart Engel,” that Japanese officials approved these nukes but needed ‘plausible deniability’ for domestic political reasons.”

Japan’s “Atomic Energy Basic Law,” enacted by the Diet in 1955, states that “atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety . . . and under democratic management.” Its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” resolution, passed by the Diet in 1971, states that “Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory.”

In his book The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner (Bloomsbury, 2017), Daniel Ellsberg writes that “in early 1960 I was told in great secrecy by a nuclear control officer in the Pacific that one small Marine airbase at Iwakuni in Japan had a secret arrangement whereby its handful of planes with general war missions would get their nuclear weapons very quickly in the event of a general war alert.” Ellsberg goes on to explain how they would be deployed.

Because of the special relation of the Marines to the Navy, there was a flat-bottomed ship for landing tanks on the beach (LST, for Landing Ship, Tank), anchored just offshore Iwakuni with nuclear weapons aboard, loaded onto amphibious tractors, just for the small group of planes on this base.

Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni with port and airfield.

U.S. Navy LST

The LST, the USS San Joaquin County, had a cover mission as an electronics repair ship. It was permanently stationed not just inside the three-mile limit of Japanese territorial waters but anchored a couple of hundred yards from the beach, in the tidal waters. By any standards it was stationed within the territory of Japan. So were its nuclear weapons.

In a nuclear emergency. The San Joaquin County would operate as it was designed to do in an amphibious landing. It would haul anchor and come straight ashore. The front of the ship would open up like a clam-shell, and amphibious tractors loaded with nuclear weapons would come down a ramp into the water or directly onto the beach, then head on land straight to the airstrip where the weapons would be loaded onto the Marine planes.

[In 1966] Edwin Reischauer, our ambassador to Japan, learned of [the San Joaquin County’s] presence—through a leak to his office—and demanded that it be removed. He threatened to resign if it wasn’t. In 1967 it finally moved back to Okinawa.²

Ellsberg later wrote, “There were major interviews in Japan after Reischauer’s revelations, in one of which I was paired with a retired general who had been in one of the highest positions in the Japanese defense establishment.”

Like other official spokespersons at the time, he maintained that the U.S. had assured the Japanese government they would inform the government of any intention or practice of introducing nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. This was in reference to nuclear weapons even aboard U.S. ships in Japanese ports, let alone permanently in Japanese territorial waters like the LST at Iwakuni. Since the U.S. had not made any such announcement to the government, the government assumed that no such introduction had ever occurred.

Every US sailor in a Japanese port knew that was untrue. Virtually every U.S. ship in a Japanese port had nuclear weapons aboard. But did the Japanese government know it? Yes, said former ambassador Reischauer. Moreover, he said, they knew about the LST, and accepted it, so long as the U.S. kept it secret and denied it. On the ports, the US always said “We neither confirm nor deny the location of any US nuclear weapons.” This declaration was largely to allow the Japanese government, in particular, to deny their knowledge and to lie about it.³

In an article headlined “Japan reels under Reischauer’s nuclear ‘bombshell’” (Christian Science Monitor,May 19, 1981), reporter Geoffrey Murray wrote,

Why did he choose now to make a statement like that? It’s incredible, beyond belief.” The anguish in the voice of the senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official was obvious. He was referring to claims by Edwin Reischauer, a highly respected former US ambassador to Tokyo and now a Harvard professor, that American warships carrying nuclear weapons had frequently entered Japanese ports or passed through territorial waters.

Repeatedly over the years, however, the Japanese people have been assured by their government that visiting U.S. vessels have been “clean” in compliance with this country’s three nonnuclear principles — not to manufacture, possess, or allow introduction of nuclear weapons.

In fact, Japanese government officials have a long history of approving U.S. nuclear weapons deployments going back to 1954 when the crew of a Japanese fishing boat suffered severe radiation poisoning from the test of a hydrogen bomb in the South Pacific. The March, 1954 “Bravo Shot” H-bomb explosion dumped radioactive debris on the Marshall Islands, U.S. servicemen aboard Navy ships, and the crew of the Japanese fishing boat Lucky Dragon No. 5. The multi-megaton blast infected Marshall Islanders with radiation sickness and caused cancers in the years that followed. Their contaminated home on Bikini Atoll remains uninhabitable to this day. U.S. servicemen who had been purposely transported into the blast zone have suffered from multiple cancers from radiation exposure. For years their claims were denied by the Veterans Administration. It took an act of Congress in 1990 to provide compensation for them and their children with birth defects. One crew member of Lucky Dragon No. 5, Kuboyama Aikichi (age 40), died while in treatment with the others for radiation exposure.⁴

“Bravo Shot” H-bomb test, Bikini, March 1, 1954

Japanese scientists examine the hull of contaminated Lucky Dragon No. 5  at Yaizu City port,  Shizuoka Prefecture, Japan.

With the Diet in an uproar over the H-bomb tests and the resulting poisoned fishermen, opposition parties demanded that the Japanese government bring the case to the International Court of Justice. On March 17, 1954, Representative Kawasaki Hideji of the Progressive Party argued that “world opinion would be deeply sympathetic to a nation that has now been victimized three times by nuclear explosions. Our foreign policy must be courageous enough to petition the International Court.” Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo responded that “I am confident we can resolve the issue without going to the Court.”

On April 9, 1954, Foreign Minister Okazaki explained his decision not to pursue America’s legal responsibility at a party in Tokyo given by the America-Japan Society. “We recognize that nuclear tests are indispensable to the security not only of America, but of Japan and other democratic nations. Thus, we join the other democratic nations in helping to make sure the atomic tests are successful.”⁵

For his thoroughly researched article “Japan under the US nuclear umbrella,” Hans Kristensen drew on historical records and recently declassified documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act that listed U.S. nuclear weapons deployments in Japan during the Cold War.⁶

There was in fact no such understanding. In a secret letter on July 17, 1955, the foreign minister was officially informed by the Embassy that the ambassador “made no commitments … regarding the storage of atomic weapons in Japan” and that “the U.S. government does not consider itself committed to any particular course of action.”

In March of 1955, one year after the crew of Lucky Dragon No. 5 had suffered radiation poisoning from the Bikini H-bomb test, Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō was asked at a press conference if he would permit U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan. He responded much like Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo had the previous year. “If we are to sanction the present ‘peace sustained by force’ as justifiable, then I would have to allow such stockpiling.” To calm the furor that ensued, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) insisted that Japan had an “understanding” with the U.S. that it would be consulted before such deployment took place. Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru told the Diet in June, 1955, that there would be “prior consultation” with the U.S. if nuclear weapons were ever deployed in Japan. But in a classified internal report in 1957 the U.S. State Department refuted this claim.

Meanwhile, only one week after he told the Diet the U.S. would not bring nuclear weapons into Japan without asking first, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu sent a letter to the American ambassador John M. Allison assuring him that “nothing in the discussions in the Diet commits the U.S. to any particular course of action.” As noted by Hans Kristensen, “This double standard policy of secretly relieving the U.S. from any obligations before bringing nuclear weapons in, while at the same time assuring the public that specific limitations existed, would become a trademark of Japanese governments for the next four decades.”⁷

On July 29, 1955, only eleven days after the State Department’s letter, the Associated Press reported a U.S. Army announcement that it was sending nuclear missiles and Honest John artillery rockets to Japan. The report cited a “heretofore secret agreement” between the U.S. and Japanese governments permitting their deployment, but that “the Diet had not been informed.” The report made headlines in Japan. The next day Prime Minister Hatoyama, testifying in the Diet, denied any knowledge of the planned deployment and claimed there was no secret agreement. Without mentioning an agreement, U.S. Ambassador Allison released a statement that the missiles and rockets would be sent to Japan minus their nuclear warheads. In fact, the “secret agreement” between the two governments allowed for the positioning of the weapons and their crews in Japan with the understanding that nuclear warheads would be brought in if both governments agreed that the international situation required them.⁸

However, no such subterfuge was necessary when it came to Okinawa. A prefecture of Japan until the spring of 1945, Okinawa was seized by the U.S. during the Battle of Okinawa and ruled under U.S. military occupation until 1972. This allowed American forces “freedom of operations” unfettered even by the easily circumvented laws in “sovereign” mainland Japan. The same day, July 29, 1955, that the Associated Press reported the U.S. dispatch of nuclear weapons to Japan, the Chicago Tribune reported that atomic cannons and nuclear-armed Honest John rockets were being deployed to Okinawa.

Although the subsequent presence of nuclear weapons in Okinawa was supposed to be highly classified information, anti-nuclear protests that greeted the arrival of Honest John rockets showed that they were hardly a secret to Okinawans. How could local residents not be suspicious of the extremely high security at the Army’s ordnance storage base at Henoko where squads of armed soldiers with German Shepherd sentry dogs patrolled its perimeter 24/7, where signs along the main road passing it ordered “no stopping,” and where a large area of close-cropped grass surrounded by high-wire fencing contained several oblong, sod-covered concrete bunkers with steel doors? They could easily find out that the base’s “SW” designation on the sign at its entrance gate stood for “special weapons”–nuclear, chemical and biological. Among Okinawans inclined to do some research into nuclear issues, a book published in mainland Japan about the U.S. military in Okinawa noted that an unclassified Army manual describing the base’s organization listed a “nuclear ordnance platoon.”⁹

Nuclear-capable Honest John rocket on its truck-transported launcher.

Storage “igloos” at the Army ordnance company in Okinawa that stored nuclear  weapons until 1972. (Photos by the author, 2014)

In the 1956 edition of the college student magazine Ryūdai Bungaku, its founder Arakawa Akira published his poem “The Colored Race,” protesting deployment of the Honest John rockets and calling for black soldiers to join Okinawans in resisting the U.S. military occupation. Occupation officials promptly shut down the magazine for one year, confiscated issues already printed, and expelled Arakawa and his co-editor Kawamitsu Shin’ich from University of the Ryukyus. One stanza reads,

The whites,

The flabby, hairy whites

Bring the Honest John to our island,

Strut around arrogantly,

And act like our masters,

Calling us yellow.¹⁰

There could have been any number of reasons for this crack-down on a small student publication, but nuclear weapons in Okinawa were supposed to be a military secret. According to a November, 1999 article in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, nuclear weapons had first come to Okinawa in 1954.

Deployment of complete weapons and components coincided with the U.S.-China crisis over the Taiwan straits in 1954–55. The Eisenhower administration, worried that Chinese forces might attack the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu or even Taiwan itself, made nuclear threats and developed contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons against China. Complete nuclear weapons were deployed to Okinawa in December 1954. That same month, the nuclear-armed aircraft carrier U.S.S. Midway deployed to Taiwanese waters. . . .

At the end of the Eisenhower administration, U.S. nuclear deployments on shore in the Pacific—at Okinawa, Guam, the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan (but not Hawaii)—totaled approximately 1,700 weapons. There were about a dozen weapons on Taiwan, 60 in the Philippines, 225 on Guam, and 600 in Korea. The lion’s share—nearly 800 weapons—were located at Kadena airbase, Okinawa, the location of SAC’s strategic bombers. New dispersals to the Pacific region began with the Kennedy administration. By the beginning of 1963, on-shore deployments—to Guam, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Taiwan—grew to about 2,400, a 66 percent increase from 1961 levels. The on-shore stockpile in the Pacific peaked in mid-1967 at about 3,200 weapons, 2,600 of which were in Korea and Okinawa.¹¹

Stored with the Honest John rockets at the Army’s ordnance base in Henoko were Nike-Hercules surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles with nuclear warheads. They were deployed on hilltops and at airfields in Okinawa. In 1959 one of the Nike-Hercules missiles at Naha Airbase fired accidentally killing two Army crewmen and injuring one. The warhead bounced out and rolled on the ground, but did not detonate. Soldiers in Okinawa worried about the Nike Hercules. Although it was capable of destroying a squadron of Soviet MiGs, a nuclear explosion in the air would release radiation endangering everyone on the ground.

Nike-Hercules warhead, conventional version. Nuclear version was white.

Along with the nuclear strategic bombers at Kadena airbase, nuclear-armed Mace-B surface-to-surface missiles arrived in 1961 with a range capable of attacking all of China and the Soviet Far East. An erroneous launch order issued to Mace-B crews during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962, came close to starting a nuclear war.¹²

Mace-B surface-to-surface guided missile.

Along with growing outrage in Okinawa and mainland Japan over the presence of nuclear weapons, NATO nations in Europe demanded in 1957 that they had to be deployed “in agreement” with the host country. In response, a meeting of officials from the U.S. military and the Atomic Energy Commission in January, 1958, produced the “Neither Confirm nor Deny” (NCND) policy that remains in effect today.¹³

[I]t is the policy of the United States Government . . . neither to confirm nor deny the presence of the nuclear component of nuclear-capable weapons in any another country, and that this policy would be followed in the event that U.S. officials are queried with respect to any statement made by an official of a foreign country or by any other source.

The United States refused to agree to treaty language committing it to seek Japan’s approval for nuclear weapons deployments on land. In April, 1963 it secured the aforementioned agreement from Foreign Minister Ōhira Masayoshi, with an exchange of formal letters, to accept the transit of nuclear armed warships through Japanese ports and territorial waters. (Kristensen) This directly contradicted Japan’s 1955 “Atomic Energy Basic Law” that restricted nuclear energy to “peaceful purposes;” and its “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” resolution passed by the Diet in 1971 specifying that “Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory.” Not limited to transit by ship, Navy records from 1963 and the 1972 interview of a former U.S. serviceman, published in the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper, indicate that nuclear weapons were delivered by air to U.S. bases in Japan. “On a number of occasions over three years beginning in 1960 we carried B-43 small nuclear bombs and others from McCord [Air] Base in Tacoma, Washington to four bases in Japan: Yokota, Misawa, Johnson (Iruma), and Kadena [in Okinawa].” ¹⁴

In March of 1961 with tensions rising in Southeast Asia over anti-government insurgencies, the U.S. Navy declared a DEFCON 2 alert, the condition immediately below the outbreak of war. Nuclear-strike aircraft carriers USS Midway, docked at Yokosuka Naval Base in Japan, and USS Lexington at Okinawa, were ordered to the South China Sea. The Japanese government was already well aware of U.S. carriers’ nuclear capability. One month earlier, in February of 1961, the Chief of Staff of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) observed a demonstration of “special weapons delivery” by U.S. Navy aircraft from nuclear strike carriers on a three-day cruise to Okinawa. By this time Navy warships were routinely bringing both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons into Japanese ports well before the 1963 formal agreement from the Japanese government.¹⁵

U.S.S. Midway underway in the Pacific

In December, 1965, a jet fighter carrying a hydrogen bomb accidentally rolled off the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ticonderoga returning to Yokosuka Navy Base in Kanagawa Prefecture, one hour west of Tokyo. Hans Kristensen describes the accident:

While steaming 80 miles off Okinawa on December 5 enroute to Yokosuka, a nuclear weapon loading exercise was conducted onboard. An A-4 strike aircraft was loaded with a B43 hydrogen bomb and rolled onto one of the ship’s elevators to be brought up to the flight deck. For reasons that remain unclear, the brakes failed and the aircraft, with the pilot still strapped in his seat, rolled overboard and sank in 16,000 feet of water with its nuclear armament. Neither the pilot, the aircraft, nor the bomb was ever recovered. The carrier’s remaining nuclear weapons were still onboard when the USS Ticonderoga arrived at Yokosuka only two days after the accident. Japan was not informed of the accident at the time.¹⁶

By the mid-1960’s protests in Okinawa against the U.S. occupation and its nuclear-armed bases were beginning to interfere with the functioning of the American military mission. Mass demonstrations, including sit-ins at base gates and occupation headquarters, demanded a return of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, reduction of the U.S. military presence, and the removal of nuclear weapons. Beginning in 1967, negotiations led to the “Okinawa Reversion Agreement” between U.S. President Richard Nixon and Japan’s Prime Minister Satō Eisaku, concluded in November, 1969.

Prime Minister Satō and President Nixon at the White House in November, 1969  

The Japanese government had publicly pledged an Okinawa reversion with bases reduced to mainland levels (hondo nami) and without nuclear weapons (kaku nuki). Thus the actual agreement, which left the U.S. military presence intact and mentioned nothing about nuclear weapons, sparked outrage and more protests in Okinawa. Officially named in Japanese Okinawa Henkan Kyōtei (Okinawa Reversion Agreement), it came to be known among Okinawans as Okinawa Henken Kyōtei (Okinawa Discriminatory Agreement).Prime Minister Satō, who reaped enormous political benefits from the agreement in mainland Japan and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974, was later revealed as the ultimate betrayer.

Accompanying the Reversion Agreement, Sato and Nixon secretly signed what was officially called an “agreed minute,” drafted by Henry Kissinger, later known in Japan as a “secret nuclear understanding” (kaku mitsu-yaku). Confirming widespread suspicions of its existence, the “secret” was uncovered in 1972, the year of the reversion, by Mainichi Daily reporter Nishiyama Takichi. Two decades later Wakaizumi Kei, special envoy and interpreter, published a draft of the “agreed minute” in his book Tasaku Nakarishi o Shinzamuto Hossu (I Want to Believe There Were No Other Options), Bungei Shunjū, 1994. The existence of this document has never been officially recognized by the Japanese or U.S. governments, but in 2009 Satō’s son Shinji discovered it, signed by his late father and President Nixon, inside a drawer at a former family residence in Shibuya Ward, Tokyo.. The English text of the agreement reads,

Agreed Minute to Joint Communique of United States President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Sato (Draft)

21st November, 1969

United States President:

As stated in our Joint Communique, it is the intention of the United States Government to remove all the nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the time of actual reversion of the administrative rights to Japan; and thereafter the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and its related arrangements will apply to Okinawa, as described in the Joint Communique. However, in order to discharge effectively the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan, in time of great emergency the United States Government will require the re-entry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan. The United States Government would anticipate a favorable response. The United States Government also requires the standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa: Kadena, Naha, Henoko and Nike Hercules units.

Japanese Prime Minister:

The Government of Japan, appreciating the United States Government’s requirements in time of great emergency stated above by the President, will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes place.

The President and the Prime Minister agreed that this Minute, in duplicate, be kept each only in the offices of the President and the Prime Minister and be treated in the strictest confidence between only the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan. [emphasis added]

Washington, D.C., November 21, 1969

Despite the stated desire to keep the agreement in “strictest confidence,” its subsequent revelation showed that Prime Minister Satō had not only broken his oft-stated promise of a post-reversion Okinawa without nuclear weapons (kaku-nuki), but he had violated his own proclamation for the 1971 Diet resolution of Japan’s “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” (non-production, non-possession, and non-introduction), which was cited as a major reason for awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.

With Okinawa’s return to Japan in May, 1972, it became the nation’s only prefecture where the Japanese government explicitly approved the re-deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on its land, in its surrounding waters or airspace during any U.S.-determined “emergency.” The “secret understanding” became headlines and sparked outrage in Japan when it was first revealed publicly by a Mainichi Daily reporter in 1972 and when Satō’s interpreter published the text in 1994. Subsequently, Akiba Takeo, a senior Foreign Ministry official, testified before a U.S. Congressional Commission in 2009 that re-deploying nuclear weapons to Okinawa “sounds persuasive to me.”

Akiba’s statement to the Commission, obtained by the Union of Concerned Scientists, ignited a predictable firestorm in Japan. Gregory Kulacki, UCS Senior Analyst, explained, “[A] reason for redeploying US nuclear weapons in Okinawa that might sound persuasive to Mr Akiba is that US and Japanese officials can use ambiguities in the language of the Nixon-Sato agreement, and tight controls on the dissemination of information about related bilateral discussions, to obscure the process that would be followed if the United States decided to make Okinawa nuclear again.” Kulacki explains how the “secret understanding” makes redeployment easy in Okinawa.

[P]ermission [of the Japanese government] need not be explicit, or public. It may not even be necessary. The language of the Nixon-Sato agreement is intentionally vague and suggests simple notification at a relatively low level of the bureaucracy might be enough. This kind of low level agreement would give the prime minister and other LDP officials the same kind of plausible deniability they used to avoid discussing the Sato-Nixon agreement on redeploying nuclear weapons in Okinawa for more than 50 years.

The potential presence of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa would be further obscured from public view by the US government’s non-confirm, non-deny policy on military deployments. . . . In the absence of an external inquiry, US nuclear weapons could be put back in Okinawa quietly, without public knowledge or debate.

[Another] reason Okinawa might sound persuasive to Mr. Akiba is that the United States is building a new military base in the Okinawan village of Henoko. The project includes significant upgrades to a munitions storage depot, adjacent to the new base, where US nuclear weapons were stored in the past. Henoko is specifically mentioned in the 1969 Nixon-Sato agreement as a mutually acceptable location for the possible redeployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan.¹⁷

Thanks to the Tokyo government’s betrayal in the 1969 Okinawa Reversion Agreement, this small island prefecture still bears 70% of the U.S. military presence in all of Japan on 0.2% of the nation’s land area with 1% of its population. Construction of the new base in Henoko, with offshore runways for planes and helicopters, has been delayed more than twenty years by daily protests at the construction site and opposition by the local prefectural government which has filed lawsuits on jurisdictional and environmental grounds. Joining a protest rally at the site on March 3, 2016, Gregory Kulacki urged Okinawans to continue opposing its construction. The protests continue in 2021.

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Stewart Engel served in the U.S. Navy from July,1958 to July, 1961 as Lieutenant Junior Grade. He trained at Watch Officers School in San Diego and was aboard the U.S.S. Carpenter in the Western Pacific when it entered port at the Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan in late 1959. He has worked as a computer programmer, systems analyst, and engineer for companies in New York, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, California and Virginia where he currently resides in Fredericksburg.

Steve Rabson was stationed as a U.S. Army draftee at the 137th Ordnance Company (SW) in Henoko, Okinawa from July, 1967 to June, 1968. He is professor emeritus of East Asian studies at Brown University and has published books and articles about Okinawa, and translations of Okinawan literature. His articles about nuclear weapons in Okinawa and Japan are listed below.

Notes

¹ Geoffrey Murray, “Japan reels under Reischauer’s nuclear ‘bombshell’,” Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 1981.

² Ellsberg, Doomsday Machine, 118.

³ From email communication with Daniel Ellsberg in May, 2021.

⁴ Okuaki Satoru, “How Japanese scientists confronted the U.S. and Japanese governments to reveal the effects of Bikini H-bomb tests,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, September 1, 2019, Volume 27, Issue 17, Number 2. From the introduction by Steve Rabson.

⁵ Okuaki.

⁶ Hans Kristensen, “Japan under the US nuclear umbrella, supporting documents global problem-solving nuke policy,” Nautilus Institute, July 21, 1999.

⁷ Kristensen, “Nuclear umbrella.”

⁸ Kristensen, “Nuclear umbrella.”

⁹ Okinawa Beigun kichi (U.S. bases in Okinawa), Shin-Nihon Shppan-sha, 1972. Includes Henoko ammunition storage area map.

¹⁰ Translated in Steve Rabson, Righteous Cause or Tragic Folly: Changing Views of War in Modern Japanese Poetry, Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan, 1998, 227. Also see Michael S. Molasky, The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory, Routledge, 1999, 93-102.

¹¹ Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, William Burr, “Where they were,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists,November 1, 1999.

¹² Ota Masakatsu and Steve Rabson, “U.S. veterans reveal 1962 nuclear close call dodged in Okinawa,” Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 13, Issue 13, Number 3, March 30, 2015.

¹³ Kristensen, “Nuclear umbrella.”

¹⁴ Quoted in Kristensen.

¹⁵ Kristensen, “Nuclear Umbrella.”

¹⁶ Kristensen, “Nuclear Umbrella.”

¹⁷ Gregory Kulacki with a comment by Steve Rabson, “Nuclear hawks in Tokyo call for stronger nuclear posture in Japan and Okinawa,” Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 16, Issue 11, Number 1, June 1, 2018.

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Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting on Friday included a four-point proposal for APEC cooperation, based on the themes of strengthening international cooperation over COVID-19, deepening regional economic integration, pursuing inclusive and sustainable development, and seizing opportunities for scientific and technological innovation. We can examine each of these in this article.

COVID-19 and the Health Silk Road

Xi said China has so far provided more than 500 million doses of vaccine to other developing countries and “will provide another US$3 billion in international aid over the next three years to support the COVID-19 response and economic and social recovery in other developing countries”.

China is currently involved in developing some 35 COVID-19 vaccines and has made significant strides in the development of its BioPharm industry, raising considerable sums of money on the Hong Kong, Shenzhen, and Shanghai bourses to raise development capital. Some US$90 billion was raised among 28 companies listed on these exchanges last year, with China ramping up vaccine production to reach an estimated 3.2 billion doses in 2021 and 5.3 in 2022.

As of July 3, this year, China has provided nearly 500 million doses of vaccine overseas. (Source: Henry Tillman, China Investment Research from the Dezan Shira & Associates GBA webinar event from 34:30 viewable here). These vaccines are being distributed largely among Belt & Road Initiative countries, comprising some 35 percent of the global population, viewed as very important” for lower- and middle-income countries, many of them in Asia and in Africa.

Xi also stated that China will provide another US$3 billion in international aid over the next three years to support COVID-19 response and economic and social recovery in other developing countries. China supports waiving intellectual property rights on COVID-19 vaccines and will work with other parties to push for an early decision by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other international institutions.

China will take an active part in cooperation initiatives to keep vaccine supply chains stable and safe and support the movement of essential goods, and take effective measures to ensure healthy, safe, and orderly people-to-people exchanges and restore normal business cooperation in our region at an early date. China has financed the founding of a Sub-Fund on APEC Cooperation on Combating COVID-19 and Economic Recovery, which will help APEC economies win an early victory over COVID-19 and achieve economic recovery.

Regional economic integration

Xi stated that “We need to deepen regional economic integration. Opening-up and integration is the prevailing trend. It is important that we promote the liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment and uphold the multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core. We must remove barriers, not erect walls. We must open, not close off. We must seek integration, not decoupling. This is the way to make economic globalization more open, inclusive, balanced, and beneficial for all.

We need to step up macroeconomic policy coordination, minimize negative spillovers, and fully implement the APEC Connectivity Blueprint to promote cooperation on digital connectivity. We need to advance regional economic integration, with a view to establishing a high-standard Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific at an early date. China is among the first to ratify the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership agreement. We look forward to its entry into force this year.”

Comment: This section reveals how China sees itself as part of East Asia – RCEP – and APEC, together with links to Central Asia, Africa, Europe and later, South America. The Belt & Road Initiative, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and other institutions complete this picture and will further integrate through a high yielding mechanized agricultural and focused innovative approach of China, ASEAN, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand and the rising new vast Asia, including Central Asia, Africa, and South America. The rising Chinese domestic market will sit at the center of the new East Asian Free Trade Area. The other areas of Asia will link in gradually as they mature – the world’s leading industries will focus on East Asia for new markets, capital, and profitability. Eventually Asia will be the continent of the world, and its central economy.

Xi’s comments echo those made on a more regional basis by China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who delivered a more regionally focused speech in Tashkent last week at the ‘Central and South Asia: Regional Connectivity, Challenges, and Opportunities’ inter-governmental conference hosted by Uzbekistan. That also contained a four-point plan and dealt more with the regional dynamics of connecting Central with South Asia. Our analysis of that, complete with planned Eurasian interconnectivity maps can be viewed here.

Inclusive and sustainable development

Xi stated that “We need to pursue inclusive and sustainable development. Planet Earth is the only home for humanity. We must follow a people-centered approach, foster a sound environment to buttress sustainable economic and social development worldwide, and achieve green growth. China attaches great importance to addressing climate change. We will strive to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.

China supports APEC in advancing cooperation on sustainable development, improving the List of Environmental Goods, and making energy more efficient, clean, and diverse. We need to enhance economic and technological cooperation, promote inclusive trade and investment, support the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises, scale up support for women and other vulnerable groups, share experience on eliminating absolute poverty and strive to deliver the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”

Scientific and technological innovation

Xi commented “We need to seize opportunities from scientific and technological innovation. The digital economy is an important area for the future growth of the world economy. The global digital economy is an open and close-knit entity. Win-win cooperation is the only right way forward, while a closed-door policy, exclusion, confrontation, and division would only lead to a dead end. We need to ensure full and balanced implementation of the APEC Internet and Digital Economy Roadmap, further develop digital infrastructure, facilitate the dissemination and application of new technologies, and work for a digital business environment that is open, fair, and non-discriminatory.

China has concluded several cooperation initiatives, including those on using digital technologies for the prevention and control of COVID-19 and on smart cities. We will host a workshop on digital capacity building and take forward such initiatives as bolstering the recovery of the tourism sector with digital tools, as part of our efforts to contribute more to Asia-Pacific cooperation on digital economy.

China has embarked on a new journey toward fully building a modern socialist country. As China enters a new development stage, we will follow a new development philosophy and foster a new development paradigm. We will build a new system of open economy of higher standards, create a more attractive business environment, and advance high-quality Belt and Road cooperation. We hope to work with countries in the Asia-Pacific and beyond to achieve higher-standard mutual benefit and win-win cooperation.”

Comment: Xi’s statements, and especially those made by Wang Yi as concerns Central Asia, herald the arrival of Asia as an Asian managed region. This has arrived as an on-going process of infrastructure building, urbanization and wealth creation and has ultimately resulted in the complete withdrawal of both NATO and US troops from Afghanistan. The Central and South Asian region, and increasingly the Middle East and Africa are undergoing a new influential course and geopolitical dynamics.

Asia, centered on East Asia, will not a federal state. It will be a continent of nations, but with a Free Trade Area – a combination of ASEAN, RCEP, the Eurasian Economic Union, and agreements with the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, the Gulf Cooperation Council and South America’s Mercosur bloc. (Source, Dezan Shira & Associates GBA webinar, Regional Free Trade from 1:48.40 viewable here).

What we see happening is the coordination by the regions national leaders to build continental and intercontinental infrastructure and mechanisms to develop living standards and care for society and the environment. Their central banks will coordinate as they have done since 2002 through the Chiang Mai Accords, while their economies will trade in currencies that are not capable of being sanctioned but are more available as digital and easily transferable and convertible.

China is ushering in a new emerging world and has been making long term plans to do so. Frictions have arisen because the United States and Europe have neglected at present significant long-term plans – as can be seen from the somewhat ‘knee-jerk’ response to initiatives such as the G7’s ‘Build Back Better World’ and the EU’s ‘Globally Connecting Europe’ plans which lack any tangible structural or address the financial planning requirements.

China in Asia and beyond has very clear objectives and is openly discussing these in international forums such as APEC. The United States and EU in comparison need to clearly see this and listen to these plans with an eye of global development instead of concentrating purely on their internal priorities. If this does not occur, and a re-engagement with Beijing materialize, it will be China, Asia, and its trading partners alone that will govern and influence global trade.  

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Another method rich countries are using to downplay the severity of climate change is to ignore its consequences, or try and pass them off as “natural” events.

Climate change is already leading to rising sea levels, threatening island and coastal communities and devastating food security and access to fresh water. Long-term drought and changes in weather patterns are causing hunger and destroying farming land.

By the middle of the century, it is estimated that as many as 200 million people worldwide may be displaced as a result.

Yet, rich countries have responded to this humanitarian disaster with lock-down and lock-up measures to try and stop vulnerable people trying to flee.

The poorest nations with the least resources — which have had the least to do with the climate emergency — are being left to deal with humanitarian problems.

Climate-related displacement is still not considered to be an important global issue. The United Nations (UN) Charter still does not recognise climate refugees — those who cross international borders to find safety — let alone internally displaced persons due to changes in the climate.

The UN Human Rights Committee handed down a landmark decision last January, after a 2015 case was brought by Ioane Teitiota from the small Pacific island nation of Kiribati seeking protection in Aotearoa/New Zealand as a climate refugee. His claim was denied by the NZ government.

The UNHRC eventually upheld the NZ government’s decision on the grounds that the situation in Kiribati was not yet dire enough that Teitiota and his family faced an imminent risk to their lives.

However, it added a disclaimer, saying that “without robust national and international efforts”, the effects of climate change may expose people to life-threatening risks or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and countries could not lawfully send people back to these conditions.

Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) islands, including coral atolls, are experiencing saltwater inundation, leading to shortages of safe drinking water and threats to food security.

This is compounded by the legacy of colonial occupation and theft of resources by former colonial powers. Today, neo-colonialism continues in the form of foreign company land grabs for logging and mining (including deep sea mining). In addition, there is a lack of transparency and corruption in government and business sectors.

These people also face the impacts of onshore mining. Gold mining produces tailings that flow down rivers causing mass fish kills (due to cyanide poisoning) and bring sediment downstream to clog rivers and impact ocean ecosystems.

The loss of control by local land owners over the land and resources means they are more vulnerable to underhand land grabs for logging. Policies and laws around sustainable land use either do not exist or benefit foreign interests.

Traditional knowledge, passed down through generations, about land and resource management has not been codified or given proper status.

Islands washing away

Mualim Island, located in the Duke of York Islands in PNG is gradually being engulfed by the sea on its northern and southern tips. The lack of arable land and fresh drinking water means people paddle their canoes to other islands to tend food gardens, collect firewood and fresh water.

Nukumanu (Tasman) islanders are forced to travel hundreds of kilometres by dinghies, risking their lives, to the island of Buka to buy rations, especially rice.

The impact of climate change on PNG’s coral atolls is that most islands experience almost half a year of drought. This means islanders have a limited water supply which often leads to poor sanitation.

According to the Coral Sea Foundation, Potaminam Island is likely to disappear in another few decades due to rising sea levels.

The beach is shrinking and coconut palms are falling into the water. Potaminam is located more than 260 kilometres from the nearest significant high ground.

Rising sea levels mean the people of the Carteret Islands in PNG are now on the brink of starvation: they cannot grow food and crops due to high salt content in the soil.

While the PNG government wants technological solutions to mitigate the impacts of climate change — building sea walls and regrowing corals — the islanders want a response now. They are so worried, they find it hard to sleep.

Ten Carteret Island-displaced families are now living on Bougainville, on land provided by the Catholic Church in the Tinputz region. Another 10 families are due to be relocated there soon.

Those remaining on the islands (about 2400 people) live precariously. Their diet consists of coconut and fish, but coconuts are not maturing and arable land is becoming scarce and unsuitable for gardening.

The island is slowly being washed away. It could take 50–60 years, or it could happen sooner, advocates say. A humanitarian and immediate disaster response is needed now.

Activists are discussing voluntary migration with communities to what they call a “safe second home” where islanders would have full rights and the right of return to their island if they want to.

Carteret Islands’ community representatives have raised concerns over the use of the term “climate change refugees” as they are internally displaced. They want their human rights, dignity and respect to be guaranteed before they are forced to move.

Organising for survival

Fala Haulangi is a campaigns organiser with E tū union in Aotearoa/NZ. Haulangi is originally from the Pacific island nation of Tuvalu, where the sea level is rising by nearly twice the global average.

Haulangi told a web forum hosted on July 3 by the Global Ecosocialist Network that climate change and sea-level rise are “everyday challenges” her people are faced with.

“I have been living here in Aotearoa/NZ for about 30 years now, but I am deeply connected to my land — Tuvalu. So, when we talk about climate change, we talk about the survival of my people.

“Continuous rising of sea levels, the increase of salt water [in the soil], means our people are not able to plant their own root crops. The increasing [intensity] of cyclones and drought — they are new things that our people are experiencing nowadays.

“It’s such a shame — we are a small island [with] only 10 square kilometers of land mass. We are only about 4 metres above sea level. The population is about 11,000. But the impact of climate change is a reality to my people.

“One of the wise men in our Tuvaluan community here always says: ‘When we talk about the land — Tuvalu — we are connected to that land. It is about our art, our language, our values and Indigenous culture.

“All this will die because of climate change. When culture dies, our stories die. Our connections and identity dies. When our identity dies, we will be truly lost people. When the land disappears, we will all disappear.”

Haulangi said that despite being “resilient” people, Tuvaluans “live with fear everyday because of climate change”.

E tū union has been campaigning for the rights of Pasifika (Pacific islands peoples) living and working in Aotearoa/NZ.

“Our union has been quite proactive, because E tū union has quite a lot of members who are Pasifika migrants,” Haulangi said.

Just transitions

E tū has adopted programs and policies that support the migration of people from the Pacific to Aotearoa/NZ due to the impact of climate change, which are also endorsed by the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions.

The union has also developed a Just Transitions Plan, that aims to deal with “rapid changes” to industries and economic sectors as they restructure in response to government and international commitments to combat climate change.

“Recognition of obligations to Pacific peoples affected by rising sea levels” is included in the plan, she said. “We are trying to make sure that this government recognises that the people of the land should be at the centre of all these discussions of planning [for a just transition].”

“It is very important to us that tangata whenua [those with traditional authority over the land] unions and workers are part of this discussion [with government] from the word go.”

Haulangi said her union wants the government to be “more lenient when it comes to immigration from Tuvalu and islands of the Pacific to Aotearoa/NZ”.

Aotearoa/NZ has a history of racism towards workers from the Pacific islands, who were welcomed in the 1960s to help fill labour shortages and grow the economy, only to be told to “go back where they came from” when things had improved.

Haulangi said a petition before the NZ government now is calling for pathways to permanent residency.

“Our Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardern, was supposed to deliver an apology to our Pasifika people … for how they were dealt with in the dawn [immigration] raids in the 1970s.”

During those early-morning raids in the 1970s and ‘80s, authorities demanded families show their papers to prove they were “legal”. Many have suffered ongoing trauma as a result.

Haulangi said the apology had to be postponed because of COVID-19, but that they were not simply looking for an apology.

“We don’t want the PM to just say sorry … we want to make sure that the government will look at all the over-stayers here … not just Pasifika but any other ethnic groups … to make sure that the government grants them permanent residency.”

This would be a small step for a rich country in a climate emergency.

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When the whole world is lamenting that the US is quitting Afghanistan in ignominy, the Biden Administration is snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. What an audacity of hope!

The agreement reached in principle in Tashkent on Friday between the representatives of the United States, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan “to establish a new quadrilateral diplomatic platform focused on enhancing regional connectivity” is a watershed event in regional politics marking the overnight transition in the US regional strategy from the hurly-burly of battles to geoeconomics. It is breath-taking. 

This QUAD idea stems from the Biden administration’s realisation that “peace and regional connectivity are mutually reinforcing” — something that China had discovered almost a decade ago.  

The joint statement issued at Tashkent says that the four countries recognise a “historic opportunity to open flourishing international trade routes, [and] the parties intend to cooperate to expand trade, build transit links and strengthen business-to-business ties.” 

The parties agreed to meet in the coming months to determine the modalities of this cooperation with mutual consensus. 

This major development underscores that Washington intends to remain involved in Afghanistan’s stability. That augurs well for the intra-Afghan dialogue. 

The US is intensely conscious that its prestige in the region is at its nadir today and it stands isolated, as the reported cheeky Russian offer volunteering to be America’s gatekeeper shows. 

Evidently, Washington is reluctant to accept the Russian offer, which can turn out to be an Albatross. That explains to an extent its thoughtful move to create a regional axis of friendly states who are manifestly keen to foster ties and willing to work with the US in the region. Potentially, Washington may have use for the US-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan as a “counterweight” to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation which is dominated by China and Russia.  

Despite their friendly relations with China (and Russia), both Uzbekistan and Pakistan are eager to deepen relations with the US. And they are the two biggest countries in the Greater Middle Eastern arc stretching from Persian Gulf to Central Asia’s border with China. 

Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan are also Muslim countries and they provide a market of around 300 million people. No doubt, the US did its homework. This QUAD has viability unlike its insipid namesake in the “Indo-Pacific.”

In the recent years, the US has been paying extra attention to cultivate friendly ties with Uzbekistan, which is not only the biggest country in Central Asia but a relative success story regionally in political stability and overall developmental trajectory. 

Tashkent has been receptive to Washington’s overtures, as strong ties with America help it to balance Russia and will strengthen its strategic autonomy. 

The new Quad signals the US’ receptiveness to Pakistan’s persisting demand for a bilateral relationship that goes beyond Afghan issues. There are fault lines in the China-Pakistan relationship, which are no more possible to conceal, and in Washington’s judgment, Pakistani elites, civilian and military, have remained as western-oriented as ever despite their alienation in the recent decade. 

To be sure, with the curtain coming down on the Afghan war, the time has come for establishing rail/road links connecting Central Asia with Karachi/Gwadar ports. The expected improvement in the security situation allows mega projects to be implemented. Conceivably, the Taliban would have no reservations over the QUAD. The Pakistani ports are ideally placed to connect the resource-rich Central Asian region and Afghanistan with the world market.  

There are seamless possibilities ahead. The recent G7 summit in Cornwall had agreed on a new initiative to support global infrastructure investment. A recent paper by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC saw this new global infrastructure initiative as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative [BRI] with emphasis on catalysing private capital to invest in global infrastructure. read more 

The German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on Thursday after talks with President Biden at the White House that when Germany’s turn comes next year to chair the G7, Berlin intends to implement the Cornwall Summit’s decision. Will G7 join the US’ QUAD initiative in Central Asia? 

Clearly, by having both the CPEC and the QUAD on its platter, Pakistan is tasing success in its foreign-policy shift toward geoeconomics. Pakistan’s geography makes it a turf for competition between China and the West in infrastructure development. Simply put, the new QUAD will impact regional politics. 

Indeed, the US hopes to wean Pakistan away from its heavy dependence  on China. The new QUAD will make India look an outlier drifting aimlessly without a sense of direction. India turned its back on China’s BRI but Pakistan secured the $60 billion CPEC and is now looking forward to the US-led QUAD. 

India’s relations with China are in deep chill and its traditional friendly ties with Russia have become listless, whereas, Pakistan not only enriched its ties with China but is successfully exploring the multipolarity in the world order. 

On July 16, Pakistan and Russia signed a mega deal for a 1100 km gas pipeline project costing between $2.5 – $3 billion connecting Karachi and Lahore which will transport imported LNG (for which it has separately signed a deal with Qatar whereby 200 mmcfd of gas will initially reach Karachi’s LNG terminal in the beginning of next year that would be enhanced to 400 mmcfd in the coming years.) Whereas, India’s gas pipeline project with Iran has been languishing as pipe dream. read more

Pakistan is anxious to have President Putin inaugurate the groundbreaking of the gas pipeline project, which is expected to be held later this year or in early 2022. Delhi should seriously introspect whether its passionate embrace of the US bandwagon through the past decade under successive governments, brought any significant dividends.

Pakistan is once again becoming a frontline state in big-power rivalry. But this time around, Pakistan stands to gain out of its geography and hopes to create equity for its development. 

Conceivably, the new Quad is the brainchild of Zalmay Khalilzad, US special representative on Afghanistan, who has for long advocated that the best way of stabilising Afghanistan is by encouraging the reset in the Pakistani calculus away from militancy and extremism to peace and development. 

Pakistan’s epochal journey is bound to be painful and will face uncertainties, as the past week’s events in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Islamabad remind us. The US can help cement it as an irreversible shift by offering a meaningful partnership to Pakistan. 

In all likelihood, China will only welcome the US initiative as it is in the overall interests of regional security and stability from which Beijing also stands to gain. China has huge stakes in Pakistan’s and Afghanistan’s security and development, and in this respect, a congruence of interests between Beijing and Washington is entirely conceivable.

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Featured image: Nine Chinese citizens were killed after a bus carrying them plunged into a ravine following an explosion in Pakistan’s far north Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, July 14, 2021. (Source: Indian Punchline)

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New evidence has surfaced that China may be expanding its nuclear arsenal – much more, and much faster than previously assumed.

Experts from the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation obtained satellite images showing work underway on the construction of more than 100 new missile silos near Yumen.

The evidence, which dropped June 30, has since focused the minds of US national security experts – as might have been expected given Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s description of China as America’s “pacing challenge.”

The discussion is still fluid, but two interpretations are emerging. One offers that China is reacting to US actions and that Washington should pursue arms control with Beijing – negotiate to get both sides to limit their forces and avoid an arms race.

The other interpretation holds that the new discovery means that there is a nuclear dimension to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s promise that China will have “the dominant position” in the world by 2049, and that Washington should double down on deterrence, including by fully modernizing its nuclear arsenal and more.

Yet neither negotiating arms control nor strengthening deterrence is a straightforward solution – nor are the two necessarily mutually exclusive. The Chinese nuclear arsenal, like other facets of Chinese power, is going to be an enduring problem for the United States.

As Admiral John Aquilino, the new Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, put itduring his confirmation hearing earlier this year: “China is a long-term challenge that must be ‘managed’ rather than ‘solved.’”

The arms control response

Anyone with a cursory knowledge of US-China strategic relations is aware that the United States is a major driver of China’s nuclear modernization program. Beijing is concerned by Washington’s nuclear superiority and its improved ability to find and destroy Chinese forces, or to intercept them with missile defenses.

China, plainly, fears that the United States might become capable of putting it in checkmate, achieving what Chinese diplomats call “absolute security.”

To solve that problem, Beijing has been expanding and perfecting its arsenal. In addition to building more nuclear weapons, it is investing in road-mobile missiles and sea-based platforms because these systems make it more difficult for Washington to target its forces, and it is adding multiple independent re-entry vehicles to its missiles to penetrate US missile defenses.

Of late, Beijing also seems to have embraced tactical nuclear use and nuclear warfighting options. In unofficial dialogs, Chinese strategists make clear that China’s modernization program is directed at the United States and, by extension, its allies.

Countering the United States and its allies is not the sole driver, however. In private discussions, Chinese strategists confess that Beijing is increasingly motivated by nuclear developments in India. As one such strategist explained: “Beijing now regards India as a deterrence problem, not as a proliferation problem.”

Chinese strategists are less forthcoming when asked whether Beijing considers Russia when it does defense planning, but some admit it is a factor.

While it is unclear if North Korea impacts Chinese calculations, it would be foolish to assume that defense planners in Beijing do not also contemplate conflict with their nuclear-armed neighbor given their complicated relationship.

Finally, analysts have explained that domestic and organizational factors are driving the Chinese modernization program as well.

The idea that a US push for arms control with China could solve the problem, then, is not obvious.

It’s also not as if the United States had never tried. Since the 2000s, Washington sought to jump-start bilateral nuclear dialogue with Beijing for that purpose. Yet neither Washington’s initial “patient” approach nor, from the mid-2010s, its more confrontational stance, has yielded results. Beijing has declined to engage.

The United States could try harder. Chinese strategists have long insisted that a US statement recognizing that the United States and China are in a situation of mutual vulnerability would help establish a foundation upon which US-China strategic stability can be built, despite the asymmetry of forces between the two countries.

Put differently, a US “vulnerability acknowledgment” could entice Beijing to engage in dialogue and arms control.

Research currently conducted by this author, however, suggests that it is not a given and that, in any case, an agreement would not emerge quickly. So deterrence will play an important – and possibly growing – role in US-China relations regardless of whether there is movement on arms control.

The deterrence response

The deterrers, unlike the arms controllers, think that engaging China is pointless. They believe that the latest news makes clear that China seeks nuclear parity with, perhaps even dominance over, the United States, and they argue that Washington should counter with a major nuclear update.

Without minimizing the problem, maintaining perspective about China’s nuclear build-up is essential. The US Department of Defense estimates that China’s stockpile is in the low hundreds – a fraction of the US and Russian stockpiles, which are in the low thousands.

So, neither a doubling, tripling or even quadrupling of China’s stockpile would come close to US and Russian stockpile levels.

It is also unclear whether China seeks nuclear parity or dominance. Some analysts have the opinion that the latest evidence may show Beijing playing a shell game – moving a small number of missiles across a big matrix of silos to prevent its adversaries from locating the missiles.

It is a possibility worth considering, especially given that the United States has systematically over-predicted the future size of the Chinese arsenal.

More problematically, focusing on the quantitative growth of China’s arsenal risks underestimating its qualitative improvement – which is where Beijing has made the most progress.

A formation of Dongfeng-17 missiles takes part in a military parade during the celebrations marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China at Tian’anmen Square in Beijing. Photo: Xinhua / Mao Siqian

Beijing has not only strengthened the survivability of its forces. It also seems to have developed new missions. With its new intermediate-range, dual-capable missiles, Beijing is now able to conduct limited nuclear counterforce use.

Beijing is also improving the readiness of its force, including by mating warheads with missiles (a first for China), and possibly moving towards a launch-on-warning posture.

Moreover, Beijing has been increasing its cyber and space power, and it is developing an integrated deterrence posture, notably through its Strategic Support Force.

This overview suggests that China poses little risk of nuclear aggression against the United States and that this will remain unchanged in the foreseeable future.

The danger was high in the US-Soviet context during the Cold War, and it has not disappeared in US-Russia relations today.

It is low in the US-China context because the Chinese arsenal is and will remain limited in comparison to the US arsenal. China will simply not have a first-user advantage against the United States.

What is present, however, is a risk of nuclear escalation in a conflict. With a more sophisticated arsenal, Beijing may become more aggressive at the conventional level, which could lead to wars and nuclear use.

One pathway to such use is a situation in which China is losing a war – for instance over Taiwan – and launches limited nuclear strikes to force the United States to give up the fight.

Another is a situation in which, again during a war, the United States hits Chinese nuclear forces with conventional weapons, prompting Beijing to go nuclear with its remaining forces. This is not far-fetched given the increasing entanglement between Chinese nuclear and conventional forces.

To be sure, the open-ended nature of China’s nuclear build-up raises legitimate questions for the United States about nuclear policy, strategy and force planning, especially given that Washington, for the first time, faces two major nuclear-armed adversaries – Russia and China – that are growing their forces and deepening their strategic cooperation.

Russian and Chinese soldiers take aim in a 2018 joint military exercise. Image: Twitter

US nuclear deterrence is also important because it provides an essential backstop to out-of-control escalation.

But doubling down on nuclear deterrence will do little to address the rising risk of conflict and limited nuclear escalation with China. This problem is best solved with stronger conventional deterrence and tighter alliance relationships – to deter Chinese adventurism below the nuclear threshold – and, if there is a conflict, good crisis management with Beijing to prevent nuclear escalation, at least inadvertent escalation.

So, even from a deterrence perspective, there is a role for engagement with China. This is important, and it’s worth noting that the 1963 US-Soviet hotline agreement – a crisis management mechanism – was a prelude to arms control.

Just over 20 years ago, a few analysts lamented that China was a “forgotten nuclear power.” Today, Russia is still the United States’ primary nuclear problem, but China is taking center stage.

Addressing nuclear China will be challenging, and neither arms control nor deterrence will, alone, be enough. The United States needs a more sophisticated approach, one for which it can – and should – lay down markers in the next US Nuclear Posture Review.

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David Santoro ([email protected]) is the President and CEO of the Pacific Forum in Honolulu. He is the editor of a new volume, US-China Nuclear Relations: The Impact of Strategic Triangles (Lynne Rienner, May 2021). Follow him on Twitter @DavidSantoro1. This article was originally published by Pacific Forum and is republished here with permission.

Featured image: China’s nuclear stockpile has been growing rapidly. Image: Pacific Forum / iStock

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On 6 June three U.S. Senators arrived in Taiwan to “meet with senior Taiwan leaders to discuss U.S.-Taiwan relations, regional security, and other significant issues of mutual interest.” It was stated they were also there to announce donation of 750,000 Covid-19 vaccine doses, but their main purpose, their over-riding objective, was simply to be there to annoy the Beijing government which, the BBC notes, regards Taiwan — formerly Formosa, and the refuge of a few hundred thousand fleeing mainlanders in 1949 when civil war resulted in defeat of the Kuomintang political party — as remaining an integral part of China, which it had been since the 17^th century.

Two of the senators are members of the Armed Forces Committee, and one of them, Dan Sullivan, is even more rabidly anti-Chinese than his colleagues and in March this year declared in an interview that “I spent one of my first deployments as a U.S. Marine in the Taiwan Strait defending America’s interest, but also defending the interests of an ally. That island is free and democratic because of the sacrifice of American citizens, of American military, of American taxpayer money.” We all know where we stand, as regards the U.S. Congress and China, because confrontation is one of the very few things about which a majority of the Senate can agree, as when on June 8 they voted 68-32 to “to approve a sweeping package of legislation intended to boost the country’s ability to compete with Chinese technology.” The bill will also promote the Taiwan “independence” status by allowing “diplomats and Taiwanese military to display their flag and wear their uniforms while in the United States on official businesses.” Never at a loss to display the utmost pettiness it also bans U.S. officials from attending the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, while Senator Todd Young announced that “Today we declare our intention to win this century, and those that follow it as well.”

This performance was staged two days before the Pentagon, as represented by its Secretary, retired general Lloyd Austin (until January on the board of major weapons’ contractor Raytheon), decided “to sharpen focus on China, which the United States has tagged as its top strategic rival.”

The Pentagon directive is classified, but Austin declared that “The initiatives I am putting forward today are nested inside the larger U.S. government approach to China and will help inform the development of the national defence strategy we are working on” which is fair warning that all the stops are being pulled out in the growing determination of Washington to confront China over every aspect of its policy and posture.

What wasn’t mentioned by anyone in Congress or by the U.S. mainstream media is that in 2020 the value of Taiwan’s exports to China and Hong Kong totalled 151.45 billion U.S. dollars, which was the highest annual amount — so far. Statista.com notes that “Mainland China is Taiwan’s largest export partner” and it is also recorded that “The European Union and China are two of the biggest traders in the world. China is now the EU’s second-biggest trading partner behind the United States and the EU is China’s biggest trading partner.”

Another piece of non-news (as regarded by the U.S. media and Congress), is that the land route linking China and Europe is thriving and trade flow is expanding vastly in both directions as part of the Belt and Road Initiative. The Financial Times reported that “More than 2,000 freight trains ran from China to Europe in the first two months of 2021, double the rate a year earlier when the coronavirus first hit. Over the whole of 2020, the total number of train journeys rose 50 per cent”, and on the day that the U.S. Senate voted to penalise China in every way they could think of, a Xinhua news release indicated that “a new China-Europe freight-train route linking the city of Jinhua in east China’s Zhejiang Province with Budapest in Hungary was launched on Monday… The new China-Europe freight-train service offers a new efficient and convenient route for the Yangtze River Delta and even eastern Chinese coastal cities to export goods to Europe… In the January-May period, a total of 286 China-Europe freight trains departed or arrived in the city of Jinhua, carrying 23,700 TFE [twenty-foot equivalent] of goods, with the two figures up 565 percent and 566 percent year on year, respectively.”

China’s export-import trade with Taiwan, Europe, Africa, and Asia is thriving, and it is apparent from official figures that while the overall “U.S. trade gap narrowed to $68.9 billion in April of 2021 from a record high $75 billion gap in March” the “deficit with China decreased $7.1 billion to $32.4 billion as exports were up and imports declined.”

This is all part of globalism, and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, for example, has noted that “the outlook for Chinese exports is positive” — and although Beijing has suspended economic dialogue because of Canberra’s aggressive support of the U.S.’ anti-China policy, “Chinese imports from Australia rose 49% in April to $14.87 billion, while exports rose 20% to $5.25 billion, and exports to the EU rose 24% to $39.92 billion, while imports climbed 43% to $26.79 billion.”

So what is Washington’s problem?

Quite simply, it is feared that, in the words of Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, a principal director of the anti-China surge, “If we do nothing, our days as the dominant superpower may be ending. We don’t mean to let those days end on our watch. We don’t mean to see America become a middling nation in this century.” But he’s going to have to face reality, because in the not-too-distant future the United States is going to be overtaken by China, economically, and its reign as “dominant superpower” is indeed coming to an end. This is inevitable — and it isn’t going to be a disaster for the American people or for the rest of humanity. Why should it be?

It would be better for the United States and for the world if the Biden administration realised that engagement is preferable to estrangement and that straight, lawful competition is entirely consistent with western capitalism. The foreign ministers of China and the ten countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations, Asean, had a meeting in China on June 7 and their joint statement included notification that Asean “connectivity” would continue in synchrony with the Belt and Road Initiative and that they would all “work to enhance linkages in the region to enhance conducive business environment and to fuel sustainable and inclusive economic growth.” They are looking forward to increased cooperation and prosperity, benefitting all their citizens. Let us hope that the G-7 and other countries will reflect on the positive results of economic collaboration rather than the nationalistic drum-bashing confrontation advocated by such as Chuck Schumer. Of course people should be proud of their country. But one of the best ways to encourage pride is to maintain peace and encourage prosperity.

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Brian Cloughley is a British and Australian armies’ veteran, former deputy head of the UN military mission in Kashmir and Australian defense attaché in Pakistan.

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China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reaches out in all directions, across Central Asia into Europe, up into Russia, through the seas and oceans of Asia, out to Africa and of course, deep into Southeast Asia.

The Southeast Asian leg of BRI consists primarily of a now-under-construction high-speed rail (HSR) line connecting China’s Yunnan Province with Laos, Thailand and perhaps eventually Malaysia and Singapore.

A large number of adjacent projects also are in the making and will complement other infrastructure projects recently constructed over the past decade or under construction now.

This includes various expressways, particularly through mountainous Laos which have already cut trips by road from days to just a day from China’s border with Laos in the north to the nation’s capital of Vientiane near the Laotian-Thai border. Additional expressways are under construction to facilitate more traffic within and through Laos.

Another expressway is currently proposed that will connect northern Thailand to southern China via Laos, cutting travel time between the two nations to just 2 hours.

Bangkok Post’s article, “Laos surveys new expressway linking Thailand, China,” would note:

The new road will connect with Chiang Khong district of Chiang Rai via the existing bridge over the Mekong River.

The 180-kilometre highway would allow vehicles to travel at 80 kilometres per hour and a drive from Thailand to China through Laos would take less than two hours.

The HSR line itself will include both passenger and freight services and across Laos, a network of “landports” to facilitate regional logistical operations.

The entire network is already under construction with Bangkok’s new Bang Sue Grand Station completed and ready to open this year, hosting Thailand’s high-speed trains in coming years, and the Laotian leg nearing completion with train services possibly coming online by the end of 2021 or early 2022.

Western Derision & Hopes to Undermine

Criticism for the network of transportation projects stretching into Southeast Asia, like criticism of the BRI itself, stem mainly from Western ambitions to prevent the rise of China and with it, the rise of the rest of Asia.

US media sources like the US State Department’s Voice of America repeatedly floats accusations of Beijing employing “debt-trap diplomacy” while also admitting that Laos, until these projects began, was landlocked, isolating it from regional markets and preventing economic growth.

It’s obvious that Laos’ current economy is not well-suited for paying off massive infrastructure projects, but the infrastructure projects will expand its economy up to and beyond levels needed to do so, which is the fundamental principle behind investing in infrastructure in the first place.

Other cart-before-horse analysis includes claims that there is no market for HSR services across Southeast Asia and specifically in Laos or Thailand. The same flawed arguments were made by bitter Western analysts in a bid to deride China’s own domestic HSR development.

Analysis attempting to conclude low-income passengers wouldn’t’ be able or willing to pay for tickets to ride China’s HSR services missed the crucial fact that the building of infrastructure accelerates more than just passengers down a set of rails. It connects cities and rural regions, expands economic activity for a larger number of people and if extensive enough (as China’s HSR network is) it moves whole sections of society up the socioeconomic ladder.

Initially low ridership was seized upon by Western pundits claiming China’s HSR ambitions were too big and the entire project was “in trouble,” as one Business Insider op-ed did in 2011. Now in 2021, Western pundits, despite China State Railway overseeing the nation’s HSR network regularly turning an annual profit, still lecture China over HSR after over a decade of predicting failure that never materialised.

Today, China’s HSR network moves between 2 billion and 3 billion passengers a year and reaches into the most remote areas of the nation (with a leg completed in Tibet just this June) bringing with it tourists, investors, businesspeople and opportunities hitherto out of reach especially for rural regions.

Infrastructure comes first, prosperity follows. Attempting to claim infrastructure is ill-conceived because it won’t immediately profit demonstrates the exceedingly shortsighted nature of many Western observers versus the long-term thinking of China’s government and apparently also of its partners in Laos and Thailand.

Obviously rural regions in Laos or in northeast Thailand will not find HSR services immediately appealing during the first years of operation. But as economic activity flows through these regions made accessible to many more people both within Laos and Thailand and also from China, economic conditions will improve, and ridership will increase, just as it did in China. With the prospect of this regional HSR network also moving freight, new markets will also be made available for businesses and farmers in these regions.

For the West, a tangible jealousy is manifesting itself as China builds infrastructure out of reach of even the richest Western nations. To see nations like Laos and Thailand share in China’s rise seems to pain many in the West even more, many in the West who see their culture and system as superior, yet find it increasingly difficult to explain why Asia as a whole appears to be surpassing the West by a growing number of metrics.

Beyond derision across the Western media, Western governments have mobilised opposition groups in Thailand in a bid to oust the current government primarily because of its close and growing ties with China.

We can expect in the next several years for this opposition to intensify and for both them and their Western sponsors to resort to increasingly desperate tactics as these projects near completion.

If China’s regional ambitions are realised, this opposition along with Western condemnation will become irrelevant as the vast majority of people in the region will see with their own eyes the tangible benefits these projects afford them in their daily lives, rendering moot the well-funded propaganda campaign well underway trying to convince them otherwise.

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Joseph Thomas is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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The untimely remarks by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar on the situation in Afghanistan during a joint press conference with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov at Moscow on Friday does no good for his reputation as a scholar-diplomat with integrity or for India’s standing on the global stage as a responsible regional power. 

The Indian newspapers have quoted Jaishankar as saying,

“Of course we are concerned at the direction of events in Afghanistan. The point right now we stress is that we must see a reduction in violence. Violence cannot be the solution for the situation in Afghanistan. At the end of the day, who governs Afghanistan has a legitimacy aspect. I think that is something which we cannot and should not be ignored.” 

If Jaishankar’s ageing government plane had chosen Bahrain instead of Georgia for refuelling on his return journey from Moscow, would he have been flustered by the “legitimacy aspect” of his hosts? Bahrain is an old-fashioned brutal autocracy which refuses to empower the majority Shia nation. Yet, India has wonderful relations with it. It is a very violent regime which puts down even mild traces of dissent — and thanks to Abraham Accords, may now become more bestial with the access to Israeli expertise. Does that bother India? 

It doesn’t — and it shouldn’t. Because, there is a flourishing Indian community living in Bahrain, and even though it has no oil to give India, the remittances are important. It also hosts an American base where at one time India wanted to depute a naval officer to liaise with the US’ Sixth Fleet within the framework of the Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China. 

Since when is it that India started losing sleep over the “legitimacy aspect” of other regimes? The “legitimacy aspect” is not even an issue in Afghanistan where the state withered away a long time ago. Jaishankar probably doesn’t know why Afghanistan has so many “acting” ministers. Because, President Ghani keeps changing his ministers every now then according to to his whims and fancies and dares not seek parliamentary approval for his new picks, which the constitution mandates. 

In fact, the current parliament, which is housed in a new building inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2015, itself has outlasted its term aeons ago — and in any case, no one misses legislative work in Afghanistan where power flows through the barrel of the gun. 

Take the “legitimacy aspect” of Ghani himself. The voter turnout in the 2019 election was roughly 1 million (in a country of 40 million.)  At best, Ghani can claim he got somewhere around 5 lakhs votes in that rigged election, which was fiercely disputed by his opponent Abdullah who felt embittered — rightly so — that he was cheated out of victory. 

Finally, all the King’s men and all the King’s horses from Washington and other NATO capitals managed to reconcile the two Afghan politicians with vaulting ambition but improbable popular base with a compromise formula that was supposed to be an interim arrangement for creating the post of a prime minister for Abdullah, which Ghani coolly ignored. 

This is, in a nutshell, the chronicle of Afghanistan’s current regime. The international community looked away since it really didn’t matter who ruled as president in Kabul, since the real power vested in the hands of the American military commanders and some of Ghani’s closest deputies too were their creations, who plucked them out of thin air, trained them in intelligence work and catapulted them to the nerve centres of Afghanistan’s fearsome spy agencies. 

It was a cosy arrangement as the gravy train puffing its way through the valleys and mountain slopes of the Hindu Kush was carrying tens of billions of dollars. Simply put, the Afghan ruling elite have had a whale of a time. The interest groups on the American side also stood to gain out of nefarious activities ranging from prostitution to drug trafficking. Russia has repeatedly alleged that the US military personnel were directly involved in drug trafficking. 

Of course, the Afghan elite prospered like nobody’s business and almost everyone has stashed away the loot in foreign countries — in Dubai or wherever. In the bargain, corruption spread like cancer eating into the vitals of the state and the country has become notorious as the most corrupt on the whole planet. 

The Pentagon’s inspector who audits the war and reports to the Congress has thrown up his hands in despair and admitted he cannot possibly account for vast sums of expenditure in this 20-year war. Hundreds of millions of American dollars just vanished into thin air! Perhaps, such venality is endemic to all armies and spy agencies fighting protracted wars and insurgencies far away from public view and are not held accountable. 

Now, this is the Ghani regime for you. Jaishankar had no reason to have got emotional about the violence in Afghanistan. It is a documented fact that the unofficial militia groups trained by the CIA and operating under Ghani’s security tsars and spy agencies have perpetrated such horrific crimes on the Afghan civilian population that words cannot possibly describe. read more 

And the curious part is that India has had no qualms about bonding with those Afghan tsars with blood on their hands. Suffice to say, Delhi either didn’t know what has been really happening in Afghanistan all these years and where the rivers of blood originated from — or more likely, it simply looked away because of some unspeakable congruence of interests. 

Indeed, violence has been a part of Afghan way of life for centuries. As President Biden noted last week, the country itself has never been a unified state. Amazing, isn’t, that an American president would know Afghan history that an Indian foreign minister next door doesn’t seem to know?

The crux of the matter is that it is not because of the graph of violence or the “legitimacy aspect” that Ghani refuses to give way to an interim government but the lure of power and the perks and privileges that goes with it. (By the way, Jaishankar’s argument about this “legitimacy aspect” is plucked from Ghani’s lips.) Unfortunately, some Pentagon commanders deployed to Afghanistan encouraged Ghani to be recalcitrant as their vested interests dovetailed with his and his circle’s. 

The cabal in Kabul managed to hoodwink Barack Obama and Donald Trump. But to its bad luck, Biden knows this war like the back of his hands and had once done his best to prevent the catastrophic “surge” in 2009, even visiting Obama on a Sunday to dissuade him from that path. Biden is sensitive to the public opinion, which decidedly approves of his decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. read more 

Afghanistan’s salvation lies in a quick transition to an interim government that includes the Taliban, as envisaged under the Doha pact, so that this brutal, senseless bloodshed can be stopped and negotiations can begin in right earnest for a peace settlement and the drafting of a new constitution to address the “legitimacy aspect”. 

In such a process, the regional states can help Afghans to navigate the tough journey ahead to peace and the recovery of their sovereignty. Hopefully, India will stop acting like a dog in the manger as the SCO foreign ministers meet in Dushanbe next week. China is taking the historic initiative to open an SCO pathway leading to Kabul. read more

Clearly, a civil war is not inevitable in Afghanistan. To make that doubly sure, New Delhi should resist any temptation to act as spoiler and instead should cooperate sincerely with its SCO partners in reaching a regional consensus behind the formation of an interim government in Kabul. 

Jaishankar probably does not understand it yet, but the SCO is precisely the diplomatic vehicle that suits India as a responsible regional player meaningfully contributing to regional security and stability rather than meander aimlessly as an outlier or lone ranger. 

There are hidden charms too, as a splendid opportunity becomes available to harmonise with Pakistan. India should have the self-confidence that it is uniquely placed to help Afghanistan recover from the trauma of death and destruction it went through in the past half century since the overthrow of King Zahir Shah. 

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Featured image: Amidst reports that Taliban fighters have entered Kandahar City, Afghan forces guarding a road, Afghanistan, July 9, 2021 (Source: Indian Punchline)

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Declaring its firm intent to respect and protect each other’s “state sovereignty” and “territorial integrity,” the historical Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (July 11, 1961) between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been the foundation of the relationship between these two states. As one of the main alliances in Northeast Asia—along with the US alliances with Korea and Japan—their partnership has become a permanent fixture in the geopolitical landscape of the region. China’s emergence as a great power and North Korea’s accelerated buildup of its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities has, however, made the alliance more significant as well as more complicated.

As the date for the treaty’s renewal draws close, how will this partnership evolve? What will the treaty’s extension mean for the future of the Northeast Asian peace and security architecture? Both countries may not entirely agree on clauses related to their mutual obligations, and Beijing will seek to redraw those provisions in its favor. While the value of the treaty is too important to both parties to let their differences significantly weaken it, this time around, the alliance is likely to face enormous challenges going forward.

How Relevant Is the Treaty of Friendship Today?

The critical axis between Northeast Asia, China and North Korea has undergone a turbulent period in bilateral relations over the past two decades. Tensions have appeared in the relationship from time to time—with debate on whether the treaty is “outdated” having emerged in Chinese media and strategic circles—as the two worked to manage changing geopolitical circumstances and deteriorating ties with the United States. Nonetheless, on May 27, 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met North Korea’s new ambassador to China to reaffirm their “traditional friendship,” continued “high-level strategic communication,” and joint cause of promoting socialism, as both states gear up to celebrate the 60th anniversary of their alliance.

Critically, Article II of the treaty codifies a China-DPRK collective defense commitment, explicitly obligating both states to take all measures (including military assistance) to prevent any “armed attack” by a state or an alliance of states. To this end, Article III restricts both countries from participating in a bloc or action directed against the other; simultaneously, the first clause of the treaty stipulates that the two countries will strive to “safeguard the peace of Asia and the world and the security of all peoples.”

Under the current circumstances, these clauses have become inherently contradictory. For instance, to ensure peace in Asia and the security of all peoples (Article I), Beijing has been forced to participate in actions against Pyongyang—such as imposing sanctions on the North through the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Chinese diplomatic and military analysts have, over time, also contended that Beijing is “not obliged” to help shield Pyongyang in the event of conflict, as its development of nuclear weapons has put Beijing’s national security in jeopardy, thus breaching the common defense commitment.

Since its last renewal, North Korea’s nuclear ambitions have tested the relationship over and over again. A key turning point in China-DPRK relations was October 2006, when the North tested its first nuclear weapon. This compelled China to sponsor UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which imposed sanctions on North Korea for this action. This resolution signaled a change in Beijing’s tone towards North Korea—from discreet political aid and diplomatic humanitarian aid to one of restraint. As Pyongyang continued to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technologies, further rifts have emerged. This was especially evident in 2017, when the DPRK’s aggressive nuclear and missile testing coincided with key Chinese events like the inauguration of Xi Jinping’s flagship Belt and Road Forum in May 2017, the Xi-Trump Mar-a-Lago Summit in July 2017 and the September 2017 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Summit in Xiamen. This was a particularly strained time in China-DPRK relations, and these actions pushed them closer to a “tipping point.”

However, despite such tensions, the importance of strengthening the China-DPRK alliance has become secondary to their existing pragmatic economic and security ties. Nevertheless, the legacy of their shared roots in “Marxism-Leninism” and the principle of “proletarian internationalism” have continued to underpin their interactions, as the two countries promoted inter-party relations alongside inter-state ties. Moreover, both states have deepened their commitment to regular consultations on matters of mutual interest under Article IV of the treaty. Both formal and informal China-DPRK meetings at various diplomatic levels have strengthened the narrative that despite differences, the two sides are focused on “carrying forward [their] traditional friendship.” While the 2018 informal summit between Kim Jong Un and Xi Jinping highlighted Beijing’s wish to play a “constructive role” in the future of the Korean Peninsula, the 2019 state visit by Xi to North Korea reassured Pyongyang of the “eternal friendship” the two states share.

Furthermore, shared tensions with the US have tended to drive continued engagement between China and North Korea despite bilateral frictions. Their shared worldview—primarily opposition to US efforts at regime change and promotion of human rights and democracy—have been critical aspects of China-DPRK friendship, validating the relevance of the treaty in the years ahead. The American strategy to influence the geopolitics of Northeast Asia through the security landscape and its dominant position in strategic institutions also encourages China and North Korea to stay united and achieve the goals of their partnership. For instance, the May 2021 reaffirmation of their bilateral ties came after the US decision to lift a 42-year-old ban on South Korea’s development of ballistic missiles that can reach beyond the Korean Peninsula, which poses security challenges to both China and the DPRK.

For China, the treaty remains indispensable as an instrument enabling Beijing to sustain its engagement with North Korea and play an influential role in the affairs of the Korean Peninsula. China believes that South Korea and the US expect to dominate the politics and (perhaps] unification processes of the Korean Peninsula, excluding Chinese participation. Under such conditions, the treaty’s Article VI notably provides a legal avenue for China’s involvement in devising a solution to the Korean question by committing both states to a Korean unification solution “along peaceful and democratic lines,” in “national interests of the Korean people,” and that sustains “peace in the Far East.”

The Treaty in US-China Rivalry

With its delicate security balance, Northeast Asia is a critical region of interest to both China (as its backyard) and the US (as home to its Indo-Pacific Command and its alliances with Japan and South Korea.) The China-DPRK treaty has been a long-standing pillar of such regional dynamics, and its importance to China emerges from Beijing’s interest in maintaining its influence in this crucial region.

The historic meeting between South Korea’s Moon Jae-in and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un in April 2018 and the signing of the Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula provided a diplomatic win in advance of US-DPRK talks but left China out in the cold. The declaration itself only mentioned China in passing in a quadrilateral format and focused instead on trilateral ROK-DPRK-US arrangements to shape the Korean Peninsula’s future, making it a matter of strategic concern for China. A subsequent historic meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un in June 2018 further solidified the Chinese belief that the inter-Korean peace process would unfold with the US at the helm, reducing China’s long-held and well-established political power in Northeast Asia.

Under US President Joseph Biden, Washington has deepened its engagement with Seoul. By settling the military cost-sharing issue, ending restrictions on Republic of Korea (ROK) ballistic missile development and holding a successful Biden-Moon summit, the Biden administration has worked to repair damage inflicted on the alliance by the Trump administration, reset the bilateral relationship and shift the focus to bolster the alliance to confront challenges posed by China and North Korea. The US has also completed its North Korea policy review and announced a new “calibrated, practical approach” to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, with an openness to diplomacy with North Korea. It also made a surprise appointment of veteran diplomat Sung Kim as a new special representative for the DPRK at the Biden-Moon summit despite early indications the post would remain vacant for the near future.

In this political climate, with the renewed US focus on alliances in the region, the China-DPRK treaty becomes fundamentally vital for China to maintain its influence and regional stability. As long as the US-ROK alliance remains strong, and the US continues its presence on the peninsula, the treaty will act as a counterweight to US and ROK influence in the region—making its renewal a foregone conclusion.

Challenges to the China-DPRK Treaty

In evaluating how the treaty has held up since its last renewal in 2001, it is evident that, while the agreement is critical for both states, its renewal will present challenges. For instance, in the context of Article II on military assistance, it remains to be seen whether China is willing to commit itself to the defense of North Korea, based on the conclusion that the North’s nuclear development has rendered the clause invalid. Moreover, according to the terms of the treaty, China is only obligated to come to North Korea’s aid if Pyongyang is attacked first; thus, Kim Jong Un could find himself without Chinese military assistance should he repeat the events of the Korean War when the North was the aggressor. It is unlikely, however, that North Korea would support the treaty’s renewal without the military protection clause.

Beijing considers stability on the Korean Peninsula an essential interest. Its support to North Korea guarantees a buffer between China, the South and US forces on the peninsula. Hence, even though the Chinese are inclined towards a North Korea without nuclear weapons, their biggest fear remains a collapse of the Kim regime, which raises serious concerns over the potential unification of the Korean Peninsula under South Korean control, the security of the North’s nuclear weapons stockpile, and a massive influx of refugees across the border (China is already the first destination for North Korean refugees).

Therefore, peace on the Korean Peninsula (and, by extension, East Asia) has become central to Xi’s Korea policy. A war emanating from the region could pit the US and China directly against each other. While China has a rapidly expanding and modernizing military, it currently remains far behind the US in terms of both capabilities and, crucially, experience. Beijing’s foremost priority would thus be to avoid an unwanted full-scale war and may seek to amend or nullify Article II accordingly. Beijing has reportedly sought to revoke this clause to no avail, and has conveyed to Pyongyang not to count on Chinese military aid.

For North Korea, the treaty’s importance is based not only on China’s position as its largest trade partner—accounting for 95 percent of the North’s total merchandise trade—but also as a source of leverage in its negotiations with South Korea and the US. In recalibrating the language in the treaty, North Korea’s aim will be to reaffirm its currently asymmetric relationship with China as the Biden administration amps up coordinated efforts with allies on North Korea.

Conclusion

For both China and the DPRK, their Treaty of Friendship remains vital as a tool for engaging with the US and ROK on more favorable terms, and its renewal is inevitable. While it is unlikely for significant changes to emerge from this year’s renewal, it will likely face major challenges over the next 20 years owing to changed political realities, opening the door to its amendment. Although China will not allow outside pressure to destabilize the regime in North Korea, it is an increasingly reluctant ally to the DPRK. Moving forward, Beijing will seek to redraw the treaty in its favor. How the alliance evolves under this agreement over the next two decades will be critical for both Xi and Kim’s leadership.

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Australia, like other island states, has had spells of isolationist fancy and hermit dispositions.  Protected by geography, distant and vast, the country’s first bit of legislation in 1901 was the Immigration Restriction Act.  This nasty little statute came to be colloquially known as the White Australia Policy.  Doors would remain open to Europeans and preferably those of Western stock. 

Fortress Australia has also had a few modern manifestations.  Refugees and asylum seekers who dare make their perilous journey to Australia via sea are rapidly whisked away into a privatised, Pacific concentration camp system.  They are solemnly promised never to be settled on the Australian mainland.

Now, against another sort of traveller, far less tangible and distinctly invisible, Fortress Australia is again finding its shaky form.  But the novel coronavirus cares little for such shuttering approaches.  It specialises in spread and mutation, skirting around barriers, leaping over obstacles and coasting along aerosol transmission.  The virus’s devastating product – the disease of COVID-19 – is indifferent to the fortress. 

Since Australia’s borders closed in 2020 the fortress formula has become an article of faith.  International travel was halted.  Caps were placed on returning Australians and permanent residents.  Arrivals were placed in quarantine for fortnightly periods in ill-fitted hotels. 

For a time, the Hermit Nation strategy worked, if creakily.  Quarantine breaches did take place with telling consequences – Melbourne suffered in June 2020 and endured a lockdown lasting 112 impoverishing days.  But for the most part, breaches could be contained.  Contact tracing and surveillance was sharpened.  A sense of hubris developed: the virus could be outwitted.  The country could bask in the isolation of “COVID Zero”.

While Australia was fashioning its suppression and elimination strategy, its politicians became bullish and complacent.  The vaccine strategy, the crucial counterpart to containment, was neglected and left to wither.  In August 2020, Morrison boasted that “Australians will be one of the first in the world to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, if it proves successful, through an agreement between the Australian Government and UK-based drug company AstraZeneca.”  That agreement, at least initially, was merely a letter of intent.

The government then thought it sensible to focus on acquiring the AstraZeneca vaccine over all others.  Alternatives were treated as distant contenders.  Fictional numbers and targets were generated.   

Countries which spectacularly failed in containing COVID-19 – the United States and UK foremost among them – showed greater prudence on the vaccine front.  Contracts with pharmaceutical giants were drawn up to develop and manufacture a range of vaccines.  Supply chains were guaranteed and mass rollout strategies scripted.  From the rooftops of morgues, President Donald Trump and UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson could celebrate and distract.  The needle and the jab could take over from death and catastrophe, working alongside a range of other containment measures. 

In the meantime, Australia was left behind.  Health Minister Greg Hunt called the quest to vaccinate the Australian populace “a marathon not a sprint.”  Morrison similarly informed the press that this was neither a race nor a competition.  The vaccination rollout, correctly seen as a “strollout”, only began on February 22; the UK, US and European states had begun around Christmas, if not earlier. 

There was also inadequate supply to meet demand.  Hunt’s March 22 announcement that people should make a friendly call to their GP to organise a vaccination was farcical and wishful thinking.  GPs had little idea when or how many doses they would receive.  It did not occur to the federal government that mass vaccination centres should also be set up as a priority.

The pace of this “boutique” program was also affected by the bad press surrounding AstraZeneca’s vaccine.  While it does cause rare blood clotting, the risk of death remains one in a million.  But the communications strategy of the federal government was woeful and disunited. 

As the health advice changed to prioritise older groups, the Morrison government realised it needed to consider other vaccine options.  The problem was not vaccine hesitancy but hesitancy to AZ.  Other options, notably Pfizer, were needed.    

While the vaccine rollout crawled, COVID-19 did not.  Cases of community transmission began to soil the COVID Zero record.  A number of snap lockdowns were imposed in Western Australia and Queensland. Victoria, yet again, added its name to the list.  Now, stubborn, resistant New South Wales has become another member of the lockdown family, with Sydney facing the Delta strain. 

The Australian government’s response to this latest debacle?  An advertising campaign crass in nature, ill-conceived and inaccurate.  Designed to terrify people into vaccination, its amateurish clumsiness misfires in puns and insensitivity. 

More practical approaches have come from outside government circles.  Former Prime Ministers have shown Morrison up.  The ever connected Kevin Rudd made his own intervention in lobbying Pfizer’s chairman Albert Bourla.  This effort was bitchily dismissed by Hunt and watered down by the Morrison government.  Rudd’s response was a snarl.  He would “definitely not seek to associate himself with the Australian Government’s comprehensively botched vaccine procurement program.” 

The Australian model, if it can be called that, has pricked international attention.  John LaMattina, former president of Pfizer Global Research and Development, was all understatement about it in an interview on Australian television: “If I was an Australian, and I was seeing the rest of the world getting all these vaccine doses, and my country … was late to the party, I’d be a little disappointed to say the least.  And it isn’t as if they were blindsided.”

The Financial Review was less reserved.  Australia may well have developed “an enviable test and tracing system” that helped keep the COVID-19 death toll to less than a thousand.  But it had “squandered its early victory over the virus, despite being one of the world’s wealthiest countries”. It now faced “a costly round of restrictions as it struggles to protect a largely unimmunised population from outbreaks of the highly contagious Delta variant.”

The country stood as “a warning to other nations, not least neighbouring New Zealand, that a fortress approach to the virus cannot succeed in the absence of an effective vaccine program.”  The hermit approach is not only looking foolish but dangerous.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

“Dear customers, if you are standing there reading this sign you are part of the problem. STAY THE FUCK HOME! Best, Sydney.” Note on store front, Sydney, Twitter, July 10, 2021

It is proving to be an unfolding nightmare. For a government that had been beaming with pride at their COVID contract tracing for months, insisting that people could live, consume and move about with freedom as health professionals wrapped themselves round the virus, the tune has changed.  The Delta variant of the disease has proved viciously wily in Sydney, New South Wales.  Admissions to intensive care units are growing.  The first death has just been reported. The number of infections recorded on July 10: 50; the number the next day: 77. 

Of concern are the numbers of people who were moving in the community during all or part of their infectious phase.  Of the 50 reported cases on Saturday, 37 of those qualified.  “That is the number we need to get down to as close as zero as possible,” statedan alarmed Premier Gladys Berejiklian.  “The only conclusion we can draw from this is that things are going to get worse before they get better.”

The 11am press conferences are proving grim affairs tinged by panic.  The questions asked are the same as those in other states in Australia where outbreaks took place.  What are essential shopping items?  How many people are permitted in your home?  On each successive occasion, the Premier seemed panicked, even shrill.  “Zero means zero!” she has stated at various points.  “No visits!”

The most telling element behind the surge of cases is the blithe approach taken to the health orders by the citizenry of Australia’s largest city.  This is understandable, given the erratic changes in Berejiklian’s approach to communicating health orders.  With an almost manic insistence on keeping areas of the city open, she has confused rather than clarified, hoping that the virus might be contained within various local government areas (LGAs).  Erin O’Leary, manager of a café in Newtown, noted in late June the distinct irony of having the front of her store in lockdown, and the back, not.  Andrea Chapman, owner of a design store, had a few words of wisdom that might well be ringing in the ears of the Premier.  “Sometimes you’ve just got to hit everyone hard and everyone sucks it up, then we can move on.” 

The Premier has been the victim of her own success, telling Sydney residents and those in New South Wales that the state was that different from the rest of Australia.  They were the “gold standard” to be emulated by all in terms of containing the pandemic.  On June 1, the often fawning Herald Sun from the Murdoch press stable praised the Berejiklian government for getting everything right where its Victorian counterpart had failed.  “One state is NSW, led by a competent woman who has displayed a sense of proportionality throughout the Covid crisis and has kept people safe while ensuring their livelihoods and liberties are not needlessly destroyed, the other is Victoria.”   

Through that same month, as the Delta variant was starting to show heft, there was no reason to worry: sagacious Gladys had things under control, as did everybody else.  Those in Sydney could use their highly attuned “common sense” and “make individual decisions based on their own circumstances.”  On June 18, she cautioned against mass gatherings.  “Unless you absolutely have to, our strong preference is that you do not engage in any activity.”  Business owners were left to decide on how best to operate in the changing circumstances.

Even as the virus had harnessed itself and trotted through the city, the Premier resisted any reference to the “lockdown” term, opting for the softer, milder “stay-at-home” order.  Lacking the necessary gravity to be persuaded, individuals moved about with liberty, dropping off children before heading to work, or continuing visits to family members.    

Sounding at points comically maternal, Berejiklian has been telling those in Sydney to be honest about where they have been for reasons of contact tracing.  Some accounts supplied to the tracers have been inaccurate.  Chief Health Officer Kerry Chant has admitted “having difficulty getting ahead of [transmission] chains”.  “We haven’t got time to waste unpicking stories, going back, cross-checking and verifying.”  Her advice: “It’s critical that [people] tell the truth the first time.”

Parties and gatherings are being held and a number of infringement notices have been handed out by police (167 of them on Friday alone).  On social media, the hashtag “SydneyMockdown” is trending.  The man behind Australia’s punchy response to combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, Bill Bowtell, has been regular in his scathing assessments.  “Nothing like lockdown lite.  No outdoor mask mandate, retailing open and no kilometre radius restriction.  Neither short nor sharp as in [Western Australia] or [Queensland].”

The haphazard approach to public health policy is also to be found in the government’s response to shopping and trading practices.  The decision to keep non-essential shopping outlets open, including large retail centres ripe for transmission opportunities, has meant free movement of both people and the virus.  Berejiklian “thinks people understand what is required”; a stricter enforcement of orders would produce unintentional “suffering” to those who “can’t access something they really need”.   Simon Chapman, professor emeritus in public health at the University of Sydney, could only express his bemusement.  “It’s not rocket science to show that a place with large numbers of people in it is going to be far more of a superspreading environment than a place with small numbers of people.” 

Within the New South Wales cabinet are the business-as-usual types such as Treasurer Dominic Perrottet, who argued with colleagues that the lockdown should not be extended to July 16.  He now concedes that the already extended lockdown may well have to move beyond this coming Friday.

Looking wistfully at vaccination rates in the United Kingdom and the United States, Perrottet has this message for those in his state: “We’ve got to get to a point where those who want to have a vaccine, get access to one.  And at that point, we’ve got to open up our society, and have the freedoms that we had operating prior to the pandemic.”  Few would demur from this; the problem lies in the former remark: access to vaccines.  On that score, Australians continue to dream, supply continues to be short, and the federal government continues to bungle.  Gold standards have, in the meantime, turned into rusted metal.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

Sex on the screen and on the page has often incurred the wrath of Australian censors.  Over the years, the opaquely functioning Office of Film and Literature Classification has been guarding Australians like the children of Eden, fearful that their sensibilities might be corrupted.  But Australian politicians and various advocacy groups have broadened their interest over the years to focus on the Internet and how best to regulate both posted content and access to it. 

Pornography features highly in this effort.  In April former opposition leader and shadow minister for government services Bill Shorten remarked to the National Press Club that, “Children have too easy access to pornography in this country online … I think a lot of parents are oblivious.”  While not claiming to be a censor, he still insisted that children “shouldn’t be getting their sex education from hardcore pornography.”

The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs is also exercised about the subject, having tabled a report in February 2020 asking the Digital Transformation Agency (DTA), working with the Australian Cybersecurity Centre, to develop a regime for online verification that would limit access to such services as online wagering and pornography.  “These standards will help to ensure that online age verification is accurate and effective, and that the process for legitimate consumers is easy, safe, and secure.” 

The report’s title is suggestive of a broader moral mission: Protecting the Age of Innocence.  Much material is marshalled against pornography.  The average age of a child first exposed to porn was somewhere between eight or 10 years of age.  Its consumption led to harm, be it in terms of education, health, relationships and wellbeing. 

The committee was firm in suggesting that the eSafety Commissioner steer the “development of a roadmap for implementation of a regime of mandatory age verification for online pornographic material”.  This would be “part of a broader, holistic approach to address the risks and harms associated with online pornography.”

The government response to the report was made last month, supporting age restrictions on accessing such material “in principle”.  “The government is committed to protecting young people while safeguarding the privacy and security of people of all ages in an increasingly digital environment.” 

An acknowledgment was made that technology could only be “part of the solution.”  The response notes that parental engagement and education should also constitute a “multifaceted approach” in reducing “the adverse effects of online pornography and other harmful content.”  But there is agreement “that the Digital Transformation Agency is well placed to explore extending the digital identity program.”  The government’s initial focus “will be to complete work underway that explores the potential for changes to the policy and accreditation framework … Depending upon the findings of this work, further technical interventions may be required.”

The DTA has been enthusiastic about the merits of its Trusted Digital Identity Framework.  In its submission to the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs in 2019, it claims that, “Digital identity does not involve a unique identifier, nor does it allow tracking of online activities.  Instead, it provides a means for a person to authenticate their identity online.”

The eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant is now engaged in exploring various means of age verification, and promises results in this crusade to shield children from pornography.  “The last thing anyone wants is for this material, which is becoming increasingly violent and degrading towards women, or the less dominant intimate partner, becoming the de facto sex education tool for a generation of children.”

The use of digital ID for reasons of verifying age is a subject of concern for the cyber fraternity.    Matt Warren of RMIT University wonders if such policies might well encourage children to explore other realms of the digital frontier such as the dark web.  “Society norms wouldn’t apply there because they’re not regulated or policed.” The problem would not only remain unaddressed but could be worsened.

Cyber expert Susan McLean, while not necessarily convinced that children would plunge into the world of dark web pursuits, suggests old fashioned parental guidance and restraint.  Age verification measures, were they to be used, had to be more than mere box ticking.  “On its own, it’s not going to work.”  It needed to be supplemented by education.  “We need support for parents, we need education for parents.”

This firm push for regulating Internet content and access should also be read alongside the Online Safety Bill, which is directed at improving online safety through enlarging the cyber-bullying scheme to remove material harmful to children found on services other than social media; establish a adult cyber-abuse scheme, where material seriously harmful to adults may be removed; and create an image-based abuse scheme, where intimate images shared without consent may be scrubbed. 

While the spirit of the scheme may be laudable, its effects are unlikely to be.  Such regimes tend to encourage the deletion of links relevant to sex education while restricting access to what are otherwise deemed legitimate services (dating apps, escort advertising platforms).  Digital Rights Watch warns that such activities as watching porn, visiting kinky websites or maintaining subscriptions to adult content will fall within the remit of the eSafety Commissioner “to tell you what you can and cannot see.” 

As with most measures tinged by moral outrage and paternalistic indignation, the outcomes of these policies may well prove not only self-defeating but even more pernicious than the ills they seek to address.  Be wary of the law of unintended consequences.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Shutterstock

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***

Background

In 2017, hundreds of small-scale farmers and farm workers were poisoned – and over 20 died – in just a few weeks whilst spraying pesticides on cotton fields in the district of Yavatmal.  A key product involved was the insecticide Polo, manufactured by Syngenta.

The use of Polo’s active ingredient diafenthiuron is long banned in Switzerland and the European Union but Syngenta keeps selling it in countries where regulations are weaker and less strictly enforced. In 2017, Syngenta exported 75 tonnes of diafenthiuron from Switzerland to India. A Special Investigation Team (SIT) investigated the poisoning in Yavatmal, identified several policy measures and recommended to ban multiple product formulations that were responsible for most of the deaths, including diafenthiuron. Although temporary bans were adopted, today all products are again available on the Indian market.

In September 2020, Public Eye, ECCHR, PAN India and MAPPP filed a “specific instance” with the Swiss national contact point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, on behalf of a group of 51 affected farmers, to demand that Syngenta provides remedy and changes its sales practices in India. At the same time, a claim for compensation was filed in the court of Basel, by the law firm Schadensanwälte on behalf of the families of two victims who died and a farmer who was severely injured due to the exposure to the pesticide Polo.

In October 2020, Switzerland decided to prohibit the export of five highly hazardous pesticides including diafenthiuron. Just a few weeks later, the Responsible Business initiative, which proposed to introduce mandatory human rights due diligence requirements for Swiss companies like Syngenta, was narrowly rejected.

Quest for Justice

An international webinar titled ‘Pesticides Poisonings in India webinar on implications for business accountability and regulatory reform’ was organised organised on 24^thJune, 2021, discussed the quest for justice and accountability of a group of Indian farmers who were poisoned by a pesticide marketed by the Swiss agrochemical giant, Syngenta, and shed light on the way forward for regulating pesticides use both in India and Europe.

The webinar was organised jointly by the Maharashtra Association of Pesticide Poisoned Persons (MAPPP), the Pesticides Action Network (PAN India) and PAN Asia Pacific together with Public Eye and the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR).  The webinar discussed various aspects of the unfortunate incidents of occupational poisonings of farmers and farm workers in Yavatmal district in Maharashtra India.

Sri. Dewanand Pawar, convenor of MAPPP, highlighted the sufferings of the farming community who were poisoned by the pesticide Polo in Yavatmal in 2017. Farmers and farm labour suffered a lot, due to the harmful impact of pesticides, even as the District hospital was overwhelmed by the sudden influx, impacting treatment. In addition to the regular patients, number of pesticide poisoned patients swelled to more than 700. These persons were accommodated in the corridors and in the nook and corner of the hospital. Inadequate number of staff, stunted with lack of knowledge in treating poisoned patients added to the misery of those days.

Mr. Dileep Kumar of PAN India shared details and evidences of harm caused by the pesticide polo from the agrochemical giant Syngenta in Yavatmal based on pesticide poisoning assessment that PAN India conducted in the region. During 2018 and 2019 PAN India team, connected with many of the victims of pesticide poisoning and gathered details such as medical records and police records, container of the pesticides and purchase bills. Citing the police record, exclusively accessed police record showed 94 incidents of polo poisonings. PAN India’s assessment revealed conclusive evidences of polo usage and consequent poisoning among 54 victims including two deaths. Chronic patients continued to be ill, carrying injuries.

Acute effects of the poisoning included eye problems, nausea, neurological and muscular complaints, breathing problems as well as swellings and skin reactions. Poisoned Persons were hospitalised, most of whom for between one day and two weeks, and one person even spent 31 days in hospital. Many reported temporary blindness, while some of these and others were unconscious for between several hours to several days. Most were unable to work for long periods, a few for up to a year. These people reported ongoing health problems, including neurological and muscular problems. For many families, the poisoning caused their already low household income to fall dramatically while the burden on female family members increased – in addition to looking after the children, women had to care for their sick husbands and work as day labourers in the fields, for which they receive significantly lower wages than men do. Their social lives have also been impacted. Many victims of poisoning are no longer able to walk longer distances and, due to recurring skin and eye irritations, can no longer withstand the sun.

Christian Schliemann (Senior Legal Advisor, from the ECCHR) discussed the quest for justice and accountability in Switzerland with regard to the poisoning happened in Yavatmal India[1]. He stressed the need of making multinational companies accountable when their products contribute to harm and human rights. He also spoke about the so-called product liability law, which in a nutshell that makes the manufacturer of a product responsible for the harm that users suffer due to defects in the product. He mentioned that a complaint was filed on 17^th September, 2020, in Swiss National Contact Point of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation Development against Syngenta for violating the OECD guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. He added that two women who lost their husbands due to pesticides poisonings and one farmer who suffered severe health consequences after spraying Polo have filed a lawsuit in civil court in Switzerland demanding compensation for the harm suffered, in 2020.

Polo is an insecticide with the active ingredient diafenthiuron, which was banned in the EU in 2002. In Switzerland, Polo was taken off the market in 2009. In March 2017, diafenthiuron was added to the European list of substances that are banned because of their effects on health and the environment. Nevertheless, Syngenta continues to market the pesticide Polo in the Global South, such as India.

The Yavatmal case shows once again that pesticides can only be sold in Europe under strict conditions. This is quite different when international agrochemical companies sell their products in the Global South: farmers often use pesticides without protective equipment and are not informed about the possible dangers. Companies like Bayer and Syngenta know this. Nevertheless, they continue to export these products to maximize profit, accepting negative effects on their customers’ health as part of the cost of doing business.

Ms. Anina Dalbert (legal advisor of Public Eye) highlighted the need for an export ban of hazardous pesticides and mandatory human rights due diligence to be followed by the multinational companies such as Syngenta[2]. An export ban for pesticides banned in Switzerland has entered into force at the beginning of this year. Anina stated that they “will keep working towards mandatory human rights due diligence in Switzerland to prevent such human rights violations as well as to hold Swiss based multinationals accountable”

Dr. Narasimha Reddy of PAN India (Honorary director of PAN India, & Policy Expert) spoke about the regulatory lacunae in India. Because of this, agrochemical companies are able to escape from product liability and corporate accountability. He highlighted several directions for improving the pesticide regulatory regime. Pesticide management should be decentralised with powers to State governments, so that the regulatory response is quicker and practical. Comprehensive and strong pesticide legislation and monitoring is required to eliminate the harms caused by toxic pesticides.

Ms Sarojeni Rengam (Executive Director of PAN AP) who was moderating the session concluded by saying “we need justice for the farmers and agricultural workers who were poisoned by pesticides in Yavatmal produced and marketed by Syngenta. Pesticide companies have to be made accountable for their business products.  The burden of proof should not be on farmers who are poisoned, but the companies that introduce toxics.”

This webinar highlighted the need for better and comprehensive regulation of pesticides taking into account the corporate accountability and liability, so that potential poisonings and harms caused by pesticides can be prevented.

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Dr. Narasimha Reddy Donthi has been a passionate campaigner on environmental and development issues. He has contributed to public discourse and policy changes in electricity, seed, rice, cotton, sugarcane, sericulture, handloom and textiles, land, water and other related areas. He built campaigns, advocacy programmes and policy change projects. He is an author, writing on different subjects in regional, national and international publications. He also guides students in their Ph.D and other research activities.

Notes

[1] https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/vergiftungswelle-yavatmal-pestizid-konzern-syngenta/

[2] https://www.publiceye.ch/en/topics/pesticides/yavatmal-poisonings-syngentas-pesticide-far-more-heavily-involved

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***

As China celebrated 100 years of the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC) it was also celebrating the nation’s rise from a humiliated colony subjugated by Western imperialism to a global power.

In just the last 21 years of the 21st century, China has transformed from a developing nation, to rivaling the United States, to now being poised to surpass the US and the West in general.

China’s rise has also meant the rise of Asia and beyond as it builds an alternative to the so-called “rules-based international order” created by and exclusively for the US and its Western allies.

Chinese President Xii Jinping’s speech commemorating the 100 year anniversary of the CPC was devoid of self-proclaimed “global leadership” and instead focused on strengthening China internally while constructively contributing to the world abroad, mentioning its massive infrastructure building spree – the One Belt, One Road – by name.

President Xi Jinping also noted China’s transformation from, “a highly centralized planned economy to a socialist market economy.”

Indeed, China today is not the China of Mao Zedong, nor the China of 100 years ago, though the Western media has worked hard to convince global audiences otherwise – attempting to reinforce not only the most negative prejudices held toward China, but also the most inaccurate ones.

China’s Rise, A Difficult Pill for Western Hegemons to Swallow

President Xi Jinping’s speech and related activities to the 100 year anniversary of the CPC covered a wide range of topics. Celebrations and performances noted China’s progress in everything from manufacturing, energy production, and infrastructure, to space exploration, poverty reduction, and the development of China’s armed forces.

Indeed, China has accomplished for its 1.4 billion citizens as well as for its friends and allies abroad feats in the realm of development, peace, and stability unrivaled by the West.

Yet Western media coverage appeared fixated on a single sentence taken from an over 5,000 word speech.

The BBC in its article, “CCP 100: Xi warns China will not be ‘oppressed’ in anniversary speech,” would begin by stating:

China’s President Xi Jinping has warned that foreign powers will “get their heads bashed” if they attempt to bully or influence the country.

The quote was meant to provoke Western audiences, many of whom are guided by their respective media outlets of choice to adopt a sense of superiority and to feel threatened by China’s successes. It was also meant to couple with a massive disinformation campaign depicting China as a threat to global peace and stability, leading audiences to see the quote as threatening to “bash” the heads of anyone who now tries to hold China accountable.

Deliberately omitted by the BBC was any context related to President Xi Jinping’s or China’s well-founded concerns regarding foreign powers who at one point in China’s recent history, colonized sections of its territory with Hong Kong being handed back over to China by the British only as recently as 1997 and with Taiwan still maintained as a Western foothold in Chinese territory to this day.

In fact, the only mention of Hong Kong and Taiwan by the BBC related to claims of Beijing’s “crackdown” on Hong Kong and tensions surrounding Taiwan’s reunification with mainland China – two points of contention created deliberately by the West as a means to pressure Beijing and to contain the rise of China.

China’s humiliation by the West lasted nearly a century and in many ways still continues – albeit in an ever diminishing capacity.

The arrest of Huawei Chief Financial Officer Meng Wanzhou in 2018 by Canadian police at the direction of the US government over alleged violations of illegal US sanctions against Iran serves as a pertinent example of this continued campaign by the West to exercise “domination” over China and to humiliate it and its people at every juncture.

The BBC in its article also claimed that China “has repeatedly accused the US of trying to curb its growth,” as if to suggest Beijing is imagining this rather than it being a central theme of US foreign policy toward China and Asia in general.

US documents such as the declassified “UЫ Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific,” released as part of the Trump White House archives, explicitly state that US objectives in Asia include maintaining “US strategic primacy in the Indo-Pacific region,” and to “promote a liberal economic order while preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence.”

In reality, US President Donald Trump’s desire to maintain primacy over Asia (including China) was carried over from the Obama Administration – who in turn was pursuing an agenda that has been ongoing for decades – articulated as early as the 1960’s in the “Pentagon Papers.”

And it is a policy that continues today. Current US President Joe Biden in his “remarks on America’s place in the world,” would claim that “American leadership” must meet “advancing authoritarianism, including the growing ambitions of China to rival the United States.”

How else would either Trump’s or Biden’s stated objectives be met besides “curbing China’s growth?”

And that is exactly what US sanctions, kidnapping industry leaders, destabilizing Chinese allies, and its growing propaganda war against China itself all aim to achieve – curbing China’s growth. The US along with its G7 allies now find themselves not only being surpassed by China, but engaged in a campaign of geopolitical bullying with a nation increasingly able to fight back.

The West’s Inevitable Reckoning?

China understands that “the West” is not merely Wall Street, Washington, London, and Brussels. It is a region including hundreds of millions of people who otherwise could be potential partners in building a new multipolar world order where national sovereignty – not a self-appointed international arbiter composed of elite special interests – holds primacy.

Toward that end, China has exercised patience. China’s rise beyond the reach of these fading special interests is inevitable.

China has a population 4-5 times larger than the US. It’s population is hardworking and well-educated. China produces millions more graduates in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics than the US does – every year. These are graduates that will directly contribute to research and development, technological innovation, improved manufacturing and the overall expansion of China’s already massive industrial capacity, as well as the construction of essential infrastructure both at home and abroad as part of the OBOR initiative.

China is already counted by the nations of Asia as a leading trade partner and investor. Even nations like Australia and New Zealand find themselves pivoting eastward, placing economic development ahead of traditional political alliances. Australia’s leadership is attempting to ignore the changing tides of geopolitics and has thus self-inflicted economic hardship on its population. New Zealand has performed a much more graceful balancing act to its own benefit while setting a precedent for others to follow, including for Western nations.

China’s naval forces are already larger than the United States’ – with the rest of its armed forces more than capable of defending against any Western aggression against it in its own territory.

And while the Western media continues to cite the threat of China using military force to “take” Taiwan, Taiwan has – like nations in the region – found itself tied economically to the mainland’s rise. Taiwan is additionally a territory of China and the people of Taiwan share a common fate with the mainland. It is China’s rise that propels Taiwan’s economy, not trade with the West. This is a trend that will only continue well into the foreseeable future.

Looking at these fundamentals, what can the US and its partners do to “maintain primacy” over the “Indo-Pacific region” and by implication over China? While the US attempts to use sanctions, political subversion – both within and along China’s borders – and even military aggression by proxy or directly – US leadership appears not to have considered whether or not the premise of maintaining primacy over a nation with a larger population and soon to have a larger economy was ever sound to begin with.

The celebration of the CPC’s 100 year anniversary and all that China’s government and people have achieved in the past century is a story that does not sit well for a West determined to deride these accomplishments and to add fuel to a propaganda war being used to undo these accomplishments.

The story of China’s rise will not only be about how it went an impoverished, humiliated colony of Western powers to a global superpower, and perhaps even the premier global superpower – but also a story about how it has and will continue to navigate the dangerous, irrational policies of the West in its increasingly desperate bid to contain this rise. It will also be a story about whether China has learned from the West’s mistaken pursuit of unsustainable hegemony once its rise is complete.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

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Sales of Chinese passenger vehicles totaled 1.6 million units for June, which was down 5.3% from June 2020, according to figures released Thursday. Passenger vehicles include sedan, MPV, SUV and minivans, according to the China Passenger Car Association (CPCA).

Despite the dip in the numbers, retail new energy passenger vehicle sales rocketed higher in June, totaling 223,000 units. This marks an increase of 169.9% from June 2020, which was in the midst of China’s full blown response to the coronavirus.

Wholesale volume of new energy passenger vehicles rose by 165.7% year over year to 227,000 units, according to Xinhua. Automakers exceeding 10,000 units of NEV vehicles last month included BYD, Shanghai General Motors Wuling, Tesla China and GAC Aion.

Tesla sold 33,155 China-made vehicles during the month of June, according to the CPCA, Reuters noted on Thursday. In the month of June, the company sold 28,138 China-made vehicles and exported 5,017 vehicles. This total is down from the 33,463 vehicles that the company sold in May.

For comparison, BYD sold 40,532 NEVs for the month. General Motors’ JV with SAIC sold 30,479 vehicles.

Tesla also introduced a lower priced version of its Model Y to the Chinese market this week, starting at ¥291,840 before incentives, which reduced the model’s base price to ¥276,000, or roughly $42,600, according to The Street.

$TSLA Model 3 sales in China are tanking, which is why they exported 31K of them during Q2.

Given the 52% QoQ decline in Model 3 sales, it's clear Chinese demand for it is weak.

Once it's made in Germany, expect capacity utilization in China to drop significantly. $TSLAQ pic.twitter.com/ifYXit7Whw

— Motörhead (@BradMunchen) July 8, 2021

On Wednesday, Morgan Stanley analyst Adam Jonas published a note highlighting concerns about Tesla doing business in China after recent scrutiny of ride-sharing app Didi.

“From our discussions with clients, there is a growing consensus that Tesla will likely face increased scrutiny in the Chinese market over time,” Jonas wrote.

He continued:

“According to our China Autos & Shared Mobility team, China cyberspace regulators have already indicated that they will require OEMs to locally store the data from vehicle cameras/vehicle sensors that is needed for autonomous driving. The regulations around autonomous driving in China should get stricter over time and may present some increasing challenges to foreign auto makers in the years ahead.”

Of course, these concerns didn’t stop Jonas from reiterating his buy on the name and slapping Tesla with a $900 price target, based on…well…this:

With 1.13B diluted $TSLA shares:

Bucket shop $MS values its:

NON-EXISTENT "mobility" business @ $83.6B.

NON-EXISTENT powertrain supply business @ $109B

NEGATIVE GM energy business@ $81B

BARELY-EXISTENT insurance business@ $41B

NON-EXISTENT "network services" business@ $278B pic.twitter.com/tBLbKwY3c6

— Stanphyl Capital (@StanphylCap) July 6, 2021

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Something very dangerous happened a few weeks ago when the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) held its meeting in Brussels. In its communique after the meeting on June 14, it identified China as a “systemic challenge” to areas “relevant to Alliance security”.

The implicit message was clear: Nato would like to expand its tentacles beyond the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. All of us who live close to the Pacific Ocean, especially in East Asia, should be deeply concerned. If Nato comes to the Pacific, it only means trouble for us. Why? Three reasons.

First, Nato is not a geopolitically wise organisation. It did a brilliant job in the Cold War, deterring Soviet expansion into Europe. During the Cold War, it was careful and restrained, building up military capabilities and avoiding direct military conflicts.

The Cold War ended 30 years ago. In theory, after “mission accomplished”, Nato should have shut down. In practice, it desperately looked for new missions. In the process, it destabilised Europe.

It bears remembering that relations between Russia and Nato used to be much better, so much so that in 1994, Russia officially signed up to the Partnership for Peace, a programme aimed at building trust between Nato and other European and former Soviet countries. But things fell apart because Nato rejected Russia’s repeated requests to refuse to accept new members in its “backyard”. Then, in April 2008, Nato pushed things further, opening the door to membership for Georgia and Ukraine at the Bucharest summit.

As US commentator Tom Friedman noted:

“There is one thing future historians will surely remark upon, and that is the utter poverty of imagination that characterised US foreign policy in the late 1990s. They will note that one of the seminal events of this century took place between 1989 and 1992 – the collapse of the Soviet Empire… Thanks to Western resolve and the courage of Russian democrats, that Soviet empire collapsed without a shot, spawning a democratic Russia, setting free the former Soviet republics and leading to unprecedented arms control agreements with the US. And what was America’s response? It was to expand the Nato Cold-War alliance against Russia and bring it closer to Russia’s borders.”

The result was inevitable. Russia had tried to be a friend of the Nato countries after the Cold War ended. Instead, it was slapped in the face with Nato expansion. Many Western media reports portray Russia as a “belligerent, aggressive actor”. They fail to mention that Nato actions generated this response.

A truly dangerous moment surfaced in 2014 when it looked as if Nato was about to encroach into Ukraine with the ouster of its pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych by Western-supported demonstrators. For President Vladimir Putin, that was the last straw, and soon after came the seizure of Crimea, which the Russians consider part of their cultural heartland.

The dangers of Western expansion into Ukraine were well known. Dr Henry Kissinger had pointed out that the Ukrainians “live in a country with a complex history and a polyglot composition. The Western part was incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, when Stalin and Hitler divided up the spoils. Crimea, 60 per cent of whose population is Russian, became part of Ukraine only in 1954, when Nikita Khrushchev, a Ukrainian by birth, awarded it as part of the 300th-year celebration of a Russian agreement with the Cossacks. The west is largely Catholic; the east largely Russian Orthodox. The west speaks Ukrainian; the east speaks mostly Russian. Any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other – as has been the pattern – would lead eventually to civil war or break-up. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West – especially Russia and Europe – into a cooperative international system”.

Sadly, since 2014, Ukraine has become a divided country. If Nato had shown greater geopolitical restraint, these problems could have been avoided.

The second major weakness of post-Cold War Nato is that its behaviour reflects the old adage: If you are a hammer, every problem looks like a nail.

Curiously, during the Cold War, Nato dropped very few bombs on foreign countries. Since the end of the Cold War, Nato has dropped a massive amount of bombs on many countries. Between March and June 1999, Nato bombing campaigns were estimated to have killed 500 civilians in the former Yugoslavia. Nato also dropped several thousand cluster bombs there, despite their use being illegal under the 2010 Convention on Cluster Munitions Treaty.

Nato air strikes in Libya in 2011 resulted in 7,700 bombs dropped, and killed an estimated 70 civilians.

Many of the bombing missions were illegal under international law. I vividly remember having dinner at the home of a former Canadian diplomat in Ottawa when Nato decided to bomb Yugoslav forces in 1999. This Canadian diplomat was deeply worried. Since this military campaign was neither an act of self-defence nor authorised by the United Nations Security Council, it was clearly and technically illegal under international law.

Indeed, Ms Carla Del Ponte, a former special prosecutor in the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, tried to investigate whether Nato committed war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Even though most Nato countries believe in the sanctity of international law, they applied so much political pressure that Ms Del Ponte could not carry out her investigations.

Even worse, Nato has often started a military campaign and then walked away from the disastrous consequences of its intervention. Libya is a classic example of this. The Nato countries were exultant when Muammar Gaddafi was removed from Libya. However, after the country split apart and became caught up in a civil war, Nato just walked away. Many years ago, a wise former US secretary of state, Mr Colin Powell, warned against such military interventions by citing a common statement in crystal shops: “If you break it, you own it.” Nato failed to own the wreckage it left behind.

This leads to the third danger: East Asia has developed, with the assistance of Asean, a very cautious and pragmatic geopolitical culture. In the 30 years since the end of the Cold War, Nato has dropped several thousand bombs on many countries. By contrast, in the same period, no bombs have been dropped anywhere in East Asia.

This is therefore the biggest danger we face in Nato expanding its tentacles from the Atlantic to the Pacific: It could end up exporting its disastrous militaristic culture to the relatively peaceful environment we have developed in East Asia.

Indeed, if Nato was a wise, thinking and learning organisation, it should actually be studying the East Asian record – especially the Asean record of preserving peace – and learning lessons from it. Instead, it is doing the opposite, thereby creating real dangers for our region.

In view of the risks to East Asia through the potential expansion of Nato culture, all of East Asia should speak with one voice and say no to Nato.

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Kishore Mahbubani is a distinguished fellow at the Asia Research Institute at National University of Singapore, and the author of Has The West Lost It? and Has China Won?

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Abstract

Mitsui’s Miike Coal Mine is World Heritage listed by UNESCO as one of Japan’s “Sites of the Industrial Revolution.” The Japanese government, however, has failed to tell the full story of this mine, instead promoting bland tourism. In World War II, Miike was Japan’s largest coal mine, but also the location of the largest Allied POW camp in Japan. Korean and Chinese forced laborers also were used by Mitsui in the mine. The use of prisoners was nothing new, as Mitsui and other Japanese companies used Japanese convicts as workers in the early decades of the Meiji era. The role of Australian POWs in particular reveals that there was resistance inside Miike even at the height of abuse by Japanese wartime authorities. Japan has a responsibility under its UNESCO World Heritage agreement to tell the full history of this and other “Meiji Industrial Revolution” sites.

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“As we passed through the gates [on January 16, 1945] we saw a few Japanese soldiers grouped about a charcoal brazier in the open porch of a small building. … It seemed that this was the largest prisoner-of-war camp in Kyushu, if not in Japan. … The camp held four nationalities: English, American, Dutch and Australian. … We were warned that our existence in and out of camp was governed by a multitude of rules and regulations. … Whenever we met one of the Australians who had been in the camp before our arrival and worked in the mine, we asked the same questions but could never get an accurate picture of what the mine was like down below. We only learnt we’d ‘work like slaves’.” – Private Roy Whitecross, 8th Division, Australian Army¹

In July 2021, Japan’s public presentation of its “Sites of the Meiji Industrial Revolution” at the UNESCO World Heritage Committee annual meeting may be challenged. Among the sites possibly under question are two undersea coal mines that have been closed for decades: Mitsubishi’s former Hashima Coal Mine, popularly known as “Battleship Island” (Gunkanjima in Japanese) off the coast of Nagasaki; and Mitsui’s former Miike Coal Mine in Omuta, some fifty kilometers from Nagasaki city, or about an hour by car around the Ariake Sea in Kyushu.

Japan has succeeded in making Gunkanjima a huge tourist attraction, with over a quarter of a million visitors in 2015, the year it was inscribed as a World Heritage site.

The 2012 James Bond movie Skyfall featured a cameo scene of Gunkanjima, the villain’s secret island headquarters. A major South Korean history action film followed in which

Korean forced laborers destroyed the Japanese authorities in a fantasy liberation of the island in wartime.²In contrast, Miike Coal Mine and its Omuta harbor connection have thus far failed as a tourist draw, accounting for very low visitor numbers. Local online publicity that highlights smiling Japanese Miike miners traveling underground to the coal face lacks the popular drama of the huge island ghost city of Gunkanjima. But the true history of miners at the Miike Coal Mine over the century of its operation (1870s to 1997 closure) is just as dramatic as that of the Gunkanjima mine. Unfortunately the Japanese government omits most of this history at the Miike Mine.

Omuta local tourist website. The photo of these Japanese miners was probably taken in the late 1950s, before the 1960 strike – Japan’s largest strike in the postwar era. There are no tours underground.

Tourists arrive at Gunkanjima / Battleship Island, Mitsubishi’s former undersea coal mine – one of the World Heritage listed “Japan’s Sites of the Meiji Industrial Revolution”. Almost all buildings in these photos were built after Meiji, during the 1920s and 1930s. Photos by David Palmer.

The irony is that if the Japanese government told the true story of the Miike Mine itr could substantially reverse this tourism failure, as this coal mine was not only the largest in Japan in World War II, essential to its wartime economy, but also had the largest Allied POW camp in Japan – Fukuoka 17 – along with thousands of Korean and Chinese forced laborers, making it the largest “prisoner of war” operation within Japan.

What drives the distorted narrative of the Japanese government is its prioritizing tourism that focuses on machinery combined with a nationalism that portrays Japanese workers who enjoy their jobs, but without any mention of substantial forced labor. For decades tourism has been a major part of Japan’s economy, and World Heritage site listings are an important part of the government’s economic strategy to expand tourism, especially international tourism. In 2019, the year before the pandemic closed most tourism in Japan except to Japanese, World Economic Forum ranked Japan fourth globally in travel and tourism competitiveness.³ Japan’s tourism that year constituted 7.5 percent share of the country’s GDP, a total of $49 billion (US). For 2018, Japan ranked ninth among the top global tourism earners, and came in second in percentage change of earnings, at 19 percent growth, beaten out only by first ranked China.⁴ Tourism in Japan is big business. The World Heritage listings of Japan, now numbering a collection of 23 (many of these are multiple sites),⁵ have been a core part of this business. Think Mount Fuji, the Hiroshima Atomic Bomb Dome, Himeji Castle, the temples of Kyoto and Nara – all are part of the World Heritage listings. The plan is to expand these further, with Kyushu a major target as it is further from Tokyo and Kyoto where a majority of the “Meiji Industrial Revolution” sites are located.

Two narratives: Japan’s patriotic fantasy and the reality of industrial exploitation

The history of industrial revolutions in all countries around the world has involved the introduction of modern technology. But industrial revolutions also require new forms of labor to operate these new technologies. The story of industrial revolutions as only the rise of new machines is a fantasy long dismissed by historians. Industrial revolutions have occurred because those organizing new enterprises have found alternative ways for harnessing the labor of workers in new settings, whether in the mills of Manchester or the mass production lines of Henry Ford or hull construction at the Nagasaki Shipyard.⁶ 

But somehow, according to the Japanese government narrative, new machines (what the government narrative simplistically calls “technology”) were introduced into Japan from the West between 1850 and 1900. The Meiji Restoration began in 1868, but the sites push the beginning date back to late Tokugawa, allowing a convenient “half century” for Japan’s “industrial revolution.” Japan developed its own versions of these machines (“technology”) combining Western and Japanese know-how, and by 1910 (just two years before the death of Emperor Meiji and the end of the Meiji Era) the whole process was “established.” This remarkable event is unmatched in history in terms of its precise completion point. Everything after 1910 is then presented as just a continuation of this “development.” This compartmentalized view of history was put forward by Japan in its statement to the World Heritage Committee in 2015, again eliding any mention of how labor contributed to shaping industrial innovation:

“After 1910 … Japanese industrial development continued to grow, relying more and more on imported raw materials, but its concentrated period of technological innovation associated with the blending of western and Japanese technologies had come to an end: the Japanese industrial system was established.”⁷

The official Japanese government website for “Japan’s Sites of the Meiji Industrial Revolution” describes – in Japanese – Mitsui’s purchase of the mine from the Meiji government in 1889; its development by the company’s president Dan Tokuma; introduction of new technology, including some brought in from England; and abolition of convicts and women working in the mine by 1930. The historical description then leaps from 1930 to 1997 when the mine closed – leaving a gap of 67 years. The English language version of the historical description only gives you the technology information, with Dan Tokuma and scant mention of convict labor.

Omission and failure to consult with all those affected by the site – Australia, the United States, Britain, South Korea, China, the Netherlands, and Southeast Asian countries – is unfortunately the Japanese government’s style for promoting its history through UNESCO and elsewhere, which is the major criticism that will be brought up at the July UNESCO meeting.⁸ Why weren’t these other countries consulted, given that a number of the World Heritage listed sites used forced and slave labor from these countries at these sites during World War II? The coal mines at Mitsubishi’s Gunkanjima (Hashima) and Mitsui’s Miike are the most egregious disregard for this requirement World Heritage listings oversight.

If you go to the local website for the Miike Coal Mine, promoted by the Omuta local government and different than the national government website, you are greeted with a banner photo of cheerful Japanese miners riding underground to the coal face no doubt taken in the 1950s. The historical chronology of the mine’s history is entirely in Japanese. It notes that in one year during World War II coal production reached a new high. In another year, we learn that the mine was hit by bombing, but no mention is made of the constant incendiary bombings by American planes in 1945. No English is provided on the site, nor is Korean or Chinese, the three main languages of foreign visitors to Japan. It is at the local level that the historical documentation is the most distorted, and designed almost entirely for Japanese tourists.

Were all Miike coal miners Japanese from 1939 to 1945? The Omuta website would lead you to this conclusion. Here is the reality for those years – World War II.

Mitsui Miike Coal Mine Workforce – 1940-1945:

• Total workforce (all employees) by early 1945: 15,160
• Japanese (all employees): 11,000 / probably less than 10,000 miners
• Total non-Japanese: 4,160
• Korean (all employees): 1,683 (50 deaths)
• Chinese (all forced laborers): 564 (47 deaths)
• Allied POWs: 1,913 (139 deaths)
• American POWs: 829 (59 deaths)
• Australian POWs: 440 (20 deaths)
• British POWs: 268 (18 deaths)
• Dutch POWs: 355 (41 deaths)
• Other Nationality POWs: 21 (1 death)

Death rates in this group would confirm the abusive treatment and extreme death rates of these non-Japanese workers consistent with slave labor.⁹ 

Japanese listed in the table above include all employees (surface, underground supervisors, guards, and actual miners), averaged over the seven year period. Women are not included in the sources for these statistics, but there is no evidence of their presence underground during the war, in contrast to smaller mines to the north in Kyushu’s Chikuhō region. Koreans include all employees, the vast majority forced laborers, in addition to a small number of guards serving as collaborators for the Japanese. Chinese were all forced laborers, the majority most likely farmers taken by force in China, while a minority were prisoners-of-war who had been fighting against Japanese troops in Northern China. Allied prisoners-of-war arrived at different times, with Americans, Dutch, and British arriving earlier. Australians arrived later, suffering more than these earlier arrivals from their previous POW camp locations – the vast majority coming from the Thai-Burma “death” railway construction. The estimated total forced labor numbers, with some deduction for Korean guards, was probably over 4,000. For Japanese underground supervisors, there generally was one for each group of five to six miners, reducing Japanese employees from 11,000 to about 10,200, and then below 10,000 for guards, and reduced even further if administrators are subtracted. Many POWs worked in the Mitsui foundry adjacent to the mine, but foundry employment numbers were small compared to the mine. A handful worked on the surface in various service capacities. With these other POW positions taken into account, probably a third of Miike miners of all nationalities were forced – or more accurately, slave – laborers.

This system of prisoners used as workers became widespread in the first decades of the Meiji Era, introduced in Miike in 1873 when the coal mine was bought from local owners by the new Meiji government. When Mitsui took over the Miike mine from the government in 1889, the company continued using convict labor through contracts with the government.¹⁰

The exact type of punishment used against some Allied POWs in World War II at the Miike Mine was introduced during Meiji, as this painting from the Tagawa Coal Museum in the Chikuhō region of northern Kyushu illustrates. This particular disciplinary practice used on coal miners was known as yama no miseshime – using the mountain to warn others – by forcing the worker to kneel on wooden slats and then placing heavy weight on his thighs, increased as time went by to make the pain worse, along with beatings.¹¹

Painting by Yamamoto Sakubei, Yamamoto Sakubei to tankō no kiroku, p. 26.

Japan’s industrial revolution: The alternative history of energy technology’s introduction

A fundamental rationale for the World Heritage listing of “Japan’s Sites of the Meiji Industrial Revolution” is the central role of heavy industry in this process, focusing on three key industries: iron and steel; shipbuilding; and coal mining. The scope of the industrial revolution, the Japanese government claims, covered the years from 1850 to 1910, spanning the end of Tokugawa and all of Meiji except the last two years.¹² The endpoint of this periodization for historians is simplistic when applied to steel (Yahata works) and shipbuilding (Nagasaki shipyard), but does have some evidence for support. Coal mining, however, is not a valid example if underground mining technology is a factor. The way to understand “industrialization” is in how production processes occur, which involves the transition from exclusively manual labor to mechanized labor incorporating new machines and technology. Mitsui’s Miike Coal Mine is generally considered to have been the first “advanced” coal mining operation in Japan, but underground its operations remained primitive until the early 1920s when minimal mechanization was introduced in some mine pits. This is a decade after the “1910” designation. Japan generally lagged behind Western technological advancements in underground mining until after World War II. The way to track this lag is through the history of changes in Mitsui’s workforce from the 1890s through 1945 and how its changing workforce was utilized.

Coal fueled industrialization in modern Japan. Japan’s coal fields contained bituminous coal, but not anthracite, the type used for coke in the production of steel. Japan’s coal was used entirely for energy. Meiji certainly was an era when the origin of Japan’s industrial revolution occurred in terms of large scale extraction of coal and introduction of surface mechanization (hoists, water pumps) that allowed expansion of coal mines. Rail expansion used coal for engines. Modern manufacturing required new sources of energy, and these were either from hydro-electric or coal-fired plants. Electrification of Japan’s cities drew from these plants, but especially utilizing coal as the source.¹³

Important developments in coal mining centered on the rise of the two most important private business combines in late nineteenth century Japan: Mitsubishi and Mitsui. By the 1880s, these two zaibatsucontrolled the two largest coal mines in the country, both based in Kyushu: Takashima (two islands, one being Gunkanjima on Hashima) off the Nagasaki coast, bought by Mitsubishi from the Meiji government; and Miike Coal Mine at Omuta (Fukuoka prefecture, bordering Kumamoto prefecture), bought by Mitsui. During this period, the largest coal fields being developed in Japan were in Kyushu (Takashima’s islands, Miike at Omuta, and the Chikuhō region in northern inland Kyushu between Kitakyushu and Fukuoka city). Large scale development of the huge Hokkaido coal reserves occurred later and did not rest on major technological innovations of the industry between the 1880s and 1920s.

Mitsui relied substantially on contracting convict laborers from the Meiji government from the 1880s until 1900 at the Miike Coal Mine. Following the 1899 Prison Law restricting convict use, a national cap of 400 on the number of convicts allowed in coal mining shifted the Miike workforce from predominantly convict to a rise in husband-wife teams, known as sakiyama / atoyama (hewer / helper), drawn from farming areas around Omuta, with men extracting the ore and women collecting it hauling it to the surface.¹⁴ Chikuhō mines, even those of Mitsubishi and Mitsui, had less capitalization and came to rely on cheaper

Inoue Tamejiro, artist. Portraying women miners in the Miike Coal Mine, “Meiji jidai no tankō fūzoku” [Meiji Era coal mine customs], in Sakubei, pp. 59, 60. This system may have increased during the 1900s with the reduction of convicts used in both hewing and gathering coal.

Korean labor brought in after Japan’s colonization of Korea in 1910. Productivity above ground may have driven this dynamic as well, with Mitsui’s Miike Coal Mine efficiency due to shorter transport links between mine pits and harbor at Omuta, compared to Chikuhō mines further inland that had to send coal by rail to ports at a considerable distance to the north. Dan Tokuma became head of the Miike Coal Mine in the 1890s and introduced a number of administrative reforms at the turn of the century. The shift away from convict labor also involved an end to using contractors for non-convict Japanese miners, with the aim of eliminating turnover while seeking to gain local loyalty of workers, what historian Tanaka Naoki has described as “a familial approach to business management.”¹⁵

The following table documents the radical shift from convict to non-convict labor at Miike from 1894 to 1900, and then the sharp rise in women workers afterward, finally ending after 1930 when all women were excluded from underground work at Miike.

Hoists and air shafts were introduced during late Meiji (1890s to 1900s), but more advanced mining technologies for underground mining only arrived in the following decades – after Meiji. These were technologies developed first in the West, but only introduced later in Japan. According to Donald Smith, “Mitsubishi and other major mines began another spurt of mechanization in the latter half of the 1920s, building on the changes in mining practice in the early 1920s.” This shift was from sole use of mining tunnels – the room and pillar system, zanchūshiki saitan – to long wall extraction, chōhekishiki saitan, combined with room-and-pillar. “Mines installed boring machines and rock drills, eliminating the necessity of drilling holes by hand for dynamite. From 1927 or 1928, they installed coal cutters [undercutters essential for long wall mining] … mechanical picks [and] face conveyors, which sped the coal on the first stage of its journey out of the mine.”¹⁶ This technological transformation in the 1920s resulted from Mitsubishi’s and Mitsui’s ready access to capital through their zaibatsu internal banks and other divisions, resources not available on the same scale for smaller companies.¹⁷ 

Photos from 1926 Mitsui Miike yearbook, in Sakubei, p. 74. Examples of continuing primitive conditions underground at Miike in the 1920s. The loin cloth miner’s dress is exactly the same attire that Allied POWs wore in the mine during World War II, what Australian POWs described as a “G string.”

Specific mechanization developments crucial to modern coal mining were only introduced into Japan in the 1920s at the most advanced mines, including Miike Coal Mine. By contrast, many mining equipment innovations outside Japan occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but were not introduced into Japan until the change to longwall mining. Priscilla Long provides one of the best descriptions of the longwall system:

“Longwall mining can easily be understood if one thinks of a bed of coal as an underground field extending for hundreds or thousands of acres. When coal is reached by shaft or slope, a main entry is driven. … Then two parallel tunnels are driven off to one side, four hundred to six hundred feet apart. … Between the tunnels, made permanent with timber and other construction material, the longwall mining is done. The miners (a whole gang rather than just two or three in a work space) work at the face under a set of movable pillars, which they move forward (one at a time) as the face recedes.”¹⁸

American coal miners resisted the longwall system until the 1920s because skilled miners viewed it as eroding their control over the work process they had with the room-and-pillar system. Implementation of the longwall system changed the work environment from one that was more artisan-based to one similar to a factory environment, with teams and direct supervision, and new machinery required to extract and load coal. The Japanese coal mines also had individual “artisan” miners, but they were the dual system of husband-and-wife miners in contrast to the American all-male underground setting. American miners in some locales had a strong union movement by the early part of the twentieth century that led to resistance to mechanization, whereas Japanese miners had no substantial labor organization until World War I. The change to teams and longwall mining appear to have been driven by Mitsui’s management introduction of new technology among miners. Japan’s first labor union, the general membership Yuaikai, had a coal mining membership base, and in 1912 Mitsui coal miners went on strike for five months, Japan’s largest prior to World War I, but were defeated by the company.¹⁹ Trade union organization among coal miners revived under a different industrial union formation during the 1920s, but could not be sustained under the impact of the Great Depression by the 1930s.²⁰ In contrast, the United Mine Workers of America became the backbone of the industrial union organizing movement in the United States by the 1930s with a membership of over 800,000 by the early 1930s.

The lag in the rate of mechanization in Japan’s coal mining related to over-reliance on labor intensive production, a dynamic that did not substantially change underground until the 1920s. Below are examples of coal mining equipment innovations internationally. These were not introduced into Japan, including the Miike mine, the country’s most advanced, until after the end of the Meiji Era.

Innovations in coal mining – international introduction:

• Coal cutter – 1876 in U.S. (Lechner)
• Punch / pick machine – 1877 in U.S. (J.W. Harrison patent)
• Rock drilling tools – 1882 in U.S. (Brunner and Lay)
• Mechanical drive systems – 1883 in Switzerland (ABB)
• Undercutting chain machine – 1913 in U.S. (Sullivan Machinery Co.)
• Loaders, continuous miners – 1919 in U.S. (Joy Mining)
• Excavators, haulage trucks – 1917 in Japan (Komatsu)
• Mining & loading machines – 1925 in U.S. (McKinley; Jeffrey-Morgan)
• Pit car loader – 1925 in U.S. (Hamilton)
• Coal loading shovel – 1925 in U.S. (Jones Coloder, others)
• Scraper loaders – 1925 in U.S. (Goodman)

Japan did introduce some innovations, as the Komatsu example indicates, but this was after Meiji, and this innovation did not change the crude underground system of industrial relations heavily reliant on manual labor. Coal loaders, marketed by 1918 by a number of American companies, appear to have been absent at Miike, which was still using horses in the 1920s for pulling coal cars along tracks where they could then be brought to the surface.²¹

Limited mechanization took off in the large mines in Japan after the First World War, driven by major shifts in the labor structure within mines. Takeshima (Hashima / Gunkanjima) and Miike mines led the way, leading to increased miners’ wages while maintaining relatively primitive labor practices underground. Mechanization in the 1920s at Miike coincided with introduction of longwall mining and teams to remove coal, which reduced the use of women to collect the ore. Mine work now utilized teams that loaded huge volumes of coal that could be shoveled into coal cars and then hauled to the surface via lifts. Smith states that this process was possible once coal cutters were installed with face conveyors, but this change appears to have been confined to major mines in Chikuhō and not all the pits in Miike.²² 

By 1930, the Miike Coal Mine in Omuta completely eliminated both convict labor and women workers underground. The company claimed that removal of females from underground work was in line with Japan’s agreeing to the ILO stand of 1928 for the elimination of women from underground coal mines, but Smith believes that the company’s decision was a consequence of technological change. Women continued as surface workers sorting coal. The practice of using women miners underground continued informally in smaller mines of the Chikuhō region, despite the national government prohibiting the practice by 1933. Japanese women returned to underground work at the end of World War II, but there is no indication they did so at the Miike Coal Mine.

Histories of Japanese coal mining on women published in English have tended to focus on the Chikuhō region of northern Kyushu, where there was a wide diversity of small, medium-sized, as well as some large mines operated by Mitsui and Mitsubishi. In that region women continued to work illegally in the medium and smaller mines after 1930. These are significant studies, but only reveal part of the larger picture of Japan’s coal mining history, particularly during the Pacific War.²³ The Miike mine was located in an entirely different coal field, where Mitsui employed quite different labor practices. Distinctions in regional coal fields of Japan are crucial to understanding the contrasts between mines where women miners were employed and those where they were eventually pushed out of underground mining after 1930. The map below, from Arents and Tsuneishi (p. 126), shows the distinct geography of these separate regions that was an aspect of these two quite different coal mining environments.

Japan’s wartime empire and slave labor at the Miike Coal Mine

The history of Japan’s “Meiji Industrial Revolution” World Heritage sites is directly linked to Japan’s war and pursuit of empire in the Asia Pacific. During the Meiji Era (1868 to 1912) Japan colonized Taiwan, the Ryukyus (Okinawa), and Korea, and gained footholds in Manchuria and ports in China. This expansion of empire required a modern navy and army, with steel, ships, munitions, and coal as the economic foundation for Japan’s competition with the West. Mitsui advanced into East Asia after the first Sino-Japanese War, initially establishing operations in Taiwan, Korea, Manchuria and China from 1896 to 1907.²⁴By the advent of the Pacific War in the 1930s, Mitsui was the largest Japanese company to invest in China and Japan as supplier of military and civilian imports.²⁵ With Mitsubishi, Mitsui laid the foundation for Japan’s economic and military dominance of East Asia and the western Pacific.

In 1938, with Japan’s massive escalation of its invasion of North China, tonnage of coal extracted from the Miike Mine accelerated, peaking by 1944 at over 4 million tons. But in 1945 production collapsed along with the rest of Japan’s productive capacity and infrastructure, and its empire, the euphemistically dubbed “East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere,” vanished. This term is nowhere to be seen in historical presentations – in English – at the World Heritage sites where “history” has become clean, technological, and a patriotic celebration of national achievement.

Japan’s model of war production was exemplified by Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki Shipyard, the largest shipbuilding complex in East Asia during the Second World War. During the Pacific War (1937 to 1945) the Nagasaki Shipyard built 72 warships and 15,000 torpedoes. Mitsubishi turned the entire metropolitan region around Nagasaki city into a military-industrial complex with over 24 industrial and technical facilities, using thousands of Korean forced laborers and Allied POWs as slave laborers, including Australian POWs who produced materials for the Nagasaki Shipyard at Mitsubishi’s nearby foundry in the Urakami District.²⁶ Mitsui had returned to its labor system using prisoners, but a new type that combined waged Japanese workers with foreign slave labor that had its origins during the early years of Meiji of convicts.

POWs at Fukuoka 17 – Japan’s system of slave labor from Burma to Omuta²⁷

The Australian POW experience is particularly important for understanding how the major zaibatsu, particularly Mitsubishi and Mitsui, were instrumental to Japan’s war production and brutal occupation of East and Southeast Asia. Mitsubishi supplied the merchant ships, known by POWs as “hell ships”, that transported POWs from camps on the Thai-Burma railway construction (known as “The Line”), via Singapore, to Japan. Mitsubishi also supplied cross ties for the Thai-Burma rail construction.²⁸ Australian POWs on “The Line” – in terms of percentage of the Australian population – far outnumbered the British, even though more British soldiers were POWs there.²⁹ By 1945, the Australians outnumbered the British at Fukuoka 17 POW camp in Omuta, working in the Miike Coal Mine. Most POWs underground at Miike were Australians and Americans. The Australians also appear to have led the resistance inside the mine.

Mitsui’s Miike Coal Mine was a larger complex spreading across Omuta, with a rail, foundry, and port built by Mitsui. When Australian Private Roy Whitecross arrived at Moji port in northern Kyushu prior to the journey to Omuta, after years in Changi prison and on the Thai-Burma Railway construction with others from the AIF 8th Division³⁰, he wondered if conditions would be better as a prisoner-of-war in Japan. But encountered conditions more deadly than Changi and in many respects on a par with the “Railroad of Death” in Burma. He learned from the other Australian POWs, at Fukuoka 17 for a year, that they’d work ‘like slaves’ in Mitsui’s coal mine.³¹

AIF Private David Runge found the “huts” at Fukuoka 17 far better than what he and thousands of others had experienced while working on the Thai-Burma Railway. Each POW had their own “mat” (tatami), blanket, … straw pillow. Overall he found the dorm room clean. The tatami were a perfect accommodation for lice, of course, but compared to the torrid tropics the sleeping quarters were “very good.” But there was no heat, and winter snow at Omuta could reach over a foot, making the cold a serious health hazard. The problem with the non-work environment centered on two issues: first, the food, which was meager and at times inedible; and second, the constant harassment, regimentation, and beatings by Japanese guards.

Photos: Australian War Memorial: Entrance (post-surrender) to Fukuoka 17 POW Camp, Omuta, next to Mitsui Miike Coal Mine. Photo on right: Center for Research – Allied POWs under the Japanese, website: overview of POW barracks.

AAMC³² Captain Ian Duncan was one of the camp doctors. Like Runge and hundreds of other Australians at Fukuoka 17, he had been stationed along the Thai-Burma Rail construction. He had been beaten almost daily by Japanese guards while serving on “The Line” because he was the one who had to tell the Japanese who was too sick to go to work. He got the blame, as they assumed he was lying, thinking that only visible injuries qualified for time off. Malaria. beriberi, and dysentery didn’t count. Conditions for medical staff were considerably better at Fukuoka 17, including better hospital facilities, but medical supplies were virtually non-existent. Health conditions were equally horrendous for those working in the mines. Malnutrition was so bad that men talked only about food, and they showed no interest in the Japanese women digging gun emplacements near the camp working with no tops during the hot summer.

The Red Cross sent food supplies to the camp, but these were secretly stockpiled by the Japanese and not distributed to POWs. They were discovered only after the surrender in August 1945. Runge describes what rations were like at the camp mess hall:

“The rations consisted of a bowl of rice…like a small pudding dole, very small, and … a couple of these pickles, like cucumbers … or seaweed. That was to take down the mine. But we used to eat it before we went down the mine. … Back in camp they’d have dog soup. I never ate dogs. … Back in camp, everybody traded. … You’d get somebody didn’t feel too well and they’d sing out ‘I’ve got rice for rice and soup on Wednesday night.’ And somebody who’s hungry’d sing out, ‘I’ll give you rice and soup on Wednesday night for that rice now.’”

It was like a market, and those who traded but didn’t come through with their promised rations would pile up “debts,” eventually declared “bankrupt” by the other men, losing all their rations each day. A Dutch “padre” (chaplain) helped the “bankrupts” by providing them with minimal rations so they wouldn’t starve.

The “cook house” (as Runge called it) was run by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Commander Edward Little, a man who routinely harassed POWs for what he considered poor behavior. The Japanese camp heads put Little in charge, and as a result he received special privileges, including withholding Red Cross food supplies from the POWs that he accessed himself. He was detested by the Americans and Australians, and after the war was court martialed for having reported U.S. Marine Corps Corporal James G. Pavlakos to the Japanese authorities for selling a bowl of rice to James O. Wise in exchange for two packs of cigarettes. Pavlakos was punished and beaten for nearly 30 days by the Japanese until he died. Three other American POWs died under similar circumstances – Little reporting them for small “infractions,” followed by beatings and death.³³

Photos by George Weller, from George Weller, ed. by Anthony Weller, First into Nagasaki: The Censored Eyewitness Dispatches on Post-Atomic Japan and Its Prisoners of War (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006)

The Miike Mine had eight levels and ran two miles under the sea from entrances at Omuta. Fukuoka 17 was actually built on land fill from mine slag. Temperatures underground ranged from freezing at upper levels to virtually boiling at the lowest level. The miners often had to work with their legs submerged in water. Runge described how they routinely put on their “G string” before descending down the shafts. This practice of wearing only a loin cloth went back to the early years of Meiji when the mine first opened and continued through the 1920s and 1930s. Miners’ clothing of this type reveals how inadequate the ventilation systems were at Miike, even during World War II. But the tunnels where the POWs worked were often ones Mitsui had abandoned in previous decades, with timber pillars rotting and cave-ins frequent. American journalist George Weller, the first non-Japanese outsider to reach Fukuoka 17, on September 10, 1945, learned that “[b]oth those Mitsui mines worked by Americans and those worked by Chinese are defective, ‘stripped’ mines, dangerous to operate because their tunnels’ underpinnings have been removed to obtain the last vestiges of coal.”³⁴ David Runge and the other Australian POWs were also working in those mines.

Men worked in tunnels but also in longer underground stretches – the long wall mining that began in the 1920s when technology made this possible. Miners dug out the coal, usually with hand picks after dynamiting a section, and other times with pneumatic jackhammers. Roy Whitecross recalled “twenty American prisoners … working a ‘long wall’ [with] the roar of machinery and the clank of the scraper chain [making] speech all but impossible.”³⁵ This was the undercutting machinery brought into the mine during the 1920s, one of the best indicators of “modernization” for any coal mine. The coal was then loaded into coal cars (skips), and winding gear pulled the cars up to areas where the coal could then be loaded onto hoists that would take it to the surface. The winding gear cables would sway back and forth across the low, narrow tunnels, forcing men to negotiate past the skips and tracks for the coal cars and tracking. Dr. Ian Duncan found that many injuries were caused by these cables hitting limbs of the miners walking through these tunnels.

David Runge’s interview of 1983 reveals the POWs confusion about how the shift system operated. American POW Stanley Kyler, from Dekalb, Illinois, told George Weller, “I’ve been working twenty-two months for Baron Mitsui. Four months was driving hard rock, and eighteen months was shoveling coal, twelve to fourteen hours a day.”³⁶ Runge recalled that the POWs worked 12 hour shifts, but that these constantly rotated, giving the men just enough time to eat and then sleep. Whitecross explained how the rotating three shifts system operated:

“The first shift left camp at 4 a.m. and returned at four o’clock in the afternoon. The second left camp at noon and returned at midnight, while the third, or night shift, went out at 8 p.m. and returned at 8 a.m. the following day. In addition to these shifts, a permanent day shift carried out maintenance work at the mine. Apart from a small number of men who worked in welding shops and other engineering plants, all shifts worked below ground in two sections, one working the actual coal and the other carrying out work incidental to the coal hewing, such as drilling tunnels, laying railway lines, shifting rock, and a dozen-and-one miscellaneous tasks.”³⁷

The POWs had no free time, using every spare minute to try to sleep before returning to the mine, often on a different shift. It appears that the work week based on constant rotating shifts – with no time off except every month or so – amounted to approximately 80 or so hours. Ian Duncan said that the men working in the mine had to walk about a mile from the POW camp to the mine entrance for each shift, adding to the workday. The exhaustion resulting was so severe that some men deliberately had other POWs break their foot, leg, or arm so that they no longer had to return to the mine depths.

A zinc foundry was connected to the Miike complex. According to former Australian POW Tom Uren, he and the other POWs took a tram to the foundry, something the POW miners could not do on their trek to the mine pit. Working conditions at the foundry were far better than down in the mine, with Dutch POWs the main group.³⁸ The better jobs generally were held by POWs who had arrived earlier, particularly the Dutch. British POWs apparently were concentrated at the port loading coal onto ships. Uren got a foundry job most likely because he arrived only months before the end of the war, having earlier worked at the copper smelting works of Nippon Steel Works (which owned Yahata Steel Works in Kokura, another “Meiji Industrial Revolution” World Heritage site). He too had previously been a slave laborer on the Thai-Burma Railway, like his other Australian compatriots at Omuta.

There seem to have been few deliberate executions at Fukuoka 17 (such as beheadings or bayonetting), in contrast to POW camps outside Japan, especially in the Pacific islands and Southeast Asia. Deaths occurred from a combination of constant and severe beatings by guards and supervisors, disease from the terrible conditions and freezing weather in winter, and malnutrition that prevented recovery from disease and beating injuries. Infections were common, with medical supplies lacking. The Red Cross supplied surgical instruments, sulfur drugs, aspirin tablets, plaster of paris, and other medical equipment and medications, but the Japanese prevented access to these, confining them to their secret storehouses. Dr. Duncan believed that had these supplies been released, many lives could have been saved.

AIF Private David Runge’s story – from rural Murwillumbah to warzone Omuta

Too often the POWs’ experiences in Japan have been treated only as those of “victims.” But the Chinese forced labor response to Japanese authority in the Hanaoka Coal Mine uprising, escape, and subsequent massacre by the Japanese in Akita prefecture, northern Honshu, indicates a broader pattern of resistance to Imperial fascism within Japan, focused particularly in the coal mines run by Japanese companies.³⁹Australian Private David Runge’s account as a POW at the Mitsui Miike Coal Mine opens a new perspective on this resistance.

His background growing up in rural, agricultural Australia helped prepared him for the ordeals as a prisoner-of-war. He was born in 1922 in Murwillumbah, New South Wales, a small town near the Queensland border ten kilometers from the Pacific Ocean coast. He grew up in the town’s Solomon Row community, with its mix of South Sea Islander, Aboriginal, and South Asian residents of color. His father, Albert Ernest David Runge, was born in Denmark in 1898. After coming to Australia, Albert married Florence Silva, who was born in Queensland a year before her husband. Florence’s’ father, David Silva, was born in Ceylon in 1846, and arrived in Australia in 1881, before the “White Australia Policy” excluded Asian migrants from entering the country. The ancestry of Florence’s mother, Emma, is not known. These details reveal the multicultural character of David Runge’s family heritage. His mother died in 1931 when he was only eight, and his father seems to have vanished from his life at that point, leaving him in the care of his older sister May, who he listed as next-of-kin when he enlisted in the Australian Army in 1940 as “Dave Runge.”⁴⁰

He went to work after finishing primary school, and as a teenager became a driver at a local banana plantation. South Sea Islanders were a regular part of the agricultural workforce in the banana and pineapple plantations of northern New South Wales and Queensland. In his 1983 interview, Runge told of how he enjoyed growing up in this community and how he identified as Australian. He never made any mention of race or color in talking about his Australian upbringing, even though discrimination against anyone of color during those years would have been comparable in many ways to racial segregation in the United States, but not the extremes of the South. After he entered the Army, lying about his age as he only was 17, he seems to have found a new family and community, feeling a strong connection to his “mates” and a sense of responsibility as a soldier. Above all, his story from childhood to the many experiences as a POW in Southeast Asia and then Japan, is one of survival and relying on those few he felt he could trust.

Photos: “Attestation” (enlistment) papers for David Runge, National Archives of Australia

David Runge’s view of the Japanese, in terms of their racism toward other Asians, was a revelation when he became a POW in Singapore, where he was put in Changi Prison. It was a world apart from his roots in the multiracial Solomons Row community of Murwillumbah.

“I always thought Japanese were like us, when we fought ‘em. … Like their attitude – Japanese soldier and us. But I seen enough in Singapore when they cut off people’s heads, and I seen a bunch of five or six Chinese women with their lips sowed up and dragged along the street by string, and these sorts of tortures that went on around the place. Well, you get a different attitude toward the Japanese then, don’t you. The Asians thought that when the Japanese came down that [the Japanese were] ‘Asia for Asians.’ But it was ‘Japanese for Japanese.’ The Asians that spat at us and threw stones at us when we got taken prisoner, in the end they become to realize where their bread and butter was buttered, they kept waving flags secretly and putting up their thumbs in the ‘Hello Joe’ sign. Then they realized that the Japanese weren’t ‘Asians for Asians.’”

Photos from National Archives of Australia: David Runge’s Fukuoka Camp 17 POW card – reverse side lists previous POW camp on Thai-Burma railway construction and arrival in Japan by sea.

By the time he reached Fukuoka 17, Omuta, and the Mitsui Miike Coal Mine on June 18, 1944 he was determined to continue the fight. “My attitude was to do everything in my power to cripple that coal mine.” He acted on his own to sabotage production. “I took emery dust down the coal mine and put [it] in the motors and chewed up the chain conveyor motors … when we was working in the laterals [and] digging.”

He also had a small group around him that worked secretly with other POWs who were American.

“My particular group was to look for coal, and when we found the coal we’d drill a long tunnel through the seam of coal and then the coal extractors would come and take all that seam out and that’s what they call a long wall, in Australia. The jackhammer used to weigh about 60 pounds, and the length of those drills is 13 feet. The Jap ‘Mito Man’ [foreman with a nickname for “dynamite man” because he used so much of it] that was in charge of us, he’d be drilling in like that and since he went in the depth he wanted in the face where we’re drillin’ – instead of us saying with his hands ‘ok, move back’ he’d grab hold of the drill and pull it back, and we’d go falling back over rocks and everything. He’d grab hold of it and pull it forward again, and we’d go slamming, trippin’ over everything again. So what I used to do, and what others did, was put a pick in the ceiling and pull the ceiling down on him, and bung him off, and then tell the ‘buntai jo’ – that’s the Japanese foreman – that the ceiling came down on him, which was ‘tenja cabina’ – the word for cave-in, and we’d beat the Jap out.”

Runge continued the sabotage in other ways when he managed to stay on the surface for a short time.

“One time I put on a crook [injured] back, back in camp. They put us to work topside in the mine workshops. My job was to sharpen the diamond drills. You had to put them in water or something like that to harden them, which I didn’t do. And of course they’d go down the coal mine and in five seconds they be turned to butter. At times I find I’d be repairing the motors I’d put emery dust in.”

Secrecy was essential to conduct this sabotage, because the two main American officers the Japanese had put in charge of the camp, Little and Bennett, were known to collaborate with the Japanese. Some POWs also tried to gain favor with the authorities and could not be trusted. Runge did not even tell his closest Australian mates, including Roy Whitecross, and the man whose mat was next to his, John Towers.

“Down the coal mine I had a very bad name with the Japanese because whenever I worked in a group, say there’s five or six, my number in Japanese was ‘go-haku-go-jyu’, that’s five-fifty [550], and [they] used to say ‘go-haku-go-jyu dunny door’, that’s ‘no good.’ Because every time I went to work something happened to them, or something went wrong. Me and a couple of Americans who were in on this sort of thing, of sabotaging the coal mine, we done it secretly because we didn’t want to reveal what we were doing, because there were people that were lovey dovey with the Japs and you didn’t know if they’d turn you in or not.”

Runge felt that Americans had the most in common with Australians among the POWs. For him it came from an innate sense of connection based on common experience, what he called “race” but actually was about class. “Generally, apart from them two [US officers Bennett and Little, viewed as collaborators with the Japanese], the Americans were … the same as Australians. Like the Japanese would call it ‘onaji,’ means ‘the same.’”

He felt the Australians were very different from the English. “The Australians and English don’t get along anyhow, anytime.” His view may have been influenced by the relative absence of English and Scots in the mines, a group based mainly in the foundry, along with the Dutch. These were the better jobs. But the major differences seem to have been cultural. “Like our humor is entirely different to English, Dutch, German, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, anything. Our way of life, our humor is entirely different. … But the Americans and the Australians, the humor – as the Jap would say – ‘onaji,’ the same. That sort of attitude with one another, we could sling off at one another and it was a joke.” Some of this related back to growing up poor and getting by in the years before the war. “Australians and Americans, at that particular time come from pioneering families. Like the Depression, everybody came out of that Depression. A lot of people can remember that we had corned beef and damper⁴¹ and … syrup on the table back home. And so did the American boys. They called their damper ‘corn bread’ or something like that. We were so alike in their upbringing. So therefore we got on well together.”

The Allied POWs were kept separate from the Korean and Chinese forced laborers. The Chinese were treated the worst of any group and experienced the highest death rates. But in the mine this separation could not always be enforced. Roy Whitecross recalled a chance encounter, clearly against company rules, with a Korean miner. Korean forced laborers and Allied POWs would be severely punished if caught fraternizing.⁴²

“One night I was sent to the main tunnel to collect dargo, long, sausage-like pieces of hard clay used for tamping the dynamite in the holes drilled in the rock or coal face. At the truck of dargo I found a Korean on a similar errand. He looked carefully at me, then up and down the tunnel. It was deserted.

‘Goshu, Korea,’ he said. ‘Onaji.’

Apparently he had not been long in Japan either. His Japanese was halting and slow, and I understood him. I indicated that I did not understand his remark that Australians and Koreans were the same.

He answered: ‘All prisoners. Work all the time.’

Keeping a furtive look out for any approaching miners, he unburdened his heavy heart. ‘Nippon, no good. Very little food. Korea, plenty food. Australia?’

‘Yes,’ I said. ‘Australia plenty, plenty food.’ …

He shook his head dolefully, and reaffirmed his belief that Nippon was definitely ‘no good.’ In the distance along the main tunnel a miner’s lamp appeared. Hastily assuring me that Koreans and Australians were the same and that they were ‘friends’ he grabbed his sack of dargo and hurried into the inky blackness of hatchiroash tunnel.”⁴³

One act of sabotage Runge and his group carried out involved a character they called “Pinto Rice.” From his 1983 interview it is probable that ‘Pinto’ was Japanese. ‘Pinto Rice’ could have been a play on ‘Binto box’, Runge’s way of saying bento box, used by the Japanese for the POWs’ rice ration. Or it could simply have been taken from ‘pint-a-rice’, the standard small ration, and perhaps this man was small in stature and Asian in appearance. Runge’s Japanese foreman this one day told him that if his group loaded extra skips full of coal that they could have a shushin – quick nap. Runge’s team followed through, but then the foreman refused and wanted more skips loaded. Runge got into an argument with him, to no avail. His team then loaded more extra skips, but the system of moving the coal cars along the track incline required stopping at a certain point.

“[This Japanese foreman] used to stand on the front of these full cars. And as he went down that tunnel, and as he went past – there’s a button on the wall – he’d hit that and … the red light’d flash up where this ‘Pinto Rice’ [worker] was at the top, and [Pinto would] put on the brake and stop it. The [foreman] would connect the other full cars and they’d pull them up into the main line. So [the foreman] would ride in the front. And as they went down the cable … he’d hit that, the red light’d go on and Pinto would put on the brake.

“When [the foreman] went away [after the argument], I raced up to this ‘Pinto Rice’, and I said, ‘Now when he goes down with those two full cars and he hits that button, don’t stop it. Because he’d be ridin’ in the front, see.’ So Pinto said ‘ok.’ So when he come and he hooked on these two full cars, took ‘em out and changed the points, and then he had to go down the slope, down underneath. We seen the red light glow through the tunnel when he hit the thing. Pinto didn’t stop it, and that drove him clear into the coal face.

“We had to go down there, and … we dug him out of the coal, and he’s still alive. His pelvis and everything was crushed. So we dug him out, and the Jap [Pinto – as the foreman was unable to talk after his injury] told us to take him up topside. So he [presumably Pinto] said, look, we got to kill this bugger before we get him up topside, otherwise he’s going to squeal, you know. He’s going to tell. So we threw him [the foreman] over tops of coal trucks, down there. Fell down on the other side. Dropped him. We done everything. He wouldn’t just die.”

Another foreman ranked higher than the injured man arrived and organized the men to take him up to the surface and then to the hospital. Runge and the POWs feared that the injured foreman would tell what actually happened, that the accident was deliberate. But the foreman was unable to speak and eventually died, saving Runge and the POW rebels – and Pinto – from brutal punishment.

David Runge’s ordeal – torture and survival

On February 12, 1945 Runge’s luck ran out. The Japanese in charge that day made him a leader of a team of Australian POWs who had just arrived at the camp. They were inexperienced compared to Runge and the others who had been there a year, and they were the type of POWs Runge did not trust, men he differentiated as “new” versus his “old” crowd that he felt he could rely on. To help these new Australian POWs, he told them not to work too hard. But there had been coal car derailments that day, making the Japanese foremen angry. Runge and his team had been clearing rocks rather than loading coal, and the foreman was dissatisfied with their rate of work as well.

Two of the new Australians were pulled aside, and they revealed to the foreman that Runge advised them not to go too fast. But more was involved than just Runge’s go-slow advice, as he had secretly been carrying out a particular form of sabotage.

“There was a couple of Americans and me. … We sabotaged the mine as much as we could sabotage it, and destroy everything that we could destroy, to knock down their production. This particular time I told these guys that was with me – and they were new Australians, I was the senior guy. When we used to load these rock cars, the coal cars, I used to get all the rocks and stand them up perpendicular … so it looked like a full car.

“Anyhow one of these flamin’ coots [actually two, according to Runge’s affidavit for War Crimes trials] went and told the Jap. And of course when we got into topside they called me out. It was snowing, really snowing, and they got me and this American. They hit the American fair across the mouth, and he went down, which I shoulda went down. Because once … the American … went down they let him alone. They got hold of me, they put me up on a box, and tied me thumbs up on a rope, kicked the box from underneath me and wacked me with sticks and god knows what.”

The guards then marched him through deep snow and took him to the prison cell, known as the aeso to the POWs. He was forced to kneel on bamboo slats placed on the cold concrete floor.

“This [guard] used to come and stand on me thighs and squash me legs into the bamboo. If you can realize the bamboo was about four inches in diameter. I had to kneel. There’s one [bamboo piece] forward, and the other [bamboo piece] was near me shin, and I was suspended on that above the ground in the kneeling position. The Sailor [Takeda Sadamu] used to come and stand on me thighs to push that into me shins. I’d be kneeling down and they’d say ‘Stand up!’ And I’d stand up. With the soreness you’d start to get cold again. They’d say ‘Kneel down again!’ And they’d kneel me in again. At night time they’d stick us in the cell, and in the morning they’d come along and kick us in the ribs, get us up again, and straight back onto the bamboos. In the end I couldn’t stand up.”

This torture continued for five days, the first two without food or water, and with only thin clothes in the bitter cold of the prison room. Finally two POW orderlies took Runge to the camp hospital. Dr. Ian Duncan found Runge’s legs were frozen solid. After several days gangrene set in, and Doctors Hewlett and Duncan had to amputate his legs, but could only do it with a common saw. Fortunately Runge was given a spinal injection that made everything from his waist down numb, but he could still hear the saw cutting through his legs.

Even as he recovered from this horrendous torture the drama was not yet over. An American POW, orderly Bill Zumar, took Runge to a separate room in the hospital a few days after the operation. Zumar was from the town of Comanche, Oklahoma, which had been part of the Chickasaw land grant after Indian removal from the Southeast before the Civil War. Whether Zumar was Chickasaw, Cherokee (the largest Oklahoma tribe), or not, he talked to Runge like a Native American who knew when one had to fight to survive.

“He said ‘Dave, do you know why they put you in here?’ None of us ever told lies to one another. No prisoner lies to one another. … [I said] ‘No.’ ‘Because the Japs are going to come in and bandage you … I brought you this piece of iron. Now when the Jap makes a swing at you, goes with the bayonet, knock it aside real quick and hit him over the head, and take his rifle and you might be able to shoot a couple of them before they kill you.’ Well you can imagine you’d be in that situation, you got no legs, you know you really and truly got to sit there and take it. …

“One particular day I could hear these boots coming up this passageway. … They had rifles and fixed bayonets. I thought, well this is it. I took a solid grip on this iron bar behind me back. There was Dr. Hewlett and Dr. Duncan standing there. And I thought to me self, they’re going to bayonet me and these doctors are going to pronounce me dead.

“They had bayonetted an American between the huts. They gave him a cigarette and so they bayonetted him in the back. [That] killing was before we got there. This Japanese captain [Isao Fukuhara] said … to Dr. Duncan and Hewlett, ‘You giving this man extra rations?’ – in Japanese. They said yes. He said, ‘Well you give him food, make him strong.’ They said ok – and they all turned around and went out of the thing, and I was moved back into the ward. That was a hairy experience, I tell you.”

The presence of Duncan and Hewett probably prevented further harm to Runge, as they were witnesses, and they too would have had to be killed to hide Runge’s murder. Captain Fukuhara, who ran the camp, had authorized Runge’s torture. He was tried after the war and executed, along with three other guards who were at Fukuoka 17 and the Miike Coal Mine, including his main torturer, ‘The Sailor’ (Takeda).

Fukuoka 17 was finally liberated in September 1945, over a month after the official surrender. The Nagasaki atomic bombing, visible from Omuta, had made harbor access difficult for the hospital ship needed to accommodate the prisoners-of-war, delaying access to POW camps beyond the city. All the POWs who saw Nagasaki on their return were shocked at the devastation, but no one knew anything about the dangers of radiation at that time. The full impact of the atomic bombing was not understood by any of the POWs, who believed that the destruction of Nagasaki contributed to their liberation. Some at Fukuoka 17 later learned about what atomic warfare meant and the terrible loss of civilian life it caused. Tom Uren, a Fukuoka 17 POW from Australia, was one, and as a result of what he saw firsthand in Nagasaki became an activist for peace later in life, and a leader in the Australian Labor Party as an elected MP and by the mid-1970s the deputy leader of the ALP.

David Runge returned to Australia, and in the following years was fitted with prosthetic legs by Dr. Duncan, who had served with him at the Mitsui Miike Coal Mine POW camp. He moved to Auburn, a suburb of Sydney, and found a new job and a new community. But as Duncan related in 1983, all the Australian POWs he knew from that time, including David Runge, suffered severe stress – what we now know as PTSD. But David Runge, even in 1983, still had a spirit of rebellion and sense of connection to his Army mates from those hard years.

Photo on left from Australia War Memorial: David Runge carried on the back of a sailor on return to Australia, with his best mate John Towers at the front, on crutches from injury resulting from torture at Fukuoka 17. Photo on right: Runge, Sydney Sunday Telegraph, Oct. 14, 1945.

Conclusion – Will Japan tell the full story of the Mitsui Miike Coal Mine?

The Japanese representative at the World Heritage Committee session of July 2015, bidding for international support for World Heritage designation, agreed that “Japan will sincerely respond to the recommendation that the strategy allows ‘an understanding of the full history of each site.’ .. [and] is prepared to take measures that allow an understanding that there were a large number of Koreans and others who were brought against their will and forced to work under harsh conditions in the 1940s at some sites, and that during World War II, the Government of Japan also implemented its policy of requisition. Japan is prepared to incorporate measures into the interpretive strategy to remember the victims such as the establishment of an information center.”⁴⁴

At the Omuta Mitsui sites – World Heritage listed – Japan has failed to honor the workers who were prisoners at the Miike Coal Mine, and has failed to consult fully with representatives from South Korea, Australia, the United States, the Netherlands, Great Britain, China and other countries whose people worked at the mine during the war. The Japanese government needs to begin to tell the full history of this mine, consistent with its legal obligations agreed to under the World Heritage Committee’s requirements.

The Japanese government’s omission of this disturbing history from its “Meiji Industrial Revolution” sites is a disservice to the Japanese people and their own history, as it was Japanese convicts, Japanese miners – men and women – who suffered in earlier decades before the forced slave labor of Koreans, Chinese, and Allied POWs. The ‘smiling miners’ propaganda on the Omuta tourist website also fails to acknowledge the largest strike in Japan’s history – the coal miners’ strike of 1959-60 that was defeated – by Mitsui, with the support of the Japanese government.

Photos of the Miike 1959-60 strike by Japanese workers, supported by the Omuta community. Clash with police in left photo; miners’ wives in right photo. Source: Unknown autßhor – Japanese book “Album: The 25 Years of the Postwar Era” published by Asahi Shimbun Company.

Japan’s historical misrepresentation at the Miike Coal Mine stands in stark contrast to how Germany and Austria have openly acknowledged their past treatment of forced laborers, including POWs, under the Third Reich. The Japanese people can benefit from knowing their country’s history and acknowledging the crimes of the past, while finding ways to honestly build new relations internationally with countries victimized by that past, as Germany and Austria have sought to do.

South Korea raised concerns in 2020 about Japanese government failure to abide by the agreement reached in 2015, Decision 39 COM 8B.14 of the World Heritage Committee regarding full consultation with all affected parties related to the “Sites of Japan’s Industrial Revolution,” which included Mitsui’s Miike Coal Mine.⁴⁵ It is imperative that the Australian government, which has a representative on the World Heritage Committee in 2021, support these concerns. History should not be reduced to bland, falsified tourist nostalgia. Public history requires accuracy, honesty, and compassion for those who paid with their lives for a country that waged a brutal war in the Asia Pacific.

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David Palmer is Associate in History at The University of Melbourne. He is the author of Organizing the Shipyards: Union Strategy in Three Northeast Shipyards (Cornell UP); “Foreign Forced Labor at Mitsubishi’s Nagasaki and Hiroshima Shipyards: Big Business, Militarized Government, and the Absence of Shipbuilding Workers’ Rights in World War II Japan,” in van der Linden and Rodríguez García, eds, On Coerced Labor: Work and Compulsion after Chattel Slavery (Brill); and other publications on the labor history of the U.S. and Japan. [email protected] 

Notes

¹ Roy Whitecross, Slaves of the Son of Heaven: A Personal Account of an Australian POW, 1942-1945 (East Roseville, NSW: Kangaroo Press, 2000 – originally published in 1951), pp. 180-182.

² David Palmer, “Gunkanjima / Battleship Island, Nagasaki: World Heritage Site or Urban Ruins Tourist Attraction?” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, vol. 16, issue 1, number 4, Jan. 1, 2018. 

³ Anna Bruce-Lockhart, “These are the top countries for travel and tourism in 2019,” World Economic Forum, Sept. 4, 2019.

⁴ “International Tourism,” The World Bank. 

⁵ UNESCO, World Heritage Committee, “Japan: Properties Inscribed in the World Heritage List.”

⁶ Even conservative historians of the industrial revolution highlight the centrality of the shift from artisan and manual labor to collective (factory) and mechanized labor for the industrial revolution in Europe and the United States. See David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present (Cambridge U.P, 1969); Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Harvard U.P., 1977).

⁷ Japanese document cited in “Follow-up Measures concerning the Inscription of the Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution on the World Heritage List,” Non-paper addressed to World Heritage Committee Member States, Republic of Korea, June 26, 2020.

⁸ “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution” – Japanese website version, Meiji Nihon no sangyo kakumei isan. 

⁹ Tanaka Satoko, “Rodosha no gisei ni miru senzen no Miike Tankō okeru romuseisaku no hensen to rōdōsha teikō ni kansuru kosatsu,” Bukkyo University Bulletin, Shakai fukushi gaku kenkyū rishū (Social welfare research university documents), no. 7, March 2009, p. 46; Takeuchi Yasuto, Korean Forced Labor Investigation: Coal Mines Volume (Chōsa: Chōsenjin kyōsei rōdō – Tankō shu), Tokyo, 2013, p. 132; Takeuchi Yasuto, Wartime Korean Forced Labor: Investigation Documents (Senji chōsenjin kyōsei rōdō chōsa shiryō shu), p. 211.; Tanaka Hiroshi, Record of Chinese Forced Labor: Documents (Chūgojin kyōsei renkō no kiroku: Shiryō) (Tokyo, 1990), pp. 541, 542; “Fukuoka POW Camp #17 Omuta” spreadsheet, Center for Research: Allied POWs under the Japanese – http://www.mansell.com/pow_resources/camplists/fukuoka/fuku_17/fukuoka17.htm . The Korean death count is almost certainly higher than this figure. Takeuchi had to rely on two government reports (issued in 1946) and a company report on the mine. His figures for conscript numbers cover 1942-1945. Figures for Japanese employees are averaged from Tanaka’s numbers over the full six years. Australian numbers begin in 1944, American, British and Dutch numbers earlier. Aside from POW numbers, which are verifiable through multiple government documents, these figures are approximations using available sources. The Japanese numbers are the most problematic. This issue can only be resolved when Mitsui makes public its company records for this period.

¹⁰ Miyamoto Takashi, “Convict Labor and Its Commemoration: The Mitsui Miike Coal Mine Experience,” The Asia-Pacific Journal – Japan Focus, vol. 15, issue 1, no. 3, Jan. 1, 2017. 

¹¹ Yamamoto Sakubei to tankō no kiroku (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2014).

¹² Japan’s claim to these sites having “outstanding universal value,” a crucial criterion for World Heritage listing, includes this statement: “The technological ensemble of key industrial sites of iron and steel, shipbuilding and coal mining is testimony to Japan’s unique achievement in world history as the first non-Western country to successfully industrialize. Viewed as an Asian cultural response to Western industrial values, the ensemble is an outstanding technological display of industrial sites that reflected the rapid and distinctive industrialisation of Japan based on local innovation and adaptation of Western technology.” Japan’s assessment of cultural value apparently does not include its treatment of coal miners, notably its use of convict, forced, and slave labor at Miike prior to the end of World War II. “Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution: Iron and Steel, Shipbuilding and Coal Mining,” UNESCO website.  

¹³ Richard J. Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cornell U.P., 1987), pp. 68-167.

¹⁴ William Donald Smith, III, “Ethnicity, Class and Gender in the Mines: Korean Workers in Japan’s Chikuhō Coal Fields, 1917-1945,” Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1999, pp. 466, 473; Tom Arents, Norihiko Tsuneishi, “The Uneven Recruitment of Korean Miners in Japan in the 1910s and 1920s: Employment Strategies of the Miike and Chikuhō Coalmining Companies,” International Review of Social History, 60, Special Issue, 2015, pp. 129-131.

¹⁵ Summary of Tanaka Naoki, Kindai Nihon tanko rōdōshi kenkyu (A Study of Coal Mining Labor History in Modern Japan), by Hatakeyama Hideki, in Japanese Yearbook on Business History, trans. Stephen W. McCallion, 1998, pp. 200-203.

¹⁶ Smith, “Ethnicity, Class and Gender in the Mines,” pp. 115, 116.

¹⁷ Arents and Norihiko, “The Uneven Recruitment of Korean Miners in Japan,” pp. 121-143. 

¹⁸ Priscilla Long, Where the Sun Never Shines: A History of America’s Bloody Coal Industry (New York: Paragon House, 1991), p. 41.

¹⁹ William R. Nester, Japanese Industrial Targeting: The Neomercantalist Path to Economic Superpower (Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), p. 127. 

²⁰ Ta Chen, “Labor Conditions in Japan,” Monthly Labor Review, Nov. 1925, pp. 8-19.

²¹ Michael Coulson, History of Mining: The Events, Technology and People Involved in the Industry in the Modern World, (Harriman House Publishing, 2012), pp. 226, 227; Keith Dix, What’s a Coal Miner to Do? The Mechanization of Coal Mining (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), pp. 29-34.

²² Smith, “Ethnicity, Class and Gender,” pp. 92-138.

²³ See, for example, Regine Mathias, “Female Labour in the Japanese coal-mining industry,” in Janet Hunter, ed., Japanese Working Women (Routledge, 1993), pp. 98-121; Sachiko Sone, “Japanese Coal Mining: Women Discovered,” in Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt and Martha Macintyre, eds., Women Miners in Developing Countries (Ashgate, 2006), pp. 51-72; W. Donald Smith, “Digging through Layers of Class, Gender and Ethnicity: Korean Women Miners in Prewar Japan,” in Lahiri-Dutt, Macintyre, pp. 111-130; Matthew Allen, “Undermining the Occupation: Women Coal Miners in 1940s Japan,” Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, July 2010. Mathias and Sone deal with Miike, but not beyond the 1920s. Developments in the 1930s through 1945 reveal how Japan’s coal mining industry not only stagnated, but went backward, with the exclusion of women from underground at the largest mines part of this process.

²⁴ Sakamoto Masako, Zaibatsu to teikoku shugi: Mitsui Bussan to Chūgoku (Tokyo: Minervashobo, 2004), pp. 42, 123.

²⁵ John G. Roberts, Mitsui: Three Centuries of Japanese Business (New York: Weatherhill, 1974), p. 351.

²⁶ Genbaku shibaku kiroku shashinshū (Photographic Collection of Atomic Bomb Photographs), Nagasaki City, 2001, p. 1 (map of Nagasaki City sites bombed); Takeuchi Yasuto, Wartime Korean Forced Labor: Investigation Documents (Senji chōsenjin kyōsei rōdō chōsa shiryō shu), Kobe, 2015, p. 115.

²⁷ Information on Fukuoka 17 and the Miike Coal Mine in sections that follow come from interviews with David Runge and Ian Duncan, as well as David Runge’s affidavit for postwar War Crimes trials, unless otherwise indicated. David Runge interview, with Margaret Evans, March 28, 1983, accession number SO2948, Australian War Memorial Archives; Ian Duncan interview, with Margaret Evans, May 13, 1982, accession number SO2986, Australian War Memorial Archives. and David Runge affidavit for War Crimes trial, Australian War Memorial Archives, series no. AWM 54, control symbol 1010/4/125, DPI: 300. Tim Bowden organized over one hundred interviews with former Australian prisoners-of-war through the Australian War Memorial, which were for Hank Nelson’s ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) radio series, produced by Bowden, “Prisoners of War: Australians under Nippon.” ABC published a book version by Nelson in 1985.

²⁸ Linda Goetz Holmes, Unjust Enrichment: How Japan’s Companies Built Postwar Fortunes using American POWs, (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2001), p. 84, quoted in William Underwood, “The Japanese Court, Mitsubishi and Corporate Responsibility to Chinese Forced Labor Redress,” Japan Focus, March 29, 2006.

²⁹  Frances Miley and Andrew Read, “In the Valley of the Shadow of Death: Accounting and Identity in Thai-Burma Railway Prison Camps 1942-1945,” paper presented at 14th World Congress of Accounting Historians, 2016, p. 5. In 1942, Australia’s population was over 7 million, while Great Britain’s was over 50 million, yet the number of Australian POWs in the Thai-Burma construction camps was 13,004, with 2,802 deaths, while British POWs numbered 30,131, with 6,904 deaths.

³⁰ Australian Infantry Force.

³¹ Whitecross, Slaves of the Son of Heaven, pp. x, 182. “Railroad of Death” is a memoir of the Thai-Burma railway construction by former Australian POW Lieutenant John Coast, quoted in the 1951 “Forward” to Whitecross’s book, written by Adrian Curlewis, District Court Judge and former POW in Changi and on the Thai-Burma railway.

³² Australian Army Medical Corps.

³³ William Green, “The General Courts Martial of Lieutenant Commander Edward N. Little,” The Text Message, National Archives (US), Nov. 13, 2018.

³⁴ George Weller, ed. by Anthony Weller, First into Nagasaki: The Censored Eyewitness Dispatches on Post-Atomic Japan and Its Prisoners of War (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2006), p. 57.

³⁵ Whitecross, Slaves of the Son of Heaven, p. 196.

³⁶ Weller, First into Nagasaki, p. 51.

³⁷ Whitecross, Slaves of the Son of Heaven, p. 181.

³⁸ Tom Uren, Straight Left (New South Wales: Random House, 1995), pp. 46-53.

³⁹ Nozoe Kenji, Shirizu: Hanaoka jiken no hitotachi – Chūgokujin kyōsei renko kiroku (Tokyo: Shayo, 2007). 

⁴⁰ Email correspondence from Michael Bell, Australian War Memorial, and Felicity Perrers to Bell, July 13, 2021, citing government and family records, and newspaper obituaries; Attestation Form for Dave Runge, Australian Military Forces, July 18, 1940, National Archives of Australia, service number NX 65609.

⁴¹ Damper is unleavened soda bread of Aboriginal origin, common everywhere in Australia in modern times. It has never had any racial connotations in Australian popular culture but has always had strong links to working class culture.

⁴² Japanese civilian guard Takeda Sadamu, who was probably “The Sailor” who tortured Runge, was tried for war crimes. This accusation was one of a number used against him. He was convicted and sentenced to death. “Defendant: Takeda, Sadamu, Civilian Employee, Japanese Army, Fukuoka POW Branch Camp No. 17, Kyushu, Japan,” Docket No./ Date: 130/ Apr. 15 -25, 1947, Yokohama, Japan, summary on War Crimes Studies Center, U.C. Berkeley. 

⁴³ Whitecross, Slaves of the Son of Heaven, p. 231.

⁴⁴ “Follow-up Measures concerning the Inscription of the Sites of Japan’s Meiji Industrial Revolution on the World Heritage List,” Non-paper addressed to World Heritage Committee Member States, Republic of Korea, June 26, 2020.

⁴⁵ “Follow-up Measures,” ROK.

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***

For many New Zealanders, He Puapua came shrouded in controversy from the moment it became public knowledge earlier this year.

Released only when opposition parties learned of its existence, the report on “realising” the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was labelled a “separatist” plan by National Party leader Judith Collins.

“Quite clearly there is a plan,” Collins said, “it is being implemented, and we are going to call it out.”

But He Puapua is not a plan and it’s not government policy. It’s a collection of ideas drafted by people who are not members of the government. To understand its real significance we need to examine how and why it was commissioned in the first place.

'It meant nothing': Collins denies UN indigenous rights pact signed by National in 2010 led to He Puapua https://t.co/AZefDQPCJx

— Newshub Politics (@NewshubPolitics) July 5, 2021

Self-determination for all

He Puapua’s origins can be traced back to 2007 when the UN adopted the Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, confirming the human rights affirmed in all previous international declarations, covenants and agreements belonged to Indigenous peoples as much as anybody else.

It confirmed the right to self-determination belongs to everybody. Thus, in New Zealand, Pakeha have the right to self-determination, and so do Māori.

At the time, 143 UN member states voted for the declaration, including the major European colonial powers of Britain, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands.

There were 11 abstentions, but four states voted against — Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. They were especially concerned about the scope of Article 28(2) which deals with compensation for confiscated or other dishonestly acquired land:

Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned, compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.

New Zealand was worried this article would justify returning much more Māori land than was already occurring under te Tiriti o Waitangi (Treaty of Waitangi) settlements.

'Helen Clark got it right': Seymour calls for Parliament to discard Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples https://t.co/Q9WopK9RNa

— Newshub Politics (@NewshubPolitics) July 4, 2021

Future aspirations

However, the phrase “other appropriate redress” is open to less restrictive interpretation. In 2010, the National-led government decided the declaration did not threaten freehold private property rights. Then-Prime Minister John Key argued:

While the declaration is non-binding, it both affirms accepted rights and establishes future aspirations. My objective is to build better relationships between Māori and the Crown, and I believe that supporting the declaration is a small but significant step in that direction.

Australia, Canada and the United States also changed their positions. In 2019, New Zealand’s Labour-led government established a working group to advise on developing a plan for achieving the aims of the UN declaration. These aims are not just concerned with land rights, but also with things like health, education, economic growth, broadcasting, criminal justice and political participation.

Not government policy

He Puapua, the group’s report, was provided to the government in 2019. However, the government didn’t accept a recommendation that the report be promptly released for public discussion. According to Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, this was due to the risk it could be “misconstrued” as government policy.

Nevertheless, it has now been released and the government appears to have accepted the recommendation that Māori should be actively involved in drafting a plan.

Collins also objected to the report’s description of this involvement as “co-design”. What she can’t say, however, is that including people in policy making is separatist. Inclusion is an essential democratic practice.

He Puapua also uses co-design to describe Māori involvement in the delivery of social services and the protection of the natural environment. This involvement isn’t new, but He Puapua says it should be strengthened.

And while there may be arguments against this kind of inclusivity (for example, co-design is a weaker authority than the rangatiratanga affirmed in te Tiriti), calling it separatist is an error of fact.

Securing rangatiratanga

Rangatiratanga describes an independent political authority and is consistent with international human rights norms. It has gradually influenced public administration in New Zealand under successive governments over more than 40 years.

He Puapua says there are human rights arguments for strengthening and securing rangatiratanga.

In fact, the UN declaration may help clarify how independent authority might work in practice, especially in the context of the Crown’s right to govern — which the declaration also affirms.

It's time for the B.C. NDP to get serious about UNDRIP, Indigenous leaders say https://t.co/2qT98Qu9Ye

— CBC Indigenous (@CBCIndigenous) October 27, 2020

Separatism versus sameness

He Puapua’s potentially most controversial idea involves creating “a senate or upper house in Parliament that could scrutinise legislation for compliance with te Tiriti and/or the Declaration”.

There are reasons to think this won’t get far. The government has already rejected it, and the idea was raised in just one paragraph of a 106-page report. But its inclusive intent shows why “separatism versus sameness” is the wrong way to frame the debate.

What it means to ensure all, and not just some, people may exercise the right to self-determination requires deeper thought. In that sense, He Puapua might usefully be read in conjunction with British Columbia’s draft action plan on the UN declaration.

Released only last month for public consultation, the plan coincided with the Canadian federal parliament passing legislation committing to implement the declaration. The British Columbian plan addressed four themes:

• self-determination and inherent right of self-government
• title and rights of Indigenous peoples
• ending Indigenous-specific racism and discrimination
• social, cultural and economic well-being.

He Puapua in practice

Some of the plan’s specific measures are not relevant to New Zealand and some may be contested. But its important general principles draw out some of the basic attributes of liberal inclusivity.

Those include ensuring people can live according to their own values, manage their own resources, participate in public life free of racism and discrimination, and define for themselves what it means to enjoy social, cultural and economic well-being.

British Columbia’s far-reaching proposals can inform New Zealand’s debate about what He Puapua’s proposals might mean in practice.

As I try to show in my book ‘We Are All Here to Stay’: citizenship, sovereignty and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, there are ways state authority can be arranged to reject the colonial assumption that some people are less worthy of the right to self-determination than others.

This requires radical inclusivity.

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Dominic O’Sullivan is Adjunct Professor, Faculty of Health and Environmental Sciences, Auckland University of Technology and Professor of Political Science, Charles Sturt University

Featured image: The flag flying alongside the Flag of New Zealand on the Auckland Harbour Bridge, Waitangi Day, 2012. (CC BY-SA 3.0)

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***

South Korean President Moon Jae-in, in the midst of a five-day US visit, is being accompanied by a delegation of corporate chieftains pledging up to $33.8 billion in United States investments.

Joining Moon on his five-day US tour are Samsung Electronics vice chairman Kim Ki-nam, SK Group chairman Chey Tae-won and LG Energy Solution CEO Kim Jong-hyun – global titans in electric vehicle (EV) battery and semiconductor production. Hyundai Motor Group president Kong Young-woon is also on the trip.

For the US, which is working to “Build Back Better” after the ravages of Covid-19, these are big names and numbers and are likely to inject real goodwill into Moon’s meetings with US leaders.

After meeting US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other Congressional leaders on Thursday, Moon will wag chins with Vice President Kamala Harris on Friday morning, then summit with President Joe Biden in the afternoon.

As the world waits to see how Washington’s policy toward Beijing plays out, it is abundantly clear that firming up South Korea’s position in the US supply chain is a presidential priority for Moon and the blue-chip delegation accompanying him.

The Korean corporate bosses are reportedly set to greenlight US investments worth tens of billions of dollars – albeit, some of these projects have already been announced and uncertainty still hovers over a massive investment anticipated from Samsung.

Multiple media, citing documentation filed in the state of Texas earlier this year, say Samsung plans to construct an additional chip production facility next to its existing plant in Austin, and possibly another one elsewhere in the United States, worth some $17 billion.

That would synch very neatly with the policy of the new US administration.

With Biden seeking to rejuvenate America’s flagging position in semiconductor manufacturing with some $50 billion worth of incentives, Samsung was one of 19 global firms that joined a meeting with the US President in April.

Heavy hitters, big bucks

The Korean company is the number one fabricator of memory chips globally, and the number two producer in foundry – advanced, non-memory chips made to external clients’ designs.

However, the shutdown of Samsung’s Austin plan due to freak weather in February that killed much of Texas’ power generation – losing Samsung an estimated hundreds of millions of dollars in output – has raised uncertainties. Questions also hang over whether there is enough labor in the area to fill the company’s demand.

Market watchers will be hoping for some clarity in the days ahead.

LG Energy Solution and SK Innovation are both key players in lithium-ion batteries, a core component in EVs. For two years, the Korean rivals engaged in a US court dispute over intellectual property, which ended with a compromise last month.

That frees SK Innovation to finalize its $2.6 billion Atlanta, Georgia factory. Moon, along with SK’s Chay, will visit the site on Thursday, the last day of the presidential visit, a Blue House official confirmed to Asia Times.

The factory is expected to supply EV batteries to Ford and VW starting in 2022.

LG Energy, a subsidiary of LG Chem, announced in March that it would invest $4.5 billion through 2025 to increase its US output. The company runs a lithium-ion battery factory in Michigan and is constructing another plant in Ohio through its JV with General Motors, which is expected to be completed in 2022.

Moreover, the GM-LG joint venture, Ultium Cells, announced earlier this month a $2.3 billion investment plan for a second plant in Tennessee.

And it is not just supply chain.

Last week, Hyundai Motor Group’s North American arm announced that it would invest $7.4 billion in the US through 2025 to produce “future EVs, enhance production facilities and further its investments in smart mobility solutions.”

The products will be made by Hyundai Motor and affiliate Kia. “Hyundai Motor Group looks forward to working with the US government and other business partners to expand the US hydrogen energy ecosystem,” it said.

More details are expected during Kong’s stay in the US. Hyundai already operates a production plant in Georgia, and Kia in Alabama. The group also said it would set up a liaison office in Washington DC.

Spreading the investment, spreading the risk

Global supply chains were massively complicated by the trade and tech wars launched by the Donald Trump administration against China, and the Biden administration has kept up the pressure.

South Korea – like democratic neighbors and fellow manufacturing/export powerhouses Japan and Taiwan – faces a conundrum in this situation as its leading trade partner is China. However, Seoul – like Taipei and Tokyo – is politically aligned with Washington

Last year, information website Worlds Top Exports, found that Korean exports to China were worth $132.6 billion – or 25.8% of South Korea’s total overseas shipments. Exports to the US were just over half that, at $74.4 billion, or 14.5% of the total.

However, China is not a major investor in South Korea. In 2020, its direct investment totaled just $1.99 billion, compared with $5.3 billion from the US, according to website Business Korea, which cited Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy statistics.

When it comes to Korean overseas investments, in 2019 – the biggest year ever for outbound investment with $61.8 billion deployed overseas, according to the Ministry of Economy and Finance – the US  took the largest share of $14.77 billion, 23.9% of the total. Korean FDI in China, by contrast, was $5.8 billion, or 9.4%.

These robust investment flows reflect solid Korea-US economic interchange.

However, the massive multiple investments planned by Korean firms in the US this year – if confirmed, they would dwarf those of the whole of 2019 – are also very likely a hedge against political risk.

“I always think economic diversity is very, very important and supply chains are more important than ever,” James Kim, CEO of the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea, told Asia Times. “Korea and the US can be partners to establish a more robust supply chain.”

“I would like Moon to know that the US is the most important partner to South Korea….even though China has a bigger share of the export pie,” Kim added.

But Kim, who represents US businesses in Korea, also hoped that Biden would make some demands of Moon.

He cited issues in the Korean regulatory environment that are problematic for US firms  – notably taxation, labor market flexibility and some standards that are unique to Korea, including in future-centric areas such as cloud computing,

He also urged the two countries to reach an agreement on vaccination recognition. Currently, visitors to Korea from overseas – even if they have been fully vaccinated – are subject to 10 days mandatory quarantine.

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***

All too predictably, the crisis in Myanmar has rapidly spiralled out of control with what we were told were “peaceful” “pro-democracy” protesters transforming into heavily armed militants fighting Myanmar’s central government, its police force and its armed forces with war weapons.

Of course, the protests were never peaceful. The Western media only claimed as much to then depict subsequent security operations against what were in fact very violent protests and a nascent militancy as “brutal repression” and as a means to justify more direct Western intervention in a political crisis already driven by decades of Western interference.

But just as was the case in similarly US-engineered conflicts in Libya and Syria in 2011, the ability to cover up the violence of the opposition, their use of war weapons and terrorism, as well as their carrying out of atrocities has become impossibe to conceal.

A June 2, 2021 Reuters article titled, “Boycott and bombings mar Myanmar’s new school year,” would note that growing armed attacks from the opposition prompted security forces to stand guard at schools and bring students “under armed escort from their homes.”

The article noted that teachers were also in fear for their safety, going to school in “normal clothing” and then changing into their government uniforms “only inside the school.”

Despite admitting to a “a series of bombings” targeting educational institutions across Myanmar, Reuters deliberately attempts to downplay the terrorism and add ambiguity when attributing who is carrying out the terrorism.

However, opposition media inside Myanmar including US government-funded ‘Myanmar Now,’ have quoted leaders of armed opposition groups admitting to their terror campaign against schools and other public facilities.

Myanmar Now’s June 3, 2021 article, “As spate of killings continues, anti-junta forces warn of more to come,” would claim (emphasis added):

While peaceful protests continue—albeit on a far smaller scale than in the early days of the movement—they have been increasingly overshadowed in recent weeks by almost daily reports of shootings and bombings. 

One of the most recent came on Tuesday afternoon, when a lone gunman shot at two soldiers stationed outside the No. 32 Basic Education High School in Mandalay’s Pyigyidagun Township, killing one and injuring the other. 

Unlike many such incidents, this one could be attributed to a particular group—the Mandalay People’s Defence Force (PDF), part of a nationwide network of local civilian resistance forces that aims to coalesce into a federal army. 

“Our PDF team has started carrying out guerrilla activities in Mandalay,” said Bo Nat Khat, one of the group’s leaders. He also claimed responsibility for a recent series of small explosions in five townships.

The Myanmar Now article would also report:

Speaking to Myanmar Now by phone, he also acknowledged that the shift to more confrontational tactics could make life more dangerous for ordinary citizens. 

“We don’t want people to go to crowded places such as the electricity office or the courts,” he warned. 

He insisted, however, that the only civilian targets would be officials and others who have collaborated with the regime in its bid to cement its hold on power. 

These so-called “People’s Defense Forces” are clearly not acting in self-defence but instead are openly admitting to carrying out violence to remove the current government from power and to seize control of the country for themselves and the so-called “National Unity Government” (NUG) chaired by the remnants of Aung San Suu Kyi’s US-backed National League for Democracy (NLD) party.

Thus, just as Reuters and many others did in 2011 regarding Libya and Syria, the Western media is deliberately ignoring admissions from among the opposition itself to the use of terrorism and instead, continuing to depict the crisis in Myanmar as a one-sided campaign of violence by the nation’s government and military.

While the United Nations and other supposed international institutions have continuously condemned and pressured Myanmar’s government and military in line with Washington’s foreign policy objectives, there have been recent admissions by even them regarding atrocities being carried out by armed opposition groups.

A June 17, 2021 press release from the UN in Myanmar would report:

The UN in Myanmar is alarmed at recent acts of violence that illustrate a sharp deterioration of the human rights environment across Myanmar.

One such case is the discovery of two mass graves in Myawaddy Township (Kayin State), containing the human remains of twenty-five people who had reportedly been detained on 31 May by the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO).

The “Karen National Defense Organization” (KNDO) is among several ethnic armed groups propped up by the US and British governments for decades as part of an ongoing effort to divide Myanmar territorially and undermine the nation’s central government and military since it gained independence from Britain in 1948.

The US and British governments had openly armed and trained these groups during World War 2 and have since provided them with support through organisations like USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and through more clandestine and indirect forms of support, particularly in regards to providing arms and military training.

These ethnic armed groups now play a key role in training the so-called PDFs fighting government forces in Myanamr’s urban centres as well as funnelling war weapons to these armed groups.

Little if any mention is made of the atrocities carried out by these ethnic armed groups, atrocities that have been ongoing throughout the decades in their fight to divide Myanmar into a patchwork of Western-sponsored ethnic narco-terror fiefdoms. But these are atrocities now expanding as armed conflict spreads across the country, now under increased international scrutiny, making it increasingly difficult to hide.

The current conflict was easily predicted if we understand the foreign interests involved in engineering it. It is equally predictable that the Western media will continue spinning, downplaying or altogether attempting to cover up opposition terrorism and atrocities now being carried out inside Myanmar in a deliberate effort to assist US, British and European Union efforts to sell continued and escalating pressure on Myanmar’s government and military.

The end goal is collapsing the current government, dismantling Myanmar’s powerful and independent military and leaving Myanmar a divided and destroyed failed state unable to function as a constructive partner to its neighbours and main trade partners, namely China and Thailand.

China’s many ongoing projects within Myanmar including the extension of its One Belt, One Road initiative will be open to attack by militant groups the US will be able to more openly back and maneuver within Myanmar. This is essentially the entire objective of Anglo-American interference in Myanmar’s internal political affairs, the encirclement and containment of China by dismembering an important partner along Beijing’s periphery.

A concerted effort through alternative media and at the UN by Myanmar’s allies will be required to stave off the implementation by Western interests of the ‘Libya Model’ now playing out in Southeast Asia.

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Joseph Thomas is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”. 

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***

Up to 100 turtles and 20 dolphins have washed up dead on Sri Lanka’s beaches in the past month, as experts fear a link to the leak of toxic chemicals from a sunken freight ship.

“So far, around 176 dead turtles have got washed onto different beaches around Sri Lanka,” said Thushan Kapurusinghe, coordinator of the Turtle Conservation Project of Sri Lanka (TCP).

Marine turtles washing up dead on the Indian Ocean island are common around this time of year, which is when the peak of the monsoon turns the seas rough and leads to the turtles being fatally injured.

But this June, the waves have brought in an “abnormally high” number of turtle and even dolphin carcasses, Kapurusinghe told Mongabay.

Unusual increase

Five of the world’s seven marine turtle species nest along Sri Lanka’s southern and southeastern beaches. The April-May period marks the height of the nesting season, according to Lalith Ekanayake, chairman of the  Bio Conservation Society.

But this period has also been marked by what environmental activists and experts warn is the biggest maritime disaster unfolding in Sri Lanka’s history. In late May, the Singapore-flagged cargo ship MV X-Press Pearl caught fire off Colombo, on Sri Lanka’s western coast, and sank in early June. It was carrying a cargo of nitric acid and plastic pellets, among other items, and was loaded with 378 metric tons of bunker fuel. Modeling by researchers has shown that ocean currents would carry these pollutants south, right through the path of the turtles and toward their nesting sites, Ekanayake told Mongabay.

“The timing of the accident couldn’t have been worse than this as the number of turtles in our waters would be high during this time as April-May records the highest number of nesting occurrences, going by past research,” Ekanayaka said.

Satellite tracking data show that most migratory turtles nesting in Sri Lanka move along the west coast closer to shore up to the Gulf of Mannar in the north before moving out to their feeding grounds. This makes them more vulnerable to any pollution from the ship accident, Ekanayake told Mongabay.

Kapurusinghe highlighted what he said was a disturbing trend revealed by the turtle carcasses reported from various locations:  most of the dead turtles are juveniles. Immature turtles are more likely than nesting adults to stay close to shore, mainly to feed. That makes it “possible that these deaths are linked to some food contamination, probably due to pollution caused by the freighter,” Kapurusinghe said.

The carcasses have been sent to the Department of Wildlife Conservation (DWC) for further analysis.

Migration of 10 satellite-tagged green turtles in this study from southeastern Sri Lanka show that most of them swim parallel to the island’s west coast and are being exposed to possible pollution from the wrecked ship. Image courtesy of Thushan Kapurusinghe.

Suhada Jayawardana, DWC’s veterinary surgeon who performed necropsies on the dead turtles found along the western and southeastern coasts, said it was difficult to identify a single reason for most of the deaths. He said there were a few with fin cuts, a telltale sign of entanglement in fishing gear. One turtle showed injuries that may have been by the explosion of the X-Press Pearl. Further laboratory tests are being conducted to get a conclusive answer.

According to Jayawardana, most of the dead turtles are olive ridleys (Lepidochelys olivacea), but there are also some green turtles (Chelonia mydas), hawksbills (Eretmochelys imbricata) and leatherbacks (Dermochelys coriacea).

Around 20 dolphins and 4 whales have also washed ashore during the past month. Most are dolphins, while there was also a juvenile blue whale. “I have been observing whale strandings and deaths for over 30 years and this is a clear increase of their deaths,” said Ranil Nanayakkara, co-founder of the NGO Biodiversity Education And Research (BEAR).

Nanayakkara added that, unlike sea turtles, marine mammals tend to sink to the seabed after dying, so only one in four may get washed ashore. This suggests that far more marine mammals have died than the number that have washed ashore.

During the first few days after the X-Press Pearl’s sinking, it was nearshore dolphin species such as humpbacks (Sousa chinensis) and spinners (Stenella longirostris) that were washing ashore. Later, there were other species, including the dwarf sperm whale (Kogia sima), spotted dolphin (Stenella attenuata), striped dolphin (Stenella coeruleoalba) and melon-headed whale (Peponocephala electra), indicating the impact of possible spreading of pollution, Nanayakkara said.

But some of these deaths may not be related to the ship accident, he added. A case in point is the juvenile blue whale (Balaenoptera musculus) found in northern Sri Lanka, away from where the pollutants may have spread. Nanayakkara said it’s important to carry out a thorough analysis of each carcass to determine the cause of death.

A striped dolphin found washed ashore on June 19. Image courtesy of Supun Jayaweera.

Conflicting science  

There’s no consensus within Sri Lanka’s scientific community over whether the sinking of the X-Press Pearl and the high number of marine animal deaths are linked. The Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA) and other government agencies have appeared hesitant to put an end to the speculation, and several politicians have forwarded their own theories for the animal deaths.

Asha de Vos, a marine biologist with Oceanswell, said in a tweet that

“We have to be cautious about making assumptions without evidence.” She noted that “The truth is, animals die at sea. If currents flow shoreward (As they are doing on our southern and western coasts right now), the carcasses get pushed on the beach.”

She called for an end to speculation and theorizing, and for scientific reasoning to identify the cause of death. She also noted that the reporting of more carcasses than before could also be a result of “observer bias,” where people who previously didn’t pay attention to the issue were now more conscious of it as a result of the ship disaster.

“The main the issue here is the lack of baseline data to compare the environmental parameters and the number of marine creature stranding to quantify whether there is a widespread pollution due to the sinking of the ship and an increase of turtle and marine mammals deaths,” said Nishan Perera, co-founder of the Blue Resources Trust.

He said Sri Lanka urgently needs national-level, long-term monitoring of environmental parameters in the ocean using a standardized methodology. He said such data should be published transparently so that other researchers and volunteers can contribute to it. Such a program will assist in quantifying the true impacts of isolated incidents such as the X-Press Pearl sinking and would also assist in monitoring the status of various marine environment variables, Perera added.

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***

With a lamentable, even disgraceful vaccination rate, confusion over how best to deal with the AstraZeneca supply, vague promises about the arrival of other COVID-19 vaccines, and a degree of complacency, half of Australia found itself in lockdown conditions earlier this month. 

A good deal of this was occasioned by an outbreak in Australia’s largest city in June, which saw the state of New South Wales become the last bastion to yield to the lockdown formula.  For the duration of the pandemic, the state government saw the blunt approach as unnecessarily harsh to residents, preferring to rely on fabled common sense.  We, the argument went, were different.  Business and commerce could be left in peace, bar some tinkering on matters of social distancing. 

But common sense and wily viruses do not necessarily go hand in hand; and the Delta variant of COVID-19 is proving more than a match for public health authorities.  It began with an airport driver in Sydney, who caught the strain from flight crew from the US.  Infections ballooned, helped along by a gathering at a birthday party of around 40 people, one of whom had unknowingly crossed paths with the driver. Those not infected turned out to be the ones who were vaccinated.

While the critics have been, and will be noisy about the tardy reaction of the Berejiklian government in NSW, nothing can take away the dunce status accorded to the Commonwealth, whose primary responsibilities on quarantine and public health have been forfeited.  This monumental debacle, a product of smugness and contentment, was bound to unfold.  The building of specially adapted quarantine facilities to house arrivals from overseas was stubbornly resisted when Australia was essentially free of COVID-19.  Hotel-based quarantine, run by the State governments, was deemed more than suitable. 

There was also a diabolical lack of vision on purchasing a range of vaccines.  All that mattered was the AstraZeneca option, billed as saviour of the nation and intended to give Australia a sovereign capability. Manufacturing it on home soil was celebrated as something visionary.  But that was not to be.  The roll out has been stuttered, erratic and abysmal.  The blood clotting controversy, a risible communications strategy, and a worried public, has left the Morrison government floundering.  Other vaccines had to be selected, and supply of these remains woeful.   To date, just 7% of Australians are fully vaccinated.

Getting a sense about how profound this floundering could be gathered from the way the government approached the pharmaceutical giants to begin with.  What, exactly, was promised by either of the parties?  On that score, the Morrison government is keeping mum, as well it might.  Secrecy is often the first refuge of the incompetent, and there is much secrecy on the way the Commonwealth has been implementing its vaccine policies. 

For one, the entire vaccine supply agreement with AstraZeneca has been stubbornly withheld for reasons of national security, a laughably grim state of affairs.  The only thing we have to go on is the letter of intent between the government and the pharmaceutical giant, which was only released because it says nothing at all. 

The ABC’s 7.30 program, testing the country’s feeble Freedom of Information laws, sought access to the full agreement on April 12.  The answer from one Allison Jones, assistant secretary to the COVID-19 Vaccine Taskforce in the Department of Health, was a typically frail rebuke of the public interest.  In refusing access to the agreement, she considered there to be “real and substantial grounds for expecting that [its disclosure] would, or could reasonably be expected to, cause damage to the security of the Commonwealth.”  What follows is a dull regurgitation of various definitions of “security” and the “security of the Commonwealth” from various statutes, none of them vaguely applicable to discussing public health.   But this technique of irrelevant spray gives us an insight on bureaucratic thought processes: that health priorities fall within the realm of the clandestine.

Jones cites, for instance, the definition under the FOI legislation of “security of the commonwealth”, which is “taken to extend to: (a) matters relating to the detection, prevention or suppression of activities, whether within Australia or outside Australia, subversive of, or hostile to, the interests of the Commonwealth or any other country allied or associated with the Commonwealth”. 

The absurd, and irrelevant definition of “security” from the Australian Security and Intelligence Act 1979 (Cth) is also thrown in for good measure.  These include everything from espionage to “acts of foreign interference” and “the protection of Australia’s territorial and border integrity from serious threats”. 

Few clues were given as to what sort of damage could arise from making the agreement public, other than exposing the government to unalloyed embarrassment.  “I consider the particular damage to the security of the Commonwealth to be the fact that disclosure of the information could provide insight into the unique arrangements for the manufacture and supply of the COVID-19 vaccine.”  Releasing the details of the contract would signal “to other countries the terms agreed between the Commonwealth and AstraZeneca.” What a frightening prospect.

Bill Bowtell, the architect behind Australia’s response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, has made a spirited argument for transparency in this regard.  “Public health cannot be secret health,” he asserts.  “The advice, proceedings and participants of all AZ meetings should be published.” He makes the salient point that the deal has actually compromised national security.  And no government wishes their citizens to know that.    

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

A police superintendent is dead in what may be the fastest death we’ve covered on this blog.

Mr. Malik Imtiaz Mahmood was the Superintendent of Police for the city of Khushab. He received his experimental injection against COVID-19 on or around June 13, according to the World Doctors Alliance. The organization shared a photo of Mr. Mahmood receiving the injection.

Details are sketchy as to what exactly happened next. But a disturbing video shows Mr. Mahmood clutch his heart and drop to the ground, apparently just minutes after receiving the shot.

Watch the video here.

The Namal reported that Mr. Mahmood died of a heart attack. It is unclear which injection he received. The China-made “inactivated virus” Sinopharm and Sinovac, Russia’s Sputnik V, AstraZeneca and the CanSino (China-made viral vector DNA) shots are all authorized for emergency use in Pakistan.

The country also ordered 13 million Pfizer doses late last month. Pakistan processes and packages the CanSino shots at its own labs. Most Pakistanis receive one of the China-made injections. But many Pakistanis travel abroad for work and need AstraZeneca or Pfizer to enter their host countries.

Further the Pakistani government punishes people for refusing the experimental injections. Some provinces cut off your cell phone service for refusing the shots. Others withhold paychecks until you show proof of vaccination. Pakistan suspended 70 military troops without pay for refusing the injections in January.

Remembering Tiffany Dover

One of the early cases that inspired the creation of this blog was Tiffany Pontes Dover. She was a nurse at CHI Memorial Hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee, but lived in a nearby Alabama town. Ms. Dover, 30, received the experimental Pfizer mRNA injection on live TV on December 17, 2020.

Less than 20 minutes later, she passed out, on live television.

Watch the video here.

The story was insulting to the intelligence of critical thinkers. Ms. Dover got on camera shortly thereafter and said she passes out all the time, specifically “six times in the last six weeks.” How can someone work as a critical care nurse and pass out so frequently? The subterfuges continued when the hospital staged some “Welcome back Tiffany” thing where the masked nurse clearly was not Tiffany Dover.

The truth is that she’s likely dead. But we’ll never hear that from mainstream media. What a disaster that would be for Pfizer and all these other companies if one of the first recipients of their poison died immediately on live television. Thus the story has been manipulated and suppressed. We knew our platform was necessary from that point forward.

More instant deaths

These instant deaths after experimental injections are not anomalies. The following video is from a vaccine clinic in Mexico. Watch the woman in the background fall out of her chair and have a seizure just minutes after receiving the injection.

What we know for certain now is that the viral RNA (spike proteins) in these shots spreads to every organ in your body. We also know that the spike proteins cause blood clots. Whether you die in minutes, days, weeks or months after the experimental shots, it’s likely going to happen within a year or two. Blood clots are inevitable after any of the experimental viral vector DNA or mRNA shots.

The only way to protect yourself is to avoid the injections. Stay vigilant and protect your friends and loved ones.

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***

In a major blow to Bharat Biotech’s plan to market Covaxin abroad, the Brazilian government on Tuesday suspended its contract to import 20 million doses of the vaccine in a $300-million deal with the Indian company. With the growing scandal around the contract closing in on Jair Bolsonaro, the Brazilian government is now in a complete damage-control mode to save the president’s skin in a multi-million-dollar case which is keeping this country fixated to TV news.

In a development on Tuesday evening that was not completely unexpected, Brazil’s minister of health Marcelo Queiroga announced that the government has “decided to suspend the contract on the recommendation of the federal comptroller general (CGU)”, which is investigating the alleged irregularities in the contract. After examining the entire contract, which may take 10 to 15 days, CGU will decide whether to terminate the contract or not. But in the views of senators leading the parliamentary commission of inquiry (CPI), the contract is as good as dead.

“I think they suspended the contract to buy some time and then cancel it. They will try to negotiate with the company and say that they have reached a limit because there is a great distrust among the Brazilian population and there is a very deep investigation by the CPI. There won’t be a contract in a few days, I’m sure of that. The plan is to get rid of this contract because the investigation into the Covaxin case is now reaching the president’s office,” said Senator Omar Aziz, president of the parliamentary commission, speaking on a channel on Tuesday night.

The contract between Brazil and Bharat Biotech, mediated and signed by a local company called Precisa Medicamentos, has been in the eye of a political storm for days as it became the main target of the parliamentary commission of inquiry (CPI) investigating the government’s handling of the pandemic. Last week, after a health ministry official, Ricardo Miranda, testified at the senate that he and his brother, federal deputy Luis Miranda, had informed the president about the serious irregularities in an invoice sent by Madison Biotech, an offshore company from Singapore, the CPI turned its focus towards Bolsonaro and Bharat Biotech, whose owner Dr Krishna Ella is also the founding director of the firm which operates from the ground floor of a two-story house in Singapore.

In a late-night report on Tuesday night, CNN Brasil revealed some parts of the CGU report which had forced the government to suspend the contract. In the 11-page official report, as per CNN Brasil, the focus of the investigation is the invoice from Madison Biotech. “Five points are listed to justify the suspension: Attempt to make advance payment, without contractual provision; possible payment through a company not a signatory to the contract; non-compliance with contractual deadlines; non-justification of price; and breach of contract by Bharat/Precisa as reported by ministry of health,” said the report, which largely seem to put the blame on Bharat Biotech, its offshore partner and its Brazilian representative.

The Indian company signed a pact with Precisa Medicamentos on January 12, 2021. Just 40 days later, on February 25, Precisa Medicamentos signed a contract with the Brazilian government for the sale of 20 million doses. At the time of signing of the contract, Covaxin had not been approved by Brazil’s National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA). Yet, its purchase price was agreed at $15 a dose, the highest paid by this country for any of the six vaccines contracted so far. Rejected by ANVISA on March 31 and then approved for limited import with strict conditions on June 4, the Indian vaccine has been mired in a controversy for months. Now, it is at the centre of a massive scandal that is rocking the Brazilian government and tearing apart Bharat Biotech’s reputation as pharmaceutical company.

Amid damaging revelations, the national capital has been abuzz for days with rumours that the government was considering cancelling the contract. According to sources in Brasilia, the people close to the presidential palace want to wash their hands of the deal. “The question is not if the government wants to terminate the contract, the question is when they will cancel it. It is taking time because the contract is under so many ongoing investigations,” said a senior official, speaking on the condition of anonymity. “Nobody wants anything to do with this vaccine anymore. It is toxic.”

For the Bolsonaro administration, which has been completely cornered by the CPI over the purchase of Covaxin and hydroxychloroquine – both from India, the scandal is now too hot to handle. But the suspension – or eventual termination – may not bring any closure as the senators leading the parliamentary probe are not in a mood to give up on their trail of money in the deal. On Tuesday, soon after the government’s announcement to suspend the deal, Senator Randolfe Rodrigues, the vice president of CPI, called it a “confession of guilt”. “If nothing was wrong (in the contract), why would they suspend it? There is only one word for it: Confession!” the senator wrote on Twitter.

The senate probe has gone too deep into the scandal surrounding the Indian vaccine to give it up now. Already dubbed CovaxinGate, it has captured the country’s imagination and is dominating the news cycle. Ricardo Miranda, the health official who exposed the request for $45 million advance payment sent by Madison Biotech of Singapore, is now being treated as a whistleblower by CPI; and the invoice he and his brother took to Bolsonaro with their complaint is the smoking gun on which rests the probe into corruption in the India-Brazil deal.

The senate probe will continue to dig deeper into the vaccine deal between Brazil and Bharat Biotech. Photo: Pedro França/Agência Senado

Four days have passed since the Miranda brothers testified at the senate, telling the country that the president was aware of corruption in the deal, told them the name of the person behind it and yet did nothing about it, but Bolsonaro has not denied the revelations in the bombshell testimony.

The government has, in fact, tied itself in knots, trying to tackle the extremely serious allegations against the president. When the invoice story was revealed last week, the government tried to accuse Ricardo Miranda of tampering with it, but it was soon proved that the document was in the ministry’s computer system and had not been forged. Then the government claimed that the president had forwarded the complaint to then minister of health, Eduardo Pazuello. The senators from CPI found this claim to be fragile because Pazuello was dismissed on March 23, just three days after the brothers meeting with Bolsonaro. On Tuesday, the government came out with the third version, claiming that Pazuello had forwarded the complaint to the executive secretary of the ministry, Élcio Franco, who would have done a “proper” check. It was immediately pointed out by senators that Franco was also dismissed just three days later and had no time to probe the matter.

On Ricardo Miranda’s testimony that he told the president about being under “extreme pressure” from his superiors to clear the invoice for advance payment from a company which is not part of the contract, Bolsonaro is standing on thin ice. As per Brazilian law, not reporting a wrongdoing by a public official is a crime of malfeasance – an impeachable offence. Three senators, including the CPI vice president, asked the Supreme Court on Saturday to open a criminal case against the president. On Monday, an apex court judge forwarded the application to the federal prosecutor-general’s (PGR) for action. On Tuesday, the PGR’s office requested the court to “wait till the senate probe is over”.

The senate investigation may be extended by a few weeks as has been demanded by CPI, during which the investigators plan to dig up more dirt on corruption, especially in the Covaxin deal, before they prepare their report which may shake up the country’s politics. At the heart of this probe is the invoice from Madison Biotech presented by Ricardo Miranda at his testimony. What could be giving sleepless nights to officials at the presidential palace is the announcement on Monday that Ricardo Miranda will be appearing again at the senate but this time in a closed-door session. There has been speculation, hinted strongly by Luis Miranda, that there is a recording of the brothers’ conversation with Bolsonaro where no other person was present.

Bolsonaro’s silence on the Miranda brothers’ testimony is a sign that he knows what is coming. In recent days, his allies have become shaky, rallies called by his supporters have been no-shows and anger against his government has grown. Nationwide protest rallies, scheduled for July 24, have been advanced to this Saturday (July 3), when hundreds of thousands, if not millions, may pack the streets across the country. To suspend a scandalous contract may be an attempt by the government to get out of the tight spot. But it may be too little and too late.

Suspension of the Covaxin contract is unlikely to put an end to this scandal. On Thursday, Francisco Maximiano, the head of Bharat Biotech’s representative in Brazil, is expected to appear at the senate hearing. Now just CPI investigators but the whole country is waiting to watch it live. It may bring out more scandalous details.

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Shobhan Saxena and Florencia Costa are independent journalists based in Sao Paulo, Brazil.

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***

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) centennial takes place this week at the heart of an incandescent geopolitical equation.

China, the emerging superpower, is back to the global prominence it enjoyed throughout centuries of recorded history, while the declining Hegemon is paralyzed by the “existential challenge” posed to its fleeting, unilateral dominance.

A mindset of full spectrum confrontation already sketched in the 2017 U.S. National Security Review is sliding fast into fear, loathing and relentless Sinophobia.

Add to it the Russia-China comprehensive strategic partnership graphically exposing the ultimate Mackinderian nightmare of Anglo-American elites jaded by “ruling the world” – for only two centuries at best.

The Little Helmsman Deng Xiaoping may have coined the ultimate formula for what many in the West defined as the Chinese miracle:

“To seek truth from facts, not from dogmas, whether from East or West”.

So this was never about divine intervention, but planning, hard work, and learning by trial and error.

The recent session of the National People’s Congress provides a stark example. Not only it approved a new Five-Year Plan, but in fact a full road map for China’s development up to 2035: three plans in one.

What the whole world saw, in practice, was the manifest efficiency of the Chinese governance system, capable of designing and implementing extremely complex geoeconomic strategies after plenty of local and regional debate on a vast range of policy initiatives.

Compare it to the endless bickering and gridlock in Western liberal democracies, which are incapable of planning for the next quarter, not to mention fifteen years.

The best and the brightest in China actually do their Deng; they couldn’t care less about the politicizing of governance systems. What matters is what they define as a very effective system to make SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time-bound) development plans, and put them in practice.

The 85% popular vote

At the start of 2021, before the onset of the Year of the Metal Ox, President Xi Jinping emphasized that  “favorable social conditions” should be in place for the CCP centennial celebrations.

Oblivious to waves of demonization coming from the West, for Chinese public opinion what matters is whether the CCP delivered. And deliver it did (over 85% popular approval). China controlled Covid-19 in record time; economic growth is back; poverty alleviation was achieved; and the civilization-state became a “moderately prosperous society” – right on schedule for the CCP centennial.

Since 1949, the size of the Chinese economy soared by a whopping 189 times. Over the past two decades, China’s GDP grew 11-fold. Since 2010, it more than doubled, from $6 trillion to $15 trillion, and now accounts for 17% of global economic output.

No wonder Western grumbling is irrelevant. Shanghai Capital investment boss Eric Li succinctly describes the governance gap; in the U.S., government changes but not policy. In China, government doesn’t change; policy does.

This is the background for the next development stage – where the CCP will in fact double down on its unique hybrid model of “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

The key point is that the Chinese leadership, via non-stop policy adjustments (trial and error, always) has evolved a model of “peaceful rise” – their own terminology – that essentially respects China’s immense historical and cultural experiences.

In this case, Chinese exceptionalism means respecting Confucianism – which privileges harmony and abhors conflict – as well as Daoism – which privileges balance – over the boisterous, warring, hegemonic Western model.

This is reflected in major policy adjustments such as the new “dual circulation” drive, which places greater emphasis on the domestic market compared to China as the “factory of the world”.

Past and future are totally intertwined in China; what was done in previous dynasties echoes in the future. The best contemporary example is the New Silk Roads, or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – the overarching Chinese foreign policy concept for the foreseeable future.

As detailed by Renmin University Professor Wang Yiwei, BRI is about to reshape geopolitics, “bringing Eurasia back to its historical place at the center of human civilization.” Wang has shown how “the two great civilizations of the East and the West were linked until the rise of the Ottoman Empire cut off the Ancient Silk Road”.

Europe moving seaward led to “globalization through colonization”; the decline of the Silk Road; the world’s center shifting to the West; the rise of the U.S.; and the decline of Europe. Now, Wang argues, “Europe is faced with a historic opportunity to return to the world center through the revival of Eurasia.”

And that’s exactly what the Hegemon will go no holds barred to prevent.

Zhu and Xi

It’s fair to argue that Xi’s historical counterpart is the Hongwu emperor Zhu, the founder of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644). The emperor was keen to present his dynasty as a Chinese renewal after Mongol domination via the Yuan dynasty.

Xi frames it as “Chinese rejuvenation”: “China used to be a world economic power. However, it missed its chance in the wake of the Industrial Revolution and the consequent dramatic changes, and was thus left behind and suffered humiliation under foreign invasion …we must not let this tragic history repeat itself.”

The difference is that 21^st century China under Xi will not retreat inward as it did under the Ming. The parallel for the near future would rather be with the Tang dynasty (618-907), which privileged trade and interactions with the world at large.

To comment on the torrent of Western misinterpretations of China is a waste of time. For the Chinese, the overwhelming majority of Asia, and for the Global South, much more relevant is to register how the American imperial narrative – “we are the liberators of Asia-Pacific” – has now been totally debunked.

In fact Chairman Mao may end up having the last laugh. As he wrote in 1957, “if the imperialists insist on launching a third world war, it is certain that several hundred million more will turn to socialism, and then there will not be much room left on earth for the imperialists; it is also likely that the whole structure of imperialism will utterly collapse.”

Martin Jacques, one of the very few Westerners who actually studied China in depth, correctly pointed out how “China has enjoyed five separate periods when it has enjoyed a position of pre-eminence – or shared pre-eminence – in the world: part of the Han, the Tang, arguably the Song, the early Ming, and the early Qing.”

So China, historically, does represent continuous renewal and “rejuvenation” (Xi). We’re right in the middle of another one of these phases – now conducted by a CCP dynasty that, incidentally, does not believe in miracles, but in hardcore planning. Western exceptionalists may continue to throw a fit 24/7 ad infinitum: that will not change the course of history.

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Pepe Escobar, born in Brazil, is a correspondent and editor-at-large at Asia Times and columnist for Consortium News and Strategic Culture in Moscow. Since the mid-1980s he’s lived and worked as a foreign correspondent in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles, Singapore, Bangkok. He has extensively covered Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia to China, Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East. Pepe is the author of Globalistan – How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War; Red Zone Blues: A Snapshot of Baghdad during the Surge. He was contributing editor to The Empire and The Crescent and Tutto in Vendita in Italy. His last two books are Empire of Chaos and 2030. Pepe is also associated with the Paris-based European Academy of Geopolitics. When not on the road he lives between Paris and Bangkok.

He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

Featured image: The 18th National Congress, convened in November 2012 (Public Domain)

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The prospect of a trans-Himalayan connectivity has historically been a sensitive geopolitical issue since it concerns the region’s main rivals: China and India.

Even back in 1961, when Nepal and China signed an agreement to build a highway linking Kathmandu to Lhasa there were misgivings about Beijing’s strategic motive. India and China were about to go to war along the Himalaya, and the Cold War was at its height. King Mahendra allayed those fears by famously saying: “Communism does not travel by taxi.”

Sixty years later, similar suspicions have surfaced as China moves full steam ahead to connect its Tibetan Autonomous Region with new bullet train links that could ultimately be extended to the Nepal border, and even Kathmandu as a part of its Belt Road Initiative (BRI).

On 25 June, China made a high-profile inauguration of a 435km section of the Lhasa-Nyingchi Electrified High-speed Rail (HSR). The ‘bullet train’ will have a top speed of 160 km/h and pass through 47 tunnels and 121 bridges along the Tsang Po (Brahmaputra) River.

A feat of modern engineering, 90% of the HSR lies above 3,000 meters above sea level and will be a part of the new Sichuan-Tibet Railway. When connected to Kerung via Lhasa and Xigatse, the train could put Lhasa within six hours distance and Chengdu within 19 hours from the Nepal border.

The Lhasa-Nyingchi Electrified High-speed Rail passes through 47 tunnels and 121 bridges along the Tsang Po (Brahmaputra) River.

While China makes rapid progress on rail connectivity, on the Nepal side of the border talk of a trans-Himalayan railway is only political tokenism. Successive governments in Kathmandu have not even been able to maintain existing highways to Kodari and Rasuwagadi to international standards.

But even the Chinese side seems to be daunted by the cost and sheer magnitude of a trans-Himalayan railway, especially its engineering challenge. Nepali Times had revealed in 2019 the content of a Chinese pre-feasibility study that proposed an alignment from Kerung to Kathmandu through a series of tunnels below Langtang National Park.

Chinese engineers found the gradient from the Tibetan Plateau to the low valleys in Nepal to be too great, and there was also the need to avoid building a railway inside Nepal’s protected areas in Langtang, Rolwaling and Mt Everest regions.

“Technically this will be one of the world’s toughest railways to construct,” said train engineer Paribesh Parajuli of Nepal’s Department of Railways who was educated in China, and a consultant for the study.

The Kerung-Kathmandu rail track will be 170km long, and a third of its length could tunnel below the Himalaya to reach the outskirts of Kathmandu. The study estimated the project to cost 38 billion yuan ($5.5 billion).

A report in Railway Standard Design last week and quoted in the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post confirmed that the proposed alignment would include 30km of tunnels beneath Langtang National Park.

Liang Dong, a lead engineer with the China Railway First Survey and Design Institute Group will be presenting his report to the Chinese and Nepal governments.

He said the Himalayan Tunnel route from Kerung (Gyirong) to Kathmandu would be more challenging and costly, but other routes were rejected either because the gradients were too steep, they went through protected areas, or were geologically unstable and exposed to glacial lake outburst floods due to climate change.

The possibility of trans-Himalayan connectivity was first mooted as far back as 1973 by Mao Zedong in a meeting with King Birendra in Beijing. Since then, China built the Qinghai-Tibet Railway connecting Lhasa to Xining, and is now working on the Sichuan-Tibet Railway to Chengdu and Kunming.

The Qinghai-Tibet Railway was extended from Lhasa to Xigatse in 2014, and in three years those tracks will reach Kerung on the Nepal border, only 70km in a straight line north of Kathmandu.

Even though it is just a secondary route in China’s ambitious BRI, Nepal could gain valuable access to Chinese seaports and trade centres, especially as relations with long-time trade partner India blow hot and cold. Construction on the HSR in Tibet has gone ahead despite the pandemic.

The possibility of extending this train track across the Himalaya to Kathmandu had captured the Nepali public’s imagination ever since Prime Minister K P Oli and Chinese Premier Li Keqiang committed to exploring the project five years ago.

The arrival of the railway line in Kerung possibly in three-year’s time will bring that dream closer to reality, but for that the Nepali side has to show more commitment to the project.

So far, Nepal’s action has been limited to participating in discussions and signing MoUs. Framework agreements were signed in 2017 for the Trans-Himalayan Multidimensional Connectivity Network, and President Bidya Devi Bhandari even attended a summit in 2019 of the BRI Forum.

China had committed to financing Detailed Project Reports (DPR) for a 72-km rail line between Kathmandu and Rasuwagadi during President Xi Jinping’s visit in October 2019, but since then, government planners have blamed the pandemic for delays in taking plans forward.

Rasuwagadi on Nepal’s border with China. Photo: Nabin Baral

In fact, no funding was sourced for DPRs, says Suresh Paudel, Deputy Secretary of Development Assistance Coordination and Quality Branch of the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transportation.

“China showed readiness in supporting detailed survey designs, but a budget has not been set so far,” Paudel says.

Nepal has already lost time twiddling thumbs and waiting for China’s support, even while China aims to finish its Sichuan-Lhasa rail line by 2030.

Even without the delays on the Nepal side, a Kathmandu-China connection will prove to be costly and difficult. Nepal has no railway infrastructure to speak of, and in any case would be unable to bear the financial cost of building a difficult and expensive tunnel across the Himalaya.

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Featured image: On 25 June, China inaugurated a 435km section of the Lhasa-Nyingchi Electrified High-speed Rail. The ‘bullet train’ will have a top speed of 160 km/h and bring Chengdu closer to the Nepal border when completed in 2025. Photos: Xinhuanet

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Beijing has underscored the importance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) at the recent Asia and Pacific High-level Conference on Belt and Road Cooperation, a meeting held via video link consisting of over 30 parties, including officials from Asia-Pacific countries and representatives of international organizations.

During the meeting, China stated that it stands ready to forge even closer BRI partnerships with various sides and “follow a path of unity, cooperation, connectivity and joint development to jointly promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.”

Amid these comments, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that the pandemic has not frozen the initiative and the “pause button had not been pressed,” despite economic disruption around the world caused by various lockdowns.

The world is at a crucial economic turning point. As nations look for a long-term exit strategy from COVID-19 amid vaccinations, sights are set on a global recovery this year with IMF and World Bank projections estimating strong rebounds for some.

But one must question, is this recovery uniform or even? It has proved easier said than done for consumer driven economies with surplus amounts of stimulus such as the United States and the United Kingdom, or “zero-COVID” countries such as China where economic recovery has been sustained based on long-term stability and control of the virus. But what about developing nations which don’t have easy access to vaccines or the financial resources required to kickstart their economies?

This is why the Belt and Road Initiative is crucial for spearheading global recovery. The BRI is envisioned to promote common development and economic integration across global south countries and beyond by facilitating the creation of infrastructure which overcomes geographic obstacles in order to establish commercial and economic opportunities. Infrastructure is ultimately about imagining potential. Without ports, railways or roads, the logistical challenges of exchanging services, goods and money are near impossible. Businesses look for what is affordable, convenient and possible.

And this is why the BRI is crucial in helping developing countries consolidate their own growth strategies. For example, one BRI project of note is the China-Laos High Speed Railway, which will connect the Laotian capital Vientiane with Kunming in China’s Yunnan province at the end of this year. It will provide a direct, fast and convenient route from landlocked Laos, whose eastern border with Vietnam is mountainous, to the world’s second largest economy. In terms of business, tourism and trade, its impact will be massive.

Another example is the Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway, a BRI project established by the China Road and Bridge Corporation, which established a route between Kenya’s capital city Nairobi and its Indian Ocean city of Mombasa, again massively expanding the country’s commercial and export options. The BRI, therefore, contrary to Western media hysteria, is not about debt or loans but rather about promoting mutual economic growth and trade, and led by China’s perspective that economic development is not a “zero-sum game.” In other words, facilitating economic development within other countries will benefit you too.

In the midst of the global economic fallout caused by the pandemic, there has never been a greater need for more infrastructure investment in order to reboot economic growth, and also envision what the growth of the future will be. Countries need new opportunities and an ambitious and efficient way to boost commerce.

As China enters a new development stage, follows a new development philosophy and fosters a new development paradigm, the country will provide more market opportunities, investment opportunities and growth opportunities for its partners, so as to contribute to an even global recovery.

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Tom Fowdy is a British political and international relations analyst and a graduate of Durham and Oxford universities. He writes on topics pertaining to China, the DPRK, Britain and the U.S.

Featured image: Photo taken on July 29, 2020 shows the construction site of the China-Laos Railway in northern Laos. [Photo/Xinhua]

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On Tuesday, Pakistan PM Imran Khan claimed to have resisted pressure from the US and other Western nations to downgrade ties with its “all-weather friend” China. Speaking exclusively to China’s English-language state broadcaster China Global Television Network (CGTN), he admitted that Pakistan was rattled by the growing clout of the Quad. India, Australia, the US and Japan have formed the ‘Quad’ coalition to counter China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific region.

Weighing in on the special relationship with China, Imran Khan stated, “Whenever Pakistan was in trouble politically, internationally, when we had conflicts with our neighbour, China always stood with us. So, the people of China have a special place in the hearts of the people of Pakistan”. Asserting that the bilateral ties have strengthened, he added, “And now, when you talk about the region, there is a strange great power rivalry taking place. You see, the United States is wary of China”.

“What the United States has done is form this regional alliance called the Quad which is India, the US and a couple of other countries. So from that point of view, Pakistan thinks that it is very unfair for the US or other Western powers (to expect that) countries like us will take sides. Why should we take sides? We should have a good relationship with everyone,” the Pakistan PM opined.

Ruling out a rethink on his country’s ties with China, the 1992 Cricket World Cup-winning captain affirmed,

“If there is pressure put on Pakistan to change its relationship or downgrade its relationship with China, it won’t happen. Because the relationship between Pakistan and China is very deep. And it’s not just the governments, it is the people-to-people relationship. To sum up, the relationship between the two countries no matter what pressure is put on us is not going to change.”

CPEC’s role in Pakistan-China ties

Launched in 2015, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It was expected to bring in massive investment from China, creating thousands of job opportunities for the people of Pakistan. When Nawaz Sharif was the PM, several projects were close to completion. However, Imran Khan’s regime has witnessed the stalling of the CPEC projects owing to the dire economic situation and non-cooperation of the bureaucracy due to the prevailing fear of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB).

Political instability has also hindered progress as the NAB has been regularly arresting leading opposition leaders in Pakistan. On his part, Khan has repeatedly assured that the timely completion of CPEC projects is a top priority for the Pakistan government. Recently, debt-ridden Pakistan requested Beijing to forgive debt liabilities owed to China-funded energy projects established under the CPEC.

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Featured image: Imran Khan speaking at the Chatham House in London (CC BY 2.0)

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In Washington’s ongoing and ever-growing confrontation with China, it continues to place pressure on Beijing over Taiwan.

However, as China continues along a path soon to exceed the US economically, militarily, and technologically, Taiwan’s reintegration as part of a single China is all but inevitable. Recently introduced legislation attempting to reinforce US influence over the island territory is – in the short-term – only going to ratchet up tensions further between Beijing and Washington.

While US moves are sold as “supporting Taiwan,” in reality Taiwan stands most to lose from these resulting tensions.

In the long-term, it will likely prove a poor investment for Washington regarding its Indo-Pacific strategy.

US Investing in a Problematic Relationship with Taiwan

While many assume Taiwan is a country and that it has close ties with the United States, in reality Taiwan is not a country. Under the universally recognized “One China Policy” Taiwan is considered part of China with one single government representing “One China.” Even the US, officially, recognizes the “One China Policy.” For example, the US does not have an official embassy in Taiwan.

In practice, however, the US uses Taiwan as a foothold of Western influence within Chinese territory, much the way it and its European allies used Hong Kong until very recently.

The US carries out highly provocative arms shipments to the authorities in Taiwan and instead of an official embassy, conducts diplomatic affairs out of what it calls the “American Institute in Taiwan.”

The US government has also established a presence for other arms of US “soft-power” including the so-called “Taiwan Foundation for Democracy,”  a franchise of the US government’s National Endowment for Democracy. Through this Taiwan-based institution, the US is able to exercise political control over both Taiwan and opposition groups throughout the region who all share an uncoincidental animosity toward Beijing.

More recently, the US has proposed a series of bills to both pressure China overall, and specifically ratchet up tensions between the two global powers over the Taiwan issue.

Reuters in its article, “Pushing against China, US lawmakers plan pro-Taiwan bill,” would claim:

Democratic and Republican members of the US House of Representatives will introduce legislation this week seeking to boost US support for Taiwan, part of an effort in Congress to take a hard line in dealings with China.

Called the “Taiwan Peace and Stability Act,” it aims to further deepen this “unofficial” relationship between Taiwan and Washington. While in official statements the US continues to recognize the “One China Policy,” unofficially this act and others like it are aimed at encouraging Taiwan’s independence movement and the souring of economic ties between Taiwan and the mainland.

US-Taiwan Strategy Fundamentally Flawed

Reuters also noted the recently introduced EAGLE Act, or the “Ensuring American Global Leadership and Engagement Act.”

While the topic of “ensuring American global leadership” is surrounded with discussion and debate over how to achieve it, the question of whether or not the US should “lead” the world remains unaddressed by policymakers in Washington.

China has between a four and five times larger population than the US. It has access to plenty of resources. China’s population is hardworking and well-educated. According to a Forbes article titled, “The Countries With The Most STEM Graduates [Infographic],” China graduates in a single year millions more in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) than the US does.

These STEM graduates will go onto further enhancing China’s research and development efforts, technological innovation, overseeing advances in manufacturing, and the construction of modern infrastructure both at home and abroad as part of Beijing’s burgeoning One Belt, One Road initiative.

When added together it is clear that China’s surpassing the United States both economically and technologically is an inevitability.

With this backdrop it is perfectly clear why Washington’s current obsession with maintaining geopolitical primacy over the planet is fundamentally flawed. It also makes perfectly clear why Washington’s strategy toward Taiwan is fundamentally flawed.

Utilizing tools like Harvard University’s Atlas of Economic Complexity, one can explore the economic ties of a particular nation or territory over the course of approximately 20 years.

Taiwan’s economic relationship with both the mainland and the United States plays out in a very illustrative manner. In 1998 mainland China hardly registered in terms of imports or exports which were at the time dominated by the United States and Japan.

By 2008 Taiwan’s economic relationship had become balanced between its American and Japanese trade partners and the Chinese mainland. By 2018 the tables had completely turned in favor of mainland China.

Even the US government’s International Trade Administration admits that China is Taiwan’s primary trading partner with nearly twice the amount of total trade with Taiwan than with the US.

If one counts Hong Kong, Chinese trade with Taiwan is nearly four times greater than that with the US.

More than just trade, investments in both directions across the strait reflect an already ongoing economic if not political integration of Taiwan within “One China.” It is a process that will influence socio-political factors over the long-term no matter how much money the US invests in political interference in the short-term.

Time is on Beijing’s side. Washington warns constantly of a possible military intervention by Beijing regarding Taiwan, but it is clear China’s economic rise is a far more persuasive and constructive means toward integrating Taiwan than military might. This is a lesson that, had Washington learned it, it might not have found itself in such a disadvantageous position both in the Indo-Pacific, or upon the global stage.

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Brian Berletic is a Bangkok-based geopolitical researcher and writer, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.

Featured image is from NEO

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He began on RN Breakfast by claiming that he, and his company, would be open and transparent about mining operations.  But Lucas Dow, chief executive of Adani’s Australian operations, soon revealed in his June 25 interview that his understanding of transparency was rather far from the dictionary version.  When asked how the Carmichael Coal Mine was getting its water, he claimed that these were from “legally regulated sources” and in commercial confidence.  Businesses work like that, he stated forcefully, preferring to praise the company for it – and here, he meant no irony – its sound ecological credentials in solar energy and renewables.

The interview set the background for another sad chapter in the continued environmental renting of Australia.  The company had found its first coal seam in Queensland’s Galilee Basin.  As the ABC reported, it meant “the extraction of thermal coal at the 44,700-hectare site can begin.”  The head of the Indian Adani Group, billionaire Gautam Adani, was celebrating his 59^th birthday.  “There couldn’t be a better birthday gift than being able to strengthen our nation’s energy security and provide affordable power to India’s millions,” tweeted the delighted chairman.

Even as oil and gas giants face court decisions and shareholder insurgencies about not having sufficient, tenably projected plans to reduce emissions, Adani remains antiquated in its stubbornness.  Its vandalising behaviour flies in the face of even such conservative, pro-fossil fuel defenders such as the International Energy Agency.  In its May report, the IEA noted, keeping in mind the target of a net zero emissions world by 2050, that more simply had to be done.  Certainly, it argued, more could be done to meet 2030 targets.  “Mandates and standards are vital to drive consumer spending and industry investment into the most efficient technologies.  Targets and competitive auctions can enable wind and solar to accelerate the electricity sector transition.  Fossil fuel subsidy phase-outs, carbon pricing and other market reforms can ensure appropriate price signals.”

Such observations are distant siren calls for the Indian giant, whose Australian branch, swaddled in controversy, has gone for a rebrand.  Well as it might.  Adani’s Carmichael Coal project, originally proposed in 2010 by the Adani Group, has catalysed the largest environmental protest movement since the Franklin campaign of the 1980s.

Having no doubt hired a goodly number of public relations consultants, the company’s rebadging as Bravus Mining and Resources suggests a stealthy deception.  And it was as Bravus that success was announced: “We have struck coal at Carmichael,” came the headline in a June 24 company release.

The company CEO David Boshoff treated it as a matter of success in the face of opposition.  “We have faced many hurdles along the way, but thanks to the hard work and perseverance of our team, we have now reached the coal seams.”  The CEO would even have you believe that Bravus was playing a humble servant to many noble causes.  “The coal will be sold at index pricing and we will not be engaging in transfer pricing practices, which means that all our taxes and royalties will be paid here in Australia.  India gets the energy they need and Australia gets the jobs and economic benefits in the process.”

Boshoff is optimistic that Bravus will be able to export its first coal shipments in 2021.  “We’re on track to export [the] first coal this year, and despite reaching this significant milestone, we will not take our eyes off our larger goal of getting coal to the market.”  But do not worry, insists Bravus and the Adani Group: we have green credentials as well.  Adani Green Energy Ltd (again, the PR consultants really have been working hard) had acquired SB Energy Holdings, which would see the company “achieve a total renewal energy capacity of 24.3GW.”  What the Carmichael coal project did was contribute to a “burgeoning energy portfolio designed to create a sustainable energy mix” of thermal power, solar power, wind power and gas.

There were a few glaring omissions of detail from the fanfare, both in Dow’s interview and the company announcement.  First came that pressing issue of water, one of its most scandalous features given the preciousness of that commodity on a water starved continent.  The Queensland regulator notes that Adani has but one viable source, what is described as “associated” groundwater, drawn from the Carmichael site itself.

In May, the company’s North Galilee Water Scheme fell foul in the Federal Court, scuttling a pipeline project that would have supplied in the order of 12.5 billion litres a year from Queensland’s Sutton River.  The Court agreed with the Australian Conservation Foundation that the federal government had erred in law when the Environment Minister failed to apply the “water trigger” in assessing the Scheme.  The quashing of the plan led the ACF’s Chief Executive Officer Kelly O’Shanassy to concludethat, “Without the North Galilee Water Scheme, it’s hard to see how Adani has enough water to operate its mine.”

On water, as with much else, Bravus has adopted a policy of dissembling.  In correspondence between an employee and Dow regarding a query by Guardian Australia on available aqueous sources, it was suggested “we do not give [the paper] anything more than what is already on the public record from us. They are clearly struggling to work out where we are getting our water, so I don’t think we give them any further clarity.”  Dow approved of the measure.

There was also an absence of detail on the issue of the rail line, which is intended to link the mine to the Abbot Point coal terminal.  Boshoff might well be confident about coal shipments this year, but the line is not, as yet, finished.  That aspect of the project has also faced its share of problems, being accused of having a less than adequate approach to minimising erosion.  The Queensland state government, after investigating those claims, found in favour of Adani, though it recommended that “construction activities within waterways should not be undertaken during the wet season”.

The Friday interview with Dow was also marked by the usual numbing apologetics and justifications long deployed by the fossil fuel lobby.  If we don’t do it, others will. If we do not dig and exploit the deposits, Australians will miss out.  Families will suffer.  Coal remained a king with a firmly fastened crown, left un-threatened for decades.  Precisely such a frame of mind is firmly fastened to the raft of dangerous unreality, and it is one that is sinking.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Greenpeace

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***

Things could always be worse in Australia–China relations, but on both sides, analysts see a rift too deep to be mended anytime soon.

Leaders of the two countries have not held prearranged talks since 2016, ministers since 2018. Chinese officials now impose informal sanctions and bans on Australian exports on a regular basis, plunging some industries into crisis and spooking many of the rest.

Ostensibly, it was Australia’s call for China to admit an international investigation into the origins of COVID-19 that triggered China’s ongoing trade retaliation. But the truth is China is responding to a range of measures that represent a wholesale shift in the way Australia views it. Security laws, foreign investment decisions, raids on Chinese journalists – the list is long.

The combined effect of all these measures has been to cultivate an image of China as a uniquely dangerous country, with which business as usual cannot go on. China has got that message and is now taking its business elsewhere.

We’ve got ourselves into a position where serious debate as to the rationale for, and wisdom of, Australia’s foreign and domestic policies involving China is becoming hard to have. We need to get ourselves out of it.

Security agencies and backbencher ‘wolverines’

Historians will eventually have a more precise picture of how Australia entered onto this path, but we can say with some confidence that security agencies have led the way.

An inter-agency inquiry chaired by prime ministerial adviser John Garnaut has been widely cited as the catalyst for Malcolm Turnbull’s policy shift. ASIO has itself taken on an increasingly public role, issuing warnings from 2017 onwards that foreign interference was occurring at “an unprecedented scale” in Australia.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has likewise been assiduous in talking up risks from China. Headed by Peter Jennings, who advised John Howard on intelligence leading up to the Iraq War, ASPI has often been the brains behind Australia’s interventionist policies in the Pacific and the Middle East, and now serves as a clearing house for “get tough” strategies towards China.

Backbenchers from the right wings of both major parties have openly embraced the new mood, adopting the “Wolverines” moniker from the 1980s film Red Dawn.

While that image calls to mind plucky young Cold Warriors putting up a last-ditch defence, the definition of “security” that Australia’s hawks work with often extends well beyond the Australian continent and its maritime frontiers, making the line between defensive and offensive measures a blurry one.

Paul Monk, one-time director of China analysis for the Defence Intelligence Organisation, recently outlined a five-step plan to push back against Beijing. He advises Australia to configure its “information warfare capabilities” for offence, which will include “talking up the attractive prospects for a more open and tractable China”.

The definition of “tractable”, of course, is “easy to control or influence”. It’s notable that those most exercised by foreign influence are often the most interested in exercising it.

‘Selling out for the national interest’

In the economic sphere, meanwhile, those who first guided Australia’s liberalisation and turn to Asia remain bullish on China and champion trade multilateralism as the alternative to what they see as America’s turn to protectionist nationalism.

What of capital itself? Are Australia’s captains of industry tilting towards China, as many imagine?

Some have certainly been sending signals. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, it was hard not to be struck by the scene of Andrew “Twiggy” Forrest bypassing the government to engage his “Chinese friends” in the medical equipment industry, and then ambushing health minister Greg Hunt by inviting a Chinese consul to the press conference announcing his purchase.

Some in the immediate firing line of China’s trade shutdown have been more forthright in their views. When wine shipments were held up last November, one angry vigneron complained: “It’s no one else’s fault, it’s the Australian government’s fault.”

Many who do business with China probably feel the same way, but there can be a cost for speaking up. So effective has been the suspicion cast on corporate ties to China, that even the mildest critics from that milieu can find themselves pilloried for selling out the national interest.

My book is written, though, with an understanding that foreign policy is not so much a field of competing ideas as a field of competing interests. As much as Australia’s major parties are resolute in their loyalties to the US alliance, they also remain deeply beholden to corporate interests.

In a field of foreign policy dominated by these two outsized influences, it can often feel as if our options are constrained.

China hawks don’t so much challenge the corporate influence on Australian policy as use it as a foil: if we don’t side with the United States, they ask, then what’s to stop Australia dropping its criticism of China for the sake of a buck?

I take this question seriously. Certainly, nobody wants corporate lobbyists writing Australia’s China policy. Even if that’s not on the cards, certain truths have been exposed about the nature of Australia’s transactional relationship with China, and about China itself, that naturally make people hesitant to endorse any return to “business as usual”.

The standard critique of “engagement” – that the West learned to live with a repressive party-state so as to advance its own political and economic interests – has much truth to it.

Compromises that were made to preserve and cultivate “the relationship”; a revolving door between politics and the corporate world; the blurry line between political lobbying and more dubious forms of influence-peddling: all of these issues and more have come into view.

Where does Australia go from here?

The solution seems obvious. What we need is a position not beholden to the paranoid vision of the security agencies or to the priorities of trade, but one that lives up to its profession of universal values.

This, of course, is where the structural constraints of foreign policy get in the way. To reorient Australia’s China politics in a more progressive direction, one capable of both defusing the brewing cold-war conflict and extending solidarity to people in China, there’s no getting around the fact that those constraints will need to be broken down. A wider range of voices and interests need to be represented in the making of Australian foreign policy.

I sometimes talk about what “Australia” should do, but most of the time I’m really talking about what Australians should do. I’m sceptical that the Australian state, as it exists today, can be a principled humanitarian actor on the world stage – it’s simply not built for that purpose.

Similarly, with occasional exceptions, I avoid referring to a national “we”. The lesson to draw from today’s conflict over China policy is not that Australia is having trouble identifying its national interest, but that there’s really no such thing as a single national interest.

Global rivalries for economic and political dominance serve elite interests, but for the rest of us, they deplete public resources and endanger political freedoms.

To get out of the rut into which Australia’s China debate has settled, we need to recentre it on the interests that ordinary people in Australia and across Asia share in both combating oppression and resisting warmongering.

The array of questions that China raises for Australia today is daunting, far too diverse for anyone to claim expertise in them all. I’ve written my book not because these questions require a specialist, but because they’re too important to leave to the specialists.

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David Brophy is Senior Lecturer in Modern Chinese History, University of Sydney.

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***

South Korea has approved plans to pursue a $2.6-billion artillery interception system, similar to Israel’s “Iron Dome”, designed to protect against North Korea’s arsenal of long-range guns and rockets, the defence acquisition agency said.

A large part of the area surrounding Seoul, the capital, is home to about half the population of 52 million, and lies within range of the neighbour’s long-range guns and multiple rocket launchers.

Late last year the government’s defence blueprint called for the development of a “Korean-style Iron Dome” that can defend Seoul and key facilities.

On Monday a committee presided over by Defence Minister Suh Wook approved the project, expected to be completed around 2035 at a cost of $2.6 billion, the Defence Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) said in a statement.

“Through this project, it is expected that the ability to respond to the threat of enemy long-range artillery will be strengthened, as well as securing domestic technology and creating domestic jobs,” it said.

The Ministry of National Defence has said while existing weapons such as the Patriot and THAAD missile defence systems are designed to target the North’s increasingly capable short-range ballistic missiles, the new system aims to protect against long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers.

Pyongyang does not comment on its military deployment, but experts believe most of North Korea’s 13,600 guns and multiple rocket launchers are positioned near the border, about 40 km (25 miles) distant from Seoul.

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Suspected rebels fatally shoot police officer, his wife and their daughter in India-administered Kashmir, authorities say, while two more drones fly over military base and a gun battle rages in main Srinagar city.

Suspected rebels have shot dead a police officer, his wife and their daughter in India-administered Kashmir, authorities said, while as Indian army intercepted two drones flying over an army base and a gun battle raged in main Srinagar city in powder keg Himalayan region.

Police said anti-India rebels entered officer Fayaz Ahmad’s home in the southern Tral area late on Sunday and fired indiscriminately at those inside.

Ahmad was killed immediately, while his wife died a few hours later at a hospital. Their 23-year-old daughter died at a hospital early on Monday.

In a statement, police called it a “terror attack.”

Ahmad was a so-called special police officer, a lower-ranked police official recruited mainly for intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency operations.

His son works in the Indian military’s counterinsurgency unit.

Srinagar gun battle

Meanwhile, a gun battle between Indian forces and rebels raged on Monday in Srinagar, the region’s main city.

Police said Indian forces surrounded a neighbourhood in the city on a tip that rebels were there.

There were no immediate reports of casualties.

The Himalayan region of Kashmir is divided between India and Pakistan and claimed by both in its entirety. Rebels have been fighting Indian rule since 1989.

Most Muslim Kashmiris support the rebel goal that the territory be united either under Pakistani rule or as an independent country.

New Delhi deems the Kashmir revolt to be Pakistan-sponsored “terrorism.” Pakistan denies the charge, and most Kashmiris call it a legitimate freedom struggle.

Tens of thousands of civilians, rebels and Indian forces have been killed in the three-decade conflict.

High alert after drones spotted over base

Also on Monday, India’s military said it thwarted a major threat when it intercepted two drones flying over an army base, a day after suspected explosives-laden drones were used to attack an air base in the disputed region.

The military said troops around midnight spotted two drones separately flying over Kaluchak military base on the outskirts of Jammu city.

“Immediately, high alert was sounded and Quick Reaction Teams engaged them with firing,” the military said in a statement. “Both the drones flew away.”

Search operations in the area were launched, the statement said, adding that troops remained on high alert.

On Sunday, Indian officials said two drones carrying explosives were used to attack an air base in Jammu city and called it the first such incident of its kind in India.

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Southeast Asia is home to roughly half of the world’s tropical mountain forests. These highland ecosystems support massive carbon stores and tremendous biodiversity, including a host of species that occur nowhere else on the planet. But new evidence suggests these havens are in grave danger. Conversion of higher-elevation forest to cropland is accelerating at an unprecedented rate throughout the region, according to findings published June 28 in Nature Sustainability.

By analyzing high-resolution satellite data sets of forest loss and state-of-the-art maps of carbon density and terrain, an international team of researchers quantified patterns of forest loss in Southeast Asia during the first two decades of this century. They found that during the 2000s, forest loss was mainly concentrated in the lowlands; but by the 2010s, it had shifted significantly to higher ground.

Between 2001 and 2019, the researchers calculated that Southeast Asia had lost 610,000 square kilometers (235,500 square miles) of forest — an area larger than Thailand. Of this loss, 31% occurred in mountainous regions, equivalent to 189,100 km²(73,000 mi²) of highland forest converted to cropland and plantation in less than two decades.

Moreover, the study reveals an accelerating trend. By 2019, 42% of total annual forest loss occurred at higher elevations, with the frontier of forest loss migrating upslope at a rate of roughly 15 meters (49 feet) per year.

Particularly prominent shifts to mountain forest loss were found in north Laos, northeast Myanmar, and east Sumatra and Kalimantan in Indonesia — the country that experienced the most overall forest loss.

Terraces are cleared on a hillside in Malaysian Borneo to make way for an oil palm plantation. Image by Rhett Butler/Mongabay

Decades of widespread clearing of lowland forests to make way for rice, oil palm and rubber plantations has led the conservation community to perceive forest loss as an issue only affecting the lowlands, said Paul Elsen, climate adaptation scientist at the Wildlife Conservation Society and co-author of the study.

“To see through this study that forest loss is increasing and accelerating in mountainous areas throughout the whole of Southeast Asia was pretty surprising,” he told Mongabay.

The expansion of agriculture into higher elevation areas, despite sub-optimal growing conditions due to lower temperatures and steep slopes, spotlights just how scarce undeveloped land now is in lowland Southeast Asia.

“Just because we found that there’s a lot of increasing forest loss in the mountains does not mean that we’re not still seeing forest loss in the lowlands … we still have to worry about lowland forest loss,” Elsen said. “It is just shocking that [forest loss] is continuing to move up into places that we felt were safe by virtue of being rugged and remote and isolated.”

Slopes planted with maize ascend to the tops of hills where they have replaced secondary forest in Nan province, Thailand. Image courtesy of Zhenzhong Zeng

Natural hazards

Worldwide, more than 1 billion people live in mountainous regions. Forest loss in these areas has far-reaching implications for people who depend directly on forest resources and downstream communities.

Clearing forests in steep headwaters where rivers originate can increase the risk of catastrophic landslips and flooding in lower areas. It also exacerbates soil erosion and runoff, causing rivers to clog with silt and agricultural pollutants, reducing downstream water quality and availability. In 2018, many people blamed the devastating floods that struck southeast Sulawesi in Indonesia, displacing thousands of people from their villages, on upstream forest clearing.

“These impacts can kill people, of course, but they also disrupt roads and transportation access so goods and services can’t reach communities,” Elsen said. “That’s hugely impactful when you have increased soil erosion and instability following the removal of trees.”

Elsen said communities dependent on mountain forests are hit with a “double whammy” when trees are cleared, since they lose the safety net the forest provides against diminished crop yields, which also suffer from diminished water availability and quality. “Now that the forest has been removed, you have fewer products available for communities to rely on, so it also reduces their adaptation potential,” he said. “If left unchecked, this could be a really big environmental problem for the communities living both in the mountains and in the lowlands.”

Furthermore, a 2021 study showed that deforestation in the tropics can increase local warming by up to 2° Celsius (3.6° Fahrenheit). “Local communities living in these frontier zones will suffer much stronger climate warming due to the biogeophysical feedbacks driven by tree loss further compounding the effects of global warming,” Zhenzhong Zeng, associate professor at the Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China and co-author of the new study told Mongabay.

A landslip in Indonesia caused by the removal of trees which has destabilized the steep slope. Image by Rhett Butler/Mongabay

Nowhere to go

If the forest loss continues to march upslope, the consequences for wildlife could be equally devastating. Recent studies suggest many species are shifting their ranges to higher altitudes in response to warming temperatures.

“The mountains of Southeast Asia are one of the most biologically rich regions of the planet and it’s incredible how many species of mammals, of birds, of amphibians are living only in the mountains and rely on forested ecosystems for their survival,” Elsen said. “So the removal of any of those forests will most likely reduce their abundances at a minimum and could potentially cause local extinctions because species that live in mountains often are very isolated in particular spots.”

“While it’s not surprising, unfortunately, that forest loss rates are moving up elevation in Southeast Asia, this study importantly quantifies this upwards acceleration,” Tim Bonebrake, a conservation biologist at Hong Kong University who was not involved in the study, told Mongabay in an email. He said the rate of upslope shift in the frontier of forest loss is very concerning and might hamper species’ ability to adapt to climate change.

“Not only do these losses of forest cover amount to losses in habitat for species, but the incursion of this forest loss up elevation will also impair biodiversity resilience to climate change,” Bonebrake said. “Forest species that may have otherwise been able to shift their distributions in response to warming will have less space to do so.”

Global carbon budget

As part of the study, the researchers investigated how forest loss is affecting carbon budgets by overlaying forest loss datasets on high-resolution carbon density maps. They found that carbon stocks in steeper, higher-elevation forests are much greater than in lowland forests. This contrasts with patterns in Africa and South America where lowland forests account for more carbon sequestration. The Southeast Asia pattern is most likely due to greater levels of primary production and organic soil content in the region’s highland forests, say the researchers.

The team calculated that the total annual forest carbon loss across Southeast Asia was 424 million metric tons of carbon per year, which is equivalent to one-sixth of all the carbon absorbed by the world’s oceans each year. Mountain areas accounted for nearly one-third of that loss.

Their findings suggest that assumptions used in global climate change models, which consider all forest carbon emissions as equal, could be inaccurate. Moreover, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) climate models incorporate predictions that tree-dominated land cover will persist in Southeast Asian mountains. Not only are those mountains losing their forest cover, but the fact that the region’s mountain forests store comparatively more carbon than lowland forests means that their loss will disproportionately affect climate predictions.

The authors calculate that if the patterns of forest loss continue, annual forest carbon loss in the mountains will exceed that of the lowlands as soon as 2022. They also suggest that the continued loss of carbon-rich forests at higher elevations could eventually tip the scales, shifting Southeast Asia’s forests from being a neutral actor in the global carbon cycle to a net carbon emitter.

Ultimately, the loss of higher-elevation forest will make it much harder to meet international climate objectives to limit global warming to below 2° Celsius (3.6° Fahrenheit) by the end of this century. This is, according to Elsen, “A very simple message that we need practitioners and policymakers to understand.”

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Sources

Feng, Y., Ziegler, A. D., Elsen, P. R., Liu, Y., He, X., Spracklen D. V., … Zeng, Z. (2021). Upward expansion and acceleration of forest clearance in the mountains of Southeast Asia. Nature Sustainability. doi:10.1038/s41893-021-00738-y

Featured image: White-handed gibbons (Hylobates lar) are among the many species that may have to shift their ranges further up into mountain forests in response to climate change. Image by JJ Harrison via Creative Commons (CC BY 3.0)

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***

India has dispatched at least 50,000 additional troops to the Chinese border where there are currently 200,000 combat-ready troops, an increase of more than 40% since the two rival powers clashed in the Himalayas in June last year, resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of Chinese.

India has also moved fighter jets to its northern border and the navy has sent warships along key sea lanes in the Indian Ocean to keep a watch over maritime trade to and from China. These moves have been made public at the same time as the Indian and US navies just conducted a joint exercise in the same ocean.

It all points to escalating tensions despite several rounds of talks aimed at de-escalating the situation. That’s because India perceives China is consolidating control in border areas that once served as buffers through massive infrastructure building, including train lines in and out of Tibet and down to neighboring Nepal.

India has America firmly on its side as Washington seeks to ramp up multi-front pressure on Beijing’s rising regional ambitions. To be sure, the US and India have a common interest in countering China, especially in the Indian Ocean. New Delhi has long seen the waterway as its sphere of influence but China has recently made inroads both to protect its trade and apply strategic pressure.

But a long history of US-India mistrust also runs deep, constraining their joint willingness and ability to develop a more robust, anti-China alliance. The Indians are particularly wary of Washington’s long-time strategic relationship with their archenemy Pakistan, ties the Biden administration seems keen to revive as a strategic hedge to its withdrawal from Afghanistan.

At the same time, the US has expressed its displeasure with India’s recent purchases of military hardware from its erstwhile ally Russia. India’s US$5.2 billion S-400 air defense system deal with Russia has become a major point of friction between New Delhi and Washington.

But the two sides are making a show of military cooperation that clearly has China in its sights. On June 23 and 24, the USS Ronald Reagan, a Nimitz-class nuclear-powered supercarrier, along with its escorts and a fleet of F-18 fighter jets joined forces for exercises with Indian warships and Anglo-French Jaguar jet attack aircraft as well as Sukhoi-30MKI fighter jets, a Russian-developed plane produced under license in India.

The exercise was carried out south of Thiruvananthapuram (previously known as Trivandrum) on India’s southwestern seaboard.

The drills went beyond basic exercises to include “advanced air defense exercises, cross-deck helicopter operations and anti-submarine exercises,” according to a statement issued by the Indian Ministry of Defense. Needless to say, the only submarines that India and the US would be attacking in the Indian Ocean would be Chinese ones.

Most recently, the Chinese survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 03 has been carrying out a systematic survey in the eastern Indian Ocean. The data, nominally collected for scientific purposes, would also be relevant in any submarine warfare scenario.

Over the past few years, the Indians have noted that Chinese submarines have been spotted in the waters around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, an Indian union territory located near the entrance to the Strait of Malacca, a maritime chokepoint through which as much as 80% of China’s energy imports pass.

China’s interest in the Indian Ocean is clearly motivated by its desire to protect its trade routes to the Middle East, Europe and Africa. But China’s incursions with warships and submarines into a region where it has never been a power has put it on a collision course with India.

China has used anti-piracy deployments as a justification for expanding its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and making it more permanent by establishing its first military base abroad, in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa in 2017.

But even China’s own 2015 Defense White Paper went much further than that by stating, “The traditional mentality that land overweighs sea must be abandoned and great importance has to be attached to managing the seas and oceans and protecting maritime rights and interests…[China will] participate in international maritime cooperation, so as to provide strategic support for building itself into a maritime power.”

The situation in the Himalayas, where India and China are separated by a disputed border over which a full-scale war was fought in 1962, is increasingly volatile and could lead to more bloody confrontations between the two sides. But it is the Indian Ocean — with or without American participation — that is quickly becoming a front line in Asia’s new Cold War.

David Scott, an associate member of the Corbett Center for Maritime Policy Studies, a United Kingdom-based think tank, concluded in an article for the US-based Center for International Maritime Security in September last year that:

“India’s strategy for the Indian Ocean during the 2010s has been threefold: “building up its naval-maritime infrastructure (based and support facilities), building up power projection assets, and strengthening relations with increasingly China-concerned powers.”

Those powers would be India’s allies in the Quadrilateral Security Dialog, also known as the Quad, a highly informal strategic forum between the US, Japan, India and Australia which has been widely viewed as a response to the rise of China as a regional power.

Originally initiated by then Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, it fell apart when Australia withdrew a year later because its then-new prime minister Kevin Rudd did not want to upset relations with China, his country’s main trading partner.

The Quad remained dormant and was not revived until 2017 when four state leaders — all of them considered China hawks — met on the sidelines at an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Manila.

Although India and the US had conducted bilateral naval exercises since 1992, India achieved the status of a “Major Defense Partner” of the United States in 2016 and subsequently sent a flotilla of warships to join a US-Japan task force in the South China Sea.

India has also been an active participant in a series of exercises called Malabar, which have brought it closer together with the US, Japan and other regional allies.

In March 2020, Quad officials teleconferenced to discuss the Covid-19 pandemic and were joined for the first time by officials from New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam. Given rising regional tensions, it was clear that the health crisis was not the only item on the agenda.

China’s moves in the Indian Ocean haven’t been totally unexpected. As early as 2001, India established the Andaman and Nicobar Command, its first and only tri-service command, to safeguard India’s strategic interests in the waters east of its mainland and specifically to monitor China’s maritime movements.

Headquartered in Port Blair in the Andamans and Nicobars, it coordinates the activities of the navy, the army and the air force as well as the coast guards in the eastern Indian Ocean.

Apart from the strategically important facilities on the islands, India’s main naval bases are situated along its east and west coasts with stations also on Lakshadweep, a chain of islands north of Maldives.

The Indians are now also talking to the Australians about getting access to the Cocos (Keeling) Islands, an Australian possession in the Indian Ocean. India’s next step will be to build three nuclear-powered attack submarines and upgrade its own naval bases.

It is too early to say how successful all these moves will be in countering China’s designs in India’s traditional sphere of influence. But the battle lines have been drawn, from the heights of the Himalayas to the tropical waters of the Indian Ocean.

The 16th installment of the China navy escort fleet conducts a two-ship alongside replenishment in the eastern waters of the Indian Ocean in a file photo. Photo: Twitter

China may not be overly concerned whether its borders with India should be marked on one barren rock or another, but last year’s confrontation in the Himalayas was more a show of force to keep India off balance.

As this week’s Indian response shows, New Delhi is prepared to engage China militarily if perceived provocations continue along their Himalayan border.

China is responding in kind. In April, a commentator for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) launched a blistering attack on India and its friendship with the United States: “India has unfortunately become a victim of US selfishness…the benefits of US allies and partners attaching to the US anti-China chariot could get scarce.”

In an even tougher attack on India, writers for the same Chinese paper claimed in May that India — not China — was to blame for the Covid-19 pandemic.

A May 1 post on the Chinese site Weibo from an account linked to the CCP showed an image of a rocket launch in China alongside a photo of bodies of virus victims being cremated in India with the text: “Lighting fire in China versus lighting fire in India.”

The post was later deleted, but it reflected crudely the rising animosity between the two rival powers in a new Cold War that is only just beginning.

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Did you know that one of Australia’s First Nations people are preparing to evacuate from their islands due to climate change? 

Eddie Mabo did not fight for land only to lose it to climate change.

Zenadth Kes, also known as the Torres Strait Islands, are experiencing climate change first-hand with the threat of rising sea levels.

Losing a piece of land would affect every Island nation across the waters and on the mainland. The devastation caused by climate change would spread throughout Indigenous communities across Australia.

Our culture seeps into the land.

The food, dances and songs, tradition and ailan kastom (island custom) are based on the ecosystem and environment. Ceremonies, rituals and cultural events were given birth on the islands. To lose the land would be extremely traumatising for all Zenadth Kes Islanders.

We refuse to abandon our homes as our tradition and culture are meaningless without our mother. We are spiritually woven into the land. The islands play a significant role in our lives: they provide food, shelter, comfort and love. These islands are viewed as our libraries: they contain ancient wisdom, knowledge and stories.

The Queensland government must be held accountable as this matter is serious. Climate change is badly affecting my people. The constant burning of coal and other fossil fuels is melting the polar ice caps that, in turn, allow my islands to be eaten by the ocean.

Our islands are our home even though they are sinking. Coconut trees are no longer able to withstand king tides.

The government can do so much more to prevent further damage.

I’m a city boy, born and raised on Yuggera and Turrubul lands of Meanjin (Brisbane). Late last year, at 16 years old, I made my journey home for the very first time.

The moment I planted my feet onto the sand, I felt a strong sense of connection. It was as if my ancestors were calling on me to return home to witness the destruction of climate change, hoping that I may become a voice to advocate for them.

Despite being brought up in the city, I remind myself that my elders walked upon the sacred lands of Masig and Poruma and that they were fearless seafarers and warriors.

Even though they are gone, I hear them still calling through my prayers and island songs.

As I did, I would want other Zenadth Kes mainlanders to travel home and discover their identity and for those that live there to continue preserving it as best they can.

I do pray that sometime, sooner rather than later, the Queensland government will step in and help my people of Zenadth Kes take on the struggle and fight the rising of seas.

In truth, I fear losing my island.

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Makiba is a proud man from the islands of Masig and Poruma in the centre of the Torres Strait. Visit his website here.

Featured image: The Torres Strait is under threat from climate change, exacerbated by governments’ support for fossil fuels. Masig Island. Photo: Makiba

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Maggots are considered gross since they thrive best in stinky, decaying organic matter such as animal waste and plants. The mere sight of them in a household often prompts a frantic search for a can of insecticide.

But in Davao City, the hometown of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the black soldier fly or BSF (Hermetia illucens), an insect that many confuse with a wasp, is making a buzz as an innovative solution to address the problem of kitchen waste — benefiting both the environment and agriculture.

Located 960 kilometers (600 miles) south of the capital Manila, Davao is the largest city in the Philippines in terms of land area, and has grown as the major metropolis in the southern Mindanao region with its catchy “Life Is Here” slogan. Its population has grown from 1.1 million people in 2000 to an estimated 1.8 million in 2020.

More people means more garbage. Data from the City Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) show that Davao has generated at least 600 tons of garbage daily since the COVID-19 pandemic started last year, with about half considered biodegradable that could have been composted at home to make fertilizer. Eighty percent of the trash is from households, while the rest comes from commercial establishments.

Data show that Davao has generated at least 600 tons of garbage daily since the COVID-19 pandemic started last year, with about half considered biodegradable that could have been composted at home to make fertilizer. Image courtesy of FiveDOL.

Aiming to turn that trash into treasure, an eco-agricultural startup is piloting a program to produce compost and animal feed using black soldier flies. FiveDOL Upcycling Corp. started commercial operations in March 2021, and is the first such outfit of its kind in Mindanao (a few similar initiatives are launching in the northern Luzon region of the Philippines). It uses techniques developed with the help of the Swiss Federal Institute of Aquatic Science and Technology (Eawag).

“Food waste is a good resource that we can create value from while at the same time helping to conserve the environment and address the problem on biodegradable kitchen waste using the black soldier fly,” Peter Damary, FiveDOL’s chief executive officer, told Mongabay in a video interview.

By harnessing the rapid growth of the flies and their capacity to break down kitchen waste, scientists and engineers have, over the last few years, been able to develop an efficient technology to transform large quantities of kitchen waste into insect protein and compost beneficial to agriculture and the environment, Damary said.

Despite its wasp-like appearance, black soldier flies don’t sting. A female can produce between 500 and 900 eggs during its two-week lifetime. The larvae, once mixed with kitchen waste, grow very quickly: From 1 millimeter in length, the black soldier fly larvae can reach 27 mm (1 inch) long and 6 mm (0.25 in) wide, and can weigh up to 0.22 grams, nearly as much as an aspirin tablet, after just 18 days.

Damary said the black soldier flies, which originated in the Americas, have long been present in the wild in the Philippines and do not pose risks to the local ecosystem, or worse, become invasive. The adult flies naturally die after two weeks and they thrive only on decaying wastes. Black soldier flies have significantly reduced mouth parts compared to housefiles; they don’t bite and are not known to transmit any diseases.

During the larval stage, they consume and convert large quantities of food waste into compost, while the larvae grow rich in protein and can be used as alternative feed for chicken or pigs.

Chickens feeding on protein-rich black soldier fly larvae. Image courtesy of FiveDOL

Commercial feeds are usually produced using fishmeal, which has been partly blamed for depleting fish populations from the seas; or soybeans from Latin America, where industrial-scale farming drives deforestation and consumes high volumes of pesticides and fertilizers. Black soldier fly larvae can be a substitute to these commercial feeds — and making that switch will help save precious ocean resources and prevent further deforestation for soy cultivation, Damary said.

“The compost produced by black soldier flies can give back life to the soil for organic farming,” he added. Damary, a Swiss national married to a Filipina and long based in Davao, founded FiveDOL in 2019, inspired by the success of black soldier fly larvae ventures in Europe, South Africa, China, Malaysia and Indonesia.

FiveDOL is locally promoted as LimaDOL. “Lima” means “five” in Filipino, while DOL stands for “day-old larvae” — hence, five-day-old larvae, which is the crucial period for black soldier fly larvae.

FiveDOL formally launched a facility on May 27  in Barangay Tacunan, a village of nearly 13,000 people some 15 km (9 mi) from the heart of Davao City. Barangay Tacunan has already proven receptive to environmental initiatives and collaborations: it holds regular radio programs promoting environmental protection, requires residents to plant at least five types of vegetables on their properties, and received a local award for “outstanding initiatives in environmental protection and management” in 2018.

FiveDOL’s project has drawn the support of the Tacunan village government as well as the Sustainable Davao Movement (SDM), a coalition of environmental multisectoral organizations in the city.

So far, at least 50 households have voluntarily joined the zero-kitchen-waste initiative, and several small-scale farmers have started using the compost it produces. The participating households in Tacunan have been trained to properly segregate their kitchen waste, which the company regularly collects without a fee.

A black soldier fly laying eggs. A female can produce between 500 and 900 eggs during its two-week lifetime. Image courtesy of FiveDOL.

Damary says his company aims to be profitable, while also promoting organic agriculture and helping the city solve a mounting waste-management problem.

Davao City has mandated the segregation of solid waste and banned the use of single-use plastics to help reduce its mounting garbage problem of the locality. Under a local ordinance, failure to separate waste is punishable with a fine of up to 5,000 pesos ($100) or a jail term of up to six months.

CENRO chief Marivic Reyes says that despite continuous awareness campaigns, many households still don’t practice proper waste separation, which is part of the reason why the city’s waste landfill is quickly exceeding capacity.

The landfill, in the outlying village of Tugbok some 15 km from the city proper, was opened 10 years ago with a capacity of 800,000 tons. As of 2016, the landfill had accumulated 900,000 tons of waste. The local government carried out rehabilitation that allowed the city to continue using it until now, while looking for an expansion area. It is also eyeing the establishment of a 2.5 billion peso ($51.3 million) facility to burn the solid waste to generate electricity, using a grant from the Japanese government.

The city’s solid waste problem is also compounded by the lack of material recovery facilities at the grassroots level, where garbage can be sorted either for composting or recycling. Of the city’s 182 villages, fewer than a dozen have such functional facilities.

Damary noted that if FiveDOL can get hold of 200 tons of kitchen waste daily and compost it using black soldier flies, that would help tremendously in conserving the environment and reducing the pressure on the city’s exhausted landfill. Aside from leaching that causes health hazards, kitchen waste in landfills contributes to greenhouse gas emissions, with each ton of kitchen waste producing the same amount of carbon dioxide equivalent in the form of methane, he said.

BSF larvae can be a substitute to commercial feeds for chicken and pigs such as fishfeed and soybeans; making this switch can help save precious ocean resources and prevent further deforestation. Image courtesy of FiveDOL.

Carmela Santos, director of Ecoteneo, the environmental advocacy arm of the Jesuit-run Ateneo de Davao University and one of the members of the Sustainable Davao Movement, described the black soldier flies as “friends of the earth and a community’s treasure.”

“It is an amazing demonstration of science at work and technology that works for a carbon-neutral world,” she said. An opponent of the city government’s waste-to-energy project, Santos says the black soldier fly technology shows that waste can be managed without subjecting the public to health risks like air pollution and food contamination associated with incineration.

“Organic solutions and composting technology like BSF will help our homes become waste-proof, our communities prepare to be pandemic-proof, and our world become climate-proof,” she said.

With FiveDOL’s venture gaining the support of local environmentalists, Damary says he’s upbeat that BSF can invade other parts of Mindanao and become the army that will address the problem of household kitchen waste.

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Featured image: A black soldier fly on a red leaf. Image courtesy of FiveDOL.

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***

Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s chilling promise to “drug pushers, holdup men, and do-nothings, you better get out […] because I’ll kill you” may finally come back to haunt him.

Today the International Criminal Court Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda announced that she has asked the court’s judges to approve her investigation into crimes committed in the Philippines from November 1, 2011, the date the Philippines became an ICC member, until March 16, 2019. On March 17, 2019, the Philippines effectively withdrew from the court.

A possible ICC investigation into the thousands of “drug war” killings in the Philippines is especially welcome given the United Nations Human Rights Council has yet to effectively condemn the Duterte government’s atrocities, despite a scathing report by the UN top rights’ commissioner sounding the alarm on the scale and gravity of the situation.

In 2017, Human Rights Watch found President Duterte and other senior officials have instigated and incited killings of mostly the urban poor in a campaign that could amount to crimes against humanity. According to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, 6,117 individuals were killed during police anti-drug operations from July 1, 2016, to April 30, 2021. The Philippine National Police has a higher figure – 7,884 killed up to August 1, 2020.

Instead of condemning these abuses, the UN Human Rights Council has opted instead to provide technical cooperation and capacity-building to the same government that denies the true scale and severity of the human rights violations, has publicly endorsed the policy of killings, avoids independent investigations, and continues to crack down on civil society.

In his February 2021 address to the Human Rights Council, head of the Philippine Department of Justice, Menardo Guevarra, admitted police culpability in thousands of “drug war” killings. But while the new police chief, General Guillermo Eleazar, has promised to cooperate with the Department of Justice, he is only allowing access to 53 case files.

There is an urgent need for a Human Rights Council-backed investigation. The government’s campaign of extrajudicial killings has continued well beyond its withdrawal from the ICC, with devastating consequences for victims and their families, including children. And the killings have only intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic.

The UN Human Rights Council should course-correct and stand up for the Philippine’s victims instead of giving support to the government that kills them.

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Featured image: Protest by local human rights groups, remembering the victims of the drug war, October 2019. (CC BY-SA 4.0)

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***

David McBride calculates he faces up to 50 years in prison for being a whistleblower. McBride is an Australian whistleblower and former British Army major and Australian Army lawyer.  He served two tours of duty in Afghanistan in 2011 and 2013 and received a combat services medal. But, his troubles began when he uncovered serious war crimes committed by Australian soldiers.  He honored his duty to humanity and truth by leaking the information to the Australian press, who in turn were searched, and threatened with legal action for bringing the information forward in the interest of the public’s right to know. 

Andrew Wilkie, a former Australian government intelligence analyst whistleblower who’s now an independent federal lawmaker, is a vocal critic of national security being used as an excuse to hide wrongdoing by the Australian government, and its agents. Wilkie believes Australia has drifted into becoming a “pre-police state” through its embrace of secrecy.

“It’s now unremarkable when a government cloaks something in a national security need for secrecy,” Wilkie said. “We don’t bat an eyelid anymore. We should be outraged.”

From 2014 to 2016 McBride gave information to the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), and ABC broadcast details in 2017.  The information came to be known as ‘the Afghan Files’, and in 2018 McBride was charged with the theft of Commonwealth property contrary to s 131(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Additionally, in March 2019 he was charged with a further four offenses: three of breaching s 73A (1) of the Defense Act 1903; and another of “unlawfully disclosing a Commonwealth document contrary to s 70(1) of the Crimes Act 1914”.

Major General Justice Paul Brereton began an investigation in May 2016 and the results were made public in November 2020. The Brereton Report found “credible information” that war crimes were committed by Australians in Afghanistan. Detailed credible evidence of a series of alleged SASR war crimes in Afghanistan from 2005-2016 was included in the report, such as 39 Afghans had been willfully and unlawfully killed by 25 ADF members in 23 incidents, along with two instances of cruel treatment, in circumstances where it “was or should have been plain that the person killed was a non-combatant.” The Brereton Report concluded that there is “credible information” sufficient to lay charges of war crimes, and its findings were corroborated and relied on eyewitness accounts or “persuasive circumstantial evidence and/or strong similar fact evidence”; however, it did not set out evidence in the format required for criminal prosecution. Brereton concluded his investigation was held hostage by the chains of military code of silence and bonds of loyalty to patrol commanders, and this culture was instrumental for concealing the alleged criminal activity.

McBride pleaded not guilty to each of the charges at a 30 May 2019 preliminary hearing and is currently awaiting trial.

The Afghan Files covered a wide range of topics, and it detailed multiple cases of unlawful killings of unarmed men and children. In response to the leak by McBride, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) raided the ABC’s offices in June 2019 and confiscated all material related to the Afghan Files.

A Freedom of Information request into the search and seizure of the files revealed that the AFP were intentionally targeting journalists, and that prosecution of journalists involved was considered. Following the raid, the ABC began litigation against the AFP, claiming the warrant was too broad and thus not enforceable. In February 2020 the case was dismissed by the federal court, and the AFP began the process of accessing the confiscated files.

In June 2020, charges were considered to be laid against journalist Dan Oakes for breaking the Afghan Files story. In October 2020, the government announced that they would not be prosecuting Oakes. The government published a report on the matter in May 2021 and made 17 recommendations, including proposed reforms to laws that have the potential to criminalize public interest journalism.

Media law experts Johan Lidberg and Denis Muller said Australia is the only country among the United States, Britain, Canada, and New Zealand that gives its security agencies the power to issue search warrants against journalists in the hunt for public interest whistleblowers in the name of national security.

Many Australians feel the government took a step too far in June 2019 when they searched ABC and its journalists.  They feel the situation highlights the government’s “organizational culture” including a “warrior culture”, and are opposed to intimidating journalists only to protect government secrets of wrongdoing. Some have called it a culture of impunity and reminiscent of the US President Bush administration and the lies which were sold to the Australian public for the need to invade Afghanistan.

Public accountability and the principle of open justice are in danger in Australia, as they have charged, tried, convicted, and jailed a military intelligence office known only as “Witness J”.  The entire 2018 legal process was wrapped in a cloak of secrecy.  Dr. James Renwick, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, said the case was unprecedented and hoped it would not be repeated.  There is a possibility that war crimes prosecutions could also be gagged. The secret court hearing and imprisonment became public in late 2019 after “Witness J” opened a lawsuit against the Australian government, claiming his human rights were violated by police who raided his prison cell in search of a memoir he was writing.

The Australian military was in Afghanistan to help the US military.  The Taliban has long been condemned and dehumanized at the highest political and military leadership levels, in Australia and by the US allies. Throw in a bit of anti-Islamic bias, a desire to punish them for previous attacks, and you have the climate that supports the charges in the Afghan Files.  The Australian government’s ongoing charging and investigation of war crimes whistleblower David McBride provides the ammunition to fire charges of ‘police state’ at the country down under.

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This article was originally published on Mideast Discourse.

Steven Sahiounie is an award-winning journalist. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from Mideast Discourse

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***

Fourteen refugees have been on hunger strike for more than a week in protest at their imprisonment in a refugee prison in Broadmeadows. Some have been detained by the federal government for eight years. 

Refugee rights supporters organised a snap vigil on June 21 outside the Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation (MITA) to show their support. By June 25, two refugees had to be hospitalised.

One of the MITA hunger strikers, quoted by the Refugee Action Collective (Victoria), asked: “Why is the government torturing us for nine years? We want to know what is the difference between us and the others [Medevac refugees] who were released six months ago? We can’t be in detention anymore.”

Around 90 refugees were brought to Australia for medical care in 2019 from detention camps on Nauru and Manus Island. Some are still being held in prison hotels and detention centres in Adelaide, Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane.

People brought for medical treatment after the repeal of the Medevac law are also still being held in detention in Sydney and Darwin and Adelaide.

Between December and February, about 100 Medevac refugees were released into the community on bridging visas.

More than 60 Medevac refugees wrote to Home Affairs Minister Karen Andrews in May, asking her to use her discretionary powers to release them. They are still waiting for an answer.

“All the Medevac refugees must be released,” RAC spokesperson Ian Rintoul said on June 24.

“In many cases, the government has not even provided medical treatment they were brought to Australia to receive. After detention on Manus and Nauru, and two years of detention in Australia, every day in detention worsens their mental distress. They need freedom.”

Some refugees are being sent overseas, instead of being released into the community. Two Medevac refugees were flown to the United States on June 21, leaving 33 still locked up in the Park Hotel in Melbourne.

One of them was Babkir Omda who had been held in Melbourne hotel prison for almost two years. He spoke to Green Left before flying out of the country. “I’m happy to be free and breathe fresh air again after 22 months, but I wish I could have been released in Melbourne where I know people. I was given no choice.”

[RAC has called a snap rally on June 25 at 4.30pm in solidarity with the hunger strikers. A vigil is being organised on July 19 will mark their ninth year in detention.]

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***

Its title notwithstanding, a new book by Debasish Roy Chowdhury and John Keane, To Kill a Democracy, starts out with hopeful words:

“Like other national stories, India’s rests on a belief in a beginning that ranks as the beginning of beginnings: that magical moment of the birth of Indian democracy, just before sunset on 14 August 1947, when the Indian tricolor was raised over the old imperial Parliament to flutter in the late-monsoon Delhi sky, blessed by a distant rainbow.”

It’s all downhill from there.

But don’t jump to the conclusion that the authors contend Indians have lost interest in participating in the “world’s largest democracy”; to the contrary, they note, “Voter turnout is high, and unusually by global standards, the most marginal parts of society show up at the polls more often than the wealthier middle and upper classes. Votes count. Votes are dignity.”

And yet almost from the first days of the “India Story,” things started to go wrong. That much, everyone already knows; after seven decades of independence from the British Empire, this country of vast population, vast resources, a wealth of ethnic diversity, a long and vibrant history, and – most important in the modern context – an admirable and envied constitution, India remains racked with poverty, underachievement, and corruption.

What the casual observer does not know is why. And that is why this book is important. Not only in the Indian context; on nearly every page, non-Indian readers will be reminded of ills in their own societies.

That is not accidental. India’s great size and unrivaled diversity make it a microcosm – actually, a macrocosm – of the world itself.

Commendable research

Debasish Roy Chowdhury is an award-winning Indian journalist now based in Hong Kong (and, incidentally, a onetime business editor for this website, when it was known as Asia Times Online). John Keane is research professor at Wissenschaftszentrum (Social Science Center) Berlin and professor of politics at the University of Sydney.

Clearly, the meticulous research that powers this book was begun before the Covid-19 outbreak that now dominates news about India, to the unfortunate exclusion of nearly everything else. Mercifully, the timing of their task helped spare the authors from that obsession.

That is not to say what they rather quaintly refer to as “the pestilence” is ignored, but it is given its proper place, more so than in much of the so-called reporting on Covid that consists largely of click-bait horror stories that almost never put statistics in their proper context by noting India’s huge population. (Brazil is a victim of similar sloppy journalism, while countries like Belgium and Hungary are let off the hook because they are too small to generate dazzling death tolls.)

In most of the developing world, and indeed to a large degree in the rich world, ham-fisted efforts to “contain” the virus have done more severe, and longer-lasting, damage than the illness itself. There can hardly be any stronger example of this phenomenon than the “great lockdown” imposed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government with almost no notice:

“The apocalyptic scenes of reverse migration, the panic over food within just days of the lockdown, the failure to arrange for suitable transport to systematically transfer migrant workers to their place of origin in order to minimize contagion risks, and the calamity confronting Indian hospitals from the earliest days of the pestilence: all of this pointed to a deeper social malaise caused by government inaction, mismanagement, and dereliction of duty.”

The book also steers clear of the error many writers make when documenting recent Indian history, namely to blame it all on Narendra Modi.

Chowdhury and Keane don’t let Modi off the hook; far from it. But they observe that he is the product of a long decline in Indian democracy and, hence, Indian society, much as some (too few and too late) recognized that Donald Trump was the result and not the cause of a remarkably similar decline in the so-called paragon of democracy itself, the United States of America.

The book’s subtitle is India’s Passage to Despotism. A theme of the book is something called “elective despotism,” or what Sweden’s V-DEM Institute in its Democracy Report 2020 termed “electoral autocracy” when analyzing India’s “path of steep decline.”

These seemingly oxymoronic terms speak to the “slow-death” theory of democide, as opposed to the “sudden-death” sledgehammer coups d’état seen most recently in places like Thailand and Myanmar.

In this way, not only despite vibrant elections participated in by enthusiastic masses, but actually by means of the nominally democratic franchise, the path to despotism becomes ever steeper.

No stone unturned

Few will find nothing new to learn from this book. Practically every aspect of life in India, and not just elections or the other bare bones of democracy, is covered in detail. For example, the authors note that the simple phenomenon of human movement, and the development of transportation, has been a driver of civilization from ancient times. And the book devotes an entire chapter to transport, titled – no surprise – “Motion Sickness.”

The Indian rail network, launched with fanfare and hope long ago, has not only been yet another disappointment, it has become downright deadly. “A ride on a Mumbai train in rush hour,” we read, “is more the stuff of nightmare than dream.”

“Traveling like animals, risking their lives for livelihood, has been the lot of Mumbai daily commuters for as long as they can remember. So deadly are its trains, and so low the safety bar, that zero fatalities on one day (26 June 2019) was marked as a milestone. The very next day it was back to business, with nine deaths.”

But it’s not just the trains; buses (in Bihar, there is one bus per 50,000 people), private vehicles (in Mumbai, “residents on average waste 11 days a year stuck in traffic”), bicycles and even sidewalks and potholes get a close (and un-glamorized) look.

Democide

Though smartly written, and peppered with anecdotes of ordinary people interviewed by the authors, this book is not light reading. Page after page documents tragedy after tragedy, of how the Indian demos has not only been systematically robbed of the hope symbolized by that distant rainbow of August 1947, but how the demos has actually been redefined by the robbers. Readers will be tempted to peek at the closing pages in search of a happy ending.

There is one, of sorts, but it’s more philosophical than the hard-edged, fact-based tone of the bulk of the book. To many, apparently including the authors, belief in democracy has become more of a cult of hope, of paradise in the sweet by and by, than a pragmatic ideology.

That may also explain why there is relatively little analysis here of the successes of systems the writers disparage as “tyrannies,” such as the late Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela or, more obviously and much more importantly, India’s great neighbor and rival, communist China.

Despite this book’s fretting title, and the unrelenting evidence within to back it up, its purpose is to deliver a paradoxical message: For all its many failings, government of, by and for the people has been and will continue to be a worthy experiment. How true that message rings is up to the reader – and, more important, to the people of a great nation – to decide.

To Kill a Democracy: India’s Passage to Despotism (June 2021) by Debasish Roy Chowdhury and John Keane is published by Oxford University Press.

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***

In her final act as chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bensouda gave the green light for a formal investigation into charges of mass atrocities under Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte.

After almost three years of a preliminary examination, she called on the international body, and by extension her newly-installed successor, “to authorize the commencement of an investigation” into reportedly tens of thousands of extrajudicial killings (EJKs) under Duterte’s drug war and “any other crimes which are sufficiently linked to these events” between November 1, 2011, and March 16, 2019.

Crucially, the specified period covers Duterte’s tenure as mayor of the southern city of Davao, the first major urban center to bear the brunt of the Filipino leader’s violent crackdown on illegal drugs and criminality.

Families of victims and human rights groups warmly welcomed the move, while the Filipino leader remained defiant and lambasted the court’s decision as “bullsh*t” and its chief prosecutor as “crazy.”

Right off the bat, the former British crown prosecutor and new ICC chief prosecutor, Karim Khan, vowed “to ensure that the quest for accountability and inroads on impunity are made” and emphasized the need for “building stronger cases and getting better cases in the courtroom” against abuses by officials under his watch.

The move, which could lead to the eventual prosecution of top Philippine officials, came much later than many initially expected, but it may have also come too early, giving the incumbent populist an even stronger impetus to rig next year’s presidential elections in favor of a trusted ally, if not his daughter, Sara Duterte.

Court under attack

However, the international court’s decision was far from assured, given questions over its jurisdiction and its willingness to take on a popular incumbent. In recent years, The Hague-based court has come under attack on many fronts, including from the former Trump administration, which sanctioned several ICC judges for launching investigations into US war crimes in Afghanistan.

The Biden administration has reversed those punitive measures, but there is little sign that the US or other superpowers such as China or Russia will ever accede to the Rome Statute under the ICC.

Meanwhile, the Beijing-friendly Philippine president has relied on strong backing from China in international bodies, including the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR).

Drawing on a cabinet of lawyers and litigation experts, Duterte, himself a former prosecutor, has also been quick to chase legal loopholes to undermine any international investigation of his alleged human rights violations.

The first major response was the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute in March 2019 in an effort to undercut any cooperation with the ICC. The following year, in a speech during the 44^th session of the UNHCR, Philippine Justice Secretary Menardo Guevarra, a renowned legal expert, reiterated the primacy of local courts and judicial institutions in addressing alleged abuses in the country.

The Philippine justice chief announced the creation of an inter-agency panel to investigate at last 5,655 deaths during police drug war operations under Duterte’s watch. Up to this date, however, only a handful of erring officers have faced trial or any kind of stiff administrative punishment.

EJKs, meanwhile, have continued, now targeting progressive activists and opposition members.

In response, the outgoing ICC prosecutor maintained that the court “retains jurisdiction” over investigating state-sponsored abuses, which are “not subject to any statute of limitation.”

The International Criminal Court at the Hague, Netherlands. Photo: iStock.

ICC at crossroads

The strongly-worded statement also marked a categorical rejection of the Philippine government’s claim that domestic courts and relevant agencies have been sufficiently functional to preclude the need for any international investigation.

Highlighting what’s at stake, Bensouda warned that the ICC “stands at a crossroads” and it needs to ensure, despite its limited resources, that large-scale abuses “not only [receive] prioritization” but also “open and frank discussions” with other member states to “advance the fight against impunity for atrocity crimes.”

The Duterte administration was quick to dismiss the ICC’s “midnight announcement” and reiterated that the international body was a “court of last resort,” thus the latest announcement constitutes a “blatant violation of the principle of complementarity, which is a bedrock principle of the Rome Statute.”

The Philippines maintained that local agencies were already conducting “concrete and progressive steps” to ensure accountability and that it has demonstrated a “long track record” of cooperating with international human rights bodies.

It also accused the outgoing prosecutor of “pre-empt[ing]” her successor in a supposed bid to undermine any proper evaluation of facts of the case. Presidential Spokesperson Harry Roque declared that the Filipino president will “never cooperate” with any international investigation.

Duterte was predictably less diplomatic, accusing the international body of colonial-style intervention in the Philippines’ domestic affairs.

“This bullsh*t ICC … I would not … Why would I defend or face an accusation before white people? You must be crazy,” Duterte said, evidently ignoring the fact that both the outgoing and the new ICC chief prosecutors are persons of color.

“These colonialized, they have not atoned for their sins against the countries they invaded, including the Philippines. Then now … they’re trying to set up a court outside our country and making us liable to face them,” the Filipino president added, claiming that “our laws are different. Our criminal procedures are different. How are you supposed to get justice there?”

Shooting off his mouth

The Philippines’ constitution, however, is one of the most liberal democratic of its kind, largely drawing on American jurisprudence. No less than former Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio has argued that both domestic laws as well as relevant ICC articles can be invoked to hold the Filipino president accountable for, among other things, inciting violence and instructing the country’s law enforcement agencies to engage in a bloody crackdown against suspected drug dealers.

On his very first day of presidency, Duterte told the country’s police forces: “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself as getting their parents to do it would be too painful.” Shortly after, he reiterated the same position during a press conference, by stating: “I say let’s kill five criminals every week, so they will be eliminated.”

Two years into his violent drug war, Duterte openly admitted in an interview that his “only sin is the extrajudicial killings.”

“These statements of President Duterte are called extrajudicial confessions because they were uttered out of court and outside of custodial investigation, admitting involvement in alleged crimes,” wrote former magistrate Caprio, arguing that such statements are “universally recognized as admissible in evidence against an accused provided, they are voluntarily made and corroborated by evidence of the actual commission of the crime.”

With a legal storm gathering against Duterte, there is now a greater incentive for him to shape the direction of the upcoming presidential elections, if not rig the system altogether given his wide array of emergency powers due to the Covid-19 crisis.

The incumbent is confined to only a single six-year term in office by the constitution, but he has openly contemplated the prospect of running as a vice-presidential candidate next year and actively supported key allies, including his long-time aide and current Senator Christopher “Bong” Go, as a potential successor.

His daughter, Sara, who is the frontliner in the latest survey of potential presidential candidates, is another option to ensure Duterte stays in power for the foreseeable future.

Ultimately, however, the Filipino president’s priority is to ensure that the opposition, especially current Vice-President Leni Robredo, will not be able to mount an electoral challenge next year.

And the instinct for survival raises the temptation for deploying draconian measures, including Duterte’s notorious “drug list” and vaguely-defined anti-terror laws, to intimidate, isolate and even violently target opposition candidates and their supporters across the country.

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President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, commanded citizens to get vaccinated against COVID-19, threatening them with prison time or forced injection of a drug if they do not get the vaccine.

Duterte can be seen speaking to the camera while wearing a mask and threatening the public, according to a video released by The Guardian.

“You choose, get vaccinated or I will have you jailed. I’m telling you, those police jail cells are filthy and foul-smelling, police are lazy in cleaning. That is where you’ll be,” he said.

The video clip cut to another moment when Duterte says,

“You get vaccinated, otherwise I will order all the village heads to have a tally of the people who refuse to be vaccinated. Because if not I will inject them with Ivermectin which is intended for pigs.”

The Washington Post reported that Duterte also said,

“If you don’t want to be vaccinated, I’ll have you arrested and have the vaccine shot into your [buttocks],” he said, reportedly using a vulgar word. “If you don’t get vaccinated, leave the Philippines. Go to India if you want, or somewhere, America.”

Justice Secretary of the Philippines Menardo Guevarra reportedly cleared up Duterte’s words on Tuesday and said refusing vaccination was not a violation of the law, per The Post. 

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have warned everyday people not to use Ivermectin against COVID-19. 

On its website, the FDA stated that the agency “has not approved ivermectin for use in treating or preventing COVID-19 in humans. Ivermectin tablets are approved at very specific doses for some parasitic worms, and there are topical (on the skin) formulations for head lice and skin conditions like rosacea. Ivermectin is not an anti-viral (a drug for treating viruses),” adding that “Taking large doses of this drug is dangerous and can cause serious harm.”

The agency added,

“Never use medications intended for animals on yourself. Ivermectin preparations for animals are very different from those approved for humans.”

In March, the WHO recommended that Ivermectin only be used in treatment of COVID-19 within clinical trials.

“The current evidence on the use of ivermectin to treat COVID-19 patients is inconclusive. Until more data is available, WHO recommends that the drug only be used within clinical trials,” it stated, citing a guideline development group that looked at data from trials. 

As Reuters reported,

“Duterte is famous for his bellicose rhetoric and his remarks on Monday contradicted those of his health officials, who have said getting vaccinated against COVID-19 is voluntary.”

“Don’t get me wrong, there is a crisis in this country,” Duterte said. “I’m just exasperated by Filipinos not heeding the government.”

COVID-19 cases have gone down in the Philippines since a spike in April, but continue to maintain an uncomfortable rate. 

According to the WHO,

“from 3 January 2020 to 5:44pm CEST, 22 June 2021, there have been 1,364,239 confirmed cases of COVID-19 with 23,749 deaths, reported to WHO. As of 12 June 2021, a total of 6,624,417 vaccine doses have been administered.” The current population of the country is 111,034,497 people, according to Worldometer. 

Reuters reported that “as of June 20, just 2.1 million people had been fully vaccinated of the 70 million people targeted for this year.”

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Today, the world is witnessing the Covid-19 pandemic, accompanied by other pandemics like the information pandemic (infodemic) and the Covid-19 waste pandemic. The burgeoning consumption and improper disposal practices of face masks by the community worldwide have given rise to a new environmental challenge. These materials are getting into waterways from where they reach the freshwater and marine environment, adding to the burden of plastics in the aquatic medium. For instance, OceansAsia, an organization committed to advocacy and research on marine pollution, reported in February 2020 that the ocean is being cluttered with new forms of plastic, i.e., face masks of different types and colours in Hong Kong (Oceanasia, 2020). The collection of face masks was also spotted along highways and drainage in many other parts of the world (Fadare & Okoffo, 2020).

This new form of plastic waste has emerged as an environmental litter in terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems. Thereby acting as a piece of evidence that the global pandemic has further increased the challenge of plastic pollution across the world (Prata et al., 2020).

Single-use polymeric materials have been identified as a significant source of plastics and plastic particle pollution in the environment. Like other single-use plastics (bottles), these medical face masks are also typically made up of polypropylene, polyurethane, polyacrylonitrile, polyethylene, or polyester(Fadare & Okoffo, 2020). In turn, making these disposable face masks (single use) and PPE’s an emerging new source of microplastic fibres, as these plastics, can break down into smaller particles size of less than 5 mm under environmental conditions (Fadare & Okoffo, 2020).

The UN Environment also highlighted the issue in its report stating that the general public is producing more waste than usual. Along with domestic waste, biomedical waste such as masks, gloves, and PPEs are prevalent due to a lack of awareness (COVID-19 Waste Management Factsheet, n.d.). As per a recent Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) report, 146 tonnes of COVID-19 related waste were generated in the year 2020 in India alone (Kumar, 2021). Already 150 million tons of plastic waste were said to float in the ocean; if the trend continues, by 2050, there will be more plastic by weight than fish in the ocean (Ford, 2020). Additionally, fish and other animals are getting intoxicated because of plastics. Ultimately, consuming such fishes and animals is causing plastics to enter our food chain, threatening human health (Andrews, 2012).

Therefore, proper waste management responsibility not only falls on the healthcare institutions but also on the citizens to effectively use and dispose of these single-use masks to protect themselves, others, and the environment. The public should be made aware about the plastic footprint created due to the irrational use of face masks and the long-term consequences that can arise if the situation is not controlled in time.

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Dr Silvy Mathew is a dental graduate and a prospective global health professional. Currently pursuing a Master of Public Health (MPH) from Manipal Academy of Higher Education.

Sources

Fadare, O. O., & Okoffo, E. D. (2020). Covid-19 face masks: A potential source of microplastic fibers in the environment. Science of the Total Environment, 737, 140279. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2020.140279

Kumar, S. (2021, June). World Environment Day: India produced 45,308 tonnes of Covid-19 biomedical waste in previous one year | Latest News India – Hindustan Times. Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/world-environment-day-india-produced-45-308-tonnes-of-covid-19-biomedical-waste-in-previous-one-year-101622862552910.html

Oceanasia. (2020, February). No Shortage Of Masks At The Beach – OCEANS ASIA. https://oceansasia.org/beach-mask-coronavirus/

Prata, J. C., Silva, A. L. P., Walker, T. R., Duarte, A. C., & Rocha-Santos, T. (2020). COVID-19 Pandemic Repercussions on the Use and Management of Plastics. Environmental Science and Technology, 54(13), 7760–7765. https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.0c02178

Featured image is from Countercurrents

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In an attempt to protect the dwindling numbers of Tasmanian devils, an “insurance population” was shipped to Maria Island causing “catastrophic” damage to the native birdlife, including the elimination of little penguins on the small Australian island.

“Every time humans have deliberately or accidentally introduced mammals to oceanic islands, there’s always been the same outcome … a catastrophic impact on one or more bird species,” Dr. Eric Woehler, the convener of BirdLife Tasmania said to The Guardian.

The population of little penguins has declined since the Tasmanian devils were introduced in 2012, but according to a report by BirdLife Tasmania, the most recent survey showed that the penguins were completely gone from the island, according to The Guardian.

The Tasmanian devils were moved to the island because of the threat of the highly contagious and deadly devil facial tumor disease.

The initial population of Tasmanian devils was 28 in 2012 but has since grown to around 100 devils as of 2016.

Just a decade ago, the 45 square mile island was the home to around 3,000 breeding pairs of little penguins.

Little penguins are the smallest of all the penguin species.BirdLife Tasmania / Eric Woehler

“Losing 3,000 pairs of penguins from an island that is a national park that should be a refuge for this species basically is a major blow,” Woehler said to The Guardian.

Before the species were introduced to the island, a 2011 report by the Tasmanian Department of Primary Industries, Parks, and Environment predicted that introducing the carnivorous species would have “a negative impact on little penguin and shearwater colonies on Maria Island through devil predation,” according to The Guardian.

In addition to little penguins, researchers also found that Tasmanian devils had also destroyed colonies of short-tailed shearwaters on the Australian island. Wombats and possums are also prey to the devils, according to The Hill.

“Because of their larger size and ability to dig, devils had greater impacts on nesting shearwaters than either cats or possums [which also prey on the birds],” the study found.

Woehler noted that the devils impacted another bird species on the island: Cape Barren geese. The species are ground-nesting birds, but they’ve been nesting in trees to avoid the Tasmanian devils, he said.

The decision to bring the Tasmanian devils to the island a decade ago was sound according to Woehler because, at that time, the facial tumor disease was not well understood, according to The Guardian.

However, in 2020, researchers found that the facial tumor disease was unlikely to wipe out the population of Tasmanian devils.

The Save the Tasmanian Devil program’s government spokesperson said that the program is continually monitored, according to The Independent.

“All effective conservation programs are adaptive and the STDP will continue to evolve in line with new knowledge in science and emerging priorities,” the spokesperson said to The Guardian. “This also applies to Maria Island, where active monitoring and management occurs, and Maria Island remains an important part of the broader devil program to help restore and maintain an enduring and resilient wild devil population in Tasmania.”

Woehler said, “it’s rather hard to justify” keeping the Tasmanian devils on the island because of the new research on the facial disease. He said that it’s likely the penguins will return once the devils are removed from the island, according to RT News.

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Audrey Nakagawa is the content creator intern at EcoWatch. She is a senior at James Madison University studying Media, Art, and Design, with a concentration in journalism. She’s a reporter for The Breeze in the culture section and writes features on Harrisonburg artists, album reviews, and topics related to mental health and the environment. She was also a contributor for Virginia Reports where she reported on the impact that COVID-19 had on college students.

Featured image: A Tasmanian devil (CC BY-SA 3.0)

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To float in such an aqueous body is to find a majestic creature unparalleled in beauty and expanse, stretching at 2,300km.  There are other stunning formations on the planet, but the Great Barrier Reef has such dimension, form and cocksure brilliance as to make others shrink, not so much because of beauty as due to sheer scale and ecological variety.

But the Reef’s health record has been patchy.  Each year brings a series of negative assessments about the patient. Its ticker is having palpitations; its central mineral supports in the form of coral life is being bleached.  Water quality is being affected.  The crown-of-thorns starfish, richly stimulated by nutrients from runoffs, has grown in number to savage the unmoving coral with relish.

With such activity, it was little wonder that the World Heritage Committee, under the umbrella of UNESCO, has suggested placing the Reef on the endangered list.  While taking note of “many positive achievements by the State Party [Australia], progress has been insufficient in meeting key targets of the Reef 2050 Plan.  The Plan requires stronger and clearer commitments, in particular towards urgently countering the effects of climate change, but also towards accelerating water quality improvement and land management measures.” 

Despite the money committed by the Commonwealth government to protect the Reef, along with cross-institutional collaboration, “the long-term outlook of the ecosystem of the property has deteriorated from poor to very poor, and that the deterioration has been more rapid and widespread than was evident during the period 2009-2014.”  Bleaching events from 2016, 2017 and 2020 “as a result of global warming”, are also noted in the agenda.

Given such considerations, the World Heritage Centre and the International Union for Conservation of Nature recommended “that the property is facing ascertained danger” and should be placed upon “the List of World Heritage in Danger.”  Australia would be invited to collaborate with the World Heritage/IUCN Reactive Monitoring mission “to develop a set of corrective measures” to enable the Reef to be removed from the list of world heritage in danger.

Richard Leck, Head of Oceans for the World Wide Fund for Nature-Australia summed it up thus: “The recommendation from UNESCO is clear and unequivocal that the Australian government is not doing enough to protect our greatest natural asset, especially on climate change”.  Imogen Zethoven, consultant for the Australian Marine Conservation Society, saw the UNESCO recommendation as a chance to draw attention to Australia’s lethargic climate change policies.  “Australia’s climate record is more consistent with a 2.5 to 3 Celsius rise in global average temperature – a level that would destroy the Great Barrier Reef and all the world’s coral reefs.”

Members of Scott Morrison’s government violently disagreed.  Ministers claim, in outrage, that such moves to deem the sacred reef endangered is a profanity and in the spirit of diplomatic duplicity.  This is all the more tickling for the fact that Australia has one of the weaker environmental portfolios: Environment Ministers usually find themselves as fossil fuel cross dressers and apologists for mining.  “Australia believes,” claimed the startled Environment Minister Sussan Ley, “it is wrong to single out the best managed reef in the world for this potential ‘in danger’ listing.”  Ley also claimed to have been “blindsided by a sudden late decision.”  It was “unheard of for a site to be added to an endangered list, or recommended … without the necessary consultation leading up to it.”

In a press release, Ley claimed that “UN officials” had assured Australia that no such recommendation would be made prior to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee meeting to be hosted by China in July.  The draft decision had been a mere “desk top review with insufficient first-hand appreciation of the outstanding science-based strategies being funded by the Commonwealth and Queensland Governments.”

For a government that has politicised everything from renewable energy to the granting of mining permits, such anger was mildly amusing. In Ley’s barely credible words, “When procedures are not followed, when the process is turned on its head five minutes before the draft decision is due to be published, when the assurances my officials received and indeed I did have been upended.  What else can you conclude but that it is politics?” 

The allusion lurking in such views was that the decision had been massaged.  In what is fast becoming a boring tic, Australian government sources pointed the eager finger at China.  One, who remained unnamed, told the South China Morning Post that Australia would “appeal but China is in control.” 

Rupert Murdoch’s press outlets, showing how quickly they can change from ingratiating themselves with Chinese Communist officials to condemning them (the mogul’s failed dream to penetrate the Chinese market continues to rankle), is running the Yellow Devil story.  China, raged Sky News host Chris Kenny, was being aggressive towards Australia “under the guise of climate activism.”  The UN was being used as a vehicle for “environmental emotional blackmail”.  Sky News Political Editor Andrew Clennell was most pleased to reveal that the environment minister had “specifically mentioned China in the Coalition party room with the hint being this was another example of the coercion tactics that China has been using against Australia.”

The view from the other side was rather different.  Dr Fanny Douvere of the World Heritage Centre attempted to correct the record.  “We don’t share [decisions] before they are finalised,” she told Guardian Australia.  “That’s the simple truth.”  Nor was it credible to assume that China had been a factor.  “There is absolutely zero influence.  This is simply not the truth.  There is no interference at all.”  Beijing was not even aware of the recommendations being made.

Some of Ley’s angst may well be due to the return of the deputy prime minister, who hails from the junior partner, the National Party.  Barnaby Joyce remains wedded to the idea of nuclear energy and snorts at investing in renewables.  “What this insane lemming-like desire to go to renewables going to do to our economy?” he asked in 2013.  Having languished in backbench exile for alleged sexual harassment, exiting a long marriage and scooting off with his mistress, he has stormed back to the front of the Morrison cabinet, decapitating (politically speaking) the now former leader, Michael McCormack.  In doing so, he resumes a position he left in disgrace three years ago.  More to the point, the fossil fuel fanatics are now breathing more furiously than ever, being the types who think that the Great Barrier Reef is the sort of thing you see in specimen drawers and Madame Tussauds.

South Australia’s Greens Senator Sarah Hanson-Young saw the problem closer to home and rather damning. “You weren’t ‘blindsided’,” she scornfully tweeted about Ley, “you had your eyes closed [and] ignored the science and kept taking donations from the fossil fuel industry.”  The Queensland Premier, Annastacia Palaszczuk, had her own barb with the federal government, telling a press gathering on June 23 that the greatest threat to the Great Barrier Reef was none other than the National Party.

The one true victim in this international brawl is the Reef itself.  Bureaucrats will be haggling and disagreeing over data, labels and outcomes as the degradation continues.  And Australia, for its incessant resort to that fiction called the “rules-based international order” will seedily attack international institutions if it serves to placate domestic interests.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne.  He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected] 

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China expressed “strong dissatisfaction” over US Senators visiting Taiwan to donate coronavirus vaccines, saying it could embolden “separatist forces” on the island.

Foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said China “has lodged a solemn representation.” He also urged the United States to “be prudent when dealing with the Taiwan question and avoid sending any erroneous signals to separatist forces” on the island.

But the relatively tepid statement from a ministry notorious for its pugnacious responses to any diplomatic overtures to Taiwan awoke the scorn of China’s online patriots.

“Saying that is the same as saying nothing, I’m sick of it,” one Weibo user commented Monday on a post by state-run tabloid Global Times about Wang’s statement.

“You should send two fighter jets to escort them!” another user urged.

China’s diplomats and official propaganda had in recent years encouraged an assertive, belligerent form of nationalism, with officials tweeting insults and conspiracy theories about diplomatic rivals and state TV gloating at the chaos caused by protests and coronavirus outbreaks abroad.

After years of increasingly bellicose language, President Xi Jinping last week called for a change in tone from China.

He urged the nation to show a softer face abroad, cultivating a “reliable, admirable and respectable image.”

The US visit

Beijing sees democratic, self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory which is to be seized one day, by force if necessary, and rages at any diplomatic attempts to recognise it as an independent nation.

A delegation of three US lawmakers made a stopover on Sunday in Taipei, where they announced Washington would donate 750,000 coronavirus vaccine doses to Taiwan.

The gift came as Taiwan accuses China of hampering its efforts to secure vaccines, saying it is part of Beijing’s ongoing campaign to isolate the island.

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Abstract

In 2020 Chinese “dark fleets” replaced North Korean “ghost ships” in international discourse as symbolic of a certain form of global maritime threat and disturbance. This article takes a longer view of trouble on the high seas, looking back to the globalization of the oceanic commons at the behest of post 1945 geopolitics and new forms and methodologies of fisheries science. With Carmel Finley’s articulation of Pacific Empires of Fishing in mind the article explores fishing histories of East Asia and the Pacific, both during and after the era of colonization The article considers the marginalization of already peripheral traditional Korean fishing communities by Japanese colonization, ecological collapse generated by the technological and statistical development underpinning scientific fishing, and the ghosts made of fish themselves as the powers and logics of accumulation and extraction transform the watery geographies of the Pacific. 

Introduction

In 2020 many of the drivers of globalization appeared to go into reverse or halt uncomfortably, as that most global of forces, a worldwide pandemic, ravaged international travel and the connections through which intercontinental trade and travel have become so normalized in recent decades. As the airport lounges emptied and the stratospheric sinews that stretch across the planet became ever thinner and more tenuous, it was as if we had returned, apart from the ever present and very global virus, to the world of our grandparents and great-grandparents where nations such as Australia and South Korea, from Europe at least, were very, very distant, very much over there or down there, half known about and seldom visited. Just as these more familiar and practically useful products of globalization receded, so alongside the virus, and perhaps because of the disconnection brought by this extraordinary year, other seemingly uncontrolled globalizing energies began to disturb and dismay popular and political media. A particularly widely spread academic article published in July 2020 raised the issue of Chinese “dark fleets” of fishing boats,¹which had come to dominate many of the fishing grounds once important to North Korea (North Korean boats perhaps displaced or reduced due to Covid19-related epidemic restrictions which saw most of its fleet restricted to port). Later in the year the “dark fleets” were reported just outside the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Galapagos Islands (sovereign to Ecuador), and further reports suggested that they had created ecological pressure on waters off West Africa (displacing of course the very public fleets from European Union nations which had previously exploited these same waters). Such masses of fishing boats are of course dark in many ways in global discourse. Dark in the literal sense that they are generally invisible to the normal monitoring technologies important to contemporary global fishing (they switch their AIS transponders off or do not have them fitted in the first place). But Dark also in the conceptual sense that they are regarded as nefarious and evil in intent, another long arm of the autocratic People’s Republic of China (PRC) with which it shamelessly and brutally seeks to strip resources without limit from the global commons.

Image 1: Dark Fleets – Chinese Boats in North Korean Waters, 2019 – Image in supplementary materials for ‘Jaeyoon Park et al. 2020. “Illuminating Dark Fishing Fleets in North Korea.” Science Advances 6.30, eabb1197. Twelve AIS messages are shown matched to detected pair trawlers (grey ovals) in a PlanetScope image captured on 2 June 2018 in North Korean waters. The solid white dots, with accompanying 9-digit MMSI numbers, indicate the AIS positions broadcast closest in time to image acquisition, while the hollow white dots are the estimated positions at acquisition time based on extrapolation of the vessels’ speed and course.

The Chinese global fishing fleets of 2020 and 2021 are highly obvious given their size, and perhaps provocative given their avoidance of the regularized monitoring systems prevalent across the globe, but they are not really unique in their ecological impact or in their presence in the Pacific. Industrial fishing since the 1950s has seen something of a developmental and technological arms race across the planet that has stripped the oceans of life and abundance, fishing down trophic levels and exploiting species such as krill that would never previously have been considered worth catching, and radically altering the topography of the deep sea, transforming sea floors across the planet into flat, featureless deserts marked by the drag lines of trawler gear.

The PRC is late to the enterprise, as fleets from the European Union, the United States, Japan, and the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations prior to 1992, ranged across the globe. They are perhaps brazen in their efforts, which resemble a form of poaching on the high seas, but interestingly they have displaced the previous fleets of concern regionally, namely those North Korean “ghost ships” which began to appear after 2012 (Winstanley-Chesters 2020).² These forlorn, old fashioned and decrepit boats which washed up hundreds of times on the coasts of northern Japan and the Russian Federation, sometimes with cargoes of deceased North Koreans, were themselves the offspring of poaching fleets in the West Sea/Sea of Japan exploiting the rare rainbow squid populations on and around the Yamato Bank and competing uncomfortably with technologically advanced Japanese squid boats.

North Korean fleets were once almost as visible in the media as the Chinese from 2020, and aside from the impact of the occasional dead crew members on the Japanese and Russian coast, were almost as impactful when it comes to poaching and illicit extraction from the commons. There was huge concern about North Korea’s monetization of potential maritime resources and what that might have meant for the support given to its military capacity and capability, as well as the breaking of the sanctions regime led by the United States designed to restrict and constrain Pyongyang. There was also some concern that North Korean institutional pressure on non-fishing coastal communities, given the other pressures on its economy and government, was pushing people who weren’t actually fishermen to sea, endangering them and leading to those unfortunate situations which resulted in some boats becoming “ghost ships.” The Russian Federation in particular was most upset by the damage caused by North Korean fleets to the delicate conservational balance off the shores of Primorsky, particularly the Pacific Salmon which return to spawn in its far eastern rivers.

Here we take a longer view of East Asian and Korean maritime interactions. We also take a longer view of the impact of internationalization and globalization on fishing and marine matters. Whereas globalization is generally considered a product of the WTO and GATT agendas, post-Cold War deregulation, financialization and neo-liberalism, when it comes to the extraction of value from under the waves and the exchange of products from the sea, global interactions have long been the reality. Extending a nation’s fishing capabilities and capacities across the globe, essentially an invention of the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, was injected with a new sense of urgency after the end of Second World War. In the Pacific the late 1940s and 1950’s was an era of technological development and international competition in what was considered a global commons by the United States, Japan and other postwar allies on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact nations on the other. After 1960 nations sought to claim sovereignty once again over waters closer to them, a trend which eventually led to the development of 200 mile EEZ’s (Exclusive Economic Zones), but this did not reverse the pressure and urgency on countries participating in global fishing efforts.

Korean interactions with the sea are, like most elements of the peninsula’s history, unnavigable and incomplete if its pre-modern and colonial histories are not examined. Korea’s watery history does of course not simply start in 1945, and neither does the history of Pacific fishing and maritime endeavor. The desire to extract and accumulate wealth and value from the seas, the coasts and the ocean floors of the Pacific as the reader will see, may have dramatically expanded in the second half of the twentieth century at the behest of capital, the United States and its former enemy Japan, but fishing has a longer history and the former Japanese Empire and territories such as the Korean peninsula were testbeds and nurseries for many of the techniques and technologies that would later be familiar in the practice of industrial fishing.

 

Watery and Fishy Histories of the Korean Peninsula

Fishing and coastal development on the Korea peninsula is intricately linked to its complex religious and cultural histories. Buddhist practices integrated into Korean society during the Koguryŏ (고구려) (37 BCE – 688 CE) and Koryŏ (고려) (918 CE – 1392 CE) eras meant that, as was the case in Japan (as Jakobina Arch found with the transformation of wild boar into “mountain whales”³), eating animal flesh and animal products became highly problematic. Because of the stipulations of Seon Buddhist theology (in which Korea’s Jogye Order (조계종) is rooted), fishing and the killing of fish and other marine life became entirely forbidden, seen as an act of blasphemy against the Buddha. When Koryŏ was replaced by Chosŏn and the Yi dynasty in 1392, Buddhism declined in institutional influence, replaced by what came to be a very distinct approach to Confucianism and later Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism was very tightly focused on social ordering and complex organization of state ritual which included a restrictive class based system.⁴ Fishing as a tradition that involved the killing and preparation of fish never rank high under Buddhism, but became more or less problematic at various moments during the history of Chosŏn.At times fishermen or gatherers of products from the sea were counted in the Sangmin, (상민) (common people) and sometimes within the Ch’ŏnmin (천민) (vulgar common people) class. Those that actually killed and prepared fish products or took shellfish and prepared them however found themselves in the Paekchŏng (백정) (untouchables or unclean) class. Thus contact or relationships with fishing people for people in other, higher classes, or the development of trade or enterprise with them, was further complicated by social strictures.⁵ This meant that fishing communities were often at some distance or remove from other villages and towns in historical Korea and they were extremely low down the list of institutional priorities for the institutions of Chosŏn.

There is one further element of spiritual practice which impacted on Korean fishing communities. While both Buddhism and Confucianism established rigorous frameworks for religious and cultural practice on the peninsula, they did not entirely replace earlier animist and geomantic traditions.⁶ Given Korea’s topography a real sense of geomancy developed, perhaps influenced by similar development in what would become China. Such geomancy remains influential in Korean culture, known through notions such as Paektutaegan/Baekdudaegan (백두대간), in which spiritual energy is seen as flowing through the Korean peninsula using the mountain ranges as networks and conduits,⁷ and mountain spirits, Sanshin/Sansin (산신), who embody the spirit and the physicality of mountains.⁸ Geomancy does not revolve entirely around mountains, and it would be surprising if similar traditions had not developed at the coast or beyond it. For traditional or early Korean spiritual traditions, as with Chinese, the sea, its coasts and waters were the domain of one of the Sea Dragon Kings. While in China these latter served as both water and weather gods, connecting to the points of the compass in a variety of traditions, in Korean coastal traditions they become unified as a single King.⁹ This spiritual vision of watery geomancy has the waters not as a place of control, but of dangerous chaos. Thus Korean coastal communities and by extension the peninsula’s wider culture were wary of the sea, which needed placating.¹⁰ Before the modern and colonial periods, this placating was done by a highly complex, but little researched, network of ritual and practice which is very rarely glimpsed in the contemporary era. Just as in the mountains, communities would visit and intercede with Sanshin at Sanshingak, coastal and fishing communities would have Sea Dragon King temples and visit auspicious places along the coast where spiritual energy resided.¹¹ This often meant that particular coastal rocks or islets were extremely significant, that there were areas of sea or coast which could not be visited or only visited at certain times. It also meant that Korean traditional fishing boats were organized in particular formats and decorated with shamanic signs and charms and that their sails were as much for coordinating spiritual messages as they were for catching the wind.¹² Beyond the complexity of the nexus of purely spiritual or cultural matters and development, observers/scholars must also contend with the extreme reluctance of the Chosŏn government to develop what might be called conventional mercantilism in Korea. This difficulty with economic development and the connection between people engaged in practical development or extraction, (such as fishermen) is also demonstrated by the restrictive and exploitative system developed of commission tradesmen and bond holders, who financially complicated the daily and yearly life of fishing communities, the Kaekchu.

Image 3: Sea Dragon King painting in harbor shrine at Gageodo Island, South Korea – Image taken by author, 22nd June, 2017.

Fishing and colonization in the Pacific

The Korean fishing communities and Korean maritime culture in the 19th century was impacted by the new forces of capitalism and colonialism. Japan and Korea are something of a special case in Asian fishing, given that Japan colonized Korea and neither country was colonized by a European or American power. The impositions of extra-territoriality during the treaty port era heavily impacted on China’s extensive maritime cultures, western powers setting up new institutions and enterprises all along its coast. While the Dutch had long been engaged in connection with South Asian territories and developmental communities, for the most part these had involved spices and materials from the land.¹³ Fish and products of the sea had been difficult to ship and trade across great distances but by the 19th century steam ships and refrigeration promised real changes to potential maritime economies. Such changes came first to Japan whose economy and political structures had been forced open by the powers of colonialism and upended in the turmoil of the Meiji restoration (明治維新). The Sakoku 鎖国 (closed country) restrictions (instigated after 1639), were quickly lifted and in 1867 stipulations on the size of Japanese ships, and whether they could go beyond the coast into the deep sea were abandoned.

It would take another two decades before extensive change occurred as Japan’s population was still too small due to Tokugawa policies and cultural traditions surrounding abortion and infanticide which allowed poor families to deliberately keep their families small, To support an extensive fishing industry and the local class system in which fishing people had low status (though not as low as in Korea), meant that when the class system was finally abolished in 1870 many fishing people partially abandoned the sea to work in agricultural settings.¹⁴ However improved technology and the reduction in restrictions on boat size and distance meant that in-shore fishing began to place an impractical burden on fish stocks and catches actually began to decline.¹⁵ Accordingly, in 1887, the government of Japan’s first modern Prime Minister, Ito Hirobumi, instituted legislation which sought to encourage deep sea fishing by bestowing subsidies on sailing ships of more than thirty tons.¹⁶ Later this legislation was extended to cover steamships of over fifty tons. Steam fishing ships were soon added to the fleet, the first two being imported into Japan in 1897 and by 1899 Sahrhage and Lundbeck report that there were some “3000 locally built vessels and 37 sailing and two steam driven ships of European type.”¹⁷ This new offshore fishing industry aimed for all manner of fish including herrings, sardines, anchovy, mackerel and squid focusing heavily on the northern seas around Hokkaido. The yield of the Japanese industry exploded with the development of new technology such as gill nets, cotton made nets, and the purse seine nets which were first imported from America in 1882.

Image 4: Russo-Japanese War Ukiyo-e painting, Kobayashi Kiyochika 小林 清親, 1904,  ‘Russo-Japanese Naval Battle at the Entrance of Inchon: The Great Victory of the Japanese Navy–BANZAI! (public domain).

Hokkaido became an extremely important jumping off ground for Japanese forestry interests led by the Hokkaido Development Agency (Kaitakushi 開拓使), following Japan’s final colonization of the island and subjugation of the Ainu in the 1870s.¹⁸ Early attempts to clear land for agriculture had given way to industrial timber extraction in the interior such as Tokkachi and the Daiesetsuzan range¹⁹ to feed the Oji Paper Company’s paper mill at Tomakomai.²⁰ Hokkaido on both sea and land therefore was very important in the nexus of Imperial economic and political interests. Developing pressure on fish stocks to the south meant that Japanese fishermen had already explored north to Sakhalin and the Kuriles, even into the Sea of Okhotsk by the middle of the 18th century (this all being home territory in the Japanese mind). While Imperial Russia had claimed the east coast of Siberia and Primorsky Krai from a weakened Qing dynasty China in the 19th century, there were still few Russians in the area to compete. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and the Treaty of Portsmouth which followed it gave Japan complete dominance in the seas and the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin (which was named Karufuto (樺太庁) by the Japanese). Japan even gained fishing concessions in Kamchatka and the northern end of Sakhalin and a 1907 agreement between the two nations allowed Japanese companies to establish processing plants on the Russian coast, especially in Kamchatka, reserving much of the offshore for their boats while granting river mouths and bays to the Russians.²¹ By 1910 thousands of Japanese fishing boats and ships were focused on various types of salmon off the coast of Siberia and northern Sakhalin and as Sahrhage and Lundbeck report over “Japanese canneries on Russian territory produced between 60 and 90% of all tinned salmon, which was mostly exported and sold on the world market from this region.”²²

Japan had become a nation with imperial ambitions following the Russo-Japanese war and its annexation of Korea between 1907 and 1910.²³ Prior to this, Japan had extended its interests beyond the home islands of the archipelago co-opting the Ryukyu Kingdom and Okinawa and then aiming its acquisitive gaze to the south incorporating the Bonin and Volcano Islands, part of the same chain which includes the Mariana Islands. Fishing had always been important to Japan, and a sense of that importance can be gained from other writing including the fantastic work of Jakobina Arch.²⁴ However, fishing endeavors had primarily been around the home islands and focused on fish and whales passing by Japan. The Bonin Islands had presented Japan (once British possessions but claimed by the Meiji government in 1875), with an opportunity to engage in deep sea fishing and trawling for the first time, and its acquisition of what are now the Marshall Islands, Palau and Micronesia (seized by Tokyo in 1914 and awarded to Japan as the South Seas Mandate by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919), presented Tokyo with enormous further opportunities. Aside from the efforts of the South Seas Development Company (Nan’yō Kōhatsu K.K. (南洋興発株式会社), often referred to as the Mantetsu of the south (referencing the South Manchurian Railway (南滿洲鐵道) responsible for colonization efforts far to the north), to extract phosphate from the islands, plant and manage sugar cane plantations, Japanese fishing enterprises built an extensive fishing infrastructure on islands such as Saipan.²⁵ Harbors were reconfigured and extended and a number of fish processing plants built. Japan would keep its southern mandate until the end of the 1941-1945 Pacific war.

Salmon were not the only quarry for the Japanese, and in 1905 Japanese business and fishing boats began to focus on King Crabs, following the development of canning technology and safe curing of crab meat.²⁶However by this point the Trans-Siberian Railway and reconfiguration of Russian priorities meant that more Russians and more Russian boats were fishing and crabbing in the area and disputes began to break out between fishing people of the two nations.²⁷ This encouraged the Japanese to engage in further infrastructural and technological development, and by 1920 factory ships for fish processing had been developed which meant that Japan no longer needed as many shore stations.²⁸ In 1930 some 19 factory ships, each accompanied by 2 or 3 ships for laying nets and another 12 smaller boats to haul the catch worked the waters off Kamchatka, canning some 600,000 cases of King Crab, which represented some 30 million crabs.²⁹ This hugely impacted on crab stocks. In 1927 the mothership and factory ship method was deployed on the stocks of salmon and within four years some 13 factory ships and 100 smaller ships were deployed off Kamchatka.³⁰ Such activity again began to create tension between the now organized and effective government of the Soviet Union which had established a fisheries interest in Vladivostok and was concerned to not only compete with the Japanese but to reclaim its own seas from them.³¹

Japanese fishing interests had also begun to develop trawl and drag net fishing, following the first imported steam trawler in 1908 (imported from a ship builder in Swansea, Wales).³² More than 130 further trawling boats were in place over the next four years. Soon, the inshore waters of Japan were restricted to them.³³ The trawlers then worked in the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, both fairly shallow with flat beds, perfect for trawling with a focus on fish like Croaker and Sea Bream. In 1920 Japanese companies introduced bull trawling, new technology with long trawl wings and greater capabilities in the extraction of species preferred by the home market.³⁴ Tokyo’s developing Imperial project meant that bases and processing plants could be constructed for the processing of fish caught by these trawlers in Liaodong and in Formosa (Taiwan), as well as on the Korean peninsula. However Korea’s inshore waters were restricted so far as the trawling companies were concerned, as local stocks were too fragile.³⁵ Soon the seas of China began to be depleted and the Japanese trawlers focused north to Kamchatka and the Bering Sea in the early 1930s before going completely global and travelling to the waters around Australia, the Gulf of Thailand, the Arabian Sea and even off the coast of South America after 1937.³⁶

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Satellite images have captured a silvery slick spreading on the surface of the sea from the burnt-out wreck of a cargo ship that sank off Colombo earlier this month, but authorities deny there’s been a much-feared fuel oil spill.

The images first appeared on June 4, two days after the Singapore-flagged X-Press Pearl sank following an onboard fire. They showed a long, silvery trail originating from the ship and spreading several kilometers. Analyzing a series of such images taken over subsequent days, the Marine Pollution Surveillance Program at the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) indicated it was possibly an oil slick generating from the sunken ship.

The slick was 2.74 nautical miles (5.07 kilometers) north of the ship, and images from June 12 indicated the slick was getting thicker, covering an area of 0.67 square kilometers (0.25 square miles).

The X-Press Pearl was carrying 297 metric tons of heavy fuel oil and 51 metric tons of marine fuel oil. Environmental activists and experts have warned that a spill of this oil from the stricken ship would spark an unprecedented marine disaster for Sri Lanka. But authorities say the slick in the images isn’t the ship’s fuel.

No oil spill

“We sent our vessels to the area and no large scale spill of bunker oil [has] been reported from the X-Press Pearl,” said navy spokesman Indika de Silva.  He said the slick was the result of light-colored oily substances getting released in the aftermath of the ship’s burning and sinking.

De Silva said the navy was working with officials from the National Aquatic Resources Research and Development Agency (NARA) to collect samples for further analysis. NARA officials say they need about two weeks to analyze the water samples to offer a conclusive statement.

Cleanup operations carried out in the immediate area of the accident covering an extent of 230 kilometers (145 miles) resulted in the collection of up to 1000 metric tons of debris and nurdles as of June 12. Image courtesy of the Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA).

Initial inspections confirmed the oil tanks were not damaged by the fire. Experts also note that heavy ship fuel oil is a thick, blackish, tar-like substance, whereas what was captured in the satellite images was grayish or silvery.

“While satellites imagery are useful tools in detecting spills, monitoring and assessing ongoing events, and planning countermeasures, it can sometimes bring false positives of spills such as those caused by algal blooms, so it is important to have closer inspection and water sample analysis,” Christopher Reddy, a senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, told Mongabay.

Reddy has studied extensively images of oil spills in different parts of the world. He says close analysis and inspection is necessary to conclude “whether there actually is oil, type of oil, or the amount being released and whether a leak was in the ship’s cargo hold or fuel tanks, indicating potential for a much larger release.”

Despite its tarry appearance, heavy fuel oil in the ocean is often easier to clean than spills of other hydrocarbons. Marine fuel oil, or marine diesel, which can spread rapidly, forming a characteristic rainbow-hued slick, would be less viscous, but harder to contain and recover than a heavy fuel oil spill, Reddy added.

“Every spill is different, and the amount of oil that enters the water is only the first of many variables that can cause a long-term environmental disaster from a near-miss,” Reddy said.

Being prepared

Even though they can’t yet confirm a spill, Sri Lankan authorities are still preparing for the worst. The Marine Environmental Protection Authority (MEPA) has activated the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan (NOSCOP) to ensure coordinated efforts among public and private agencies to integrate resources and respond effectively.

“We have set up booms covering several environmentally sensitive areas and the ship to prevent oil reaching the beaches. We are also trying to put a boom around the ship,” said MEPA chair Darshani Lahandapura.

The debris from the cargo ship and nurdles collected are stored at a hazardous waste yard managed by the Marine Environment Protection Authority (MEPA).

Besides the silvery trail, images of the sea surface around the X-Press Pearl wreck also show a circular blue-green patch, experts say.

Gothamie Weerakoon, senior curator of lichens and slime molds at the Natural History Museum of London, said this was likely an algal boom.

“The ship carried nitric acid and some fertilizers like urea, so this would enrich the water with nitrogen that supports the growth of plants,” she told Mongabay. “Sri Lanka is a tropical country where its sea surface gets plenty of sunlight, so the nitrogen-rich water could easily trigger such an algal boom.”

As there appeared to have been other chemicals on board the X-Press Pearl, and as algae is capable of absorbing such chemicals, the resulting algal bloom could be a toxic one, Weerakoon said. She added it’s important to carry out thorough tests to analyze the situation transparently and share this information to find solutions.

Meanwhile, Sri Lankan media have reported that as many as 20 dead turtles have washed ashore in the week since the ship hitting the seabed. Thushan Kapurusinghe, project leader of the Turtle Conservation Project of Sri Lanka, said it’s not unusual during the monsoon season for turtles to wash up dead, killed by rough seas and brought ashore by strong currents.

“But some carcasses seem to be showing anomalies, hence it is important to do thorough necropsy to conclude their cause of death and whether there is a link to the pollution by the ship,” Kapurusinghe told Mongabay.

Two experts from the nonprofit International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited (ITOPF) have arrived in Sri Lanka to advise on the response to potential spills of oil, chemicals and other hazardous substances. The Sri Lankan government has also called for help from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) to assess the environmental damage caused by the X-Press Pearl.

The ship was also carrying 78 metric tons of plastic nurdles, the peppercorn-sized beads used to make all types of plastic items. Most of the nurdles fell overboard during the fire, and now pose a massive cleanup challenge for Sri Lanka. It’s the second-largest nurdle spill after a 2012 incident in Hong Kong, in which containers holding 168 metric tons of nurdles were blown off a ship during a typhoon.

Lahandapura said the MEPA had cleaned up nurdles and debris from about 200 km (125 mi) along the west coast, collecting about 1000 ton of plastic nurdles and other debris.

The X-Press Pearl has caused the world’s second-largest nurdle spill due to a marine accident, with the plastic pellets continuing to wash up along Sri Lanka’s western, northwestern and southern coasts. Scientific modeling indicates the nurdles may reach Indonesia, the Maldives, India and may even extend up to Somalia. Image courtesy of the Marine Environment Protection Agency (MEPA).

Plastic pollution

Oceanographers Charitha Pattiaratchi and Sarath Wijeratne from the University of Western Australia  have predicted that the plastic pollution could impact a larger area, given prevailing wind and wave patterns. According to their modeling, the nurdles could make landfall on the Indonesia island of Sumatra in about 60 days. Later in the year, with the reversal of the monsoon, the researchers say they expect the nurdles to circle back, making landfall in India and again in Sri Lanka — this time on the east coast — as well as the Maldives and even Somalia.

Meanwhile, the Center for Environmental Justice (CEJ), a Sri Lankan NGO, has petitioned the Supreme Court to seek full damages for the disaster. “We want to protect the rights of all sectors of our motherland, including the environment,” said CEJ chair and lawyer Ravindranath Dabare. “We are not satisfied with the compensation Sri Lanka received from the previous incident of MV New Diamond oil tanker that caught fire last year. So we want to use this as an instrument to set things straight.”

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Featured image: Circular greenish patch around the sunken freighter the X-Press Pearl. The patch is thought to be an algal boom triggered by nitrogen enrichment after nitric acid and urea fertilizer spilled into the water. Image courtesy of Sri Lanka Air Force Media.

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At its height in the early 1960s, the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) had 3 million members. It was the third largest in the world, behind only the communist parties in the Soviet Union and China.

Around a quarter of the entire population of Indonesia belonged to organisations affiliated to the PKI. It was doing increasingly well in elections, so much so that then US Vice-President Richard Nixon is quoted as saying “a democratic government was [probably] not the best kind for Indonesia” since “the Communists could probably not be beaten in election campaigns because they were so well organized”.

Since 1945, the president of Indonesia had been Sukarno, whom author Vincent Bevins describes as “a left-leaning Third World nationalist”, committed to being on good terms with both the USA and the Soviet Union. Sukarno’s 1955 conference in Bandung, Indonesia, “brought the peoples of the colonized world into a movement, one that was opposed to European imperialism and independent from the power of the US and the Soviet Union”.

Although a nationalist rather than a communist, Sukarno was sufficiently anti-colonialist and sufficiently tolerant of the PKI that Washington was very worried (as it is still) by the threat of a good example. Bevins tells how a meeting of a secret committee of the US National Security Council reached the conclusion that “the loss of a nation of 105 million to the ‘Communist Camp’ would make a victory in Vietnam of little meaning”.

It is easy to imagine how a country as populous as Indonesia, with a massive communist party and governed by a president committed to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, would be anathema to the US and its allies.

Bevins admits that 50 years later, we still lack a complete understanding of the events of the night of September 30th 1965, when a group of army officers apparently attempted to foil a right-wing plot against Sukarno by kidnapping seven of the highest-ranking generals in the Armed Forces.

By the next morning, six of the generals were dead, but the outcome was a catastrophe: “within 12 hours, the September 30 movement was crushed, and the army now led by right-wing General Suharto, was in direct control of the country”.

Suharto proceeded to literally demonize the PKI. Allegedly aided by covert, ‘black propaganda’ ops run by the US and British, Suharto “managed to give official legitimacy to a wildly anti-communist narrative, an absurdly fanatical and exaggerated version of global right-wing ideology”.

The eventual outcome was horrific. Bevins estimates that between 500,000 to 1 million completely innocent Indonesians were murdered.

This is the “Jakarta Method” of the book’s title: state-organised extermination of anyone deemed to have the slightest sympathy or connection with the left.

The success of the Jakarta Method was not confined to Indonesia, although the scale was smaller elsewhere. Bevins explains that “in the years 1945 – 1990, a lose network of US-backed anti-communist extermination programs emerged around the world, and they carried out mass murder in at least 22 countries”.

Bevins lists Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, East Timor, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iraq, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, the Philippines, South Korea, Sudan, Taiwan, Thailand, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. He suggests that the murders committed in these countries (not including direct military engagements or civilian “collateral damage” in wartime) contributed to the eventual outcome of the Cold War.

One of the best and most moving features of the book is that Bevins interweaves the wide-angled geopolitical story with the stories of a number of ordinary Indonesians caught up in the maelstrom. These are voices we hear very seldom in the West.

Now old, “they are living out their last years in a messy, poor crony capitalist country, and they are told almost every single day it was a crime to want something different”.

Bevins’s powerful book is essential reading for anyone trying to understand how we got from the optimism of the 1960s to the world of Bolsonaro, Trump and Johnson, though it’s worth remembering that at the time of the mass murders in Indonesia, the US had a Democrat as president and the UK a Labour prime minister.

While it is a shame that the first edition of such a meticulously researched and footnoted book came without an index, thankfully subsequent editions have included one.

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Featured image: PKI supporters rallying during the 1955 general election campaign. Photo: Wikimedia Commons