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After a series of pandemic-defying trips across the world, Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto appears to have settled on the French-made Rafale and an under-strength squadron of American F-15EX jet fighters to bolster Indonesia’s front-line air defenses, with deliveries expected over the next three years.

Along with the 36 Dassault Rafales and eight Boeing F-15s, the wish list also extends to three Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft, three Airbus A330 tankers for aerial refuelling, six MQ-1 Predator drones and Italy’s Leonardo early-warning radar system.

It could be Jakarta’s biggest-ever defense purchase if it goes through in its current form, but serious questions remain over whether debt-burdened Indonesia can afford the estimated $11 billion it will cost for the aircraft alone and the early availability of the F-15 variant, only two of which have been built so far.

Indonesia’s defense budget for 2021 stands at US$9.2 billion, an increase over the 2020 allocation that started out at $9.3 billion and dropped to $8.7 billion because of fiscal pressure from the pandemic. The 2021 spending includes $3 billion for military modernization.

Widodo’s first-term government had hoped to increase the defense budget to $20 billion by 2019, or 1.5% of gross domestic product (GDP), but that was predicated on 7% growth, not the average 5% the country has achieved over the last five years as it struggled to attract foreign investment.

What the February 17 announcement does seem to have settled is that Indonesia has decided not to risk US sanctions with the $1.1 billion deal to buy a further 11 Sukhoi Su-35 air defense fighters to go with the 16 twin-engine Su-27 and Su-30 Russian jets it already has.

Then-US president Donald Trump signed off on the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in mid-2017, three years after the Barack Obama administration introduced the legislation to punish Russia for its invasion and annexation of Crimea from Ukraine.

If the deal is finalized, Indonesia will become the first East Asian country to operate the Rafale, a twin-engine, delta-winged multi-role aircraft introduced in 2001 and currently in service with the French air force and navy, Egypt, Qatar and, most recently, India.

India paid $9.4 billion for its 36 aircraft, which began arriving last July amid tensions between India and China over the contested Ladakh region in the western Himalayas. New Delhi also wants to purchase 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30MKI fighters.

Washington has yet to respond to India’s request for a waiver from CAATSA for the aircraft, but senior Pentagon officials have made it clear that sanctions would be applied if New Delhi goes ahead with a plan to buy Russia’s self-propelled S-400 missile system in a deal worth $5.5 billion.

The Rafales will add a third logistical tail to the Indonesian Air Force, which apart from its fleet of Sukhoi fighters also has three squadrons of refurbished Lockheed F-16s, recently deployed on patrols over the southern reaches of the South China Sea where Chinese Coast Guard vessels have conducted past intrusions.

Concerns have mounted since China passed legislation authorizing its Coast Guard to use weapons against foreign ships that are considered to be intruding into its waters, a move that could also be aimed at enforcing its unlawful maritime claims inside Indonesia’s economic exclusion zone (EEZ) north of the Natuna islands.

Prabowo had previously shown interest in buying 15 second-hand Eurofighter Typhoon fighters offered by the Austrian Air Force, but despite the favorable price he has always said privately that he wants new-generation aircraft that will stand the test of time.

Indonesian Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto takes aim in a file photo. Image: Facebook

The 4.5 generation Rafale always appeared to be on his radar, however, due in small part to his affinity for France. A French speaker, the retired special forces general spent his early years in Europe, where family members once came across him standing in front of the mirror pretending to be president Charles de Gaulle.

The history of the proposed sale appears to go back to 2017 when the two countries signed a letter of intent to increase defense cooperation, but it was Prabowo’s two meetings with French Defence Minister Florence Parly, last October and in January, that appeared to lay the groundwork for the deal.

Armed with a range of air-to-air and air-ground missiles and advanced French-developed avionics, the 4.5 generation Rafale has a maximum speed of 2,200 kilometers an hour and a combat range of 1,850 kilometers. It can be used in air superiority, interdiction, ground attack or anti-ship roles.

Prabowo had initially hoped to also acquire Lockheed’s stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, but was persuaded to accept the latest version of the F-15, which only now is entering service with the US Air Force to fill a gap left by cuts in the F-22 Raptor program.

Then US defence secretary Mark Esper reportedly told Prabowo on a visit to Washington last October that Indonesia would have to wait at least a decade for the delivery of the F-35s because of a long waiting list of buyers, including  Japan, South Korea and Singapore as the only Asian customers.

While it is the first time the US has sold the F-15 in 20 years, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have continued to fund upgrades worth $5 billion over the intervening years to a point where the EX variant is very different from its predecessors.

Military experts point to its more powerful twin engines, updated cockpit systems and sensors, data fusion capabilities and an ability to carry 29,500 pounds of ordnance over 2,200 kilometers as examples of the improvements to the purpose-built air superiority fighter.

The F-15EX in a file photo. Image: Facebook

They also note that the F-35 is far more expensive to operate and more problematic to repair compared with the F-15EX, which has a reputed 20,000-hour lifespan and, according to some sources, may cost half as much as the F-35 to operate.

That would present a major challenge to Indonesia. It already has difficulties maintaining the army’s eight sophisticated AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, which have been barely visible since they were delivered nearly three years ago.

Claims by Indonesian officials that six of the new F-15s will be ready for delivery in 2022 appear to be overly ambitious when the US Air Force and Air National Guard will get priority in replacing up to 144 aging F-15C/Ds that are reaching the end of their service years.

Each jet has a fly away price of $87.7 million, but the avionics and weapons systems are expected to add as much as $40 million to its overall cost. The experts also note that some of America’s cutting-edge technology is banned for export to countries like Indonesia.

The acquisition of the mobile Leonardo interdiction radar system will help to bolster Indonesia’s air defenses and, if positioned at a high elevation on frontier islands like Natuna Besar and Sebatik, could conceivably cover more than 500 kilometers of both air and sea, far beyond its EEZ.

Known as unmanned aerial combat vehicles (UACVs), the Predators are a surprise addition to the shopping list, but Indonesia has been operating unarmed Chinese, Israeli and French-made surveillance drones for three years.

Indonesia’s Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology is also developing the country’s first armed Black Eagle drone, which will carry a home-built 2.75 folding fin aerial rocket already used by attack helicopters and jet fighters.

Deployed extensively across Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Middle East, the Predator’s precision-guided Hellfire missiles have killed thousands of Al Qaeda and Islamic State militants since they were introduced in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

The US Air Force replaced it with the heavier, more capable MQ-9 Reaper in 2018, but it remains in service with the Italian, Turkish and Moroccan air forces and would probably be based at Pontianak, West Kalimantan, the main drone base on the edge of the South China Sea.

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Featured image: Indonesia is set to take delivery of the France-made Rafale fighter. Credit: AINonline.

Nepal’s Mega-dam Is a Mirage

March 2nd, 2021 by Ramesh Bhushal

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Plans to build Nepal’s biggest hydropower project was been delayed by politics and compensation issues for 10 years, but is now held up because the Chinese contractor is incommunicado.

The 263-m high dam on the Budi Gandaki River will be the world’s tenth tallest, and impound a reservoir 45km long displacing 50,000 people, to generate 1.200MW of electricity. But the $2.5 billion project is in doubt because of delays and doubts about its viability.

The project, situated 60km northwest of Kathmandu, was supposed to be completed by 2022. It had been cancelled and revived several times by successive governments, but has been stuck for the past year because of the pandemic.

The China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) was awarded the main construction contract in 2018, but has not shown up for the past year.

“We have repeatedly tried to communicate with the company, but it has not responded clearly. We cannot say whether they are in or out, it is between somewhere and nowhere,” said Gokarna Raj Panta at the Ministry of Water Resources, Energy and Irrigation in Kathmandu.

‘Between somewhere and nowhere’ is also a fitting description of the lives of the people of the Budi Gandaki Valley whose homes, farms and livelihoods will be submerged by what will be Nepal’s largest reservoir.

However, at the project office in Siurenitar near the proposed dam site there is frantic activity. Phones are ringing constantly, and staff are busy taking calls from those asking about their compensation claims.

“The first priority is land acquisition and we have already paid out Rs33 billion as compensation,” said Krishna Bahadur Karki who heads the project’s compensation and resettlement unit. Another Rs20 billion is earmarked for reimbursement for homes, livestock, trees and other assets.

The government froze land dealings in 2013 along the valley, but in anticipation of jobs and economic activity new roads and towns have sprung up in a district tht has seen dramatic depopulation due to outmigration.

Ghare Gurung runs a roadside metal workshop outlet 40km north of the dam site. He bought this small patch in Arkhet using money saved from working in Malaysia. He got Rs120,000 compensation for it.

“Now they have been saying that a 10% depreciation cost would be applied for our infrastructure. If it happens, then I need to pay them instead of receiving money,” he said.

Besides submergence of the main valley, the reservoir will put another 22km of land along the Aankhu Khola tributary under water.

Gyanu Maya Shrestha sells snacks from a small stall by the Aankhu Khola in Hepne of Dhading district, and is worried about her future.

The April 2015 earthquake destroyed her home and her animal shed, killing her buffaloes, oxen, and goats. Before the quake, officials from the project had assessed both structures. “After the earthquake, they inspected it again, and now say they will reduce the compensation,” says Shrestha.

The response from project officials was that the pre-earthquake inspection was for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report, not compensation. While many other quake-hit communities have built new houses, people along these two rivers have not.

Krishna Majhi lives in unregistered land at Gumti village, 10km from the proposed dam. In 2017, the government had agreed to compensate structures on unregistered land. Till now, no payments have been made.

Krishna uses part of his earthquake-damaged house as a kitchen but has spent five years living in a makeshift structure. “Even a small earthquake would now be enough to kill us, and we cannot dismantle it because we need to show it to the project for compensation,” he said.

Many promises were made to locals to persuade them to hand over their land, including of resettlement. They were asked to fill forms saying where they wanted to be resettled and what facilities they needed.

“We were told that new villages will be built in the slopes above the reservoir we would be provided all facilities. But we have heard nothing since, all these years they tricked us,” said Sushil Dharel, from Khahare on the Ankhu Khola.

Back at the compensation office, Karki says he can understand the frustration of the people, but adds, “The compensation amount is many times higher than the government rates, and there are rules. There are also people who have received millions in compensation and bought houses in Kathmandu.”

Indeed, while some have done well from compensation payouts, the majority are from poorer communities without political clout or access. They resent the way the authorities downplay their problems.

“Our field is irrigable, there is a market nearby and we can produce three crops a year. I can’t buy a piece of land in the city with our project compensation, how do I make a living there?” asks Pampha Khadka from Khahare, bursting into tears.

Government officials in Kathmandu do not have any clearer answers on resettlement, but say the details need to be ironed out.

“We have drafted a resettlement policy, but there isn’t clarity on the modality of project implementation. Unless it is finalised, resettlement is not possible,” said Gokarna Raj Panta at Nepal’s Ministry of Water Resources, Energyand Irrigation.

Botched resettlement policies are not new in projects in Nepal. And in Budi Gandaki, too, there are problems. Some families have spent the money they got on parties, which means they will be homeless and landless if not resettled. Many have used payouts to meet their daily needs or pay debt, buy motorbikes or educate and marry off their children.

“I received about Rs100,000 for a piece of land. I spent Rs10,000 on my grandchildren and sent Rs 80,000 to my daughter in Kathmandu for her studies,” said Purna Bahadur Ale Magar from Arkhet.

According to the environmental impact assessment, the reservoir will submerge 2,400 hectares of forests with 3.5 million trees of 38 species. The forests are home to 19 mammal species, 9 reptiles and 54 birds. They include 15 protected species, and there are five fish species on the IUCN red list, whose habitat will disrupted.

There has not been much interest from environmental activists and civil society groups in Nepal.

“There was interest in the 1990s about the social and environmental costs of large hydro projects, but Budi Gandaki shows that there is no concern anymore,” says  water resource expert Ajaya Dixit.

There is also cultural impact. Much of life in rural Nepal revolves around rivers, which are considered holy. The Budi Gandaki reservoir will submerge 44  cremation sites, 74 religious and 29 places of historic and cultural importance.

“Even if you raise genuine and serious concern, you are tagged as being anti-development. I think this has helped to instill fear at all levels and civil society has fallen prey to it,” he added.

The project will also undermine the region’s achievements in forest conservation. Some 1,500 hectares of community forests managed by 62 communities will be impacted bny the reservoir. The Pashupati Community Forest in Majhitar is one of them, where locals are cutting trees before the waters start rising.

About 200m above the riverbank, Suresh Shah pointed out freshly cut tree stumps. “When I try to stop them, they say why do you care about these trees, we have lost everything,” he said. “Feelings of ownership had helped conserve the forest, but that is gone now.”

Karki, the project office manager, was unable to answer any questions on environmental issues, and his engineer was equally at a loss. “This is an issue which will be dealt with when construction starts. We have not thought about it and have not been advised on how to deal with it,” Karki said.

After the deadly flood on the Alkananda River in India this month that destroyed two hydro power projects and killed at least 100 people, concerns about the impact of the climate crisis also loom large. The Budi Gandaki watershed drains the eastern flanks of Himalchuli and Manaslu and the Ganesh Mssif to the east, which has many glacial lakes in danger of bursting.

Experts say it is very risky to build such a large and expensive projects directly downstream from mountains that are melting rapidly due to the climate emergency.

In Kathmandu, three successive governments in the last three years have made as many decisions to award or scrap the contract with China Gezhouba Group Corporation.

After pre-feasibility study in 1984, the project was sidelined till 2006, when it was opened to international bidders. No expressions of interest were received.

It was next revived in 2011, when Nepal’s power outages exceeded 12 hours per day. Once again, international companies showed no interest, so the government opted to make Budi Gandaki into a ‘national pride project’ – a development priority with a bigger budget from domestic resources.

In 2016, the Belgian multinational Tractebel completed a detailed design. The project was set to move ahead with local funds and management when China entered the picture in 2017.

A few days before leaving office, the Maoist party Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal’s cabinet awarded the project to China Gezhouba Group Corporation, without any bidding.

In November 2017, the incoming Nepali Congress-led government promptly scrapped the contract stating irregularities and lack of transparency. A court action followed. Nepal got another new government four months later, and K P Oli became prime minister who returned the project to China Gezhouba in September 2018.

Now the problem is that China Gezhouba is showing little interest and failing to respond to Nepali government requests for information.

“It’s not that Chinese are less interested now. They are just waiting for a favourable time as there is political chaos in the country,” said Nepali hydro-economist Ratna Sansar Shrestha.

In his view, China’s interest in Nepali hydro projects is limited to making money from construction contracts. “India has more interest in Nepal’s water as it depends on water that flows from the mountains for irrigating vast swathes of land in the Gangetic plains,” Shrestha explained.

Geopolitical friction

The Budi Gandaki feeds into the Gandaki, one of Nepal’s four main rivers. It flows into India’s Bihar state and eventually empties into the Ganges.

Nepal and India signed the 1959 Gandak Treaty, which bars Nepal from upstream activities that would impact water flow in Bihar, where millions of hectares of farmland depend on waters from the Gandak (as Gandaki is known in India).

However, China’s growing influence in Nepal as the largest provider of foreign direct investment could lead to geopolitical friction, according to a 2018 report by the Asia Society.

Chinese firms recently built two other hydro projects in Nepal at Upper Marsyangdi A and Upper Madi, with a combined capacity of 75 MW. But both are run-of-the-river schemes, unlike Budi Gandaki which would be a gigantic reservoir.

Indian state owned and private firms have not built a power project in Nepal since the mid-1980s, although one is involved in large projects on the Arun River.

However, India is promoting cross-border trade in electricity as part of the nascent BBNI (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal) regional sub-group in its sphere of influence. Both Nepal and Bhutan have objected to the Indian power ministry’s statement in December 2016 that electricity was a ‘strategic commodity’ so non-BBNI foreign powers could not be involved in the supply chain.

Shrestha says India is not concerned about China’s involvement in the Budi Gandaki project, whose power is solely for domestic use, and it views the reservoir positively.

“In general, India is not happy with Chinese companies being involved in Nepal’s hydropower, but in Budi Gandaki they are more than happy as India would get lean-season augmented flow for free,” he added.

India had said it was not interested in investing in or building the Budi Gandaki project, and withdrew from bilateral talks in the late 90s.

Another water expert, Dipak Gyawali says that the irrigation aspect has been completely ignored in designing Budi Gandaki.

Gyawali headed a review committee formed by the government to look at the design, and says: “About 100,000 hectares of land in Nawalparasi and Chitwan districts downstream could have benefitted in Nepal. The water that flows in dry months from the reservoir is not flowing water, it’s produced by submerging our land and through our investment. If India uses this water then we should get financial returns.”

Another problem Gyawali sees in this project is that it is located close to the epicenter of the 2015 earthquake and may not be able to withstand a future megaquake. “For a seismically active region like Nepal, rock filled dams are better than concrete double arch dams as proposed on the design,” he said.

But Laxmi Devkota, the former Chair of the Budi Gandaki Development Committee, claimed that it has been designed with a serious consideration for earthquake impacts and is within international seismic resistance parameters.

The many delays risk making the Budi Gandaki project financially unviable. Costs are plummeting for other renewables, such as solar and wind power, and emerging hydrogen energy technology.

According to the Asia Foundation  report, solar electricity tariffs in Rajasthan, India, fell from more than 19 cents per unit in 2010 to 3.6 cents, and wind energy was  around 3.7 cents. Nepal’s hydropower costs 7 cents per unit to produce.

India, which is Nepal’s expected energy export market, is ramping up renewable energy capacity fast with 37 gigawatts of solar and 38 gigawatts in wind by 2020.

However, Budi Gandaki’s output is planned for domestic use so need not compete directly in the regional market. Nonetheless, the technical costs are making its value questionable, even for domestic use.

“If we can develop this project within five years then we will definitely save some money, but if it is the next 20 years then it would be a hotpot of corruption for politicians and bureaucrats. It looks like this project is losing its technical strength in terms of cost already,” said Dipendra Bhattarai, an energy expert.

Who will buy Nepal’s hydropower?

Finally, the daily power cuts that drove Nepal’s policymakers to revive the project in 2011 have ceased.  Nepal doubled its electricity production from 700MW in 2010 to 1400 MW in 2014. Another 700MW is likely to be added in the next couple of years. However, Nepal has been importing about 600 megawatts from India in the dry, winter months (November to April) to meet peak demand as the smaller run-of-the-river projects struggle when water levels are low– one motivation to build a big reservoir.

The Budi Gandaki hydropower plant should have been completed by 2022. In 2015, the project cost was estimated at 2.5 billion— more than one fourth of Nepal’s total budget that year.

Says Laxmi Devkota of the project: “We have already lost about half a billion dollars in the last four years if we consider just 10% inflation rate. Another one and half billion dollars could have been gained by selling electricity in the four years that were delayed. We are already on loss at total project cost amount.”

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All photos: NABIN BARAL / www.thethirdpole.net

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US-backed anti-government protesters in Thailand have once again “rebranded” to shake off the image of an unpopular, violent mob only to stage a poorly attended, extremely violent protest as their first “rally.” 

I explain how this is part of a wider US plan to create a  regional crisis to deny China Southeast Asia as a viable economic, military, and political partner and how US-funded Thai opposition groups are working with US-funded protesters in Myanmar.

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Brian Berletic, formally known under the pen name “Tony Cartalucci” is a geopolitical researcher, writer, and video producer (YouTube here and BitChute here) based in Bangkok, Thailand. He is a regular contributor to New Eastern Outlook and more recently, 21st Century Wire. You can support his work via Patreon here

Featured image is from New Eastern Outlook

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On Nov. 12, 2020, Typhoon Vamco cut across the northern Philippines, flooding more than 60 cities and towns in the Cagayan Valley. Millions of dollars’ worth of property and crops were damaged.

Considered the worst flooding to hit the region in almost half a century, Vamco’s impact on communities was largely attributed to waters released from the Magat dam, one of the largest in the Philippines. The dam sits on the Magat River, a tributary of the Cagayan River, about 350 kilometers (220 miles) northeast of Manila.

In just 11 hours, the dam discharged more than 265 million cubic meters (70 billion gallons) of water — almost a third of the reservoir’s capacity, and enough to fill nearly 110,000 Olympic-sized swimming pools.

The disaster has rekindled criticism of dam-building in the region, including by longtime opponents of two proposed hydropower projects on another tributary of the Cagayan, the Chico River.

“The Cagayan flooding verified one of the many reasons why we maintain our opposition to damming any part of Chico River,” says Danny Bangibang, a leader of the Indigenous communities of Kalinga province, where the rivers are located. “We will not wait for the same disaster to happen in our own soil.” In his leadership role, Bangibang is entrusted with mediating talks among Indigenous communities and facilitating interaction with government agencies.

The two planned hydropower plants, the Upper Tabuk dam and the Karayan dam, are both set to be built on ancestral domain lands. Their developers have touted them as being pivotal to providing cheaper electricity and a consistent supply of water for irrigating upland farms. Some Indigenous groups and activists, however, have opposed the projects since 2008, questioning the exclusion of downstream Indigenous communities from the consultations, and alleging bribery and sweetheart deals surrounding the consent process.

River of life

The Chico River runs 175 km (280 mi) through Mountain Province and Kalinga provinces before merging into the Cagayan River. The Chico and its 12 main tributaries are the lifeblood of Indigenous communities in the Cordillera region of the northern Philippines, providing a bounty of fresh water for drinking and for irrigation. Its watershed is also home to a wealth of wild flora and fauna;28 species of wildlife found here are endemic.

“Similar to other civilizations around the world, communities and culture developed adjacent to the river,” Dominique Sugguiyao, Kalinga’s Environment and Natural Resources Officer (ENRO), tells Mongabay. “People refer to Chico as the ‘river of life’ because it is rightly so. Our ancestors drew living from it and we continue to do so.”

“Indigenous people have always been the stewards of land, including rivers from which they draw a valuable symbiotic relationship,” says Michael Sugguiyao, Dominique’s brother and the Indigenous Peoples Mandatory Representative (IPMR) to the provincial legislature of Kalinga.

Indigenous peoples have maintained their traditional knowledge systems, passed down from one generation to another, that prescribe the preservation and maintenance of the forests, he says. In those practices, forests are protected because they sustain the rivers with waters, which in turn, sustain the communities with food and livelihood — an unbroken cycle even in the 21st century, Michael Sugguiyao adds.

Any venture that disturbs or hampers the natural flow of the river will have an immense and profound negative effect on this ecology and the people who depend on it, Dominique Sugguiyao says.

Analyses of the environmental impacts of the Karayan dam submitted to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) show that earthmoving activities during construction could increase water turbidity, which could decrease algae diversity. This would reduce the abundance of zooplankton, which feed primarily on algae, sending a ripple effect through the aquatic food chain. The natural migration and movement of freshwater species will also be impeded, and installing fish ladders is not a solution that will work for all aquatic species, Dominique Sugguiyao says.

The uplands of the Cordillera mountain range houses various Indigenous groups in the northern Philippines. Image by Erwin Mascariñas

Overall, the interconnectedness of biological communities will be disrupted and the productivity of the river system will be reduced, the analysis concluded.

The river is also a source of aggregate (sand and gravel) that today fuels a multi-million-peso industry in Tabuk, the Kalinga provincial capital, supplying construction projects across the province and in adjacent towns. Dams would also halt the flow of aggregate, destroying the livelihoods that depend on it. “The same [analysis] is applicable if the Upper Tabuk Dam will be constructed,” says Bangibang, the Indigenous leader. “Imagine the extent of the damage if both dams will [be] push[ed] though?”

The analysis of the effects of the Karayan dam applies to the Upper Tabuk dam, and could spell greater damage if both are constructed, he said.

Upper Tabuk dam: Dividing communities

The proposed Upper Tabuk dam would feed a 17-20-megawatt hydroelectric generator from a reservoir of about 5 million m3 (1.3 billion gallons) on the Tanudan River, one of the main tributaries of the Chico. It’s also expected to provide year-round irrigation for the rice terraces and fields in Kalinga, potentially doubling rice production in the “rice granary” of this mountainous part of the northern Philippines.

The dam would be built in the village of Dupag village, which lies within the officially recognized ancestral territory of the Naneng people. In 2009, members of the Minanga, then a sub-tribe of the Naneng, formed an Indigenous-owned corporation, Kalinga Hydropower Inc. (KHI), to back the construction of the Upper Tabuk dam at an estimated cost of 2 billion pesos (about $40 million at the exchange rate at that time).

Left map: The Cordillera region is composed of 6 provinces: Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga and Mountain Province. Right map: The locations of the Chico Dam, part of the Chico pump irrigation project, and the two planned hydropower dams for construction along the Chico River

KHI partnered with DPJ Engineers and Consultancy (DPJ), owned by Daniel Peckley Jr., a civil engineer who specializes in hydro projects and whose firm operates the 1 MW Bulanao hydropower plant, also in Kalinga.

Despite scattered protests, the project obtained the necessary permits from government agencies. By 2011, it was only lacking major investors to begin construction.

In April 2012, the opposition unified, with more than a hundred tribal leaders from 18 affected villages petitioning the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) to cancel the permits.

They accused KHI and DPJ of downplaying the scale of the proposed dam by painting it as “a small hydropower development,” and said that the size of its water reservoir puts it in the category of a large dam under the standards set by the International Commission on Large Dams and the World Commission on Dams.

Mongabay made multiple attempts to contact Peckley by email and by sending a representative to his office but did not receive a response by the time this article was published.

The Chico River is a major source of quarry aggregates in the Cordillera region. Image by Erwin Mascariñas

Two months after the petition, the NCIP cancelled the certificates it had issued for the project. Five years later, in 2017, DPJ revived its proposal and reapplied for free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), a legally mandated process for projects with the potential to affect Indigenous peoples and their territories.

The following year, the NCIP identified five tribes, including the Minanga and the Naneng, as the only Indigenous groups who would be impacted by the project and thus who should be consulted for the FPIC.

In response, more than a thousand people from different tribes along the Chico River submitted their own petition against the Upper Tabuk dam, denouncing the potential impact on downstream Indigenous communities. These downstream groups say all tribes whose ancestral domains are connected to the flow of the Chico and the Tanudan should be included in the consultations.

“What is done upstream will affect the river flow in the downstream communities,” Bangibang says. “It is common sense that they too … should be consulted.” He also called into question the validity of the company’s original 2008 feasibility study, saying it skipped an FPIC process that should have been carried out before the study was conducted.

The main canal of the Upper Chico River Irrigation System in Tabuk, Kalinga. Image by Karlston Lapniten for Mongabay

The hardships of agricultural life, however, have persuaded many in these farming communities to support the dam project and its promised benefits, undermining opposition to the dam, says Andres Wailan, an elder and bodong (peace treaty and alliance) holder of the Malbong tribe.

In 2019, three Indigenous communities, including the Minanga and Naneng, consented to the dam project, leaving two other communities opposed to it: the Talloctoc and Malbong. Leaders of the consenting tribes said in a November 2019 community hearing that they were won over by the promise of jobs, infrastructure and a share of tax revenue.

“We cannot blame the people [who consented] but we cannot also just let them make bad decisions,” Wailan tells Mongabay.

Within affected communities, the split has caused tensions, including among members of the same families, straining the strong kinship ties of the Indigenous peoples, says Naneng leader Jerry Bula-at, a member of the Timpuyog ti Mannalon ti Kalinga(Federation of Farmers in Kalinga), or TMK, a progressive group advocating for farmers’ and Indigenous people’s rights.

Within his own family, some members are in favor of the Upper Tabuk dam because of the promised access to better irrigation and farming development, he says. Similar rifts have appeared in downstream communities.

“If a project causes division among Indigenous communities, it should be enough grounds for the NCIP to stop the project,” Bula-at says.

The Cordillera region is considered the primary source of upland vegetables. Image by Karlston Lapniten

The NCIP did not respond to Mongabay’s request for comment. But in a memo to its Kalinga office, dated Jan. 11, 2021, a copy of which Mongabay has seen, the NCIP regional office said the issues and concerns regarding the Upper Tabuk dam need to be settled first and “a common and united stance” among affected Indigenous communities must be achieved before the developer’s FPIC application can proceed.

Bula-at says Peckley should back out of the project knowing it has brought, and continues to bring, tension and division to Indigenous groups. “He claims that he is one of us but he does not act like one,” Bula-at says. “Indigenous peoples know that values and preservation of healthy kinship stand above monetary gains.”

Karayan dam: Wine and dine and bribes

A few kilometers from the proposed site of the Upper Tabuk dam, a larger project, estimated to cost 5.18 billion pesos ($104 million), has stalled due to violent opposition. The 52-MW run-of-the-river hydropower project is a venture by the Karayan Hydropower Corporation (KHC), which is, in turn, a joint operation of San Lorenzo Ruiz Builders and Developers Group, Inc., and the Union Energy Corporation.

Known as the Karayan dam, it would be built on the Chico River itself, in the village of Lucog, according to DENR documents obtained by Mongabay. Its 14-million-m3 (3.7-billion-gallon) reservoir would displace five communities. DENR identifies the project as “environmental critical,” meaning it has “high potential significant negative impact.”

The Cordillera region is home to 1.2 million Indigenous peoples. Image by Karlston Lapniten

Like the Upper Tabuk dam, the Karayan dam faced immediate opposition from Indigenous groups for its perceived impact on ancestral domain lands and the environment. It has also caused rifts within the community by “distorting information,” Bula-at says.

“They used the same deceptive tactics they used in gaining support for the Upper Tabuk dam,” he says. “They wined and dined people to manipulate them and sow disunity as a means to divide and conquer.”

Instead of directly talking to affected households, Bula-at says, developer KHC talked to residents whose properties fall outside the proposed project site, promising financial benefits and creating disputes with family members whose own properties lie within the area that would be submerged. Residents speaking to Mongabay on condition of anonymity say KHC gave out cash and gadgets, promising even bigger rewards if they agreed to the dam’s construction.

KHC did not respond to Mongabay’s requests for comment.

Ultimately,  most of the tribe’s voting members gave their consent to the project. In response, Bula-at and 88 other elders and members of affected communities filed another formal objection with the NCIP.

Rice terraces in the Cordillera region. Image by Karlston Lapniten

Since then, tensions have risen in the communities, while engineering surveys and community engagement efforts by non-tribe members have been met with resistance and hostility. (During a visit, this reporter was apparently mistaken for a company representative; residents threw stones and even chased him with a machete.)

Large signs reading “No to Karayan dam” and “Our lands are not for sale” have been painted on the roadside retaining walls and large boulders in the affected areas. In 2017, more than 300 people attended a protest in Tabuk, led by community members, local clergy, and Indigenous organizations like the TMK.

Throughout that year, the Indigenous groups maintained their staunch opposition and disdain for KHC and its employees. Residents showed up at consultation meetings but refused to sign the attendance sheets and disrupted KHC’s efforts to present its materials on the Karayan project.

The tensions dragged on until July 2018, when the NCIP suspended the FPIC process. It justified its decision on findings of technical violations committed by KHC and allegations that the developer had paid some of the community members.

A roadside retaining wall vandalized with anti-dam messages. Image by Karlston Lapniten for Mongabay

Elders and officials from three villages said they met with a group of ostensibly new developers in January 2019 in an attempt to revive the consent process. But their efforts were rebuffed by residents.

On February 2020, a retaining wall along Naneng village was graffitied: “Don’t force me squeeze the trigger of my gun to speak the language of death. No to dam.” Another read, “No trespassing. No to survey. Chapter 45, Verse M16, M14, R4 to M79” — an allusion to the use of firearms. Residents won’t say who was responsible for the graffiti. A few days later, it was covered over in paint and mud.

‘The question is life’

Today’s opposition to the two proposed dams in Kalinga mirrors a similar resistance in the 1970s, when Indigenous communities joined forces to wage a decade-long struggle against the Chico River Basin Development Project (CRBDP).

A pet project of strongman Ferdinand Marcos while the country was under martial law, the CRDBP called for the construction of four massive hydroelectric dams that would have been the largest dam system in Asia at the time. Two of the dams would have been in Mountain Province, and two in Kalinga. The project’s sheer scale would have submerged Indigenous communities in eight towns, impacting around 300,000 people.

When their efforts to secure an audience with officials in Manila failed, the Indigenous groups resorted to civil disobedience, rolling boulders onto the roads to block construction workers and hurling their equipment into the Chico River.

Indigenous women played a particularly significant role in the campaign. In 1974, Bontoc women drove away survey teams in Mountain Province, while in Kalinga the women tore down the workers’ dormitory in Tabuk four times. They used nothing but their bare hands, says Kalinga elder Andres Ngao-i, who was in his teens back then. “It is taboo to hurt women, much more unarmed, in the Kalinga culture,” Ngao-I says. “It was a strategy. If it were men who dismantled the camps, there would have been bloodshed.”

Upriver in the town of Tinglayan, Indigenous women from other communities tore down construction camps twice. They also stripped down to the waist and displayed their tattooed torsos and arms in front of government personnel and armed guards, in an act known as lusay, which is believed to cast bad luck.

Other members of the affected communities took up arms as part of a community militia, while many joined the armed wing of the banned Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People’s Army (NPA).

The Marcos government responded to the opposition by sending in the military and declaring the area a “free-fire zone,” where security forces had carte blanche to shoot perceived “trespassers.” From 1977, cases of human rights abuses and killings racked up.

The assassination in April 1980 of Macli-ing Dulag, an outspoken pangat (village elder) of the Butbut people of Kalinga, by the Philippine Army’s 4th Infantry Division while inside his home tipped the scales in favor of Indigenous groups.

The Heroes’ Monument in Tinglayan, Kalinga, was erected in 2017 to honor local heroes of the anti-Chico Dam struggle and includes Macli-ing Dulag (middle). The monument has been dismantled in January 2021. Image by Erwin Mascariñas

“The question of the dam is more than political,” Dulag said in a prescient interview shortly before his death for a book authored by journalist Ma. Ceres Doyo. “The question is life — our Kalinga life. Apo Kabunian, the Lord of us all, gave us this land. It is sacred, nourished by our sweat. It shall become even more sacred when it is nourished by our blood.”

Just as he foresaw, Dulag’s death magnified the resistance and mobilized various sectors across the wider region. The violent struggle ended in 1986 with the CRDBP being abandoned. The whole experience forced the World Bank, which had financed the project, to revamp its operational guidelines for infrastructure projects that involve Indigenous peoples. It was also key to institutionalizing the FPIC process, which gave Indigenous groups legal control over their ancestral lands.

The World Bank released its revised global policy on Indigenous-affected projects in 1991 to include a wider definition of Indigenous peoples, encompassing those who have close attachments to their ancestral lands, and who are often susceptible to being disadvantaged in the development process.

But the war for control of the Chico River hadn’t ended. The specter of Marcos’s mega-dams resurfaced in 1987, when then-President Corazon Aquino issued an executive order opening up the electricity generation sector to private companies. The latter quickly moved in; today, there are three large hydropower dams operating inside the Cordillera region that includes Kalinga and Mountain Province, and at least five proposed dams.

The Chico river pump irrigation system, the first infrastructure project in the Philippines that is funded by a loan from China, is set to irrigate 8,700 hectares of farmlands. Image by Karlston Lapniten for Mongabay

For Andres Wailan, the Malbong elder and veteran of the campaign against the Marcos-era dams, the current efforts to build support for the new dams rely on tactics that are all too familiar.

He says the process reeks of manipulation and deception, and suggests that the NCIP, which is meant to protect the interests of Indigenous groups, is complicit in it. “There are prescribed processes and guidelines that these proponents need to conform to, but they do not,” he says. “And the government office who are supposed to check these seem to turn a blind eye.”

Danny Bangibang, the Taloctoc tribal elder, says social media is a new battlefront, used by proponents of the dams to sow disinformation and vilify critics. “Proponents pick science and expert opinions that favor them and present them as absolute truths,” he says. “When this fails, they simply resort to made-up information.”

“We [Indigenous peoples] live here before the concept of dams,” Wailan says. “We will decide what we want with our lands and this must be respected. We will keep on fighting to maintain the natural flow of the Chico, unimpeded by any means, just as our forebears had done. We are not afraid; if the river will bleed red like before, then so be it.”

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Featured image: The Chico River is the longest tributary of the Rio Grande de Cagayan, or the Cagayan River, the longest river in the Philippines. Image by Erwin Mascariñas

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A panel exhibit featuring the experiences of Chinese “comfort women” (victims of Japanese wartime sexual slavery), their pursuit of justice and campaigns for redress, toured several Chinese provinces between 2009 and 2012.1 The panels contributed to spreading awareness of wartime sexual violence and the life-long suffering endured by its victims. The content of these exhibitions largely consisted of testimonies delivered by Chinese victims during a series of civil litigations instigated against the Japanese government between the 1990s and 2000s. This paper examines the long-term significance of those court cases in achieving greater recognition for the experience of victims of the comfort women system. I will argue that this significance extends well beyond the nature of the court verdicts, as exemplified by the touring exhibition of 2009-2012, and by subsequent commemorative initiatives.

The issue of reparations for wartime Japanese atrocities was first brought to the attention of a group of visiting Japanese lawyers by a Chinese journalist in 1994. Having been made aware of the issue, on their return to Japan these lawyers set about marshalling the resources needed to bring these cases to court in Japan. To eliminate any financial concerns on the part of former comfort women, the lawyers offered to represent victims pro bono and secured support from civil groups, who provided funding and helped publicize the victims’ travel to Japan to testify.2 With the assistance of Japanese lawyers, scholars, and feminists, surviving Chinese comfort women from Shanxi and Hainan provinces filed four collective lawsuits demanding a formal apology and state reparations. They included: 1) the First Case on Chinese Comfort Women’s Claims for Reparations (Chūgokujin ‘ianfu’ songai baishō seikyū jiken, daiichiji; hereafter, the First Case; submitted to the Tokyo District Court in 1995, requests dismissed by the same court in 2001 and by the Tokyo High Court in 2004, appeals rejected by the Supreme Court in 2007); 2) the Second Case on Chinese Comfort Women’s Claims for Reparations (Chūgokujin ‘ianfu’ songai baishō seikyū jiken, dainiji; hereafter, the Second Case; submitted to the Tokyo District Court in 1996, requests dismissed by the same court in 2002 and by the Tokyo High Court in 2005, appeals rejected by the Supreme Court in 2007); 3) the Case on Claims for Reparations by Victims of Sexual Violence from Shanxi Province (Sanseishō seibōryoku higaisha songai baishō seikyū jiken; hereafter, the Shanxi Case; submitted to the Tokyo District Court in 1998, requests and demands dismissed by the same court in 2003 and by the Tokyo High Court in 2005, appeals rejected by the Supreme Court in 2005); and 4) the Case on Claims for Reparations by Victims of Wartime Sexual Violence from Hainan Province (Hainantō senji seibōryoku higai baishō seikyū jiken; hereafter, the Hainan Case; submitted to the Tokyo District Court in 2001, requests and demands dismissed by the same court in 2006 and by the Tokyo High Court in 2009, appeals to the Supreme Court rejected in 2010).3 The call for justice by and for Chinese victims, as manifested in the lawsuits against the Japanese government, is the focus of the present research.

Eschewing the conventional verdict-centered approach to civil trials involving comfort women, this paper adopts a procedural approach. It examines court transcripts, legal briefs, and other evidentiary documents submitted to the court, materials which have so far remained under-researched, if not wholly unexamined by scholars. This paper first reviews the existing literature on reparation trials involving Chinese victims and points out the problems inherent in hitherto prevalent approaches. What follows is an examination into the testimonies delivered before the court, and an analysis of the narratives manifested in the legal briefs produced on behalf of the victims. This paper argues that the victims and their lawyers managed to turn the courtroom into a site for knowledge transmission and legal recognition. The court hearings thus set a kind of precedent for civil litigations elsewhere involving historical injustices against women. Moreover, the proceedings also carry implications for activists, scholars, and judicial personnel considering how to approach cases involving sexual violence in the courtroom while restoring respect and agency to victims.

Both lawyers and scholars have examined reparation cases involving Chinese former comfort women, but previous studies have tended to highlight either the jurisprudential debates or the historical facts established by the courts. Some of the legal barriers faced by comfort women plaintiffs included, inter alia, statutes of limitations, claims of state immunity, and prior settlement of reparation issues in the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and subsequent bilateral treaties. Lawyers on behalf of the victims tried to clear these jurisprudential hurdles by invoking legal norms regarding war crimes and the gross violation of human rights established in international law, but the Japanese Appellate and Supreme Courts ultimately dismissed such demands and ruled in favor of the Japanese state. The court records offer a rich discussion of legal issues, and the verdicts present a well-organized summary of the arguments from the opposing sides. Going beyond legal matters, activist Tsubokawa Hiroko and lawyer Ōmori Noriko sought to counter the revisionist attempts to whitewash Japan’s record of wartime sexual violence by disseminating the historical facts established by courts in an easily accessible pamphlet targeting the Japanese public.4 Ikeda Eriko, too, in a more recent paper, briefly mentions the judicial recognition of sexual violence inflicted on women in Shanxi province, as well as the different forms of sex crimes perpetrated by the Japanese military during the war.5

Court rulings do matter, since in many cases they unequivocally pronounce right or wrong and vindicate claims to victimhood; however, an overemphasis on final judgments is problematic, since legal systems are rife with gender bias.6 As Deborah Rhode contends, many social institutions, including juridical mechanisms, are fundamentally geared towards male members of society.7 When courts adhere to the articles on reparations concluded in the San-Francisco Peace Treaty and the bilateral settlements without questioning these treaties’ exclusion of women’s voices, this in itself speaks volumes about the prevalence of unconscious (or conscious) legal bias against women. In the context of this male-oriented legal environment, we should therefore value women’s gains in securing legal acknowledgment of their initial victimization and long-term suffering, even while we also consider the significance of these judicial proceedings beyond their eventual verdicts.

This paper therefore challenges the conventional verdict-centered view of the civil litigations, instead highlighting how Chinese victims and their lawyers presented their cases in the courtroom. It primarily scrutinizes the following two constellations of documents: 1) court records, including court transcripts, legal briefs (junbi shomen), and other evidentiary materials submitted to the court by Japanese lawyers on behalf of Chinese plaintiffs; and 2) lawyers’ own memoirs, which shed light on the historical background of the trials.

Testimonies for Knowledge Transmission

Although all four cases put Chinese victims on the witness stand, this section primarily examines the Shanxi Case, due to the availability of court transcripts.8 One may question to what extent the trial practice of the Shanxi Case represents all four cases of reparation trials initiated by Chinese comfort women victims. While I cannot guarantee that the interaction between the victims and judicial personnel during the remaining three trials followed the same pattern, due to the absence of relevant court transcripts, it is highly likely that lawyers for these cases collaborated with one another for two reasons: 1) the legal briefs they prepared exhibited many similarities; and 2) some of the same expert witnesses such as Ishida Yoneko and former Japanese soldiers such as Kondo Hajime were called to testify before the court.9

Court transcripts show that the lawyers caused victims’ voices to be heard, either by calling them to testify before the court or by presenting their testimonies in the form of videotapes or signed statements. Feminist scholars have pointed to the importance of heeding not only the content of testimony but also the silence, reluctance, body language, and other forms of expression manifested in the process of bearing witness.10This section focuses on how the suffering endured by victims was represented and articulated before the court through an examination of court transcripts, which provide rich insights into the way in which testimonies were solicited and delivered.

Scholars have pointed out the difficulty of bearing witness to traumatic experiences such as sexual violence. Legal scholar Nicola Henry, in particular, examines the constraints victims often experience in “bearing witness to wartime rape” in the setting of international war crimes tribunals.11 She argues that trauma and other psychological torment resulting from rape are usually deployed by the defense counsel to attack the credibility of victim testimonies or by the prosecutors to tailor the stories told by victims for prosecutorial purposes. Henry further points out that traumatic syndromes resulting from rape are considered factors militating against their trustworthiness, whereas lack of psychological disorders in the immediate aftermath of the sexual assault itself is deployed to deny the authenticity of the victim status.12In this sense, it is often impossible for victims of sexual violence to effectively bear witness in war crimes trials: they are often reduced to the status either of persons “without […] agency” or of ill-intentioned liars.13

Civil settings create new possibilities, albeit not without challenges. As Nikki Godden-Rasul has pointed out in a different context, civil courts play a crucial role in measuring and comprehending the profound impact of sexual violence upon women.14 Rather than criminal courts that center upon substantiating crimes and determining an individual defendant’s liability, civil trials place weight on financial and mental harm imposed upon victims and account for the diversity of afflictions resulting from sexual violence.15Judith Herman, on the other hand, contends that victims of sexual and domestic violence are generally unsatisfied with either civil or criminal legal proceedings, the adversarial format of which tends to marginalize victims and overlook their pain.16 Therefore, even in civil settings, the way legal personnel interact with victims generally affects their satisfaction with the judicial process.

The reparation trials involving Chinese comfort women granted victims a chance to develop their own narratives in a public legal forum. As I discuss further below, trauma remains raw and deep-seated social mechanisms that perpetuated violence against women as well as individual women’s agony and hardship found expression in the court proceedings. Kang Jian, a Chinese lawyer who engaged in evidence collection and attended some of the court hearings, recalls that lawyers acting on behalf of the Japanese state usually summarized their jurisprudential opinion in the legal briefs, without really voicing their opinions regarding the reliability and credibility of testimonies delivered by victims before the court.17This observation is corroborated by the court transcripts of victim testimonies, where the process of cross-examination is almost entirely absent. Whatever the reason for the defending lawyers’ reluctance to cross-examine the former Chinese comfort women, their silence in court nevertheless meant that victims’ narratives were not truncated, nor was the truthfulness of their testimonies challenged over inconsistencies and lapses in memory. Nor were aspersions cast upon the victims’ credibility, in part because their lawyers substantiated their oral testimony with corroborating evidence.

Chinese and Malayan girls forcibly taken from Penang by the Japanese to work as ‘comfort girls’ for the troops (Public Domain)

In contrast to international war crimes proceedings that focus on defendants and sex crimes per se,18 the reparation trials gave agency to victims and stressed the far-reaching harm brought about by sexual violence. The testimony they offered invariably featured description of both sex crimes and the suffering that these women experienced. After delivering their testimony, the witnesses were requested by their lawyers to state their demands of the Japanese government, and their answers provide insight into their motivation in bearing witness.

My examination of these testimonies draws on performance scholar Elizabeth W. Son’s analysis of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (Women’s Tribunal) and literary scholar Shoshana Felman’s analysis of the legal proceedings of the Eichmann Trial in 1961. Son examines the performance of testimonies and scars at the Women’s Tribunal, a people’s court organized by grassroots activists and convened in Tokyo in 2000, arguing that the Tribunal functioned as “a site of knowledge production and community formation.”19 Through a detailed account of witnesses’ gestures, Son points to the tension between: 1) legal protocols of oath-taking and victim-survivors’ desire to bear witness in their own ways; 2) the prosecution counsel’s focus on criminal behavior and victim-survivors’ need to circumvent details of violation against their bodies and to exert ownership over their stories; and 3) juridical emphasis on vocal testimony and the impossibility of articulating trauma—as well as victim-survivors’ body gestures as expressions of pain. Son contends that the proceedings of the Women’s Tribunal ushered in “[a] process-oriented conception of justice.”20 Borrowing Son’s proceedings-focused analytical framework, in this section I delve into the way judicial personnel interacted with victims as well as victims’ own representations of their suffering.

My analysis of the testimony is also inspired by Felman’s analysis of the Eichmann Trial which she describes as “historiographically conservative, but jurisprudentially revolutionary.”21 It was “historiographically conservative” in the sense that the trial situated itself within the historical context of discrimination against and persecution of Jews, stopping short of stressing the unprecedented scale of atrocities inflicted upon Jews during the Nazi genocide.22 On the other hand, Felman also points out that by centering on the victims and their voices, the Eichmann Trial was “jurisprudentially revolutionary,” since it produced a history of the Holocaust based on victims’ testimonies before the court.23 Although the Eichmann Trial was a criminal tribunal rather than a civil case, the significant common ground between the two proceedings makes the borrowing of Felman’s framework a rational choice here. Firstly, both cases “put history on trial”.24 The Eichmann Trial not only adjudicated the defendant’s individual liability but also deliberated on the historical oppression of Jews.25 In the different legal and social context of the Asia-Pacific region, victims and their lawyers in the reparation trials focused on the responsibility of the Japanese government for the systematic enslavement of women; as a result, the court proceedings also heard lawyers’ presentations of the pertinent historical background. Secondly, both proceedings gave victims a voice. Felman’s research highlights that unlike previous criminal proceedings that focused on convicting defendants, the Eichmann trial focused on victims, enabling them to articulate their agonizing experiences and to form a collective “political and moral identity.”26 In the same vein, the comfort women trials also foregrounded the testimonies delivered by victims and acknowledged their continued suffering. Owing to these similarities, the following analysis is indebted to Felman’s insights.

Felman points out that unlike the legal verdicts of the Eichmann Trial that “distance” history, the victims’ testimonies brought historical events into the courtroom.27 Similarly, by calling victims to testify before the court, the court hearings of the comfort women trials also functioned to “transmit”—to borrow Felman’s words again—historical events into the present through the medium of narratives and the presence of witnesses.28 The following examination of the testimonies is based on this idea of “transmission.”29 I separate this concept of transmission into two categories: 1) the communication of knowledge through clear, verbal articulation; and 2) the attempted expression of the incomprehensible through unconscious physical exhibition and presence, as well as the less articulate use of language. The first aspect concerns the lawyers’ representation and victims’ (as well as their daughters’) testimonies with regard to the complex pain and intergenerational trauma caused by the comfort women system. The testimony offered by victims on their pre-war plight and wartime victimization was generally quite clear. However, this testimonial clarity stands in contrast to some of the less readily comprehensible aspects of the physical and narrative representations of sex crimes and the demands aimed at the Japanese government, which will be examined from the second perspective.

In the Shanxi Case, the longest victim testimony was delivered by Wan Aihua, who was forced into sexual slavery three separate times between 1942 and 1943. She also endured torture under captivity due to her political affiliation. In her testimony, responding to Kawaguchi Kazuko, a lawyer for the plaintiffs, Wan narrated her involvement in the CCP-led resistance, her arrest and confinement by the Japanese military, her experience of sexual assault and torture, her escape and survival, and her subsequent ostracization by her family, among other aspects of her life. Wan’s narrative was especially detailed, possibly for two reasons. First, she was coerced into sexual enslavement three times. Second, she had prior experience of giving testimony in public. Due to the level of detail of the court record relating to Wan’s experience and the commonality manifested in the representation of testimony from other witnesses, the following analysis focuses primarily on Wan’s testimony. As the victims gave testimony to their suffering in the form of answers to lawyers’ questions, we should be aware that these questions to a certain extent determined which parts of the victims’ stories were heard in court and which were omitted.

Transmission of Conscious Knowledge: Intersectionality of Pain and intergenerational Trauma

The questions and answers exhibited in the court transcripts demonstrate the lawyers’ attempt to have the “intersectionality” of victims’ suffering recognized by the court. Coined by feminist scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in her analysis of black women’s plight, the term intersectionality has been employed to mean that gender discrimination, racial injustice, and class exploitation, among other forms of contextual and structural inequalities, intertwine to cause women’s oppression.30 Although the lawyers did not reference the term directly in their legal briefs, the way they solicited testimonies illustrates their desire to add nuance to judicial understanding of the suffering of comfort women. In the case of Wan Aihua, for example, instead of directly asking about her victimization from sexual violence, Kawaguchi Kazuko solicited testimony concerning her life prior to the Sino-Japanese War. In her response to these questions, Wan revealed her experience of being sold as a child bride due to abject poverty and being forced into sexual intercourse with her future husband. Later in her testimony, after recalling her first escape from the cave where she was kept in captivity for interrogation and sexual abuse, Wan mentioned that she was no longer welcomed back by the family into which she was sold as a child bride.31 The narrative that unfolds in Wan’s story therefore points to the multivalence of her life-long hardship and sexual abuse. Prior to the War of Resistance, she was sold as an object by her parents. When she was seen as having lost her “chastity” to foreign abusers, she was devalued in terms of the patriarchal norms of Chinese society, and cast aside by her first husband.

Patriarchal culture and Japanese sex crimes, however, were not the only elements put forward as causes of comfort women’s victimization. Yin Yulin, another victim of the comfort women system, testified that she had also been abused—though not sexually—by a Chinese collaborator.32 Through these testimonies, Chinese complicity in the operation of the comfort women system also came to light. In fact, historians such as Ishida Yoneko have made clear in their research based on interviews with comfort women victims in Shanxi Province that the villages, as patriarchal entities, were complicit in sustaining the comfort women system. Ishida and others point out that heads of villages proffered women to Japanese occupiers in response to the latter’s demands and selected as comfort women those eking out a living on the margins of society.33

In this sense, various factors intersected in subjecting comfort women to military sexual violence and social prejudice. They include: 1) Japanese sex crimes inflicted directly upon their bodies; 2) patriarchy manifested in the decision of village heads to sacrifice some marginalized women for the preservation of the village as a whole; 3) poverty that shunted some women to the margins of local community; 4) expulsion or ostracism that resulted from the loss of so-called chastity; and 5) local collaboration that further exacerbated women’s pain. Albeit in a different context, anthropologist Sarah Soh argues in the same light that imperialism, colonialism, racism, sexism, patriarchy, economic hardship, and the issue of Korean complicity all interacted and overlapped, contributing to these women’s plight both prior to their sexual abuse and subsequently.34 By unveiling the manifold acts of violence and discrimination against Chinese victims, lawyers sought not only to add weight to the portrayal of the hostile environment engendered by Japan’s occupation and the harm incurred due to military sexual violence in patriarchal societies, but also to facilitate a comprehensive juridical understanding of victims’ physical and psychological pain.

This multivalent victimization was not frozen in the timeframe of the war, but continued to haunt victims and their family members, as much of the testimony emphasized. In addition to former comfort women themselves, the lawyers also called on daughters or foster-daughters of victims, expert witnesses, and male villagers who had experienced Japan’s occupation first-hand to testify to the sex crimes and their long-term impact. Daughters were typically called to give testimony on behalf of their deceased mothers; Zhang Fenxiang, a daughter of former comfort woman Hou Qiaolian, was called to bear witness to her mother’s post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from the latter’s sexual enslavement. She related the sudden flashbacks her mother experienced while watching movies featuring war and her other daily difficulties resulting from PTSD. It is noteworthy that Zhang also described scenes in which her mother beat her up for no reason and regretted her violent behavior after regaining her composure. Engulfed by this threat of violence during childhood, Zhang herself had developed various psychological conditions as a result and relied on sedative drugs and painkillers for headaches.35

Zhang’s story showcases the intergenerational suffering brought about by the comfort women system. The trauma became “contagious” as it was transmitted to immediate family members, exposing them to violence from the traumatized original victims.36 Zhang’s testimony highlighted the phenomenon of PTSD and its profound impact on former comfort women’s immediate family members. In this sense, for comfort women victims and their families, as Kathleen Daly has pointed out in a different context, “victimization is a process.”37 It does not wane with the passage of time; rather, it ruthlessly defies both victims’ humanity and their familial bonds over time. At the end of Zhang’s testimony, she also claimed that although her mother had died, she was determined to carry on the struggle for justice on her behalf. The children of some victims thus “inherit” the justice-seeking enterprise from their mothers.38 The episode suggested to the court that intergenerational suffering had transformed into intergenerational determination for the pursuit of justice.39

These testimonies on the intersectionality of pain and intergenerational suffering therefore broadened the meaning of the courtroom by turning it into a space where witnesses and lawyers collaborated to explain the extent of the suffering experienced and seek recognition for the victims. But in addition to such efforts to articulate and explain pain, the court also witnessed the presentation of somewhat muddled narratives, some of which at times contradicted the logic of the law.

Transmission of the Unconscious and Incomprehensible: Verbal Articulation, Physical Exhibition, and Presence

Aside from descriptions of multilayered violence, the representation of sex crimes also deserves attention. It demonstrated to the court not only the difficulties of narrating the details of sexual violence but also the importance of respecting victims’ own representation of the crimes. When asking questions related to sex crimes, instead of using explicit words such as rape or sexual slavery, Kawaguchi employed the phrase “victimization of women (josei toshite no higai).”40 Not shying away from direct articulation of rape, Wan responded that she was abused and raped by Japanese soldiers when under captivity. Regardless of Wan’s use of the term “rape,” she never explained in detail how exactly she was sexually abused, in stark contrast to her detailed answers describing other forms of torture inflicted upon her by the Japanese soldiers. Kawaguchi did not ask follow up questions on Wan’s sexual abuse, unlike prosecutors in criminal trials who tend to insist on soliciting a description of vaginal penetration.41

This episode clearly reflects the lawyer’s understanding of many women’s desire to circumvent detailed description of sex crimes and even the term rape itself. Other lawyers on behalf of plaintiffs did directly employ the word rape, but none of them pushed victims for detailed descriptions of the violation of their sexual and physical integrity. Wan also had reason to describe her torture in great detail, since she attributed her smaller stature to the bone fractures that resulted from torture. Whatever the exact reasons for the lawyers’ word choices or for the victims’ attempts to circumvent details of rape, the fact that the lawyers refrained from pressing for graphic descriptions of forcible penetration restored to comfort women victims a sense of control and authority over their own narratives.

Comfort women caught and interrogated by the US army in Myitkyina (August 14, 1944) (Public Domain)

Besides verbal expressions, Wan also used her body to communicate particular points. She sought to express pain and trauma through her physical gestures. The gestures she made to illustrate how she was abused were clarified by her lawyer’s questions, for example, “Does this posture mean that you were suspended from the tree, rather than tied to it?” This physical gesturing demonstrated Wan’s fervent desire to convey exactly how she was tortured. She tried to bring attention back to her body in her final remarks to the court when talking about Japanese atrocities in China, saying, “please take a look at my body. I do not have pubic hair [as a result of Japanese sexual torture and interrogation], and I am already dispossessed of a female body.”42 For Wan, it seemed, certain body features, such as pubic hair, were closely associated with the essence of feminine physical attributes, the loss and deformation of which deprived her of the very sense of being a woman.

Furthermore, the directing of attention to her body exemplified Wan’s wish to emphasize the life-long consequences of the physical violence she suffered. By reenacting the scene of torture and by calling attention to her own injured body, Wan used her altered physical frame as evidence of the violence inflicted upon her and enabled the audience to experience her physical pain vicariously. Although direction of audience attention to violated bodies is not evident in the court transcripts of other victims in the Shanxi Case, the physical presence of the victims speaks to the court of the pain inflicted and the long-term consequence of the sex crimes.43 This exhibition constitutes what Felman calls the “physical legal dimension” of the court, in which the injured bodies before the court carried “jurisprudential speaking power.”44 In this sense, the comfort women system “returned as a ghost or as an incarnated, living present” in the very bodies of the victims.45 In a different but relevant context, Elizabeth Son examines victims’ physical representation of their suffering before the Women’s Tribunal, arguing that oral testimony alone falls short of comprehensively representing the “physical imprint of the trauma on her body.”46Borrowing Son’s words and insights on the analysis of the victims and their physical presentation of wounds before the Women’s Tribunal, I contend that by displaying the way she was tortured together with her shortened body stature, Wan, as well as other comfort women victims, also “assigned her body new meanings and repositioned herself as a survivor” during the reparation lawsuits.47 In this sense, they transmitted their experience of pain to the court through their physical exhibition and presence.

Wan’s burning desire to represent herself was also manifested in a number of verbal outbursts. On several occasions, she disrupted court proceedings and demanded an apology and fair judgment. The first such interjection came in response to Kawaguchi who inquired how Wan fled the comfort station for the second time and whether either of her families came to her rescue. She answered that she somehow escaped by herself; unlike other victims, she had no one to rely on. Then, in the following sentences, she suddenly turned to address the judges directly:

I want to reveal the sufferings inflicted upon me. I also wish to obtain an [official] acknowledgment of the crimes committed by the Japanese military. I sincerely hope that the court helps us, not just me but also other grandmothers who endured these crimes. My whole family would sincerely appreciate a ruling in our favor.48

Wan’s words demonstrate her desire for the court to uphold justice both for herself and for other victims. Kawaguchi waited until Wan finished and then brought the conversation back to her inquiry into the circumstances surrounding Wan’s return to her village.

In answer to Kawaguchi’s question regarding the murder of the village head at the hands of the Japanese military, Wan commented that it was beyond her comprehension that Japanese soldiers perpetrated wanton killing and torture in China. Once again, she went beyond the line of questioning:

I no longer have a human shape; therefore, I am not filing this lawsuit for myself, but for many other victims: victims of rape, deceased victims… I wanted to settle these old scores (urami o harashitai). Although more than five decades have passed since the incidents, I have been living with anger and resentment since then. I feel lucky that I have this chance to meet with [you] good judges. I could not be happier if these scores were to be settled. I would be really grateful if these old debts could be paid.49

We see Wan reiterate her desire to gain justice for all victims of war crimes. Also notable in this short plea is Wan’s repeated use of the phrase “settling old scores (urami o harasu),” which demonstrates the extent to which she was burdened with the unresolved feelings of exasperation and injustice.

After Wan’s speech, Kawaguchi directed her back to the testimony of the sex crimes and asked Wan about her physical condition after the withdrawal of the Japanese military. Wan first responded to Kawaguchi about her poor heath and then for a third time, she made a direct request to the court. She restated her desire for justice and for a settling of old scores. In the ensuing exchange, in an attempt to present to the court the difficulty in bearing witness, Kawaguchi asked Wan about her previous experience of delivering testimony. Instead of answering this question, however, Wan, for a fourth time, disrupted the legal proceedings, remarking that although some of her memory might be fuzzy, she was telling the truth out of her sense of conscience. She continued, saying she trusted that the judges would uphold justice and called for a just court ruling. In her final remarks, once again, she expressed her wish to “settle old scores” and highlighted her need and that of other victims for recognition, apology, and justice. She also stressed that there would have been no place for her to speak about her suffering or to initiate litigations, if she had not been able to meet with Japanese judges.50

The verbal reiterations and disruptions cogently transmitted to the court the victim’s motivation to bear witness through linguistic repetitions. Wan’s repeated statement that she was testifying not only for herself but also on behalf of other victims displays her sense of moral obligation to others. As some scholars have pointed out in a different context, “fulfilling a moral duty”—to reveal atrocities, to curb their recurrence, and to pay homage to the wronged—is an important factor in motivating people to bear witness to mass atrocities.51 Wan’s motivation to perform this moral obligation can be corroborated by Kawaguchi’s statement tendered to the court. Kawaguchi mentioned that during a rehearsal session in preparation for the court hearing, Wan lost her temper, asking, “how many times do you have to ask the same question? Is it not true that I have already answered that question?”52 Kawaguchi speculates that Wan considered herself as a representative of comfort women victims and regarded bearing testimony as her “duty (Jpn. shimei; Chn. renwu);” otherwise, she might have avoided speaking about these experiences.53 On the other hand, Stepakoff et al. hold that people articulate traumatic experiences to obtain recognition of the crimes committed against them and the long-term pain they experience in order to ameliorate their psychological suffering.54

Indeed, regardless of individual differences in the details of victimization and family background, many victims expressed similar desires. They mentioned their wishes to convey their suffering to the Japanese government, settle old scores, obtain official acknowledgment, secure an apology and reparations, have their reputations restored, and resolve the comfort women issue before their deaths.55 In the case of Wan, apart from her strong sense of responsibility, her repeated use of the term “settling old scores” indicates her pent-up indignation towards individual perpetrators and the Japanese government. During the court proceedings, although Kawaguchi always directed the testimony back to her questions, neither the lawyers nor judges disrupted Wan’s narrative or dismissed it as irrelevant. In this sense, the lawyers turned the courtroom into a relatively safe space, where victims transmitted their knowledge and experience to the court while attempting to exert control over their stories.

Through the process of delivering testimony, lawyers and victims together transcended the meaning of the courtroom and carved out a space in which victims (and at times their close family members) could attempt to explain to the court the intersectionality of suffering and intergenerational pain brought about by the comfort women system. As a group of victims who are usually denied their voices in history and their agency in memory, what they demanded first and foremost was recognition. This was also demonstrated in the legal briefs the lawyers submitted to the court on behalf of victims.

Legal Briefs for Recognition

Since many legal briefs submitted during the court proceedings focus on jurisprudential issues such as statutes of limitations and state immunity, this section primarily examines the final legal briefs (saishū junbi shomen) tendered to the court at the last phase of each case, except for the First Case, the court records of which are unavailable. Albeit different from one another in the actual layout, these final legal briefs were usually composed of the following sections: 1) the historical background of Japan’s war with China as well as the comfort women system based on academic works; 2) victims’ wartime and postwar suffering collected from testimonies and supplemented by scholarly papers; and 3) jurisprudential debates. The bulk of most final legal briefs was devoted to legal claims, but much ink is also spilled on historical background and women’s physical and psychological suffering.

Efforts for Legal Recognition

From the Second Case onwards, all the comfort women reparation trials involving Chinese victims stressed the importance of courts’ recognition of both historical facts and victims’ suffering. This specific emphasis resonates with lawyer Ōmori Noriko’s comment in her memoir on the court ruling on the First Case. Although realizing how difficult it would be to win the case, the lawyers endeavored to at least have the court vindicate the testimony of the comfort women victims.56 To their disappointment, however, the Tokyo District Court not only adjudicated in favor of the Japanese government but also failed to acknowledge the sexual violence inflicted upon victims.57 Probably in an attempt to prevent a repetition of what they considered legal negligence, in their final legal brief for the Second Case, lawyers vehemently denounced the “abnormality (ijōsei)” of the judgment rendered by the Tokyo District Court in the First Case.58 They pointed out that the court’s failure to acknowledge the victims’ pain and its relationship with Japan’s war of aggression revealed its “stance of sheer collaboration (zenmen teki na kyōryoku shisei)” with the Japanese government, whose legal representatives always skirted historical points raised by the claimants, instead focusing entirely on jurisprudential issues.59 The lawyers for the victims therefore strongly urged the court to act in its own right, rather than out of political considerations.60 They also requested that the court contextualize the sex crimes perpetrated under the auspices of the comfort women system.61 Only by situating the sexual violence imposed upon victims in the larger social context of the war, they explained, would it be possible to comprehensively fathom the affected women’s pain.62

However, recognizing the historical facts surrounding the war and comfort women system itself was still insufficient, the lawyers argued, since the judges also needed to acknowledge victims’ suffering. In particular, the lawyers for the victims in the Hainan Case viewed acknowledgment of the facts surrounding their clients’ victimhood as the fundamental responsibility of the judges and called on them to “face up to the facts (jijitsu o chokushi-suru)” based on the evidence submitted in court.63 They further argued that one of the most important reasons why victims decided to initiate lawsuits was their desire for the court to validate their claims to victimhood.64

How did the lawyers strive to achieve this goal of legal recognition? To begin with, they attempted to arouse the empathy of the judges by appealing to their humanity and by connecting the wartime sexual slavery system to contemporary sex crimes. During the Hainan Case, the lawyers associated legal recognition of historical facts and suffering pertaining to the comfort women system with the judges’ “sensitivity as human beings (hito toshite no kansei).”65 Moreover, they sought to place the comfort women issue in the context of international and domestic violations of women’s human rights. For example, the lawyers for the Second Case pointed out that contemporary armed conflicts such as those in Rwanda and Yugoslavia also witnessed large-scale sexual violence against women. To eradicate sex crimes as such, they claimed, it was indispensable for the aggressors to offer official apologies and reparations, and to punish perpetrators.66 Turning attention closer to home, the lawyers in this same legal brief reminded the court of the rape incident that occurred in Okinawa in 1995 in which a twelve-year-old schoolgirl was raped by three U.S. soldiers, and the fury this sparked among the Japanese populace.67 To stimulate the judges’ empathy, the lawyers asked them to imagine how they might feel should such sexual violence be perpetrated against “our own daughters (wareware no musume).”68

The lawyers’ intention to induce empathy in the judges is evident from the account in lawyer Ōmori Noriko’s memoir. Ōmori reveals that the lawyers deemed it their duty to “soften the heart (kokoro o yawarakakushi)” of the judges and to stimulate their imaginations.69 In fact, this also explains why the lawyers went to such great lengths to bring Chinese comfort women victims to Japan to bear witness.70With written documents alone, they assumed, it might be difficult for judges to understand properly the agony that victims endured, since the plaintiffs were non-Japanese and the crimes took place decades ago.71 Both the testimonies and the legal briefs were thus designed to arouse empathetic feelings among the judicial personnel (as well as all those present at the court), to gain legal recognition of what the comfort women victims endured.

Importance of Recognition

Why did recognition matter, particularly for Chinese comfort women? Chinese victims had been excised from historical accounts and collective memory for too long, and it was thus necessary to carve out a space for recognition by producing an authentic record of both women’s direct suffering under the comfort women system and their hardship over the following decades. The “heroic narratives” formed in the aftermath of the war feature grandiose and mythic stories of suffering, sacrifice, and resistance, leaving no space for alternative wartime experiences.72 Meanwhile, given the limits on articulation imposed by the post-war social and cultural milieu—what historian Carol Gluck calls the “effability factor”—many victim-survivors of sexual violence chose to remain silent about the crimes inflicted upon them.73 In fact, as Ishida has pointed out, regardless of the dearth of records on the experiences of victims of sex crimes as a whole, those who were raped to death or rape-murdered fared slightly better in the official historical documents than victim-survivors.74 The former very occasionally figure in the local chronicle in name whereas the latter almost always appear in abstract, vague numbers, such as “countless.”75 Historian Louise Edwards argues that the discrimination against victim-survivors of sexual violence has some bearing on the lienü, or “chaste female martyrs” phenomenon, under which women were expected to prioritize chastity over everything else, including their lives.76 In her study of anti-Japanese propaganda cartoons produced during wartime China, Edwards points out that the fate that befell rape victims in wartime propaganda was almost always death, with the reproductive system portrayed as damaged and genitals depicted as penetrated by weapons after rape, so that the values of so-called chastity could be upheld and the apprehension of pregnancy resulting from rape could be erased.77

Victim-survivors of sexual violence, in this sense, were considered not only to be tarnished women due to their loss of chastity but also to bring shame to their families and villages, embodying men’s failure to guarantee the safety of “their” women.78 Therefore, the comfort women victims, who survived the ordeal in Japanese military comfort stations, became the target of censure, due to both their forced sexual intercourse with Japanese soldiers and their survival. This also in part explains the reason why the comfort women system was largely disregarded in the postwar Class B/C war crimes trials carried out by Nationalist and Communist Chinese, among other authorities.79 As a disgrace to their villages, their suffering was erased from local history, not to mention national historical narratives. Together with a place in history, they were denied agency in memory as well.

Although the history of Chinese comfort women has entered into the memory of the Chinese populace, it has been entangled with nationalistic rhetoric. Historian Song Shaopeng, for example, argues that the media has framed the comfort women issue within a nationalistic framework.80 She notes that in the early 1990s, when the comfort women issue first surfaced, it was represented as a diplomatic dispute between Japan and its neighboring countries, South Korea in particular; as a result, the lawsuits instigated by the Chinese victims during this period did not attract much media attention. Later, with the transformation of the political landscape in East Asia, the issue came to be portrayed as a symbol of national suffering, and the Hainan Case later in the 2000s received limited coverage in the media.81 She further maintains that rather than dissecting the multivalent violence inflicted upon the victims, the Chinese media has continued to appropriate their stories for the purpose of adding more weight to the collective suffering of the Chinese at the hands of the Japanese during the War of Resistance.82 Resonating with Song’s argument, Edward Vickers maintains that the representation of comfort women in official Chinese narratives dichotomizes Japanese perpetrators and Chinese victims, without attention to Chinese complicity in women’s suffering or the larger social context of sex trafficking.83

Although the comfort women lost their lawsuits, nevertheless, together with their lawyers, they carved out an official, legal discursive space for a comprehensive representation of their suffering.84 The court verdicts on all cases involving Chinese comfort women, except for the First Case at the Tokyo District Court, recognized as facts the sex crimes and torture inflicted upon victims, as well as their subsequent life-long physical and psychological suffering (including PTSD). Although the courts ultimately denied victims’ requests for an apology and reparations, this recognition itself held considerable significance. In a different context, Clare McGlynn and Nicole Westmarland point out that victim-survivors of sexual violence consider “recognition as justice.”85 In the case of comfort women, for those who fell victim to Japanese sexual violence and social ostracization, among other forms of multilayered violence, recognition of Japanese military sexual slavery and vindication of their claims to victimhood matter tremendously. Official acknowledgment sends out a message to victim-survivors and society as a whole that rather than shameful women to be disdained, comfort women are wronged victims who deserve respect and recognition at the very least. From a broader social perspective, as Judith Butler has argued, recognition is indispensable for all individual human beings.86 She further maintains that the act of granting and seeking recognition transforms who people are, since the interaction involved in this process places them in a living relationship with one another.87 The lawsuits instigated by comfort women with the help of Japanese lawyers, while failing to secure the desired verdicts due to legal technicalities (i.e. international treaties and statutes of limitations), nonetheless succeeded in so far as they secured legal recognition positioning the state as wrongdoer in relation to victims.

Beyond the courtroom, the knowledge of victims’ suffering also transmitted to a larger audience. The touring exhibitions mentioned at the outset of this paper reached approximately 180,000 visitors in total.88While it is impossible to gauge the overall impact of the exhibits on attendees, the research conducted by Chinese scholar Qu Yajun provides a glimpse into the public response in Shaanxi province.89 Focusing specifically on the messages left at the exhibition site of Shaanxi Normal University, Qu points out that the responses—mostly from students—featured three themes: 1) the importance of peace, as women almost always fall victim to wartime sexual violence; 2) a profound understanding of victims’ suffering, as a result of both wartime sexual enslavement and postwar social prejudice and ostracization; and 3) self-reflexivity on the rise of Chinese nationalism, upon realizing Japanese activists’ and scholars’ unflagging commitment to the resolution of the comfort women issue.90 Turning attention to Japan, Chinese victims’ testimonies and pursuit of justice in the reparation litigations also in part formed a special exhibition temporarily housed at the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) in Tokyo between 2008 and 2009. In this sense, the transmission of knowledge regarding victims’ suffering and their yearning for justice transcends the physical space of the courtroom, reaching a wider audience and exerting a long-lasting influence on the commemoration of comfort women.

Conclusion

Through a close reading of the court records, including the court transcripts and legal briefs, both of which have been understudied thus far, this paper shows how the comfort women victims and their lawyers broadened the meaning of the reparation trials by turning the courtroom into a space for transmitting knowledge and gaining recognition. Although their efforts were frustrated in the sense that the Japanese courts never ruled in favor of the Chinese plaintiffs, the trials nevertheless bore witness to the victims’ pursuit of justice. The court transcripts demonstrate that the victims obtained the opportunity to transmit their experience to the judicial personnel and all those in the courtroom, through their formal testimony as well as through physical display, without being interrupted or denied by defense lawyers or by other judicial personnel. Moreover, though aware of the difficulties involved in winning the cases, the lawyers spared no effort in seeking the courts’ recognition of the brutality of the comfort women system and the women’s victimhood.91 This paper therefore also demonstrates that for a better understanding of civil trials involving sexual violence and historical injustice, it is essential to go beyond an examination of final verdicts. The proceedings of the reparation trials also carry implications for other civil litigations elsewhere adjudicating sexual violence, in a world fraught with sexual and gender-based historical injustice and ongoing sexual violence in armed conflict.

These trials were nonetheless far from unproblematic. In her research on human responses to large-scale atrocities, Martha Minow surveys a range of trials, truth commissions, reparations, and apologies, and argues that none of these are sufficient to cure the wounds and to mend the wrongs suffered.92 This argument rings true for these reparation trials, which only witnessed the representation of a limited number of victims with similar experiences. In fact, victims featured in all four lawsuits came from just two major provinces—Shanxi and Hainan—and were selected by lawyers on the grounds that their narratives were independently verifiable.93 Those (far more numerous) who had endured in isolation or silence had no opportunity to enjoy their day in court. This selectivity has some relevance to the legal structure of the trials, since unverifiable claims do not constitute admissible evidence. As lawyer Barbara Freg has pointed out in an interview with James Dawes, trials are ultimately designed “for a certain type of justice for certain selected victims.”94 Therefore, to uphold justice for all comfort women victims, it is also vital to direct attention to those whose stories are excluded from the lawsuits. Regardless, the reparation trials still carry tremendous significance for the victims and their families, for future litigations, and as a form of public history—as demonstrated by the use made of the testimony in subsequent public exhibitions. They exemplify a defiance of persistent taboos surrounding the verbal articulation and physical representation of sexual violence that hold lessons for future responses to such atrocities.

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Xiaoyang Hao was awarded her doctorate in 2020 by Kyushu University’s Faculty of Integrated Science for Global Society. Her thesis is entitled From Legal Derivatives to Legal Subjects: Adjudicating Sex Crimes from the Sino-Japanese War.

Notes

1 Edward Vickers, “Commemorating ‘Comfort Women’ beyond Korea: The Chinese Case,” in Remembering World War Two Across Asia, ed. Mark Frost, Daniel Schumacher, and Edward Vickers (London: Routledge, 2019), 174-207. As a euphemism, the phrase “comfort women” should be enclosed in quotation marks, but for the sake of convenience, they will be omitted hereafter.

2 Chūgokujin sensō higai baishō seikyū jiken bengodan, ed., Sajō no shōheki: Chūgokujin sengo baishō saiban 10-nen no kiseki (Tokyo: Nihon Hyōronsha, 2005), 280.

3 See WAM, Aruhi, Nihongun ga yattekita: Chūgoku senjō de no gōkan to ianjo (Tokyo: Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace, 2008 [2015]), 48.

4 Tsubokawa Hiroko and Ōmori Noriko, Shihō ga nintei shita Nihongun “ianfu”: Higai, kagai jijitsu ha kesenai! (Tokyo: Kamogawa Booklet, 2011).

5 Ikeda Eriko, “Coercion, Sexual Violence, and Rape Centers in Yu County, Shanxi Province,” in Denying the Comfort Women: The Japanese State’s Assault on Historical Truth, ed. Nishino Rumiko, Kim Puja, and Onozawa Akane (London & New York: Routledge, 2018), 64-69.

6 Ann J. Cahill, Rethinking Rape (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 33-34.

7 Deborah L. Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 1989), 252-53. For a detailed discussion on the gendered nature of legal institutions, see Cahill, Rethinking Rape.

8 I turned to the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) for archival research, which only holds the court transcripts of the Shanxi Case and legal briefs of the Second, Shanxi, and Hainan Cases, in part due to the lawyers’ reluctance to share certain records with the WAM and the larger public for the sake of their clients’ privacy.

9 Ōmori Noriko, Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte: Chūgokujin “ianfu” higaisha totomoni (Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppansha, 2008), 38, 99-101, 115.

10 See, for example, Maki Kimura, Unfolding the “Comfort Women” Debates: Modernity, Voices, Women’s Voices(London & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016), 156-61. Another significant factor is that the testimonies were given before the court through the medium of interpreters, who facilitated communication between victims who spoke in the Shanxi dialect of Chinese and the lawyers who spoke in Japanese. While I acknowledge the importance of delving into non-verbal aspects of testimonies and the possibility of certain linguistic elements being omitted in the process of translation, the unavailability of audiovisual records of court proceedings renders it impossible to conduct research on that front.

11 Nicola Henry, “The Impossibility of Bearing Witness: Wartime Rape and the Promise of Justice,” Violence Against Women 16, no. 10 (2010): 1098.

12 Ibid., 1098-1119.

13 Ibid., 1111. Indeed, testimonies can be extremely touching and empowering, as exhibited in literature and mass media. However, without an effective mechanism ensuring victims’ ownership over their own narratives, testimonies tend to be truncated for prosecutorial purposes in court. After all, both sides—defense lawyers and state prosecutors—try to win the cases and tend to employ testimonies as primary sources to bear out their arguments and build their cases.

14 Nikki Godden-Rasul, “Retribution, Redress and the Harms of Rape,” in Rape Justice: Beyond the Criminal Law, ed. Anastasia Powell, Nicola Henry, Asher Flynn (London and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 112-26.

15 Ibid.

16 Judith Lewis Herman, “Justice from the Victim’s Perspective,” Violence Against Women 11, no. 5 (2005): 581-84.

17 Kang Jian, Suopei: Qinli Zhongguo “weianfu” ji bei qianglu furi laogong susong (Beijing: Beijing ribao chubanshe, 2015).

18 Henry, “The Impossibility of Bearing Witness.”; Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998).

19 Elizabeth W. Son, Embodied Reckonings: “Comfort Women,” Performance, and Transpacific Redress (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2018), 101.

20 Ibid., 70.

21 Shoshana Felman, “Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust,” Theoretical Inquires in Law 1, no. 2 (2000): 28.

22 Ibid., 1-43.

23 Ibid., 1-43.

24 Shoshana Felman, The Juridical Unconscious: Trials and Traumas in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2002).

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 38.

27 Ibid., 153.

28 Ibid., 133.

29 Ibid., 133.

30 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241-1299.

31 Sokkiroku (Court Transcript, Wan Aihua; hereafter, Court Transcript of Wan), November 30, 2000, 1-13.

32 Court Transcript of Yin Yulin, February 21, 2001, 4-5.

33 Ishida Yoneko and Uchida Tomoyuki, ed., Kōdo no mura no seibōryoku: Dainyan tachi no sensō wa owaranai(Tokyo: Sōdosha, 2004), 163.

34 Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

35 Court Transcript of Zhang Fenxiang, June 2, 2004.

36 Psychiatrist Judith Herman points out that “[t]rauma is contagious.” Concepts such as “traumatic countertransference” and “vicarious traumatization” refer to the phenomenon of psychiatrists experiencing traumatic syndromes as a result of exposure to the traumatic narratives of their patients. The word “contagious” here is employed to explain the profound influence of trauma exerted on both comfort women victims and their close family members. For further explanation on traumatic countertransference, see Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery: The Aftermath of Violence—From Domestic Abuse to Political Terror(New York: Basic Books, 1992), 140-47.

37 Kathleen Daly, “Reconceptualizing Sexual Victimization and Justice,” in Justice for Victims: Perspectives on Rights, Transition and Reconciliation, ed. Inge Vanfraechem, Antony Pemberton, and Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda (London & New York: Routledge, 2014), 378.

38 See Gerry Johnstone and Joel Quirk, “Repairing Historical Wrongs,” Social & Legal Studies 2, no. 2 (2012): 158.

39 The author is inspired by Elizabeth Son’s study of the Wednesday Demonstrations before the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. She argues that younger generations, children in particular, embody the “futurity” of the demonstrations, in defiance to the Japanese government’s indifference to the comfort women issue. She further points out that their participation to a certain degree guarantees the continuation of the demands for redress and awareness-raising in the future as well. Son, Embodied Reckonings, 27-64.

40 Court Transcript of Wan, 8, 9, 12, 15, 17, 21. Very occasionally, she also used “sexual violence (seibōryoku)” though, see Court Transcript of Wan, 10.

41 Henry, “The Impossibility of Bearing Witness,” 1106.

42 Court Transcript of Wan, 37.

43 The author is inspired by Son’s discussion of the Korean victim Park Yong-shim’s physical presence before the Women’s Tribunal, see Son, Embodied Reckonings, 93-94.

44 Felman, The Juridical Unconscious, 163, 166.

45 Ibid., 153.

46 Son, Embodied Reckonings, 92.

47 Ibid.

48 Court Transcript of Wan, 19. Wan later adopted a daughter; by “family,” she was probably referring to the bond she formed with her foster daughter.

49 Court Transcript of Wan, 23.

50 Ibid., 36.

51 Shanee G. Stepakoff et al., “Why Testify? Witnesses’ Motivations for Giving Evidence in a War Crimes Tribunal in Sierra Leone,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 8 (2014): 431-32.

52 Kawaguchi Kazuko, Chinjutsusho, October 28, 2004, 6.

53 Ibid.

54 Stepakoff et al., “Why Testify?,” 433-34.

55 Court Transcript of Yin Yulin, February 21, 2001; Court Transcript of Zhang Xiantu, February 21, 2001; Court Transcrpit of Wang Gaihe, February 21, 2001; Court Transcript of Gao Yin’e, May 17, 2001; Court Transcript of Zhao Runmei, September 6, 2001.

56 Ōmori, Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte, 95-96.

57 Ibid., 96-97.

58 Genkoku saishū junbi shomen (the Second Case), November 2, 2001, 18-19.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

61 Ibid., 24-27.

62 Ibid., 28.

63 Genkokura saishū junbi shomen (the Hainan Case), March 22, 2006, 4.

64 Ibid., 23.

65 Genkokura saishū junbi shomen (the Hainan Case), March 22, 2006, 4-7.

66 Genkoku saishū junbi shomen (the Second Case), November 2, 2001, 7.

67 Ibid., 69.

68 Ibid.

69 Ōmori, Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte, 142.

70 Ibid., 49.

71 Ōmori, Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte.

72 Carol Gluck, “Operations of Memory: ‘Comfort Women’ and the World,” in Ruptured Memories: War, Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, ed. Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 49-50.

73 Ibid., 51.

74 Ishida Yoneko, “Nihongun seibōryoku ni kansuru kioku, kiroku, kijutsu: Sanseishō ni okeru senjō seibōryoku no chōsa kara,” in Kōdo no mura no seibōryoku: Dainyan tachi no sensō wa owaranai, ed. Ishida Yoenko and Uchida Tomoyuki (Tokyo: Sōdosha, 2004), 228-31.

75 Ibid., 230-31; Song Shaopeng, “Meitizhong de ‘weianfu’ huayu: Fuhaohua de ‘weianfu’ he ‘weianfu’ xushizhong de jiyi/wangque jizhi,” Kaifang shidai (2016): 148.

76 Louise Edwards, “Women Sex-Spies: Chastity, National Dignity, Legitimate Government and Ding Ling’s ‘When I Was in Xia Village’,” The China Quarterly 212 (2012): 1059-78.

77 Louise Edwards, “Drawing Sexual Violence in Wartime China: Ant-Japanese Propaganda Cartoons,” The Journal of Asian Studies 72, no. 3 (2013): 562-586.

78 Ishida, “Nihongun seibōryoku ni kansuru kioku, kiroku, kijutsu,” 229; Song, “Meitizhong de ‘weianfu’ huayu,” 149.

79 For a discussion of the judicial treatment of wartime Japanese sex crimes, see Xiaoyang Hao, “What Is Criminal and What Is Not: Prosecuting Wartime Japanese Sex Crimes in the People’s Republic of China,” The China Quarterly 242 (February 2020): 529-49.

80 Song, “Meitizhong de ‘weianfu’ huayu.”

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Vickers, “Commemorating ‘Comfort Women’ beyond Korea.”

84 No verdict ruled in favor of comfort women plaintiffs except for the one rendered by the Yamaguchi District Court. The case, which is known as the Kampu Trial (Kampu saiban), involves a group of former Korean comfort women, and the court held the Japanese government liable for its failure to provide redress to the satisfaction of comfort women victims in a timely manner. However, this ruling was later reversed by the Hiroshima High Court upon the appeal by the Japanese government.

85 Clare McGlynn and Nicole Westmarland, “Kaleidoscopic Justice: Sexual Violence and Victim-Survivors’ Perceptions of Justice,” Social & Legal Studies 28, no. 2 (2019): 188.

86 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London & New York: Verso, 2006), 19-49.

87 Ibid.

88 WAM, Aruhi, Nihongun ga yattekita, 54.

89 The same set of exhibits actually toured Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Guangzhou provinces, and Beijing. I choose to focus on Shaanxi province here primarily because Qu’s detailed account on the Shaanxi experience enables me to analyze the impact of the panel exhibits, and by extension, testimonies and legal recognition.

90 Qu Yajun, “Josei, heiwa, minzoku jisei: Sansei Shihan Daigaku de Nihongun seibōryoku paneru-ten o kaisai shite,” in Gendai Chūgoku no jendā poritikusu: Kakusa, seibaibai, “ianfu,” ed. Kohama Masako and Akiyama Yōko (Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2016), 180-90.

91 Although the Japanese government has implemented several reparation programs, including the Asian Women’s Fund (1994-2007) and the ROC-Japan bilateral pact (2015), it has yet to issue an official apology to comfort women victims.

92 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness.

93 Ōmori, Rekishi no jijitsu to mukiatte; Chūgokujin sensō higai baishō seikyū jiken bengodan, ed., Sajō no shōheki, 18.

94 James Dawes, Evil Men (Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: Harvard University Press, 2013), 30.

Featured image: Rangoon, Burma. August 8, 1945. A young ethnic Chinese woman from one of the Imperial Japanese Army’s “comfort battalions” is interviewed by an Allied officer. (Public Domain)

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Having made something of a splash last month with the fuss over Australia’s News Media Bargaining code, Facebook, and the digital giants, are facing another stormy front in India.  The move here has nothing to do with revenue so much as alleged bad behaviour.  “We appreciate the proliferation of social media in India,” stated Ravi Shankar Prasad, India’s minister of electronics and information technology. “We want them to be more responsible and more accountable.”

Such responsibility and accountability will purportedly be achieved through the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.  They are part of a program that has been incubating for some years.  An IT industry consultant advising the government expressed the sentiment to Wired in 2018.  “The government’s message is: If you want to do business in India, do it on our terms and conditions or you are free to leave.”  Previously, the Indian approach has been more timorous.  It had “always been ‘Do it the Apple way, do it the Facebook way, do it the Amazon way.”

Behind such rules is a crude, self-vested interest at work.  The primary role of social media lies in the sharing of information.  Governments tend to be happy with material they can finesse, curate and control on such platforms.  When the platforms become home for material that challenges the official version, stirring the blood of the citizenry or encouraging misrule, problems emerge.

To make its case, the Indian government has resorted to the marketing of moral outrage.  Over the last years, fake news has become something of a favourite, the Zeitgeist driving the regulatory truck.  In 2017 and 2018, over 40 deaths due to mob violence were said to have arisen from generously circulated disinformation.  On July 1, 2018, in the hamlet of Rainpada, five men, all members of the Nath Panthi Davari Gosavi wanderers, were beaten to death.  They were victims of a rampaging mob incensed by rumours circulating on WhatsApp that the area was crawling with opportunistic child kidnappers. 

The Indian authorities duly asked WhatsApp to assist in stopping the “irresponsible and explosive messages” on its platform.  Some actions were taken.  The number of forwards was limited to five at a time.  Those messages also sported a “forwarded” tag.  This did little to pacify government officials.

The scope of the proposed changes is far from negligible.  The draft IT rules take aim at over-the-top (OTT) media services responsible for content on such outlets as Amazon, Netflix and Prime and news media platforms.  Applicable entities include “publishers of news and current affairs content”; “intermediaries which primarily enable the transmission of news and current affairs content” and “publishers of online curated content”.  Finally, “intermediaries which primarily enable the transmission of online curated content” are included.

The regulatory framework will entail three tiers: self-regulation by the entity itself; self-regulation through “self-regulating bodies of the applicable entities” and an “Oversight mechanism by the Central Government.”  The creation of “Chief Compliant Officers” by the companies is envisaged as are “nodal” persons responsible for 24 hour “coordination with law enforcement agencies and officers to ensure compliance to their orders or requisitions made in accordance with the provisions of law or rules made thereunder.”  Resident Grievance Officers will also have to be appointed. 

The introduction of this additional layer of regulation will constitute a form of bureaucratic strangulation, with the oversight mechanism open to censoring content in a manner that goes even beyond the current powers of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting for TV regulation.  

The Internet Freedom Foundation considers the mechanism a calamity in waiting, breaching the digital rights of citizens, causing economic harm “and [will] also negatively impact India’s growing cultural influence through the production of modern and contemporary video formats entertainment.”  In anticipation of the government code, 17 OTT platforms have already developed “self-regulation toolkits” which risk embracing the genie of self-censorship.

The incorporation of news media in the Code goes beyond the ambit of current legislation and potentially exceeds the safe harbour protections for intermediary platforms outlined by section 79 of the Information Technology Act.  That section exempts intermediaries hosting material from liability provided they follow various stipulated guidelines.  The draft rules, as they stand, circumvent due process and parliamentary scrutiny through regulation.  Media would also be censored if the government were to take a broad reading of the definition “publisher of news and current affairs content”.

Prasad does not merely want social media channels to be more diligent monitors and, if necessary, censors.  He is clear that such digital platforms lend a hand in identifying culprits who might be behind the dissemination of information and be targets of government prosecution. “We don’t want to know the content, but firms need to be able to tell who was the first person who began spreading misinformation or other objectionable content.”

Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 proposes to do this, stating that the significant social media intermediary primarily responsible for providing messaging services “shall enable the identification of the first originator of the information on its computer resource as may be required by a judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction” or by “the Competent Authority” pursuant to legislation.

The unacceptable content officials have in mind is detailed in a government release.  The objectionable material would be the sort that relates to Indian sovereignty and integrity, state security, friendly relations with States, “public order or of incitement to an offence relating to the above or in relation with rape, sexually explicit material or child sexual abuse material punishable with imprisonment for a term of not less than five years”.  Prosecutors will have much to play with.

Breaking the resistance of companies such as WhatsApp to traceability requests has been a central aim of the Modi government, despite such proposals being dismissed as ineffectual in actually achieving their stated purpose.  They are not the only ones.  End-to-end encryption is seen by states as a technique for concealment, ripe for abuse, which is always a mean spirited way of clamping down on digital sovereignty.  Countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia fantasise about creating backdoors to content.  That very subject is being currently considered by the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Antony Clement v Union of India (TC Civil No. 189 of 2020)

The emerging trend here is that, while such policy may fail to achieve its stated goal, it will certainly be pernicious in other ways, as any backdoor weakening of encryption or vital escrow systems would breach privacy and security.  Given that encryption acts as a safeguard in the current digital environment of data aggregation, while also deterring identity theft and code injection attacks, the draft rules look menacing.

Manoj Prabhakaran, Professor of Computer Science and Engineering based at ITT Bombay, suggests that States should do the opposite.  In a furnished expert report in the Antony Clement case, he urges government authorities to “promote strong encryption and anonymity.  National laws should recognize that individuals are free to protect the privacy of their digital communications by using encryption technology and tools that allow anonymity online.”

While the conduct of digital platforms is monstrous in terms of their operating rationale, not least their tendency to monetize privacy and commodify predictive behaviour, government scapegoating is a shallow distraction.  The agenda of the Modi government is moral stringency, surveillance and the monitoring of unruly citizens.  Breaking down the doors of encryption while encouraging social media giants to regulate themselves into censorship, is all in keeping with this theme.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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The planned construction of three luxury residential estates in vital wildlife refuge and popular tourist site Bokor National Park marks the latest update in a wider tale of loss for Cambodia’s native forests.

Also known as Preah Monivong Bokor National Park, the protected area in south-west Cambodia’s Cardamom Mountains region offers a refreshingly cool climate, spectacular ocean views, boulder-strewn waterfalls and poignant decay in a haunting, 1920s French hill station. In pre-pandemic times, these attractions brought in thousands of tourists each year to an area known for its abundant forests and varied wildlife.

Environmental activist group Mother Nature Cambodia says Bokor’s forests are already being destroyed. In a video shared on their Facebook page, an activist – their identity hidden by a large black coat, sunglasses and mask to avoid detection and possible harassment – describes the project and its expected harm to the park’s primary forests before the video cuts away to clips of areas that have already been heavily deforested.

Drone image of alleged clearing for luxury residential estates in Bokor National Park. Image courtesy of Mother Nature Cambodia.

Drone image of alleged clearing for luxury residential estates in Bokor National Park. Image courtesy of Mother Nature Cambodia.

A master plan released by Cambodia’s Ministry of Land Management details how the development will cover just under 19,000 hectares – equivalent to around 35,000 football fields – of the entire 154,000-hectare park.

Once occupied by the Khmer Rouge, the park gained official protected status in 1993, yet was awarded to Cambodian tycoon Sok Kong in 2007 as a 99-year concession for $1 billion. In the intervening years, Kong’s company has developed an access road, luxury hotels and condominiums in Bokor.

According to the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity, Preah Monivong National Park harbors virgin lowland forest including dry dipterocarp, mixed deciduous and moist tropical evergreen tree species, while mangrove forests line its southern stretches. And within the park’s entrancing mix of tumbling hills and sweeping plateaus, unique flora, such as Burretiodendron hsienmu, a valuable flowering plant threatened by habitat loss, finds a home.

An abundance of wildlife also relies on the forest to survive. Pileated gibbons (Hylobates pileatus), green peafowls (Pavo muticus), chestnut-headed partridges (Arborophila cambodiana), Asian elephants (Elephas maximus), gaurs (Bos gaurus), Asiatic black bear (Ursus thibetanus), dhole (Cuon alpinus), large Indian civets (Viverra zibetha), and banteng (Bos javanicus) have all been sighted within the park. Bokor is also a catchment area for Touk Chhou, a major river flowing to Kampot.

The wider Cardamom Mountains region encompasses several protected areas, including four national parks (Central Cardamom, Southern Cardamom, Botum Sakor and Preah Monivong Bokor) and four wildlife sanctuaries (Phnom Samkos, Phnom Aural, Peam Krasaep and Tatai). Yet these official designations apparently offer little protection. Satellite data from the University of Maryland (UMD) visualized on Global Forest Watch show the Cardamoms’ national parks and wildlife sanctuaries together lost some 148,000 hectares – more than 8.6% – of their tree cover between 2001 and 2019.

During that time, UMD data show Bokor National Park lost nearly 9% of its primary forest cover. Preliminary 2020 data from UMD show deforestation may have jumped further last year, with clearing expanding along the southern, northern, and western boundaries of the park as well as invading deeper inside. This trend appears to be continuing; so far in 2021, the dataset has registered three weeks of higher-than-average deforestation activity.

Satellite data from the University of Maryland show large areas of deforestation in Bokor National Park in 2020 and 2021. (Mongabay has not confirmed all areas of forest loss are attributable to the residential development.)

Satellite data from the University of Maryland show large areas of deforestation in Bokor National Park in 2020 and 2021. (Mongabay has not confirmed all areas of forest loss are attributable to residential development.)

Satellite imagery shows rapid, recent clearing in the northern portion of Bokor National Park.

Satellite imagery shows rapid, recent clearing in the northern portion of Bokor National Park.

An activist working with Mother Nature Cambodia, who asked to remain anonymous citing the sensitivity of the issue, told Mongabay that vast swathes of Bokor have been earmarked for construction and that developers have already begun clearing the forest, with a vision to complete the new residential areas by 2030.

“This plan provides almost 20,000 hectares of land concessions, where almost all of the land is forest, to Sokha Real Estate company, which belongs to Sok Kong, a tycoon close to Hun Sen,” the activist said.

The source added, however, that there’s another section of the plan that covers almost 9,000 hectares. Thus, the total amount of land that is earmarked for the plush residential estates encompasses just under 28,000 hectares.

“Though the plan was signed by the Prime Minister in 2019, Bokor Mountain’s forest has been cut down for years before that,” the activist said. “Therefore, it looks like the master plan is just something to legalize their acts.”

“The land concessions approved by this plan are mostly covered in forest, “the activist continued. “Although the trees are not that big compared to other forests, it is a significant shelter to wild animals, an oxygen tank to produce fresh air and a picturesque natural landscape for tourists.”

International and local NGOs ordinarily play a meaningful role in preventing widespread forest loss in Cambodia. However, it appears many have been muzzled through fear. A reporter in Cambodia, who asked to remain anonymous, said “deforestation” has become a dirty word. Speaking on record about the issue, he said, can lead to NGOs being shut down or at least harassed. Many activists working for Mother Nature Cambodia, he added, have been arrested in recent years.

On February 9, Cambodian human rights organization Licadho released a statementsigned by 74 community groups calling on the Ministry of Environment to stop arresting forestry activists after local officials arrested five individuals who “were wrapping trees in Buddhist cloth and collecting evidence of widespread illegal logging occurring inside Prey Lang Wildlife Sanctuary.”

Four major conservation organizations working in Cambodia contacted by Mongabay all said they were unable to comment on the developments in Bokor, while Sokha Real Estate Company did not respond to requests for comment.

Neth Pheaktra, a spokesperson for Cambodia’s Ministry of Environment, said in an email to Mongabay that the government pays “high attention” to environmental protections and biodiversity conservation, and that the Ministry of Environment is working to create zoned areas to conserve natural resources such as forests and wildlife.

“According to the master plan, officially known as the ‘Master Plan for Bokor City Development Project until 2035,’ around 8 percent of land (12.016 [thousand] hectares) of Preah Monivong Bokor National Park (154.458 [thousand] ha) has been earmarked by the Royal government of Cambodia for development into a smart city and a historical site,” Pheaktra said. “The master plan will look into the need for housing, relaxation, employment, study, and business, all within an eco-friendly environment …”

Pheaktra said that the project has been planned in response to shifting demographics, land use requirements, and takes current and future needs into account. He added that the plan will ensure the protection of natural resources above and below ground, including delicate ecosystems.

Drone image of alleged clearing for luxury residential estates in Bokor National Park. Image courtesy of Mother Nature Cambodia.

Drone image of alleged clearing for luxury residential estates in Bokor National Park. Image courtesy of Mother Nature Cambodia.

Beyond the threat to natural life that depends on Bokor’s forest, corruption concerns also remain. Sophal Ear, associate professor of Diplomacy & World Affairs at Occidental College, Los Angeles, said the developments in Bokor are “a disgrace.”

“Even if there were by some miracle transparency on the money that should have gone to the state for this allegedly secret 99-year concession, there’s no telling how that money would have been spent,” Ear said. “The Prime Minister [Hun Sen] regularly has total discretion over more than a billion dollars from the national budget.”

“Cambodia’s forests have been decimated for decades in this same way,” he added. “No surprise here, only the last vestiges of forestland, gone.”

The Mother Nature Cambodia activist echoed Ear’s concerns, saying what the government and Sokha Real Estate are doing in Bokor goes against the law.

“Based on land laws in Cambodia [Article 16], every mountain belongs to the state as public property and cannot be given to a private owner if it is still of benefit to the public. Moreover, Bokor is a national park, which should be protected by the law…”

“In this case, Bokor has not lost its public interest, so providing Bokor land as a concession to any private company is illegal,” the activist added. “However, Hun Sen can do all of this, because deciding land concessions and transferring public state land to private state land depends solely on sub-decrees, for which Hun Sen alone is enough to do it.”

Sokha Real Estate Company’s estates aren’t the first developments slated for Bokor National Park. Here, a man stands outside an entrance to the decaying Bokor Palace Hotel and Casino. Image by Chris Humphrey.

Bokor isn’t the only Cambodian national park threatened by development. Ream City, a huge $16 billion development comprising housing estates, hotels, family attractions, beachfront homes, shopping malls, hotels, resorts, and a yacht and marina club, was recently approved in Ream Bay, a prominent feature of Ream National Park in Preah Sihanouk province.

Meas Nhim, former park director in Beng Per and Ream National Park, and a current deputy director of the Environment Mini­stry’s protected area department, told Mongabay the Bokor development and the coastal city project in Ream will each have a “big impact” on the environment in the area and said the bay should be kept in a more natural state.

Deforestation and corruption issues have also crept up in the wider Cardamom mountains region, with critics saying government-linked land grabs and infrastructure projects are particularly to blame. And there remains a fear that national parks like Bokor could be wiped out entirely. Rampant trafficking of Siamese rosewood in certain border areas with Vietnam grew so severe in recent years that two protected areas, including Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary, were dissolved in 2018 by royal decree after being almost entirely stripped of forest.

“All of the land concessions on Bokor Mountain belong to Sok Kung,” the Mother Nature Cambodia activist said, before adding: “It looks like it is his private mountain now.”

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Featured image: Dholes (Cuon alpinus) are wild canids that range throughout South, Central, East and Southeast Asia. They are listed as endangered, with fewer than 2,500 adults remaining in the wild. Image by Davidvraju via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

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Let’s take a look at a US-backed opposition party in Thailand – Future Forward (now renamed as the Move Forward and Progressive Movement parties). 

These are parties that vow to create “equality” in Thailand – to take the “pyramid” of social order and turn it upside with “people power” at the top.

I explain how this is pure propaganda and how those selling these lies to the public in an effort to swell the ranks of US-backed anti-government mobs in the streets have organized their own parties and businesses into the very “pyramidal” structures they claim they seek to topple. They are pyramidal structures they will only make larger and more oppressive if ever they get into power.

In a wider context – these US-backed opposition groups seek to reduce or eliminate Thailand’s relationship with China in Washington’s bid to encircle and contain China.

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Brian Berletic, formally known under the pen name “Tony Cartalucci” is a geopolitical researcher, writer, and video producer (YouTube here and BitChute here) based in Bangkok, Thailand. He is a regular contributor to New Eastern Outlook and more recently, 21st Century Wire. You can support his work via Patreon here.

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Just one of the 52 short-finned pilot whales that washed up on an Indonesian shore last week survived, an official said.

Volunteers and local authorities on the island of Madura initially managed to save three whales, pushing them back out to sea.

But the trio became stranded again at a different location, and two of them died, according to Permana Yudiarso, the head of the marine resources agency in neighboring Bali island.

Contact with the rocky ocean floor had injured them somewhat, said I Made Jaya Ratha, a veterinarian who was among those at the scene, though they were still in relatively good condition.

The governor of East Java province, Khofifah Indar Parawansa, said that according to volunteers, “some of the whales got back to the coast again as their mothers are still stranded at the beach.”

The pilot whales in Madura. Image courtesy of the Bali marine resources agency.

Researchers are now trying to figure out why the whales ended up on land, just the latest mass beaching incident in the country with the world’s longest coastline.

Results of the necropsies — autopsies performed on animals — now underway at Airlangga University in the provincial capital Surabaya will take about a month to come in, Permana said.

Observers cited water pollution, extreme weather and shipping activity as among the possible causes of the stranding — though they cautioned they could only speculate.

“The main cause can only be known from the necropsy of the alpha pilot whale apart from the social behavior and condition of the group members,” said Adriani Sunuddin, a researcher in the marine science department at the Bogor Agricultural Institute (IPB).

Pilot whales — which, despite their name, are actually a type of dolphin — are highly social, tending to travel in groups of 30 or more immediate family members.

“To my knowledge, nobody’s figured out yet why they strand the way they do,” marine biologist Amy Van Cise told Mongabay in 2018. “But when they do, you’re losing what seems to be basically an entire social group. If one animal in that group strands, they all strand together.”

Short-finned pilot whales have been recognized as a single species, but a recent study found that two unique subspecies actually exist: the round-headed “Shiho” type, left, and the square-headed “Naisa” type, right. Image by Natalie Renier, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution.

Indonesia has sought to train its citizens to deal with sea mammal strandings, setting up groups of first responders around the country.

Sekar Mira, a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), said live whales must be separated from dead ones.

He also cautioned locals from pouring water into their blowholes, which could suffocate them.

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The Issue

On 1 December 2020, an article by Professor J. Mark Ramseyer was published online in the International Review of Law and Economics. The article, ‘Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War’, was scheduled for inclusion in the March 2021 edition of the journal but, following expressions of concern from scholars, the article was taken down from the journal’s website for further examination. These events caused a major controversy amongst scholars. A copy of the article as it appeared on the journal’s website is attached (Appendix 1).

The main contentions of this article are: (i) that wartime ‘comfort stations’ were run by private entrepreneurs, the Japanese military’s only direct role being the maintenance of hygiene in the establishments; (ii) that ‘comfort women’ freely negotiated contracts with the ‘comfort station’ owners, reflecting their personal interests and following the ‘basic game theoretic principles of credible commitments’ (p. 7).

The article was strongly criticised by a number of student and other groups linked to Harvard Law School and by other groups and individuals (see an example).

On the other hand, some groups have responded with criticisms of Ramseyer’s critics, arguing that they are threatening freedom of speech by denying Professor Ramseyer the right to controversial opinions. The attached letter from a group of conservative Korean public figures, for example, has been widely circulated to various university groups and individuals in the US. It praises Professor Ramseyer’s article, insisting that the article should be published in the journal, and argues that anyone who questions the journal’s decision to publish is trampling on free speech (Appendix 2).

Professor Ramseyer’s article provides a really important opportunity for a free and open debate. But that debate must begin by examining the ground-rules and understandings of academic knowledge and research integrity that underpin debates between contending opinions. Are the participants in a debate following the same fundamental principles of research integrity and ethics? If there are no ground rules, then academic journals would have no basis for rejecting any paper submitted to them, and any statement of opinion – however lacking in logic or factual evidence – would have to be treated as equal to any other. We could then very easily end up spending much of the rest of our lives debating conspiracy theories or fake news which have no intellectual foundation whatever. To put it at its simplest and crudest, if there are no research standards, then we may as well all pack up and go home, because anything goes and any truth claim is just as good as any other.

So, I welcome the opportunity for debate, and embrace the opportunity for academics, students and the broader community to have a thorough and frank discussion about crucial questions of free speech and academic integrity. This short document provides a few suggestions and questions as a starting point for such a debate, accompanied by illustrative materials from Professor Ramseyer’s article and other writings on the ‘comfort women’ issue. The fundamental principles, it should be emphasised, apply not just to this article or historical issue, but across the board of research and scholarship.

Free Speech and Research Integrity 

We live in an age when the online and other media are flooded with conspiracy theories, pseudo-science, fake research findings etc. But it is also an age when free speech faces as many challenges as ever, if not more. The issue, then, is how we defend and uphold free speech, while also learning (and teaching others) how to assess the quality of information. How do we distinguish well-founded research and knowledge from research that lacks integrity? How do we identify knowledge claims that lack proper foundations? How do we protect free debate while preventing the abuse of academic credentials to disseminate misleading information? These are vital problems of our age.

Sincerity and Integrity in Research

Universities have developed a range of rules and principles about proper research practices and ethics. These are always a work in progress, and are an important topic for debate and improvement. You can find some helpful thoughts on the subject in a range of documents such as the US government Office of Research Integrity’s guidelines on responsible publication or the European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (ALLEA 2017).

Below, I suggest some key principles that, I think, have come to underpin the notion of research integrity. This is my list, which I offer to you also for debate and improvement. In each case, I illustrate the principle by referring to issues arising from research on the ‘comfort women’ issue and from the debate about the Ramseyer article.

The European Federation of Academies of Humanities and Sciences (ALLEA 2017, p. 4) defines the underlying principles of research integrity as being reliability, honesty, respect and accountability. This means that researchers should genuinely want to find the answers to research questions, be as honest as possible about their own research motives, and be prepared to report unexpected findings if they discover that the data they are looking at contains information which they had not anticipated. They should try their best (within the human limitations that we all have) to convey their findings truthfully to others, and should certainly not consciously invent or misrepresent information about the data they have collected (e.g. by falsifying the results of experiments or stating that source material contains facts which it does not contain).

Below I try to flesh this out in a bit more detail. The principles set out are the aims. No researcher is perfect and no one piece of research fulfils all the principles listed below perfectly. The issue is whether a piece of research falls so far below all (or nearly all) of these principles that it fails to meet fundamental standards of research integrity.

Former “Comfort Women” from various Asian countries and Holland in Tokyo in 1992.From left anonymous Taiwanese survivor, Kang Soon-ae, Wan Ai Hua, Kim Young-hil, Maria Rosa Henson, Jan Ruff O’Herne and Coordinator Indai Sajor.

Some Key Principles for Discussion 

  1. Defining the boundaries of the research topic. Research integrity begins by telling yourself and others what topic you are researching, and defining the scope of the topic. Many topics are very large, so researchers will only look at one small corner of them. This can be very valuable – a single human being’s life history can tell us a lot about a whole historical era, for example. But a historian who writes about a single life should try to say something to readers about the extent to which this one person’s experience can be generalised to the wider history of their day.In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history – What is the ‘comfort women’ issue? So-called ‘comfort stations’ were places where members of the Japanese military had sex with women during the ‘long’ Asia-Pacific War (defined here as the period from 1931 to 1945) under the jurisdiction of the Japanese military authorities. The Japanese government’s 1993 report ‘On the Issue of Wartime “Comfort Women”’ states that ‘comfort stations were established in various locations in response to the request of the military authorities at the time’, and adds: ‘the countries or areas where it has been possible as a result of the study to confirm that comfort stations existed are: Japan; China; the Philippines; Indonesia; the then Malaya; Thailand; the then Burma; the then New Guinea; Hong Kong; Macao; and the then French Indochina’. (In this context, ‘Japan’ means the pre-war Japanese empire, including Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan and Karafuto [Southern Sakhalin]). It defines the ‘comfort women’s’ known places of origin as ‘Japan; the Korean Peninsula; China; Taiwan; the Philippines; Indonesia; and the Netherlands. Apart from Japanese, many of the comfort women transferred to the war areas were from the Korean Peninsula.’

    The report notes that the earliest ‘comfort stations’ appear to date from 1932, and that ‘many comfort stations were run by private operators, although in some areas there were cases in which the then Japanese military directly operated comfort stations.’ (see full document)

    Substantial further research has since extended our knowledge of the problem, but this provides a starting point.

    During the war, the Japanese government and military used the term ‘comfort station’ (ianjo) or ‘comfort facility’ (ian shisetsu), but typically used terms such as ‘bar maids’ (shakufu) or ‘special women’ (tokushu fujo) to describe the women in these ‘facilities’. Allied service-people who encountered the women during the war sometimes referred to them as ‘comfort women’ or ‘comfort girls’, and after the war the euphemism ‘comfort women’ became widely used in debates. From the 1990s a number of researchers began to use the term ‘sex slaves’, drawing on the internationally understood definition of ‘slavery’ as ‘an umbrella term covering practices such as forced labour, debt bondage, forced marriage, and human trafficking’ and referring to ‘situations of exploitation that a person cannot refuse or leave because of threats, violence, coercion, deception, and/or abuse of power’.

    Questions for discussion – How well do the boundaries of the problem presented in Ramseyer’s research match the Japanese government’s 1993 definition of the ‘comfort women’ problem, or the definitions used by other key reports and documents on the issue?

    Why does Ramseyer’s research make no mention of women from China, the Philippines, Indonesia or the Netherlands (nor of women from Malaya, East Timor and other places who are now also known to have been recruited into the system?

    Why does he largely cite pre-1932 sources to analyse a post-1932 problem, and what is the basis for his claim that information about the 1920s to early 1930s applies to the period of the Asia-Pacific War?

    Given that the 1993 Japanese government report, like many other sources, says that the Japanese military directly operated some comfort stations, why does Professor Ramseyer state that the Japanese army ‘encouraged private entrepreneurs to establish semi-official brothels next to its bases’ (Ramseyer 2020 p. 1) but remain entirely silent about bases run by the military themselves (including the navy)?

  2. Defining your own position in relation to your research. Most researchers approach their work with some pre-existing belief and ideology, and many have political objectives, such as the wish to influence policy, support the work of social movements etc. It is important that researchers are open about their own positions. It can be argued that, if a piece of research is being done specifically to advance a policy position or movement etc., the author should make this clear to readers.
    In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history – Immediately after publishing the article ‘Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War’, Professor Ramseyer went on to publish a media piece, ‘Recovering the Truth about the Comfort Women’ in the online journal Japan Forward. Here, repeating sentences from his International Review of Law and Economics article, he shifted from his academically-worded conclusion about the application of game theory to wartime ‘comfort stations’ to the much more aggressively political statement that ‘the comfort-women-sex-slave story’ is ‘pure fiction’, that testimonies from former ‘comfort women’ about forcible recruitment are lies, and the whole story has been driven by a left-wing South Korean lobby group bent on sabotaging Japan-South Korea relations in order to promote a ‘key North Korean political goal’. Japan Forward is a news/opinion site established by the neo-nationalist Japanese Sankei Media group to propagate its views and those of like-minded people to an English-speaking audience (see Nakai 2018, p. 3). The site is currently running a very energetic campaign on the ‘comfort women’ history, aimed at denying that any ‘comfort women’ at all were recruited by force or deception and denouncing women who testify to forcible recruitment as liars.Questions for Discussion – Should Professor Ramseyer’s have provided his readers and peer reviewers with more frank information about his personal position on the ‘comfort women’ issue and his aims in conducting this research?
  3. Demonstrating awareness of the existing research done by others in your field – Good research needs to be based on a knowledge of the work that has been done already in the field of study. Researchers have very rarely read everything in their field, but they should have read a fair share of existing research, and it is helpful to readers if they start by mentioning some of the existing works that have informed their own research. Where they strongly disagree with existing work in the field, particularly the most influential works, they should provide some explanation of the reasons why they are doing so.
    In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history Appendix 3 (from a reading list published by the Center for Korean Legal Studies at Columbia Law School), contains one list of many existing works on the ‘comfort women’ issue in English (representing various viewpoints); there are many other lists, including this one (please note that this list is from a former ‘comfort women’ support group, and lists works sympathetic to their cause); and this one (a somewhat older list from Japan’s Asian Women’s Fund, including key works in Japanese). You can doubtless find more lists online.Questions for Discussion –

    See if you can find further lists of resources on the ‘comfort women’ issue.

    Can you identify the position on comfort women issues of the creators of the lists, or their openness to presenting conflicting positions on a subject that is notable for controversy?

    How many of the key existing research works on the ‘comfort women’ issue does Professor Ramseyer refer to in his article?

    Does he explain his selection?

    Does he indicate why his work disregards the conclusions of most other researchers of the topic?

  4. Providing evidence for your research claims – The key findings of research need to be supported by verifiable evidence, which might include documents, oral testimony, material objects, combinations of all of these etc.
    In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history – ‘Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War’ offers an analysis of the contracts signed between ‘comfort women’ and the owners or managers of ‘comfort stations’ during the Asia-Pacific War. Surprisingly, though, Professor Ramseyer does not provide any references to or quotations from any contract actually signed by a ‘comfort woman’ and her ‘employer’. He provides no evidence that he has ever seen such a contract, and no oral or written testimony from anyone who had ever signed one of these contracts or witnessed one being signed.Source material which he has read and cited (though without acknowledging this part of its content) describes a situation where ‘contracts’ were signed by women who had been recruited by deception (see 5.iii below), with a loan payment going to their debt-burdened families. Ramseyer assumes that all women signed contracts on the basis of informed consent while providing no evidence to support this assumption, and remaining silent about evidence which contradicts this assumption.

    His article also ignores testimony of cases where women clearly did not sign ‘contracts’ of any sort (for example, O’Herne 1998; McGregor and Mackie 2018)

    Question for Discussion – Does Ramseyer provide convincing evidence for the existence of ‘comfort women’ contracts founded on ‘basic game theoretic principles of credible commitments’?

    What percentage of the wartime ‘comfort women’ do you think might have signed such contracts?

  5. Using sources with honesty and respect – Debates about historical, social and political issues rely on a range of resources, including official documents, private records, oral testimony etc. It is a basic principle of research that scholars should not deliberately misrepresent the content of the sources that they cite. It is also important that they think carefully about the nature of the sources and the context in which they were produced. In the case both of oral and written sources, we need to ask ourselves the questions: who produced the information in this document or interview etc. and why? Using multiple sources carefully and honestly is central to research integrity.
    In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history – Here are just a couple of illustrative examples of the sources used by Professor Ramseyer, and of the way in which he has cited them.(i) On p. 6 of the article, Professor Ramseyer quotes from the memoirs of former ‘comfort woman’ Mun Ok-Ju, as published in the ‘Korea Institute of History, 2016’. Despite the impressive-looking institutional title, the ‘Korea Institute of History’ is actually an anonymous neo-nationalist online blogger whose site is dedicated to denying the forced recruitment of ‘comfort women’. The blogprovides no information about the person who runs it or its source of funding. The site does not contain Mun’s memoirs. Rather, it contains one page of selected extracts from her memoirs, carefully chosen to try to persuade readers that her experiences were pleasurable and well-paid. Incidentally, it also mis-spells her name. University of Toronto scholar Joshua Pilzer, who has studied testimony given by Mun in detail, writes that she described being forcibly abducted by Japanese military personnel in 1940 at the age of 16 and forced to provide sexual services to twenty to thirty Japanese soldiers a day (Pilzer 2014, p. 2). He quotes Mun, a courageous and resourceful woman, as saying that ‘on the rare occasions when we had something to laugh about in our torturous life, and when we felt lonesome or miserable, we would sing in unison or hum together quietly’ (Pilzer 2014, p. 18)

    (ii) Professor Ramseyer writes that the Japanese military ‘encouraged private entrepreneurs to establish semi-official brothels next to its bases’ (Ramseyer 2020, p.1), but that ‘the Japanese military did not need additional prostitutes; it had plenty. Prostitutes have followed armies everywhere, and they followed the Japanese army in Asia’ (Ramseyer 2020, p. 5). Thus he tells his readers that women and private brothel owners flocked to the war zones, with the role of the military in the ‘comfort station’ system being limited to its regular checks of the hygiene of women in the ‘semi-official brothels’. This is at odds with the contents of the sources cited by Ramseyer himself, such as his reference ‘Naimusho 1938’, in Suzuki et al 2006, vol. 1, pp. 124-138 (incorrectly referenced by Ramseyer as Suzuki et al 2006, vol. 1, p. 124.) The information in that document shows that in late 1937-early 1938 private recruiters in various parts of Japan reported being urgently requested by the military command in Shanghai to help dispatch 2500-3000 Japanese women for work in ‘comfort stations (in fact brothels)’ being set up ‘within the Shanghai Expeditionary Army’ (Suzuki et al. vol. 1, pp. 130 and 134). Reports of this request – and of the fact that the women were to be transported from Japan in military vessels under the supervision of Japanese military police (kempei) – clearly caused concern and even disbelief amongst some officials in Japan, one of whom expressed his anxiety that it was hard to maintain that this ‘was not in contravention of the terms of international treaties on the trafficking of women’ (‘婦女売買に関する国際条約の趣旨にも悖ること無きを保し難き’- Suzuki et al. vol. 1 p. 125). But enquiries made by local authorities to the Japanese Consulate General in Shanghai confirmed the essence of the reports, including the central involvement of the Japanese military police and the Consulate’s own military bureau in the scheme, and the recruitment of the women continued (Suzuki et al 2006 vol. 1, p. 136). In short, these documents provide compelling official testimony of the role of the Japanese military and other government agencies in initiating and overseeing the recruitment of Japanese women to serve in ‘comfort stations’ in China, but Ramseyer makes no mention of this aspect of the document’s content.

    (iii) On p. 6 of his article, Ramseyer gives a detailed account of the contract terms in ‘comfort stations’ in Malaya, and provides two sources for this information. One of these is the document ‘US Office of War Interrogation (1944), Interrogation Report no. 49’. You can find a copy of this document here.

    As was common in Allied military reports on encounters with ‘comfort women’ on the battlefield, the tone of this report is derogatory towards the women, but the report still contains important information and is widely known to researchers. Interrogation Report No. 49 does contain figures for the pay received by the women, but the figures are different from the ones cited in Ramseyer’s text, which are for Malaya, while this document is about Burma.

    Significantly, this document does refer to contracts signed by the women, which might seem to support the core contention of Ramseyer’s article. But it states the following: ‘Early in May of 1942 Japanese agents arrived in Korea for the purpose of enlisting Korean girls for “comfort service” in newly conquered Japanese territories in Southeast Asia. The nature of this “service” was not specified but it was assumed to be work connected with visiting the wounded in hospitals, rolling bandages, and generally making the soldiers happy. The inducement used by these agents was plenty of money, an opportunity to pay off the family debts, easy work, and the prospect of a new life in a new land, Singapore. On the basis of these false representations many girls enlisted for overseas duty and were rewarded with an advance of a few hundred yen. The majority of the girls were ignorant and uneducated, although a few had been connected with “oldest profession on earth” before. The contract they signed bound them to Army regulations and to work for the “house master ” for a period of from six months to a year depending on the family debt for which they were advanced… Approximately 800 of these girls were recruited in this manner and they landed with their Japanese “house master ” at Rangoon around August 20th, 1942’. In other words, the report shows that the signing of wartime ‘contracts’ did not mean that these women had freely chosen to work in ‘comfort stations’. ‘Contracts’, in this case at least, were signed even though women were recruited by trickery and transported to places from where they had no possibility of returning until they had paid off their debt (and in many cases probably even after paying off their debt). Contrary to statements made by Ramseyer in his article (see particularly Ramseyer 2020, p. 5), only a few had previously worked as prostitutes, while most had not. Having read and cited this important document, Ramseyer fails to acknowledge or address this crucial part of its content directly at odds with his claims.

    Question for Discussion – See if you (with help from Japanese or Korean speaking friends if necessary) can check more of the sources used in the Ramseyer article.

    Consider possible reasons why Professor Ramseyer may have failed to mention the information about contracts contained in Interrogation Report no. 49.

    Do you think he uses his sources in an academically responsible, honest and balanced way which genuinely conveys the content of the sources to his readers?

  6. Treating readers with honesty and respect – The Office of Integrity’s Responsible Publication guidelines, like other statements on research standards, remind us that footnotes and bibliographies need to be fair and accurate, so that other researchers can verify a scholar’s conclusions and follow up sources for their own further research. It’s easy to make occasional mistakes with a page number or a date in a reference, but a systematic mismatch between the information in a book or article and the source material that it claims to be citing is cause for real concern.In relation to the ‘comfort women’ history – Here are a few more instances of the sources used by Professor Ramseyer, and of the way in which he has cited them.

    (i) One basic rule of academic referencing is that you should cite page number/s that point readers to the information you are citing. A large proportion of the wartime primary sources quoted by Professor Ramseyer come from a two-volume collection of archival documents edited by Suzuki Yūko and others; but in the case of these documents, Professor Ramseyer simply provides the number of the first page of the document concerned – and some of these documents run to a dozen or more pages. In most cases, therefore, the information on the page cited by Ramseyer bears no correspondence to the information he is supposed to be citing, and does not provide the necessary help to readers trying to follow up his sources.

    (ii) He gives figures of 12 Korean ‘comfort women’ and 527 Korean ‘unlicensed prostitutes’ in Shanghai in 1938, and attributes these to a document reproduced on ‘p. 118’ of vol. 1 of the Suzuki et al. collection (actually pp. 118-120) and to Table 6 of a 2012 article by Takei Yoshikazu (Ramseyer 2020, p. 5, footnote 5). In an earlier 2019 article, he gave the same figures and said that they were for 1940 (Ramseyer 2019, p. 10), oddly citing pre-1940 official data as a source for 1940 statistics. He seems subsequently to have spotted the problem, because his 2020 article now tells us that these are 1938 figures. The figures he cites appear nowhere in either of the sources referenced. The Takei document cited in Ramseyer’s article is a conference presentation outline which contains no Table 6 and no figures for ‘comfort women’ or unlicensed prostitutes. There is also a full version of this paper, which does contain a Table 6, but this table does not give numbers of individual ‘unlicensed prostitutes’ and ‘comfort women’. The figures are for households not individuals, and the terminology used makes it impossible to distinguish ‘unlicensed prostitutes’ from ‘comfort women’. The document from Suzuki et al. does not give a figure of 527 (nor any precise figure for the number of Korean unlicensed prostitutes in Shanghai), and gives a figure of 20 Korean ‘comfort women’ in the ‘comfort stations’ that it lists. (See Appendix 4).

    (iii) Ramseyer also writes that, in one month of 1938, 90 Korean women ‘petitioned’ the colonial government for permission to go to the Chinese city of Jinan ‘to work as unlicensed prostitutes’ (Ramseyer 2020, p. 5). The document he cites as his source (Suzuki et al. 2006 vol. 1, p. 143; Appendix 5) does not contain any mention of a petition or a request from any women, Korean or otherwise. What it contains is a letter from the colonial government of Korea reporting that 907 people (including 115 Korean women) had been issued with official documents for a journey to Jinan. There is no mention of ‘unlicensed prostitutes’ in the document. It speaks of ‘special women’ (tokushu fujin), a term used in documents of the time to refer to military ‘comfort women’ as well as women working in private brothels. The document also notes the issuing of documents to an unspecified number of others by the Japanese military police. In other words, Ramseyer converts a government document about the mass transportation of women to sexual service in Jinan into a ‘petition’ from women pleading to be ‘permitted’ to be unlicensed prostitutes.

    (iv) Professor Ramseyer states that ‘Some Korean comfort women in Burma worked on contracts as short as six months to a year’, and references this to a nineteen-page document in another five-volume archival collection (Josei no tame no Ajia Heiwa Kokumin Kikin ed. 1997), The document is confusingly referenced, but the reference appears to be to p. 19 of volume 1 of this collection. That page (Appendix 6) contains no reference to Korean comfort women, Burma or six-months contracts. It is about the setting up of ‘comfort stations’ in North China in the 1930s. Interrogation Report no. 49, cited in 5(iii) above, does refer to contracts of six months to a year, but, as we have seen, states that these contracts were fraudulent.

    (v) Professor Ramseyer’s statement that karayuki-san earned ‘generally higher wages [overseas] than they could earn within Japan’ (Ramseyer 2020) is referenced to ‘p. 451’ of Park Yuha’s 2014 book Teikoku no Ianfu. Since the book only has 324 pages, it is impossible to identify the source of the information.

Question for Discussion – As above, see if you (with help from Japanese or Korean speaking friends if necessary) can check more of the sources used in the Ramseyer article.

Does Professor Ramseyer provide full and correct references which confirm his conclusions and allow other researchers to verify them and follow up sources for their own further research?

General Questions for Discussion:

How would you rate the article ‘Contracting for Sex in the Pacific War’ in terms of your own standards of research integrity?

Do you think this article should be accepted for publication in an academic journal?

What systems exist in your university to protect research integrity?

Who implements them, and how?

What sanctions do they impose on researchers whose work fails fundamental tests of research integrity?

Could these systems and their implementation be improved?

What do you consider to be the best ways of maintaining research integrity and preventing research misconduct while also supporting the right to free speech?

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Tessa Morris-Suzuki is Professor Emerita of Japanese History at the Australian National University. Her current research focuses on the history of the indigenous people of the Okhotsk Sea region, and her most recent publications include Japan’s Living Politics: Grassroots Action and the Crises of Democracy (2020), On the Frontiers of History: Rethinking East Asian Borders(2020) and The Korean War in Asia: A Hidden History (edited, 2018).

Sources

McGregor, Katherine E. and Mackie, V, ‘Transcultural Memory and the Troostmeisjes/Comfort Women Photographic Project’, History and Memory: Studies in Representation of the Past, vol. 30, no. 1, 2018, pp. 116-150.

Nakai, Daisuke, ‘Mass Media in Japan, Fake News in the World’, Reexamining Japan in Global Context, Suntory Foundation Research Project Forum Report 13, 2018. Pp. 1-5

O’Herne, Jan Ruff, 50 Years of Silence, Watson’s Bay NSW, Editions Tom Thompson, 1997.

Pilzer, Joshua D., ‘Music and Dance in the Japanese Military “Comfort Woman” System: A Case Study in Performing Arts, War, and Sexual Violence’, Women and Music: A Journal of Gender and Culture, vol. 18, 2014, pp. 1-23.

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A coal-slurry spill into a river in Indonesian Borneo has killed hundreds of fish and forced authorities to shut off water lines to households.

The waste-management facility at coal miner PT Kayan Putra Utama Coal’s site in North Kalimantan province was reportedly breached on the evening of Feb. 7. The slurry spilled into the Malinau River and other waterways, including the Sesayap River, home for the nearly extinct Irrawaddy dolphin (Orcaella brevirostris).

By the morning of Feb. 8, the water in the Malinau had turned brown and cloudy, and nearly a thousand dead fish were found floating on the surface, according to residents. The local water board, which pipes its water from the river, shut off its pipeline over concerns that the pollution would contaminate the area’s water supply. The water supply was cut off for two days, according to Rosiena Kila, a resident of the district of Malinau, who also shared photos on Facebook of the dead fish. She added that residents had to collect rainwater during this time.

A dead fish collected by residents from the polluted Malinau River. Image courtesy of Rosiena Kila.

On Feb. 10, the North Kalimantan provincial legislature issued a letter to local authorities to investigate the incident.

“If it’s proven that the environmental pollution was caused by a certain company, we hope the government will certainly take an assertive move by demanding responsibility from the company — administrative, civic and criminal,” the letter, signed by councilor Hasan Basri, said.

Residents say the spill wasn’t the first of its kind in Malinau, where coal mining is a major industry, but that it was the worst. “Coal slurry spills are a classic problem in Malinau,” Rosiena said.

Five companies manage mining concessions along the Malinau River, according to data from the Mining Advocacy Network (Jatam), an NGO. They are PT Artha Marth Naha Kramo, PT Amarta Teknik Indonesia (ATI), PT Kayan Putra Utama Coal (KPUC), PT Baradinamika Muda Sukses (BMS), and PT Mitrabara Adiperdana (MA).

Jatam has recorded coal slurry spills in the river dating back to 2010. One particular incident, in 2017, was so severe that authorities ordered the company responsible, BMS, to suspend its operations for 60 days. In 2018, Jatam published a report showing the deterioration of the Malinau River’s ecosystem over the years due to mining activities. It cited complaints from residents that the river was turning darker and muddier, and fish populations had declined. Residents have also stopped using the river for bathing in or washing their clothes.

The problems of weak enforcement of environmental regulations, a lax licensing process, and a general failure to rehabilitate the river ecosystem mean there’s no deterrent effect for the coal companies, said Andry Lalingka, coordinator of Jatam’s North Kalimantan chapter. He added that, for residents, losing access to the river meant economic losses, given how reliant they are on the Malinau as both a source of water and a transport conduit.

“It’s fair to suspect that mining companies intentionally do this [spill slurry] to reduce the load on their waste facilities,” Andry said.

One of the smaller channels branching off the Malinau River has also been polluted. Image courtesy of the Mining Advocacy Network.

KPUC, the miner accused in the latest spill, has apologized for its negligence and promised to help distribute clean water to affected residents. It holds two permits allowing it to mine a combined 4,476 hectares (11,061 acres) of forest.

Government records identify KPUC’s beneficial owners as Soesanto, Gunawan Santoso, Lauw Kardono Lesmono, and Hendry Lesmana. Other names listed in the corporate deeds are Soegwanto, Ery Santi, and Juanda Lesmana. Juanda Lesmana is a prominent businessman with interests in North Kalimantan’s logging, shipping, and hospitality industries. He has also publicly backed politicians running in local and national elections, including the current governor and deputy governor of North Kalimantan, Zainal Paliwang and Yansen Tipa Padan.

While those ties suggest any punishment for KPUC will likely be trivial, Rosien said she still hopes justice will be served.

“Pity the people of Malinau who depend on the water and natural resources,” she said. “I hope the government of Malinau and other responsible stakeholders will immediately bring sanctions that can give a deterrent effect to the company so that this won’t happen again.”

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Featured image: Dead fish collected by residents from the polluted Malinau River. Image courtesy of Rosiena Kila.

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India’s Forever Wars and Forever Warriors

February 22nd, 2021 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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The Washington-based Quincy Institute, arguably the most intellectually stimulating American think tank nowadays, in its compulsively readable publication Responsible Statecraft featured on Tuesday an investigative report titled Weapons biz bankrolls experts pushing to extend Afghan War, authored by Eli Clifton, noted expert and journalist on US foreign policy.

It was an expose of the interest groups that dominate the narratives on America’s ‘forever wars’. Clifton made a case study of the controversial report by a group of experts established by Congress, which recommended that the White House should extend the May 1 deadline for withdrawing troops from Afghanistan, as stipulated under the Doha pact with the Taliban.

But the fine print is: “Two of the group’s three co-chairs and nine of the group’s 12 plenary members… have current or recent financial ties to major defence contractors, an industry that soaks up more than half of the $740 billion defence budget, and stands to gain from protracted U.S. military involvement overseas.”

One of the co-chairs named is Gen. Joseph F. Dunford, formerly Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commander of all US and NATO forces in Afghanistan (2013), and is now serving on the board of Lockheed Martin, and holds approximately $290,000 worth of stock in the arms manufacturing conglomerate under a devious scheme to award stock to directors in order to “further align their economic interests with the interests of stockholders generally.”

Clifton estimated that “the study group’s plenary is deeply intertwined with the military industrial base, with nearly $4 million the group’s co-chairs and plenary have received in compensation for their work on the boards of defence contractors.”

Clearly, Biden administration’s Afghan-policy making is skewed insofar as all of the advice it gets is heavily dominated by people with financial stakes in continuing the war. It was US president Dwight Eisenhower, the only general to be elected president in the 20th century, who first warned about the corrupting influence of the military-industrial complex, when he said famously in January, 1961 in his farewell address, “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”

The Indian narrative on the recent disengagement of troops on the disputed border with China in eastern Ladakh fits the above description in certain ways, although India doesn’t yet have an avaricious military-industrial complex. Logically, the disengagement of troops in Eastern Ladakh ought to be a cause for celebration that the war clouds have dispersed. Even Chinese experts acknowledge that the disengagement signifies a “a key breakthrough” that hopefully leads to peace and stability in short and medium term.

Looking ahead, pre-conditions now exist for a positive turn to the India-China bilateral relationship. Arguably, the recent India-China consultations over the upcoming agenda in the UN forum and an exclusive Reuters report on Tuesday that the government is getting ready to clear some new investment proposals from China in the coming weeks are discernible signs that the disengagement agreement is gaining traction.

A top Chinese expert, Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, a highly prestigious institution internationally, wrote yesterday that the disengagement agreement is “a wise and pragmatic decision” by the Modi Govt “after weighing the country’s interests at both home and abroad.”

No doubt, the decision is in India’s national interests. Frankly, the curtailment of economic ties with China was an unrealistic move. India’s imports from China actually increased in the second half of last year and China surged as India’s number one trading partner, surpassing the US.

Rolling back Chinese investments in the Indian economy was a self-defeating policy, as post-pandemic economic recovery and job creation ought to be national priorities. China becomes an irreplaceable partner, given the state of world economy.

Belatedly, the government realises it. But it remains to be seen whether the Chinese investors are about to get engaged with Indian economy. The systematic factors that inhibit western investors are also applicable to Chinese investors. Clearly, western companies relocating from China to cut production costs prefer Vietnam or Taiwan to India.

India stands outside the Asian supply chain, which the RCEP is expected to consolidate. Above all, there is the trust quotient. Despite the disengagement in Ladakh, the mutual trust in India-China relations has hit rock bottom.

This is where the creation of buffer zones in the disputed border areas assume significance. Such underpinnings enhance mutual confidence & ensure that peace and tranquility is sustainable. The stunning disclosure recently by minister VK Singh, a former army chief, that Indian ingressions must be five times the number of Chinese ingressions historically, underscores the criticality of buffer zones.

Yet, Indian analysts bemoan the creation of such buffer zones, saying it deprives the army from conducting “patrols” in disputed territories. Now, border transgressions can always be monitored through technical means, whereas, patrols risk face-offs. The government decided to prioritise peace and tranquility on a sustainable basis.

Why do Indian analysts look crestfallen? Fundamentally, the adversarial mindset inculcated through decades of indoctrination since 1962 explains it. As happens in opaque circumstances, interest groups proliferate, like mushrooms in damp soil.

VK Singh’s disclosure is a rare acknowledgement of ground realities which successive governments through past decades obfuscated as a mater of political expediency. Having said that, the government’s decision on disengagement cannot and should not be a ‘stand alone’ decision. Downstream developments in the political and diplomatic arena become highly relevant.

Any student of the Sino-Russian border settlement would agree that the October 2003 pact, which fully settled the intractable dispute, including the vexed question of control over the three islands in the Amur and Argun rivers, was only possible due to the mutual desire to strengthen the developing Russo-Chinese strategic partnership “in all areas, based on shared basic fundamental approaches to key issues of world politics” — to quote from the then Russian foreign policy concept (which, curiously, had also called for a “Russia-India-China triangular format”, although Delhi ignored it.)

Clearly, India and China have a lot of ground to cover to reach the ‘October 2003 moment’ in their relationship. The US will not probably countenance such a moment, either, as sans India, its Indo-Pacific strategy will remain a damp squib. Nor is India’s foreign-policy trajectory leaning toward a  quasi-alliance with the US going to be helpful. The untimely QUAD meeting yesterday that Washington convened bang in the middle of the disengagement in the Himalayas highlights the contradiction in the Indian policies.

Suffice to say, India also has a powerful pro-American lobby clamouring for “forever wars”. Sinophobia feeds into it seamlessly. This lobby will only gain ascendancy, as India develops a defence industry and the corporate interests and their eventual nexus with the defence establishment come into full play, inevitably, in the domain of foreign and security policies.

Eisenhower was prescient in laying down the red line universally applicable to all democracies upholding the civilian supremacy, but it is easier said than done. Thus, the ‘forever warriors’, being the best organised and best-endowed faction — and highly motivated too — almost always prevails, in the final analysis.

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The AMAN-21 naval exercise, the biennial event hosted by Pakistani Navy since 2007, in Karachi and the Arabian Sea from February 11-16 draws special attention. As many as 45 navies are reportedly participating, which makes AMAN probably the biggest event of its kind in the Indian Ocean or anywhere. Not only that, the participants include the US, UK, Turkey, Russia, China, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and some unnamed countries from East Africa.

In a world torn apart like at no time since World War 2, the US and Russia, the US and China and China and Japan are rubbing shoulders under the Pakistani canopy. Russia’s participation in AMAN is another novelty. Russia is having a military exercise with the NATO member countries for the first time in a decade. Without doubt, Pakistan’s growing diplomatic clout as a regional power is on spectacular display.

Clearly, India’s campaign to isolate Pakistan is not taken seriously by the international community. India’s Pakistan policy seems to have landed in a cul-de-sac. It lacks credibility and has no future. A course correction is overdue.

AMAN-21 makes a mockery of India’s aspiration to be a “net security provider” for littoral states in the Indian Ocean. The participation of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in AMAN-21 speaks for itself. Comparison will be drawn, inevitably, with the first-ever first ever Indian Ocean Region (IOR) defence ministers conference on February 4 at Bengaluru, which was poorly attended. Only Maldives, Iran and Seychelles were represented at ministerial level.

Evidently, there aren’t many takers in the IOR for India’s self-appointed leadership role. On the other hand, the militarisation of the Indian Ocean has resulted in a new reality: Maritime security challenges in IOR have acquired international dimensions.

The Trump administration’s expansion of the Area of Responsibility of the US Indo-Pacific Command to include the Indian Ocean waters within its fold has proved, in retrospect, a defining moment. The growing perception is that the US, which has limited presence in East Africa, would be depending on India to ensure freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean and to counter the Chinese Navy’s growing presence in the region.

India, in turn, is having back-to-back dealings also with the navies of France and the UK, NATO members, as well as Japan, a new kid on the block in the IOR, and the UAE and Bahrain, the US’s surrogates in the Persian Gulf. Much is happening beneath the radar such as a reported US-Indian exercise in Diego Garcia on “submarine hunting”. But India’s diplomatic thrust toward Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros is drawing international attention to the rapidly growing militarisation of the Indian Ocean.

The “Western Indian Ocean” comprising Somalia, Kenya, Madagascar, Comoros, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa and Tanzania is poised to become the focus of an increased US-Indian geo-strategic interest. The US’s National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2020 incorporated enhanced amendments to improvise existing Indo-US strategic ties in an enhanced framework in the Western IOR to take stock of the military coordination activities of the two countries.

Curiously, the US legislation defined “Western Indian Ocean” as the “area in the Indian Ocean extending from the west coast of India to the east coast of Africa,” which subsumes countries along the entire east Africa belt and Iran and Pakistan.

Indian strategists are delighted that the Pentagon is developing a Western Indian Ocean version of the Indo-Pacific concept incorporating the Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf and Africa that envisages India as the linchpin. It seems India has begun working on it diligently, as evident from the External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s recent regional tour of Bahrain, the UAE and Seychelles. The Indian strategic concerns appear to be two fold: China’s growing naval presence in IOR and Pakistan’s expanding submarine fleet.

Of course, the militarisation of the Indian Ocean is in direct violation of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2832 dated 16th December 1971 which designated the Indian Ocean as a “zone of peace” and called upon the great powers to halt further escalation of military presence including bases, installations and logistic/supply facilities.

The Resolution 2832, which was sponsored by Sri Lanka, guaranteed that warships and military aircraft would not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force; the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations; and, an international agreement would be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Without doubt, Washington’s definition of Western Indian Ocean is tantamount to imposition by an extra-regional power, which fundamentally violates various United Nations resolutions and encourages a conventional-cum-nuclear build-up in the high seas. India should have had nothing to do with it.

Looking ahead, India’s quasi-alliance with the US and other NATO powers will not have acceptability in the Indian Ocean region, especially Iran and Pakistan. It is easily predictable that Russia and China will also push back. In 2019, Russia and China held a joint naval exercise with South Africa and Iran respectively. Another Russia-China-Iran naval exercise is due on the Northern Indian Ocean later this month.

Tehran’s gravitation toward China and its support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also fall into perspective. It is a matter of time before Iran’s interests will converge with Pakistan and China’s via the BRI pivot. (Pakistan was invited originally to the Iran-Russia-China naval exercise in 2019.)

In the backdrop of AMAN-21, in an interview with the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Pakistani navy chief Admiral M Amjad Khan Niazi said, “Pakistan finds itself in the midst of a complex geopolitical and geo-economic competition prevailing in the region. Pakistan’s maritime security is intertwined with the maritime environment in the Indian Ocean region which is rapidly transforming… India, with an expansionist mindset, is destabilising the region by actions that could imperil regional security.”

Admiral Niazi added that the Pakistani and Chinese Navies “with their longstanding and expanding cooperation can play an important role in maintaining good order at sea. The PLA Navy’s presence in the Indian Ocean region is thus an important element in maintaining the regional balance of power and promoting maritime security.”

He hinted that Gwadar Port, which will serve as “the lynchpin of the CPEC” (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) may receive Chinese warships. The admiral took note: “Pakistan maintains close and ever-growing ties with China which has been one of the most steadfast and reliable partners for peace in the region… PLA Navy now operates two aircraft carriers. The PN would like to conduct an exercise with these carriers whenever an opportunity arises… PN would continue to welcome further visits by PLA Navy ships, including aircraft carriers.”

Even India’s time-tested friend Russia must be nodding disapprovingly. Russia recently announced the setting up of a naval base in Sudan, presumably to service its nuclear-powered submarines deployed to the “Western Indian Ocean”. Russia has discussed with Myanmar a regime to facilitate regular visits of its warships to the Bay of Bengal (which is, by the way, likely to be a major transportation route for China) against the backdrop of India providing access for the US to its bases in the Andamans and Nicobar.

To be sure, the audacious Indian trajectory on the pretext of “maritime security” is going to isolate it in the region. How a tie-up with the western powers, which are keen to tap into the emergent Asian Century, would serve India’s long-term interests is beyond comprehension. Do not rule out the US’ “Suez moment” in a conceivable future.

India cannot choose its geography and devise regional strategies to dovetail into the Western Indian Ocean hypothesis conceived in the Pentagon. India lives in its region and the accent should be to sort out its differences with Pakistan and China rather than piggy riding the NATO powers to counter China in IOR or to blockade Pakistan’s Makran coast.

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India: The Kisans Are Right. Their Land Is at Stake.

February 15th, 2021 by Research Unit for Political Economy

All Global Research articles can be read in 27 languages by activating the “Translate Website” drop down menu on the top banner of our home page (Desktop version).

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The protesting kisans on the borders of Delhi repeat one thing over and over: When fighting against the three farm-related Acts, they are fighting to save their land.

“See, they want to capture our land.  Adani, Ambani, corporate houses…” says one young protester. Though wheelchair-bound, he has come from Punjab to take part in the Delhi protest. An older kisan, shelling peas for the protesters’ collective kitchen, declares: “The Britishers, they captured our land. We shooed them away. We have to do the same thing now. We will not rest till we shoo them away.”

Yet the authorities are unanimous in declaring: the kisans are misled. There is no threat to their land.

  • The Prime Minister asserted on December 15: “a massive conspiracy is underway to misguide farmers in Delhi and nearby areas. They are being intimidated that others will occupy the land of farmers after the new agricultural reforms. Brothers and sisters, I want to know from you whether any dairy owner who enters into a contract with you for milk takes away your cattle. Whether the land of those trading in fruits and vegetables is taken away?”

 

  • “No corporate can snatch away any farmer’s land as long as Narendra Modi is Prime Minister of the country”, proclaimed Home Minister Amit Shah on December 25.
  • The Chief Justice of India too assured the kisans on January 12, 2021: “We will pass an interim order saying no farmer’s land can be sold for contract farming”. Senior advocate Harish Salve, appearing for the Government, informed the Court: “The Attorney General and Solicitor General can assure that these concerns are unfounded….  no lands will be sold off.”
  • The Government’s top policy-making body, the Niti Aayog, produced a paper in November 2020, in which it declared that “apprehensions like corporates usurping the lands of the farmers, or forcibly taking their assets by manipulating the agreement are totally misplaced.”
  • Indeed the alleged land-snatchers themselves, Reliance Industries, issued a press release on January 4, 2021, asserting: “Neither Reliance nor any of our subsidiaries has purchased any agricultural land, directly or indirectly, in Punjab/Haryana or anywhere else in India, for the purpose of ‘corporate’ or ‘contract’ farming. We have absolutely no plans to do so.”

 

Earlier, more candid, statements by the rulers

However, probing a bit deeper, it becomes clear the kisans are right. What is at stake, ultimately, is their land. The three Acts are an integral part of a larger policy, the result of which will be to part peasants from their land.

Indeed, just a few months ago, the rulers themselves were keen to advertise this fact to corporate investors. In his speech of May 12, announcing the “Corona package”, Modi said: “In order to prove the resolve of a self-reliant India, Land, Labor, Liquidity and Laws all have been emphasized in this package.” What “Land” was he referring to?

Two days later, the Chief Economic Advisor, Krishnamurthy Subramanian, spelled out what the Prime Minister meant: “Land and labour are really factor market reforms [in textbook economics, Land, Labour and Capital are the three ‘factors of production’ — RUPE] because these are factor inputs that really affect the cost of doing business and you have seen a lot of changes on these recently at state level. Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat have announced fundamental labour reforms and other states are also in line to follow up…. Karnataka had just gone ahead and changed the regulation on acquisition of land for business. Land can now be directly bought from farmers in the state and other states will also imbibe the model.”

The old land reform law in Karnataka prevented direct acquisition of land by private business, in order to protect peasants from force and fraud. The removal of this protection[1] in December 2020 was immediately welcomed by big business.

In line with this, at the height of the Corona crisis, the Modi government initiated two measures: drone-based mapping of all residential areas in the rural areas; and a model legislation for states to implement ‘conclusive’ land titling. Before we discuss these steps, let us briefly state the argument of this article.

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Summary

(1) Over the last two decades, international agencies and the Indian government have explicitly been preparing the ground for transfer of the lands of poor peasants. They term this the creation of “vibrant land sales markets” for farmers who “find their lands too small to be a viable source of livelihood.”

(2) In pursuit of this aim, the Indian government is trying to establish a system of ‘conclusive titling’ of all land in the country, whereby the State would permanently guarantee the title of the title-holder against any other claimants. The Niti Aayog is accordingly pushing state governments to adopt a draft ‘conclusive titling’ bill.

(3) In our country, land continues to be the single largest source of livelihood and sustenance, and there are often multiple, historically established, claims on it. These claims need to be determined and satisfied through a social process, not a mere administrative one. The present rapid forced-march of conclusive titling and digitizing land records threatens to oust large numbers of poor peasants from the most important rural means of production.

(4) This process is actually driven, not by the needs of the poor peasants, but the needs of international and domestic corporate investors, who want, from remote locations, to be able to take investment decisions related to Indian land.

(5) Ongoing changes and growing uncertainties in the world economy, as well as those anticipated in the world climate and environment, have fueled a drive on the part of international agribusinesses and financial investors to get control of land, including agricultural land, in the Third World. At the same time, in the neoliberal era, Third World economies have opened themselves to foreign investment further and further, and (in line with this) scrapped step by step their existent legal restrictions on corporate and foreign ownership of agricultural land.

One such global trend is the growth of organised retail, generally linked to foreign investment. This is leading to “the corporate takeover of the domestic food systems of the developing countries as a whole.”[2] This process reorients Third World countries’ agriculture away from staple crops for domestic consumption, toward fresh fruits, vegetables, and other produce demanded in the developed world and by the Third World countries’ domestic elites. Domestic food security systems are dismantled, and Third World countries become dependent on imports of foodgrains from developed countries (which have large surpluses of these grains). Foreign and domestic corporate investors’ penetration of the agricultural sector of a Third World country spurs the “concentration and foreignization”[3] of land.

(6) Three decades of neoliberal restructuring of India’s agriculture have led to an acute crisis, manifested most starkly by the suicides of over 3,00,000 peasants since the late 1990s. Official data reveal that the poor peasantry is squeezed, with their farm income not covering even their consumption needs.[4] At the same time, they are unwilling to part with their land. Their stubborn resistance is due to their knowledge that other secure livelihoods are not emerging (indeed, are disappearing), and that land and access to common property resources can still yield some subsistence for the peasant family.

However, the corporate takeover of India’s food system will press upon the various sections of the Indian peasantry in multiple ways. The winding up of official procurement will reduce farmgate prices for foodgrains, and force growers in procurement regions to shift to growing crops demanded by corporates, in a desperate attempt to meet their consumption expenditures. But the specifications and investments demanded by organised retail and by exporters are unaffordable for these small producers. Meanwhile, the winding down of the Public Distribution System will raise the consumption costs of peasants in other regions, including in tribal areas. All these trends will intensify the debt crisis of different sections of the peasantry, and lead to parting them from their land.

The kisans are not misled. Their resistance to this process is in their long-term interest. It is also in the national interest, by defending the food security and land of the country. It is thus a direct heir to the legacy of the struggles of India’s peasantry under British rule.

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We now proceed to elaborate the above.

The aim: creating “vibrant land sales markets”

One of the key elements of the neoliberal ‘reform’ process has been the transferring of control over land. As is well known, the Modi government in its first term tried to dilute or virtually scrap various provisions of its predecessor’s Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-settlement Act, 2013[5], against the interests of peasants, and in favour of forcible land acquisition.

That attempt at amendment had to be dropped by the rulers in the face of opposition both by peasant organisations and parliamentary parties, but the rulers plan to bring it back: According to a former member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council (PMEAC), “With the ruling party expected to be placed comfortably from November 2020 it is hoped to introduce the land bill again.”[6]

However, the process of separating peasants from their land is not limited to the acquiring of land for industrial, infrastructural, mining or real estate projects. It is also part of the re-structuring of India’s agriculture in the interests of monopoly capital. As part of this process, the neo-liberalizers wish to first fix ownership of the land on some person, whether or not that person has the exclusive right to it, so that ownership can thereafter be transferred to others. For this purpose, they reduce the question of land rights to a purely managerial question of improving the efficiency of land administration, which is the opposite of the truth. They have always been quite clear in stating the aim of this exercise: to facilitate the transfer of land. (Toward the same end, they have also been pushing for a new law for the leasing of land, aimed at promoting the leasing of small peasants’ land to large landholders.)

A 2001 report by the leading international consulting firm, McKinsey, claimed (without citing any reference) that “most, even 90 per cent by one estimate, of the land titles in India are ‘unclear’”.[7] One reason for this unclear status, it claimed, is the strength of tenancy rights in India: “both legal as well as illegal occupants gain de facto rights on the property they occupy, increasing the time and paperwork needed before the real owner can fully exercise his right to sell the property”.[8] In McKinsey’s view, by implication, all tenants are encroachers, without legitimate claims; only “real owners” have legitimate claims.

In fact, such tenancy rights as exist in India’s lawbooks are the legacy of fierce struggles by India’s peasantry over decades. These struggles, to one extent or another, established the social claim that those who actually work the land have a primary right on its fruits, not those who extract rent of one kind or another on the basis of paper titles. It is clear that what McKinsey terms a lack of ‘clarity’ is actually a social question, a struggle between classes for possession and fruits of the land.

In a 2007 document, the World Bank claimed that traditional land reform in India (abolition of intermediaries, tenancy legislation, and ceilings on land ownership), was no longer beneficial; indeed it was now turning harmful.[9] Land reform laws affected “the efficiency with which land is used by land reform beneficiaries as well as landowners targeted by land reform”. In other words, in order to boost ‘growth’, it was necessary to do away with land reform laws. In their place, the World Bank laid out a new charter: “Expand computerization, integration, and use of textual records to ensure full coverage [of land]. Provide a basis for statewide spatial coverage. Allow private sector participation in surveying, focusing government on a regulatory role.” Finally, it said, “Eliminate restrictions on land markets”, by legalising leasing of land; removing ceilings on rent; removing restrictions on the transfer of land, including to non-agriculturalists; and allowing direct acquisition of agricultural land by investors (i.e., without Government mediation).

Going further, the Columbia University economist Arvind Panagariya, in his best-selling book India: The Emerging Giant (2008), called for “state-guaranteed titles” to land as a prerequisite for a “highly efficient land market in India”:

Currently, an effort is under way to digitize the existing land records. While this is a useful exercise to ensure that the records that exist are properly documented and preserved, it will not solve the fundamental problem of the absence of state guaranteed titles. The latter requires legislative action. While politically complex, this reform has a very large payoff. Not only will it give millions of farmers peace of mind and avoid millions of law suits in future, it will also give rise to a highly efficient rural land market in India. (p. 322)

Indeed, it was the Congress-led UPA government that, in August 2008, launched the “National Land Records Modernisation Programme” (NLRMP), with the explicit aim of moving to a system of conclusive, State-guaranteed titles of land ownership.[10] It appears that the state governments gave their assent, and sent in their plans for implementation of this scheme. Progress, however, was slower than the rulers wished, and the Economic Survey 2012-13, prepared under Raghuram Rajan, called for accelerating the NLRMP “to map land carefully and assign conclusive title”, and bring about “greater liquidity for land”.

In 2014, the new Modi government made Panagariya the head of its central policy body, Niti Aayog, and he set about creating the land market of his dreams. A 2015 paper of the Niti Aayog states:

…[O]wnership rights in India are also poorly defined. All ownership is presumptive and subject to challenge in the courts. This feature has undermined the development of a vibrant land sales market with the owner unable to get the true value of his piece of land. In turn, this discourages land sales as well when the farmer finds his [sic] piece of land too small to be a viable source of livelihood.[11]

Thus neither international agencies nor successive governments, from the Congress-led UPA to the present Modi government, were ever coy to state their intent to part the “unviable” farmer from his or her plot of land through “vibrant land sales markets”.

Making use of the Covid-19 crisis

In April 2020, as India reeled under the world’s harshest lockdown – the country’s most terrible humanitarian crisis since Partition – commentators in the business press called for the Government to use the occasion to ram through politically difficult measures: “While the need to unleash the power of land was never in doubt, the coronavirus crisis has given us an opportunity to make it happen now.” Panagariya called on the Government not “to let the crisis go to waste”, pointing out “The crisis… gives the government the opportunity to introduce reforms in areas of land and labour markets that are harder in ‘peace’ time.”

In April 2020, at the height of the lockdown, the Prime Minister launched a new project, ‘SVAMITVA’ (Survey of Villages and Mapping with Improvised Technology in Village Areas), for drone surveys to map all residential houses in rural areas. Once this is done, state governments would issue property cards for these houses to village households. (Note that this merely formalises existing home ownership; those who do not have house sites will not benefit from this scheme.) Apart from demarcation of individual rural property, other gram panchayat and community assets like village roads, ponds, canals, open spaces, schools, anganwadis, health sub-centres, etc. would also be surveyed and maps would be created.

Why did the Government accord such urgency to this scheme? The Government claims this would “increase liquidity of land parcels in the market” (i.e., facilitate sales of property). Moreover, it is likely that, having set up a sizeable physical infrastructure and trained personnel for drone-based mapping in the rural areas, the Government may use the same later for mapping agricultural land as well.

Niti Aayog’s Draft Land Titling Act

In 2008, the UPA government undertook the National Land Records Modernisation Programme (NLRMP), with the aim of establishing ‘conclusive titling’ of land in India. This was revamped in 2014 by the Modi government as the “Digital India Land Records Modernisation Programme” (DILRMP).

Taking this further, in November 2020, the NITI Aayog released a model Land Titling Act, which it is pressing state governments to adopt (land being a state, not Central, subject). Given that all state governments signed on to the NLRMP, they may well agree to adopt such legislations in their respective states now.

A bit of background is required to understand the significance of the above step.

Land accounts for 73 per cent of the assets of rural households (buildings, located on that land, account for another 21 per cent).[12] Who owns, who possesses, who has a right to the fruits of, who has specific use rights in, and who can transfer a parcel of land are not simple questions in India; nor are they merely technical or administrative questions, but social ones, which must be determined through a social process. There are multiple layers of land rights, often belonging to different persons. And these can be questions of life and death for those affected.

At present, India has a system of ‘presumptive’ land titles, whereby the State does not guarantee land titles; evidence of ownership is provided by sale deeds, tax revenue receipts, etc. The onus of verifying ownership lies on the buyer of a property, for which the prospective buyer frequently carries out a ‘title search’ of existing documents.

Under a system of ‘conclusive’ titling, titles to property are registered with, and guaranteed by, the State. In order to institute such a system, it is necessary to conclusively determine ownership of all land, including the claims of creditors, and the rights of other parties such as tenants. Once such a determination is made, the State will guarantee the rights of the owner against all other persons. Such a system is known internationally as a “Torrens system.” Not all developed countries have it. Indeed it is not prevalent even in most states of the United States.

Legal scholar Jonathan Zasloff points out that, since land registration documents are to be accepted or rejected by bureaucrats, the present drive for a Torrens system provides enormous potential for bureaucratic corruption.[13] The official record will be determined by powerful vested interests.

India’s history provides ample evidence of this.

(1) Redistributive land reforms, to break the landlord monopoly on land, failed utterly in India. The historic report of the official Task Force on Agrarian Relations (1973) frankly admitted that such reforms never stood a chance: “Considering the character of the power structure obtaining in the country it was only natural that the required political will was not forthcoming.”[14] More recently too, the official Committee on State Agrarian Relations and Unfinished Task of Land Reforms (2009) pointed to “deep collusion between the large landholders [and] the political and bureaucratic structure”.

(2) An estimated 200 million people (Scheduled Tribes and other forest dwellers) were to be covered under the Forest Rights Act of 2006. To date, just 4.1 million individual titles have been distributed, representing about 20 million people, or 10 per cent of the projected coverage. The situation is even worse with regard to community forest rights (CFR): just 3 per cent of the potential CFR area has been established to date.

Even the much more modest aim of recording and securing tenants, and improving their share of the produce, was never attempted in most of the country. No doubt West Bengal carried out a major programme (‘Operation Barga’) in 1978-82, during which officials camped at 8,000 sites, and peasant organisations of the ruling Left Front mobilised sharecroppers to get registered. Yet even this covered only half the sharecroppers and half the sharecropped land, and more or less came to a halt by the mid-1980s.[15]

The final burial of land reform

Further, as Zasloff notes, if “land owners” are to be protected, “the question of who should own the land cannot be avoided”:

Among other things, Torrens protects absentee owners against loss of their land to squatters under adverse possession: squatters obviously will lack title registration certificates, and thus lack title. A just land distribution system in India, however, might favor squatters, millions of whom are poor victims of an often savagely oppressive history, and in any event are the ones making productive use of the land, frequently for several years.

Thus the Torrens system represents the final and formal burial of land reform; for once the State itself is the guarantor of the owner’s title, what question is there of the same State redistributing land to the landless? This despite the fact that there is much land to be redistributed, and (to quote the 2009 Committee on State Agrarian Relations) “The country will never be able to achieve a structural end to rural poverty without land reforms, including redistributive measures and security of tenure and ownership, prevention of usurious alienation from vulnerable segments of people and ownership of house sites.”

In current times, the word ‘reform’ is used not in its historical sense of progressive change, but to refer to all sorts of utterly regressive neoliberal policies and even outright plunder. So too the phrase ‘land reform’ has been appropriated: It now refers not to the historically progressive task of breaking up the monopoly of land and abolishing all types of feudal extractions, but policies to grab the means of production from poor peasants.

Indeed, as Zasloff points out, the very drive for titling can become a drive for dispossession:

Formalization can pose a problem for the poor for several reasons. It forces them to defend their claims, and they may lack the resources to do so. It might undermine customary or collective forms of tenure that work on the ground but are difficult to formalize. The very increase in property value that formalization can achieve might enable a government to levy property tax, and if the poor are unable to pay it, they will be driven from their homes. More darkly, greater land values might encourage those interests with little interest in the niceties of due process to make the poor offers that they cannot refuse.

But the implications of this process are not limited to dispossession of a section of peasants in the course of conclusive titling. The fixing of conclusive titles is meant to set the stage for a wider dispossession.

In Part 2 of this article (to follow), we discuss changes in the world economy which have fueled the desire of international investors to get control of land; and how the planned restructuring of India’s agriculture will force kisans to part with their land.


Annex

The theoretician of conclusive titling for Third World property

The justification for the move to conclusive titling derives from a fashionable theory propounded by the Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto in an international best-seller, The Mystery of Capital. Since its publication in 2000, the book has become a neoliberal bible, winning praise from neoliberal icons such as Margaret Thatcher, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, two Nobel Memorial prize-winning economists, and a host of other celebrities and authorities. The institute set up and run by de Soto “has been ranked as the world’s second-most influential think tank, with assignments from the ILO, the UN, and some thirty governments in the Third World and former Soviet states.”[16]

De Soto’s book is specifically aimed at refuting Marx’s thesis of irreconcilable class interests between the working people and capitalists. He is worried that Marxism may still provide the only explanation for the way things are, and so Marxist movements will revive: “Today, there are serious statistics that provide the anticapitalists with just the ammunition they need to argue that capitalism is a transfer of property from poorer to richer countries and that Western private investment in developing nations is nothing short of a massive takeover of their resources by multinationals.”[17]

De Soto sets out to refute those who point to the misery of the Third World as an indictment of world capitalism. He claims that in the West (the advanced countries), strong formal property systems enable all persons to participate in the economy, hence capitalism is successful there; whereas this is not the case in the Third World. Using questionable methodology, he discovers that the global poor already have ample property: “By our calculations, the total value of the real estate held but not legally owned by the poor of the Third World and former communist nations is at least $9.3 trillion.” (italics in the original)[18] Of this, $6.7 trillion is the value of the property of “informal urban dwellings” (slums and shantytowns), and $2.6 trillion is the value of “informal rural area” (land holdings). But this is what he calls “dead capital”, because “What the poor are missing are the legally integrated property systems that can convert their work and savings into capital.”[19] If only they had the legal titles to that property, they could borrow against it and start or expand their business activities.

We need not here discuss the whole of de Soto’s bogus theory, but one point is relevant for our present discussion. Contrary to de Soto’s depiction, rural land in India is not entirely undocumented. Moreover, given that rural credit in India is extended by public sector banks, not private ones, decisions on how much credit to extend, and what type of collateral to accept, are determined by Government policy. Rural landholders do possess various types of documents evidencing their right to the plots they hold. On this basis, millions of them already avail of bank credit. According to official press releases, 97 million farmer families have been registered on the PM-KISAN web portal, of whom nearly 67 million have Kisan Credit Cards. (No doubt, tenant farmers are unable to obtain credit against their land, but under any drive to formalize legal titles, they would be excluded from title anyway.) The problem of poor landholders is not that lack of conclusive title hinders them from obtaining credit, but that they face various types of exploitation as well as risks, so much so that they are frequently unable to service their loans, and thus some even face loss of land. Without improving the terms on which they labour, what use are de Soto-inspired drives to enhance the quality of their title, and enable them to borrow more?

The real import of de Soto’s theory (although he avoids saying it directly) is that, as long as the property of the poor is not part of his “legally integrated property system” (with formal, tradable, legal titles), it cannot easily be taken over by the private corporate sector. When bank officials or private creditors turn up to seize a debt-ridden peasant’s land, they may face the wrath of a peasant community, indignant at the idea that land is to be bought and sold.  In de Soto’s words:

A good property system… allows assets to become fungible [i.e., mutually interchangeable, like currency notes] by representing them to our minds so that we can easily combine, divide, and mobilize them to produce higher-valued mixtures. This capacity of property to represent aspects of assets in forms that allow us to recombine them so as to make them even more useful is the mainspring of economic growth, since growth is all about obtaining high-valued outputs from low-valued inputs.[20]

As one commentator notes, “What de Soto actually argues is that these assets would produce significantly more wealth if they were drawn into the formal sector”[21]; but wealth for whom?

Thus de Soto’s theory, while making seemingly pro-poor noises, actually prepares the basis for separating the poor from their meagre assets.

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Notes

[1] The Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Bill, 2020 removes Section 79A of the Act, that allowed only those earning less than Rs 25 lakh per annum to buy agricultural land, and Section 79B, that said only people earning a living through agriculture could buy agricultural land. 

[2] John Wilkinson, “The Globalization of Agribusiness and Developing World Food Systems”, Monthly Review, September 2009.

[3] See The Land Market in Latin America and the Caribbean: Concentration and Foreignization, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2014.

[4] See RUPE, India’s Peasantry under Neoliberal Rule, May 2017, Chapter III, https://rupe-india.org/66/partthree.html

[5] The full form is “Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013.”

[6] Jagadish Shettigar and Pooja Misra, “Land reforms: The next big game changer”, Hindu Business Line, November 23, 2020.

[7] McKinsey, India: The Growth Imperative, October 1, 2001, p. 19. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/india/growth-imperative-for-india#. McKinsey named the land market as one of the “three main barriers to faster growth: the multiplicity of regulations governing product markets (i.e., regulations that affect either the price or output in a sector); distortions in the land markets; and widespread government ownership of businesses.” Do away with these, McKinsey said, and annual GDP growth would be 4 percentage points higher.

[8] Ibid., p. 27.

[9] India: Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction (2007). The World Bank says: “econometric evidence also suggests that the positive impact of land reform legislation has been declining over time and actually risks becoming negative”. p. xxi.

[10] “Moving towards clear land titles in India: Potential benefits, a road-map and remaining challenges”, Rita Sinha, Secretary, Department of Land Resources, Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India, August 2008.

[11] Niti Aayog, “Raising Agricultural Productivity and Making Farming Remunerative for Farmers”, December 2015.

[12] National Sample Survey Organisation, NSS 70th Round (January-December 2013).

[13] Jonathan Zasloff, “India’s Land Title Crisis: The Unanswered Questions”, Jindal Global Law Review, 2011, Vol. XX Number X.

[14] Quoted in “Land Reform Is Dead, Long Live Land Reform”, Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), May 19, 1973. Further: “In a society in which the entire weight of civil and criminal laws, judicial pronouncements and precedents, administrative tradition and practice is thrown on the side of the existing social order based on the inviolability of private property, an isolated law aimed at the restructuring of property relations in the rural areas has hardly any chance of success….”

[15] Dipankar Basu, “Political Economy of ‘Middleness’: Behind Rural Violence in West Bengal”, EPW, April 21, 2001. Total land under sharecropping in West Bengal is estimated at 18-22 per cent of arable land; sharecroppers were recorded on 8.2 per cent of the arable land. West Bengal Human Development Report 2004, pp. 31-32.

[16] Steffan Graner, “Hernando de Soto and the mystification of capital”, Eurozine, January 2007, https://www.eurozine.com/hernando-de-soto-and-the-mystification-of-capital/

[17] Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, p. 165.

[18] Ibid., p. 41. These calculations are based on questionable methodology, which we will not enter into here.

[19] Ibid., p. 173.

[20] de Soto, op. cit., p. 168.

[21] Steffan Graner, op. cit.

Featured image: Farmers’ protest in India. (Source: Green Left Weekly)

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A 7.1 magnitude earthquake was recorded off the coast of Fukushima Prefecture in northeastern Japan on Saturday night, injuring around 100 people, closing roads and trains, and leaving almost a million people without electricity overnight.

It came almost 10 years after the nearby Tohoku quake of March 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake that caused a catastrophic tsunami and resulted in thousands of deaths and a nuclear reactor meltdown.

In the hours after Saturday’s quake, there were several aftershocks up to magnitude 5, and officials warned there could be more to come.

The Japan Meteorological Agency said the quake itself was an aftershock of the 2011 event. That might seem odd, but aftershocks of a major earthquake can persist for years and even decades.

How do you know if it’s an aftershock?

The earthquake occurred in what’s a called a “subduction zone”, where the Pacific tectonic plate slides under the plate on which northern Japan sits at a rate of 7 to 10 cm per year. It’s an area where there are a lot of earthquakes. It was a structurally simple earthquake: what’s called a “thrust” or “reverse slip” quake, in which rock above the fault moves up and over the rock below the fault.

In areas with low seismic activity, we can recognise aftershock patterns for years and decades after a major quake. The Christchurch earthquake of 2016, for example, was an aftershock of the 2010 quake. Some scientists think aftershock sequences in regions like the eastern USA and Australia may persist for centuries.

In these seismically quiet places, it’s relatively easier to spot aftershocks. The main hallmark is that the rate of quakes in an area is higher after a major quake than it was before. When the rate of quakes has dropped back to what it was originally, we say the aftershocks have stopped.

However, in places like Japan with high seismic activity, it can be hard to say whether one earthquake is an aftershock of another.

On one hand, the rates of aftershocks reduced to pre-2011 rates within about 3 years of the Tohoku earthquake and thus the sequence may have concluded.

On the other hand, rates of seismic activity were continuing to decrease in a fashion consistent with an ongoing aftershock sequence. And Saturday’s earthquake appears to have occurred in an area that generated fewer immediate aftershocks following the 2011 event, suggesting this earthquake could have occurred as rupture of a remaining “sticky part” of the 2011 fault that generated the Tohoku earthquake.

So was this an aftershock?

It’s certainly plausible that Saturday’s quake was an aftershock.

The 2011 quake was enormous — the largest ever recorded in Japan, and the fourth-largest worldwide since modern record-keeping began around 1900. It released around 1,000 times as much energy as Saturday’s earthquake, and created a rupture more than 500 km long with 10s of meters of slip. But the slip on the fault was not uniform and seismic activity continued in some areas that did not fail entirely in that earthquake.

Given all this, it’s almost certain there will be some relationship between the two quakes.

What’s more, there have been relatively few aftershocks of the 2011 quake close to where this one happened. This suggests it might have been a “balancing out” of stresses.

On the other hand, there have been several magnitude 7 quakes over the past century within 100 kilometres or so of this one, so it’s hardly out of the ordinary.

A definite answer on whether this was an aftershock or not will require detailed analysis of the quake and others in the region.

What we can learn from this

A quake like this one can be a valuable reminder of how important it is to learn the lessons of a disaster.

The earthquake generated very strong shaking in areas of Japan that were severely affected by the 2011 earthquake shaking and tsunami. Effects such as liquefaction are likely to have occurred again.

People sometimes think a big quake relieves stress built up in Earth’s crust and you can relax afterwards. In reality, it’s the opposite. When you have a big quake, there’s a higher probability you’ll have more to come. Subsequent earthquakes, whether they adhere to statistical definitions of aftershocks or not, can induce recurrent hazards that cause more damage to buildings and infrastructure and present risks to human life.

After a disaster, it is critical to act to reduce future exposure and vulnerability to future disasters through actions such as more considered land-use planning informed in part by better maps of seismic hazards, enhancing coastal protection through engineering of sea-walls and breakwaters and using vegetation, and making sure that warning and evacuation protocols are efficient and effective.

Japan is a world leader in many of these aspects, and the lessons learned from Tohoku are likely to have generated outcomes that minimised some of the loss and damage that could have otherwise occurred from Saturday’s earthquake.

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 is an Associate Professor of Earthquake Science, University of Melbourne.

Featured image is from The Millennium Report

Military Coup: The Myanmar-China Nexus

February 15th, 2021 by Askiah Adam

Myanmar has reverted to military rule. Claiming allegations of election fraud as basis for a coup the military has detained top civilian leaders of the former government, including the State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi who was head of government and the President, Win Myint. And many others including the student protesters that had brought Suu Kyi’s National League of Democracy (NLD) to share power with the military in a transition to democracy. On 1st February 2021 this ended and the military regime has announced a one year long national emergency before holding another election.

Meanwhile, while in power, the Nobel Peace Laureate, Suu Kyi, walked a tightrope of appeasement. She appeared in defence of her government before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against charges of genocide of the Rohingyas, an ethnic group robbed of its citizenship, denied its human rights and subject to ethnic cleansing by the Myanmar military. While some accuse her of racist prejudices towards the Rohingyas for her inactions, as head of government she was in no position to admit to the world that she had little control of the army, very much a part of her government.

Today that is a proven fact despite her best efforts. And to make matters worse the military government has charged her with crimes to legally silence her. The November elections demonstrated her continued popularity among the people, her waning international support notwithstanding. Suu Kyi held fast to her struggle for democracy in Myanmar but the compromises forced on her did much to damage her reputation but helped little in democratising the military.

There is an outcry against the coup in Myanmar, which some of them prefer to call Burma despite the now widely received name encompassing the country’s sovereignty. It is this hegemonic tendency by certain western nations that many find offensive.

In this regard, therefore, the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of sovereign nations by Beijing is much appreciated, while yet bringing shared prosperity.  Myanmar especially has had relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for 70 years, most of it years of military rule in Myanmar. China’s support had kept successive military regimes in power. Only very recently have there been any problems between Myanmar and China when the civil war in Myanmar spilled over into the Chinese province of Yunan, which shares a border with Myanmar.  But even this is under control.

So when China refused to interfere with the recent Myanmarese reversion to military rule in the UN Security Council, it was no surprise. Inasmuch as relations were good with the NLD government the indications are that nothing will change. China is heavily invested in Myanmar as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Myanmar will provide it with a port that can overcome the risks of Strait of Melaka congestions, imposed and otherwise.

As such, Myanmar has strategic value to China. Supporting Myanmarese sovereignty is also important to its security. The shared border is of immeasurable importance to China given the presence of the surrounding US bases intended to encircle her as part of the US’s Asian pivot policy. Maybe its plausible to believe that an army on standby is more attractive to Beijing than a civilian government propped up by the West on its borders.

Losing Myanmar as part of the Indo-Chinese buffer zone, too, is surely not a palatable option. Vietnam is already an illogical development for China where the US is being welcomed back even before the pervasive damage of the Vietnam War has yet to be fully repaired. Granted a thousand years of Chinese colonialism is not easily forgiven by the Vietnamese but the US damage caused by intensive bombing and harrowing Agent Orange deformities still persisting many decades after the war is even more horrifying. Hence China’s wariness of its borders.

Myanmar is showing risks of prolonged instability. Just over a week since the military coup the protests are escalating in the country’s two main cities Yangon and Mandalay. The police are using water cannons and protesters are being detained. It is claimed by the international media there is more demonstration of concern about the loss of democracy in Myanmar worldwide. But one wonders why a general can rule in Egypt and not in Myanmar?

Meanwhile, reports from Bangladesh suggests that the Rohingya refugees are happy to see the end of Aung San Suu Kyi’s rule. While the Dhaka Tribune piece cautions the Rohingyas, thus far, however, history has shown that repatriation in the past happened during military rule. The military has, in fact, immediately after the coup, reached out to the Rohingyas in Rakhine state. China is the only power to have offered a substantive contribution to the resolution of the Rohingya problem. It has offered to play an overseeing role in a tripartite arrangement to repatriate the Rohingyas where China can hold to account both sides. Such a move indicates the special relationship between China and Myanmar irrespective of who governs.

Of course, now that China is heavily invested in Myanmar vis-a-vis its BRI policy, debilitating political instability in its neighbour is something China will give its all to prevent. Its refusal to act against Myanmar in the UN Security Council is a strong signal that China still has Myanmar’s back. That Russia has stood by China in this respect suggests an unwavering strategic alliance between these two super powers.

Myanmar as a member nation of ASEAN is unlikely to be under pressure from the other members. Like China the organisation holds dear the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its members. Rather, this regional organisation exercises constructive engagement as the means to resolve any and all contradictions. This has been the position it has always held regarding Myanmar. There was no aversion to the military junta of old and, in all likelihood, the stance will remain unchanged.

Which time has shown that China is comfortable with.  While there maybe protests that are escalating at the moment its further escalation will most likely be too reminiscent of Hong Kong and Thailand.

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Askiah Adam is the Executive Director of International Movement for a JUST World (JUST). 

Featured image is from Asia Times

Lobbying for Gain: Passing Through Australia’s Revolving Door

February 15th, 2021 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

Governments have an almost crippling trouble appreciating conflicts of interest.  Since tentacle-heavy lobby groups decided to move into the world’s capitals to make the case for their clients, the revolving door has become the sickening feature of politics.  Former bureaucrats, public service officials and elected representatives find few problems with joining the very lobby groups that once pressured them to change policy.  This seamless movement of sewerage makes accountable governance a hag and transparency a bed-bound dream.

The indifference shown by political wonks and private sector lobbyists to this practice is reflected in an abundant literature that is enchanted by it.  Be it in organisational or management studies, you are bound to find work that even approves of the phenomenon, suggesting that people with abundant skills and contacts obtained while serving their country should be made use of on leaving their positions.  The significance here lies in the benefits that accrue to those in the market place (the lobbyists and companies) rather than the political needs of transparency and accountability.  A co-authored article in Managerial Finance from 2015 is almost prosaic in observing over the sample period of study that “firms which hire former politicians as directors or executives have significantly positive long-term abnormal returns”.  Hardly earth shattering.

In Australia, the greased revolving door is swift to giddying effect.  In critical industries, those formerly in government and public office make their slime strewn way into the corporate sector while still retaining compromising links.  In 2019, a study published in Public Health and Research Practice examined the background of 569 individuals whose names are on the federal lobbyist register.  The authors of the study were keen to examine the lobbying effect of companies in the alcohol, food and gambling industries.  As they rightly point out, “the development of public health policy often runs counter to the interests of” such companies.  To undermine the making of such policy is an essential feature of their revolving door strategy, an effort to capture the regulatory field. 

Of those surveyed, 197 had declared to have previously worked within government.  In this happy tribal collective were found 122 former representatives of government: 18% had been members of parliament or senators; 47% had held positions as chiefs of staff or senior advisors.  The authors conducted 15 key informant interviews which found the inevitable effect of such influence.  “Interviewees stated that they believed the revolving door created an imbalance between industry and public health advocates in terms of their access, advocacy and influence with government.”

Things are not much better in the defence and security industries, pockmarked as they are by appointments with a direct line to government officials.  In recent years, the examples have multiplied.  Dr Tony Lindsay, one of the country’s most notable defence scientists, farewelled his role as Chief of National Security Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Division in Defence, Science and Technology on October 28, 2016 only to take up an appointment, a few days later, with Lockheed Martin. 

The multi-billion dollar contractor is more than knee-deep with the Defence Department, having signed partnership agreements and running a scheme of industry placements for DST staff.  Lindsay’s Lockheed move was to take up the position of Director of the then newly established STELaRLab, the company’s first R&D lab outside the United States.  

Michelle Fahy of Michael West Media remarked at the time that the decision was “a good example of how the revolving door between the public sector and military-related private industry in Australia is being facilitated by both sides.”  Justifications to keeping such a process opaque follow a predictable copybook: journalists and the public should be kept in blissful ignorance for reasons of “national security” and “commercial in confidence” restrictions. 

Another tactic of obfuscation lies in the world semantics.  Avoid using such terms as “lobbying”, which emits an unnecessary pungency.  Focus, instead, on such platitudinous terms as “strategic adviser” and the giving of “strategic advice”.  This was particularly evident in justifying the role of former defence minister Christopher Pyne, who even went so far as to commence discussions with Ernst and Young Defence while still in the ministerial portfolio.  Within nine days of leaving politics, he was hired as a consultant and careful with his words.  “I’m looking forward to providing strategic advice to EY,” he told The Australian, “as the firm looks to expand its footprint in the defence industry.”

The most recent and startling instance of this is the case of Nick Warner, who completed his term as the first Director-General of the Office of National Intelligence last December.  He has also served as Director-General of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) and secretary of the Department of Defence.  His resume also has the lacing of various overseas roles: ambassador to Iran, high commissioner to Papua New Guinea, and special coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands.

Without so much as a murmur, Warner was retained by the Melbourne-based advisory firm Dragoman as a counsellor.  The company’s appetite is considerable and global, having previously included developing “a government strategy for an Australian provider of project and asset management services in the energy, chemicals and resources sectors.”  The company is not shy in emphasising the “alignment with Australia’s national interest.” 

Dragoman’s managing director and only publicly declared lobbyist is former Liberal Party vice-president Tom Harley; its chairman of counsellors is former defence minister Robert Hill.  Other counsellors, for good measure, include Ambassador Thomas Shannon, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs of the US State Department and Malcolm Rifkind, former British foreign minister and minister for defence.

Warner’s new role at Dragoman is not all that piques the interest.  The Canberra security and intelligence veteran, as revealed by the ABC, began being remunerated for consultancy services for the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) in January this year.  Questions posed by the national broadcaster to Harley, Warner and Dragoman on potential conflicts of interests have been treated with icy silence.

Federal Labor MP Julian Hill, deputy chair of Parliament’s Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, is also querying Warner’s engagement.  “The Prime Minister’s got some serious questions to answer about this whole arrangement.”  It was not clear what work Warner was engaged in “and how and if conflicts of interest are being managed”.  A man with “access to the most privileged secrets of Australia, more than most ministers would ever get” had concluded his tenure in the public sector, only to now work for “a lobbying firm whilst separately contracted by the Prime Minister.”  Perhaps Warner, in his wisdom, is merely providing well thought out, strategic advice. 

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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“Creating an environment in which women find it comfortable to work… is no longer a matter of choice for Japan. It is instead a matter of the greatest urgency.” — PM Abe Shinzō, speaking to the United Nations in September 2013. (Emphasis added.) 

“Since Japan’s population is shrinking, capital is finite, and productivity gains will take time, unless radical steps are taken quickly, we argued [in 1999] that the nation not only faced the risk of a further decline in its productivity and potential growth rate, but eventually, lower standards of living as well.” –Kathy Matsui, Vice-Chair and Chief Strategist of Goldman Sachs Japan. (Emphasis added.) 

Abe’s Womenomics Policy in Historical Context 

In 1999 a group of investment strategists at Goldman Sachs Japan led by Kathy Matsui applied the term ‘Womenomics’ to describe their recommended strategy for revitalizing the stagnant Japanese economy by “closing the gender employment gap” and promoting the better utilization of human capital through workplace equality.1 Two decades later, and six years after seeing Womenomics adopted as official government policy, Matsui claimed that “one of the biggest game changers in Japan’s attitude towards gender issues was the shift from diversity being a social or human rights issue to being an economic and business imperative.”2 This article critically examines whether the elevation of gender within economic discourse has been matched by results in the economy and in society. It finds that notwithstanding several important innovations in the past three years relating to labour standards, pay equity, tax policy, and the funding of both paternity leave and daycare, Japan seems fated to fall drastically short of nearly all its stated goals for gender equity in the 2020s.

“Abenomics”, a brochure and website by the Government of Japan updated in June 2020, touted the Abe government’s achievements since taking office in 2012 in promoting the status of women in the Japanese economy.3 It pointed out that, between 2012 and 2019, the number of women in private sector management positions “approached 10%”, while 3.3 million joined the workforce. An impressive graph showed Japan’s labour force participation rate for females vaulting past that of the United States during this period, to 74.0% compared with just 70.9% for the US. Unfortunately, these statistics were misleading insofar as they failed to mention the precarity of the female workforce. In 2017, 50% of the 28 million women in the Japanese labour market were in ‘non-regular’ jobs with few benefits, lower pay and shorter hours than ‘regular’ (i.e. ‘permanent’) employees, in comparison to just 16.7% of the 35 million male workers.4 By 2019, these ratios had risen to 56.0% of females and 22.8% of males respectively.5 Unsurprisingly, women disproportionately bore the brunt of unemployment in the COVID-19 recession. Of the record 970,000 people who had just been laid off in April 2020, 710,000 were women, making them the “shock absorbers” of the Japanese economy.

Image Source: Savvy Tokyo

The current situation of Japan’s female workers is deeply rooted in 75 years of history. Postwar Japan pioneered novel institutions that combined both foreign and domestic elements in the realms of education, the financial system, bureaucracy and employment practices. In the economic arena, this meant that the export of manufactured products, capital and people was stressed, while their import was not. This strategy was facilitated and reinforced by a high domestic savings rate and high export earnings. An employment structure was also developed based on lifetime employment and seniority wages for elite workers in large corporations, enterprise unions which agreed to non-confrontational labour relations and long hours in exchange for job security, and paternalistic company welfare functions in elite corporations. These institutions of high-speed growth worked well enough to make possible Japan’s rise to being the world’s second largest economy, consistent with an advanced welfare state and lower levels of income inequality than almost every other developed country.6

Underpinning this entire system, however, was a sexual division of labour in which women accepted virtually sole responsibility for household management, the raising of children, and the care of aging parents. Women’s management of household finances gave them an important role in helping to generate the savings that financed the economic miracle, but no say in shaping economic institutions or the salaryman culture that pervaded Japanese society despite only directly benefitting a small number of elite male middle-class workers.7 As millions of women gained ground in affluence, education, and juridical status, many began to see the role of housewife and mother as a trap. R. Taggart Murphy describes this perceived trap as being more pronounced, and more problematic, in Japan than in other industrial and industrializing countries, where men are both more able and more willing to share in housework and child-rearing. “For while Japanese blue-collar workers, salarymen, farmers, small business owners, shadowy Far Right fixers, ambitious politicians and the University of Tokyo-bred mandarin class…had all had their input during the 1950s when the institutions of high-speed growth assumed their final shape, women were not represented. The consequences of their exclusion—both for them and for the men they married and the children they raised—would prove incalculable.”8 Feminist critiques have shown that the first generation of laws dealing with employment equity, childcare, eldercare, and sexual violence were inadequate to address the deep structural and cultural impediments facing women struggling to balance family responsibilities with careers.9 10 As Helen Macnaughtan observed in 2015, “[t]he lingering ideal of the male salaryman and the female shufu (housewife) is now hugely disconnected from social realities, but remains as an ideal because the alternative – the renegotiation of men, women, work and childcare – is complex.”11

Moreover, the growing disillusionment of Japanese women with the shufu role model has occurred within an economic context of increased precarity of employment since the Great Recession of the 1990s. The increase in non-regular work for both males and females has meant that people are increasingly reluctant to commit to marriage and childrearing, which, in combination with a restrictive immigration policy, has meant that Japan is aging faster than any other large country.12 The Japanese population has been shrinking, from its historic high of 128.5 million in 2009 to 124.2 million in 2020. (If this trend were to continue, there could be as few as 88 million people by 2055, with 38% of that population aged 65 or older, supported by a workforce that will have been cut in half to just 45 million.) Even under less alarming scenarios, and despite the stimulus afforded by Abenomics, Japan may find it increasingly difficult to encourage investment, avoid declining consumption of goods and services and deflation, manage its public debt (already the world’s highest relative to GDP), or maintain its high standard of living. From a demographic perspective, the failure to restructure the gender order has produced the worst of both worlds: the rejection of the shufu model that once encouraged larger families, without the kinds of economic opportunities, cultural changes and institutional supports that could enable Japanese women to effectively combine child-rearing with careers (or contribute to raising productivity).

In 2020, Japanese men still did less housework than their counterparts in any other developed country, while women got less sleep than any of their counterparts, according to the OECD.13 The postwar employment model and several aspects of its associated social compact are still firmly in place, despite this growing dysfunction, which explains how a G-7 country that ranked 19th among all nations in the 2020 United Nations Human Development Index has also slid to 121st out of 153 countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report] , a drop of 40 places since 2006. The equality ranking is a composite of four sub-indices: a respectable 40th in health; a more worrying 91st in educational attainment; and a dismal 115th in economic opportunity and 144th in political empowerment—the latter being by far the worst of any advanced industrial country. This paradox (no other country in the top 20 of the UNHD index is also in the bottom 50 of the WEF index of gender equality) is largely attributable to Japan’s employment system, and to the inherent limitations of what Ayako Kano has called “state feminism” (state sponsorship and co-optation of gender issues), particularly under the aegis of the LDP and Abe Shinzo.14At issue is whether a few recent major initiatives in the areas of the provision of childcare, parental leave, work hours and tax policy, in addition to a number of ambitious but completely voluntary targets, promotional and educational activities, are adequate to address these demographic and economic challenges.

Continued Structural Inertia in the Employment System and the ‘Breadwinner’ Model

Most scholars seeking to explain the very slow advancement of women in the Japanese economy, despite various types of legal support, stress that Japan’s lifetime employment and seniority-based system for elite workers was generally ‘rational’ during the postwar period of high growth. Japanese firms anticipated an excess of labor demand over supply; lifetime security increased retention rates and prevented the loss of firm-specific human capital; and seniority-based wage and retirement schemes acted as a form of deferred payment that gave employees the incentive to work long term. Sociologist Kazuo Yamaguchi has argued that this appearance of rationality may have been deceptive: the system only had a limited (“strategic”) rationality because of specific historical conditions and cultural assumptions that were emphasized or constructed at a particular socio-economic juncture, the irrationality of which only became apparent once Japan’s postwar period of rapid economic growth had passed. Yamaguchi observes that the popular ‘cultural’ theory that traces the origins of Japanese firms’ attributes to the Edo samurai household “fails to explain why, barring a few exceptions, the Edo period samurai system was not widespread among Japanese companies during the Meiji, Taisho, and early Showa periods, and was only popularized during a period of rapid economic growth.”15 Nor does it explain why more elements of Japanese feudal agricultural households (uji), in which males and females worked together, were not chosen instead. He finds that “institutional inertia” was created in postwar Japan as mutually reinforcing practices, based upon strong job security and seniority-based wages, became established. These possessed high stability notwithstanding the existence of other, more rationally desirable institutions, which could have better served to attract, develop, and retain female employees. “From its inception, the Japanese employment system was created by overlooking the utilization of female personnel.” 16

Under this system, opportunities for regular employment are scarce for those who leave the workforce, regardless of their experience or educational attainment, and regardless of whether they do so for childcare reasons. Although this lack of second chances technically applies to men as well, women experience far higher turnover rates during child-rearing ages, typically retiring from regular jobs upon marriage or the birth of a first child, and then returning to the workforce as non-regular workers after their children are grown. As several leading Japanese labour scholars have stressed, regular employment in Japanese firms makes them “membership-type” organizations, and not just “job-type”; “kintract” (i.e. the combination of kinship and contract, applying the feudal loyalty to the household to the modern corporate context as the quid pro quo for lifetime employment) rather than simply “contract”. Even the Japanese bonus system, which pays almost all regular employees at the same rate depending on company sales or profits, is starkly different from most Western-style bonus systems, which reward individual performance. When pay is premised upon collective performance, both management and trade union peers can enforce corporate norms, including the expectation of long hours from regular employees—an expectation premised upon the so-called ‘traditional’ sexual division of household labour in which females play the supporting role to the male breadwinner. The lifetime employment system, the seniority-based wage system, and the Japanese-style bonus system all serve to reinforce employee acceptance of constraint in exchange for security, even though the actual beneficiaries of that social bargain represent a shrinking proportion of the population.

Yamaguchi’s game-theoretic analysis, which explains how the Japanese employment system displays strategic rationality at the expense of general economic rationality, is broadly consistent with feminist critiques of state feminism over the past three decades. Ayako Kano’s account of feminist debates concerning the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (EEOL) shows how the elimination of paternalistic “protections” in the name of equality enabled more women to join the workforce, but the law was still heavily criticized by both liberal and radical feminists for caving in to business interests. “The issue of workplace equality was left to the discretion of employers, who simply created a two-track system—one that subverted the intent of the law and ensured that most women would remain in secondary positions in the workplace.”17 This system assigned the majority of men to the managerial career track (sōgō shoku) even if they lacked college education, and the majority of women, including college graduates, to the clerical career track (ippan shoku).

Stephanie Assmann argues that “the EEOL has always been a guideline for private companies rather than a policy enforced by law. … Japanese companies have regularly evaded the EEOL by establishing a dual career track … system [which] continues to be practiced to maintain gender-specific employment conditions, without openly declaring a gender bias.”   She observes that the revised version of the EEOL in 2006/07, which forbids indirect discrimination, challenges the dual track system by further constraining the conditions for hiring and promotion. Nevertheless, those changes were implemented in the context of deregulation of the labour market, which limited progress against discrimination due to the rising tide of irregular and part-time employment.18 The growing prevalence of irregular employment may have also blunted the economic benefits of the 1999 Basic Law for a Gender Equal Society and the subsequent five-year Basic Plans for Gender Equality, which set out specific numerical targets and deadlines (including several for 2020) as well as the promotion of work/life balance, child-rearing support and the development of policies to implement international standards. Economic insecurity no doubt contributed to some of the backlash against state feminist initiatives from about 2000 to 2006, much of it led by none other than Abe Shinzō.19

Indeed, certain aspects of sexual discrimination in the workplace may have increased during and after Japan’s Great Recession of the 1990s, notwithstanding the legislative advances during that period. Yamaguchi points out that in the past three decades, Japanese firms responded to recession and slower growth by replacing regular employment with non-regular employment through retirement and “restructuring”, thereby attempting to secure economic rent by keeping the wages of non-regular workers lower than their productivity. Consequently, the labour share of national income declined and corporations experienced a temporary improvement in their operating profits. Because this defensive measure did not raise productivity, though, and in fact left most traditional regular employment practices untouched, it actually gave rise to a new form of discrimination against women: “giving priority to men in new-graduate regular employment, unlike during the period of rapid economic growth when new graduates could find regular employment regardless of gender.”20 But after the economic slowdown, more women could be slotted into the non-regular and ippan shoku (regular, clerical) positions exempt from long working hours. At least this development gave Prime Minister Abe something to brag about until the COVID-19 crisis hit: a temporary boost in female employment.

Beyond Tokenism? Recent Legislation and its Limited Effects

The effectiveness of the 2018 Workstyle Reform Laws in providing equal pay for equal work and a labour market more conducive to work/life balance is difficult to gauge amidst the massive layoffs and revocations of informal job offers caused by the pandemic. Abe boldly pronounced that “[t]hese are the first major reforms [to labour laws] in 70 years. We will rectify the problems of working long hours and eradicate the expression ‘non-regular employment’ from Japan.”21 Yet, as economist Naohiro Yashiro has pointed out, the formal prohibition against discrimination between regular and non-regular workers does not affect the large wage gap attributable to seniority-based pay, since employers are only obliged to pay equal wages to regular workers and non-regular workers with the same length of work experience at the same firm. “It de-facto rationalises the current wage gap mainly based on the seniority wage of regular workers.”22   Moreover, the amendments enacted to improve pay and employment conditions for non-regular workers still do not explicitly refer to equality between men and women, and do not carry stiff penalties, but merely require employers to explain the reasons for any differences upon an employee’s request. This is consistent with the soft law ‘comply or explain’ approach favoured by both the corporate sector and the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).

Yamaguchi’s analysis of the ‘gender wage gap’ by a combination of employment types (four categories distinguishing regular versus non-regular employment and full-time versus part-time work) shows that gender differences in employment type explain only 36 percent of the gap.23 In fact, the primary factor is the wage differential within full-time regular employment. “The elimination of the gender wage gap among regular workers is therefore a more pressing issue than fixing the overrepresentation of women in non-regular employment.”24 A major cause of this disparity is the small percentage of female managers in Japan. According to the 2017 Annual Report of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare,25 women hold just 6.6% of senior management positions (department director or higher); 9.3% of middle management (section heads); and 18.6% of lower management (e.g., task unit supervisor) positions.

Even more remarkable is how much Yamaguchi’s research findings contradict employers’ stated reasons for not promoting more women. The two major reasons given by personnel officers in surveys are (1) “at the moment, there are no women who have the necessary knowledge, experience, or judgment capability”, and (2) “women retire before attaining managerial positions due to their short years of service.”26 His analysis of firms with 100 or more employees shows that only 21 percent of the gender disparity among regular workers in middle management (section heads) and above could be explained by gender differences in education and employment experience. In fact, “the proportion of managers among female college graduates is far lower than that among male high school graduates, for any given number of years of employment for the current employer.”27 In all, about 60% of the wage gap remains even after educational attainment, age, employment duration and working hours have all been equalized.28 The rest of the disparity arises from gender differences in the rate of promotion to managerial positions among employees with the same levels of education and experience. (Hence the proportion of section head positions that women attain on average after 26–30 years of employment is attained by men within 5 years.) Yamaguchi surmises that the major underlying cause of gender inequality stems from the Japanese employment practice of promotion based upon seniority combined with indirect discrimination against women through firms’ internal tracking systems. This practice of statistical discrimination based upon the putative probability of temporary job-quitting becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, since women often quit their jobs when raising children due to their smaller chance of developing their careers in their firms.29 Given the wider influence of corporate/salaryman culture in Japanese society, it is not surprising to find that this pattern extends beyond the corporation to the professions as well: for example, the now-discredited practice at Tokyo Medical University (and probably several other private universities) of making deductions from entrance exam scores for more than 10 years to curb the enrollment of women.

This issue is deeply structural and highly resistant to ordinary incremental inducements and exhortations. That is why Yamaguchi advocates broadening the definition of indirect discrimination in Japan’s Equal Employment Opportunity Law:

In order to break through this present situation, the definition of indirect discrimination in Japan must be changed to comply with international standards, including, as discriminatory practices, institutions that have a disparate impact on the minority, rather than only institutions that are discriminatory in intention. In particular, an essential requirement for gender equality of opportunity will be to prohibit by law internal tracking systems such as the distinction between the managerial career track and the clerical career track, which is very strongly associated with the employee’s gender, as an institution of indirect discrimination.30

Such proposals, though, run counter to the general policy ethos of deregulation. After not a single Japanese company took up the Ministry of Labour’s offer in April 2014 of between 150,000 and 300,000 yen apiece to train and promote women to supervisory roles, the government’s Gender Equality Bureau reduced the target for female section heads in businesses to just 15%. In June 2020, it was announced that the 30% target would be delayed for up to a decade. In June 2020, the Minister of State for Gender Equality announced that the 30% target would be delayed for up to a decade. More importantly, there was still no indication that the new target would be mandatory or carry stiff penalties if not achieved. At present, only 4% of Japanese corporate board members are female, even though the stated goal for 2020 was 10% (most American and European companies are already over 20%). The government simply delayed the goal, with an additional promise “to aim for a society where men and women alike are in leadership positions” by 2050.31

Osawa Machiko, a labour economist at Japan Women’s University, states that the problem will not be solved until Japan “develops a more liquid job market that would allow women to threaten to take their skills to other organisations.”32 Her analysis, like Yamaguchi’s, is consistent with a recent OECD study recommending the labour market reforms that are needed in order to enable Japan to better utilize its human capital.33 All of these experts agree that breaking down labour market dualism is crucial to expanding employment opportunities for women and older people, while reducing income inequality and relative poverty. This need not mean jettisoning the Japanese system in its entirety (Macnaughton, for example holds out hope that “core Japanese elements such as corporate loyalty and citizenship, commitment to investment in employee training and careers, and a priority for employee security before corporate profits can be extended to encompass female and non-regular employees”), but it does mean confronting the fundamental logic of seniority, tenure, collective bonuses, sōgō shoku/ippan shoku, and other aspects of the Japanese corporation that serve to reproduce gender inequality.

The rigidity and entrenchment of the system is why the gap between promise and performance is so pronounced in the area of parental leave. Japan’s generous Child Care and Family Leave Law has been in place since 2009 and childcare leave benefits have recently been increased from 50% to 67% of parents’ existing salary for the first six months of leave, and 50% thereafter for up to a year. Japan even has the longest paid-leave for fathers in the world, 30.4 weeks, according to a 2019 UNICEF Report.34 The difficulty is that very few fathers use it. According to data compiled in the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Basic Survey of Gender Equality in Employment Management for fiscal 2019, only 7.48 percent of eligible men used childcare leave.35 (By comparison, 62% of eligible German fathers and 70% of Swedish fathers took at least two months of paternity leave in 2015, for a total uptake of the legally available leave of 30% and 45% respectively.36) Japan has experienced a steady incremental increase since 2011, but the figure remains far below the government target of 13% of fathers by 2020 and 30% by 2025. The latter objective is unlikely to be achieved, but not because they are not interested. A 2017 Japanese government-commissioned study found that 35% of new fathers wanted to take paternity leave but did not because they feared the repercussions for status and promotion.37

Although there continues to be incremental progress in the development of new legislation,38the persistent under-utilization of paternity leave in the face of both legislated incentives and popular support for the policy suggests that there exists not just a cultural lag, but a collective-action problem: i.e. a situation in which individual rationality makes a collectively rational outcome impossible to achieve.39 As such, mandatory paternity leave may be necessary in order to break the impasse. It would remove at a stroke the problem of intra-company competition deterring the use of parental leave, as well as the problem of inter-company competition pressuring managers to punish leave-takers. Such a proposal does not appear to be unacceptably radical for Japan, because in June 2019 50 Diet members, including 11 former Cabinet ministers, supported the idea.40

The expenditure of nearly 2 trillion yen in the 2017 budget to expand the scope of free education and childcare services, along with increasing childcare leave benefits and the reform of the dependent spouse tax deduction (which had discouraged women from entering the labour force by giving a tax benefit to married couples if a spouse — in most cases the wife — earned less than a certain amount) are more than just token measures. So are some of the revisions to Japan’s labor laws. As of April 1, 2019 large firms (defined as firms with 300 or more employees) were required by the aforementioned Workstyle Reform Law to comply with a new overtime Basic Limit of 45 hours per month and 360 hours per year, although under “special circumstances” this can be extended to 100 hours per month and 720 hours per year.41 It also carries a penalty for non-compliance with the new overtime rules that may include imprisonment for up to six months or fines of up to 300,000 Yen. Although it is not clear how much this directly affects women, given their small presence in the regular workforce, it does strike a blow against the prevalent ‘more is always better’ attitude toward male working hours.

Nevertheless, these measures reflect a narrow, compartmentalized strategy that is tailored to impose minimal restraint upon business. They may not be sufficient to engineer the kind of rapid structural, cultural, and societal transformation that many commentators feel is needed when the fertility rate in 2020 remains stuck at 1.369 births per woman (replacement rate is 2.1 per woman), and the cost of females not participating in the workforce on an equal basis with males is estimated by Goldman Sachs to be almost 13% of GDP.42

Supportive Social Policy and Increased Immigration as Policy Alternatives

The reluctance of Japan’s political elites to adopt a more comprehensive and aggressive approach is more baffling considering their resistance to mass immigration, which is the only feasible policy alternative to Womenomics for stemming the effects of demographic decline. The United Nations estimated in 2009 that Japan would need 650,000 immigrants per year to stabilize the nation’s population (the actual number of net immigrants in 2019 was 165,000). Although the majority of Japanese people surveyed are not opposed to gradually increasing immigration to meet labour shortages, there is official opposition to creating a large, permanent immigrant community.43 One reason for this is the difficulty that was experienced in integrating the 370,000 nikkeijin (ethnic Japanese born in Brazil and Latin America) between 1990 and 2010. That policy failure suggested that unfamiliarity with the Japanese language and culture presents a serious obstacle to reliance upon immigration as the primary policy instrument for solving Japan’s demographic dilemmas.44

Japan therefore needs to ask how seriously it takes, or ever took, the goal of raising its fertility rate from under 1.4 to 1.8 by 2025. France furnishes perhaps the most relevant international comparison because it successfully used public policy to raise its fertility rate from 1.7 to nearly 1.9 in just 10 years between 1993 and 2003. The French began precisely where conservative Japan has thus far feared to tread: by taking the broadest, most liberal definition of family possible, to include unwed couples, adoptions, same-sex couples, and single parents. French maternity leave (fully paid for sixteen weeks per child for the first two children and twenty-six weeks in the case of a third child, with an additional monthly stipend that rises with the number of children) can be split with partners, with an additional eleven days of paternity leave reserved exclusively for fathers. A mother can also take an additional two and a half years without pay, with a guaranteed right of return to her job (up to five years leave if there is more than one child). French law requires that at least 40 percent of directors be women (or not fewer than the number of men minus two for smaller corporations). Yet Japan purportedly seeks to raise its fertility rate twice as much as France by doing considerably less. Moreover, France’s current fertility rate of 1.85 births per woman is due to French-born mothers giving birth at a rate of about 1.75, plus the contribution made by immigrant mothers, who in 2017 averaged 0.8 more (all told, immigrant mothers contributed 18–19% of French births in 2017).45Japan’s reluctance to greatly increase its levels of immigration means that it is even more reliant than France is upon its domestic fertility rate, making its task that much more difficult.

Although the number of children waiting to enter authorized daycare facilities in Japan as of April 2019 was the lowest (16,772) it had been since records started in 1994, new demands arising from the advent of free daycare for children up to the age of two from low income households, coupled with a growing shortage of childcare workers eating into the profitability of private preschools and daycare centers, means that the goal of eliminating waiting lists remains elusive.46 To achieve its ambitious goals for both increasing female labour participation and raising birth rates, however, Japan should probably take a page from Scandinavia and the Netherlands and not just from France. That is: it should supplement these social policy supports with policies that take more direct aim at gender equality and labour market flexibility across different job categories.

There is also more that can be done in other areas of family law and social policy, such as providing more support for (or at least fewer impediments to) single parents, unmarried parents and gay couples who may wish to raise families. Opposition parties submitted a bill in 2019 that proposed legalizing same-sex marriage, but the Abe government declined to debate it, on the grounds that same-sex marriage is prohibited by Article 24 of the Constitution, which states that “marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes.” That conservative interpretation of Article 24 is currently being challenged in the courts, and the Japanese Bar Association has recommended that Article 24 be interpreted so as to not deny the Article 14 guarantee of Equality.47 The first judgement in this case is expected in the Sapporo District Court on 17 March 2021.Some prefectures have issued partnership certificates to same-sex couples,48 and the trend in public opinion is unmistakeable: according to a poll carried out by Dentsu in October 2018, 78.4% of Japanese people under the age of 60 were in favour of same-sex marriage.49 It is telling however that the national government is more of a hindrance than a help to recognizing non-traditional family structures, notwithstanding its ostensible commitment to promoting adoptions and to facilitating the careers of all women and couples who decide to raise children.50

Tokenism in the Political Arena: Gender Inequality and the LDP

Abe Shinzō acknowledged the need to complement efforts to promote female managers in the private sector with those to encourage both elected and non-elected officials in the public sector. Nevertheless, his government managed to avoid several key opportunities to break the glass ceiling at the highest reaches of government. First, the issue of female succession to the Throne of Japan: the existing Imperial House Law of 1947 remains a clear affirmation of patriarchy and patriliny in a country that needs just the opposite.51Second, Abe allowed the number of women in his Cabinet to slide from seven in 2014, just after Womenomics was announced, to just two in 2020, a number maintained by his successor, PM Suga Yoshihide. Third, the lack of female representation in the Diet: Japan’s electoral system allows for 176 members of the House of Representatives and 96 members of the House of Councillors to be elected from party lists in accordance with proportional representation (PR). In most countries with a PR-element in their electoral system, political parties use PR-lists in multi-member constituencies in order to enhance and ensure female and minority representation. Emma Dalton’s work describes how the replacement of the multi-member Single Non-Transferrable Vote with the mixed-member plurality system in the electoral reform of 1994 raised hopes for a similar breakthrough in Japan, which did not materialize due to a series of moves by LDP politicians calculated to defuse its radical potential. One aspects of this was the steady reduction in the number of PR seats (from one-half or 250 in the original proposal of the Hosokawa government, to 226 in the compromise negotiated by Hosokawa with the LDP in November 1993; to the 200 PR elected in 11 regional blocs that was included in the 1994 law and used in the 1996 general election, to 176 out of 480 seats used in the 2000 general election and afterwards). Arguably even more important was a provision in the 1994 law allowing dual candidacies across the two electoral segments (the “zombie” clause), which protected the careers of incumbents and thus greatly reduced opportunities for women. Most parties, in particular the LDP, resisted calls for quotas. Some campaign finance reforms limited the power of private money and provided some modest government funding of parties, but these measures had only modest effect, with female representation in the Diet rising from 2.7% in 1993 to just 7.3% in 2000, and then levelling off.52

The political reforms of 1994 also gave the PM increased powers in order to curb the cost and frequency of elections and to reduce the scope for local pork-barrel politics, corruption and factionalism. These powers helped Abe to achieve a more cohesive cabinet, greater political stability and to eventually become, in 2019, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister. He was also able to overcome the veto power of the agricultural lobby and other domestic constraints in order to become a leader on free trade in the wake of President Trump’s withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Nevertheless, he allowed the LDP to repeatedly water down a multi-party bill aimed at promoting the recruitment of female candidates. Why was the law eventually adopted in 2018 calling for parties to “aim for” balanced gender representation among candidates in elections not made binding, at least with respect to the PR-list seats? As it happens, in the first local elections held under the new law in April 2019, a record six out of 59 mayoral races were won by women. In prefectural assembly elections, women constituted 12.7 percent of candidates, winning 10.4 percent of those seats. This was a slight increase over the 9.1 percent of prefectural assembly seats that went to women in 2015. In the July 2019 Upper House election, the percentage of female candidates rose from 24.7 percent in the 2016 election to 28.1 percent, winning 28 out of the 124 seats (22.5 percent). These numbers were all modest improvements, but they could have been significantly better if the candidate lists in multi-member districts used for proportional elections had been gender-balanced to begin with. It was also telling that only 15 percent of LDP candidates were women, compared with 45 percent for their main opponents, the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP).53 Qualitative research confirms the continuing prevalence of a patriarchal party culture in the LDP, including the norms internalized by LDP women themselves.54 

These missed opportunities reflect both the government’s narrow conception of Womenomics as simply part of an economic growth strategy, and the social conservatism of Abe and many leading members of the LDP. The short-term success of the first two arrows of Abenomics (monetary easing and fiscal stimulus) meant that between 2012 and 2019 the government had been able to postpone or avoid actions that were less politically popular among its core constituencies. As Jeff Kingston observes, “Abe’s ‘Three Arrows’ strategy suffers because the third arrow of structural reforms remains in the quiver. …[F]inancial markets rejoiced that the Bank of Japan was underwriting guaranteed stock gains…[while]increased government spending on public works projects…helps construction companies and generates jobs in rural areas where longstanding LDP activists reside.”55 No comparable constituency exists for Womenomics, which is basically a public good. The lack of a strong centre-left Opposition party after the implosion of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2012 has meant that there is no longer an alternative government-in-waiting to compete on the basis of a more progressive program. This power vacuum has undoubtedly boosted the relative influence of the Nippon Kaigi (the “Japan Conference”), the conservative right-wing organization that included Abe and most of his Cabinet. (Although Nippon Kaigi has also included some important female leaders, such as former defense minister Inada Tomomi, it is hardly known for promoting feminist policies.)56 During the campaign to secure the succession of Abe as President of the LDP, neither the eventual winner, now Prime Minister Suga, nor the other leading candidates (Ishiba Shigeru and Kishida Fumio) proposed to do more than “push for female hiring targets and more progress on child-care provision.”57

Womenomics and Business

Members of the business elite, upon whom the LDP rely heavily for advice and support, are also complicit in this policy drift. In 2017, Keidanren agreed to foot 300 billion yen (US $2.7 billion) of the 2 trillion yen daycare and education initiative of the government, to be paid in the form of employer contributions under the employee pension insurance system.58 Japan still, however, lacks an official evaluation system to check the daily operations of nursery facilities, and suffers from low pay for qualified daycare workers, resulting in an acute labour shortage. Lack of regulation and cheap labour may prove attractive to foreign companies looking to open private daycare centres,59 but they also arguably neglect the quality of educational and daycare services, which is what matters most to working parents.

Capital markets also stepped up to the plate, as when, in 2018, the Corporate Governance Code set out by the Tokyo Stock Exchange and the Financial Services Agency was revised to stipulate that at least one female board member was “expected” to be in position at every listed company. Nikkei Asia reported in December 2020 that “[c]ompanies in Japan will be encouraged to set voluntary targets for female and foreign managers and provide information on their progress under a revised corporate governance code due out in the spring of 2021.”60 Kathy Matsui, reflecting in 2019 upon the progress of Womenomics over the previous two decades, expressed a measured satisfaction that it had “helped shift corporate managers’ and societal attitudes to the critical role gender diversity can play in driving growth” and “while Japan is still far from reaching its targets on female leadership representation, headway has been made in other areas.” Matsui recommends that Japan consider temporary quotas for the Japanese Diet, but–despite reiterating the stakes, in terms of implications for productivity, economic growth, and standards of living, of gender inequality and depopulation—does not recommend stronger regulation of the private sector.61 

That is because ‘Womenomics’ keeps bumping into another glass ceiling: the need to cohere with the other “Arrows” of Abenomics and with business imperatives. Goldman Sachs, Keidranen and other business elite organisations are committed to a general strategy of deregulation, privatization, and other market-oriented policies to maximize growth. Lobbyists have successfully persuaded the government to follow a neoliberal prescription that preserves managerial autonomy,62 a shift to more regressive expenditure taxes, and deregulation. These lobbyists and advisers in the private sector have not, however, been inclined to advocate quotas for hiring and board representation, a broader definition and stronger regulation of indirect discrimination in the workplace, higher minimum wages, or mandatory paternity leave.

Conclusion: Womenomics and the Limits of Neoliberal Reform 

It is undeniable that the last three years of the Abe government in Japan saw a move beyond mere tokenism and symbolism in certain key policy areas relating to Womenomics. The investments in daycare, parental leave, and the cap on working hours are significant, if not exactly transformational. The long-criticized ceiling for the spousal tax deduction was finally raised from 1.03 million yen to 1.5 million yen, encouraging more women to work—although out of political sensitivity to many women who are still full-time homemakers, the tax deduction framework remains firmly in place.63 The new Prime Minister, Suga Yoshihide, states that he is committed to giving renewed momentum to the ‘third arrow’ of structural reform, including labour market reforms that would promote gender equity.64

Nevertheless, these recent innovations do not fundamentally alter the validity of Helen Macnaughtan’s conclusion that the system continues to serve the “ideal of core regular male employment,” and that until that model is dismantled, genuine progress for both men and women will be impossible to achieve. Nor have they disproven Jeff Kingston’s prediction in 2014 of “a muddling-through scenario of crisis-averting half-measures” by the Abe government in response to the growing needs of the precariat, women, youths, and immigrants. The case has not been convincingly made that continued incrementalism, with heavy reliance upon voluntary targets and disclosure requirements, is sufficient to achieve the dramatic change that Japan needs. It is still rational for too many employers to bet against women staying in the workforce to the same extent as men; for fathers to not take the full paternity leave to which they are entitled; and for women to not attempt to combine ambitious careers suited to their talents with the raising of families. The complaint from corporations that not enough female talent was in the pipeline to meet the 2020 hiring targets for managers was the self-fulfilled prophecy of a discriminatory dual track career system. In the face of such an entrenched system of gender inequality, to base one’s optimism on the idea that the “critical tailwinds” of social investment and generational culture change will serve to blow Japan across the finish line65 is to miss the historical lesson that it was determined political leadership that once fashioned “Japan Inc.” This may be needed again to forge a more inclusive and egalitarian political economy that fits 21stcentury realities.

The paradox of the Abe-era reforms is how extensive legislation and publicity efforts to change the system nonetheless tiptoed very carefully around the same political coalitions between conservative policymakers, politicians, large firms, and core regular workers that consolidated labor market dualism and inequality during Japan’s protracted recession of the 1990s and 2000s. By not offending these key constituencies, the LDP may have maintained its grip on power, but in so doing may have jeopardized Japan’s long-term growth and progress. In contrast, by reducing the distinctions between regular and non-regular employment; prohibiting internal tracking systems that have highly gendered effects; making targets for female managers and Board appointments mandatory; making paternity leave compulsory; reserving half of the Diet’s PR-list seats for female candidates; and strongly supporting parents regardless of their gender, sexual orientation or marital status, Suga could break some of the vicious circles that prevented Abe’s government from reaching its stated goals. To make Womenomics work, Japanese neoliberalism must bend to the requirements of gender equality, and not just the other way around.

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Mark Crawford is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Athabasca University in Alberta, Canada. He specializes in Canadian and Comparative Politics and spent his most recent research sabbatical in 2020 in Okayama, Japan.

Notes

Kathy Matsui, Hiromi Suzuki and Yoko Ushio. “Womenomics: Buy the Female Economy”. Goldman Sachs Japan: Portfolio Strategy. August 13, 1999.

Kathy Matsui. “Is Womenomics Working?” Arancha Gonzalez and Marion Jansen, eds. Women Shaping Global Economic Governance. UK: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2019. Pp. 151-60 at 151, 156-157.

Abenomics: For future growth, for future generations, and for a future Japan.”

Katharina Bucholz, “Half of Japanese Female Workers are Not Employed Full Time.” Statista, March 06, 2019.

Statistical Handbook of Japan 2020, Chapter 12 “Labour “. Pp. 130-132.

Koike Yuriko. “Why Economic Inequality is Different in Japan.” World Economic Forum, March 02 2015.

Romit Dasgupta. Re-reading the salaryman in Japan: crafting masculinities. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2013.

Taggart Murphy. Japan and the Shackles of the Past. Oxford, UK: Oxford UP, 2004. P.157.

Stephanie Assmann, “Gender Equality in Japan: The Equal Employment Opportunity Law Revisited,”The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 45, No. 2, November 10, 2014.

10 Ayako Kano. Japanese Feminist Debates: A Century of Contention on Sex, Love, and Labor. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016. See also Yoshie Kobayashi, A Path Toward Gender Equality: State Feminism in Japan. New York: Routledge, 2004. Pp.139-171.

11 Helen Macnaughtan, “Womenomics for Japan: is the Abe policy for gendered employment viable in an era of precarity?“, The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 13, Issue 12, No. 1, March 30, 2015.

12 Noriko O. Tsuyo. “Low Fertility in Japan—No End in Sight”. AsiaPacific Issues, No. 131. June 2017. Pp.1-4.

13 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Japan Policy Brief, April 2015.

14 Kano. Japanese Feminist Debates. Op. cit., Ch.5.

15 Kazuo Yamaguchi. Gender Inequalities in the Japanese Workplace and Employment: Theories and Empirical Evidence. Singapore: Springer Press, 2019. Sect.1.2.1.

16 Ibid., Sect. 1.2.2.

17 Kano. Op.cit., p. 123.

18 Assmann, op. cit.

19 Kano. Op. cit. Pp. 3-4, 155-165. See also Tomomi Yamaguchi. “’Gender Free’ Feminism in Japan: A Story of Mainstreaming and Backlash,” Feminist Studies 40, no.3, 2014. Pp.541-572.

20 Yamaguchi. op.cit. Sect. 1.2.2

21 Work Style Reform Bill Enacted.” Japan Labor Issues, Volume 2 no. 10. November, 2018.

22 Naohiro Yashiro. “Serious Flaws in Japan’s new ‘Equal Pay for Equal Work’ Law”. East Asia Forum, November 8, 2019.

23 Kazuo Yamaguchi . “Japan’s Gender Gap”, Finance & Development, vol.56 no.1, March 2019, pp.26-29 at p.27.

24 Ibid.

25 https://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/wp/wp-hw11/index.html.

26 Kazuo Yamaguchi 2016. “Determinants of the Gender Gap in the Proportion of Managers among White-Collar Regular Workers in Japan.” Japan Labor Review 51:7-31 at p. 8.

27 Yamaguchi. Ibid., at p. 7(emphasis added).

28 Ibid., p.30.

29 Glenda S. Roberts. “Leaning out for the long span: what holds women back from promotion in Japan?” Japan Forum, 32:4, 555-576, 2020. DOI: 10.1080/09555803.2019.1664619

30 Yamaguchi. “Determinants of the Gender Gap in the Proportion of Managers among White-Collar Regular Workers in Japan.” Op. cit., p.30.

31 Japan gov’t to push back 30% target for women in leadership positions by up to 10 years.” Mainichi Shimbun June 26, 2020.

32 Leo Lewis. “Japan’s womenomics resists the skeptics.” Financial Times March 27, 2017.

33 Randall Jones, and Haruki Seitani. “Labour market reform in Japan to cope with a shrinking and ageing population,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1568, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2019.

34 Japan Has the Best Paternity Leave System, But Who’s Using It?Nippon.com July 25, 2019.

35 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare.  Basic Survey of Gender Equality in Employment Management for fiscal 2019.. July 31, 2020.

36 Janna Van Belle. “Paternity and parental leave policies across the European Union.” RAND Research Reports.

37 Motoko Rich. “Men in Japan Claim They Paid Dearly for Taking Paternity Leave.” New York Times, Sept. 13, 2019, Section A, P. 4.

38 In September 2020, a subcommittee of the Labour Policy Council, which advises Japan’s Minister of Health, Labour and Welfare, announced that it was considering a new paternity leave program: . There is also encouraging news that most prospective fathers in Japan’s public service are planning to take at least 30 days of parental leave. 

39 Keith Dowding. “Collective Action Problem.” Encyclopedia Britannica. March 07, 2013. Accessed December 19, 2020.

40 Shirakawa Toko, “Why Paternity Leave Should Be Mandatory,” Japan Times, June 14, 2019.

41 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare’s leaflet on the Work Style Reform with slight changes to the explanatory text by the Japanese Institute for Labour Policy and Training (JILPT), 2018.

42 Kathy Matsui, Hiromi Suzuki, and Kazunori Tatebe. “Womenomics 5.0: 20 Years On”.

43 Jeff Kingston argues that “there is reason to be skeptical when Ministry of Justice officials invoke anti-immigration public opinion to justify their desired policy goal,” both because it is rare for the government to be deferential to public opinion, and because polling data indicates that public opinion is not as staunchly anti-immigrant as is often supposed. Kingston, “Demographic dilemmas, women and immigration.” Kingston, ed. Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan. Abingdon, UK: Routledge Press, 2014. P. 197.

44 Ibid. Pp. 195-197.

45 Sabrina Volant, Gilles Pison, François Héran. “French fertility is the highest in Europe. Because of its immigrants?Population & Societies, 2019/7 (No 568), p. 1-4. DOI: 10.3917/popsoc.568.0001. URL.

46 Record low of 16,772 children on day care waiting lists in Japan, welfare ministry says.” Japan Times, September 6, 2019.

47 Magdalena Osumi. “In a first, LGBT couples sue Japan over constitutionality of not recognizing same-sex marriage.” Japan Times February 14, 2019.

48 Naha starts system to certify same-sex marriages.” Japan Times, July 08, 201.

49 Dentsu Diversity Lab Conducts “LGBT Survey 2018”. Dentsu. 10 January 2019.

50 “Japan is not a signatory to the [1993 Hague Convention on adoption]…and has followed a policy that lies somewhere between the diverging paths of extensive state involvement in adoptions [i.e. the international norm] and leaving society free to create its own solutions.” Hayes and Habu, op. cit., p. xii. Habu argues that the more laissez faire approach to adoption in Japan reflects the state’s willingness and inclination to maintain “the structures of social, economic, and legal inequality”.

51 The Imperial House Law.”

52 Emma Dalton. Women and Politics in Contemporary Japan. New York: Routledge, 2015. Ch.2.

53 Linda Sieg and Miyazaki Ami. “Path to the Diet still strewn with high hurdles for Japan’s women.” Japan Times, July 18, 2019.

54 Dalton. Op. cit., Ch.4.

55 Jeff Kingston. Japan.  Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2019. P. 156.

56 For a discussion of Nippon Kaigi’s influence on political activities during the Abe era, including of a discussion of NK’s institutionalized ambivalence toward feminism, see Sachie Mizohata. “Nippon Kaigi: Empire, Contradiction and Japan’s FutureAsia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus. Volume 14, Number 4 November 1, 2016.

57 Julian Ryall. “Female workforce in Japan despair as Abe’s womenomics dream fails to materialize before sudden handover.” The Telegraph, September 14 2020.

58 Japan business lobby agrees to contribute 300 billion Yen to expand child care services.Japan Times,December 1, 2017. .

59 Cheang Ming. “Japan’s childcare industry is creating an unlikely opportunity for some foreign firms.”

60 Mari Ishibashi and Ryosuke Eguchi, “Japan governance code to urge hiring targets for women and foreign bosses.” Nikkei Asia December 9, 2020.

61 Matsui. 2019. Op. cit. Pp.153-154.

62 Steven K. Vogel. “Japan’s Ambivalent Pursuit of Shareholder Capitalism,” Politics & Society. 2019, Vol. 47(1) 117–144.

63 Philip Brasor and Masako Tsubuku. “Japan’s tax laws get in way of more women working full time.” Japan Times March 5, 2019.

64 Ryushiro Kodaira . “Can Suga replicate success of maverick reformer Koizumi?Nikkei Asia September 22, 2020. One encouraging sign in this direction is that Suga also already promised to make infertility treatment eligible for coverage by national health insurance.

65 Matsui. 2019. Op.Cit,. P.160.

Featured image is from Answer Coalition

Since the 2018 emergence of African swine fever in China, the viral disease has torn through Asia, leaving behind a trail of economic devastation. It’s witheringly fatal to pigs but harmless to humans, and at least 100 million pigs have either been cut down by ASF or culled in a grisly campaign aimed at corralling the disease.

Over the past two years, the disease has hopped China’s land and sea borders and swept across pig-rich Southeast Asia. Previously unknown to the immune systems of the region’s domestic and wild pigs, the virus moves readily from pig to pig, ripping through a single farm in a matter of weeks and leaving listless, coughing, dying pigs in its wake.

Now, according to recent research, it could also jeopardize the foundations of food security and local economies, threaten endangered animals — including but not limited to Southeast Asia’s kaleidoscope of unique wild pig species — and imperil entire ecosystems. In a study published Dec. 21 in the journal Conservation Letters, a team of biologists is calling on countries across Southeast Asia to use every tool available to halt the spread of the disease.

Anchors of the ecosystem

Southeast Asia has a lot of islands — more than 25,000, at last count. As with Darwin’s finches in the Galápagos, evolution has hewn a remarkable cast of curious species living on the islands.

Few animal families in Southeast Asia exemplify this speciation over generations more aptly than pigs, or “suids,” if you’re a biologist. There are several varieties of both warty and bearded pigs, as well as a short-slung (and -legged) member of the Porculagenus called the pygmy hog. Several Babyrousa species stalk the islands of Indonesia, sporting tusk-like canines that burst from their skulls like an animal from the pages of Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World. In all, scientists have found 11 suid species in Southeast Asia.

Confined in some cases to just a few islands, these species tend to have naturally small populations. That, combined with surging human settlement and the related loss of the pig habitat to deforestation for timber and agriculture, has winnowed those numbers even further. In 2016, for example, scientists estimated that only about 1,000 adult Togian babirusa (Babyrousa togeanensis) lived on its namesake island chain in Indonesia.

With such small populations, these pigs teeter on a precarious edge, where a single calamity — such as a deadly disease to which they have no developed immune response — could wipe them out, and it’s put scientists on alert across Southeast Asia.

Image on the right: A Sulawesi babirusa (Babyrousa celebensis). Image by Masteraah at German Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Commons(CC BY-SA 2.0 DE).

A Sulawesi babirusa (Babyrousa celebensis). Image by Masteraah at German Wikipedia, via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 2.0 DE).

Particularly worrisome have been reported mass wild pig deaths in places like India, home to the last few hundred pygmy hogs, as well as on the islands of Sumatra, Java and Borneo, said Matthew Luskin, a wildlife ecologist at Australia’s University of Queensland and the study’s lead author, in an email to Mongabay. Recently, scientists from Danau Girang Research Centre in northern Malaysian Borneo happened on dozens of dead bearded pigs (Sus barbatus barbatus).

Luskin said the arrival of ASF in Borneo’s wild pigs would have been the realization of scientists’ “worst nightmares.” But on Feb. 9, government officials said that no evidence of ASF had turned up in samples taken from the dead animals, according to The Star newspaper. They’re still unsure of what caused the deaths, though they suspect the animals may have been poisoned.

Addressing the threat of the disease more broadly turns out to be complicated. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic could make it more difficult to marshal resources for a disease that hasn’t been shown to infect humans or jump from pigs to other animals, Luskin added. What’s more, farmers who see wild pigs as a nuisance might be less inclined to support measures to control a disease like ASF.

But even if it remains within the pig family, the effects of the disease could still reverberate through ecosystems and human communities across the region, the authors write.

Image below: Critically endangered Sumatran tigers, pictured here in Indonesia, rely on wild pig species as prey in parts of their range. Image by Rhett A. Butler/Mongabay.

A Sumatran tiger in Indonesia. Image by Rhett A. Butler/Mongabay.

On the surface, the disease imperils the survival of Southeast Asia’s wild pig species, several of which are listed as endangered or critically endangered on the IUCN Red List. But these animals also serve vital functions in their home ecosystems: Their hooves and fondness for rooting around for food help till the soil and encourage plant growth. And they’re a critical source of food for critically endangered predators, such as the Javan leopard (Panthera pardus melas) and the Sumatran tiger (Panthera tigris sumatrae).

For people living in many parts of Southeast Asia, farm-raised and wild pigs are a primary source of protein and income, even in Indonesia, where the predominantly Muslim majority avoids pork. Luskin said the disease first popped up in Indonesia in the port cities of Medan on the island of Sumatra and Denpasar on Bali, both home to large non-Muslim populations.

If the disease wipes out local pig populations, “the impact on those already threatened species and on the livelihoods of people would be catastrophic,” said Benoît Goossens, the director of Danau Girang. Goossens was not involved in the study.

“Southeast Asian governments need to recognize that this is a large social and environmental problem in the making with potentially massive impacts if not controlled early on,” Luskin told Mongabay.

‘A precautionary approach’

Image on the right: A Philippine warty hog (Sus philippensis). Image by Lsj via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0).

A Philippine warty hog (Sus philippensis). Image by Lsj via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0).

To date, information on the spread of the disease, the potential for spillovers from domesticated to wild pigs, and the efficacy of control measures in Southeast Asia is scant. So Luskin and his colleagues set out to figure out what’s known about the disease and where the gaps lie.

The team began by plotting out the known outbreaks of the disease, starting with its arrival in China in mid-2018. From their examination of shipping data, they concluded that the disease likely spread through trade. In Africa, where the disease originated, ticks harbor the virus and carry it between pig populations. But so far, scientists haven’t yet determined if Asian tick species are also a vector.

Once the virus surfaces, wild boars, which are the same species (Sus scrofa) as domestic pigs and the most ubiquitous wild pig in Southeast Asia, help circulate the disease.

The scientists also mapped out the known ranges of each of the region’s 11 wild pig species. They then assigned an overall risk of each pig species’ or subspecies’ susceptibility to ASF based on factors such as the density of nearby human populations, the local appetite for pork and pig farming in the area, each species’ conservation status, and whether it overlaps with wild boar territories.

An infographic tracking the timeline and geographic spread of African swine fever in Asia. Image by Luskin et al., 2020.

An infographic tracking the timeline and geographic spread of African swine fever in Asia. Image by Luskin et al., 2020.

The risk posed by ASF to the hairy babirusa (Babyrousa babyrussa) — literally “deer-pig” in Indonesian — is relatively low. Human communities in its range are sparsely populated, and neither pig farming nor pork consumption is very common. By contrast, the Visayan warty pig (Sus cebifrons), which lives in six of the Visayan Islands in the central Philippines, is at “very high” risk: There’s a lot of trade in pigs and pork within its range, and the species’ numbers are already low enough to warrant a designation of critically endangered by the IUCN.

Lowering these risks and minimizing the losses to both wildlife and people will require a host of solutions, the authors write, many relying on a precautionary approach advocated by other experts as well.

“It is important for the wildlife and veterinarian authorities to be extremely vigilant and treat suspicious deaths of wild pigs very seriously,” Goossens said in an email. He and the Danau Girang staff are currently working with Malaysian authorities to determine what killed as many as 60 Sunda bearded pigs (Sus barbatus barbatus) in early February 2021.

Fajar Sumping, Indonesia’s animal health director with the Ministry of Agriculture, told Mongabay that the ministry has been communicating with provincial veterinarians to prepare for possible ASF outbreaks since 2018. The government also has a health information system for animals called i-sikhnas, which allows veterinarians and farmers alike to report suspected cases of animal disease for follow-up.

“Through infographics that we distribute on social media, radio and ground campaign,” Fajar said, “the public are being informed and educated to actively participate in recognizing the symptoms of ASF, how to report them and how to carry out simple biosecurity actions.”

Image below: A Sunda bearded pig (Sus barbatus) in Malaysian Borneo. Image by Quinet via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

A Sunda bearded pig (Sus barbatus) in Malaysian Borneo. Image by Quinet via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 4.0).

Luskin noted that certain biosecurity measures, such as testing, the proper disposal of carcasses, and controlling the movement of animals and trade, are more feasible for large pork producers. But they are “practically impossible” for small family farms, he said. That means authorities will need to exert more control over the pork trade, even halting it completely if an outbreak is suspected.

He and his colleagues also said that collecting saliva samples for testing from wild pigs using bait could help to verify whether and where the disease might be spreading, along with stepping up in-the-field monitoring.

“What may [be] useful is the enhanced surveillance with active patrolling to look for dead wild boar and immediate testing and imposing restrictions to infected areas,” Sheherazade, a conservation scientist with WCS and co-author of the study, said in an email.

Communities living near wild pig ranges will be crucial to curbing disease transmission, Luskin said.

“[L]ocal traditional, commercial or recreational hunters are the first line of defence of the disease spreading as they are likely the first to notice whether and where the disease is affecting wild populations,” he said.

Image on the right: Wild pigs also help sustain Javan leopards, another critically endangered carnivore in Southeast Asia. Image by Anaxibia via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0).

Wild pigs also help sustain Javan leopards, another critically endangered carnivore. Image by Anaxibia via Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0).

The authors also write that the scientific community needs to invest in continued research to determine which vectors pose the greatest risk. Scientists also don’t currently have enough data about the ecology of these animals, such as the size of the groups they live in, the team writes. Nor do they have up-to-date numbers for many of the species, apart from a general consensus that the populations are generally pretty small.

It’s that last point that is particularly concerning. Elsewhere, pigs can and have adapted to live with ASF. In Africa, the disease lies in wait more or less harmlessly in warthogs (Phacochoerus africanus), and even domestic pigs seem to have evolved some ability to cope with the disease since it was first introduced from Europe 400 or 500 years ago.

“If the disease persists across Asia, and there is no doubt that it will,” Luskin said, “then at some point in time it will similarly become endemic.”

The question then becomes whether the small — tiny, in some instances — populations of Southeast Asia’s distinctive wild pig species will be able “to buffer the high mortalities of the initial outbreaks,” he said, with the region’s ecological health hanging in the balance.

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Hans Nicholas Jong contributed reporting.

John Cannon is a staff features writer with Mongabay. Find him on Twitter: @johnccannon

Sources

Luskin, M. S., Meijaard, E., Surya, S., Sheherazade, Walzer, C., & Linkie, M. (2020). African swine fever threatens Southeast Asia’s 11 endemic wild pig species. Conservation Letters. doi:10.1111/conl.12784

Featured image: Visayan warty pigs (Sus cebifrons) at a wallow in the Philippines. Image by Shukran888 via Wikimedia Commons(CC BY-SA 4.0).

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Former prime minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad has reportedly blamed corruption for accelerating the downfall of the short-lived Pakatan Harapan government (PH) last year, after several MPs decided to defect and join forces with Umno and PAS then.

In an interview with Free Malaysia Today, the Parti Pejuang Tanah Air chairman said the opposition then was “led by people who were under suspicion and who have been tried in court for a lot of crimes”, and the same politicians are now backing the Perikatan Nasional government.

“So, the government [now] is backed up by people who have criminal records. And they seem to have powerful influence. So the corruption in Malaysia has reached a very high level that endangers the government of this country,” he was quoted saying.

However, he also pointed out that the previous Barisan Nasional administration had also fallen due to corruption, pointing at the how money politics had allegedly proliferated.

This, he said continued with the 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB) scandal which he said had showed that an “entire government” can be subverted with wealth, and he claimed this practice has been picked up by the current administration to garner support.

“At that stage I had already warned them, but it is very difficult because the people were all wanting to become ministers and all that they were prepared to even borrow money to bribe people,” he reportedly added.

Claiming that both sides of the political divide are “bribing” voters, he then claimed that democracy has “enabled” corruption as winning support is contingent on who commands the most popularity.

“Now, people vote according to what they are paid. It’s no longer a question of choosing the best candidate, but choosing the candidate who will give you [the most] money,” he reportedly said.

Last month, watchdog Transparency International released its report on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which placed Malaysia at 57th out of 180 countries for last year.

Malaysia ranked 51st in the international watchdog’s CPI in 2019.

Its Malaysian chapter said the drop in ranking underscores the country’s deteriorating score, from 53 points in 2019 to 51 last year.

Countries are scored from zero to 100, with zero being perceived as the most corrupted, and 100 marks for those perceived as the cleanest and most transparent.

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Raid on NewsClick: An Attempt to Muzzle the Voices of Dissent

February 11th, 2021 by Countercurrents.org

NewsClick, a progressive website based out of Delhi has been raided by the Enforcement Directorate. The raid comes at a time when NewsClick has been bravely covering the farmers’ agitation and other issues of the marginalised when most of the mainstream media are keeping silent or toeing the line of the government. The raid on NewsClick is a continuation of the attempt of the Modi regime to silence the voices of dissent across the country.

Recently an independent journalist Mandeep Punia was arrested for reporting from the farmers’ protest site. He was later given bail. However, another independent journalist Siddique Kappan is in jail for more than two months. He was arrested under a stringent anti-terrorism law, UAPA, when he was on his way to report the Hathras rape incident.

Sixteen intellectuals and activists are in jail for over two years, arrested under UAPA, allegedly trying to overthrow the government. This includes 83 year old Jesuit priest Stan Swamy and 81 year old poet Varavar Rao.  Washington Post today came out with a report that in fact, the evidence was planted on the laptop of Rona Wilson using a malware. The present raids on NewsClick is an attempt to muzzle the voices of dissent in India.

NewsClick wrote an editorial today on the raids. We are reproducing it in full:

Govt Raids on Newsclick: Our Voice Can’t be Muzzled

Since the morning of February 9, officials of Enforcement Directorate (ED) have been searching through Newsclick’s office and at homes of senior persons in order to find evidence for what are alleged to be financial irregularities, as reported by media. The raids are still ongoing at the time of writing, some 30 hours after they started.

Media reports have quoted from what appears to be the official narrative that alleges that Newsclick was involved in “money laundering” by channeling funds received from abroad. During the raid, Newsclick has cooperated with the officials and will continue to do so. If the ED and the government are truthful and follow the course of law, no wrong doing will be found and this unfortunate event will be closed. Newsclick has nothing to hide.

It has become a routine practice with the present government to deploy government-controlled agencies to deal with all those who disagree with and criticise the government. In the past, the income tax department, the ED, various Central investigative agencies like the Central Bureau of Investigation and National Investigation Agency, have been selectively used in this manner against a range of people – from journalists to political leaders, to even farmers’ leaders.

The whole panoply of the legal instruments available with the government have been deployed for such politically motivated coercive actions, including filing cases of sedition, defamation, harming harmony, breach of peace, etc. under the Indian Penal Code, and use of other laws like the Disaster Management Act, the draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), the Information Technology Act, and others.

The present raid at Newsclick appears to be on the same lines, and its purpose appears to be the same: to cow down an independent and progressive voice through a vindictive course of action.

In the meantime, Newsclick will continue to report and record voices of the unheard and unseen people of India, and the world, who are struggling to build a life of dignity and well-being. Efforts such as these raids, to suppress protests and indeed, any striving for progressive thought, will not deter those who stand for justice.

There has been an outpouring of support and solidarity for Newsclick from across the country and the world over, for which Newsclick is thankful.

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December 8, 2020—now already “last” year—marked the 20th anniversary of an event wherein the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was declared reopened for the purpose of taking up a category of crimes against humanity unaddressed in 1946—crimes against women in the form, specifically, of military sexual slavery. Here, we are speaking of the Japanese military. Its victims, known as “comfort women” (慰安婦) in an especially egregious exercise of euphemism, hailed from all over Japan’s empire, including the homeland, and its theaters of war. 

The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal (女性国際戦犯法廷) was the culmination of arduous and imaginative work by activists, legal specialists, and scholars from the region and beyond. There were men—many of them—who collaborated in every aspect of this process. During the Tribunal itself, they were present as expert witnesses, as prosecutors, and as authors of amicus curiae briefs arguing for due process on behalf of the deceased defendants as well as the Government of Japan, which declined to send representatives. (See richly documented program of the Tribunal for listing of participants, video clips, and texts.) The Tribunal represented the committed labor of international civil society, in response to a phenomenon that had been tacitly known for decades, but which, especially in the 1990s, could no longer be ignored, as survivors themselves came forward, but state actors, notably Japan, refused to respond. It is the testimony of these courageous women, many no longer with us, that formed the centerpiece of the proceedings. And that testimony has left us with a vast archive of research, historical and legal, that must be taken into account in subsequent attempts to address the “comfort woman” issue.

The Tribunal took place over three days, from December 8-10, 2000. The fourth day, while the four-person panel (three women, from the U.S., the U.K., and Argentina, and one man, from Kenya) of distinguished jurists serving as judges deliberated, we were able to hear from women subjected to crimes in ongoing military conflicts. On December 12, the judges delivered a summary of their judgment. The full judgment in the case of The Prosecutors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Hirohito Emperor Showa, Ando Rikichi[and 8 other military leaders] and the Government of Japan, amounting to 312 pages in the pdf version, was delivered December 4, 2001 at The Hague.

I had the great good fortune to attend all the proceedings in Tokyo. The venue, Kudan Kaikan, crackled with excitement, with media from all over the world (though tellingly, only one-third were from Japan) and booths crammed with information and goods from struggles the world over. Pausing over the literature and handicrafts at the Zapatista table, I suddenly felt closer to Chiapas than I ever had at home in Chicago—and not just because I could buy a souvenir with the masked image of Subcommandante Marcos. Judges, prosecutors, witnesses, and survivors were all housed in Kudan Kaikan, which not only had a long association with the emperor and the prewar military but was located not far from Yasukuni Shrine. It was there where those who had died in the emperors’ wars since the Meiji Era were enshrined; and there where cabinet members of the Liberal Democratic Party betook themselves for performative visits, rousing affirmation and bitter controversy, depending on one’s view of Japan’s role in World War II. During a lunch break, one of the veritable army of volunteers walked about, carrying a sign attached to a pole warning us to be careful of what we said “because there are many right-wingers around.”

Inside the large hall, over 1000 of us gathered to share in the solemnity and drama that would be sustained for the duration of the proceedings. What our sight could grasp was augmented by earphones providing multilingual translations. Looking back, I reexperience the pride I felt in watching two distinguished African American women jurists: Patricia Viseur Sellers, serving as co-chief prosecutor, and Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, chief justice. That the Tribunal happened at all felt miraculous then and even more so, now. The large miracle contained multiple discreet miracles, such as the North and South Korean prosecutors working together to produce a single indictment. We were even granted perpetrator testimony, in the form of two veterans who shared in some detail their experiences of rape and gang rape in China—acts that the “comfort woman system” was meant to prevent. Surely, they had children and grandchildren? And yet they had brought themselves there, to testify. As they bowed to make their exit, the survivors applauded them.

We knew we were watching a living history, one that inadvertently and yet necessarily presented us with an invaluable secondary narrative, that of serial colonialism and occupation. It began with the courageously pioneering Dutch survivor testifying that Batavia [Indonesia] was “paradise” until the Japanese came. Later, the video shows her sitting close by, with intent interest, as we hear testimony from Indonesian survivors. And then, it is East Timor’s turn. The prosecutor for Indonesia expresses her regret to the court that she had not been able to prepare fully because of Indonesia’s military occupation of East Timor. The prosecutor for Indonesia covers her face in her hands. She will applaud the Timorese survivors as they depart after their spirited testimony. In fact, it was in the course of pursuing Indonesian violence against women that the survivors of Japanese military sexual slavery were discovered. Esmeralda Boe and Marta Abu Bere left an indelible impression with their surprised response to the ritual question of whether they promised to tell the truth: why would they not? They had not come to Japan for sightseeing.

The final day took place in a different, still larger venue. And there was delivered, in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald’s calm, warm tones, the pronouncement of Hirohito’s guilt. Who among us will forget that moment?

Many of these scenes can be found in the invaluable documentary, Breaking the History of Silence. The Tribunal it records was a historical event whose significance is both reinforced and newly revealed with the passage of time. The intensified denial and hatemongering by nationalist groups and the backtracking of the Government of Japan (read the pathbreaking “Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono” of 1993, not officially disavowed, but increasingly difficult to find) are dispiriting and worse, but they cannot negate the event and its record. Or the power generated by the collective effort to give respectful hearing to those who had been denied the right to report the destruction of their lives and the theft of their dignity.

Watch the documentary and explore the records archived, all accessible at the site of the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace. There you will see the scrupulous efforts made to gather historical records, apply legal reasoning, and present concrete suggestions for a path ahead. Some of this is concisely presented in the follow-up video, Hague Final Judgment, which, incidentally, captures a moment when Japanese members of a small party attempting to deliver a copy of the Judgment to the Japanese Embassy are told by officials—yes, Japanese—that they must be addressed in English.

Inevitably, to watch the documentaries today is to register loss, beginning with many of the survivors, including the Timorese. They were already frail twenty years ago from their hard, hard lives. Also gone is Matsui Yayori, co-convenor and the spirit behind the entire undertaking. Still young attorney Kazuko Kawaguchi, one of the Japanese prosecutors. The two Japanese veterans. And with a start, followed by piercing grief, we identify the face of prosecutor Park Won-soon, social justice activist, campaigner for the rights of “comfort women,” and longest-serving mayor of Seoul until he took his own life in July 2020, apparently in response to allegations of sexual harassment.

Please read the succinct, updating essay below by Watanabe Mina, who was deeply involved in the Tribunal and is now Director of the Women’s Active Museum. And then turn to the videos.

-Prof. Norma Field

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Revisiting the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal: Saying “No!” to Impunity.1

by Mina Watanabe

The year 2020 marked the 20-year anniversary of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery (hereafter the Women’s Tribunal) held in Tokyo in December 2000. For this occasion, the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) has organized a special exhibition focusing on the Women’s Tribunal, entitled “The War Responsibility of the Emperor – Voices Against Oblivion.” It is intended as a challenge to the citizens of Japan, who concealed and then consented to forget the emperor’s responsibility, as head of state and chief commander, for the conduct of the Japanese military in World War II.2

The establishment of WAM embodies the last wishes of Matsui Yayori, a prominent journalist and women’s rights activist who proposed and then exerted herself to realize the Women’s Tribunal. She held this to be a responsibility that women in Japan needed to shoulder. Tragically, she died of cancer only two years after the Women’s Tribunal. Three years later, in August 2005, WAM was installed in a small corner of a building in Tokyo, thanks to donations mainly from people in Japan. Since then, WAM has held exhibitions, archived testimonies and documentary evidence, engaged in fact-finding projects and participated in actions in solidarity with the victims/survivors of Japan’s military sexual slavery, or the “comfort woman” system.

Punish the guilty! For the sake of peace by Kang Duk-kyung, 1995 (Courtesy of the House of Sharing)

Prior to and during preparations for the 20th anniversary exhibition, we assembled and researched the archives. It was on February 6 of 1994 that an epochal event took place: six Korean women, who had been subjected to sexual enslavement as “comfort women” to the Japanese military, arrived in Japan, statement of complaint in hand. The Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office declined even to receive their statement. Footage from that day reveals frustration and anger pouring from the words and evident in the faces of Kang Duk-kyung, who painted “Punish the Guilty! For the sake of peace,” as well as Kim Soon-duk, Yi Young-suk, Mun P’il-gi, Pak Tu-ri, and Pak Ok-ryŏ. The force of their emotion is overwhelming. This action, which sought the punishment of responsible parties, met with a chilly reception from Japanese society as a whole. Even among supporters, there were responses tinged with negativity, such as “our kids might be bullied” or “some people’s parents could be targeted.” But there were others who said, “I wanted to quit being Japanese, but now I know what I need to do,” and expressed their resolve at the report-back assembly after the action. The halmoni had hurled their cries at the heart of postwar Japanese pacifism, which had failed, even in its dreams, to imagine the possibility of punishing those responsible for colonialism and the war of aggression.

What Kang Duk-kyung and the others sought was not punishment of the foot soldiers who had directly caused them to suffer, but of those who were in positions of responsibility. Who was it that came up with the system of Japanese military sexual slavery and ordered its implementation? Whose face should we see behind the maintenance of this inhumane system? They wanted the truth to be revealed. Mun P’il-gi, who, during her 1994 visit, had shouted out the demand that those in charge be punished, would often ask after the two former Japanese soldiers, Kaneko Yasuji and Suzuki Yoshio, witnesses at the Women’s Tribunal. She had come to care about their well-being. These halmoni had witnessed the anguish caused by the memory, seared into soldiers’ hands, of the killings they had been ordered to commit. We can readily imagine that the ones the halmoni could not bring themselves to forgive were those with power, the ones who had never had to sully their own hands, who never experienced pain, who spent their postwar years in comfort and died surrounded by their families.

Japanese society remains predisposed not to pursue the responsibility of those in charge. Public documents are destroyed or falsified so that “higher ups” are not held accountable, even as those actually compelled to commit criminal acts are robbed of their lives—all the more so if they are sincere. Surely, many have had these thoughts as they watched the allegations of deception and falsification of official documents unfold in the case of the Moritomo and Kake educational institutions.

To mark the twentieth anniversary of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal, WAM has launched a web-based archival project dedicated to the Tribunal. We will be conducting interviews and adding documents, updating the contents throughout 2021, hoping that people in Japan as well as the global community will revisit this people’s initiative for justice for the survivors of military sexual slavery. Courtesy of Video Juku, “Breaking the History of Silence,” the documentary video of the Tribunal, will be available for free until December 4, 2021, the day the final judgement was delivered at The Hague 20 years ago.

We hope that many of you will visit, with proper coronavirus precautions.

Please click here for the digest and full versions of the video, Breaking the History of Silence as well as the Hague Final Judgment.

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Mina Watanabe is the director of the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace (WAM) based in Tokyo. She has been campaigning internationally for the rights of survivors of Japan’s military sexual slavery system and has written alternative reports for, as well as lobbied at, a range of UN human rights institutions.

Norma Field is a professor emerita, University of Chicago. 

Notes

Adapted by Watanabe Mina from her opening essay to the wam newsletter [wam だより] no. 46 (November 2020) and translated by Norma Field. Please see here for the extensive range of articles pertaining to the “comfort women” published at The Asia-Pacific Journal.

WAM, as a museum in keeping with the spirit of the “Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery,” has decided to stay open on four specific public holidays. The majority of public holidays in Japan are closely linked to the Emperor system, and during the Asia-Pacific War, these holidays were deployed as occasions for deifying the Emperor. We open our doors on the Emperor’s birthday and comparable occasions as a refusal to participate in such celebration. We hold seminars to discuss the Emperor system and the kinds of discrimination rooted in it, such as patriarchy, colonialism and racism, which still prevail in Japanaese society.

Featured image is from Kyodo News

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China Building Indonesia into an EV Powerhouse

February 9th, 2021 by John Mcbeth

Chief investment minister Luhut Panjaitan has few concerns about China’s iron grip on Indonesia’s nickel industry as other major investors flock to a country with the range of mineral elements needed to turn it into one of the world’s leading producers of lithium batteries and electric cars.

“We invited everybody and no-one came, except the Chinese,” the minister said in a wide-ranging interview that reflected the retired general’s consuming vision of Indonesia as a modern industrialized state. “So they’re welcome and they are easy to deal with.”

It is not the first time he has defended China’s growing role in the Indonesian economy. “Like it or not, happy or not happy, whatever is said, China is a world power that can’t be ignored,” he told a virtual public lecture last year. “You can’t dodge facts out in the field.”

While European interest often remains focused on just one level of the manufacturing process, the hard-charging Chinese are developing a fully-integrated supply chain, from stainless steel and lithium batteries to even copper wire and other finished products. As Panjaitan puts it: “All the way down.”

“Indonesia will move up from a producer and exporter of raw materials to becoming an important player in the world supply chain, where lithium batteries account for 40% of the total cost of an electric car,“ says Bahlil Lahadalia, head of the Indonesian Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM).

However narrowly focused it may be for now, it is a vindication of the once much-criticized value-added mining policy introduced during the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency and now being pursued with new energy by the Joko Widodo administration.

When he steps down in 2024, President Widodo will almost certainly leave a legacy as Indonesia’s “Infrastructure President.” But his uncertain handling of the Covid-19 notwithstanding, it could be so much more if his government can lay the groundwork for a great leap forward in industrial development.

“Nobody but China was prepared to risk putting money into Indonesia,” says a foreign mining expert who has visited Central Sulawesi’s Morawali Industrial Park, the site of one of privately-owned Tsingshan’s Steel’s two nickel-processing complexes in eastern Indonesia.

As an illustration, he recalled a Chinese engineer telling him during his tour of the plant:

“We looked at the numbers and worked out whether we would be in the lowest 25% in terms of cost of production. Once we had determined that, we knew we could never be out of business.”

Often dubbed the “Minister of Everything,” Panjaitan is well aware of talk that he sits in Beijing’s pocket. “They (Indonesians) don’t understand sometimes,” he says. “But they can’t blame me anymore. I also have a good relationship with the Americans and I have good relationship with Abu Dhabi.”

He might have added South Korea, with lithium battery-maker LG Chemical and car manufacturer Hyundai recently announcing new investments totaling $11.3 billion that will give them a leading role in the fledgling electric car industry.

Panjaitan and his team have also had four rounds of talks with American auto giant Tesla, a major producer of lithium battery packs whose interest in Indonesia lies in several diverse areas, including the location of a future SpaceX rocket launch pad on the northern Papuan island of Biak.

Industry aside, Panjaitan has also been a leading figure behind Indonesia’s planned sovereign wealth fund, which has attracted initial pledges from the US International Development Finance Corp (IDFC) and the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the body that manages the emirate’s excess oil reserves.

Government planners say the introduction of electric vehicles on the domestic market and a concerted push into solar power, neglected up to now, will help reduce Indonesia’s $21.2 billion in energy imports by at least a third and also utilize 8,000 megawatts of oversupply on the Java-Bali electricity grid.

Panjaitan and other senior officials are confident incentives in the newly-passed Job Creation Omnibus Law have now given Indonesia a competitive edge with President Widodo ready to sign the last of the EV implementing regulations, some aimed at protecting smaller local producers.

The general-turned-businessman falls back on military terminology in explaining what he calls his “rules of engagement” for potential investors – first-class technology, added-value, majority Indonesian labor, technology transfer and business-to-business deals only.

Skilled labor is still an issue. Finding employees for technical positions has struck an obstacle in Morawali, for example, after it was found the education level of high school students was not up to the standard required for them to enter a newly-established polytechnic.

Progress on the electric car has already been impressive, despite the worrying economic impact of the pandemic which has infected more than one million Indonesians and left 30,000 dead.

In the space of a few months, LG Chemical confirmed the planned construction of a $9.8 billion lithium battery venture in Batang, Central Java and Hyundai announced it is moving its Malaysia-based regional hub and an entire China assembly line to Indonesia.

At the same time, Panjaitan expects a deal to be reached by next month on Tsingshan Steel’s offer to build Freeport McMoRan Copper & Gold’s long-delayed copper smelter at its Weda Bay nickel processing facility on Halmahera, the main island of the Maluku chain.

It now appears Tsingshan has been the driving force all along behind the sudden decision to move the long-delayed project from Gresik, near the East Java port city of Surabaya, to Halmahera, 3,400 kilometers to the northeast and closer to Freeport’s Grasberg mine operation in Papua.

That’s because the sulphuric acid derived from the copper smelting process is needed to produce nickel sulfide, the composition of the alloy used in  cathodes. The existing Gresik smelter, operated by Mitsubishi, supplies the by-product to a state-owned fertilizer company.

Panjaitan says Tsingshan has agreed to pay 85% of the cost of the $1.8 billion facility, with Freeport and the government, the majority partner in its Indonesian subsidiary, committed to sharing the balance. But sources familiar with the talks say the Chinese are still holding out for a smaller 75% stake.

Tied up in the negotiations is what Freeport will have to fork out for treatment and refinement charges (TCs/RCs) and how that will relate to the 5% export tax the Phoenix-based mining giant now pays for the half of the concentrate output it currently exports to mainly Japan and Spain.

Tsingshan is also in talks with Indonesian firm PT Merdeka Copper and Gold to supply pyrite rock from a mine on Wetar island, south of Weda Bay, to the $7.8 billion Morawali nickel-processing complex, which began construction in 2013.

Nickel mining in Indonesia. Image: Facebook

Together, the two facilities are expected to be producing lithium batteries by 2023 when high-speed acid-leach operations come online. A fourth $5.3 billion battery plant to be built by China’s Contemporary Amperez Technology (CATL) is planned for completion in 2024.

Morawali is expanding its coal-fired power plant from 2,000 to 2,900 megawatts, needed to drive a three million ton a year nickel pig iron smelter to produce stainless steel, a 500,000-ton carbon steel facility and a 600,000-ton high-carbon ferrochrome plant.

Further down the coast, in Southeast Sulawesi, China’s Virtue Dragon Nickel Industry has completed the $1.4 billion first stage of its three-phase Konawe complex, which will eventually boast production of three million tons of ferronickel a year.

It is still unclear how much of Tsingshan’s nickel sulfide will be allocated to other battery makers. The only element Indonesia does not have in abundance is the lithium used to produce anodes, which will likely be imported from either Australia or China.

Illustrating the synergy which is already developing in the electric car business, Tsingshan’s Weda Bay partner, Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt, already has a joint venture with LG Chemical in the production of precursors and cathodes in Wuxi, north of Shanghai.

Panjaitan says LG was initially reluctant to expand into Indonesia but finally came around after he convinced the company of the logic behind investing in a country with 25% of the world’s nickel reserves and adequate amounts of cobalt, magnesium and other key elements used in lithium batteries.

The South Korean project will become part of Batang’s 4,300 hectare Integrated Industrial Estate, with power supplied by a new Japanese-built 2,000MW coal-fired power station and a planned gas pipeline linking Cirebon and the central Java province capital of Semarang.

Hyundai will start producing combustion-engine cars at its new $1.5 billion plant at Cikarang, Jakarta, by the end of this year, and electric cars as early as 2022 with a planned capacity of 250,000 vehicles, more than initially anticipated for domestic demand.

With Toyota still dithering over a planned $2 billion investment in hybrid and electric cars, the South Koreans have a jump on the Japanese who have seemingly grown complacent after controlling 95% of Indonesia’s conventional car and motorcycle market for decades.

Launch of a soon to be ubiquitous Electric Vehicle charging station in Indonesia. Image: Facebook

State-owned Perusaahan Listrik Indonesia (PLN) says it already has enough charging stations between Jakarta and Bali, which will reduce the cost of traveling 350 kilometers, the maximum range for an average EV, from 350,000 rupiah ($25) to 37,000 rupiah ($2.6).

Tsingshan took only 18 months to bring its first Halmahera nickel smelter into production, a can-do attitude that has struck a chord with Panjaitan and the team of young assistants he consults on speed-dial when he doesn’t have an answer.

The reason for the Chinese-built copper smelter being $1 billion cheaper than the planned Finnish-designed facility at Gresik is partly explained by new Chinese advances in smelter technology, which have reportedly impressed even Freeport engineers.

But cost-effective equipment isn’t the only reason. Asked to explain the difference in prices, a Jakarta-based Tsingshan executive told Asia Times: “It is very important it is done at speed. You have to do it quickly otherwise the budget will only increase.”

He was referring to the prolonged delays, exacerbated by the pandemic, that have dogged the Gresik project from the start, mostly due to Freeport’s reluctance to take it on. “The problem is there has been too much talking and the capital cost has become too high,” he said.

Copper refineries, in particular, operate on paper-thin margins, only breaking even with the sale of anode slime, the sediment rich in gold, silver, selenium and tellurium that settles at the bottom of an electrorefining cell during the refining process.

Panjaitan says that at a recent conference in Yunnan, Chinese companies were encouraged to invest in value-added ancillary industries at Halmahera to offset any potential losses. Electric cars use three times more copper components than conventional vehicles.

In that sense, the new copper smelter will lose much of its stand-alone status and become part of the integrated supply chain dedicated to the electric car venture. After decades of being the Indonesian public’s Corporate Enemy No 1, Freeport’s Phoenix directors may welcome the distraction.

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Featured image: Indonesia is poised to take the regional lead in electric vehicle production. Image: iStock

India Needs Course Correction on Myanmar

February 8th, 2021 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

The Modi government made a strident call on February 1 that the “rule of law and the democratic process must be upheld” in Myanmar. The statement, following a prodding from Washington, was unabashedly intrusive, and, ironically, completely overlooking that human rights, rule of law, democratic pluralism, etc. are universal values that India also can (and should) be held accountable for. Lapping up the neocon prescriptions from Washington may not serve India’s interests, in general, and they are very specific to Myanmar. 

The government failed to fathom the US’ motivations in riding the high horse of democracy so soon after the Capitol Riots in Washington, DC. Human rights issues come handy for Washington to rally allies at a juncture when its leadership of the transatlantic alliance is in drift and major European powers do not see eye to eye with its global strategies on Russia and China and mock at its nostalgia-laden slogan that “America is back.” 

Alas, the government failed to consult the ASEAN despite Delhi’s refrain that it attributes “centrality” to that grouping.

The ASEAN Chair’s statement of Feb, 1 recalled the “purposes and the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter” which include respecting the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, non-interference, consensus and unity in diversity.” 

The ASEAN Chair’s statement of Feb, 1 recalled the “purposes and the principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter.” Simply put, India chose to bandwagon with the US, Japan and Australia while the ASEAN and China took a differentiated stance. Geopolitics crept in. But the US has since realised the folly and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan scrambled to contact the ASEAN ambassadors in Washington. 

How come Delhi goofed up? Primarily, it is due to a flawed understanding of the Myanmar situation. The Indian analysts increasingly view world developments through their China prism and began fancying that with the massive victory of Aung San Suu Kyi in the November election provided an opportunity for India to “gear up to implement a major strategy with Myanmar under its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy… to bring Myanmar under the Indo-Pacific construct” so as to align that country “more with ‘like-minded’ countries… to stand firm against China… to make Myanmar a part of the Indo-Pacific policy… (and) steer Myanmar away from the Chinese grip.”  

Such views betray a zero sum mindset borne out of blind Sinophobia. Whereas, the ground realities are much more complex. The point is, Beijing brilliantly succeeded over the years in building a close relationship of mutual trust and mutual respect with Suu Kyi, parallel to the nurture of links between the Chinese Communist Party and her party National League for Democracy. 

Unlike the western narrative of Aung Suu Kyi as Myanmar’s democracy icon, Beijing regarded her as a pragmatic politician who never uttered remarks to the detriment of China-Myanmar ties, was manifestly eager to maintain good relations and consistently adopted a soft stance on the South China Sea issue. 

Beijing was greatly impressed that although Suu Kyi wanted Western support, she was adamant about national sovereignty. Arguably, it was in sync with what China would like its neighbours to practice. Chinese President Xi Jinping received Suu Kyi seven times since 2015.

State Counselor Wang Yi visited Myanmar recently on Jan. 12, met Suu Kyi and expressed strong support for her government and conveyed a strong commitment that China wants to work with her during the second term. And they agreed to push ahead with Belt and Road projects and lock in a five-year pact on trade and economic cooperation. Clearly, the prospect for the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor under Belt and Road Initiative has become uncertain now, as compared to a month ago. 

In fact, the Chinese media reports already sound a word of caution that “Chinese companies operating in Myanmar need to watch out for contractual and default risks amid the current political upheaval… Government default is a major risk, especially for major and strategic projects in sectors including transportation and energy… But Chinese companies can seek international arbitration if they face illegal confiscation of their property.”

It is no secret that the Myanmar army marks a certain distance from China. Suffice to say, Myanmar developments present an extraordinary case study where Beijing silently feels distressed over the sudden eclipse of western style democracy in a neighbouring country. (See the Reuters analysis Myanmar coup does China more harm than good.)

Surely, the coup creates political baggage for China insofar as it cannot (and will not) take a position against the military, but also comes under compulsion to cover or provide protection for the military internationally. On the whole, this situation poses a major political and diplomatic liability for Beijing and cannot bring good news. Therefore, China prioritises that the concerned parties to solve their differences mutually, according to the constitution and within the legal framework, while maintaining peace and stability. Chinese expert opinion is that Suu Kyi’s political career is in jeopardy. 

Of course, Suu Kyi made some serious errors, too. She heavily depended on people loyal to her personally, without bothering about their competence or integrity. It not only spawned corruption but also led to government failure to deliver, especially in job creation. Her leadership style was often dictatorial. She resorted to draconian laws to muzzle or jail critics. (See the Singapore-based Channel News Asia video titled Aung San Suu Kyi: A Fading Legacy dated October 22, 2020 on the eve of the November elections.)

Suu Kyi had no control over some major sectors of the national economy through two entities, Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited and Myanmar Economic Corporation as well as a network of domestic private business enterprises, known as “crony companies,” which generate revenue for the military and strengthen its autonomy.

Suu Kyi’s biggest mistake was in believing that she could, through her brand of nationalism, dismiss accusations of genocide directed against the Rohingya. In the process, Suu Kyi lost western support. From that point, she has been on borrowed time and the military barely hid its distaste for Suu Kyi.

To be sure, the military anticipated the impact and the reaction from the international community and took into consideration the Biden administration’s preoccupations with domestic issues. Myanmar doesn’t even figure in the top 10 priorities of Biden’s foreign policy. But the US Congress is not going to tolerate a coup in Myanmar and will mount pressure on the Biden administration to punish the military by imposing sanctions, cutting aid or targeting the generals and their companies.

However, a reversal of the military takeover is not to be expected and the probability is that Washington may lose whatever little leverage it would have had in Naypyidaw. Washington is mulling over policy options

But there may be a Plan B. Indeed, the former US Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson, who is no stranger to Myanmar, voiced the opinion last week that the time has come for the West to look beyond Suu Kyi for new faces among the opposition. One way is to mould a leadership that will be friendly to the US. There are signs that the western agencies are inciting the youth in Myanmar to stage protests, as had happened in Hong Kong and Thailand. The military has clamped down on Facebook and internet. Shades of colour revolution? 

This is where Russia’s role merits attention. The struggle for influence in Myanmar has a geopolitical dimension, for obvious reasons. Since 2015, following the signing of a military cooperation agreement, Russian presence has increased, and, importantly, it coincides with the lengthening shadows of Russian presence in the Indian Ocean. 

Russia has emerged as a major military partner for Myanmar. Russia operates a servicing centre in Myanmar. The Russian Deputy Defense Minister Alexander Fomin told the media last month that Myanmar plays “a key role in maintaining peace and security in the region.” 

It is entirely conceivable that Russia, which has great expertise in countering colour revolutions, shares intelligence with the Myanmar military. Over six hundred military officers from Myanmar are studying in the Russian military academies presently. Myanmar’s military chief Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia six times in the recent years, more than to any other country. 

During the visit of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu to Naypyidaw last month, the Russian media quoted Gen. Hlaing as saying, “Just like a loyal friend, Russia has always supported Myanmar in difficult moments, especially in the last four years.” An agreement was signed for supply of a batch of Russian missile and artillery air defense systems Pantsir-S1. 

Tass reported that the “command of Myanmar’s armed forces has shown interest in other advanced weapon systems of Russian manufacture.” Shoigu has reportedly expressed interest to establish visits of Russian warships to Myanmar’s ports. 

All things taken into consideration, we may expect China and Russia to provide a firewall for Myanmar to ward off western penetration, as is happening in Central Asia. (The UN Security Council statement avoids any reference to the military or a coup as such in Myanmar and lays emphasis on national reconciliation, with pointed reference to Suu Kyi’s release.)Russia shares China’s perception of Quad as a destabilising factor in regional security. 

Clearly, India needs to keep the “big picture” in view. It will not be to India’s advantage to create misperceptions that it is bandwagoning with some neocon Anglo-American project for regime change in Myanmar. In regard of Myanmar’s stability, India too is a stakeholder and would have a convergence of interests with Russia and China. 

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Farmers Are Tillers, Not Killers

February 8th, 2021 by Kancha Ilaiah Shepherd

Kangana Ranaut again and again is attacking the Indian farmers as terrorists. She has done that in response to the world famous pop singer Rihanna and famous environmentalist girl Greta’s support to farmers movement. Sachin Tendulkar and other pro-BJP forces also joined the chorus. Most of these forces are pro-monopoly houses and hardly have any engagement with the agrarian production.

One’s own social location in terms of caste plays a key role in taking stands when the farmers of India and the business and industrial houses are on the course of conflict.  International expressions cannot be judged based on convenience. In a globalised world international opinions get expressed on many things. In fact the BJP/RSS mobilized international opinions in their favour on many occasions. Such international opinions were expressed during the anti-rape Nirbhaya agitation and the RSS/BJP combine was very happy and welcomed such global opinions coming in since those opinions were against the Congress Government at that time. The farmers issue is a massive survival issue of the whole nation itself.  I have never in my life time experienced such massive agitation by farmers. What do Sachin Tendulkar and Kangana kind of people know about agriculture? Particularly Kangana Ranaut’s language against farmers has shocked the whole world, not just the nation.

It is a well known fact that Kangana is a Ksatriya arrow left on the Indian Shudra farmers by Yogi Adithyanath. I say this with conviction  because the agitating farmers mostly are Shudras and the Ksatriyas as a community did not put its hand on the plough, in their historical existence, though they own estates of land. They treat tilling land below their community status. Quite interestingly the Jats of Uttar Pradesh are in the lead of the movement at present under the leadership of Rakesh Tikait, who is a son of the famous Mahendra Singh Tikait. Even then Kangana says the same thing that she was saying against Punjab farmers linking this agitation to Khalistan. The caste system makes many of the policy decisions biased. There is a clear divide between the agrarian production and the business networks that want to make business and make profits around agrarian produce. Farmers  have never evolved into a business community in India. Even the high end agriculturist communities like Kamma, Reddy, Velama, Kapu, Lingayat, Jat, Gujjar, Yadav, Maratha and so on did not get into high end monopoly businesses. The high end business is mainly in the hands of national Banias, Brahmins, Kayathas, Khatris. Of late Ksatriyas are also entering into business. The farmers’ fears get compounded because of this caste divide also.

Kanagana, who characterises the food producers  comes from a family that never tilled an acre of land and never sowed a seed and produced a ton of grain. She comes from a horse riding and knife wielding family heritage. Perhaps she has not seen how a farmer’s furrow germinates the plant that becomes the source of life blood of all others in the country while living in a mansion in Himachal Pradesh.

There is a fine Telugu folk song that has become a trend setter on youtube written by a Telugu writer Asta Gangadhar ‘Raithu (farmer) the Legend’ and sung by Relare Ganga, which broadly goes as follows:

O farmer you are our hero

O farmer you are our legend

O farmer you produce food from the mud

Unless you produce food computers cannot work

Unless you produce food the robots do walk

Unless you produce food the soldier cannot fire a gun

Kangana calls this farmer who is the real hero of the nation and real legend of the nation, a terrorist repeatedly. She does not seem to read or hear what is said and written about her daily attack on farmers.

Why did the international response come even after so many days of farmer agitation against the new farm laws? A tribal environmentalist young girl from North East India called Kangujam, who is just nine, gave a call to the world to respond to the suffering farmers in the cold, in corona pandemic in the open on Delhi borders. They are facing police lathis, barricades along with insufficient food and water.

Kangujam tweeted, “Dear friends, our millions of poor farmers sleeping in the streets in this cold weather don’t expect anything from you. Just your one tweet of love and support /solidarity to their cause means a lot to them. Our Indian celebrities are lost!”

This appeal of our own environmentalist young Adivasi girl invoked responses from many global celebrities including

Rihanna who said in her hashtag tweet “Why aren’t we talking about this farmers’ protest” with a picture of Indian farmers living in the cold on the Delhi border. This led to a series of tweets.

Greta Thunberg said “We stand in solidarity with the farmers protest in India”

Actress and Instagram influencer Amanda Cerny too showed her support:

She said:

“The world is watching. You don’t have to be Indian or Punjabi or South Asian to understand the issue. All you have to do is care about humanity. Always demand freedom of speech, freedom of press, basic human and civil rights-equity and dignity for workers. ❤️ #FarmersProtest #internetshutdown

Kanagana said in her tweet in response to these international tweets, they “are not farmers but terrorists who are trying to divide India”. She not only repeatedly slut shamed Rihanna in a aseries of tweets, Ranaut also called Thunberg a “dumb and spoilt brat”. Kangana’s response must be seen in the background of the BJP Government trying to project the farmers movement as Khalistani terrorist movement. For the first time in six years Modi rule a political blunder has been committed. He went after farmers who voted the BJP to power twice. His Government and party also do not stop such a miscalculated attack on the farmers.   Why should the Government of India become very sensitive to individual criticism from abroad? As I said such a criticism came more than this when Nirbhaya rape agitation took place in Delhi.

The narrative of farmers getting attacked as terrorists is certainly making the organic intellectuals coming from the agrarian family background who write in every regional language their own songs, stories and novels. The farmers agitation has inspired a new genre of writing, singing and dancing in the villages. The farmer terrorist language is infuriating them. That will have its fall out sooner or later.

Social media cuts both ways. In one particular stage it worked in the RSS/BJP favour. But now the narrative is changing. Farmer is too much of a nationalist to be brandished as terrorist or anti-national.

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The author is a political theorist, with an upcoming new book The Shudras — Vision for a New Path co-edited with Karthik Raja Karuppusamy (Penguin).

Featured image is from Countercurrents

Illegal loggers in Indonesia’s remote Papua region have largely evaded any meaningful kind of punishment and continue to operate unimpeded, in what a new report calls a failure by the country’s legal system to crack down on the problem.

That’s the finding of a forensic analysis of enforcement actions and court cases between 2018 and 2020 by the London-based Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) and its Indonesian partner, Kaoem Telapak. The two NGOs looked at instances of companies and company directors prosecuted for trading illegal timber, mostly the prized tropical hardwood merbau, in Papua, in Indonesia’s far east.

Merbau (Intsia bijuga), also known as Pacific teak, is threatened with extinction in the region as a result of high volumes of exports to China, where it is sought after for use in flooring, furniture and musical instruments.

An estimated 50% of merbau timber exports go to China. One of the Indonesian companies in that supply chain, according to the EIA/Kaoem Telapak report, is PT Bahtera Setia. The company received merbau timber from 25 companies in Papua and the neighboring Maluku region, according to the NGOs; nine of those suppliers were caught up in law enforcement actions in 2018 and 2019.

PT Bahtera Setia, in turn, sold merbau to 49 companies in the cities of Surabaya and Gresik on Indonesia’s main island of Java. EIA and Kaoem Telapak say they shared this finding with the Ministry of Environment and Forestry’s law enforcement division, but no apparent action was taken against the 49 companies.

The lack of enforcement by the authorities is common, said Kaoem Telapak executive director Abu Meridian. He said the NGOs had identified at least 50 companies involved in the illegal timber trade from Papua, “but less than 10 firms have had their cases legally processed.”

The island of New Guinea is split between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea.

Court bottlenecks

The environment ministry’s law enforcement division has ramped up its efforts to stop illegal logging and trading in recent years, Abu said, but the issue is with the courts, specifically the lack of clarity on whether these cases are being followed up with a criminal prosecution.

In the small number of cases where illegal loggers and traders have been put on trial and convicted, the punishment handed down doesn’t reflect the severity of the crime, and therefore fails to act as a deterrent, he said. Furthermore, some cases are inexplicably missing from court records even in the event a suspect has been charged.

“It is frustrating that the ministry’s law enforcement directorate-general is doing so much to crack down on those trading in illegal timber, but it seems that the courts are undermining so much of the work,” Abu said.

The report singled out the case of Henoch Budi Setiawan, also known as Ming Ho, the owner of two companies implicated in the illegal logging trade. In October 2019, a court in Papua’s Sorong district found Ming Ho guilty over the role of his companies in the illegal trade. The court sentenced him to five years in prison and ordered him to pay 2.5 billion rupiah ($178,000) in fines. Officials also confiscated nearly 1,700 cubic meters (60,000 cubic feet) of merbau wood from his companies during raids in December 2018 and January 2019.

Ming Ho appealed the verdict all the way to the Supreme Court, which ordered that his sentence be cut to two years and that the state return more than 1,900 m3 (68,000 ft3) of the illegal timber, worth roughly 23.2 billion rupiah ($1.6 million) — or nearly 10 times the fine imposed — be returned to Ming Ho.

The court’s decision was widely criticized by activists, with the EIA and Kaoem Telapak pointing out that Ming Ho’s case failed to meet any of the conditions in which seized assets may be returned to a convicted criminal. The NGOs also criticized the court system’s lack of transparency, with the only document that was available being a summary decision of the case. The full, detailed verdict remains unavailable. This makes it impossible to understand how the Supreme Court justified its decision, they said.

“This lack of transparency, coupled with some seemingly irrational decisions by various courts, leads to the concern that many criminals are going unpunished or are having their punishments reduced with no explanation from the courts,” said EIA senior forests campaigner David Gritten.

Grita Anindarini, a program director at the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL), said Ming Ho’s case set a bad precedent.

“When the evidence” — the seized timber — “was returned to the convict, it opened up the opportunity for the evidence to be circulated in the market,” she said.

Deforestation outside of Manokwari, West Papua, Indonesia. Image by Rhett A. Butler/Mongabay.

Certification loophole

Besides lenient verdicts, EIA and Kaoem Telapak also found inconsistencies in law enforcement, with some companies going unpunished even though their executives were found guilty.

In the few cases where timber trading companies were found guilty and ordered to cease operating by the courts, some continued to operate and hold certificates under Indonesia’s timber legality verification system, or SVLK.

The system, first rolled out in 2009, aims to ensure all parties in the timber supply chain obtain their wood and timber products from sustainably managed forests and conduct their trading operations in accordance with existing laws and regulations. The SVLK certificate thus acts like a stamp of approval that a company follows the required chain of custody to ensure the timber in its supply chain is legal.

The analysis discovered that of the 21 companies found to be trading $7.7 million worth of merbau timber during a string of operations by law enforcers in December 2018 and January 2019, eight were allowed to keep their SVLK certificates.

And of the 13 companies whose certificates were revoked, four soon obtained new certificates. They did this by repeating the registration process to get an SVLK certificate, but with a different independent assessor approved by the government, which either failed to check or overlooked the companies’ track records.

As of last December, therefore, 12 of the 21 companies raided for illegal timber trading had a valid timber legality certificate allowing them to continue exporting.

EIA and Kaoem Telapak said these companies should have had their certificates revoked immediately upon being caught in the act of illegal trading. They also urged the government to stop executives and owners of these companies from being allowed to reapply for an SVLK certificate.

“The SVLK system has to be strengthened,” Abu said. “If a company has been found guilty, audit agencies have to follow up on it.”

The SVLK certificate is mandatory for companies operating in Indonesia to export timber, and has been approved by the European Union as the basis for importing timber into its market. Indonesia is the first country in the world to have its timber legality system recognized by the EU.

The EIA’s Gritten said the findings show the SVLK system hasn’t been able to completely stop the illegal timber trade, and that it needs to be continuously improved. The EIA and Kaoem Telapak have made some suggestions on how to strengthen law enforcement against illegal loggers, such as improving transparency and coordination among government agencies.

One deterrent measure that could go a long way to stamping out the crime is to add money laundering to the list of charges that suspects may face. Money laundering statutes are used primarily in fraud, corruption and financial crimes prosecutions, but can theoretically be applied in other cases, including the illegal timber trade. Money laundering charges carry much heavier penalties than illegal logging ones, but prosecutors in the cases analyzed in the recent report opted not to bring them, Abu said.

“Fines are not enough,” he said. “We hope that the anti-money-laundering law can be used to return state revenue that has been lost [from illegal logging].”

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Featured image: The Indonesian Ministry of Environment and Forestry’s law enforcement team seized 100 cubic meters of tropical hardwood merbau as an evidence in a sting operation that arrested two illegal loggers in Raja Ampat district, West Papua province, Indonesia, on February 3, 2020. Image courtesy of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry.

Modi’s Farm Produce Act Was Authored Thirty Years Ago, in Washington D.C.

February 5th, 2021 by Research Unit for Political Economy

On December 18, addressing a Kisan Sammelan (farmer conference) in Madhya Pradesh by video conferencing, Narendra Modi declared:

We are compelled to do things which should have been done 25-30 years ago…. The new laws that have been made for the farmers are in the news for some time now. These agricultural reforms have not come about overnight. Every government of this country has held wide-ranging discussions with the state governments in the last 20-22 years. (emphasis added)

It is true that things now being carried out by the Modi government were recommended nearly 30 years ago. It is true too that governments of various parties at the Centre have been discussing these measures over the last two or three decades, more or less as Modi says.

However, key provisions of the measures the Modi government announced in May 2020 as part of its ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ (‘Self-Reliant India’) package were in fact spelled out in a World Bank document of August 1991.

That World Bank document was titled India: Country Economic Memorandum, vol. II. (henceforth referred to as the Memorandum). At the time, India was still in its foreign exchange crisis of 1990-91, and had just submitted itself to an IMF-monitored ‘structural adjustment’ programme. Thus India’s July 1991 Budget marked the fateful start of India’s neoliberal era. The Memorandum (vol. I) bluntly clarified that India had little choice but to accept the IMF-World Bank prescriptions for ‘structural adjustment’:

India’s creditworthiness has declined to the point where international sources of commercial credit have been cut off and, despite borrowing from the IMF, the external liquidity position is extremely tight. India, therefore, has to take strong measures to adjust the economy. The only real options are whether the adjustment is made in the context of an orderly, growth-oriented adjustment program with external financial support, or through a disorderly and painful process that will leave the country cut off from international capital markets for years to come and significantly reduce its growth.

The Memorandum spelled out a programme designed to restructure India’s agriculture drastically, exposing India’s agricultural producers as well as consumers to grave dangers, while benefiting multinational agribusiness corporations. The Memorandum provided, in tabular form, a list of its ‘recommendations’, with a schedule for completing each (“immediate”, “medium-term”, “changes to begin in next budget”, etc).

To summarise, the Memorandum called on the Government to do the following:

1. Scrap subsidies for agriculture – on fertiliser, water, electricity, bank loans – and open agriculture to foreign trade

a.) The Government should eliminate all subsidies on fertiliser over the course of four years. It should scrap protection for India’s fertiliser industry, and link domestic fertiliser prices to world prices; “restructure” the fertiliser industry (i.e., allow the closure of fertiliser units). It should do away with Government intervention in, and regulation of, fertiliser marketing.

b.) It should eliminate ‘priority sector’ lending quotas, which reserve a share of bank credit for agriculture, and raise interest rates on agricultural lending, eliminating all subsidy.

c.) It should increase charges on all it supplies to agriculture, such as irrigation, veterinary and other extension services. It should enlist greater private sector involvement and investment in these.

d.) It should scrap protections from imports for agriculture. For a start it should open up to imports of edible oilseeds. It should also remove restrictions on agricultural exports.

e.) The Government should promote private research in seeds, remove regulations on private marketing of seeds, and remove subsidies for seeds.

f) It should raise electricity tariffs for agriculture to the level of non-agricultural tariffs.

2. Move toward dismantling the entire system of public procurement and distribution of food.

a.) “Food Corporation of India (FCI) should reduce its large direct role in purchasing, transport, and storing grain, through subcontracting to licensed agents, wholesalers and stockists, and providing price incentives for farmer storage of grains.”

b.) India should maintain only a small buffer stock, and turn to the world market at times of shortage, keeping foreign exchange to handle purchase in deficit years.

c.) Price support programmes should be divorced from public procurement.

d.) Food subsidies should be reduced by targeting only those officially defined as poor. The “non-needy” should be denied access. The Government should “Use new methods of reaching the most vulnerable, including private sector distribution.”

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Implementation of the World Bank programme over the years

The timetable prescribed by the Bank paid little heed to the political difficulties the Indian rulers would face in implementing such a comprehensive attack on the livelihoods of India’s peasantry, the nutritional requirements of the majority of people, and above all the country’s economic sovereignty. Nevertheless, on most of these fronts, successive Governments of India tried to follow the Memorandum’s script, albeit haltingly, with partial retreats from time to time in the face of popular resentment and opposition.

  • Subsidies on phosphatic and potassium fertilisers have been slashed, and their prices decontrolled, leading to a sharp drop in their use, with harmful consequences for the soil nutrient balance.
  • The share of agriculture in bank credit has fallen steeply, leading to a rise in credit from moneylenders, the growth of peasant indebtedness, and over 300,000 peasant suicides since the late 1990s.[1]
  • Public sector extension services for agriculture collapsed between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s; there has been a partial revival thereafter, but these services are still grossly inadequate.
  • Quantitative restrictions on agricultural imports were removed, and tariffs on agricultural imports have been lowered. As a result, India imports about half of its requirement of edible oils. Other produce too has faced the threat of imports.
  • Once-dominant public sector seed firms steadily withdrew from the market for seeds; private sector seed firms became dominant.
  • The recent Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2020, proposes to do away with all electricity cross-subsidies at one stroke, implying a massive burden on an already crisis-ridden peasantry.

Drastic restructuring of India’s food economy

Now the Modi government is dramatically advancing the implementation of the above programme, using the Covid-19 crisis as cover. The dismantling of the public procurement and distribution of food is to be implemented by the three agriculture-related Acts recently ‘passed’ by Parliament.

Of course, the implementation of the World Bank’s guidelines began much earlier. The Targeted Public Distribution System introduced in 1997 drove so-called “Above Poverty Line” consumers out of the Public Distribution System, thereby crippling the entire PDS – leading to a build-up of grain mountains and so creating an excuse for winding up the PDS itself.

Prime Minister Vajpayee told peasants bluntly that they needed to adjust to global ‘comparative advantage’. Speaking at a gathering in Haryana on March 6, 2001, he exhorted them to “Look beyond wheat and paddy”, and to switch to “horticulture, floriculture, oilseeds and vegetable production and have a good export potential.” The farmer, he explained, had to adjust and respond to the growing pressures of the world market — especially with the removal of quantitative restrictions under WTO — by producing less food and more of other crops. Only then, he said, would they be able to benefit from the free market. In this way he made explicit the policy of discouraging foodgrains production as a part of ‘globalisation’.

In 2002, the High Level Committee on Long-Term Grain Policy noted in its report: “the Committee had to take note of an opinion that the existing system need not be salvaged and that the present crisis may in fact be an opportunity to do away not only with Minimum Support Prices (MSP) but also with the Public Distribution System (PDS), and restrict the role of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) to maintaining a reduced level of buffer stocks”.

However, the Vajpayee government’s agriculture and food policies led to an agrarian depression, to widespread hunger and to rural discontent. This contributed to the defeat of the BJP in the 2004 elections. The subsequent Congress-led UPA government no doubt thought it prudent to backtrack on some of these measures for a while, even as it kept trying to find openings to revive the ‘reform’ programme.

In his speech at Varanasi last Diwali (November 30), Narendra Modi vehemently denied that the Government was planning to wind up the system of public procurement at minimum support price (MSP):

I am aware that decades of deceit make farmers apprehensive. The farmers are not to be blamed, but I want to tell the countrymen, my farmer brothers and sisters, that work is being done with intentions as pure as Gangajal. This I want to say from the banks of the Ganges, from the holy city of Kashi.

However, when the kisans conclude that the Government intends to wind up public procurement, they have a much more solid basis – namely, documents of the Government’s own official bodies. In 2014, the Modi government’s very first year in office, it appointed the High Level Committee (HLC) on Reorienting the Role and Restructuring of the Food Corporation of India. The Committee was headed by BJP leader Shanta Kumar. The HLC briefly acknowledged that the “FCI was mandated with three basic objectives: (1) to provide effective price support to farmers; (2) to procure and supply grains to PDS for distributing subsidized staples to economically vulnerable sections of society; and (3) keep a strategic reserve to stabilize markets for basic foodgrains.”

While perfunctorily acknowledging the need for these objectives at some time in the distant past, the HLC more or less dismissed those objectives for the present day. It instead recommended: involving private firms at every stage of the food supply chain; outsourcing food stocking operations to the private sector; reducing public sector grain stocks; penalising state governments that provide bonuses to farmers above the MSP; replacing public procurement of grains with cash transfers to farmers; deferring implementation of the National Food Security Act (NFSA); drastically reducing the percentage of the population to be covered under the NFSA; steeply hiking the issue prices of foodgrain, and replacing the public distribution system by cash transfers to consumers. Indeed the HLC baldly declared that the FCI should turn into an “agency for innovations in Food Management System”.

In essence, the report propagated the notion that the Government can save vast sums by doing away with the physical system of public procurement, transport and distribution of foodgrains, instead handing out some cash to farmers and consumers, and leaving the rest to the ‘market’. (This is the propaganda of finance: that all public needs can be financialised – stripped of their concrete forms, i.e., of actual provisioning, and converted instead into ‘lean’, purely financial mechanisms.[2])

It is revealing to compare the Shanta Kumar Committee report recommendations with those of the World Bank Memorandum of 1991, which stated:

“Third, there is a need to reconsider FCI’s role in market operations within the context of changing program objectives and the need to contain costs. FCI’s operations are already too large and complex: rising costs indicate the organization’s inability to cope with current, let alone expanded responsibilities…. Marketing is an activity which by its very nature is ill-suited to cumbersome, public sector entities. FCI should reduce its large direct role in purchasing, transporting and storing grain, through subcontracting to licensed agents, wholesalers and stockists, and providing price incentives for farmer storage of grains.

“Fourth, stock levels and management require review. High levels of buffer and working stocks for wheat and rice (currently over 19 million mt) are both expensive and unnecessary, especially in light of changing objectives for market interventions and a new role for FCI. India could be adequately protected with a smaller buffer stock, entering the world market to obtain supplementary supplies in poor production years and keeping foreign exchange to handle purchases in deficit years. Concerns of price rises when India enters the market could be mitigated using tools of price risk management (forward and futures contracts) coupled with more accurate information gathering on production and stocks, and improved mechanisms for decision making on emergency food imports. FCI could retain responsibility for the maintenance of India’s buffer stock. A review of stocking levels, analysis of the costs and benefits of different stock levels, and development of recommendations for encouraging private sector storage is recommended.

“Finally, the Govemment needs to review price support objectives for each commodity, cross commodity price impacts, and the structure of domestic incentives. Current efforts to adjust procurement prices at the margin through the addition or subtraction of price elements defeat the objectives of these prices: they are meant to provide price supports, not substitute for ptice setting through the market. A review of the price support system is recommended, to revise objectives and provide clear guidelines for the role and levels of price supports. In general, procurement prices need to be divorced from the objectives of food distribution schemes, and need to be set at levels which provide support in surplus areas, but not excessive returns. There also needs to be explicit recognition of international price signals. Allowing increased trade of rice, wheat and cotton at the margin would dictate greater attention to world prices in setting procurement price levels. For rice and wheat, a more focused targeting of the PDS may result in fewer market purchases, and thus less need to use high procurement prices to attact surpluses into the procurement system.

“India should also consider the potential benefits and costs of increased openness in foodgrain trade. Gradual opening of the sector to international market forces would improve competition, with benefits for both producers and consumers.”

Thus the Government’s present “Atmanirbhar” plan for agriculture closely adheres to the World Bank’s instructions of 1991. The foreseeable impact on Indian citizens of this package was outlined in a previous blog entry.

In 1996, RUPE’s publication Aspects of India’s Economy, no. 18, had discussed the World Bank Memorandum of 1991 in detail. It pointed out the deceptive nature of the Bank’s claims regarding the benefits of globalising Indian agriculture; the inherent problems in leaving agriculture to ‘market forces’; the mirage of better terms on the world market; how India would be squeezed as a seller on international markets; how it would be squeezed as a buyer on international markets; the implications of volatility on the international market; the illusion that huge markets would open up for India with the creation of the WTO; the means the developed countries would use to continue to protect their markets, including new forms of subsidies; and the fact that multinational corporations, not Indian peasants, would be the real beneficiaries of such a globalisation. Although there are several new developments to be taken account of in the past 25 years, much of what we said then has been borne out since, and as such remains relevant. A pdf of it can be accessed here.

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Notes

[1] Meanwhile, there has been a steep rise in loans to traders and the corporate sector disguised as agricultural loans, which accounts for the apparent rise in agricultural loans in the 2000s. R. Ramakumar and Pallavi Chavan (2014), “Bank Credit to Agriculture in India in the 2000s: Dissecting the Revival,” Review of Agrarian Studies.

[2] For example, in place of public health facilities, health insurance; in place of public education, school vouchers.

Featured image: Farmers’ protest in India. (Source: Green Left Weekly)

Aboriginal Historical Memory and ‘Australia Day’

February 5th, 2021 by Ramona Wadi

The symbolic “Australia Day” celebrations should be juxtaposed against the normalised violations occurring against indigenous populations and their terrain, Ramona Wadi writes.

January 26 marks Australia Day in colonial narratives, when the British First Fleet arrived in 1788 to establish a penal colony on indigenous land. For the Aboriginal people, the annual commemoration is a reminder of the colonial invasion and its ramifications – the historical massacres, heritage theft, exploitation of history and a political system which to date discriminates against the indigenous.

Defying Covid restrictions, Aboriginal people and activists demonstrated in Sydney and Brisbane, calling for the day to be celebrated on another date. The chosen date marginalises Aboriginal ancestry, attributing Australia’s history only to its colonial legacy.

Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison described the day as “the moment where the journey to our modern nation began.” Such discourse of modernisation has been used in other colonial contexts – the legitimisation of destroying one history and people to impose a purportedly superior and industrialised culture. Establishing such settler dominance, alongside the economic exploitation of colonised territory, is the first step towards the political oblivion of the indigenous population. Indigenous resistance, often times organised belatedly upon realisation of the settler-colonial intent and politics, is then used as a pretext upon which to dehumanise and massacre the indigenous population. The colonial narrative, however, blames indigenous populations for their decline, once again exploiting the concept of modernisation to cultivate impunity.

The Australian government endorsed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People in 2009, thus recognising the Aboriginal right to self-determination and compensation for crimes related to colonial violence. However, there is no signed agreement between the Australian government and the Aboriginal people which would commit to addressing the country’s colonial past, Aboriginal land rights, history and memory. Aboriginals are still not recognised as Australia’s first people.

Besides the debate on whether the commemoration should be scrapped, or the date changed, the question of Australia’s identity should be raised. With Aboriginals marginalised, economically and socially, the narrative remains settler-colonial, hence the commemoration has nothing to do with Australia’s earlier heritage.

The change needs to start from within – coming to terms with the settler-colonial history of the country in order to find common ground for reconciliation with the indigenous population.

Reconciliation Australia reveals that awareness regarding the colonial violence of British colonialism in the country is increasing. In 2016, the organisation identified five concepts upon which reconciliation could be achieved: historical acceptance, race relations, equality and equity, institutional integrity and unity. The 2021 State of Reconciliation Australia Report makes one important point – reconciliation with the Aboriginal people was sought by a small percentage of the early colonisers. Expounding upon this history would bring about an acknowledgement of the settler-colonial violence against the indigenous Aboriginal population, thus strengthening the historical, collective memory of Australia.

At government level, however, exploitation of indigenous lands, carrying on from the earlier colonial framework, remains paramount. Earlier in January the South Australian government gave permission to Argonaut Resources subsidiary company, Kelaray, to drill for mineral exploration at Lake Torrens – a site of Aboriginal heritage but without native title protection, as decided by a 2016 Supreme Court case. “I am not persuaded that a determination of native title in favour of any of the three applicants should be made in respect of any part of the claim area,” the judge ruled, citing the absence of proof of ownership in the pre-colonial era.

The symbolic “Australia Day” celebrations should be juxtaposed against the normalised violations occurring against indigenous populations and their terrain. Unless indigenous rights are politically recognised, the symbolism associated with Australia Day will take precedence over Aboriginal history and collective memory – the reason being that one commemoration is being carried out on a daily level in Australia, excluding the indigenous to pave the way for the colonial legacy to flourish.

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Ramona Wadi is an independent researcher, freelance journalist, book reviewer and blogger. Her writing covers a range of themes in relation to Palestine, Chile and Latin America.

Featured image: Aboriginal dancers in 1981 (CC BY-SA 3.0)

South Korean Unification Minister Lee In-young did not mince words when addressing explosive allegations that surfaced last week, alleging that South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un had secretly discussed an inter-Korean nuclear power project.

“I think that the commentary coming from right-wing media is a baseless argument,” Unification Minister Lee In-young told foreign reporters in Seoul on Wednesday. “The Ministry of Unification is in charge of inter-Korea cooperation and we have never had a discussion on building a nuclear power plant for them.

“You won’t be able to find the ‘n’ [nuclear] word’ in the new economic initiative we presented to North Korea.”

That was a reference to plans for inter-Korean economic cooperation, handed over on a USB from Moon to Kim, in the heady days of 2018.

Then, following North Korea’s surprise, last-minute participation in the Winter Olympic Games in South Korea, the formerly reticent Kim emerged from his isolation. Summits took place between the two Korean leaders in April and September, in addition to a historic summit between Kim and then-US President Donald Trump.

Introduction

The past decade has seen the emergence of new concepts such as China’s “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the United States’ “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” in the international relations arena of the Asia-Pacific. While experts, analysts, and scholars have questioned and tried to define the significance and concepts of these clashing initiatives, there is no consensus on what exactly these concepts mean in theory and practice. Official documents and announcements explain its rationale as being based on shared values such as ‘peace’ and ‘prosperity’. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, proclaims ‘peaceful development’ and ‘economic cooperation’ through regional connectivity across Asia, Europe, and Africa. (Office of the Leading Group for the Belt and Road Initiative, 2017) The Initiative is based on the five conceptual pillars of policy coordination, facilitating connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people exchanges. These pillars are linked to the Sustainable Development Goals that were adopted by the United Nations. (United Nations, 2019) Since its initiation, the BRI has been the object of analysis and debate. Interpretations range from seeing the BRI as a Chinese version of the “Marshall Plan” designed to expand economic development as well as China’s sphere of influence and as a way to transfer Chinese excess production capacity abroad (Simon Shen, 2016), to describing it as “the new phase of globalization integrating the inland and marine economies.” (Zheng Bijian, 2017)

Regardless of differing views, developing economic corridors is a priority for the BRI in promoting the regional cooperation and economic development agenda. Therefore, it is important to conceptualize the term ‘economic corridor’ first to better understand the BRI. Although ‘economic corridors’ have become an integral part of development projects across various countries and regions, there is no clear definition. However, the concept of ‘corridor’ comes from issues related to trade and accessibility problems affecting countries that lack access to the sea. (Siegfried O.Wolf, 2020) Economic corridors play a crucial role in integrating local economies into international value and supply chains in global and regional economic development strategies. (ADB, 2014) Experts view “economic corridors” not just as transport connections that facilitate the movement of people and goods, but an integrated network of infrastructure that can spur economic development in the defined geographical area. (Hans-Peter Brunner, 2013)

Indeed, the Corridor envisaged under the BRI is a broad concept that goes beyond road building. The BRI encompasses the following six economic corridors: “the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor”, “The New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor”, “China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor”, “China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor”, “China-Pakistan Economic Corridor”, and “Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor” (Belt and Road Portal, 2019). In fact, if fully realized, the BRI is projected to create economic corridors that benefit 4.4 billion people, more than half (63%) of the global population with a collective annual Gross Domestic Product of 2.1 trillion United States dollars, which account for 29% of the world’s wealth (Christopher K. Johnson, 2016). However, questions arise about the implementation of these projects in the local contexts, including the opportunities and challenges, and the beneficiaries.

Within the framework of the BRI, Mongolia has become a key transport corridor between China-Russia and Europe. It is in one of the six main economic corridors – “the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (hereinafter, CMREC).” Given this, Mongolia is profoundly affected by this grand strategy, though the details of this potential impact are as yet unclear. This article analyzes the BRI in the Mongolian context. It first explores the origins of the idea of a ‘China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor’ and how it is envisaged within the context of Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ project. This will then be analyzed to identify potential challenges and opportunities.

BRI: China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor

The proposal of the tripartite ‘economic corridor’ emerged during the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit of heads of state of China, Mongolia and Russia in Dushanbe, Tajikistan in 2014. During the summit, Mongolian president’s proposal to use its territory as a passage of international traffic between China and Russia coincided with Chinese president Xi Jinping’s proposal of constructing an economic corridor among the three nations. (Uradyn E. Bulag, 2014) This was further discussed in 2015 during the meeting of China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia Lundeg Purevsuren (People’s Daily, 2015). During the meeting, Lundeg Purevsuren expressed Mongolia’s interest in joining the initiative and developing the economy by integrating it with Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ or ‘Prairie Road’ initiative. (The Jamestown Foundation, 2015) Meanwhile, Russia’s interest was in news sources covering the meeting. Russia Today quoted Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s speech “There is a huge area for cooperation existing between China, Russia, and Mongolia. The China Mongolia-Russia economic corridor would connect China’s Silk Road Economic Belt to Russia’s transcontinental rail plan and Mongolia’s Prairie Road program” (RT, 2015) Russian media noted that this concept coincided with Russia’s Eurasian transport corridor initiative, which involves high-speed rail and road links between Moscow and Beijing. Following this, the three countries signed a Memorandum-of-Understanding (MoU) to build an “Economic Corridor” on the basis of their respective development strategies during the trilateral meeting in Ufa, Russia in 2015.

In 2016, China, Mongolia, and Russia signed a trilateral agreement to build an economic corridor on the sidelines of the 16th summit of the Council of Heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Member States held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. As ‘The Diplomat’ remarked at the time, instead of focusing on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization agenda, the members and guests used this opportunity to settle trilateral issues. The origin of this Mongolia-Russia-China ‘trilateralism’ can be traced back to the post-Ukrainian crisis and the rapprochement between China and Russia in 2014. While Russia has had to shift its economy towards China due to the sanctions imposed from the West after the annexation of Crimea, Mongolia sought a ‘trilateralism’ strategy to prevent being bypassed by a new version of the Eurasian Silk Road. It is in Mongolia’s interest not only to promote Mongolia as ‘a reliable and cheaper ‘Economic Corridor’ for Sino-Russian transit traffic across Eurasia’ but also to increase Russia’s investment in Mongolia, building a transport infrastructure that would connect with the Trans-Siberian rail system and further with China and the Asia-Pacific. (Alicia Campi, 2020)

Prospects of Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ project under the CMREC

Within the scope of the BRI, among the proposed 190 projects from the Chinese side, Mongolia selected 32 projects for advancing its development priorities. The projects are in various fields such as transportation and infrastructure (railway, logistics, road, and telecommunication), industrial sector, development of border-crossing points, energy sector, facilitation of trade and inspection procedures, environment and energy, education, science, and technology cooperation, humanitarian, agriculture and medical science. Among these projects, more than one third (13) involve transportation infrastructure as regional connectivity is the main target of the initiative. (UB Post, 2019) On that basis, in 2014, the Government of Mongolia came up with a plan called a “Steppe Road” (in Mongolian, ‘Талын Зам’) project to use their geographical location to connect Asia and Europe. The goal is to create a favorable political and economic environment with their two neighbors and for the landlocked nation to export its products to third markets through their territories. The project involves building roads, railways, oil and gas pipelines, and power lines, and connecting the southern and northern neighbors with infrastructure. In other words, the idea is to build trade and economic cooperation between the two neighbors using Mongolia as a ‘bridge’ over land and an important transit corridor between Asia and Europe. In the same year, Russia signed a 30-year gas deal with China (effective from 2018) worth 400 billion US dollars amid its worsened relations with the western countries. Although the two countries initially planned to build a 4000 kilometer gas pipeline, the Russian side also expressed interest in exporting its natural gas through Mongolia. This was welcomed by Mongolian authorities as it would allow it to export its natural gas through this channel. Later, the Ministry of Economic Development (dissolved in 2014) which calculated that through Mongolia it would only require a 1500 kilometer gas pipeline. In September 2014, the then Mongolian Prime Minister Norov Altankhuyag conveyed Mongolia’s interest in serving as a ‘bridge’ between China and Russia during his meeting with President Vladimir Putin in Saint-Petersburg. Shortly afterward, the Government of Mongolia established a working group on the ‘Steppe Road’ project (B.Shadavdolgor, 2016).

The Mongolian-proposed ‘Steppe Road’ project involves railway, railroad, power line, oil and gas pipeline projects. Under the railway project, the aim is to upgrade the Trans-Mongolian railway corridor in conjunction with the railway capacity of its two neighbors. With regard to the railroad plan, the goal is to build three vertical and three horizontal tunnels. Mongolian planners estimate that reaching Eastern Europe through Mongolia takes ten fewer days while it takes more than a month to reach Europe from China by sea. (S. Batbaatar, 2015) Also, as the Asian Highway (AH) passes through Mongolia, it would create favorable conditions for the implementation of related road projects. In turn, this would not only contribute to infrastructure development such as trade and logistics centers in Mongolia but also serve as a ‘bridge’ connecting two continents. Another important Steppe Road project is a power line. With the increasing energy consumption of the three countries, energy cooperation and building an energy system is a priority. China is by far the largest consumer of energy not just in the region but globally. Although most of China’s energy is coal based, it has recently been exploring solar and wind renewable alternatives. Russia and Mongolia are major energy suppliers to their southern neighbor. This is also true for the oil pipeline project. Both Mongolia and Russia have oil reserves and Russia supplies oil to China via Manchuria. Building a pipeline in Mongolia would allow both countries to export oil and natural gas to China.

In 2017, the Chinese and Mongolian governments signed a Memorandum of Understanding on BRI cooperation during the first Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing. This was followed by a cooperation plan for promoting the BRI with Mongolia’s ‘Steppe Road’ program in April 2019 during a state visit of Mongolian President Khaltmaa Battulga to Beijing (China Global Television Network, 2019). In the same year, the President of Mongolia urged its two partners to accelerate construction of a network of cross-border highways, facilitate customs clearance, strengthen energy cooperation, and discuss the construction of regional power grids during the fifth trilateral meeting of presidents of Russia, Mongolia, and China. According to (Gal Luft, 2017) trade between China and Mongolia currently follows two routes: (1) 1,200-mile from Ulaanbaatar to the Port of Tianjin (passing through Erenhot in Inner Mongolia) and (2) a 1,400-mile route from Choibalsan (eastern Mongolia) to the Port of Dalian through Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia. The plan under the CMREC is to build high-speed rail and road, the first to connect the Bohai Bay Economic Circle (the economic region surrounding Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region) to Russia via Hohhot (Inner Mongolia) and the second from Dalian to Chita in Russia via Shenyang, Changchun, Harbin and Manzhouli. According to some sources, this would allow the cargo to reach Western Europe three times faster than by sea) (Ж.Гөлгөө, Б.Индра 2017) with the Mongolian cargo routed through Qinhuangdao, the world’s largest coal export port in China. (Gal Luft, 2017) Other proposed rail projects under the CMREC such as connecting Tavan Tolgoi (one of the world’s largest untapped coking and thermal coal deposits, located in the Omnogovi Province in southern Mongolia) to the Chinese border have slowed for now due to lack of funding and other external factors.

Source: Geopolitical Monitor

Opportunities and Challenges

Judging from the projects launched in Mongolia under the BRI, the majority of proposed projects are related to transportation infrastructure and the railway projects are related to mining. This is also the case in Russia (the Far East and East Siberian regions). In the Mongolian case, while mining and enrichment will take place on Mongolian territory, the products will be transported to China. Coming to transit points, the capital, Ulaanbaatar, is identified as the main transit point in Mongolia, but the Altai (Gobi-Altai) city in Western Mongolia is also listed as a conditional junction point of the Chuya Highway (also known as Russian route R256 in Novosibirsk Oblast, Altai Krai and Altai Republic of Russia) with a potential road from Kyzyl in Russia. On Russian territory, Yekaterinburg is identified as the endpoint connecting all routes from China to the West along with Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Abakan, Taishet, Ulan-Ude, Kyzyl, and Chita. (See map) These Russian cities are listed as potential future hubs of transshipment logistics centers and cargo-forming areas from and to China. 

From a Mongolian perspective, the construction of railways and roads would improve its infrastructure and open new opportunities to export its products to Europe through Russia. Mongolia’s main exports are copper, coal, gold as well as cashmere and animal products such as meat and wool. Its main imports are refined petroleum, mineral fuels, petroleum oils along with machinery and equipment, cars, and consumer goods. Russia is the main supplier of Mongolia’s power and energy and about 80 percent of Mongolia’s oil. However, almost half of its total external trade is with China, which receives more than 90 percent of Mongolia’s exports (mainly, natural resources such as iron ore, copper and gold). Also, revenue from transit fees could contribute to economic growth. In short, the establishment of the Corridor will further strengthen and intensify economic cooperation among the three countries.

From a Russian perspective, this would not only contribute to its domestic socio-economic development using the natural resources of the Far East region but integrate trade with Mongolia, China, South Korea and Japan. Additionally, the natural resources of the Far East and Siberia would attract foreign investment (B.Otgonsuren, 2015). However, some research suggests that the prospects for transit through Mongolia are relatively low and restricted mainly to the transportation of timber from Russia. This is because Russian experts calculate that the majority of freight traffic including coal, grain and containers either passes through the Trans-Siberian Railway to Chita and further to Harbin, or goes through Kazakhstan to Urumqi and farther to southern China (Beijing). They also note that for the successful operation of the already established routes through Mongolia, such measures as reduction of tariffs, advertising campaigns, ensuring lower risk indicators of the safety of cargo and smooth cross-border operations would facilitate trade between the countries. (V.Yu. Malov, 2018)

Source: V.Yu. Malov, “Assessment of the Prospects for Mongolian Transit as an Integral Part of the Belt and Road Initiative,” Regional Research of Russia, 2019. 

There are further benefits and challenges regarding implementation of the BRI projects. Apart from financial issues and railway gauge differences of the three countries and other related technical difficulties, there are socio-economic, political, and environmental risks associated with the BRI projects. While Mongolia is keen to develop its infrastructure and rail transportation, it lacks financial and technical resources. This means that the financing of the projects will largely depend on Chinese enterprises and the Chinese state. In turn, this could place Mongolia at risk of excessive borrowing, thus increasing its dependency on China. In fact, some research suggests that Mongolia is among the high-risk countries under debt distress through the BRI. (John Hurley et al, 2018)

There are, however, opportunities. Mongolia’s economy is heavily dependent on its mining sector and the recent Chinese ban on Australian coal opens the way for Mongolia to become China’s top coking coal supplier. It is worth noting that Northern and northeastern parts of China (Manchuria and Inner Mongolia) are the key regions for the coking coal market. BRI projects such as railways and gas pipelines would smooth these processes and create economic opportunities. This would allow China to meet its demand for coal and other natural gas from its two close neighbors at low cost. Mongolia and Russia could become the main coal suppliers not just for China, but potentially to other Northeast Asian markets such as Japan.

On the other hand, the BRI transportation projects pose environmental risks, as noted by the World Bank. Direct effects of the construction and operations of roads and rails include air and water pollution, soil erosion, habitat destruction and fragmentation, and timber depletion. Indirect effects are generated through road or railway operations. The changes in transport availability and costs shift markets and human populations with far-reaching economic and environmental effects, such as habitat loss for numerous species, deforestation, wildlife and timber trafficking. A spatial assessment carried out by The World Wildlife Fund in 2017 found significant overlap between the BRI corridors and some of the most ecologically fragile places on earth. (WWF 2017) In the case of the BRI, areas within the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor are identified at ‘greatest risk’ facing active deforestation. For instance, regions within Heilongjiang in the Chinese territory, Republic of Buryatia, Irkutsk Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai in the Russian territory and Lake Baikal close to Mongolian border are all identified as ecologically high-risk areas. (Elizabeth Losos et.al., 2019). Moreover, the proposed gas and oil pipeline project traversing Mongolia could disrupt the surrounding environment and threaten the livelihood of local communities in the areas. As Julian Dierkes, Professor at the University of British Columbia’s Institute of Asian Research, observes, significant environmental risks would be born entirely by Mongolia. He adds that the pipeline would result in a major disruption of herders’ activities unless there is community involvement in the planning. He also warns of the long-term risk of spills around a pipeline. (Communication to author, 2021) Indeed, the country’s economic relations with its two neighbors is a major factor in its ability to protect the environment. This can be seen from the nature of economic dependence and resource extraction at the national level. This is especially true for mining and hydroelectric energy sectors.

As the mining sector is the engine of the Mongolian economy, addressing related environmental risks is a long-term challenge to sustainable development goals with local and global implications. For example, in 2015, Mongolia was planning to build a massive dam (with partial Chinese investment) on its largest river, Orkhon, both to meet increasing domestic power needs and provide water for the country’s mining industry. This has led environmental groups to raise concerns of dangers of the hydroelectric power plant and a related pipeline project to Lake Baikal which is just over the border in Russia. (Anson Mackay 2015) Similarly, other proposed hydropower plant projects on the largest Selenge river and its tributaries in northern Mongolia involve danger to the water system of Lake Baikal. While alternative approaches such as supplying Mongolia with electricity from various Russian hydroelectric and thermal power plants were proposed, they have yet to be realized. (V.Yu.Malov 2019) On top of that, although the Government of Mongolia is committed to hydroelectric development as a potential solution to its electricity shortages and reduction of its energy dependency on its two neighbors, the hydroelectric energy sector has not been productive. This is largely because the rivers remain frozen for most of the year and rivers are relatively small in size and capacity. This has been further worsened by climate change impacts in recent years.

With regard to BRI projects, China has pledged to adhere to the laws and norms of the host-country. Technically, then, host countries are responsible to bear the risks associated. However, this is not just an issue of an individual country but also involves funding organizations and other related stakeholders. Therefore, for successful implementation of the CMREC projects under the BRI, a strategic environmental and social assessment is essential to ensure better outcomes. As a signatory of international agreements such as the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals Agenda of the United Nations, BRI projects are likely to challenge Mongolia to meet its international commitments and sustainable development efforts. According to a recent publication “Greening the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor: A Visual Synthesis” by Zoi Environment Network, while Mongolia generates 93 percent of its power from coal, it has the potential to become a regional clean energy (wind and solar) exporter from the country’s vast steppes and deserts. Under the CMREC, a possible project is to create a regional integrated power supply and transmission network for exporting clean energy out of the Gobi Desert to China, Japan, and other northeast Asian countries. Considering that China and Russia aso have the highest energy potential from hydropower (Statista, 2020), there is an opportunity to switch to clean energy alternatives which could reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the region. However, so far, Chinese involvement in the Mongolia energy sector is still dependent on coal-related technologies as can be seen from the map below. (Zoi Environment Network, 2020) In this context, environmentally-friendly ‘green’ technologies will be key to greening the economic corridor.

Source: Zoi Environmental Network 2020

Finally, as some scholars state, while an ‘economic corridor’ is considered a geographically-targeted development initiative that helps to develop infrastructure and increase people-to-people and economic connectivity, it is also a geopolitical tool. (Stephanie Petrella,2018) Against the backdrop of Beijing’s increasing attention to its neighboring countries there is growing significance given to regional economic integration and connectivity. (Peter Cai, 2017) Therefore, the article further analyzes geopolitical factors within the context of Mongolia’s ‘Third Neighbor’ policy. Geographically, Mongolia is sandwiched between Russia and China with no access to sea. Therefore, the Corridor under the BRI is a golden opportunity for landlocked Mongolia to reach a wider international market and to diversify its economy.

However, often-times, instead of seeing Mongolia as a potential contributor to global market chains, international specialists see it as a potential ‘geopolitical chessboard’ amid rising geopolitical tensions. This is because historically, Mongolia’s relations were restricted within the sphere of its two neighbors. Mongolia was viewed as ‘a pawn whose fate was determined by the nature of the Sino-Russian relationship.’ (Alicia Campi, 2020) For example, Mongolia maintained good relations with both countries until the Sino-Soviet schism of the 1950s. With the intensified Sino-Soviet clash in the mid-1960s, the Mongolian People’s Republic became a front-line of Soviet defense against China for the next two decades. (Jeff Goodson, Jonathan Addleton 2020) However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Mongolia entered into a new era. Relations between China and Mongolia improved with the exchange of high-level state visits of each country. This was followed by the ‘Declaration on Friendship and Good-Neighborly Cooperation’ between Mongolia and Russia. (Ts.Batbayar, 1998)

In 1990, Mongolia took important steps toward becoming a multiparty, pluralistic and democratic society. With the New Constitution of 1992, Mongolia declared its intention of pursuing balanced relations with its two neighbors and a new framework for a continued open foreign policy and a new international orientation. While Mongolia enjoys friendly relations with its two neighbors, it also follows a ‘Third Neighbor’ foreign policy. Given changing geopolitical realities of the 21st century, Mongolia’s relations with other countries including the United States, Japan, Germany and South Korea are expanding. Particularly, the vast mineral resources in Mongolia have not only attracted foreign investments but also have allowed it to expand its relations with those countries. Among its ‘third neighbors’, the role of the United States is an important factor in its relations with its two neighbors. Arguably, growing geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between China and the United States will affect Mongolia significantly as it is considered important in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and in the U.S ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific.’ (Mendee Jargalsaikhan, 2020) For example, experts highlight the direct impact of the so-called U.S-China trade war on Mongolia. As China is Mongolia’s dominant economic partner, this leaves it highly vulnerable to Chinese economic fluctuations and Chinese pressures. (Jeff Goodson, Jonathan Addleton 2020) Given that, it can be said that Mongolia’s fate will be substantially affected by geopolitical rivalries among the big powers. This includes the competition for access to Mongolia’s mineral and energy sources. For Ulaanbaatar, this would mean that it has to ensure that the development of its mining industry does not result in dependency on either of its neighbors. As a result, external investments from third countries are significant. On one hand, as a young democratic country, Mongolia looks up to its ‘third neighbors’ like the United States, Japan, and others; on the other hand, its economic fate is closely connected with Russia and China. The important question for Mongolia is not who might win in the great power competition, but how Mongolia can navigate through all these factors while keeping the right balance in the sphere of geopolitics in flux.

This is not to suggest that these geopolitical factors will be a major challenge for the implementation of BRI projects. In fact, as some Mongolian scholars point out, rather than seeing geopolitical factors as a hindrance to Mongolia’s infrastructure development, it is important to see it as an economic and political opportunity. (Uradyn E.Bulag, 2014) This can also be supported by international experts who argue that while the majority of analysts see Chinese motives under the BRI as combing economic and strategic drivers, focusing on the geopolitical dimensions of the BRI undermines its principally geo-economic drivers. (Peter Cai, 2017) In this context, it can be said that Mongolia can benefit from the BRI provided all the parties can exert strong political will and commitment to the projects under the Corridor. As far as China and Russia is concerned, the rapprochement of the two countries following the Ukraine crisis, is likely to persist for the time being as both Russia and China face sanctions from the West, above all from the United States. This could push the two countries to strengthen their economic cooperation within the framework of the BRI. While Western analysts are sceptical about the continuation of the Sino-Russian alliance, some experts highlight that even in the case of lifted or relaxed sanctions of western countries, Russia is likely to tilt toward China for its economic growth. (Alexander Gabuev, 2016) While it is too early to judge whether the envisaged Corridor between China, Mongolia and Russia would be successful or not in the long term, it can become clear that potential outcomes from the BRI projects have far-reaching regional and global implications.

Overall, BRI projects hold both opportunities and challenges for Mongolia. However, if addressed correctly, it seems that the challenges can be translated into future opportunities. In other words, to fully benefit from the Corridor and to avoid potential risks involved, care should be taken to safeguard the environmental and social criteria in the implementation processes of the projects. This would in turn, contribute to realization of Sustainable Development Goals both at the national and global levels.

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Yelif Ulagpan is a Master candidate at Shanghai University in Shanghai and is an affiliate of Center for the History of Global Development, Shanghai University. Her research interests are in the fields of international and public affairs, (sustainable) development, public health and the environment. Contact: [email protected]

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Myanmar Military Seizes Power

February 2nd, 2021 by The Irrawaddy

The military’s mouthpiece channel, Myawaddy TV, has announced that acting President U Myint Swe has declared the country to be under a nationwide state of emergency for one year under Article 417 of the 2008 Constitution.

U Myint Swe, a former general, was appointed by the military as Vice President to represent the armed forces in the National League for Democracy (NLD)-led government, whose powers were assumed by the military in a coup early on Monday morning.

The broadcaster read out a statement saying that “the country’s legislative, administrative and judicial powers are transferred to the military’s commander-in-chief, in accordance with Article 418 of the military-backed 2008 Constitution, until the actions are taken against [alleged irregularities in] voter list checking and [approval].”

Defending the military’s action to stage a coup, the statement accused the Union Election Commission of failing to address voter list irregularities and said it was forced to act because the government had rejected the military’s demands, including the postponement of the new Parliament, which was slated to convene its first session on Monday morning.

Senior NLD leaders including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and President U Win Myint were detained a few hours before the takeover was announced.

The NLD’s chief ministers and ministers in the states and regions were also detained.

NLD lawmakers preparing to attend the opening of the new Parliament today were also arrested. Shortly before they were detained, a number of NLD lawmakers posted video announcements on social media that were apparently prepared ahead of time in anticipation of a possible coup; others livestreamed the arrival of soldiers at a residential compound for lawmakers in Naypyidaw.

Reports have emerged that critics of the military have also been detained.

The Irrawaddy has been unable to contact its bureau chief in Naypyidaw, where communications have been shut down.

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Featured image is from The Irrawaddy

US Pressure on China; The Thai Connection

February 2nd, 2021 by Christopher Black

The change of guard in the American White House has proved that nothing has changed from the Trump regime with respect to US foreign policy. President Biden and his party continue the American propaganda attacks on Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and other nations that try to march to their own tune, and will continue preparations for aggressive actions focused on Russia, Iran and China, in other words for war against those nations.

Already, in just the first week of Biden’s presidency we have witnessed the attempt to weaken Russia internally with the Navalny gambit being used as a device to undermine Russia. The Navalny scenario cannot succeed but the Americans will not stop at that. During that same week, Biden diverted the aircraft carrier, USS Roosevelt, a ship named after a president who a number of historians believe did not die a natural death, from its recent mission of threatening Iran in the Persian Gulf, to a new mission of threatening China in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straight, and China’s important sea trade routes that are concentrated in that region.

While the Democratic Party accused Trump of being a Russian agent, his supporters claim Biden is a Chinese agent. Americans take these absurd claims seriously because they need to believe in foreign scapegoats who they can punish for the failures of their own government and an economic, social and political system that is incapable of solving the many problems facing that declining power and its people.

But the propaganda has become so constant and intense that it takes on a life of its own and becomes an important factor in making decisions. It has been successful in creating hostility and bigotry towards China and Russia that the hegemon uses as a pretext to increase its preparations for war against both countries if they do not bend down and kiss America’s feet.

The American-NATO encirclement of Eurasia progresses with NATO building up its offensive capabilities in the west from the Baltic down to the Mediterranean, through the Black Sea, the Middle East, Afghanistan, to the east with its huge build up of forces in the Pacific, its constant provocations in Chinese territorial waters, in Hong Kong, in western China and its support of the renegade regime in the province of Taiwan. This has reached such a level that China, frustrated with refusal of the Americans to answer continuous calls for dialogue is prepared for war over Taiwan if that is what it takes to defend China’s sovereignty.

But these direct military threats are not the only means they are using to attack and undermine Russia and China.  They use regional alliances, economic blockades, labelled as “sanctions,” cyber warfare, all forms of hybrid warfare to try to weaken them.

The situation in Thailand is a prime example of this strategy. One of the few nations of southeast Asia to escape European imperialism and colonialism, it maintains its independence while trying to balance between competing powers in the region. After the Second World War it cooperated with the United States in its war against Vietnam and fought against communists in its own country, allowed the US to use some of its military bases for their operations and engaged in annual joint military exercises called Cobra Gold.

During most of that time the Americans were not too concerned with “human rights” or “democracy” in Thailand. But since the rise of China from the devastation caused by the west’s colonialism, the invasion and occupation by the Japanese and has succeeded in establishing socialism, a better life for its people and become a world economic power, Thailand has come to regard China as a more reliable and sympathetic regional partner than the United States both in terms of economic issues and with respect to security.

The decline of the influence of the United States in the region and the rise of China’s influence, particularly since the inception of the Belt and Road Initiative, has led logically to Thailand seeking closer relations with China, something which the United States cannot tolerate.

The United States has tried to restore its influence in the region but aside from Japan, and South Korea, still occupied by US forces, and Australia, which enthusiastically supports the US aggression, it has not succeeded in luring other Asian nations away from good relations with China.  But it has not stopped trying, and if it cannot persuade or force a government to adhere to its will, it goes to the next step of attempting to overthrow the existing government and replacing it with one more willing to be its vassal.

The Arab Spring, so-called was an example of this strategy.  Libya was the result.  The Americans have tried this with Vietnam, and The Philippines, among other nations, and is trying with Thailand. To do this it sings the worn out tune of “democracy” of “human rights” and demands the “democratisation of Thailand” and an overthrow of its constitutional monarchy.

That these calls are sheer hypocrisy the world knows all too well.  The United States has never supported any democratic government, whether socialist or capitalist, that does not serve its interests and has supported dictatorships the world over. Where is democracy in Afghanistan occupied by the US, and its allies, for 20 years? Where in Iraq, in Rwanda, in Libya, the former Yugoslavia, or any other country it has invaded or whose government it has overthrown? Where is the democracy in the United States where only two political parties are allowed to share power, each almost a mirror image of the other, and representing not the people but two factions of capital, one of which, represented by Trump, a nationalist faction, and the other, now represented by Biden, a “globalist” faction, which seeks to break the world into small pieces they can easily to dominate for their profit.

Just as it has tried in Hong Kong, in Belarus, in Myanmar, in other places around the world from Africa to Latin America, the United States is increasing its attempts to undermine the Thai government in order to replace it with one that will serve its interests and which will be opposed to China’s influence in the region and its Belt and Road Imitative.  One of the Americans’ key strategies to accomplish this objective is by backing what they calls “democratic groups,” or “ the civil society,” and “human rights” groups.

On December 3, 2020 nine US Senators submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee of the US Congress a Resolution aimed at Thailand which among things,

“Calls on the United States Government to support the right of the people of Thailand to peacefully and democratically determine their future;

and, Unequivocally states that a military coup to resolve the current political crisis would be counter-productive and risk further undermining bilateral relations between the United States and Thailand.”

In other words the United States is directly interfering in the internal affairs of Thailand, something that it will not tolerate from other nations with respect to itself as we saw in the recent US elections and the false American claims of Russian and Chinese influence in the elections.

The United States also tries to manipulate the Thai people, especially the youth, through numerous so-called non-governmental organisations funded by the battalion of agencies it has created to support and encourage them. It flows funds and expertise and personnel through a number of its agencies set up to interfere in other nations under the guise of “supporting democracy” including the National Endowment For Democracy, USAID, the CIA The Peace Corps and related agencies. It also uses military-technical cooperation aimed at gaining influence over young officers in the armed forces, and scholarships to American universities for students they have identified as useful to them in the future.  It’s influence has also been exerted through outside agents, for example some of the British and US financed and controlled “protestors” from Hong Kong travelled to Bangkok land Thai “democracy” activists visited Hong Kong last year to stir up trouble and advised local groups on tactics, even styles of dress and colour codes.

To get some idea of the extent of American interference in Thai domestic politics we need only look at a US State Department Fact Sheet for Thailand, which brags about, “the US Peace Corps Volunteers, active in Thailand since 1963,”

The Peace Corps has long been known as a conduit for the CIA to infiltrate nations and gain influence over people. They go on to state,

‘The US government funds more than 30 exchange programs in Thailand to connect Thai youth, students, educators, artists, athletes and rising leaders to their counterparts in the USA and the ASEAN region…” 

This is not done out of the goodness of their heart but to identify and control youth who regard as potentially useful to them as collaborators willing to advance US interests over Thai national interests. They add,

“Thailand’s alumni community from US government programs is robust, with more than 5,000 members hailing from the Fulbright Program, International Visitors Leadership Program, the Young South East Asian Leadership Initiative and other programs.  The Leadership Initiative has grown to nearly 15,000 members in Thailand since its inception in 2013, 500 of whom have travelled to the US,” and they should have added for indoctrination.

The American organisation USAID (Agency For International Development is very active in Thailand. Their fact sheet states that,

“Recognising the numerous opportunities for and challenges to democracy in Thailand, USAID has committed to working with civil society, the media, and independent agencies to strengthen government transparency and accountability and bring together citizens and government to build a more fair and just society.’

It is astonishing that such a statement can be made when they have not succeeded in establishing a just and fair society in the United States, but America is famous or notorious for its hypocrisy.  And, of course, the “challenges” in their view are the Thai government itself, whose constitutional monarchy established in 1932 is not good enough for the Americans to tolerate thought it tolerates them and absolute monarchies among many of its allies, from many NATO countries to the Gulf States.

One of the main tools used to interfere in nations targeted by the USA is the National Endowment For Democracy, whose function used to be under the aegis of the CIA.  It states on its website that in 2017 (the latest year available on their site but we can assume nothing has changed since then) that, 

‘The Endowment prioritized countries in Asia that faced “fundamental democratic deficits” and states that it has switched significant resources to Thailand.’

It then lists a number of groups and organisations in Thailand to which it has given funds, all having the objective of bringing “democratic values” to Thailand, meaning in reality funding groups used to manipulate the people into overthrowing the present government to replace it with, not a better one, but one willing to supports US interests instead of its own, willing to surrender Thai sovereignty.

The list includes a number with the words “human rights” included in their name. Other examples are the Union For Civil Liberty, Café Democracy, The Thai Volunteer Service, The Solidarity Centre, the EnlawThai Foundation, online media platforms such as 101 Perecent Company Ltd. and The Isaan Record,

US influence is also exerted by the Soros Open Society Foundation, whose name reflects not a respect for democracy but for the opening up of national economies to the free flow of western capital to make profit. George Soros has a bad reputation in Thailand as it believed by many that he helped crash the Thai currency in 1997, harming the Thai people, but profiting him. Soros also funds the Thai journal Prachatai and various ngos as well as the US organisation, Human Rights Watch, to which he gave 100 million dollars in 2010 and which on January 13, 2021 issued a statement condemning the Thai government for repression of protests and encouraging students to carry out further protests.

One can imagine what the US government would do if Russia or China or Thailand called for protestors for democracy in the US to increase their activities there.  But of course, the Americans are an exceptional people, above all laws and morality, always asserting their right to judge others while denying the right of others to judge them.

In their important 1999 paper on military theory, “Unrestricted Warfare,” two Chinese Army Colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiansiu, now both generals, I believe, advanced the idea that the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden. They then examined the use of full spectrum warfare and why it is the only strategy to adopt in order to resist a powerful aggressor who does not obey international rules but makes up its own, such as the United States which, as they point out, cannot even be trusted to obey its own rules. How can anyone trust a nation that seems to have the same motto as the Mediterranean pirate chief in the middle ages who said, “Law? I make up my own laws and I take what I want.”

The United States has adopted this type of warfare for its own purposes and the undermining of a nation from within is one of their most dangerous types of this kind of warfare.

Thailand, like Russia, China, and other nations, must ever be alert to the dangers represented by the many tentacles of American influence that have spread across the world and threaten world peace and security. They must demand that the United States respect and adhere to the fundamental principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations; the sovereignty of nations, the right to self-determination of and non-interference in nations, and the peaceful resolution of disputes between nations. The Americans want us to forget about those principles. But we cannot. We will not.”

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Christopher Black is an international criminal lawyer based in Toronto. He is known for a number of high-profile war crimes cases and recently published his novel Beneath the Clouds. He writes essays on international law, politics and world events, especially for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”

He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

The final stretch of a cross-border fiber optic cable is set to be laid by China in Pakistan to create the Digital Silk Road (DSR), Nikkei Asia reports. The DSR is part of the broader Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The fiber cable will link to the Pakistan East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) submarine cable in the Arabian Sea, to service countries participating in BRI, and Europe. It is currently being laid between Pakistan’s Rawalpindi city and the port cities of Karachi and Gwadar. The $240-million project, which is in partnership with China’s Huawei Technologies, was approved by the government last week.

The laying of sea cable in Pakistan’s territorial waters will begin in March, following government approval this month for Cybernet, a local internet service provider, to construct an Arabian Sea landing station in Karachi.

The Mediterranean section of the cable is already being laid, and runs from Egypt to France. The 15,000 kilometer-long cable is expected to go into service later this year.

Read full article here.

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Featured image is from Pixabay.com / Gerd Altmann

Cowardly History: Australia Day and Invasion

February 2nd, 2021 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

It’s the sort of stuff that should have been sorted years ago in Australia: a murderous, frontier society ill disposed to the indigenous populace; the creation of a convict colony that was itself an act of invasion rather than settlement; the theft of land and its rapacious plunder.   

Even some of the rough colonists were not oblivious to such a crude record.  Henry Parkes, in planning the Centenary celebrations as New South Wales premier in 1888, was asked by a fellow politician what he would be doing for the poor and needy for the occasion.  Wealthy landed citizens had been promised a banquet of much quaffing and gorging.  As a gesture, Parkes considered the distribution of food parcels.  “Then we ought to do something for the Aborigines,” came the response.  The answer from the premier was coldly revealing: “And remind them that we have robbed them?”

But the use of such language is frowned upon by flag waving brigades advocating uplift and encouragement, those who can only ever babble about the exceptional country, the remarkable social experiment, the wonders of a Britannic transplant that found itself at the other side of the earth.

Generally speaking, Australia Day is not exactly one of patriotic feverishness.  As the BBC describes it, Australians tend to mark the occasion more as “a late summer festival than a solemn national day its founders intended it to be”.  The more serious ones find time to acknowledge such words as “a fair go” and “mateship”, along with “democracy” and “freedom”.

For the most part the date is a scribble on the calendar, commemorating January 26, 1788 when Captain Arthur Phillip took formal possession of the land that would become the colony of New South Wales.  The British flag was raised in Sydney Cove, if only because sources of fresh water had been identified.  The actual date of the arrival of the First Fleet in Botany Bay was a week prior.  And so, deceptions are born and lies established.

By 1935, January 26 came to be known as Australia Day in all states bar New South Wales, which preferred the even duller appellation of “Anniversary Day”.  Three years later, various Indigenous groups sought a different title: January 26 would be known as a Day of Mourning and Protest.  Victorian Aboriginal activist William Cooper saw little reason to dissemble: the day the British arrived was a memorial to the death of the Aboriginal people.

In recent years, the casualness has come off the gloss of the occasion.  There have been campaigns launched to Save Australia Day, spearheaded by Mark Latham, former federal Labor opposition leader and now stable mate of right wing commenters in the country.  In 2018, Latham’s effort involved television, radio and social media advertisements fearful of an Orwellian future of censorship.  “In an environment where you have so much political correctness, where certain words, themes and values are banned in public institutions, I think the Big Brother approach, that dystopian theme, is very appropriate.”

Latham’s sentiment here that a history focused on the grim and the brutal is not constructive, being merely conducive to morbid reflection.  “A lot of terrible things happened in the 19th and 20th centuries, no one’s wiping that history away, but we can’t rewrite that history.”  Nor speak of it, it would seem.

The national broadcaster, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, has also found itself thickly involved in such disputes of title, despite pretending not to be.  In attempting to keep an open church on terminology, the organisation has managed to aggravate all concerned.  As the network says in a statement, “Australia Day” is the “default terminology” used.  “We also recognise and respect that community members use other terms for the event, including ‘26 January’, ‘Invasion Day’ and ‘Survival Day’, so our reporting and coverage reflect that.”

Prior to this year’s coverage of Australia Day events, the ABC felt the need to clarify its position after suggesting that the terms were flexible and elastic in their deployment.  “Given the variety of terms in use, and the different perspectives on the day that the ABC is going to cover over the course of the long weekend, it would be inappropriate to mandate staff use any one term over others in all contexts.”

That need for clarification was driven by criticisms over an article published by the network originally titled “Australia Day/Invasion Day 2021 events for Sydney, Melbourne, Canberra, Brisbane, Perth, Adelaide, Hobart and Darwin.”  This was less than pleasing to the Communications Minister Paul Fletcher, who represents a conservative government already cranky with various news reports from the organisation.  The ABC had “clearly got this one wrong” in referencing both terms for the day and presuming them to be interchangeable.  “The name of Australia Day is reflected in legislation across Australia.  More important, it is reflected in the usage of the overwhelming majority of Australia.”

The pro-market, libertarian Institute of Public Affairs was also livid, and had some advice for Prime Minister Scott Morrison.  The government, suggested IPA communications director Evan Mulholland, could “refuse to fund a public broadcaster that doesn’t respect Australian values.”  In a sour mood to deceive, Mulholland also toyed with a moral argument.  “If Australia was invaded, not settled then native title ceases to exist.  Does the ABC support the abolition of native title?”

Showing a distinct lack of backbone, the broadcaster, despite Fletcher insisting that it retained “editorial independence” proceeded to amend the headline.  “Australia Day is a contentious day for many.  Here are the events being held on January 26”.  A minor triumph for cowardice over substance.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Pixabay

Indian Farmers on the Frontline Against Global Capitalism

February 1st, 2021 by Colin Todhunter

In a short video on the empirediaries.com YouTube channel, a protesting farmer camped near Delhi says that during lockdown and times of crisis farmers are treated like “gods”, but when they ask for their rights, they are smeared and labelled as “terrorists”.

He, along with thousands of other farmers, are mobilising against three important pieces of farm legislation that were recently forced through parliament. To all intents and purposes, these laws sound a neoliberal death knell for most of India’s cultivators and its small farms, the backbone of the nation’s food production.

The farmer says:

“Corporates invested in Modi before the election and brought him to power. He has sold out and is an agent of Ambani and Adani. He is unable to repeal the bills because his owners will scold him. He is trapped. But we are not backing down either.”

He then asks whether ministers know how many seeds are needed to grow wheat on an acre of land:

“We farmers know. They made these farm laws sitting in air-conditioned rooms. And they are teaching us the benefits!”

While the corporations that will move in on the sector due to the legislation will initially pay good money for crops, once the public sector markets (mandis) are gone, the farmer says they will become the only buyers and will beat prices down.

He asks why, in other sectors, do sellers get to put price tags on their products but not farmers:

“Why can’t farmers put minimum prices on the crops we produce? A law must be brought to guarantee MSP [minimum support prices]. Whoever buys below MSP must be punished by law.”

The recent agriculture legislation represents the final pieces of a 30-year-old plan which will benefit a handful of billionaires in the US and in India. It means the livelihoods of hundreds of millions (the majority of the population) who still (directly or indirectly) rely on agriculture for a living are to be sacrificed at the behest of these elite interests.

Consider that much of the UK’s wealth came from sucking $45 trillion from India alone according to renowned economist Utsa Patnaik. Britain grew rich by underdeveloping India. What amount to little more than modern-day East India-type corporations are now in the process of helping themselves to the country’s most valuable asset – agriculture.

According to the World Bank’s lending report, based on data compiled up to 2015, India was easily the largest recipient of its loans in the history of the institution. The World Bank thus exerts a certain hold over India: on the back of India’s foreign exchange crisis in the 1990s, the IMF and World Bank wanted India to shift hundreds of millions out of agriculture.

In return for up to more than $120 billion in loans at the time, India was directed to dismantle its state-owned seed supply system, reduce subsidies, run down public agriculture institutions and offer incentives for the growing of cash crops to earn foreign exchange.

The plan involves shifting at least 400 million from the countryside into cities.

The details of this plan appear in a January 2021 article by the Research Unit for Political Economy, ‘Modi’s Farm Produce Act Was Authored Thirty Years Ago, in Washington DC’. The piece says that the current agricultural ‘reforms’ are part of a broader process of imperialism’s increasing capture of the Indian economy:

“Indian business giants such as Reliance and Adani are major recipients of foreign investment, as we have seen in sectors such as telecom, retail, and energy. At the same time, multinational corporations and other financial investors in the sectors of agriculture, logistics and retail are also setting up their own operations in India. Multinational trading corporations dominate global trade in agricultural commodities. For all these reasons, international capital has a major stake in the restructuring of India’s agriculture… The opening of India’s agriculture and food economy to foreign investors and global agribusinesses is a longstanding project of the imperialist countries.”

The article provides details of a 1991 World Bank memorandum which set out the programme for India. It adds:

“At the time, India was still in its foreign exchange crisis of 1990-91 and had just submitted itself to an IMF-monitored ‘structural adjustment’ programme. Thus, India’s July 1991 budget marked the fateful start of India’s neoliberal era.”

It states that now the Modi government is dramatically advancing the implementation of the above programme, using the Covid-19 crisis as cover: the dismantling of the public procurement and distribution of food is to be implemented by the three agriculture-related acts passed by parliament.

The drive is to drastically dilute the role of the public sector in agriculture, reducing it to a facilitator of private capital and leading to the entrenchment of industrial farming and the replacement of small-scale farms. The norm will be industrial (GMO) commodity-crop agriculture suited to the needs of the likes of Cargill, Archer Daniels Midlands, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge and India’s retail and agribusiness giants as well as the global agritech, seed and agrochemical corporations. It could result in hundreds of millions of former rural dwellers without any work given that India is heading (has already reached) jobless growth.

As a result of the ongoing programme, more than 300,000 farmers in India have taken their lives since 1997 and many more are experiencing economic distress or have left farming as a result of debt, a shift to cash crops and economic liberalisation. The number of cultivators in India declined from 166 million to 146 million between 2004 and 2011. Some 6,700 left farming each day. Between 2015 and 2022, the number of cultivators is likely to decrease to around 127 million.

We have seen the running down of the sector for decades, spiralling input costs, withdrawal of government assistance and the impacts of cheap, subsidised imports which depress farmers’ incomes.

Take the cultivation of pulses, for instance. According to a report in the Indian Express (September 2017), pulses production increased by 40% during the previous 12 months (a year of record production). At the same time, however, imports also rose resulting in black gram selling at 4,000 rupees per quintal (much less than during the previous 12 months). This effectively pushed down prices thereby reducing farmers already meagre incomes.

We have already witnessed a running down of the indigenous edible oils sector thanks to Indonesian palm oil imports (which benefits Cargill) on the back of World Bank pressure to reduce tariffs (India was virtually self-sufficient in edible oils in the 1990s but now faces increasing import costs).

The pressure from the richer nations for the Indian government to further reduce support given to farmers and open up to imports and export-oriented ‘free market’ trade is based on nothing but hypocrisy.

On the ‘Down to Earth’ website in late 2017, it was stated some 3.2 million people were engaged in agriculture in the US in 2015. The US goverment provided them each with a subsidy of $7,860 on average. Japan provides a subsidy of $14,136 and New Zealand $2,623 to its farmers. In 2015, a British farmer earned $2,800 and $37,000 was added through subsidies. The Indian government provides on average a subsidy of $873 to farmers. However, between 2012 and 2014, India reduced the subsidy on agriculture and food security by $3 billion.

According to policy analyst Devinder Sharma subsidies provided to US wheat and rice farmers are more than the market worth of these two crops. He also notes that, per day, each cow in Europe receives subsidy worth more than an Indian farmer’s daily income.

The Indian farmer simply cannot compete with this. The World Bank, World Trade Organisation and the IMF have effectively served to undermine the indigenous farm sector in India. The long-term goal has been to displace the peasantry and consolidate a corporate-controlled model.

And now, by reducing public sector buffer stocks and introducing corporate-dictated contract farming and full-scale neoliberal marketisation for the sale and procurement of produce, India will be sacrificing its farmers and its own food security for the benefit of a handful of billionaires.

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Colin Todhunter is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research.

Viral Inequality and the Farmers’ Struggle in India

February 1st, 2021 by Colin Todhunter

According to a new report by Oxfam, ‘The Inequality Virus’, the wealth of the world’s billionaires increased by $3.9tn (trillion) between 18 March and 31 December 2020. Their total wealth now stands at $11.95tn. The world’s 10 richest billionaires have collectively seen their wealth increase by $540bn over this period. In September 2020, Jeff Bezos could have paid all 876,000 Amazon employees a $105,000 bonus and still be as wealthy as he was before COVID.

At the same time, hundreds of millions of people will lose (have lost) their jobs and face destitution and hunger. It is estimated that the total number of people living in poverty could have increased by between 200 million and 500 million in 2020. The number of people living in poverty might not return even to its pre-crisis level for over a decade.

Mukesh Ambani, India’s richest man and head of Reliance Industries, which specialises in petrol, retail and telecommunications, doubled his wealth between March and October 2020. He now has $78.3bn. The average increase in Ambani’s wealth in just over four days represented more than the combined annual wages of all of Reliance Industries’ 195,000 employees.

The Oxfam report states that lockdown in India resulted in the country’s billionaires increasing their wealth by around 35 per cent. At the same time, 84 per cent of households suffered varying degrees of income loss. Some 170,000 people lost their jobs every hour in April 2020 alone.

The authors also noted that income increases for India’s top 100 billionaires since March 2020 was enough to give each of the 138 million poorest people a cheque for 94,045 rupees.

The report went on to state:

“… it would take an unskilled worker 10,000 years to make what Ambani made in an hour during the pandemic… and three years to make what Ambani made in a second.”

During lockdown and after, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers in the cities (who had no option but to escape the country’s avoidable but deepening agrarian crisis) were left without jobs, money, food or shelter.

It is clear that COVID has been used as cover for consolidating the power of the unimaginably rich. But plans for boosting their power and wealth will not stop there. One of the most lucrative sectors for these people is agrifood.

More than 60 per cent of India’s almost 1.4 billion population rely (directly or indirectly) on agriculture for their livelihood. Aside from foreign interests, Mukesh Ambani and fellow billionaire Gautam Adani (India’s second richest person with major agribusiness interests) are set to benefit most from the recently passed farm bills that will lead to the wholesale corporatisation of the agrifood sector.

Corporate consolidation

A recent article on the grain.org website, ‘Digital control: how big tech moves into food and farming (and what it means)’, describes how Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Facebook and others are closing in on the global agrifood sector while the likes of Bayer, Syngenta, Corteva and Cargill are cementing their stranglehold.

The tech giants entry into the sector will increasingly lead to a mutually beneficial integration between the companies that supply products to farmers (pesticides, seeds, fertilisers, tractors, drones, etc) and those that control the flow of data and have access to digital (cloud) infrastructure and food consumers. This system is based on corporate centralisation and concentration (monopolisation).

Grain notes that in India global corporations are also colonising the retail space through e-commerce. Walmart entered into India in 2016 by a US$3.3 billion take-over of the online retail start-up Jet.com which, in 2018, was followed by a US$16 billion take-over of India’s largest online retail platform Flipkart. Today, Walmart and Amazon now control almost two thirds of India’s digital retail sector.

Amazon and Walmart are using predatory pricing, deep discounts and other unfair business practices to lure customers towards their online platforms. According to Grain, when the two companies generated sales of over US$3 billion in just six days during a Diwali festival sales blitz, India’s small retailers called out in desperation for a boycott of online shopping.

In 2020, Facebook and the US-based private equity concern KKR committed over US$7 billion to Reliance Jio, the digital store of one of India’s biggest retail chains. Customers will soon be able to shop at Reliance Jio through Facebook’s chat application, WhatsApp.

The plan for retail is clear: the eradication of millions of small traders and retailers and neighbourhood mom and pop shops. It is similar in agriculture.

The aim is to buy up rural land, amalgamate it and rollout a system of chemically-drenched farmerless farms owned or controlled by financial speculators, the high-tech giants and traditional agribusiness concerns. The end-game is a system of contract farming that serves the interests of big tech, big agribusiness and big retail. Smallholder peasant agriculture is regarded as an impediment to be replaced by large industrial-scale farms.

This model will be based on driverless tractors, drones, genetically engineered/lab-produced food and all data pertaining to land, water, weather, seeds and soils patented and often pirated from peasant farmers.

Farmers possess centuries of accumulated knowledge that once gone will never be got back. Corporatisation of the sector has already destroyed or undermined functioning agrarian ecosystems that draw on centuries of traditional knowledge and are increasingly recognised as valid approaches to secure food security.

And what of the hundreds of millions to be displaced in order to fill the pockets of the billionaire owners of these corporations? Driven to cities to face a future of joblessness: mere ‘collateral damage’ resulting from a short-sighted system of dispossessive predatory capitalism that destroys the link between humans, ecology and nature to boost the bottom line of the immensely rich.

Imperial intent

India’s agrifood sector has been on the radar of global corporations for decades. With deep market penetration and near saturation having been achieved by agribusiness in the US and elsewhere, India represents an opportunity for expansion and maintaining business viability and all-important profit growth. And by teaming up with the high-tech players in Silicon Valley, multi-billion dollar data management markets are being created. From data and knowledge to land, weather and seeds, capitalism is compelled to eventually commodify (patent and own) all aspects of life and nature.

Foreign agricapital is applying enormous pressure on India to scrap its meagre (in comparison to the richer nations) agricultural subsidies. The public distribution system and publicly held buffer stocks constitute an obstacle to the profit-driven requirements of global agribusiness interests.

Such interests require India to become dependent on imports (alleviating the overproduction problem of Western agricapital – the vast stocks of grains that it already dumps on the Global South) and to restructure its own agriculture for growing crops (fruit, vegetables) that consumers in the richer countries demand. Instead of holding physical buffer stocks for its own use, India would hold foreign exchange reserves and purchase food stocks from global traders.

Successive administrations have made the country dependent on volatile flows of foreign capital via foreign direct investment (and loans). The fear of capital flight is ever present. Policies are often governed by the drive to attract and retain these inflows. This financialisation of agriculture serves to undermine the nation’s food security, placing it at the mercy of unforeseen global events (conflict, oil prices, public health crises) international commodity speculators and unstable foreign investment.

Current agricultural ‘reforms’ are part of a broader process of imperialism’s increasing capture of the Indian economy, which has led to its recolonization by foreign corporations as a result of neoliberalisation which began in 1991. By reducing public sector buffer stocks and introducing corporate-dictated contract farming and full-scale neoliberal marketisation for the sale and procurement of produce, India will be sacrificing its farmers and its own food security for the benefit of a handful of unscrupulous billionaires.

As independent cultivators are bankrupted, the aim is that land will eventually be amalgamated to facilitate large-scale industrial cultivation. Indeed, a recent piece on the Research Unit for Political Economy site, ‘The Kisans Are Right: Their Land Is At Stake‘, describes how the Indian government is ascertaining which land is owned by whom with the ultimate aim of making it easier to eventually sell it off (to foreign investors and agribusiness). Other developments are also part of the plan (such as the Karnataka Land Reform Act), which will make it easier for business to purchase agricultural land.

India could eventually see institutional investors with no connection to farming (pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowment funds and investments from governments, banks, insurance companies and high net worth individuals) purchasing land. This is an increasing trend globally and, again, India represents a huge potential market. The funds have no connection to farming, have no interest in food security and are involved just to make profit from land.

The recent farm bills – if not repealed – will impose the neoliberal shock therapy of dispossession and dependency, finally clearing the way to restructure the agri-food sector. The massive inequalities and injustices that have resulted from the COVID-related lockdowns are a mere taste of what is to come.

The hundreds of thousands of farmers who have been on the streets protesting against these bills are at the vanguard of the pushback – they cannot afford to fail. There is too much at stake.

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Colin Todhunter is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research.

Mahatma Gandhi’s Enduring Message of Non-Violence

February 1st, 2021 by Bharat Dogra

In a world increasingly troubled by violence and strife Mahatma Gandhi’s message remains highly relevant today, 73 years after the assassination of this man of peace.

Gandhi’s work and writings covered a very wide range of activities, but perhaps what present-day  world needs to learn most from Gandhi is his overwhelming emphasis on non-violence to resolve any conflict or to confront any injustice. More than that, he emphasised non-violence as an entire way of life, emphasising its importance in our daily life (even relationships within family) as much as in huge movements for justice and freedom. Non-violence (ahimsa) for Gandhi is all-encompassing, bringing in its range not only all human beings but also all forms of life. Non-violence in action is considered  far from adequate – it should extend to our innermost thoughts.

Gandhi’s concept of non-violence is so pervasive that it will not only help the cause of world peace – rightly practiced it’ll help to significantly bring down the incidence of domestic violence and mental stress as well. The movement for animal rights or compassion to animals will also benefit from a wider spread of Gandhi’s ideas.

About the role of non-violence in his own life, Gandhi wrote

“I have been practicing with scientific precision non-violence and its possibilities for an unbroken period of over fifty years. I have applied it in every walk of life, domestic, institutional, economic and political. I know of no single case in which it has failed. Where it has seemed sometimes to have failed, I have ascribed it to my imperfections. (Harijan, 6-7-40, pp. 185-86)

Gandhi had big hopes from harnessing the tremendous force of non-violence. He wrote, (Harijan 10.12.38 p. 377) “more powerful than all the armaments, non-violence is a unique force that has come into the world”. Elsewhere he said

“We are constantly being astonished these days at the amazing discoveries in the field of violence. But I maintain that far more undreamt of and seemingly impossible discoveries will be made in the field of non-violence. (Harijan, 25.8-40, p. 260)

The path of non-violence is noble, but it is not easy. As Gandhi says (Harijan 14.5.38)

“If the method of violence takes plenty of training, the method of non-violence takes even more training and that training is much more difficult than the training for violence.“

A votary of Ahimsa has to be incorruptible, fair and square in his dealings, truthful, straightforward and utterly selfless. He must have also true humility. (Harijan, 20.5.39, p.133)

“The very first step in non-violence is that we cultivate in our daily life, as between ourselves, truthfulness, humility, tolerance, loving kindness. Honesty, they say in English, is the best policy. But in terms of non-violence, it is not mere policy. Policies may and do change. Non violence is an unchangeable creed. It has to be pursued in face of violence raging around you. (Harijan, 2.4.38, p. 65)

“Non-violence, to be a potent force, must begin with the mind. (Young India, 2-4-31, p. 58)

“…unless there is a hearty co-operation of the mind the mere outward observance will be simply a mask, harmful both to the man himself and to others. The perfect state is reached only when mind and body and speech are in proper co-ordination. (Young India, 1.10.31, p. 287)

“The alphabet of Ahimsa is best learnt in the domestic school, and I can say from experience that, if  we secure success there, we are sure to do so everywhere else.” (Harijan 21.7.40, p. 214)

“If one does not practice non-violence in one’s personal relations with others and hopes to use it in bigger affairs, one is vastly mistaken. Non-violence, like charity, must begin at home. (Harijan, 28-1-39, p. 441)

Gandhi captured the spirit of non-violent struggle in the following words –

“I seek entirely to blunt the edge of the tyrant’s sword, not by putting up against it a sharper edged weapon, but by disappointing his expectation that I would be offering physical resistance. The resistance of the soul that I should offer instead would elude him. It would at first dazzle him and at last compel recognition from him, which recognition would not humiliate him but would uplift him.”

For Gandhi religion was clearly a place for peace and there was absolutely no room in his thinking for religious differences turning violent. He wrote,

“I believe in the fundamental truth of all great religions of the world. I believe that they are all God given, and I believe that they were necessary for the people to whom these religions were revealed. And I believe that, if only we could all of us read the scriptures of different faiths from the standpoint of the followers of those faiths we should find that they were at bottom all one and were all helpful to one another.” (Harijan 16.2.34 P.5-6)

Gandhi saw clearly that the aggressiveness of the great powers is rooted in greed. He said world peace “is clearly impossible without the great powers of the earth renouncing their imperialistic designs. This again seems impossible without these great nations ceasing to believe in soul-destroying competition and to desire to multiply wants and therefore increase their material possessions. (Harijan 16.5.36 P.109)

The ideal he urged to his own countrymen was “we will exploit none just as we will allow none to exploit us.” (Young India 16.4.31 page-9). He added “I should reject that patriotism which sought to mount upon the distress or the exploitation of other nationalities.”

In fact Gandhi was an internationalist much ahead of his times. He wrote,

“The better mind of the world desires today not absolutely independent States warring one against another, but a federation of friendly inter-dependent States. (Young India, 26-12-24, p. 425)

‘The structure of a world federation can be raised only on foundation of non-violence, and violence will have to be totally given up in world affairs. (Gandhiji’s Correspondence with the Goverenment – 1942-44, (1957), p. 143)

‘Federation is undoubtely a greater and nobler end for free nations. It is a greater and nobler end for them to strive to promote Federation than be self-centred, seeking only to preserve their own freedom. (Harijan, 9-8-42, p. 265)

Speaking optimistically of his vision of a future world  he wrote,

“The world of tomorrow will be, must be, a society based on non-violence. That is the first law: out of it all other blessings will flow.

“… An individual can adopt the way of life of the future – the non-violent way – without having to wait for others to do so. And if an individual can do it, cannot whole groups of individuals? Whole nations? Men often hesitate to make a beginning, because they feel that the objective cannot be achieved in its entirety. This attitude of mind is precisely our greatest obstacle to progress – an obstacle that each man, if he only wills it, can clear away.

“…Equal distribution – the second great law of tomorrow’s world as I see it – grows out of non-violence. It implies not that the world’s goods shall be arbitrarily divided up, but that each man shall have the wherewithal to supply his natural needs, no more.  (The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi, PP 458-60).

“…only truthful, non-violent and pure hearted socialists will be able to establish a socialistic society in India and the world..” So what we see in his vision is a socialist society based on non-violence.

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Bharat Dogra is a journalist and author. His recent books include Man Over Machine ( Gandhian ideas for our times) and Protecting Earth for Children.

It’s Facebook versus India’s Farmers

January 29th, 2021 by Satya Sagar

The tug-of-war between Indian farmers and government over new laws facilitating corporate takeover of the country’s agriculture is getting uglier by the hour and likely to get quite bloody too.

And when the blood does flow, it will not only be the hands of Indian corporates that will be drenched in red but also those of global investors backing them.

The Modi regime is using a few stray incidents of violence during the tractor rally by farmers on 26 January in New Delhi as an excuse for a brutal crackdown against them. Supporters of the ruling party, in an openly fascist move, are also stoking mob violence against the farmers, many of whom are from the Sikh religious minority.

Watching the evolving situation anxiously, along with many Indians, are also a bunch of big investors sitting in remote foreign capitals. At stake for them are billions of dollars funneled through Indian corporates like Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries and the Gautam Adani Group, who are their battering rams to smash open the doors of India’s vast agricultural trade and online food purchase markets.

Leading the pack is the baby-faced Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg whose company invested USD 5.5 billion dollars (Rs 43,573 crore) last year in Ambani-owned Jio Platforms, to combine forces and establish full-stack domination of the Indian food sector[1]. Jio Platforms runs India’s largest mobile network service Jio  and other digital businesses of Reliance.

“India is a special place for us. We are also committing to work together on some critical projects that we think are going to open up a lot of opportunities for commerce in India” Zuckerberg was quoted as telling media after inking the deal with Reliance in early 2020. (It was not a coincidence that within just a few months of this investment the Modi government approved the three farm laws too[2]).

No, Facebook or Reliance are not planning to dirty their hands and plough the fields of Punjab. The idea is primarily  to dominate India’s rapidly growing e-grocery market size which is expected to touch  US$18 billion by 2024[3]. E-commerce companies selling essential items experienced a huge upsurge in demand during the Covid-19 lockdown in India, considered one of the biggest markets of the future.

Facebook-owned WhatsApp, which was recently allowed to  provide online payment services, has an estimated 400 million subscribers in India. They will be  targeted as a potential customer base for Jio Mart, a network of grocery stores owned by Jio Platforms, that is already present in over 200 Indian cities and delivers groceries, dairy items, fruits, vegetables.

Jio Mart also hopes to use  WhatsApp to integrate thousands of mom-and-pop stores into the online retail network. (These small store owners are likely to meet the same fate as Indian farmers, ending up as appendages to the Ambani or some other corporate empire)

Reliance, while soliciting loads of foreign money is ironically pitching itself as an ‘Indian’ and ‘nationalist’ alternative to foreign  owned rivals like Amazon and Flipkart, who together control over 60% of the country’s overall e-commerce market currently. The online commerce market in India is predicted to reach US$ 99 billion by 2024  and US$200 billion by 2026[4].

All these plans however will come to nought if the three new farm laws are not in place, as they provide the legal basis for entry of large corporates into the highly fragmented and diverse Indian food production, processing and distribution market.  The laws create a national framework for contract farming in agriculture, deregulate pricing, purchase and storage of many basic food products and facilitate online sales of agricultural produce.

Essentially the laws will allow entities like Jio Platforms to control the entire supply chain for food and related items – procuring  at low prices from farmers, stocking and processing for value addition, booking orders online and delivering the final product to either domestic or even overseas consumers as needed.

In the immediate term, farmers from Punjab and Haryana  leading the current agitation see the new laws as a threat to minimum support prices they have been getting from the government for crops like wheat and rice. In the long run, farmers across India fear being left to the mercy of corporates with deep pockets and robbed of both income and independence.

What’s happening in the Indian context is part of a global trend where Big Tech companies, large asset management funds together with agrobusinesses are aiming to ‘disrupt’ existing, disorganised agricultural markets and establish monopoly control. Given the essential nature of food, controlling their production, sales and distribution is expected to be a money-spinner in perpetuity.

While Facebook is the biggest investor in Jio Platforms, following closely is Google with US$4.5 billion. Others pouring money into the Ambani venture include  Public Investment Fund, which is the sovereign wealth fund of Saudi Arabia, with US$1.5 billion; KKR, a large US investment fund with US$1.5 billion;  Mubadala and ADIA, both investment funds based  in Abu Dhabi with US$1.2 billion and US$750 million and TPG Capital, a global asset management firm with US$600 million[5].

Of course, not all these investors investing in Jio Platforms are specifically interested in the future of Indian agriculture per se. They can clearly sense that partnership with the likes of Ambani and Adani offers  big returns on investment because of their political clout in India.

Over the years both the Ambanis and Adani groups, who are also Narendra Modi’s biggest corporate donors, have used their influence to frame policies that gives them advantage over all their rivals within the corporate world. With domestic politicians in their pocket both groups have then proceeded to sell themselves to the highest foreign bidders. In other words, if Mark Zuckerberg were the equivalent of Robert Clive then Ambani and Adani are the contemporary Mir Jafars and Jagat Seths helping him conquer India.

The Modi government’s insistence on imposing the farm laws despite massive opposition is not just about Indian agriculture either. They are also a way of signaling to all foreign investors that the Indian government is firmly on their side and willing to put down its own people – with bullets if needed- to protect their profits. Government advisors worry that not being ‘tough’ enough with the agitating farmers could result in a fall in ‘confidence’ of investors and stop the flow of big money.

While the Modi regime and the likes of Ambanis and Adanis are being rightly targeted by farmers unions it is time they also went after their international backers, who are the paymasters behind the ‘business friendly’ legislation.

That is why the next big tractor rally, if I may suggest, should be organized outside the Facebook Inc. or Google headquarters in California. From Mark Zuckerberg to Sundar Pichai to Mohammad bin-Salman, the Prince of Saudi Arabia, anyone trying to profit from the blood of Indian farmers should be named and shamed before the entire world.

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Satya Sagar is a journalist who can be reached at [email protected]

Notes

[1] https://www.techradar.com/news/facebook-floats-jaadhu-holdings-to-do-business-with-jio

[2] https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/cabinet-clears-ordinances-for-agriculture-market-reforms/1855142

[3] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/services/retail/online-grocery-to-become-18bn-industry-in-india-by-2024-report/articleshow/78315160.cms?from=mdr

[4] https://www.ibef.org/industry/ecommerce.aspx

[5] https://www.techradar.com/in/news/reliance-jio-investments

Featured image is from Countercurrents

With the spread of COVID-19 steadily worsening in Japan since the onset of winter — daily records for infections and deaths continue to be broken — the fate of the Tokyo Summer Olympics is again very much in doubt.

This week, former International Olympic Committee vice-president Kevan Gosper caused consternation in Japan when he suggested the United Nations might have to decide whether the Olympics and Paralympics can go ahead this year.

Japanese medical experts are also increasingly uncertain about the feasibility of the games being held. Even if vaccinations proceed around the world, it would still be extremely risky to allow in over 15,000 foreign athletes, plus tens of thousands of coaches, officials, sponsors and members of the media.

The Japanese public seems to agree. A recent poll by public broadcaster NHK showed 77% of those surveyed want the Tokyo Games either cancelled or postponed again.

Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has nevertheless reaffirmed the government’s determination to hold the Olympics beginning on July 23. In his opening speech for the first session in the Japanese parliament on Monday, Suga vowed the government would bring the pandemic under control as soon as possible.

So, why is the government clinging to the hopes of holding the Olympics in the face of such challenges — and what are the potential costs?

Suga’s leadership is off to a bad start

Put simply, Suga’s political fortunes depend on it. If the Tokyo Olympics are cancelled, his premiership is almost certainly doomed and his ruling Liberal Democratic Party would no doubt face a harsher electoral challenge from the more organised opposition parties.

It has been a rough start for Suga since he took over from Shinzo Abe last September, largely due to his poor handling of the pandemic.

The conservative LDP government has consistently prioritised the economy over public health. With the backing of the Japan Business Federation, the powerful lobby group of Japan’s large corporations, for instance, Suga continued Abe’s “Go To Travel” campaign, which subsidised domestic tourism and support for the hospitality sector. He reluctantly suspended the program last month after it was blamed for spreading COVID-19 around the country.

Suga has also resisted taking stronger action to control the pandemic. He was finally forced to yield to pressure from local leaders and reintroduce a state of emergency for the Tokyo metropolitan region on January 7. This has since been expanded to other major urban areas, covering half of Japan’s population until at least February 7.

But this is less extensive than the month-long national state of emergency declared last April. The new measures still rely on voluntary cooperation by the public and businesses, with people being urged to stay home, and restaurants and bars asked to close by 8pm. Because the restrictions are not mandatory, some restaurants have started to break ranks.

Legislation is being considered in the Diet to introduce penalties such as imprisonment or fines for non-compliant individuals and businesses, but opposition parties have objected to any punitive enforcement measures.

The Suga government has also been criticised for a relatively low rate of testing, poor contact tracing and the slow roll-out of a vaccine, which is not due to start until the end of February.

To counter these concerns, Suga has appointed the ambitious administrative reform minister Taro Kono to take charge of distributing the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine for the entire population.

One in six people in ‘relative poverty’

The economy has not been faring much better. While the official unemployment rate is around 3%, at least half a million Japanese have lost their jobs in the past six months. One in six are considered to be in “relative poverty”, with incomes less than half the national median.

About 40% of workers are employed in lower-wage, non-regular jobs, especially in the service industries, and have been the most vulnerable in the pandemic-related recession. Women, in particular, have been hit hard.

While the economy showed signs of growth in the last six months, it is expected to slow down again in the first quarter of 2021 before stabilising. However, the IMF is expecting a “gradual recovery” for the year, thanks to stimulus measures implemented by the government.

The Olympics loom over upcoming elections

Hosting the Olympics has always held an immense amount of political prestige, so failing to do so would be yet another blemish for the new government and could doom its prospects in the next national election, due by October 21.

Suga will also face another ballot for his party leadership on September 30. There are some rumours that a power-broker in the party, Toshihiro Nikai, could withdraw his support for Suga in favour of another candidate. One name being floated as a possible replacement is [Seiko Noda][https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/01/03/national/politics-diplomacy/suga-leadership-longevity/], who could become the first female prime minister of Japan if this came to pass.

If the Olympics are cancelled, this would also have major implications for the popular Tokyo governor, Yuriko Koike, a fierce backer of the games. She was re-elected in a landslide last year, but her party could suffer in local elections this July if the games don’t go ahead.

Then there is the financial cost to the country. After the postponement last March, the official cost of the games rose by 22% to US$15.4 billion, though audits by the government have shown the true cost to be $25 billion.

The government, too, is responsible for all of the costs, with the exception of $6.7 billion in a privately funded operating budget.

This would add to the huge fiscal deficit and public debt the government has run up due to its stimulus spending to counter the pandemic. The draft budget submitted to the Diet this week was estimated at a record 106.6 trillion yen, or US$1 trillion.

The Olympic torch relay is due to start in Fukushima on March 25, which presents a deadline for a final decision on whether the games can proceed.

The IOC has said the Olympics cannot be delayed any furtherand will have to be cancelled if they cannot begin safely in July.

Unless the Suga government can quickly tackle the pandemic more effectively, it may soon find hosting the games has slipped beyond its control — and its political fate along with it.

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 is Professor, Faculty of International Studies, Kyoritsu Women’s University.

Modi Blinks in Farmer Feud as Biden Checks In

January 29th, 2021 by Sumit Sharma

After an almost two-month deadlock with Indian farmers protesting against new farm laws, the Narendra Modi government finally blinked. Agriculture Minister Narendra Tomar on Wednesday offered to suspend the laws for 12 to 18 months pending discussions with farmers, offering a potential off-ramp to the crisis.

Farmers’ leaders did not respond immediately to the offer but were due to discuss it on Friday. However, they are unlikely to give up their demands that all three laws be repealed. Earlier, the Supreme Court offered to suspend the laws for a committee of experts to review them. The farmers rejected this overture.

Observers are speculating on the timing of the government’s concessions, which came hours before the inauguration of US President Joe Biden.

“Is it a coincidence that Modi government blinks in talks over farmers protests the day Trump leaves and President Joe Biden is sworn in?’’ former senior diplomat K C Singh tweeted.

India can’t afford any displeasure from a new administration that has said it will prioritize rights in its foreign policy. India depends critically on the US for defense equipment, technology, investment and its support at international forums, especially as it tries to block Chinese companies and investment.

Chinese forces have been occupying Indian territories in Ladakh since May, tying down its troops and using up resources amid the pandemic and an economic slowdown.

‘’They realize when irrational domestic policies start impacting your image abroad, especially in their parliaments,’’ Singh responded to a query. “Democrats are much more attuned to values than an egotistical Trump.’’

Weighing heavy is also Modi’s vocal support for Donald Trump in September 2019 at a gathering of 50,000 Indian-Americans at NRG Football Stadium in Houston, titled “Howdy Modi.”

Several diplomats raised objections at the time to the perils of getting involved in another country’s domestic politics.

Other US Democrats including new Vice President Kamala Harris and Pramila Jayapal, chair of the Congressional Progressive Caucus, have disapproved of the months-long curfew and Internet lockdown in Jammu & Kashmir after Modi’s government withdrew the contested region’s special status in August 2019.

Sikhs in the US, Canada and the UK, too, have been raising the issue of the farm laws in overseas forums. Sikh farmers from Punjab have been leading the protests in Delhi that have gathered tens of thousands.

Farmers say the laws would increase their vulnerability in getting fair prices for their produce and increase their risk of losing their land to corporates. The government has not been able to dispel their fears despite many rounds of talks between ministers and farmer unions over two months.

At least 70 farmers have died while blocked on highways outside Delhi, leaving them no choice but to live and sleep under their tractor trolleys in the freezing winter.

Adding more international pressure, a January 5 letter by Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi, a Sikh MP from Slough in the UK, and signed by 100 MPs addressed to Prime Minister Boris Johnson expressed concerns over the laws.

Last month, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau expressed his solidarity with farmers and expressed his concern for them. Trudeau has two Sikhs in his government. In retaliation, New Delhi ordered a demarche on Canadian diplomats.

Besides the possibility of international pressure increasing with a new administration in Washington, the farmers have repeatedly said they will leave only after the laws are repealed, whether it takes months or years. The latest move by the National Investigative Agency naming 50 farmers with likely links with terrorists has been widely panned as trumped up.

A proposed rally of thousands of tractors from all neighboring states on January 26, when India celebrates its Republic Day in Delhi with a march-past of army, navy and air force and watched by Indians across the globe, may have also prompted the government to back off. Many protesting farmers are ex-soldiers.

As the protests drag on, the government is losing more support and face. Farmers from elsewhere in the country could also soon turn up to lend their numbers and support.

Also weighing on Modi’s government are elections in five states by May. Modi’s BJP party sees the elections as critical to its future growth and survival and wouldn’t want its chances to get spoilt.

Incidents such as damage to telecom towers in Punjab also highlight farmers’ allegations of the government’s proximity to some top industrialists. Farmers are highlighting news of industrialists having built grain barns and other infrastructure even before the farm laws were passed.

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Featured image: Farmers’ protest in India. (Source: Green Left Weekly)

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An intergovernmental organization representing countries that produce the bulk of the world’s timber has thrown its support behind a decade-long effort to protect the last remaining primary forest in the Malaysian state of Sarawak.

In its November 2020 meeting, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) endorsed a proposal by the Forest Department Sarawak (FDS) for what’s been called the Baram Peace Park. The proposed park would cover 2,835 square kilometers (1,095 square miles) of northeastern Sarawak on the island of Borneo, incorporating a hodgepodge of undulating forests, past and current timber and oil palm concessions, and agricultural lands for the thousands of Indigenous people who live in the area.

“The project objectives contribute strongly to ITTO’s mandate to promote sustainable forest management in the tropics, including through empowering and engaging with local communities,” the ITTO told Mongabay in a written statement.

Peter Kallang, chairman of the Malaysian NGO SAVE Rivers, said the ITTO’s backing is “one step ahead after all the years of working on it.” But he also acknowledged that the ITTO’s stamp of approval did not mean that the park would come to fruition.

With the endorsement, the ITTO and the Sarawak state government will now search for other member countries to donate about 40% of the park’s roughly $2 million price tag. The prospective donor or donors will likely be one of the 38 tropical timber-consuming countries that are also members of the ITTO. Kallang said Japan or Switzerland, which both purchase timber from Sarawak, could provide more than $800,000 for the project.

The balance of the financing would come from the state government.

Image on the right: Peter Kallang, chairman of SAVE Rivers, in the Upper Baram. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

“They have been quite open to us,” Kallang said of FDS.

Peter Kallang, chairman of SAVE Rivers, in the Upper Baram. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

The former chief minister of Sarawak, Tan Sri Haji Adenan Satem, had been an ally of the park’s proponents. But Adenan’s death in 2017 has stretched the timeline for the park’s formation, and questions remain about funding.

Without the commitment of funds from donors, the proposal “is unlikely to be implemented,” FDS director Hamden Mohammad said in a statement, according to the newspaper Dayak Daily.

Hamden also said the government had never settled on the “Baram Peace Park” name. The proposal, which the forest department submitted to the ITTO, calls it the “Upper Baram Forest Area,” named for the Baram River, a major conduit draining the rain-soaked forests of northern Sarawak and carrying that water out to the South China Sea.

Hamden did not respond to requests for an interview with Mongabay.

Kallang said “Baram Peace Park” was simply the most recognizable name for the area, the one that local Indigenous groups and international NGOs involved in the effort have used for years. The SAVE Rivers website notes that the name of the park “will ultimately be determined by the communities involved.”

Logs from the Upper Baram ready for transport at a timber yard in northern Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

Logs from the Upper Baram ready for transport at a timber yard in northern Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

‘Stop the chop’

In the past year, other hurdles have arisen, seeming to dim the park’s potential to safeguard Sarawak’s last patches of intact rainforest. In April 2020, the government approved a logging concession for Sarawak-based Samling Plywood that overlaps with the future park. Kallang said the logging threatens the “core area,” home to nearly 790 km2 (305 mi2) of relatively undisturbed forest. The concession also reportedly encroaches on slivers of the forest used by nearby Indigenous communities.

“The communities are grateful for the support of the Upper Baram Forest Area,” said Komeok Joe, CEO of the Indigenous Penan organization KERUAN, according to the Dayak Daily. “However, despite the ITTO’s endorsement, Samling continues to extract timber within the area of the park.”

Samling did not respond to several requests for comment from Mongabay.

The proposed park area is home to the last remaining primary forest in Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

The proposed park area is home to the last remaining primary forest in Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

SAVE Rivers and KERUAN, along with two international NGOs, the Borneo Project and the Bruno Manser Fund, said Samling hadn’t sought permission to harvest timber from the concessions from communities nearby — communities that these organizations and members themselves say rely on the resources found there: According to the NGOs, Indigenous groups like the Penan collect medicinal plants, harvest building materials, and hunt in the forests. And the free-flowing tributaries of the Baram are a vital source of water and generate electricity through micro-hydropower installations that don’t require damming streams or rivers. Industrial-scale logging, the likes of which have whittled away as much as 80% of Sarawak’s old-growth forests, could jeopardize all of that, says the coalition supporting the Baram park.

“If you really look,” Kallang said, “in fact, there is no forest in the Upper Baram left which is not being leased out for logging.”

In June 2020, the coalition started a petition to the Geneva-based Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). PEFC is the world’s largest sustainability certification organization by land area covered. In the petition, SAVE Rivers and its allies say that communities weren’t adequately consulted about the Samling concession.

The “stop the chop” petition argues that harvesting timber without communities’ consent should not be allowed under the Malaysian Timber Certification Scheme (MTCS). Companies must obtain certification to export Sarawak’s timber from Malaysia — a point reiterated by the U.S.-based Borneo Project’s Fiona McAlpine in a Mongabay commentary in July.

The Ba Balong River, a tributary of the Baram in northeastern Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

The Ba Balong River, a tributary of the Baram in northeastern Sarawak. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

Members of the communities affected by the timber licenses told the Borneo Project that they’ve registered complaints with Sarawak authorities. But the Malaysian Timber Certification Council (MTCC), which is in charge of the certification scheme, responded in August that it had never received any “formal complaint.” The Borneo Project posted a subsequent response in September, saying that community members did not know a formal mechanism existed for submitting complaints.

The MTCC also contended that the petition confused the process for issuing concessions in Sarawak.

“The ‘Stop the Chop’ petition against MTCC was misdirected as it gave the allusion that such license or permit was approved by MTCC which was incorrect,” Siti Syaliza Mustapha, senior manager for the Forest Management Certification Unit in MTCC, told Mongabay in an email. “The decision to grant the legal right of managing the forest in accordance with the state’s land-use planning is the sole prerogative of the Sarawak State Government.”

Still, Syaliza added that the MTCC takes complaints about certification “very seriously and it is our key endeavour to ensure the highest standards of sustainable forest management are maintained by all forest managers who have voluntarily agreed to abide by these standards through certification.”

She also said the MTCC had participated in several meetings with SAVE Rivers and the Switzerland-based Bruno Manser Fund in the fall of 2020 “to address the issues and concerns” and “obtain mutual understanding on the issues raised and how PEFC and MTCC could provide further support to their plights.”

A rice paddy surrounded by forest in the Upper Baram. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

A rice paddy surrounded by forest in the Upper Baram. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

Mapping out conservation

The idea of a park in the Upper Baram began in the 2000s with the Penan people. As they watched the tide of industrial logging lapping ever closer to their communities and surrounding forests, they sought a way to protect the forest they depend on. Over the years, KERUAN and the Penan partnered with SAVE Rivers, the Bruno Manser Fund and the Borneo Project, as well as other Indigenous communities and government agencies.

In 2016, they stopped the construction of a hydropower dam that would have flooded low-lying forests and displaced communities. That same year, they created the Baram Conservation Initiative not only to support the formation of the Baram Peace Park, but also to secure land rights and find new ways to encourage economic development that don’t involve the destruction of the forest.

By 2017, 63 Penan communities, supported by KERUAN and the Bruno Manser Fund, had plotted out the locations of critical hunting areas and sources of food like the sago palm, of rivers and hillsides, and of culturally important burial grounds and past settlements, on a set of 26 maps. The maps were developed over more than a decade to serve as a record for the Penan communities.

“The Penan, more than any other community here in Sarawak … are really working hard on conserving the area because their livelihood is threatened,” Kallang said. “They have this mapping to use as one of the bullets … to fight in the struggle.”

A hand-drawn map by the Penan. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

A hand-drawn map by the Penan. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

Eighteen of those Penan communities would fall inside the park’s boundaries. Other Indigenous communities, including the Kenyah, Kelabit and Saban, would also lie within its borders.

Kallang also said that keeping the core areas of forest untouched was critical to encouraging the resurgence of wildlife in the region. In “a stepping stone toward the Baram Peace Park,” the Borneo Project has been working with technicians from Indigenous communities in and around the proposed park to catalog the species living in the Upper Baram and gather information on land use as part of the Baram Heritage Survey.

Around half of the 2,835 km2 earmarked for the park is degraded land, and another quarter or so is farmland. Still, in a recent video update of the ongoing work shared by the Borneo Project, participants in the survey said they had found hornbills, gibbons, sun bears, pangolins, and tiny deer known as muntjacs in the proposed area.

KERUAN CEO Komeok Joe, center, celebrates the completion of the maps of the Penan homeland in 2017. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

KERUAN CEO Komeok Joe, center, celebrates the completion of the maps of the Penan homeland in 2017. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

Kallang envisions the park serving as a corridor running through the remaining high-quality forest in the heart of Borneo and connecting Pulong Tau National Park in Sarawak with Kayan Mentarang National Park in the Indonesian province of North Kalimantan. The gargantuan Kayan Mentarang covers more than 10,000 km2 (3,900 mi2) — more than three times the size of Yosemite in the U.S. It reportedly teems with wildlife, including the critically endangered Bornean orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus). Kallang said he hopes the park might just facilitate the return of orangutans into this part of Sarawak.

Working toward these goals has been a long struggle, and Kallang said he knows it’s not over yet. He said he remains hopeful, though when he spoke with Mongabay in 2017, he admitted that at times he’s not always sure such efforts will succeed.

“I wouldn’t be human if I didn’t,” Kallang said at the time.

Doubts aside, though, support from the ITTO means that, three years later, a park in Sarawak’s Upper Baram is “one step” closer to becoming a reality.

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John Cannon is a staff features writer with Mongabay. Find him on Twitter: @johnccannon

Featured image: Three peaks jut from the forest within the boundaries of the proposed park. Image by John C. Cannon/Mongabay.

India’s Farmers Are Right to Protest Against Agricultural Reforms

January 28th, 2021 by Prof. Sanjay Ruparelia

The massive campaign organized by India’s farmers against laws to deregulate the agricultural sector has entered its ninth week. The government in New Delhi, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), has tried to negotiate a compromise. But its attempts to placate the farmers have thus far failed.

The strength of the mobilization has now compelled the government to suspend the laws for 18 months and form a new committee including representatives of the government and the farmers to address their grievances.

The farmers’ leaders insist that the laws must be completely repealed. Reportedly, more than 50 of their members have died, taking their lives in desperation or succumbing to illness during the cold winter nights. The thousands of farmers encircling the capital insist they will remain until their demands are met.

They are right to protest.

The agricultural sector only contributes about 15 per cent of national income, yet more than half of India’s workers depend on it for their livelihood. The vast majority are small farmers, sharecroppers and landless laborers who struggle to stay afloat on precarious wages, shrinking plots and the vagaries of the monsoon.

The costs of production continue to rise. Growing indebtedness, either to informal moneylenders or formal banks, has tragically compelled thousands to take their lives over the past two decades. Inadequate public investment in roads, irrigation and cold storage and poor credit facilities have severely constrained the productivity of Indian agriculture. Systematic reform is long overdue.

Last week, the Supreme Court of India stayed the implementation of the agricultural reforms, appointing an expert committee to find a solution. Yet its members support the laws, leading the farmers’ representatives to dismiss them as pro-government mediators.

The court has damaged its already weakened credibility by failing to articulate plausible constitutional grounds for its sudden and arbitrary involvement. High judicial intervention has inflamed the situation, rather than ending it.

Why the farmers revolted

Advocates of the three landmark reforms passed by the Indian parliament last September claim they will expand the choice farmers have. They argue that allowing large corporations to dominate the sector will spur land consolidation, investment in mechanization and generate economies of scale that will enhance productivity.

Instead of selling their crops to the government at a minimum support price in local state-regulated markets, farmers can now sell their harvest via contracts to a much wider range of private actors in a national market. As a result, farmers’ incomes will rise and food prices will decline.

Yet, consider the fine print of these laws and the larger economic realities facing small farmers in India. The vast national marketplace in the making will only be available to those who can afford to get their produce across state borders.

The majority of farmers will still have to sell their crops locally. There is also a very real risk that agricultural deregulation will lead to farmers being paid less than the minimum support price. That has already happened in some Indian states where similar reforms were tried.

The new laws also expose small farmers by removing the courts from resolving disputes that are likely to take place. India’s legal system is infamously backlogged, but compelling small farmers to seek redress through local administrative processes leaves them vulnerable to the influence of large corporations. Massive power asymmetries will encourage corporate oligarchies.

Canada has traditionally pushed for greater deregulation of Indian agriculture at the World Trade Organization. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s remarks a few weeks ago defending the farmers’ right to protest peacefully drew a sharp rebuke from New Delhi. It also led commentators in Canada to criticize the prime minister for placating a political constituency at the expense of national economic interest.

But what may be in Canada’s national interest could easily come at the expense of millions of small farmers, sharecroppers and landless workers, who are right to fear being forced off the land to face harsh economic insecurity.

Reinvigorating democracy

When he was first elected in 2014, Prime Minister Modi famously promised to create 10 million good jobs in construction, manufacturing and infrastructure every year to absorb India’s growing labour force.

Yet aggregate economic growth has significantly declined during his tenure. Private investment has stagnated while unemployment has risen. Hence, tens of millions of migrants continue to travel to the cities in different seasons to work in the informal sector, returning to their villages to sow and harvest various crops to make ends meet.

Historically, India has struggled to replicate the expansion of labour-intensive industrialization that enabled the economic transformation of North America, Western Europe and East Asia. The greater capital intensity of production in our 21st-century economies makes it harder than ever.

All of this was known before the government introduced these laws through an executive order over the summer while India struggled to contain the pandemic. Rather than consult farmers’ unions and state-level governments, the BJP government transformed the executive order into legislation in September. It then rammed the legislation through parliament via a voice vote, refusing opposition demands for the laws to be sent to parliamentary committee for further scrutiny.

The high-handed passage of these laws was characteristic of the BJP, whose deeply majoritarian ideology has sought to undermine the legitimacy of opposition, status of minorities and separation of powers in the world’s largest democracy. The dramatic political mobilization of India’s farmers, whose legitimate concerns were never heard, provided a desperately needed check.

Highly organized and strategically encamped at key entry points surrounding New Delhi, the farmers’ protest movement is the most powerful India has witnessed in decades. It is forcing the BJP government to relearn the art of democracy.

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 is Jarislowsky Democracy Chair and Associate Professor of Politics, Ryerson University.

Featured image is from OneWorld

Indigenous youths harboring from a military-led counterinsurgency in the Philippines may soon lose the only safe space they have known for the past two years.

Under a nearly 40-year pact, the 17 campuses of the University of the Philippines are off-limits to the country’s military and police. Since 2019, a group of 68 Indigenous students and teachers have taken refuge at the UP campus in Quezon City, where they attend a makeshift school following the forcible closure of more than 160 schools catering to Indigenous communities, or lumad, in the southern island of Mindanao.

But in a letter dated Jan. 15 this year to the UP president, National Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana unilaterally declared an end to the pact, effectively stripping the sanctuary status of the campuses of the country’s leading public university.

Lorenzana cited “recent events” that identified UP students as members of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), and said that “national security issues” and the safety of students against rebel recruiters are the main driving forces for the termination of what’s known as the UP-DND accord or the Enrile-Soto accord.

“The Department is aware that there is indeed an ongoing clandestine recruitment inside UP campuses nationwide for membership in the CPP/NPA and that the ‘Agreement’ is being used by the CPP/NPA recruiters and supporters as shield or propaganda so that government law enforcers are barred from conducting operations against the CPP/NPA,” the letter, addressed to UP President Danilo Concepcion, says.

The Department of National Defense (DND) says it will not “station military or police” on campuses and will not “suppress activist groups, academic freedom and freedom of expression.” The DND has nothing to gain from suppressing these activities, Lorenzana wrote: “We want them [the youth] to see their Armed Forces and Police as protectors worthy of trust, not fear.”

But despite the secretary’s reassurances, the news has triggered alarms for Indigenous students, who could now be targeted in military raids. The development threatens a repeat of the military attacks on Indigenous schools that occurred after President Rodrigo Duterte declared martial law in Mindanao in 2017, says Ruis Valle of the Save Our Schools Network (SOSN).

In 2018, the military conducted a series of campaigns and operations to crack down on lumad schools in Talaingod, in Mindanao’s Davao del Norte province, after Duterte threatened in 2017 to bomb the schools. He had accused the CPP/NPA of using the schools as training grounds.

Since then, more than 160 schools catering to Mindanao’s Indigenous inhabitants have been bombed or transformed into military detachments, and completely shut.

The group of Indigenous students and teachers who sought sanctuary at UP’s Quezon City campus have consistently called for the reopening of Indigenous schools forced to close by the government, the SOSN says. It adds the now-scrapped UP-DND accord “served as a protective barrier for lumad children from direct military and police harassment.”

Human rights and environmental groups have also expressed concern at the DND’s latest move, calling the accord’s termination an attack on UP “as a democratic space.” Since 2012, the university has “opened its doors to the lakbayan and kampuhan of indigenous people, national minorities, and farmers protesting mining plunder, land grabs, and other attacks against their ancestral lands,” the Kalikasan People’s Network for the Environment, an NGO, said in a statement to Mongabay.

The university has also been “one of the few safe spaces” for environmental and human rights defenders to mobilize amid the government’s militaristic approach to the COVID-19 pandemic. Duterte signed a controversial anti-terrorism law during the lockdown, which critics say worsens an already fragile climate for environmental defenders and Indigenous groups in the Philippines. Eco-watchdog Global Witness rates the country the most dangerous for environmental and land defenders in Asia.

“The University of the Philippines is one of the pillars of academic freedom and critical thinking in the country,” Kalikasan said. “It is because of this freedom and critical thinking that the University can produce great minds that have excelled in different fields, including environmental protection and defense.”

Displaced students from the Manobo Indigenous group harbouring at the University of the Philippines have been calling for the reopening of schools forced to close by President Rodrigo Duterte and against the contested anti-terrorism law. Image courtesy of the Save Our Schools Network

The ban on military operations within university grounds was signed in 1982 by the defense chief at the time, Juan Ponce Enrile, and student leader Sonia Soto, to protect students from the forced abductions and unlawful arrests that ran rampant during martial law in the 1970s. It was upheld in 1989 after state forces arrested a staffer of The Collegian, UP’s campus newspaper, for allegedly killing a U.S. Army officer.

The unilateral termination of the UP-DND accord has the support of President Duterte, according to palace spokesman Harry Roque, himself a UP alumnus and former law professor.

“Secretary Lorenzana is the alter-ego of the president so of course the president supports the decision of Secretary Lorenzana,” he told reporters in a Jan. 19 online press briefing. Roque added in Tagalog: “In England, there is no distinction between a campus and a city. In Europe, the police is in the campuses and there have been no violations in academic freedom.”

While Roque’s claim is correct, that has only been the case very recently. Up until 2019, Greece had legislation declaring its campuses no-go zones for the police. In scrapping the law in August that year, the country’s conservative government made the same justification that the Philippine government is now making: that the schools are being used to shield lawlessness and criminal elements.

As the debate over the termination of the UP sanctuary accord rages on, teachers and guardians of the Indigenous students at the Quezon City campus say they’re worried about the students’ mental health.

The young people have been anxious and depressed for about a year following the onslaught of both the COVID-19 pandemic and the unabated military attacks on their schools, said Rose Hayahay, a math teacher. The difficulty of online and modular modes of learning has also taken its toll on the students, she added. “The recent news have put added anxiety for all of us here,” she said.

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Featured image: The University of the Philippines campus in Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila. Image by Ramon FVelasquez via Wikimedia Commons Public Domain

China Risks a Himalayan Water War with India

January 25th, 2021 by Bertil Lintner

China-India tensions in the Himalayas is shifting from confrontation and saber-rattling over contested border territory to a potentially more destabilizing conflict over water flows from the world’s highest mountain range.

The heart of the issue is China’s plan to construct a mega-dam on the Yarlung Zangbo River, which flows through Tibet and eventually becomes the Brahmaputra when it enters India.

Precise technical details are lacking, but regional media reports indicate it will likely dwarf the massive Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River and generate three times as much electricity for distribution in China.

The Yarlung Zangbao Dam plan is moving ahead without China discussing or entering into water-sharing agreements with downstream India or Bangladesh.

China’s apparent lack of consultations with downstream neighbors follows a pattern that has already sparked controversy and angst in Southeast Asia.

China has built eleven mega-dams on the Mekong River, causing water levels there to fluctuate widely without prior notice in Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

In late December, China reduced water discharge from a dam to test its equipment near the town of Jinghong in southern Yunnan province from 1,904 cubic meters to 1,000 cubic meters per second, according to reports.

It took almost a week for China to inform the downstream countries of the move, which wasn’t enough time for downstream countries to prepare, resulting in disruptions in shipping and commerce. Water levels had already dropped a meter at Thailand’s Chiang Saen, where the Mekong forms the border with Laos,

China’s announcement was made only after the Washington-based Stimson Center’s Southeast Asia Program’s Mekong Dam Monitor, which uses satellite imagery to keep tabs on water levels along the river, notified the Mekong River Commission, a regional cooperation organization of which China is not a member.

Some analysts believe China is using its leverage over water flows as a stick to win concessions from downstream Southeast Asian states on other issues, including in regard to its Belt and Road Initiative.

It’s possible China is trying to establish a similar dynamic with India with its Yarlung Zangbao Dam designs. But if a water-sharing agreement isn’t reached, the dam could cause more bilateral conflict than compromise in the future.

After Indian and Chinese forces fatally clashed in Ladakh in the western Himalayas in June last year and a 2017 border stand-off near the border with Bhutan, anger is building in India over China’s unilaterally decided hydroelectric power scheme.

Indian newspaper editorials and private think tanks such as the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research have produced critical reports and commentaries on the issue, saying the dam will adversely affect the livelihoods of downstream communities.

In Bangladesh, which maintains cordial relations with China, protests over the Yarlung Zangbao Dam have also been heard.

On December 1, Reuters quoted Sheikh Rokon, secretary-general of the Bangladeshi environment campaigners Riverine People, as saying multilateral discussions should be held before China builds any dams and that “China’s downstream neighbors have a legitimate cause for concern. Water flow will be disrupted.”

The water controversy is heightening already inflamed anti-Chinese sentiments in India, and thus could have an impact on regional security. China claims most of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, where the Brahmaputra flows across the border, and refers to it as “South Tibet.”

Indians stage a protest against China killing Indian soldiers during a Himalayan border standoff, on June 17, 2020. Photo: Twitter

In 1962, India and China fought a short but bitter border war in that area and although the situation has been mostly peaceful since then, the actual border remains undemarcated and heavily militarized on both sides.

Perhaps in an attempt to probe India’s defenses — or just as a provocation meant to underline its territorial claims — Chinese troops have in recent years made frequent incursions across the de facto but not de jure border.

They have frequently painted Chinese characters on rocks in remote areas to stake Beijing’s claim. In September, the Chinese abducted and then released five Indian youths who had gone hunting in northern Arunachal.

In the first week of January, in apparent response, New Delhi announced a series of new road-building projects in Arunachal, evidently meant to strengthen India’s hold of the China-claimed territory.

Since the confrontation in Ladakh, India has also established more outposts along the 1,126-kilometer line of actual control that separates Arunachal from China-controlled Tibet.

Before that, in 2017, India announced that it would construct two Advanced Landing Grounds — or small airstrips — in northern Arunachal. That move came after China had renamed six places in Arunachal to make them sound Chinese.

For its part, China has begun the construction of a railroad that will run parallel to the Arunachal frontier and connect the city of Chengdu in China’s Sichuan province with Linzhi in Tibet.

It will be the second railroad project that connects Tibet with the rest of China, the first being the line from Xining in Qinghai province to Tibet’s capital Lhasa, which was completed in 2005.

According to the communist party mouthpiece the Global Times, the new line “will not only accelerate and enhance overall economic development of the Tibet region, but will play an important role in safeguarding border stability.”

Map: Facebook

In a likely related development, huge numbers of people — some say as many as two million, or nearly two-thirds of the entire population of Tibet — have been resettled in what China is euphemistically calling “comfortable housing” and “vocational training programs.”

They are officially part of Beijing’s efforts to eradicate poverty but which critics claim are efforts to bring a potentially unruly ethnic minority, the Tibetans, under stricter governmental control.

Over the decades, Tibetans in their droves have fled to and now reside in India, not least Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama. Some analysts have speculated India could play a “Tibet card” to stir instability in Tibet if relations deteriorate significantly.

It is by now clear that infrastructural developments, military build-ups and now water sharing disputes in the region are hardening Indian attitudes towards China — and vice versa as India moves to ban Chinese tech in line with outgoing Donald Trump’s tech war policies.

The Global Times ran an op-ed this month penned by Qian Feng, director of the research department at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, which predicted that “India’s public opinion about the border issue will be replaced with [Covid-19] vaccine priorities in 2021.”

He wrote, “Indian society’s overall negative attitude toward China will continue to intensify as a result of continuously malicious hyping up of the ‘China threat’ theory by certain Indian media outlets and elites.”

Qian also opined that “public anger against China has been stirred up by the [Narendra] Modi administration.”

If China moves ahead with its Yarlung Zangbo Dam project, those sentiments will only rise concomitant with diminished downstream water flows into India. That could be the spark that brings Asia’s two giants to blows in what may or may not play out as a repeat of their fateful 1962 clash.

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Featured image: China and India could soon be on the verge of a major water conflict. Image: Facebook

Why ‘Asian Era’ Will be Globally Embraced

January 22nd, 2021 by Prof. Wang Wen

The prelude of an Asian Era has begun. About 100 years ago, Japanese scholar Okakura Tenshin, Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore and Chinese scholar Liang Qichao all called for Asianism. A century has past during which numerous thinkers have conceived of Asia’s rise. Now, the Asian Era is coming.

The signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on November 15 brought together ASEAN nations, Japan, South Korea, China, Australia and New Zealand into one of the most diverse and populated trade blocks on Earth.

It marks a new age for Asian regional cooperation that features multilateralism and trade liberalism. In terms of the global recovery process during the post-pandemic era, this new configuration can accomplish many things.

By 2025, China’s GDP is expected to catch up with or even surpass that of the US. India may surpass Germany to become the world’s fourth-largest economy. European countries will be falling into a depression unseen in 500 years since Portuguese explorer Ferdinand Magellan started his global voyage in 1520. The US’ status as the world’s largest economy will be nearing its end. For the first time, three Asian countries will be among the four major economies in the world.

From the perspective of national governance, East Asian countries, which put emphasis on order in their culture, show more efficiency in fighting against the pandemic, compared with European countries and the US, which purportedly value freedom more. Therefore, Asian countries are also revitalizing their economies faster than other parts of the world. It is anticipated that by 2030, Asia will, “contribute roughly 60 percent of global growth.”

Asia’s revival and the rise and fall of great powers in the region over the past five centuries is a different story. Asian leaders do not aspire to construct an “Asian alliance,” let alone build an “Asian empire” to replace the US. Nor to do something as grandiose as to “save the world” like some missionary. By contrast, the goal of leaders from Asian countries, especially East and Southeast Asia, tends to focus on domestic affairs. They strive to satisfy the needs of the public in light of their national situations.

Asian countries advocate “learning by doing” and excel in exploiting external capital, talents, experiences and lessons. Since the 1990s, East Asia has maintained peace and cooperation for three decades. It has seen the fastest growth in terms of investment and trade. Japan and South Korea have made full use of state capitalism to promote export-oriented economics. ASEAN members have solidified and become an important part of the multi-polar world. Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has learned how to allocate global resources.

Among the seven continents in the world, Asia is the largest, has largest population and the oldest civilizations. It is also the continent with the most complex ethnicities, religion, geography and history. So far, this complexity has prevented Asia from establishing any community associated with “integration.” There is no single currency like the Euro, nor is there a unified intra-continental political organization like the European Union, African Union, or the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. It lacks an economic integration organization like the North American Free Trade Agreement. Even the Asian Games, in which all members on the continent are supposed to take part in, had been incomplete by the absence of Turkey and Israel. No one expected that this puzzle of many places would gradually become a respectable entity unto itself.

However, we can expect that the code of conduct of Asians will become increasingly respectable in the post-pandemic era. Asian values that are more conducive to human development will find growing global appeal. This will be the case with countries like China, Japan and South Korea as these Asian countries demonstrate they can strike delicate balances between the government and market, mercantilism and justice, rights and responsibilities, freedom and self-discipline – as well as individuals and society.

As Indian American scholar Parag Khanna says in his new book, The Future Is Asian, “in the 19th century, the world was Europeanized. In the 20th century, it was Americanized. Now, in the 21st century, the world is being irreversibly Asianized.”

There are another two books that I also recommend. One is The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, written by Kishore Mahbubani, former dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at National University of Singapore. Another is Easternization: Asia’s Rise and America’s Decline From Obama to Trump and Beyond written by Gideon Rachman, chief foreign affairs columnist for the Financial Times.

The “Asian Era” will increasingly be understood and embraced globally.

Chinese people are driving progress in their own way. Since 2013, China has put forward the Belt and Road Initiative and the vision of “a community with shared future for mankind.” We have every reason to believe that China is advancing the “Asian Era” in the right direction.

Surely, the prologue to the “Asian era” has been a long one in the making. Yet this reminds me of the spirit of perseverance of Yu Gong, a figure from an ancient Chinese story called The Foolish Old Man Removes the Mountains, or Yu Gong Yi Shan in Chinese. In the story, the 90-year-old Yu Gong’s perseverance and hard work to remove the mountain in front of his house along with his descendants moves a God, who finally orders the mountains separated.

I believe Asian countries also have Yu Gong’s spirit. The “Asian Era” has started and will for sure have its ultimate arrival in the annals of history.

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The author is professor and executive dean of Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at Renmin University of China. [email protected]

Featured image is by Liu Rui/GT

Boris Johnson Has Done Modi a Favour

January 22nd, 2021 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s invitation to British Prime Minister Boris Johnson conferring on the latter the great honour of being the chief guest at the Republic Day on January 26 was a hasty and premature move. True, the Oxford vaccine can turn India’s dismal future around, but the idea of inviting a British dignitary should have been reserved, thoughtfully, for the 2022 Republic Day, which is the 75th anniversary year of India’s independence from British rule. 

Great anniversaries are invested with symbolism. Indians are becoming so crass that they are losing their sense of history. Be that as it may, on balance, Johnson seems to have performed, perhaps unwittingly, a ‘rescue act’ by regretting Modi’s invitation. The good thing is that we still have the opportunity to invite a British dignitary to the 2022 Republic Day and jointly celebrate Great Britain’s profound contribution to India’s transformation from medieval feudalism to the modern era.  

Any whichever way one were to look at Modi’s invitation to Johnson, to my mind, it had all the hallmark of External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. The zest with which Jaishankar performed at his joint press conference on Dec. 15 with the visiting British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab gave the tale away. His infectious enthusiasm conveyed the impression that Jaishankar found a quick replacement for the outgoing US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who has been his close friend, confidante and guide ever since he became minister in 2019.

Of course, it would be a gross misjudgment to imagine that someone like Raab, an accomplished intellectual and erudite mind, could ever be a cowboy of the western world.  But the ‘China bug’ is creating havoc with our thought processes. There is not a soul in sight among India’s elites today who has not been bitten by that bug.

Our foreign policy may have consequently become somewhat spicy, but from a long term prospective, it is in jeopardy of losing its versatility, agility and pragmatism. Diplomacy based on a single maxim restricts foreign policy options — ‘Hello, Minister, if you have a problem with China, come and have a cuppa with me.’ 

At any rate, we are deluding ourselves if we think that Britain is on a collision course with China. Of course, things have changed since the halcyon days in 2016 when then British PM David Cameron visualised a “Golden Era” in UK-China relations. Britain since beat a retreat over Hong Kong. And it can’t be to Britain’s liking that the lone Anglo-Saxon outpost in the Asia-Pacific, Australia, is being punished by Beijing for crossing its ‘red lines’ and trespassing into its national sovereignty. 

But Britain is not all Five Eyes, either. On its rich tapestry of history, a steamy soap opera like Hong Kong cannot leave enduring impact. Apart from the BBC, no one of consequence in London seems obsessed with Hong Kong anymore.

Although back in April last year, it was a former head of Britain’s MI6, John Sawers, who first alleged that China concealed crucial information about the novel coronavirus outbreak and so should answer for its deceit,  Britain has decided not to pursue the campaign further and  has, kind of, slunk away from the podium, leaving Australian PM Scott Morrison as the night watchman. (Gareth Evans has written a delightful blog titled Australia’s China Problem on Morrison’s goof-up, which can be useful reading for the Indian establishment.) 

Post-Brexit Britain is planning to go ‘global’ after having parted company with the EU. It is a hazardous journey. Hard times lie ahead. The British economy has shrunk by 11 percent (lower than India’s) and the current lockdown exacerbates matters further. In all probability, a return to pre-pandemic times cannot happen before 2023.

The national debt is touching new heights and it seems inevitable that the Bank of England, Britain’s central bank, may rack up the pace of its asset-purchase plan to shore up the financial system. Brexit has been a historical blunder. The trade deal with the EU wears a deceptive look, since it may create downstream problems. Compulsory export declarations and lumbering red tape in trade procedures in the longer term are bound to lead to diminished British market access to the mainland. Johnson has run out of ideas. 

Again, the EU-China investment agreement of Dec. 30 means that Britain will run into European headwinds as China’s financial, manufacturing and services markets are set to be further opened to Berlin, Paris, Rome, Madrid, Athens, Brussels, etc. For example, Germany will almost certainly take away a good slice of Britain’s auto exports to the Chinese market.

The answer lies in a UK-China Free Trade Agreement, while prospects of a UK-US FTA have receded further. Suffice to say, Britain has no choice but to revive a friendly relationship with China, whose investments will be badly needed for the resuscitation of its infrastructure; whose tourists and students bring in big money; whose own domestic infrastructure investment to solidify growth is of such staggering proportions that can be highly lucrative British business; whose people’s disposable income is steadily rising and consumption power is visibly growing for British products which are in demand among Chinese consumers. 

In sum, the $15 trillion Chinese economy, which is more than five times Britain’s, is irreplaceable. And China’s economy is set to grow by more than 8 percent annually in 2021 and 2022, according to World Bank/IMF estimates. Conceivably, the lure of a “Golden Era” of UK-China relations will remain and Beijing is looking forward to it.   

Therefore, the big question is: What is it that Jaishankar can offer to Raab to draw Britain into the Quad? Hosting the newly-built British aircraft carrier on its maiden voyage across the Indian Ocean? Jaishankar should not have embarked on another misadventure like Howdy Modi. 

Without doubt, when Britain goes global, India should be part of it. Britain still has so much to offer. Britain’s multicultural society holds valuable lessons for our ruling elite. The two economies have so much complementarity. Britain’s internationalism can help us figure out how to come out of the hole we’ve dug ourselves in. We don’t need to hinge India-UK relations on shared hostility toward China. 

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Asia’s Deadliest COVID Country to Resist Vaccination

January 21st, 2021 by John Mcbeth

“My fellow Indonesians, at 9:42 this morning I took the major step as an Indonesian of receiving the coronavirus vaccine and freeing myself from the pandemic,” President Joko Widodo wrote on his Facebook page on December 13 as the Christmas-New Year Covid-19 infection rate set new records across the country.

With a reassuring “Safe and Halal” sign as a backdrop, the 59-year-old president launched the first round of inoculations of the Chinese Sinovac vaccine, whose efficacy rate is 65.3%, according to third phase trials conducted in Bandung, south of Jakarta.

But none of the volunteers were over 59, the most vulnerable age group, and there is concern about a similar trial conducted by Brazil’s Butantan Institute which recorded an efficacy rate of only 50.4%, barely above the World Health Organization’s (WHO) threshold to establish and maintain herd immunity.

Although Sinovac recently received emergency approval from the Food and Drug Monitoring Agency (BPOM) and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), the Widodo government will clearly have to do more to earn public trust as it prepares for one of the world’s biggest inoculation programs.

All vaccines must receive halal certification from the MUI to ensure they are permissible under Islamic law, an important step in the Muslim-majority nation, where it could become a serious impediment if not addressed.

Two years ago the council refused to sign off on a measles vaccine, declaring it to be haram because it was suspected of containing a pork-derived gelatin stabilizer used in some cases to prevent degradation during storage and transport.

A Saiful Mujani Research & Consulting survey last month found that only 37% of respondents were willing to take what might be the life-saving jab, with 40% uncertain and 17% saying they would refuse it, mostly because of concerns over safety and effectiveness.

Health experts say even with a smooth rollout through hospitals and 10,000 first-level health clinics, it will be at least 15 months before the program reaches the percentage required for herd immunity among Indonesia’s 270 million-strong population.

The government estimates it will need 427 million doses, factoring in a wastage of 15%, to vaccinate a targeted 181.5 million citizens, with Widodo saying he wants that done by mid-2022.

Some experts fear it may take three to four years, but with newly-appointed Health Minister Budi Sadikian, a proven manager, now at the helm there is optimism that the government now has the life-saving task in hand.

Although only a drop in the bucket, the three million doses of Sinovac already available will initially go to healthcare workers, business people, community leaders, civil servants and members of the police and armed forces.

The government has signed deals for a further 125 million doses of Sinovac, which is expected to be available to inoculate another 65 million Indonesians, and 50 million vials each of the AstraZeneca (Britain) and Novavax (US) vaccines.

But negotiations with Pfizer have reached a stalemate over the US drug company’s insistence on a government-to-business contract for 50 million doses, along with the specialized cold storage facilities to store the vaccine at the required -70 degrees Celsius.

Image below: Honesti Basyir takes questions from the press. Image: Facebook

Honesti Basyir, president director of state-owned Bio Farma, Indonesia’s only vaccine manufacturer, says Pfizer wants to be immune of lawsuits resulting from any short or long-term side effects that may emerge during the rollout of the vaccine.

Indonesia has still to complete a “cold chain” across the archipelago to handle the distribution of the vaccine, with Covid-19 Task Force spokesman Wiku Adisasmito indicating that it will be confined mainly to large urban centers.

Jakarta is also seeking 108 million free doses from GAVI, an alliance led by the WHO, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, UNICEF and the World Bank which was created two decades ago to improve vaccination access for the world’s children.

Already considered to be unstated, Indonesia’s daily infection rate has doubled from 8,000 to as much as 14,000-plus in the past two weeks, a direct result of intra-provincial travel during the Christmas-New Year holiday break.

That has boosted total infections over the 900,000 mark, with the death toll verging on 26,000, or 250-300 a day.

Officials say isolation and intensive care units are at 80% capacity as the government implements a stricter set of health protocols in Java and on the tourist island of Bali to contain the latest surge, the worst since the crisis began.

East Java leads with 6,779 deaths, followed by Central Java with 4,375, Jakarta on 3,673 and West Java with 1,294 – Indonesia’s four most populous provinces that contribute to about 60% of the national total.

The lowest number of deaths have been recorded in West Kalimantan (28) and in West Sulawesi (57), the scene of last week’s 6.2 earthquake which killed more than 50 people and collapsed hundreds of buildings.

In Asia, a region that appears to have escaped the full brunt of the pandemic, Indonesia has the highest number of deaths per million at 5.52%, according to Statista. But its data shows that is still far less than countries in Europe and most other parts of the world.

Foreign nationals have been banned from entering Indonesia until January 28 to prevent the entry of the more infectious Covid-19 strains discovered in Britain, South Africa and Brazil. Domestic tourists can only travel internally after undergoing a swab anti-gen test and obtaining a digital health card.

“The greatest challenge (to the vaccination program) is our geographic landscape,” says Wiku, a health policy and infectious disease expert. “To address that we are working closely with the military and the police to ensure there is smooth distribution.”

But he also warned that much also depends on the availability of supply, an issue amplified by Health Minister Sadikan this week when he said the government may allow for private vaccination schemes after the completion of the first phase of the program to help fill any gap.

Officials say they will not force the vaccine on people, but will wait before imposing sanctions, which include a 100 million rupiah fines for those who don’t comply with quarantine restrictions or hinder the implementation of a vaccination program.

“The people are not ready because they don’t understand,” Wiku told foreign correspondents. “We need more consistent public education. It’s very difficult to explain to people in rural areas, but with the right cultural approach we can convince them.”

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Featured image is by ABEL F. ROS | Qapta.es 

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The Australian government’s treatment and acknowledgment of First Nations peoples will be under fire from several countries participating in a UN hearing this week.  

Countries including Uruguay and Sweden have submitted questions ahead of the hearing on Wednesday on the measures being taken to reduce rates of Indigenous incarceration. And Germany has questioned why there has been a delay in raising the age of criminal responsibility from 10 to 14 years old.

Despite Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders making up just 2 per cent of the national population, they constitute 27 per cent of the prison population.

The United Kingdom has also submitted questions over the government’s plan to work with, and listen to, Indigenous elders and provide a national voice to Parliament for Indigenous people.

The questions are part of the UN Human Rights Council’s universal periodic review process (UPR) that happens about every five years.

In a submission to the review, the Australian government said that since the last review Australia had made significant achievements in the realisation of human rights, including addressing family and domestic violence, human trafficking and modern slavery, and the legalisation of same-sex marriage.

The submission said that it welcomed the opportunity to discuss “achievements and opportunities for improvement in protecting and promoting human rights”.

Indigenous leaders say taking action is critical 

Priscilla Atkins, the CEO of the North Australian Aboriginal Justice Agency, told Pro Bono News the fact that so many UN countries had pulled this issue into focus was “embarrassing”.

“Australia has failed to make any progress on these issues since the last hearing in 2015,” Atkins said.

“It’s a critical time for the Australian government to reimagine our justice system and urgently commit to ending the over-incarceration and death in custody of our people.”

She said that it was also important that community organisations kept the pressure on following the review to ensure change was achieved.

“Change can happen. We saw it last year when the ACT committed to raising the age of criminal responsibility,” she said.

The UPR working group will hand down its final recommendations to the Australian government on 22 January.

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Maggie Coggan is a journalist at Pro Bono News covering the social sector.

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Australian coal exports to China plummeted last year. While this is due in part to recent trade tensions between Australia and China, our research suggests coal plant closures are a bigger threat to Australia’s export coal in the long term.

China unofficially banned Australian coal in mid-2020. Some 70 ships carrying Australian coal have reportedly been unable to unload in China since October.

This is obviously bad news for Australia’s coal exporters. But even if the ban is lifted, there’s no guarantee China will start buying Australian coal again – at least not in huge volumes.

China is changing. It’s announced a firm date to reach net-zero emissions, and governments in eastern provinces don’t want polluting coal plants taking up prime real estate. It’s time Australia faced reality, and reconsidered its coal export future.

First, the coal ban

In May last year, China’s government effectively banned the import of Australian coal, by applying stringent import quotas. As of last month coal exports to China from Newcastle, Australia’s busiest coal exporting port, had ceased.

In 2019, Australia exported A$13.7 billion worth of coal to China. This comprised A$9.7 billion in metallurgical coal for steel making and A$4 billion in thermal coal for electricity generation.

The latest official Australian data shows these export levels fell dramatically between November 2019 and November 2020. Comparing the two months, metallurgical and thermal coal exports to China were down 85% and 83% respectively.

Several Chinese provinces experienced power blackouts in late 2020. China’s state-backed media said the shortages were unrelated to the ban on Australian coal. Instead, they blamed cold weather and the recovery in industrial activity after the pandemic.

We dispute this claim. While Australian coal accounts for only about 2% of coal consumption in China, it helps maintain reliable supply for many power stations in China’s southeast coastal provinces.

Coal mining in China mostly occurs in the western provinces. Southeast coastal provinces are largely economically advanced and no longer produce coal. Instead, power stations in those provinces import coal from overseas.

This coal is cheaper than domestic coal, and often easier to access; transport bottlenecks in China often hinder the movement of domestic coal.

Beyond the trade tensions

Experience suggests trade tensions between Australia and China will eventually ease. But in the long run, there is a more fundamental threat to Australian coal exports to China.

Data from monitoring group Global Coal Tracker shows between 2015 and 2019, China closed 291 coal-fired power generation units in power plants of 30 megawatts (MW) or larger, totalling 37 gigawatts (GW) of capacity. For context, Australia decommissioned 5.5 GW of coal-fired power generation units between 2010 and 2017, and currently has 21 GW of coal-fired power stations.

The closures were driven by factors such as climate change and air pollution concern, excess coal power capacity, and China’s move away from some energy-intensive industries.

Our recently published paper revealed other distinctive features of the coal power station closures.

First, China’s regions are reducing coal power capacity at different rates and scales. In the nation’s eastern provinces, the closures are substantial. But elsewhere, and particularly in the western provinces, new coal plants are being built.

In fact, China’s coal power capacity increased by about 18% between 2015 and 2019. It currently has more than 1,000 GW of coal generation capacity – the largest in the world.

Second, we found retired coal power stations in China had much shorter lives than the international average. Guangdong, an economically developed region of comparable economic size to Canada, illustrates the point. According to our calculation, the stations in that region had a median age of 15 years at closure. In contrast, coal plants that closed in Australia between 2010 and 2017 had a median age of 43 years.

This suggests coal power stations in China are usually retired not because they’ve reached the end of their productive lives, but rather to achieve a particular purpose.

Third, our study showed decisions to decommission coal power stations in China were largely driven by government, especially local governments. This is in contrast to Australia, where the decision to close a plant is usually made by the company that owns it. And this decomissioning in China is usually driven by a development logic.

Coal plant closures there have been faster and bigger than elsewhere in the country, as governments replace energy- and pollution-intensive industries with advanced manufacturing and services.

And as these regions become richer, the value of land occupied by coal power plants and transmission facilities grows. This gives governments a strong incentive to close the plants and redevelop the sites.

In coming years, southeast China will increasingly shift to renewable-based electricity and electric power transmitted from western provinces.

Securing our energy future

Coal power stations in China’s eastern coastal regions will continue to close in coming years, and power generation capacity will be redistributed to western provinces. For reasons outlined above, that means power generation in China will increasingly rely on domestic coal rather than that from Australia.

China’s coal exit is in part due to its strategy to peak its carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve net-zero by 2060. Australia must realistically appraise its coal export prospects in light of the long-term threat posed by shifts in China and other East Asian nations.

The Morrison government, and industry, should re-double efforts to rapidly expand renewable energy in Australia. Then we can leave coal behind, and emerge as a renewable energy superpower.

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Authors:

Associate professor, University of Newcastle

Scientia Associate Professor in International Relations / International Political Economy, UNSW

Professor Emeritus, Macquarie Business School, Macquarie University

Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Discipline of Politics & International Relations, Macquarie School of Social Sciences, Macquarie University

While trying to find sustainable, durable solutions to problems which have been building up over a long time, it is very helpful to keep in mind that the outward manifestation  is not necessarily the real problem or its core. This is very evident in the context of  farming where a number of serious problems have been building up over the last several decades.

In many areas the seeds and crop varieties which had evolved keeping in view the specific agro-ecological conditions of an area have been displaced from the fields of farmers. The self-reliance of farming communities in terms of the most basic input of seeds has been lost in vast areas. If the market provides only seeds which grow well only with chemical fertilizers and with even more specific pesticide and herbicide requirements then this has to be followed regardless of the economic costs and health hazards that may be involved. These changes increase pressures on farmers to change the cropping calendar based on new changes imposed from outside, and this in turn increases the pressure for ever-increasing mechanization of farming , which is facilitated by the availability of luring credit, inviting small farmers to invest more than they can afford in  costly machines, with heavy payback schedules. This increases costs of farmers and risks of farmers considerably, and the increasing possibility of debts piling up. This problem increases with high interest rates, corruption in credit, sales of products of dubious quality, uses of heavy handed methods for recovery of loans.

With the excessive use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and herbicides, organic content of soil declines, friendly organisms which keep on contributing to enhancing  fertility and organic matter suffer holocaust and overall natural fertility declines, so that desperate farmers have to spend more and more on chemical fertilizers to maintain yields. Poisonous pesticides kill friendly insects and birds, including invaluable pollinators, in huge numbers , even as harmful targeted pests may develop immunity. Hence over a period, the factors that contribute to farming bounty without any economic costs decline, resulting in  depletion of natural  fertility and rising of costs.

The focus of technology based development leads to neglect of social dimensions of progress. Inequalities have existed for a long time resulting in concentration of land in the hands of a few households in many villages, although the situation may be better in some other villages. Often there is neglect of sections considered to be lower in rural social hierarchy, who are often also landless, leading to increasing alienation and sometimes even hostility. Farmers often forget the livelihood needs of landless farm workers needs while going in for expensive mechanization, while landless workers become more inclined towards migration based livelihoods. There are growing fissures in community life as various sections form their own wider support groupings. Even though debts are rising, there is an increase in cash passing through hands. In some cases this leads to a rise in unaffordable wasteful expenditure, and what is worse, in increasing consumption of liquor and other substance abuse. Superstitions and regressive trends proliferate despite the outward signs of modernity, and when frustrations increase due to economic problems or social alienation/humiliation , these can be easily directed towards religious fundamentalism, communalism, sectarianism and the followings of various dubious , self-styled godmen and gurus, or else find another kind of outlet in crime.

All these accumulating problems create a distressing and tense situation when farmers do not get a fair price, or get less than expected or promised price for their produce. This may happen due to cheating by business interests, or a failure of government resulting from inefficiency, failure to allocate adequate resources for this purchase and the necessary infra-structure. In a situation of the government having very inadequate support for ensuring fair price for all, the bigger and more influential farmers corner the bulk of the benefits using various tricks. One of these is that taking advantage of the inability of small farmers to wait their turn in government purchase, the bigger farmers or traders may buy the produce of the small farmers at a much lesser price than the announced government price, and then sell it to the government in due course in the name of small farmers. Hence government records may continue to show significant procurement from small farmers, while the reality may be quite different.

As the immediate problem is the denial or delay of what is perceived to be a just and remunerative price, the entire focus may shift to this for getting some immediate relief, or else it may shift to writing off , or least postponement, of some loans or interest payments due to farmers. This is a response to the most obvious and visible current manifestation of the problem, and not to the many-sided, complex realities of the wider, deeper problem of rural distress and crisis.

It is important to realize this wider dimension of the existing problems, so that solutions do not remain confined to only those aspects which are more dominant at the level of outward manifestation and visibility. A much more holistic, comprehensive, deeper   response is actually needed at several levels.

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Bharat Dogra is a journalist and author. His recent books include Planet in Peril and Protecting Earth for Children.

Featured image is from Countercurrents

Differentiation, classification, quantification, and specification.[1] . . . These are the four basic “mathematical” aspects of human experience that lead to knowledge. Well, we’re not talking here of mathematics as we know it in the academic sense. This is not “school” mathematics. Notwithstanding, these are what we get into when we study mathematics. But we can go beyond “purely academic” mathematics and apply them to life experience. In other words, there is something “mathematical” in life as we get more focused on certain issues that need analysis because the fundamental task of mathematics is analysis. In the present discussion, I wish to focus more specifically on the issue of differentiation and classification applied to certain important matters concerning Philippine politics.

There are people who are good at maths. In fact, many believe that in many cases, being so is a gift, i.e., a talent. We’ve got professional mathematicians, statisticians, maths professors, engineers, architects, among others. But there are those who, more than being afraid of maths, are actually resentful of it. They don’t like maths and they mean maths that they had in school.

Nevertheless, we have not been aware that maths is one basic stuff in life, take it, or leave it. Forget the numbers, the operations, the equations, and everything related to it in school. Just think of its more practical functions which in the present discussion involve differentiation and classification. We have failed in these areas a lot of times. We have got used to “zooming into” or “telescoping” individual instances that need differentiation. We fail to differentiate. We’ve got the tendency to put all the eggs in one basket, so to speak because we see them as all the same when in fact, they only have certain similar features but are actually different from each other.

As a case in point, we have failed to differentiate between showbiz and politics and sports and politics as well. We have failed to distinguish, for example, Manny Pacquiao in the boxing ring and Manny Pacquiao running for a government post. Telescoping the situation is committing the failure of properly analyzing that boxing is different from taking responsibility for matters of the legislature. We have got used to always cheering for him every time he enters the ring because we know he is an ace pugilist, a champion. And we likewise cheered for him when he entered the august hall of the Philippine Senate while entertaining the inaccurate notion that if he was good in the ring, he should also be in the Senate. And we were dead wrong.

Classification is another “mathematical” aspect where we’ve got into and been misled as we’ve done it inaccurately. We’ve classified things wrongly and all the ensuing circumstances that have been going on just fail to fit into the right boxes. It is another failure of analysis as we have allowed ourselves to be influenced and beguiled by the made-up stories of paid scriptwriters tasked to perfume the persona of a self-proclaimed hero whose achievements are artificially and superficially glossed over his real less impressive person and performance.

On this issue, Rodrigo Roa Duterte, the incumbent president of the Philippines, is a leading example. Filipinos have misclassified him and a lot of those who have committed this one heck of a misdoing now constitute a group of a much-maligned bunch of stupid and brainless mob called DDS or “Digong Diehard Supporters” (a spin-off of the original DDS which were the notorious henchmen of Duterte when he was the mayor of Davao City, known as the “Duterte Death Squad”). The misclassification of Duterte as an able government leader has led the country to an intensification of crimes, widespread corruption, and the general mismanagement of the national economy.

Mathematics, more than meets the eye, have more significant functions in our daily lives. And as have been pointed out at the beginning, we are not talking here of the more technical and specific field to which we were formally introduced in school and which many of us nowadays have learned to hate.

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Prof. Ruel F. Pepa is a Filipino philosopher based in Madrid, Spain. A retired academic (Associate Professor IV), he taught Philosophy and Social Sciences for more than fifteen years at Trinity University of Asia, an Anglican university in the Philippines.

Note

[1] Cf. “How Fundamental is Mathematics?” https://ruelfpepa.wordpress.com/2015/05/13/the-fundamental-role-of-mathematics/?fbclid=IwAR3dL2LPu5njureWyvK-i7Koh54v4qSMxSFY7QavayuSB7lgW5s4w4gOJ0s

An upgrade to a road that cuts through one of Southeast Asia’s last great swaths of intact rainforest is driving deeper encroachment by humans into blocks of forest that may spread into a national park.

The road runs 36 kilometers (22 miles) between the districts of Karo and Langkat in Indonesia’s North Sumatra province, and for a long time was no more than a dirt track, a 4.1-km (2.5-mi) stretch of which runs through Gunung Leuser National Park.

Authorities recently upgraded the road, paving it over with asphalt, despite calls from UNESCO not to do so. The national park is part of a wider UNESCO World Heritage Site.

It’s also part of the Leuser Ecosystem, the last place on Earth where critically endangered rhinos, tigers, elephants and orangutans still coexist in the wild — but which has also been eaten away at in recent years by human encroachment for oil palm cultivation and illegal logging.

More than 450,000 hectares (1.1 million acres) of the Leuser Ecosystem have been deforested, leaving 1.8 million hectares (4.4 million acres) of intact rainforest as of 2019, according to data from the NGO Forest, Nature and Environment of Aceh (HAkA).

Activists say they fear more forests and habitat of key species will be lost in near future the newly paved road provides easier access into previously untouched forest areas, eventually carving into the national park itself. The Bukit Barisan public forest park, a neighboring block of forest that isn’t subject to the same degree of protection as Gunung Leuser National Park, has already been impacted by the upgrades to the road, groups say.

The forest park has lost 1,200 hectares (3,000 acres) of its tree cover for houses and coffee plantations, according to monitoring by the Indonesian Forum for the Environment (Walhi), the country’s largest green group. Officials say the people clearing the forest are evacuees forced out of their homes by ongoing eruptions of the nearby Mount Sinabung volcano. They say these people have set up houses and plantations inside the 51,000-hectare (126,000-acre) public forest park by taking advantage of the new access opened by the upgraded road.

The number of households dotted around the road when it was still a dirt track was 31, according to official data, but mushroomed to 296 in 2019, following the paving.

Sean Sloan, a scientist at James Cook University in Australia who carried out a study in 2018 on the impact of infrastructure development in the wider Leuser Ecosystem, said it’s only natural for settlements to start appearing after a road has been upgraded.

“The history of the Leuser Ecosystem evidences that settlement occurs widely and seemingly illegally along roads once they’re asphalted and made well,” he told Mongabay. “And so to make another road along the ecosystem further improves the point.”

Dana Tarigan, director of Walhi’s North Sumatra chapter, said he suspected many of the settlers who have encroached into the public forest park aren’t Sinabung evacuees, but rather part of an organized land grab using the volcanic eruptions as cover to clear the forests and occupy the land.

“In the beginning, there might have been evacuees [among the people who moved into the area], but it has turned into an organized crime and the evacuees are being used as a shield,” Dana told Mongabay.

He added that the rate of forest clearing — 1,200 hectares in just two years — was far too intensive to have been carried out by a group of a few hundred impoverished evacuees.

“What tools do they use to cut down such a large area?” he said. “What kind of evacuees, who supposedly have nothing, could encroach into 1,200 hectares of forest?”

Some of the settlers have begun selling the land they cleared, making from 30 million rupiah ($2,100) per hectare for an empty lot, to 150 million rupiah ($10,600) per hectare for land planted with crops like coffee.

“There have been underhanded dealings going on, with illegal settlement by people from outside Karo,” Dana said.

To date, the forest incursion has been confined to the Bukit Barisan public forest park. But as the amount of cleared area expands, the settlements are now less than a kilometer (0.6 miles) from Gunung Leuser National Park. A local activist keeping track of the encroachment says in some areas the land clearing is within a few dozen meters of the national park.

That means it’s only a matter of time before people started cutting into Gunung Leuser National Park, Dana said.

Aerial photograph, taken by a drone, of the Karo-Langkat road that bisects the North Sumatra province section of Gunung Leuser National Park. Image courtesy of Gunung Leuser National Park authority.

Impact on wildlife habitat

The incursion is already affecting the region’s rare and threatened wildlife, including orangutans. In 2020, there were at least two reports of orangutans seen fleeing from forest areas being cleared.

Muhammad Yusrizal Adi Syaputra, a law lecturer at the Medan Area University in Medan, the North Sumatra capital, carried out an analysis of the road project and its impacts. He said there was a potential for a decline of 28-36% in bird and mammal populations within a 2.6-km (1.6-mi) radius of the road, and a 25-38% decline within a 17-km (10.5-mi) radius.

Sloan said that while the recently upgraded road itself might not cut through the core of the Leuser Ecosystem, it’s still a major concern.

“As far as random roads go, it’s probably not the most detrimental, but it fits into a larger pattern of laxed regulation, indifference, and piecemeal destruction,” he said.

The worst-case scenario is if the road cuts off an area of forest, isolating it entirely, according to Sloan. He adds there’s a specific area of forest in the national park that could be easily isolated this way from the rest of the park.

“It might house a few dozen orangutans, but that population would die out” if the forest becomes isolated, Sloan said.

In its 2020 World Heritage Outlook report, the IUCN also noted the presence of Sumatran orangutans close to the Karo-Langkat road.

“Sumatran orangutan, which are critically endangered are known to inhabit the area of the road and therefore the road will likely fragment its habitat,” the IUCN said in the report.

Forest encroachment in the Leuser Ecosystem. Image by Junaidi Hanafiah/Mongabay-Indonesia.

World Heritage Site

Sloan said he was surprised that the proposal to upgrade the road had been approved under UNESCO’s watch, given that the U.N. body had recommended the Indonesian government to cease all infrastructure projects that might threaten Gunung Leuser National Park. The park is part of a UNESCO World Heritage Site called the Tropical Rainforest Heritage of Sumatra (TRHS) that has been listed as a World Heritage in Danger since 2011 due to “serious and specific” infrastructure threats.

In 2013 and 2018, the IUCN conducted monitoring missions to assess the state of the TRHS, including threats and the required corrective measures. The two missions highlighted the Karo-Langkat road as infrastructure that required immediate attention as it bisected Gunung Leuser National Park, including areas frequently used by tigers, elephants and orangutans.

Based on the result of the missions, UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee requested the Indonesian government stay committed to not building any new roads within the TRHS and to ensure any road upgrades are only permitted if they could be shown to not cause any negative impact on the area’s Outstanding Universal Value.

But in 2018, the IUCN mission learned that two road upgrades inside the TRHS had been recently approved without environmental impact assessments, including the proposal to upgrade the Karo-Langkat road through the national park.

The proposal was made by local officials and lawmakers, who said the road had to be upgraded to develop the local economy and provide an evacuation route in case of natural disasters. In 2016, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry rejected the proposal on the grounds that Gunung Leuser National Park is a World Heritage Site.

After years of trying to get the project approved by the central government, the local government finally managed to obtain a letter from the environment ministry in 2018 that greenlit the project as long as an academic study was conducted first.

Based on that letter, the provincial government allocated 14 billion rupiah ($981,000) for the project in 2018, and construction began shortly after that. But Gunung Leuser National Park authorities reportedly blocked the project, triggering protests from local communities and officials.

Baskami Ginting, the speaker of the North Sumatra provincial legislature, said the letter from the ministry should have been enough for the project to proceed. After the initial objection from the national park authorities, the project resumed and now had been completed.

The IUCN expressed concern over the completion of the project in its report, saying the government had ignored the committee’s call to not proceed with these upgrades until environmental impact assessments had been undertaken.

Medan Area University’s Yusrizal said the road wasn’t lacking only a proper environmental impact assessment, but also a legal basis.

“It’s better if the environment ministry gives a permit, but it has to be clear, such as a permit to construct a road,” Yusrizal told Mongabay. “But until now, I haven’t found the legal basis [for the road construction]. I’ve just found a cooperation agreement to construct the road.”

The national park authority says it is working with the Ministry of Public Works and Housing to ensure that the UNESCO-requested strategic environmental assessment and mitigation plan is prioritized in its 2020–2021 work plan and budget.

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Featured image: A Sumatran orangutan with a leaf in its mouth. The Leuser Ecosystem is home to roughly 85 percent of the species’ remaining population. Image by Rhett A. Butler/Mongabay.

In this interview, Pradeep Mehta who is the founder Secretary General of the Jaipur-based Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS International), talks about the establishment of his organization, its geographical spread, the challenges it has faced over the years and future perspectives.

Established in 1983, the Jaipur-based Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS International) is a leading economic policy research, advocacy and networking, non-governmental group in India, with offices in Nairobi, Lusaka, Hanoi, Accra, Geneva and Washington DC.

Besides working for his organization, Pradeep Mehta is an honorary Adviser to the Commerce and Industries Minister of India, Trade, Commerce and Industry, Minister of Zambia and to the Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In spite of his heavy working schedule, he found time to discuss a few business issues with Kester Kenn Klomegah. Here are the interview excerpts.

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Kester Kenn Klomegah: How did the founders come about the unique idea to establish CUTS International as a non-profit NGO? What were some of the driving factors?

Pradeep Mehta: The genesis of CUTS International can be found in the importance of communication in influencing the political economy of growth and development. A monthly wall newspaper ‘Gram Gadar’ (Village Revolution) was launched by CUTS in the very beginning in 1983 which became a means for people in rural areas to access information about government schemes and programmes meant for them and their rights. The wall newspaper is still published regularly and has been instrumental in providing a forum for the oppressed classes to get justice. This wall newspaper, in earlier days, was followed by several campaigns like virulent coin shortage, medical negligence and compensation, and many more supporting consumer rights and protection issues.

Campaigns around issues which affect a common person helped people appreciate their rights as consumers. One successful campaign was run on shortage of sticks in match boxes. Match box  is a commodity used by the poorest of the poor and richest of the rich. The average shortage was 15% and many of sticks either did not have a proper head or too large. The price of the match box is really small. However, the campaign pitched the total turnover in India which was around Rs. 20 million and hence the annual loss to a consumer was around Rs. 3.00 million, which everyone could relate to.

One of the main driving factors for CUTS International was the existence of socialism in India Other than ‘Gram Gadar’ and the campaigns, which got excellent response and recognition, one of the key drivers for the formation of CUTS International was an amendment in 1984 in the Monopolies & Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA), 1969 in India to cover unfair trade practices which mainly included misleading advertising and other deceptive practices, which are broadly understood as consumer protection issues. CUTS brought forward many complaints, including the matchbox case, before the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission and succeeded in many cases which resulted in pro consumer policy changes.

There was no organized consumer movement in the state of Rajasthan then, which lead to the establishment of CUTS, which was registered in June 1984.

The second driver which resulted in expanding our work on trade and economics was our participation in the triennial conference of the International Organization of Consumer Unions (now renamed as Consumers International) in July 1991 in Hong Kong. Here two hot topics were discussions on the Uruguay Round of GATT talks which was ultimately signed as World Trade Organization in April 1994 and the Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations. There were a few sessions on these issues which were dominated by Northern Consumer Groups while those from the South, such as CUTS, from India were clearly out on a limb. This led to the realization that these issues will have to be dealt with as they will have an impact on the developing world also.

Following that, CUTS, with the support of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, floated the South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics and Environment (SAWTEE), a network of CSOs in South Asia in 1994 to build capacity to cope with the pains of transition arising from globalization and the WTO. This initiative lead to the establishment of the CUTS Centre for International Trade, Environment and Economics on demands made by African CSOs at UNCTAD IX in Midrand, South Africa in June 1996 to help them in capacity building on global economic issues and expand South-South Cooperation among the Civil Society.

Noted trade economist, Jagdish Bhagwati agreed to chair the Advisory Board. Following that SAWTEE was transferred to Nepalese partners, who registered the organization in Kathmandu. Because of legal limitations, they could not have a board with non-Nepalese citizens and thus they established an Advisory Board and elected CUTS Secretary General, Pradeep S. Mehta, its chairman. SAWTEE is now a well-established independent NGO working on trade and development issues in Nepal and the South Asia region. It was established in 1997 and registered in 1999,

In April 2000, UNCTAD organized the ‘Asia Pacific Regional Seminar on Competition Law and Policy’ in Jaipur in partnership with CUTS and the MRTP Commission. At this meeting, representatives of DFID, World Bank, UNCTAD and WTO got together and agreed to support CUTS International in its first ever overseas project on assessing competition law reforms in seven Commonwealth developing countries of Asia and Africa. For more please visit our website: www.cuts-international.org.

KKK: Since its establishment, which of the marked achievements you are most passionate with here?

PM: Well as mentioned above, our very first initiative ‘Gram Gadar’ was revolutionary, so much so that it reached the most remote rural areas in Rajasthan state and the response was very motivating to do more good for the society. The consumer protection work that CUTS International supported was also acknowledged in a big way by media well as policy makers and led to policy changes. For example the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in India, just after the adoption of the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection, 1985.

Perhaps the most marked achievement has been the formulation of competition laws in nearly 30 developing countries after the arrival of the WTO in 1995. Until then only about 35 countries had a competition law, but today the number has crossed 140 and counting. This included countries like India, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Kenya which scrapped their old competition law and adopted a total new and modern one. CUTS is rightfully the catalyst for this change other than many developing countries adopting a competition law for the first time.

All this was achieved in spite of opposition from both left wing and right wing forces. Since a Multilateral Competition Law was an issue being discussed at the WTO and it was opposed by several developing countries supported by leftist forces, countries like Malaysia, Bangladesh dragged their feet.

On the other hand, right wing forces believed that a competition law would be a hurdle to business and trade policy is sufficient to promote competition in the market place. Today, both Malaysia and Bangladesh have competition laws and have taken CUTS technical assistance to implement their laws. CUTS has also provided technical assistance to many other developing country government agencies, including India. One can read more about some of the pioneering cases in our publication.

KKK: Why Asian and African regions have become important, what directions are particularly attractive in the continent for CUTS International?

PM: As stated just above, we became international by working on competition regime in seven Commonwealth developing countries in Asia and Africa. We also worked on trade policy issues with the civil society and governments in the two continents.  For example, governments in India, Kenya and Zambia have associated CUTS with their trade policy apparatuses.

On the other hand, many NGOs and think tanks in Asia and Africa reached us seeking support to develop their capacity and that looked like a good opportunity to promote our mission and build a network of like-minded organizations and also for promotion of South-South cooperation among the civil society. Our deep work on trade, investment, competition and development issues in Africa led to being consulted by the African Union Commission and the United Nation Economic Commission for Africa on competition and investment provisions in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

KKK: Specifically, what are your views about the investment opportunities for foreign investors in Africa region?

PM: Investment opportunities are good, it is a growing region. The current Covid-19 pandemic has certainly caused a setback but that is for the whole world.

KKK: What advice would you offer to potential investors who are considering pursuing business, say, in Asia and Africa?

PM: My advice is to have patience, things move slowly in Africa. The word ‘deadline’ does not exist in their dictionary and governance deficit is high. Despite all this, opportunities are good.

KKK: What challenges still remained to overcome in your company’s operations? Is Asia easier than Africa in doing business?

PM: We did not face any particular challenges in expanding our operations. I think mostly because we work on areas where there is a vacuum and/or much space. On your other question, my answer is ‘No’, both Asia and Africa are the same.

KKK: In what ways would you argue that, despite the difficulties, Africa is unique for business for China? And that compared to other foreign players in Africa?

PM: Chinese have deep pockets and have a big appetite for natural resources. Aided by the governance deficit in Africa, the Chinese are able to work on highly profitable ventures easily. Compared to Chinese investors, western investors are already there since the colonial times but have not gone deeper. Further, they are also prevented by their laws to indulge in corruption abroad. As far as India is concerned, it has excellent historical ties with all African countries and is providing software support in terms of capacity building etc. It is not competing against China’s exposure in hardware projects, though also providing technical support to many African countries.

KKK: Do you cooperate with international institutions, and which foreign countries are involved in the company?

PM: Yes definitely, we do cooperate and associate with World Bank, United Nations, UNCTAD, OECD and in our mission to promote consumer sovereignty we have received support as well from foundations such as Ford Foundation, Asia Foundation, MacArthur Foundation, NOVIB, HIVOS and international Institutions and NGOs such as Oxfam. We also get support from government agencies in UK, Norway, Sweden, USA, India, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, France etc.

KKK: Entrepreneurship is very challenging. What keeps you motivated working for this NGO? And the future vision for CUTS International?

PM: Being the founder Secretary General of CUTS International, I have had a very satisfying period working for CUTS since its establishment in 1983 in India, which continues until now. In particular, the way we were able to connect the voices and concerns at the grassroots with the policy landscape and amplify its reach at an international level, and achieving positive changes was very motivating. We were able to connect Institutions and build capacities of different agencies helping them to achieve phenomenal success and that keeps me further motivated.

At a personal level to change to nonprofit work from for profit work in 1990 was highly satisfying and self-actualizing. For seven years before that, I was a volunteer at CUTS struggling to establish it as a sound research and advocacy group. I gave up my business career to devote full time to CUTS because I realized that without full time attention one cannot achieve progress. Besides, we did not have such funding to engage professionals.

CUTS future vision is to grow as a civil society-UNCTAD and expand the capabilities in the sphere of trade, regulation and good governance, our three verticals, across the global South and international capitals, such as Geneva, Washington, Bangkok, Nairobi, Santiago and so forth.

Towards achieving this vision, CUTS has initiated the process of institutionalizing its learnings. In pursuing this agenda, we are a rare Southern NGO which has established centres in three regions of Africa, one in Hanoi and one each in Geneva during 2000s and Washington DC in 2018. Each of these centres are registered under local laws and under a local board with either one or two representatives from CUTS India. In India, it operates out of three centres.

Another successful initiative was to establish an independent CUTS Institute for Regulation and Competition in New Delhi in 2008 as a dedicated centre for law and economics. Another initiative on the anvil is setting up CUTS Institute of Rural Development and Empowerment in Jaipur, Rajasthan. This will be an experiential platform linking grassroots to classrooms and vice versa.

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Indian Farmers on the Frontline Against Global Capitalism

January 18th, 2021 by Colin Todhunter

In a short video on the empirediaries.com YouTube channel, a protesting farmer camped near Delhi says that during lockdown and times of crisis farmers are treated like “gods”, but when they ask for their rights, they are smeared and labelled as “terrorists”.

He, along with thousands of other farmers, are mobilising against three important pieces of farm legislation that were recently forced through parliament. To all intents and purposes, these laws sound a neoliberal death knell for most of India’s cultivators and its small farms, the backbone of the nation’s food production.

The farmer says:

“Corporates invested in Modi before the election and brought him to power. He has sold out and is an agent of Ambani and Adani. He is unable to repeal the bills because his owners will scold him. He is trapped. But we are not backing down either.”

He then asks whether ministers know how many seeds are needed to grow wheat on an acre of land:

“We farmers know. They made these farm laws sitting in air-conditioned rooms. And they are teaching us the benefits!”

While the corporations that will move in on the sector due to the legislation will initially pay good money for crops, once the public sector markets (mandis) are gone, the farmer says they will become the only buyers and will beat prices down.

He asks why, in other sectors, do sellers get to put price tags on their products but not farmers:

“Why can’t farmers put minimum prices on the crops we produce? A law must be brought to guarantee MSP [minimum support prices]. Whoever buys below MSP must be punished by law.”

The recent agriculture legislation represents the final pieces of a 30-year-old plan which will benefit a handful of billionaires in the US and in India. It means the livelihoods of hundreds of millions (the majority of the population) who still (directly or indirectly) rely on agriculture for a living are to be sacrificed at the behest of these elite interests.

Consider that much of the UK’s wealth came from sucking $45 trillion from India alone according to renowned economist Utsa Patnaik. Britain grew rich by underdeveloping India. What amount to little more than modern-day East India-type corporations are now in the process of helping themselves to the country’s most valuable asset – agriculture.

According to the World Bank’s lending report, based on data compiled up to 2015, India was easily the largest recipient of its loans in the history of the institution. The World Bank thus exerts a certain hold over India: on the back of India’s foreign exchange crisis in the 1990s, the IMF and World Bank wanted India to shift hundreds of millions out of agriculture.

In return for up to more than $120 billion in loans at the time, India was directed to dismantle its state-owned seed supply system, reduce subsidies, run down public agriculture institutions and offer incentives for the growing of cash crops to earn foreign exchange.

The plan involves shifting at least 400 million from the countryside into cities.

The details of this plan appear in a January 2021 article by the Research Unit for Political Economy, ‘Modi’s Farm Produce Act Was Authored Thirty Years Ago, in Washington DC’. The piece says that the current agricultural ‘reforms’ are part of a broader process of imperialism’s increasing capture of the Indian economy:

“Indian business giants such as Reliance and Adani are major recipients of foreign investment, as we have seen in sectors such as telecom, retail, and energy. At the same time, multinational corporations and other financial investors in the sectors of agriculture, logistics and retail are also setting up their own operations in India. Multinational trading corporations dominate global trade in agricultural commodities. For all these reasons, international capital has a major stake in the restructuring of India’s agriculture… The opening of India’s agriculture and food economy to foreign investors and global agribusinesses is a longstanding project of the imperialist countries.”

The article provides details of a 1991 World Bank memorandum which set out the programme for India. It adds:

“At the time, India was still in its foreign exchange crisis of 1990-91 and had just submitted itself to an IMF-monitored ‘structural adjustment’ programme. Thus, India’s July 1991 budget marked the fateful start of India’s neoliberal era.”

It states that now the Modi government is dramatically advancing the implementation of the above programme, using the Covid-19 crisis as cover: the dismantling of the public procurement and distribution of food is to be implemented by the three agriculture-related acts passed by parliament.

The drive is to drastically dilute the role of the public sector in agriculture, reducing it to a facilitator of private capital and leading to the entrenchment of industrial farming and the replacement of small-scale farms. The norm will be industrial (GMO) commodity-crop agriculture suited to the needs of the likes of Cargill, Archer Daniels Midlands, Louis Dreyfus, Bunge and India’s retail and agribusiness giants as well as the global agritech, seed and agrochemical corporations. It could result in hundreds of millions of former rural dwellers without any work given that India is heading (has already reached) jobless growth.

As a result of the ongoing programme, more than 300,000 farmers in India have taken their lives since 1997 and many more are experiencing economic distress or have left farming as a result of debt, a shift to cash crops and economic liberalisation. The number of cultivators in India declined from 166 million to 146 million between 2004 and 2011. Some 6,700 left farming each day. Between 2015 and 2022, the number of cultivators is likely to decrease to around 127 million.

We have seen the running down of the sector for decades, spiralling input costs, withdrawal of government assistance and the impacts of cheap, subsidised imports which depress farmers’ incomes.

Take the cultivation of pulses, for instance. According to a report in the Indian Express (September 2017), pulses production increased by 40% during the previous 12 months (a year of record production). At the same time, however, imports also rose resulting in black gram selling at 4,000 rupees per quintal (much less than during the previous 12 months). This effectively pushed down prices thereby reducing farmers already meagre incomes.

We have already witnessed a running down of the indigenous edible oils sector thanks to Indonesian palm oil imports (which benefits Cargill) on the back of World Bank pressure to reduce tariffs (India was virtually self-sufficient in edible oils in the 1990s but now faces increasing import costs).

The pressure from the richer nations for the Indian government to further reduce support given to farmers and open up to imports and export-oriented ‘free market’ trade is based on nothing but hypocrisy.

On the ‘Down to Earth’ website in late 2017, it was stated some 3.2 million people were engaged in agriculture in the US in 2015. The US goverment provided them each with a subsidy of $7,860 on average. Japan provides a subsidy of $14,136 and New Zealand $2,623 to its farmers. In 2015, a British farmer earned $2,800 and $37,000 was added through subsidies. The Indian government provides on average a subsidy of $873 to farmers. However, between 2012 and 2014, India reduced the subsidy on agriculture and food security by $3 billion.

According to policy analyst Devinder Sharma subsidies provided to US wheat and rice farmers are more than the market worth of these two crops. He also notes that, per day, each cow in Europe receives subsidy worth more than an Indian farmer’s daily income.

The Indian farmer simply cannot compete with this. The World Bank, World Trade Organisation and the IMF have effectively served to undermine the indigenous farm sector in India. The long-term goal has been to displace the peasantry and consolidate a corporate-controlled model.

And now, by reducing public sector buffer stocks and introducing corporate-dictated contract farming and full-scale neoliberal marketisation for the sale and procurement of produce, India will be sacrificing its farmers and its own food security for the benefit of a handful of billionaires.

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Colin Todhunter is a frequent contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research.

Featured image: Farmers’ protest in India. (Source: Green Left)

Philippines: ‘Drug War’ Killings Rise During Pandemic

January 18th, 2021 by Human Rights Watch

The Philippine government’s “drug war” killings intensified during the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020, as did unnecessary arrests during lockdowns, Human Rights Watch said today in its World Report 2021. Attacks by the police, military, and unidentified gunmen on leftist activists, community and Indigenous leaders, human rights defenders, and journalists also increased during the year.

“The Duterte administration appeared to take advantage of Covid-19 curfews in 2020 to expand its gruesome and bloody ‘war on drugs,’” said Phil Robertson, deputy Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “At the same time, government ‘red-baiting’ of leftist activists, rights defenders, and others have put them at greater risk of deadly attack.”

In the 761-page World Report 2021, its 31st edition, Human Rights Watch reviews human rights practices in more than 100 countries. In his introductory essay, Executive Director Kenneth Roth argues that the incoming United States administration should embed respect for human rights in its domestic and foreign policy, in a way that is more likely to survive future US administrations that might be less committed to human rights. Roth emphasizes that even as the Trump administration mostly abandoned the protection of human rights, other governments stepped forward to champion rights. The Biden administration should seek to join, not supplant, this new collective effort.

The rights situation in the Philippines worsened during the pandemic, as the government imposed strict lockdown measures that resulted in the arrest and incarceration of tens of thousands of Filipinos, in conditions that greatly increased their health risk. In the early days of the lockdown, police subjected curfew violators – including children – to abusive treatment.

“Drug war” killings in the Philippines in 2020 increased by more than 50 percent during the early months of the pandemic. The police reported in November that since Rodrigo Duterte became president, nearly 8,000 alleged drug suspects had been killed during police operations. In June, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights validated many of these killings. Domestic human rights groups and the governmental Commission on Human Rights believe the actual toll is triple that figure.

Philippine rights monitors reported in 2020 that more than 160 political activists had been killed since Duterte became president in 2016. A number of the victims had earlier been “red-tagged” or red-baited by the Philippine military, the police, and local anti-communist groups. Among those targeted for “red-tagging” were celebrities who expressed support for groups that the government accused of having communist links.

The media also came under renewed attack. In June, a court convicted Maria Ressa, prominent head of the news website Rappler, on politically motivated charges of cyber libel stemming from Rappler’s persistent reporting on the “drug war.” In July, the Duterte-controlled Philippine Congress voted not to extend the franchise of ABS-CBN, the country’s largest television network, which had often criticized the government’s “drug war,” forcing the network’s closure.

“As respect for human rights in the Philippines spirals downwards, concerned governments, and UN agencies will need to press the Duterte government harder to halt its atrocities and hold those responsible to account,” Robertson said.

Read full HRW report here.

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Featured image: Protest by local human rights groups, remembering the victims of the drug war, October 2019.
(CC BY-SA 4.0)

Wildfires Ravage Nepal Mountains

January 15th, 2021 by Nepali Times

Athree month drought in central and eastern Nepal has sparked wildfires across the Himalaya which has shrouded the mountains in smoke, adding to the urban and crossborder pollution.

The big forest fires in Pathibhara in eastern Nepal and below Mt Machapuchre in Kaski raged for a week, and spent themselves. But major fires are out of control in Manang, Rasuwa, Lamjung and Sindhupalchok, destroying huge tracts of high montane forest.

The most serious and widespread are the fires in Manang Valley around Chame. The vegetation on the slopes and undergrowth in the forests are tinder dry, and the authorities say they have caught fire accidentally because of people grazing livestock, or gathering firewood.

The fire in Manang started as far back as 26 November, and has since spread into the Marsyangdi and Dudh Khola valleys.

Under-equipped Nepal Police and Army officials have been largely unsuccessful in controlling the fire, which is whipped up by high winds.

Efforts by local volunteers, Nepal Police, Nepal Army and Nepal Armed Police have been largely unsuccessful in controlling the fire whipped up by high winds because of lack of equipment, and because the blaze is fanned by strong up-valley afternoon winds.

Forest fire in Manang has been raging for over a month, after an unusually dry and warm winter.

Part of the rapidly spreading forest wildfire near Chame on Tuesday. In the past months it has destroyed over 700 hectares of forests rich in endangered wildlife and Hiamalayan plant species.

The fire has destroyed over 700 hectares of forest rich in endangered wildlife and Himalayan plant species.

The effect of the fires is visible even in satellite images. This NASA image (pictured below) taken at noon on 12 January shows smoke shrouding the river valleys of the Marsyangdi, Budi Gandaki, Bhote Kosi, Sun Kosi and the Arun.

The above image is a composite based on NASA Worldwide image and the Fire Information Resource Management System (FIRMS) both from 12 January.

The smoke is also blowing into Kathmandu Valley and it combined with the city’s own pollution and cross border smog on Tuesday afternoon to send the Air Quality Index soaring to above 200 in the ‘Very Unhealthy’ zone.

The satellite images also show ground fog covering the Tarai and Chitwan on Tuesday morning.

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Featured image: The fire in Manang started on 26 November and is still raging as seen in these pictures taken on Tuesday. Photos: NABIN LAMICHHANE/RSS

Why Pakistan Won’t be Next to Normalize with Israel

January 15th, 2021 by Prof. Efraim Inbar

The Abraham Accords have brought about peace between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain, with Sudan and Morocco also set to develop full diplomatic relations with Israel.

The guessing game is on as to which Arab or Muslim country night be next to recognize Israel. Pakistan is often mentioned in this regard and the Pakistani media have speculated about this too.

But near-term Pakistani-Israeli peace is unlikely because of Pakistani domestic constraints and Islamabad’s foreign policy orientation.

Public debate in Pakistan regarding an approach to Israel is not a new phenomenon, and it is no longer taboo to advocate for normalization of relations. The leader of Pakistan in 2003, General Pervez Musharraf, advocated publicly for warming relations with Israel.

In September 2005, Pakistani Foreign Minister Kurshid Kasiri met his Israeli counterpart Silvan Shalom in Istanbul – a rare public meeting – but it failed to thaw relations between the two countries.

There have been other secret meetings between leaders of the two countries. There are journalists and even religious leaders that have spoken publicly about the need for Pakistan to open up to Israel.

What is equally clear is the great opposition to rapprochement with Israel, particularly among various Islamist circles that carry considerable political weight.

Moreover, anti-Semitic convictions are widespread in Pakistan. According to a 2019 Pew poll, 74% of Pakistanis held unfavorable views of Jews.

The official government position requires “a just settlement” to the Palestinian issue before a change in policy towards the Jewish state can be considered.

Recently, Prime Minister Imran Khan even admitted to resisting pressures from the US (and another unidentified country believed to be Saudi Arabia) to establish diplomatic ties to Israel.

It remains unclear, however, whether the Pakistani political elite can emulate Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states in decoupling the Palestinian issue from the potential benefits of building ties to Israel. A corollary unknown is the ability of more pragmatic elements of the Pakistani political elite to act against popular sentiments.

Pakistan’s enmity towards Israel is of no real advantage to Pakistan. Arab states have not really supported Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. By boycotting Israel, Pakistan forfeits much needed Israeli expertise in agriculture, telecommunications, water management, medical services and high tech.

A relationship with Israel also could open doors in Washington, where Pakistan is increasingly under suspicion for cooperation with China and Islamist terrorists.

Pakistan should be under no illusion that Israel will give up what Narendra Modi has called “a strategic partnership” between India and Israel. The India-Israel tie involves strategic coordination, cooperation against terror, transfer of military technology, co-production of weapons, and arms sales.

Moreover, India is a huge and lucrative market for a variety of Israeli products and services. India is also a rising global power that in realpolitik terms is much more important than its western neighbor.

Finally, for Israel the alternative to India’s economic and strategic weight is China. China’s interactions with Israel are strictly limited to the economic realm due to American concerns about transfer of military or dual-use technology to its global rival.

The repeated discussions in Pakistan about ties with Israel are followed with interest only by the narrow Israeli foreign policy community. Most Israelis do no know much about Pakistan. Generally, its image is associated with Islamist terrorists that attacked, inter alia, Jewish targets in India in 2008.

The fact that Osama bin Laden found refuge in Pakistan reinforced this image. A growing number of Israelis, partly former backpacker hikers (over 20,000 per year), feel sympathy towards India, which is seen as the largest democracy displaying tolerance for Jews.

Nevertheless, Israel would welcome in principle any approach by an important Muslim state such as Pakistan. Israel always seeks to expand its international recognition and legitimacy.

Israel also has an interest in diluting the religious dimension of conflict in the ethno-religious Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In contrast to the more secular West, Israelis understand the importance of religious matters in politics.

A global coalition of more than 50 countries have this week pledged to protect over 30% of the planet’s lands and seas by the end of this decade. Their reasoning is clear: we need greater protection for nature, to prevent further extinctions and protect the life-sustaining ecosystems crucial to human survival.

The globally recognised tool to safeguard marine biodiversity is to designate a “marine protected area”. But not all protected areas are created equal.

The level of protection these areas provide depends on the activities permitted in their boundaries. For example, in “fully” protected areas, no plants or animals can be removed or harmed. Meanwhile, “partially” protected areas allow various extractive activities to occur, such as fishing and sometimes even mining.

Australia prides itself on having one of the largest marine protected area networks in the world, which includes iconic locations such as the Great Barrier Reef, Jervis Bay in New South Wales, Wilson’s Promontory in Victoria and Rottnest Island in Western Australia. But only one quarter of this network is fully protected.

The remaining three quarters are only partially protected, with vast areas allowing fishing, aquaculture and mining exploration. This is despite industrial-scale extraction of resources going against international guidelines for protected areas.

So why is this a problem? Our two recent research papers show partially protected areas don’t contribute much to wildlife conservation, yet take valuable conservation resources away from fully protected areas, which need them more.

The gap between fully and partially protected areas

Our landmark study, published today, looked at marine protected areas in southern Australia. We gathered social and ecological data, including conducting 439 interviews, across five states and 7,000 kilometres of coastline.

We found partially protected areas had no more fish, invertebrates or algae than unprotected areas. Fully protected areas, by comparison, had 30% more fish species and over twice the total weight of fish compared to unprotected areas.

We also found partially protected areas were no more of an attraction to locals and visitors than unprotected areas — they had similar numbers and mix of users, such as walkers, swimmers, fishers and divers.

On the other hand, fully protected areas were attractive to locals and visitors for their abundant wildlife and level of protection. They had twice as many divers and more than three times as many snorkelers compared to unprotected areas.

What’s more, swimmers, divers and snorkelers said they experience significantly more marine life in fully protected areas, but not partially protected areas.

Defying public expectations

Image on the right: A sea fan, part of the abundant wildlife in in Lord Howe Island. John Turnbull, Author provided via The Conversation

Red coral with scuba diver in the background

The Australian marine protected area network has been moving further away from public expectations. In a 2020 social study, researchers found Australians are generally confused about what activities are permitted in these areas.

Survey respondents were presented with the full list of activities allowed within partially protected areas, and asked to indicate which activities they understood to be permitted or prohibited within marine protected areas in Australia.

Overwhelmingly, they believed marine protected areas offer strict protection to the marine environment, preventing all types of extractive uses, including recreational fishing.

The majority of Australia’s marine protected area network allow for commercial fishing, but few respondents were aware of this. Fewer still were aware large areas permit destructive activities, such as bottom trawling, which can destroy the seabed. The research team also documented many cases where protection has been downgraded, such as the Solitary Islands and Jervis Bay Marine Parks in NSW.

It’s clear Australians expect the marine protected area network to adequately safeguard our unique wildlife. Yet these findings show their views are in stark contrast to the reality of marine environmental protection.

A matter of money

There are costs associated with partially protected areas – they consume conservation resources and occupy space that could otherwise be allocated to more effective protection. In fact, research from 2011 found areas with a mixture of partial and full protection are up to twice as expensive to manage than a simpler fully protected area.

Partially protected areas do have a role in our overall marine network, but they should be used for specific purposes such as enabling traditional management practices, protecting important breeding sites, or acting as buffer zones around fully protected areas.

The recent changes to Australia’s marine reserve networkrepresent an extremely worrying trend, as fully protected areas such as in the Coral Sea and Batemans Bay have been opened up to fishing.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of partially protected areas globally, at a time when we face increasing challenges from climate change and loss of biodiversity, the findings of our two recent Australian studies indicate we should be aiming for more fully protected areas, not less.

If the world is to protect 30% of all lands and seas by the end of this decade, those protected areas need to be monitored closely to ensure they are delivering on their goals and expectations.

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Authors:

Postdoctoral research associate, UNSW

Lecturer Head, Cook Research Group; School of Biological Sciences , Monash University

Professor and Dean of Science, UNSW

, Senior Research Associate in Ecology, UNSW

Post doctoral researcher at the School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences, Stony Brook University (The State University of New York)

Featured image: Purple dragon (Flabellina rubrolineata) in Nelson Bay. Fully protected areas have 30% more marine life than unprotected areas. John Turnbull, Author provided via The Conversation

Will Costs Continue to Cage Laos’ Regional Connectivity?

January 15th, 2021 by Buavanh Vilavong

This article was originally published in January 2018 by East Asia Forum.

Laos is among the fastest growing economies in Southeast Asia: economic growth has averaged 7.8 per cent over the past decade. Despite the slow recovery of the global economy, the country’s growth rate was 6.9 per cent in 2017 and is expected to be 7 per cent in 2018. This is buoyed by an expansion in electricity production, manufacturing and agriculture, and it occurs despite a slight drop in tourist arrivals.

Merchandise trade in Laos has expanded 20 per cent annually on average over the past ten years. But Laos conducts most of this trade with its immediate neighbours: Thailand, China and Vietnam account for 85 per cent of Lao trade volume. This is primarily because Laos is the only landlocked nation in the region, and being landlocked raises international trade costs by up to 50 per cent. As such, an improvement in transport connectivity is critical for Laos’ development.

Even when landlocked status is put to one side, insufficient transport infrastructure is one of the biggest challenges for Laos. At present, road transport is the dominant mode of transport, constituting 70 per cent of the country’s total freight traffic. Laos has no significant rail or water transport.

Laos has leveraged its geopolitical situation to transform the country’s position from being ‘landlocked’ to ‘land-linked’. The construction of the Lao–Chinese railway began in December 2016. The cost of this mega-project is expected to reach US$6 billion; 70 per cent will be funded by China and the remainder will be funded by Laos. This 427 kilometre railway link is foreseen to be finished by 2021 and will form part of the Kunming–Singapore pan-regional connectivity route, which was 12 per cent complete as of November 2017.

Laos is also working with Vietnam to prioritise the construction of a 600 kilometre rail link between its capital Vientiane and Vietnam’s seaport Vung Ang. This project aims to improve Laos’ access to the sea. Both countries also plan to construct a six-lane highway to connect their two capitals — another mega project that will cost US$4.5 billion.

These projects add to the regional connectedness efforts that Laos has already made with Thailand and Myanmar. The first Lao–Thai Friendship Bridge, which was partially financed by the Australian government, began operations in 1994. Four international bridges over the Mekong now connect Laos’ capital and other economically important cities to Thailand. These friendship bridges now extend to more nations than Thailand: Laos opened its first friendship bridge with Myanmar in May 2015.

Although transport infrastructure is expected to improve thanks to investments in the pipeline (including a railway link from China), Laos was among the world’s bottom 10 in a recent survey on logistics performance. The country’s overall ‘logistics performance index’ (a weighted average of key ease-of-shipping indices) was 2.07 in 2016, which is down from 2.39 in 2014. Laos remained behind all other ASEAN members in almost all aspects including efficiency in border clearance, trade and transport infrastructure and logistics competence. The only areas where Laos did not score last were timeliness and international shipments, in which Laos scored comparably to Myanmar.

According to the Japan External Trade Organization, Laos has the highest logistics costs in the region. It costs US$2500 to ship a 40 foot container from Vientiane to Yokohama compared with US$1200 from Phnom Penh or US$1000 from Hanoi. The cost of transit from Vientiane to Bangkok is US$1700, of which 40 per cent is attributed to clearing customs and transport-related procedures at the Lao–Thai border checkpoint.

This highlights the critical importance of improving not only transport infrastructure but also administrative efficiency in order to better connect Laos to the region and restore growth to its historical average. Hence, customs modernisation efforts are underway particularly in the organisation of clearance procedures. A chief example is the introduction of the UN-designed Automated System for Customs Data, which has reduced the time for customs clearance.

It is essential that the current efforts continue in order to boost customs enforcement and to ensure effective regulation, as trade volumes are expected to increase when the ASEAN Economic Community (which was officially launched in December 2015) begins operating in full swing.

Improved regional connectivity will also help Laos compete internationally. Production networks are becoming a prominent feature of global trade. The associated dispersion of manufacturing across different countries to exploit locational advantages presents opportunities for Laos to tap into segments of regional supply chains appropriate to its level of development. But this will be only be possible if Laos has the necessary connectivity infrastructure.

Laos is already engaged with production networks in food processing and garments. It has also begun to tap into other elements of labour-intensive assembly such as electronics components, lens polishing, medical equipment and automotive wire harness. Laos needs to reduce its logistics costs before it can further connect to entrenched regional networks of production.

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This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2017 in review and the year ahead.

Buavanh Vilavong is a PhD candidate at the Crawford School of Public Policy, the Australian National University.

Featured image is from East Asia Forum

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