Japan’s Nuclear Revival in a Race Against Time

August 31st, 2022 by Scott Foster

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Japanese Prime Minister Kishida has expressed support for investigations that will probably lead to the first construction of new nuclear power plants in Japan in over a decade.

The obvious goal is to reduce reliance on imported fossil fuels and exposure to the wild vacillations of oil and gas prices. But also behind the move is the need to reactivate nuclear power plant construction before the manufacturing expertise that makes it possible is lost.

If the decision is ultimately taken, it would mark a fundamental shift in the policy to reduce Japan’s dependence on nuclear power that has prevailed since the Fukushima disaster in 2011.

Speaking to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry’s (METI) Green Transformation Project on August 24, Kishida said Japan should restart more of the nuclear power plants shut down after Fukushima, extend their operating lifetimes and make a political decision regarding the development and construction of new next-generation nuclear power plants.

Kishida told the Green Transformation Project’s executive council to present a report on its conclusions by year-end, of which METI is expected to fill in the details. The policy change appears to be coming just in time to avoid the loss of Japan’s technical expertise in generating nuclear power.

In July, the president of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF), Shiro Arai, met with media representatives to talk about the organization’s “proposal on maintaining and strengthening [nuclear power] supply chains” and to convey the results of a survey of 154 suppliers conducted in the second half of 2021.

JAIF is an association made up of Japanese nuclear power companies, electric power companies, electronics manufacturers, construction companies, trading companies, banks, universities, research institutes, mass media and local governments.

Its stated purpose is “To contribute to the sound development of the national economy… by promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy.”

Compared with 2010, only 22% of survey respondents said that their nuclear power-related sales had been increasing, while 48% said they had been decreasing. Around 56% said that the suspension of nuclear power plant operations had made it difficult to maintain their technological capabilities.

The shadow of the 2011 nuclear disaster at Fukushima has long hung over Japan’s nuclear energy sector but new energy realities may be forcing a reset. Photo: Photo: TEPCO / JIJI Press

According to a JAIF statement, Arai himself noted that “resumed construction [of nuclear power plants] could not be carried out within budget and according to schedule… if construction… had been suspended for a decade….”

It went on: “…the longer the blank period becomes, the longer it would take to recover technological capabilities.”

Japan last put a nuclear power plant – the Tomari 3 reactor in Hokkaido – into commercial operation 13 years ago, in 2009. Since then, Japan’s nuclear power industry has survived on maintenance work and decommissioning.

According to JAIF, R&D spending has dropped by about half and more than 20 suppliers have exited the business. Senior engineers have retired, the number of young trainees has declined and none of them have gained experience from working on reactor construction projects.

Japan has three nuclear power plant general contractors: Toshiba, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and Hitachi.

Toshiba’s prolonged and difficult restructuring has dominated news about the company but it retains its nuclear technologies, which include design, construction, maintenance, decommissioning, fuel reprocessing, waste treatment and next-generation reactor R&D. It is working on a small mobile reactor for local utilities and a small sodium-cooled reactor.

In early June, Toshiba announced a collaboration with American engineering company Bechtel to supply turbines and generators for Poland’s first nuclear power plant.

MHI specializes in pressurized (light) water reactors, 24 of which have been built in Japan and which are reportedly favored in METI’s draft plans for future nuclear power plant construction. It is also exploring advanced technologies including fusion energy.

MHI has exported nuclear power plant components to the US, Brazil, Europe, Korea and China. An MHI-led nuclear power plant construction project in Turkey was canceled in 2018 due to cost overruns.

Hitachi has a long-term commitment to nuclear power that is reinforced by its joint ventures with General Electric, Hitachi-GE Nuclear Energy in Japan and GE Hitachi Nuclear Energy (GEH) overseas. In addition to GE, Hitachi is working with Bill Gates’s Terra Power.

Like Toshiba and MHI, Hitachi has a wide range of nuclear power technologies, but its next-generation projects are more advanced.

A GE Hitachi blueprint model for a new generation small modular nuclear power plant in Ontario, Canada. Image: GE Hitachi

Hitachi was forced to abandon a nuclear power plant construction project in the UK in 2020 due to insufficient government and private sector financial support.

In addition, Japanese engineering company JGC and industrial machinery maker Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) have invested in and are working with NuScale Power, the US designer of small modular nuclear reactors.

JGC will provide engineering, procurement and construction services for small modular reactors in cooperation with its long-standing American partner, Fluor Corporation, which is NuScale’s majority shareholder. IHI will provide containment structures for reactor cores and other components.

Japan also has a venture company spun out of Kyoto University that is dedicated to solving global warming through the development of nuclear fusion energy. Kyoto Fusioneering develops fusion reactor technologies including materials, components and power generation systems, and provides engineering and design support to customers in Japan and overseas.

Japan’s private sector is well ahead of its politicians with the technology and experience needed to revitalize and upgrade the nation’s nuclear power industry and is already playing a significant role in developing next-generation nuclear energy technologies.

It would be a shame if the Japanese government moves too slowly for this expertise to be put to full and efficient use.

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***

The government of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has just reached 100 days, a time to assess its performance.

Looking at foreign policy, the question is whether there has been continuity or change from the policies of prior governments. The correct answer is usually both.

Commentators will rightly say there has been great continuity on international policy with no revolutionary change in direction. As Minister for Foreign Affairs Penny Wong recently said,

I have made clear that our national interests, our strategic policy settings haven’t changed – but obviously the government has, and how the government approaches engaging with the world and articulating those interests has changed.

So where can we see this change?

Increased international engagement

The first change is in the simple volume of international engagement. The day after he was sworn in, Albanese was in Tokyo for the Quad Leaders’ Summit, quickly followed by his first bilateral visit to Indonesia.

Wong has made four separate trips to the Pacific (Fiji, Samoa and Tonga, New Zealand and Solomon Islands, as well as July’s Pacific Islands Forum Summit) and three to Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia twice).

Minister for Defence Richard Marles has visited Singapore, India, the United States and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Rwanda. And Minister for Trade Don Farrell was busy in Geneva with the WTO Ministerial Conference and bilateral meetings.

Some of this activity is due to the fortuitous timing of international meetings, but the rest is a conscious choice to prioritise international engagement. It suggests a certain amount of pent-up energy among new ministers with much on their agendas after so long in opposition.

The overall impression is of a government focused on international matters, which has perhaps adopted the mindset that external policy is as important as domestic policy. Albanese defended his trip to the NATO summit and Ukraine saying,

we can’t separate international events from their impact on Australia and Australians.

Resetting key relationships

The second change is a reset in some key relationships. Every new government should use the opportunity to get rid of barnacles that have attached themselves to the ship of state.

This was most notable in the reset in relations with France, still seething from the cancellation of its submarine construction deal in favour of AUKUS, the trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The diplomatic freeze with China was broken by the two ministers for defence meeting at the Shangri-La Dialogue and the ministers for foreign affairs meeting soon after. This was presented as “stabilising the relationship”, with the government stressing that there has been no change in policy position.

Changes in climate, Pacific and South-East Asia

Third, there has been a substantive policy change on climate action. This has had an impact on Australia’s international relations, particularly in the Pacific, where there had been no secret about Pacific leaders’ disappointment in Australia’s lack of climate ambition.

Only four days after being sworn in, Wong spoke to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat to herald “a new era in Australian engagement in the Pacific” based on standing “shoulder to shoulder with our Pacific family” in response to the climate crisis.

Pacific leaders including the prime ministers of Samoa and Tonga welcomed this policy shift. While it won’t all be plain sailing ahead – with Australia likely to continue to face pressure around the speed of its transition away from fossil fuels – relations are much more positive.

Fourth, there has been a change in tone on some issues. For example, in South-east Asia former Prime Minister Morrison’s framing around an “arc of autocracies” was viewed as proposing a binary choice between democratic and authoritarian blocs. The Albanese government’s messaging emphasises “strategic equilibrium” where “countries are not forced to choose but can make their own sovereign choices, including about their alignments and partnerships”.

Increasing Australia’s international capability

Finally, the government is beginning the hard work of increasing Australia’s international capability across all tools of statecraft. It has announced a Defence Strategic Review and is updating its International Development Policy.

The government has also committed to building the capability of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade after decades of declining funding. Allan Gyngell, National President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), sees this as a significant change:

“After years of marginalisation, foreign policy has been restored to a more central part of Australian statecraft.”

Long-term goals

Overall, after the flurry of early visits, the Albanese government gives the impression of a government settling in for the long-term.

Looking back on nine years of the previous government – with three prime ministers creating a sense of constant campaign mode – domestic politics often seemed to dominate. The new government gives the impression it is building relationships for the long-term – three, six or more years.

In its first frenetic days, the Albanese government took the opportunity to reset some key relationships. Now it’s all about steadily building these relationships and the capability to enable Australia to pursue its national interests in the long-term.

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Honorary Fellow, Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne

Featured image is from Republic World

Beggars in Surplus: Australia’s University Gangsters

August 31st, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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With the election of a new government in Australia in May, the begging bowls were being readied by administrators in the university sector.  Bloated, ungainly, ruthless and uneven in quality, the country’s universities, for the most part, had inadvertently made their case for more public funding harder.  Initially ravaged by poor investment decisions, notably in the Chinese market, COVID-19 had threatened to wipe the balance sheets of a good number of Australia’s academic institutions.  Despite initial shocks, the storm has been, apart from a few institutions, weathered.

The University of Sydney registered a A$1.04 billion operating surplus between 2020 and 2021, with an underlying surplus of A$454 million.  The University of New South Wales (UNSW) reported a A$306 million surplus in 2021, a considerable improvement from its A$19 million loss in 2020.  The University of Technology Sydney recorded revenue amounting to A$109 million, shading their $50 million loss from 2020 into oblivion.

Such surpluses would surely suggest the viability of pay rises for staff, an important point in pay negotiations with stingy university managements.  “There’s no excuse for university management to be hoarding money in such proportions,” reasons the National Tertiary Education Union branch president Nick Riemer.  “People at the university are crying out for much-needed reforms.  This shows they are affordable.”

NTEU New South Wales Secretary Damien Cahill has also added his view that a number of universities, notably University of Sydney, “can afford a fair pay rise for staff and to fix the problem of widespread job insecurity.”

The response from the non-teaching, non-research blotter jotters was characteristic.  Such ballooning amounts were seen as unusual, one-off cases, arrows out of the blue.  Around the corner, revenue stripping disasters await.  The pot of gold needed protection, not distribution.

University of Sydney’s Vice Chancellor Mark Scott led the pack with that ill-worn argument.  “While this is a strong result, it is also a one-off result,” he claimed in a statement.  “We are not immune from the continuing uncertain future of international higher education and the growing cost pressures currently affecting the global and Australian economies.”

The University’s own annual report notes how the surplus came about “mainly due to increases in overseas student enrolments, strong investment performance and non-recurring items including the Commonwealth Government’s A$95.1 million Research Support Program contribution and the net gains from the disposal of property assets.”

The picture is one of corporate brands raking in cash rather than educators providing a public service.  Some 38 of Australia’s universities, for instance, drew revenue from selling their shareholdings in IDP Education, considered one of the world’s largest international education companies.  Prior to the sale, Australian universities held a 40% stake in IDP Education, retained via Education Australia.

While operating surpluses have been registered aplenty, job losses have been unremitting.  Thousands of staff have been given the big heave-ho and sod off treatment even as managers have continued feathering their nests.  (All in all, 3,237 fewer permanent and fixed-term contract staff positions were noted in the latest federal government figures.)

The University of NSW topped the league tables in that regard, with 726 fewer full-time equivalent positions in 2021 than the previous year.  The University of Sydney shed 223 staff despite recording its best surplus in 172 years.  The measure served to reduce employee-related expenses by A$60 million.

To these job losses can be added those suffered by the invaluable, long suffering casual workforce.  In a shameful state of affairs, this precarious body of workers, with minimal labour protections and economic security, constitute the vast bulk of those delivering courses.  Prior to the pandemic, the number of casual employees working in Australia’s universities is estimated to have been in the order of 100,000.  Losses of 4,258 full-time equivalents in 2020 were registered, but other higher assessments abound.

Before this spectacle of inequity basks that species of lamentable administrator known as the Vice Chancellor.  The Australian variants of this office have persistently proven to be untrustworthy and unworthy.  For years, their obscene pay packages, their decisions to reduce able staff while still maintaining their own inflated salaries and the tribunate that surrounds them, deserved an anti-corruption inquiry.

The scope of such an inquiry would have to be oceanic and vast, from teasing out the grounds for ludicrous investment choices to rules stifling free speech and academic freedoms.  Along the way, the habitual resort to non-disclosure agreements, the use of codes of conduct as silencing bludgeons, and the almost total absence of solid anti-whistleblower provisions, could be looked at.

Instead of being interrogated by appropriate QCs and chased up with a sharp summons, these managers only grow in number, the mold of administrative disaster, undermining academic health at every turn and creating the next absurd brand they call a “university”.  With each semester, new positions are created with names disturbingly reminiscent of industrial cleaning products: DVCs, PVCs, Deputy PVCs and what not.  These fatuous appointments are subsidised, in turn, by the labours of ailing, overworked staff, contemplating ruination, dejection, and suicide.

The education system has been in sharp decline in inverse proportion to the financial returns being hailed.  Throwing public money at these beggars in surplus, an otherwise sensible proposition that could shield the sector from the ravages of impudent investment decisions, looks less appealing on closer inspection.  Without deep, remorselessly brave reform, one that directly decapitates the officialdom of university management, good money will be thrown after ill-gotten gains.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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Australia: Shaq Dunks the Voice

August 30th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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***

August 27, Sydney.  The scale was jaw dropping and amusing.  There he was, the still fresh Labor Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, rendered pygmy-like by the enormity of one Shaquille O’Neal, popularly known as Shaq.  No degree of expert photography at this press conference could conceal the disparity in size between the two.

Albanese has made it his crowning ambition to campaign for the Voice.  By that, he means to put to Australian voters a question on constitutionally recognising Australia’s First Nations peoples (admirable and irrefutable) and enshrining a vague, as yet undetermined political forum that will represent them (problematic).  He hopes to get popular consent to alter the Constitution first without necessarily putting a model to the vote, a distinctly brave proposition.

Opponents and sceptics have been lingering in the bushes, but the appearance of Shaq provided grist to the mill.  While movie stars, tartlets and personalities find their mark in the politics of some countries (the Philippines comes to mind), Australia remains unaroused by the tinsel and bling.  Generally speaking, the celebrity factor duds when it comes to proposing substantive political change.

As much as Australians love their sports stars and, less significantly, their film stars, using them to promote an agenda that might result in votes reeks of shallowness and condescension.  When combined with finger pointing moral authority, the voter in question is bound to switch off and drop out.  This did not cross Albanese’s mind.  “Shaq is someone who is well known to younger people, and one of things that we have been doing is trying to mobilise support for the Voice to Parliament by talking with sporting figures.”

The antics of the Albanese-O’Neal show, however innocently done, served to emphasise political distance, not collective worth.  It suggested a deal in the making, one to be refined behind closed doors away from the curious mob.  “[I]f there is anything you need from me, let me know,” Shaq offered the Australian prime minister before the cameras.  This might well work for a certain demographic of green salad voter but unlikely to interest the pragmatically suspicious sort.

The event did not even feature anything profound from the titanic figure.  The focus was all about having him there.  “We know that Mr O’Neal does a lot of work in the United States about social justice and lifting people up who are marginalised, including through sporting organisations,” stated Albanese.

This is undoubtedly true as a statement, but the inference here is that local Australians involved in such projects simply don’t cut the mustard or, if they do, need something of a hand up.  Marvellous it may be that “Shaq has that record” and realises “that Australian history didn’t begin in 1788”, such celebrities can hardly be seen as high authorities of cerebration.  They could even come across as nosey meddlers.

The waft of condescension did not take long to find a number of keen and irate noses. “Anybody else uncomfortable that our PM needs to hall [sic] in an American basketball star to shill for the Voice?” wondered the cranky former Senator Derry Hynch.

Always happy to screech his agreement with the next contrarian spark, Barnaby Joyce MP of the Nationals also claimed that O’Neal had few, if any credentials, to talk about such matters.  “Why are we having a multi-millionaire American basketball star… over here to talk about how we run our Constitution?”

Presumably, the cynic might retort, because you don’t run it, the true locus of power lying with her Britannic majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, exercised via her representative, the Governor General.  The rest is left to the discretion of US power.  All is fair and mockery when you are a monarchical outpost and Washington’s bit of rough.

Harder to dispel was the question from Joyce as to whether something serious had unfolded.  “Are we selling McDonald’s here or are we changing the Constitution?”  It had to also come to a matter of size – or height.  “Why have you got an American basketball star standing at the podium about 10 feet taller than Anthony Albanese, I mean what’s this about?”

Had the grunts and grumbles remained confined to a few conservatives of pallid disposition, nothing more would have been said.  Albanese, for his part, could only see the value of the show.  Shaq “approached me and I think people should chill out a bit basically.”  The star’s appearance meant conversation about the Voice, “and that’s a good thing.”

But certain First Nations politicians refused to chill.  Victorian Senator Lidia Thorpe preferred boiling, launching her own salvo of dissatisfaction from the perspective of the First Nations who were seemingly placed in a runner-up position relative to a US sporting star.  “Labor met with an American celebrity before speaking with First Nations politicians from this Country.  Not once has Labor reached out to me to discuss the Voice. Still waiting, Labor.”

In an interview with Melbourne radio station 3AW, she kept the fusillades coming.  “He’s putting his nose into business that has nothing to do with him.”  Shaq, she suggested, did “not understand what is going on in this country and he should not be commenting”.  Thorpe continued to note that the basketball figure was “here for a speaking tour, good on him” while also promoting PointsBet “which is about gambling which is about destroying families.”

Of different political persuasion but also of First Nations sensibility, Country Liberal Party Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price found herself in furious agreement, a rare sight indeed.  “If the PM and the Minister for Indigenous Australians thinks Shaq’s experience with ‘lifting people up who are marginalised’ is the answer to winning Yes votes for the Voice then it demonstrates just how clueless and out of touch they both are with what the needs of Aboriginal Australians are.”

From this, an echo of the Republican campaign that failed so spectacularly in 1999 can be discerned.  Then, the papers, media outlets, pundits and lobbyists thought the Australian Republic in the bag.  In the final referendum outcome, it barely fitted.  A key, and failed figure then, was Malcolm Turnbull of the Australian Republican Movement.  In his company were the authorial-thespian-professional class who thought victory a foregone conclusion.  The Constitutional Monarchists, and the devious conservative Prime Minister at the time, John Howard, thought otherwise.

Since then, Turnbull entered parliament, became a victim of his own party’s malice, but not before arguing against the Voice.  The fact that he is now in favour of it should worry Albanese, given his past misreading of the Australian mood.  Down under, celebrity figures, actual and pretend, can kill worthwhile political causes.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Copyright AAP Image via TDPel Media

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***

The world of trade is having interesting developments.

An AP report from Seoul said:

South Korea landed a 3 trillion won ($2.25 billion) contract with a Russian state-run nuclear energy company to provide components and construct a turbine building for Egypt’s first nuclear power plant, officials said Thursday.

The South Koreans hailed the deal as a triumph for their nuclear power industry, although it made for awkward optics as their American allies push an economic pressure campaign to isolate Russia over its war on Ukraine.

South Korean officials said the U.S. was consulted in advance about the deal and that the technologies being supplied by Seoul for the project would not clash with international sanctions against Russia.

According to South Korea’s presidential office and trade ministry, the contract between state-run Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power and ASE requires the South Koreans to provide certain materials and equipment and construct the turbine building of the plant being built in Dabaa. The Mediterranean coastal town is located about 130 kilometers (80 miles) northwest of Cairo.

ASE is a subsidiary of Rosatom, a state-owned Russian nuclear conglomerate.

A senior aide of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol said the negotiations were slowed by “unexpected variables,” mainly Russia’s war on Ukraine and the U.S.-led sanctions campaign against Moscow over its aggression.

Choi Sang-mok, Yoon’s senior secretary for economic affairs, said South Korea provided an explanation to the United States in advance about its plans to participate in the Dabaa project and that the allies will maintain close consultation as the work proceeds. As part of U.S.-led sanctions against Moscow, South Korea has ended transactions with Russia’s central bank and sovereign wealth funds and banned exports of strategic materials to Russia.

Neither Choi nor officials from South Korea’s trade ministry elaborated on how the crisis in Ukraine and the sanctions on Moscow affected the negotiations between Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power and ASE, which has a contract with Egypt to build four 1,200 megawatt reactors.

Choi stressed that South Korea’s involvement in the project would not clash with international sanctions against Russia.

Yoon’s office expressed hope that South Korea’s participation in the Dabaa project would help the country gain a foothold in future nuclear projects across Africa and also improve its chances to export to countries such as the Czech Republic, Poland and Saudi Arabia.

Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power had been engaging in negotiations with ASE as the preferred bidder for the turbine-related project since December, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February.

Go Myong-hyun, a senior analyst at Seoul’s Asan Institute for Policy Studies, said the deal would not have been possible without an export approval by the U.S. as the components provided by Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power likely include U.S.-originated technology.

Current sanctions against Moscow also do not include specific restrictions related to nuclear energy and the Biden administration would have no interest in disrupting a crucial project for Egypt, which it sees as a key partner in the region, Go said.

While South Korea’s involvement in the Dabaa project would not immediately be a problem between the allies if the Americans signed off on it, things could change depending on how Russia’s war on Ukraine goes and whether Washington expands export controls against Moscow, Go said.

Yoon’s office said the participation in the Dabaa project is the country’s biggest export of nuclear power technology since 2009, when a South Korean-led consortium won a $20 billion contract to build nuclear power reactors in the United Arab Emirates.

Yoon government has set a goal of exporting 10 nuclear power reactors by 2030.

U.S. Warns Of Sanctions Against Turkey Over Russia Ties

Another media report said:

Turkey’s top business association has confirmed receiving a letter from the U.S. Treasury warning of possible sanctions if it continues doing business with Russia.

Washington is growing increasingly alarmed that the Russian government and businesses are using Turkey to evade Western financial and trading restrictions imposed in response to the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine six months ago.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin agreed to step up economic cooperation at a summit in the Black Sea resort of Sochi earlier this month.

Official data show the value of Turkish exports to Russia between May and July growing by nearly 50 percent from last year’s figure.

Turkey’s imports of Russian oil are ballooning and the two sides have agreed to transition to ruble payments for the natural gas exported by the Kremlin-tied giant Gazprom.

U.S. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Wally Adeyemo paid a rare visit to Ankara and Istanbul in June to express Washington’s worries that Russian oligarchs and big businesses were using Turkish entities to avoid Western sanctions.

NATO member Turkey — on good terms with both Moscow and Kyiv — has tried to stay neutral in the conflict and refused to join the international sanctions regime.

Adeyemo followed that up with a letter to Turkey’s TUSIAD business association and the American Chamber of Commerce in Turkey warning that companies and banks were in danger of being sanctioned themselves.

TUSIAD said in a statement on Tuesday that is has passed on the letter to Turkey’s foreign and finance ministries.

The letter’s contents were first reported by The Wall Street Journal this week.

“Any individuals or entities providing material support to US-designated persons are themselves at risk of US sanctions,” Adeyemo wrote.

“Turkish banks cannot expect to establish corresponding relationships with sanctioned Russian banks and retain their corresponding relationships with major global banks as well as access to the US dollar and other major currencies.”

The economic cooperation agreement sealed by Erdogan and Putin includes a deal for more Turkish banks to start processing Russia’s Mir payments system.

Turkish officials have not formally responded to Adeyemo’s letter.

Broader cooperation with Russia could help support Turkey’s ailing economy in the runup to next-year’s general election.

Erdogan has previously argued that Ankara cannot join Western sanctions on Moscow because of Turkey’s heavy dependence on Russian oil and natural gas imports.

“Our economy is such that imposing sanctions on Russia would harm Turkey the most,” Erdogan’s foreign policy adviser Ibrahim Kalin said in June.

Russia And Iran Move To Create Global Gas Cartel

Moscow and Tehran are taking serious steps toward forming an OPEC-style cartel for natural gas that would allow them to coordinate an ‘extraordinary’ proportion of reserves and control over prices, OilPrice reported on Tuesday.

“Occupying the number one and number two positions in the world’s largest gas reserves table, respectively – Russia with just under 48 trillion cubic meters (tcm) and Iran with nearly 34 tcm – the two countries are in an ideal position to do this,” the report stated.

It described the $40 billion memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed last month between Russia’s Gazprom and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) as “a stepping stone to enabling Russia and Iran to implement their long-held plan to be the core participants in a global cartel for gas suppliers in the same mold as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) for oil suppliers.”

The chairman of Iran’s Oil, Gas, and Petrochemical Products Exporters’ Union, Hamid Hosseini, reportedly said after the MoU had been signed: “Now the Russians have come to the conclusion that the consumption of gas in the world will increase and the tendency towards consumption of LNG has increased and they alone are not able to meet the world’s demand, so there is no room left for gas competition.”

According to OilPrice, major global LNG supplier Qatar – which has the third-largest gas reserves of just under 24 tcm – could be a prime candidate to join the Russia-Iran gas cartel.

Together, Russia, Iran and Qatar account for just under 60% of the world’s gas reserves, the report pointed out. The three countries were instrumental in the founding of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), whose 11 members control over 71% of global gas reserves, 44% of its marketed production, 53% of its gas pipelines, and 57% of its LNG exports, it said.

China’s Spending On Russian Energy Imports Shoots Up To $35 Billion Since The Outbreak Of The Ukraine War

China’s spending on energy imports from Russia has hit $35 billion for the months since the Ukraine war started, as the Asian powerhouse turns to Moscow for fuel.

That outlay on Russian energy from March to July is a big jump on the $20 billion booked a year before, according to a Bloomberg report Monday.

In July alone, Chinese buyers laid out a combined $7.2 billion on imports of oil, natural gas and coal, according to customs data cited by Bloomberg. That’s a rise of 53% from the $4.7 billion booked in the same month in 2021.

Energy prices soared since the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia war, and that will have inflated China’s spending figures. But the country has also imported higher volumes of Russian crude oil, natural gas, and coal since the war began, according to China’s General Administration of Customs.

A Business insider report said:

China has stepped up its spending as western countries impose sanctions against Putin and Russia. The US has vowed to phase out Russian oil imports, while the EU will introduce an embargo on Russian crude in December.

Moscow has offered its oil exports at a discount to buyers in Asia, as it searches for customers in the face of Western sanctions.

China’s state and independent refineries have jumped on the opportunity to snap up cheap crude, with Russian Urals oil trading at a 22% discount to the global Brent benchmark.

Seaborne imports to China of liquefied natural gas have risen 20% over the past year, with Russia sending 410,000 tons by tanker in July, according to Bloomberg.

Meanwhile, imports of Russian coal surged 14% year-on-year to hit a new record high of 7.4 million tons in July. Russia has now overtaken Indonesia as China’s top source for the fuel imports.

China Forgives 23 Unpaid Loans to 17 African Nations, Readies $10 Billion in Credit

Another media report said:

Chinese Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi revealed recently that Beijing would forgive a substantial amount of debt owed to its financial institutions by African nations. China has been accused by Western powers of predatory lending to poorer nations and using their debts to compel them to adopt pro-Beijing positions.

The Chinese Foreign Ministry announced on August 18 at the Coordinators’ Meeting on the Implementation of the Follow-up Actions of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Beijing. Among other actions, it said that “China will waive 23 interest-free loans for 17 African countries that matured by the end of 2021.”

However, the announcement did not state the volume of debt that had been forgiven.

Debt forgiveness has been a regular feature of China’s financial relationship with Africa, and because it refuses to meddle in the political affairs of its lender nations, China is rapidly becoming the lender of choice on the continent.

“Over the past half a year, over $3 billion out of the $10 billion of credit facilities pledged to African financial institutions has been delivered, and nearly $2.5 billion of loans has been channeled to Africa’s priority programs,” said Wang, who chaired the FOCAC meeting. “More than $2 billion of the $10 billion of trade finance has been allocated, and China’s import of African goods in 7 months has reached $70.6 billion.”

“So far this year, China has signed with 12 African countries exchanges of letters on zero tariff for 98% of their export items to China. Chinese companies have invested [an] additional $2.17 billion in Africa. The Chinese side is prepared to re-channel, through the International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust and Resilience and Sustainability Trust, $10 billion of its Special Drawing Rights to Africa, and will encourage the IMF to direct China’s contributions to Africa,” he added.

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China’s Growing Military Might

August 26th, 2022 by Brian Berletic

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What many in the West at first dismissed as a tantrum thrown by Beijing over the unauthorized visit of US Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan appears instead to be a carefully thought-out strategy designed to incrementally reassert Chinese sovereignty over the island territory. Beijing’s ability to do this is underwritten by the nation’s growing military might.

Through a unique and powerful missile arsenal to a capable and growing air force, navy, and ground force, China has created the means through which to reverse decades of injustice, encroachment, and encirclement by the West against the Chinese people and their territory. Even Western analysts and military experts admit that China’s military capabilities have grown to world-class levels. These capabilities will be key to achieving and defending Chinese sovereignty now and into the future, through deterrence if possible, or through force if necessary.

The Long Sword: China’s Missile Force

Throughout human history weapons have been used to give a fighting force a greater reach than their adversaries. Be it sword, spear, or arrow, those with the longest and most effective reach often dominate the battlefield. On today’s battlefield, this reach is achieved through missiles.

China’s modern missile forces are the largest and most capable on Earth according to even Western analysts. Through a combination of long, medium, intermediate, and short range missiles as well as a variety of cruise missiles, China has the ability to hit targets near and far.

The US government and arms industry-funded Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) through its “China Power” project wrote a paper titled, “How Are China’s Land-based Conventional Missile Forces Evolving?,” which admitted:

Conventionally armed (non-nuclear) missiles have become an increasingly important component of military power. They can be employed to deter threats or project power hundreds or thousands of kilometers away. As part of sweeping efforts to modernize the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China has developed one of the most powerful land-based conventional missile arsenals in the world.

The same paper would also admit:

According to the US Department of Defense (DoD), China’s missile forces in 2000 “were generally of short range and modest accuracy.” In the years since then, China has developed the world’s “largest and most diverse” arsenal of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles.

The PLA Rocket Force, which maintains and operates China’s land-based conventional and nuclear missiles, has fielded multiple new missile systems over the last several years. Many of these missiles are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear payloads.

The paper describes cruise missiles able to hit land targets anywhere on potential battlefields like Taiwan, carrier-killer missiles reportedly able to target and destroy US carrier groups, and hypersonic missiles that can penetrate the most advanced Western missile defense systems. Even without the ability to penetrate Western missile defenses, the sheer number of Chinese missiles could saturate and overwhelm them.

China’s missile forces have been built up specifically to keep the United States and its allies from building up military forces along its periphery and thus threaten Chinese territorial integrity. Together with Chinese air defenses and anti-ship systems, China has assembled formidable anti-access, area denial (A2AD) capabilities that would prevent US military forces from even reaching Chinese targets let alone engaging them.

It is also worth noting that China has developed significantly capable multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) in the form of its Type PCL191. It fires more rockets than its US counterparts, fires them further, and with at least as much accuracy guided by China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System.

A Business Insider article titled, “China’s new rocket launcher system is its most powerful ever, and it’s looming over the Taiwan Strait,” would note:

The system is capable of firing eight 370 mm rockets a distance of 350 km or two 750 mm ballistic missiles 500 km.

This means that China’s MLRS capabilities can reach any location in or around Taiwan from the mainland. In fact the bulk of any potential Chinese military operation regarding Taiwan and potential US intervention can be carried out from the mainland with China’s extensive and capable missile and rocket forces.

The Shield: Chinese A2AD

Russian military operations in Ukraine have been defined by Russia’s own long range fires as well as A2AD. It’s premier S-400 air defense system exists at the top of an ecosystem of other shorter range air defenses that when networked and layered make the air space they protect virtually impenetrable. Together with long range strike weapons like artillery and short-range ballistic missiles like the Iskander, there is nowhere for Ukrainian forces to hide and certainly no way for them to advance into Russia positions. By moving these capabilities forward, Russia has been incrementally securing territory from the regime in Kiev.

Not only has China emulated many tactics and strategies from Russia, it has also outright purchased the best the Russian Federation has to offer. Between 2018-2020 China purchased two regiments of Russia’s S-400 systems. China also produces a wide variety of its own air defense systems based on the Russian S-300, Russia’s Tor system, as well as systems incorporating certain aspects of the US Patriot missile system.

While Chinese air defenses have not been put to the test like their Russian counterparts, it stands to reason they would perform with similar efficiency and prevent US forces and other potential interlopers from entering Chinese airspace let alone cause damage within it.

The Dagger: Chinese Airpower

The People’s Liberation Army Airforce employs hundreds of modern warplanes including the Chengdu J-10, the Shenyang J-11 and J-16, as well as scores of its newest warplane, the Chengdu J-20.

As with Chinese air defenses, Chinese airpower has been heavily influenced by Russian military aviation. Over the years in addition to its own warplanes, China has purchased a number of advanced Russian warplanes including the SU-27, SU-30, and most recently, the SU-35 according to the Diplomat in its 2019 article, “Russia Offers China Another Batch of Su-35 Fighter Jets.”

While China’s airforce has not seen combat, the fact that it possesses a large number of Russian warplanes hints they will perform in a similar manner to Russian airpower as demonstrated in Syria from 2015 onward and now in military operations in Ukraine.

The warplanes themselves are merely platforms for advanced avionics and weapons, the latter of which is a central factor defining the success of any nation’s airforce. The US government and arms industry-funded International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in a paper titled, “Chinese and Russian air-launched weapons: a test for Western air dominance,” would note the advancements of Chinese air-to-air missiles (AAMs) stating:

The extent of Chinese progress in the air-to-air guided-weapons arena was apparent with the introduction of the PL-10 AAM. This weapon provided a marked improvement in performance over the previous generation of short-range missiles operated by the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and its development has placed China among the handful of nations with a defence-industrial base capable of producing such a weapon.

The paper would also note:

China is also developing a very-long-range AAM intended to be used to attack high-value targets such as tanker, airborne early-warning, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft. Furthermore, Beijing appears to be pursuing two or more configurations of rocket-ramjet AAMs.

By the early to mid-2020s, China will clearly have a broader – and far more capable – range of air-to-air weapons to complement the combat aircraft that are now in development. These will likely force the US and its regional allies to re-examine not only their tactics, techniques and procedures, but also the direction of their own combat-aerospace development programmes.

Chinese airpower when coupled together with its formidable A2AD capabilities creates a modern day sword and shield able to take on virtually any threat.

Other Critical Factors

One area in which the US still dominates is through its submarine fleet. While China possesses a large number of submarines with improving capabilities, the US is still thought to have an advantage in this field. US submarines could disrupt cross-strait shipping as well as threaten Chinese ground targets with submarine-launched cruise missiles.

US submarines would be one of the few platforms able to potentially breach Chinese A2AD capabilities. Because modern submarine warfare is rare, it is difficult to draw from recent examples to predict possible outcomes regarding submarine warfare between the US and China and is a critical factor that only time will fully reveal.

Chinese media, cyber and space-based military capabilities would also be critical in any potential conflict and are areas the US clearly understands parity is nearly reached with its own capabilities or has already been reached.

Other critical factors that would come into play during the most likely conflicts China faces would be the capabilities of its ground forces. Chinese tanks and armored vehicles have been developed through lessons learned from Russian platforms and are admittedly on par with their Western counterparts in terms of fire control, armor, and countermeasures against anti-tank missiles. Chinese artillery also follows the Russian model, a model proving itself deadly and effective in Ukraine.

Underwriting all of these capabilities is China’s massive industrial base. Western experts including those at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in a paper titled, “The Return of Industrial Warfare,” would note that the West has fallen behind Russia in this regard.

The paper claims:

This situation is especially critical because behind the Russian invasion stands the world’s manufacturing capital – China. As the US begins to expend more and more of its stockpiles to keep Ukraine in the war, China has yet to provide any meaningful military assistance to Russia. The West must assume that China will not allow Russia to be defeated, especially due to a lack of ammunition. If competition between autocracies and democracies has really entered a military phase, then the arsenal of democracy must first radically improve its approach to the production of materiel in wartime.

If it is true that the West lags behind Russia in terms of its military industrial production, it is many times more true in regards to China. While the RUSI paper admits this is a problem the West must rectify, it is unlikely able to. Whatever steps the West takes to improve its military industrial capacity, both Russia and China will not only match such steps but ensure they remain far ahead of them.

Even should US capabilities match those of China, the fact that it is provoking a conflict halfway around the world particularly in regards to Taiwan puts it at a disadvantage logistically. It is a fight the US holds multiple disadvantages in and a fight the US should not be picking in the first place.

China has carefully for decades cultivated its military capabilities to defend China from foreign aggression, subjugation, and the humiliation associated with it, all of which the Chinese people have suffered at the hands of Western powers in the past.

With the US military itself admitting Chinese military capabilities are in some ways reaching parity with US military capabilities and in other areas surpassing them, the notion of the US using military force with impunity in or around Chinese territory has significantly diminished. In fact, the desperate, reckless urgency that has taken hold of Washington in recent years in regards to China and Washington’s growing inability to “contain” it is at the center of US provocations like Pelosi’s recent visit to Taiwan.

It will now be a matter of Beijing managing additional and increasingly desperate provocations by the US against China to defend Chinese national security while avoiding a potentially destructive conflict with the United States. The most logical decision Washington could make is to adopt a multipolar mindset allowing it to peacefully coexist alongside China and other nations rather than its current continued attempts to assert itself above all other nations.

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Brian Joseph Thomas Berletic, is an ex- US Marine Corps independent geopolitical researcher and writer based in Bangkok, writing under the pen name “ Tony Cartalucci ” along with several others.

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***

 

Former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak was finally sent to jail on August 23, more than two years after he was convicted of criminal abuse of power, criminal breach of trust and money laundering. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and fined RM210 million (A$68 million).

This conviction was for just seven of 42 charges Najib faced as a result of a major corruption scandal around the 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), Malaysia’s collapsed sovereign investment wealth fund. It relates to RM42 million (A$13.6 million) transferred into his personal account by SRC International, a company linked to 1MDB.

Najib’s wife, Rosmah Mansor, is also being tried for money laundering and tax evasion.

S Arutchelvan (“Arul”), deputy chairperson of Parti Sosialis Malaysia (PSM), told Green Leftthat most Malaysians are very happy that Najib is finally in jail.

“People thought that day might never come until the chief justice dismissed Najib’s final appeal.”

Right until the end, Najib tried all sorts of delaying tactics, including an attempt by his lawyer to discharge himself at the last minute, to prevent a decision being made on Najib’s appeal.

The Federal Court appeals division unanimously rejected this ploy and found that “it would have been a travesty of justice of the highest order if any reasonable tribunal, faced with such evidence staring it in the face, were to find that the appellant is not guilty of the seven charges preferred against him.”

These delaying tactics were “predictable and ridiculous”, said Arul.

“I think that they look more guilty now than ever because they did not make any serious attempt to fight the appeal,” Arul added after the court outlined the sloppy and contradictory arguments advanced in the appeal.

“This is huge because it is the first time an ex-PM has been jailed for corruption. Previously we have only had a chief minister [of a state government] jailed for corruption. So, for now, everyone is praising the judiciary for showing that politicians are not above the law.”

However, Arul added that there are many more corruption cases to be dealt with and some of the corrupt politicians may yet get away unpunished.

“Najib’s wife Rosmah and Zaid Hamidi, president of the former ruling party — the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) — are next in line. But another batch of UMNO politicians have escaped charges, and it seems this is because they shifted camp to the current government.”

Apart from the corruption scandals around the collapsed 1MDB sovereign investment fund there are ongoing investigations in several countries into corruption allegations around kickbacks to UMNO politicians from lucrative arms contracts entered into under Najib’s rule. These include a RM9.20 billion(A$3 billion) deal for 11 navy combat ships.

According to an August 22 article by John Berthelesen in the Asia Sentinel, UMNO politicians have been taking kickbacks from military contracts well before Najib became PM in 2009, including under the rule of former PM Mahathir Mohammad. These include a notorious US$1.2 billion deal for French Scorpene submarines — which could not operate in the shallow waters around Malaysia!

The political cover up of the Scorpene corruption scandal involved the murder of 28-year-old Mongolian woman, Altantuya Shaariibuu, who had served as a translator during the purchase of the vessels.

“Two of Najib’s bodyguards, who were convicted of the murder, signed statements saying Najib had ordered them to kill the woman because she was a spy,” according to Berthelesen.

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Featured image: Former Prime Minister Najib Razak is now behind bars. Graphic: Susan Price. Background image: Wikimedia Commons

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***

It has been reported that, during the pandemic, the then prime minister, Scott Morrison, swore himself in as a minister to several portfolios, including health, finance and resources.

Can this be done?

Uncertainty about the facts

First, there are inconsistent stories about what occurred. There has been reference to Morrison “swearing himself in” as a minister, when only the governor-general can appoint ministers.

It has also been said the attorney-general found a way for the governor-general to be cut out of the process by making changes by way of an administrative order. It is claimed the health minister knew about and supported such action, while the finance minister and the resources minister were unaware.

Another news story said the Commonwealth government has presented evidence to court that the prime minister was sworn in as minister for resources by the governor-general on April 15 2021.

It has since been confirmed the governor-general did appoint the prime minister to administer other ministerial portfolios, but no details have so far been provided. The details of exactly what happened therefore remain unclear.

Can ministers share the administration of legislation?

Because the titles and roles of ministers change all the time, statutes tend simply to confer power on “the minister”, without specifying which one. Section 19 of the Acts Interpretation Act says that to work this out you should look to the relevant “Administrative Arrangements Order”.

An Administrative Arrangements Order sets out the matters and legislation that fall within the responsibility of particular departments and their administering minister.

For example, during the pandemic, the Administrative Arrangements Orders said the Biosecurity Act was administered by the minister for health in relation to human health and the minister for agriculture in relation to animals and plants. They did not allocate the administration of this act to the prime minister.

The governor-general makes Administrative Arrangements Orders on the advice of the Federal Executive Council. The orders are published on the Federal Register of Legislation. No such order allocates the administration of the health, finance or resources legislation to the prime minister.

So the only way the prime minister could exercise powers granted by that legislation was if he was also appointed, or acting, as the minister for health, finance or resources.

The Cabinet could reach a collective decision about a policy issue, including how a minister’s power should be exercised in relation to it, and the minister would be bound by collective ministerial responsibility to act consistently with that decision. But the prime minister alone has no legal power to instruct a minister how to exercise powers conferred by statute on that minister.

Can a minister exercise the powers of another minister?

Ministers can be struck down sick, go on holidays or be out of the country on business, so there is always a need for another minister to be able to exercise their powers. This is recognised in section 19(4) of the Acts Interpretation Act, which says a reference to a minister in an Act can include a reference to another minister who is acting on behalf of the first minister.

But this is usually when the first minister is unavailable. It is therefore different from the scenario of the prime minister simultaneously having the same powers as the ministers for health, finance and resources.

Section 34AAB of the Acts Interpretation Act also says that a minister who administers an Act may authorise another minister to act on behalf of the first minister in exercising powers under the Act. The authorisation must be in writing.

It is possible this power was used if, for example, the health minister agreed to exercise it. But it would not cover cases where the first minister did not choose to grant such an authorisation and did not know about it.

Appointing a minister to administer a portfolio

It is the governor-general who appoints ministers to particular portfolios and swears them in. This happens under section 64 of the Constitution. It is ordinarily done publicly, when a new ministry is being sworn in. The ministerial changes are then published in the Commonwealth Gazette and on the Federal Register of Legislation.

For example, on February 6 2020, Keith Pitt was appointed as minister for resources, water and Northern Australia. But it does not seem any ministerial change announcement was made for the appointment of the prime minister to become minister for resources in April 2021 (or at least, I haven’t yet found it).

A spokesperson for the official secretary of the governor-general stated:

The Governor-General […] appointed former Prime Minister Morrison to administer portfolios other than the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet.

This was done by an administrative instrument on the advice of the prime minister. The spokesperson also stated the decision whether to publicise such appointment is a matter for the government of the day.

Secrecy and transparency

Is it appropriate for ministers to be secretly appointed to exercise statutory powers?

No, such matters should be notified to parliament and formally published so members of the public can know who is entitled to exercise particular powers. That is why we have Administrative Arrangements Orders and notifications of changes in ministerial responsibility that are recorded on the Federal Register of Legislation.

It is inappropriate for such matters to be kept secret – especially if it is kept secret from the Cabinet and from the minister who was formally allocated responsibility for a portfolio by the governor-general.

Such a lack of transparency is indicative of a lack of respect for the institutions of government and for the general public who have a right to know how power is allocated.

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 is Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Sydney.

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Peaceful Protests for a Revolutionary Change in Sri Lanka

August 10th, 2022 by Kumarathasan Rasingam

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Sri Lankans had been protesting for months over the country’s economic crisis that has led to a severe shortage of many essential imported items like medicines, fuel and cooking gas. Wickremesinghe’s predecessor Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled the country after protesters stormed his official residence and occupied many key state buildings including the president’s office and prime minister’s office and official residence. Wickremesinghe was elected by Parliament to complete Rajapaksa’s term, which ends in 2024.

The untiring efforts of the peaceful protesters succeeded in forcing the resignation of three Rajapaksa brothers, first it was Mahinda Rajapaksa who resigned the post of Prime Minister on May 09, 2022. Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa on June 09, 2022. But the objective of the protesters was the removal of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Due to the siege of the President’s house he was forced to go on exile to Maldives and then secured a 14 day visa to Singapore.

Sri Lanka is the first country to succeed by the protests for a “Regime Change”, The country is riding the waves of revolutionary change for the first time in history. The mass protests irrespective of race, religion or social class, Sri Lankans, Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims collectively protesting against the growing hardships influenced by the economic crisis the country has faced since independence. The country is desperately struggling to meet the fuel, food and financial commitments.

An essential part of this struggle is peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and communication as well as the freedom of mobility. These rights and their use by an informed, youthful protest leadership was able to shake the foundations of the government pushing it to change the President, cabinet and important office holders in the government bureaucracy.

Since the takeover of Ranil Wickremesinghe, the Lankan government issues several “state of emergencies” to curtail anti-government uprisings on the island amid the crippling financial shortage. Shortly after the crisis-hit President Gotabaya Rajapaksa resigned on July 15, 2022.

The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) strongly condemned the repeated declaration of a state of emergency since April 2, 2022, to quell civil protests amid the stifling economic crisis in the country. The frequent ’emergencies’ hinder people from voicing their grievances amidst the economic collapse in the country, the statement said.

We have raised our concerns to the Government on a number of occasions over the misuse of emergency measures, but to no avail. We condemn the recent and continued abuse of such measures to infringe on the legitimate exercise of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression,” the experts said, as mentioned in the press release.

An international human rights group says Sri Lanka’s government is using emergency laws to harass and arbitrarily detain protesters who are seeking political reform and accountability amid the island country’s economic crisis.

New York-based Human Rights Watch said in a statement Wednesday that Sri Lanka’s military sought to curtail protests through intimidation, surveillance, and arbitrary arrests of demonstrators, activists, lawyers and journalists since President Ranil Wickremesinghe took office last month.

“The Sri Lankan government’s crackdown on peaceful dissent appears to be a misguided and unlawful attempt to divert attention from the need to address the country’s urgent economic crisis,” said Meenakshi Ganguly, Human Rights Watch’s South Asia director.

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Kumarathasan Rasingam – Secretary, Tamil Canadian Elders for Human Rights Org.

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Moscow Prioritises Ties with Myanmar

August 10th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Myanmar on August 3 shows that the relationship is assuming a strategic character. The Foreign Ministry in a press release on August 2 highlighted that the relationship is “one of the priorities of foreign policy in the Asia–Pacific region, an important factor in ensuring peace, stability and sustainable development.” 

The foreign ministry noted that

“Myanmar partners at the official levels express their understanding of the reasons and validity of Russia’s actions in the framework of a special military operation in Ukraine. Naypyidaw does not recognise the legitimacy of Western anti-Russian sanctions. 

“At the UN and other multilateral platforms, Russia is pursuing a line to ensure a balanced and non-politicised discussion of the situation in Myanmar in connection with the state of emergency in force in this country since February 2021, and advocates the search for constructive forms of international assistance to this country without interference in its internal affairs. We assist Naypyidaw in rapprochement with integration associations and mechanisms of multilateral cooperation in Eurasia, including the EAEU and the SCO.” 

Indeed, Lavrov scheduled his talks in Myanmar before the ASEAN-Russia foreign ministers meet in Phnom Penh. The press release issued on August 3 after Lavrov’s talks with the Chairman of the State Administrative Council, Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Min Aung Hlaing said they held “an in-depth discussion of the geopolitical situation that is emerging against the background of the unprecedented sanctions campaign unleashed by the collective West both against Russia and against Myanmar. He (Min Aung Hlaing) confirmed the need for coordinated steps to strengthen a multipolar world order…” 

Myanmar becomes the second country after Iran in the Indian Ocean region that has voiced unequivocal support for Russia. Conceivably, Lavrov may now have to visit Colombo too, once the new government is formed. 

Russia & Sri Lanka’s colour revolution 

It is difficult to assess whether the mayhem in Sri Lanka on July 9 had anything to do with the impending visit of a Sri Lankan government delegation’s weeklong trip to Moscow the next day (scheduled for July 10-16) to hold crucial talks with various Russian economic ministries on July 10-16 regarding Russia’s help to tide over the crisis. But it remains a reasonable assumption. 

The Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s remarks on July 11 regarding the Sri Lankan situation pointedly mentioned,

“Notably, the day before the unrest began, some Western diplomatic mission heads openly urged the local police not to obstruct “peaceful protests.”

It added,

“We believe that the developments in Sri Lanka are its internal affair and the political process in that country, which we regard as friendly, will develop further in keeping with its constitution and effective laws. We expect a new government to be formed and are ready to cooperate with it. We believe the situation will return to normal before long and that the new Sri Lankan authorities will take the necessary measures to ride out the crisis in the national economy.”

Indeed, Ranil Wickremesinghe, then prime minister, also told Tass in an exclusive interview about the unprecedented nature of the political turmoil — that “the island nation’s politicians cannot yet find parallels to a similar crisis in this century or in the last century or the century before.” 

It appears that Moscow anticipated that the US-backed unrest in Sri Lanka would fail to produce a regime change that the “Collective West” wanted. Interestingly, President Vladimir Putin in his congratulatory message to Wickremesinghe on his election as president noted, “I am counting on your activities as Head of State to foster further development of constructive bilateral cooperation in various spheres for the benefit of our peoples and in the interest of strengthening regional stability and security.” 

A glance at the map of Indian Ocean would show why relations with Iran, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have become so consequential for Russia. The ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Myanmar are vital to sustaining an effective Russian naval presence in the region. The strategic compulsions are amplified in Russia’s revised Naval Doctrine, which Putin decreed on July 30, reflecting the “change in the geopolitical and military-strategic situation in the world.” 

Russia & world’s oceans 

The 56-page document (in Russian) explicitly states that Russia’s national interests “as a great naval power extend to the entire world’s oceans and the Caspian Sea”. It acknowledges the lack of overseas naval re-supply points and bases, which are crucial for expanding the operational range of the Russian Navy, while spotlighting that “the strategic course of the US to dominate in the world oceans” poses “challenges and threats.” 

However, the doctrine envisions the creation of such a facility in the Red Sea. Besides, it also includes plans to construct a new shipbuilding facility in Russia’s Far East to build “large-capacity vessels” including ships suitable “for the development of the Arctic,” as well as “modern aircraft carriers for the Navy.” Currently, Russia has only one aircraft-carrying naval vessel, the Admiral Kuznetsov cruiser, which has been out of commission and undergoing repairs.

Meanwhile, the US has been steadily strengthening a maritime cooperation grid with Indian Ocean states. Recently, Washington unveiled a West Asian Quad under the ingenious rubric I2U2 (Israel-India, US-UAE). President Biden took its first summit meeting. (See here and here)

Delhi insists that I2U2 is a platform for regional economic partnerships but western strategists candidly discuss the geopolitics looming behind economics. Michel Gurfinkiel at the Middle East Forum wrote in Wall Street Journal, “Jake Sullivan, Mr. Biden’s national security adviser, compared I2U2 to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the embryonic Indo-Pacific alliance of the US, Japan, Australia and India… US, Indian and Emirati media all see it as an extension of the 2019 Abraham Accords.” 

Indeed, the longer view is even more pertinent because beyond I2U2, the Quad and the Abraham Accords, one considers many analogous developments in international security — Ukraine conflict, NATO expansion, Eastern Mediterranean security alliance (France, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt); Negev Summit architecture (Israel, Morocco, Egypt, UAE. and Bahrain); AUKUS (the born-again Anglo-Pacific defence community between Australia, US and UK); upgrade of US-Taiwan relationship; Japan’s militarisation (overcoming acrimonious history), etc.

Geopolitical cross-currents

In the above backdrop, India’s gravitation toward the US-led security alliance system is a contradiction. India’s strategic focus is China but the US’s includes Russia and Iran as well. India prioritises its strategic ties with Israel —the management of Haifa port (which the US Sixth Fleet frequents) has been awarded to an Indian company recently. Whereas, Israel’s and the US’ obsession is with Iran, which is friendly towards India. 

On the other hand, Iran is strengthening its ties with Russia and China. Perhaps, UAE and India are playing both ends. But they are also regimes lacking strategic culture and prone to whimsicality attuned to Washington’s  agenda.

Clearly, the confidence in the US’ reliability has been generally undermined in recent years in the swathe of land between the Levant and Malacca Straits. Biden’s recent initiative in Jeddah to promote a West Asian military alliance to counter Iran, Russia and China had no takers. 

Russian diplomacy has to navigate between these shoals. The great game in Indian Ocean region is wide open. Lavrov’s visit to Myanmar signals that Moscow will push back the US’ attempts to create “blocs” to dominate the Indian Ocean’s sea lanes. Access to the ports in Myanmar can be a game changer for Russian presence.

Interestingly, Min Aung Hlaing complained to Lavrov that Russian officials “rarely” visit Myanmar. Lavrov promised to make amends. Moscow intends to fulfil that promise, as Russia’s cooperation with Myanmar spreads wings — trade to investments in energy projects, nuclear cooperation, military-technical cooperation, space, education, etc.

Direct flights are being established. Mir payment cards are accepted in Myanmar, which also is also keen on settlement in local currencies. Moscow  plans to establish in Yangon a parish of the Patriarchal Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in Southeast Asia — and a temple. 

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The provocative visit of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan on August 2, 2022 has caused major uproar not just from China but even from other peace-loving states. Pelosi’s visit has breached America’s One-China Policy, which formally acknowledges only one Chinese government and maintains the position of Taiwan being a breakaway region of China. Even prior to Pelosi’s visit, recent developments surrounding Taiwan have already escalated tensions between the two major powers and further soured their diplomatic relations. The trip occurs against the backdrop of express military agreement between the US and Taiwan, thereby sending a wrong signal to mainland China.

By ignoring China’s strong objections to Pelosi’s Taiwan visit, the US egregiously imperils regional stability and peace, and endangers an imminent outbreak of war between Taiwan and mainland China.

What are its implications for the Philippines, a small state that is 719.4 miles south of Taiwan?

Map of the Philippines in relation to Taiwan and China (Source: The Diplomatic Envoy, Seton Hall University via The Maritime Review)

US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty

The southeast asian state pursued a flawed ‘independent foreign policy’ at the helm of former president Rodrigo Duterte, who threatened to abrogate the US-Philippines Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), a component of the US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The VFA is a mutual military agreement that allows US troops, under the provisions of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), “access to designated Philippine military facilities, the right to construct facilities, and preposition equipment, aircraft, and vessels, but rules out permanent basing.” The maverick leader flirted with the idea of cooperating with the Russian Armed Forces and China’s People’s Liberation Army, but reverted his decision and withdrew the termination of the VFA. This move came amid the increasing tension in the South China Sea, where the Philippines is a claimant state. 

Incumbent president Ferdinand Marcos Jr. vowed to continue Duterte’s foreign policy trajectory, iterating the slogan, “a friend to all, an enemy to none”. But it seems just another hot air as the country’s plans for US forces are back on track, including the building of facilities for US troops at five military bases — one in Palawan whose proximity to the South China Sea makes it conducive to conducting surveillance flights. Further, the Philippine navy begins to station at the Subic Bay Naval Base, which sits facing the South China Sea, with a view to “countering China’s increasing assertiveness in the contested waters“. The port authority head intimated the welcomed presence of the US navy as a balancing force against the formidable Chinese counterpart.

The crux of the US-Philippines joint military exercises and cooperation agreements is clear and definite: to counter China through the South China Sea crisis. Disaster relief, counterterrorism, etc. are just the tip of the iceberg. What is hidden from the Filipino public is the hegemon’s motive of encircling the emerging superpower — under the guise of a routine military exercise and training aimed at enriching military capabilities towards “maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region“.

The Philippines in the event of a Taiwan-China conflict

The Philippines engages in economic and trade relations with Taiwan but maintains diplomatic relations only with mainland China. Amid the rising tension in the Taiwan Strait, the Philippine government released a brief but straightforward message, claiming adherence to the One-China Policy and the importance of diplomacy and dialogue.

Analysts lambasted the press release as “tiptoeing” around a major economic partner by “refusing to give any more comments”. “Tiptoe” is a misnomer with the ongoing US-Philippines military exercises — aimed at countering China — in the background. Having US troops and military equipment in the Philippine soil, the southeast asian state will become heavily embroiled in the event of a war outbreak between Taiwan and China, given America’s expression of military support to Taipei.

The volatility of the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region should prompt a more open and honest dialogue and military diplomacy among the concerned states. The Philippines should limit, if not repeal, the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the US if it is serious in its commitment to an independent foreign policy.

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Jezile Torculas has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science. She is an Assistant Editor at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Australia and the Road to Nuclear War

August 1st, 2022 by William Briggs

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Australia’s pledge to play its part in the United States’ drive to war in the Indo-Pacific means it is hardly a surprise for China to voice its concerns.

The Australia, United Kingdom and United States (AUKUS) agreement, alongside the anti-China Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) alliance of the US, India, Japan and Australia, can only be seen as a threat to China.

China is particularly critical of AUKUS’s commitments to new bases, long-range strike capability and especially the nuclear submarine deal for Australia. AUKUS opens the door for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to expand into the Indo-Pacific.

The China Arms Control and Disarmament Association (CACDA) and the China Institute of Nuclear Industry Strategy (CINIS), issued a joint report on July 22, titled The nuclear proliferation risk of the nuclear-powered submarines collaboration in the context of AUKUS.

It argues that the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration violates the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as it contributes to the nuclear build-up in the region.

Canberra has rejected this argument, although it has also been put by a number of peace organisations, including the US-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, think tanks including the Lowy Institute, as well as anti-war organisations in Australia.

It is anticipated that, under AUKUS, the US and Britain will provide Australia with eight nuclear-powered submarines, involving the transfer of tonnes of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Cathy Moloney writes in The Interpreter that “the naval reactor has long been seen as a loophole to the NPT and [International Atomic Energy Agency] IAEA safeguards, whereby a [non-nuclear weapons state] NNWS could divert materials from naval reactors and potentially use that material for weapons production”.

The Chinese report said the AUKUS nuclear-powered submarine collaboration serves a military purpose, in violation of the IAEA.

AUKUS allows the US and Britain to provide Australia with long-range precision-strike capabilities, including Tomahawk cruise missiles, which can be nuclear-armed.

China’s criticism that AUKUS is provocative is valid, especially in light of the US’ broader military build-up in the region.

The US Indo-Pacific Command (also known as USINDOPACOM) has 200 naval ships, including 5 aircraft carrier strike groups, 1100 aircraft and 375,000 military personnel permanently stationed in the region. It has a string of bases and installations from Japan to Australia. Further arming the region can only lead to a regional arms race as part of the new cold war.

The ABC’s foreign affairs reporter Stephen Dziedzic cited “government sources” arguing that Australia has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons. “Australia’s decision to acquire conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines is something we are pursuing openly and transparently,” the source told the ABC.

Former US National Security Chief Michael Rogers on a visit to Australia addressed the “threat” from Russia and China at the National Press Club on July 21 where he put the case for Australia’s on-going commitment to the US alliance.

The former admiral said that as both countries are members of the Quad and AUKUS, regardless of economic difficulties, global fuel prices or inflation worries, the Australia-US alliance would have to deal with challenges in a unified manner.

Rogers had no need to beat any drums: the frequent visits to Washington by the previous Coalition and now the Labor government make it clear the line is set.

Admiral John C Aquilino, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, made a special visit to Australia days before the federal election. He and Angus Campbell, Chief of the Australian Defence Force General, issued a joint statement afterwards speaking of “plans for enhanced air, maritime, land and logistics force posture cooperation” and how this “will strengthen our ability to operate as a combined force and to train and deploy with our partners in the region to advance collective security and integrated deterrence”.

Aquilino visited Amberly RAAF air base near Brisbane, describing to the Financial Times how the Northrop B-2 Spirit stealth bomber “had flown in from the US to demonstrate American long-range military power to potential adversaries”. It is nuclear capable.

Aquilino made no bones about how his Indo-Pacific Command was working closely with the US Strategic Command to provide “an integrated deterrence” to be used against China.

The ABC’s defence correspondent saw fit to accuse China of making “outlandish” claims about Australia’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. But nuclear-capable US aircraft, Tomahawk Cruise missiles on Australian vessels, nuclear submarines and the integration of NATO in to the Indo-Pacific all point in one direction.

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Featured image: A trident 11 D5 missile being launched from a US submarine. Photo: US Army/Wikipeadia

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In May, Indonesians breathed a sigh of relief when President Joko Widodo announced that masks were no longer required to be worn outdoors as a guard against COVID-19.

But for the 640 students of Marunda State Primary School in Jakarta’s northern port district, masks have remained a way of life.

The reason: not COVID-19, but coal dust from a nearby coal storage facility.

“The president already said that we don’t need to wear masks anymore. But here, we still have to wear masks because we have a problem,” the school’s vice principal, Inayatullah, told the assembled students during an outdoor flag ceremony on a recent Monday morning.

“Now tell me,” Inayatullah continued, “what is our problem?”

“COAL!” the students replied in unison.

Students listen to a teacher in their classroom

Students listen to a teacher in their classroom at Marunda State Primary School, North Jakarta, in May. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

Less than 500 meters, just over a quarter of a mile, from the school is an industrial site for unloading coal shipments owned by PT Karya Citra Nusantara (KCN), a company whose operation has been designated a national strategic project by the central government.

Marunda’s residents say they have been struggling with coal dust permeating the air since 2019, after KCN began to expand its operation, a key distribution point for coal headed to power plants in and around Jakarta.

The school’s principal, Purwatiningsih, says it has become impossible to ignore how quickly grime covers everything. Even breathing “feels weird,” she said.

She said she worries about her students: almost all of them, she said, live within a 10-minute walk of where KCN’s loading site can be seen from across the water in Jakarta Bay, meaning they’re constantly exposed to pollution both in and out of school.

“Even if we tell them to keep wearing masks at school, we don’t know their living conditions at home,” Purwatiningsih told Mongabay in her office at the school.

In April, the Jakarta Health Agency conducted a public screening in Marunda, bringing in eye, lung, skin and internal medicine specialists to assess local residents, according to Dr. Fify Mulyani, the head of the agency’s public health department.

Respiratory disorders, Fify told Mongabay, were reported by 18% of those surveyed, skin problems by 10%, and eye problems by 8%, suggesting that thousands of Marunda’s nearly 36,000 residents could be afflicted.

Fifi said further examinations would be necessary to definitively link the health problems to the coal dust. Still, many in the community already suspect that KCN’s operation is causing these problems, a view shared by some government officials, such as Retno Listyarti, a commissioner at the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI), and NGOs like the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute and Bersihkan Indonesia, a group that fights pollution.

The KPAI has identified three people, two of them children, who suffered from corneal ulcers caused by KCN’s coal dust, Retno told Mongabay.

“Coal dust particles are quite large,” Retno said. “They can damage the cornea.”

According to Dr. Elvioza, an ophthalmologist at the Jakarta Eye Center, a local hospital, coal dust exposure can damage the tear film, a thin fluid layer that covers the eye’s surface.

“Under normal circumstances, there are a lot of germs on the eye’s surface,” he told Mongabay. “Those germs do not cause infection because the tear film protects them.

“When the tear film is damaged due to external irritants such as dust, the germs enter and infect the eye. The worst impact that could arise from that problem would be a corneal ulcer which can lead to blindness.”

People exposed to coal dust may also develop breathing problems, ranging from respiratory infections in the short run to bronchitis, decreased lung function, or black lung in the long run, said Dr. Agus Dwi Susanto, chairman of the Indonesian Association of Pulmonologists.

“Ideally, a coal storage area would be located far from a residential area,” he told Mongabay.

Raihan (9 years old), one of the students of Elementary Schoo

Raihan, 9, one of the students of Marunda State Primary School, whose eyes were affected by coal dust. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

‘The dust has gotten out of hand’

The greater Jakarta area, including its satellite cities, is home to some 30 million people. It routinely tops the list of major cities with the most polluted air. While many cities around the world saw their air quality improve during the coronavirus lockdowns, which drastically reduced traffic, the Indonesian capital, which is surrounded by coal-fired power plants, was a notable exception.

While Indonesia’s coal industry is one of the largest in the world, discussion around the pollution it causes typically centers on mines and power stations. But the controversy in Marunda has broadened the focus to include pollution from coal distribution facilities, which has prominently affected not only Jakarta but cities and regions like Cirebon, Jambi, North Konawe, and the Tidore Islands.

“The Marunda case is only one of many cases” in Indonesia, Melky Nahar, coordinator of the Mining Advocacy Network (Jatam), an NGO, said in an interview.

“It has happened many times, but our government is not serious about ensuring that companies operate according to legal procedures. So the government will start to evaluate after there are violations that happened. There is no mitigation effort.”

Because they tend to spend more time playing outside than adults, children bear the brunt of the impact from air pollution in Jakarta, according to UNICEF’s 2020 “Situation of Children in Indonesia” report, which listed air pollution as one of three main risk factors for child mortality in the country.

Children of Rusunawa Marunda play at the the child-friendly public space.

Children at a playground in a Marunda housing project. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

Among those who have suffered health problems is Rami*, a child living in Marunda.

Rami suffered a chronic eye problem two years ago. At the time, he was playing in the playground near the school building when a cloud of dust hit his eye. Rami’s immediate reflex was to rub them out, but the sharp dust particles wounded his eyes even further.

“[By the time I opened my eyes], there was already pus coming out,” Rami, now 9 years old, told Mongabay in the school’s principal’s office. His wounds led to an infection, and he was diagnosed with corneal ulcer. He then had to undergo an operation to replace his damaged cornea.

Jeni, 30, a mother of four who lives in Marunda with her family, said that in 2019, two of her children began to suffer from respiratory infections.

At the time, she could not wrap her head around the root cause that led her children, then aged 2 and 1, to be afflicted with health problems. Back then, only one thing seemed certain: one of her sons, Ara*, today a 6-year-old who lives with mild autistic symptoms, would start to feel better once brought to a different place.

“Children with autism undergo routine therapy, but nutrition and environmental factors also need to be monitored so that his symptoms don’t get worse,” Jeni said. “But [the dust problem] here has gotten out of hand. Children playing outside become covered with it, and they come home dirty.”

Riza, his wife Jenni and their children.

Riza, his wife Jenni and their children have been living in a Marunda housing project since 2018. Two of the children suffer from acute respiratory infections. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

Jeni and Rami are among hundreds of Marunda residents who moved to the coastal neighborhood from other parts of the city after the Jakarta provincial government evicted them to make way for infrastructure projects in Pluit, Ancol, Rawajati and other neighborhoods.

Both families live in the low-cost Marunda public housing project, or rusunawa, as it’s known in Indonesian, built by the government in 2008 to house Jakartans relocated from other areas.

The evictions were a key campaign issue against former Jakarta governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama in the 2017 election, ultimately contributing to his defeat by Anies Baswedan, the current governor, who promised a softer stance. But evictions have continued under Anies, including in Jeni’s former neighborhood, where residents were forced out to make way for a water pipe project.

The irony of the situation wasn’t lost on the Marunda Rusunawa Community Forum (F-MRM), which pointed it out in one of its press releases.

“Most of the residents of Marunda are residents who have experienced eviction, have been relocated, and have lived with the hope that their lives will be ‘better,’” the forum, which advocates on behalf of Marunda residents affected by the coal pollution, said in a statement. “But in fact, the residents of Marunda have to breathe dirty air due to coal dust until now.”

The activities of PT KCN as seen from one of the classrooms of Marunda State Primary School

KCN’s activities as seen from one of the classrooms of Marunda State Primary School. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

Right to clean air

Following demonstrations by the F-MRM, the Jakarta government carried out a screening and evaluation of KCN’s operation and legal documents.

The city’s environmental agency ultimately identified 32 violations, from overlooking administrative requirements to errors in the process of unloading coal. In March, it sanctioned the company, ordering it to resolve the issues by June 15. But after the company failed to do so, the city revoked its environmental permit and ordered it to stop operating until it had amended the issue, according to Asep Kuswanto, head of the environmental agency.

While KCN has offered to provide residents with free medical checkups, it has not acknowledged a link between its operation and residents’ health problems, and has called on observers to wait until further investigation can clarify the issue.

“KCN has formed an investigation team to follow up on all forms of reports and accusations that harm the company,” KCN spokesperson Maya Tunggagini told Mongabay. “For that, we ask all parties to respond to this objectively.”

The load and unload coal of PT Karya Citra Nusantara as seen from the rooftop of Rusunawa Marunda

The load and unload coal of PT Karya Citra Nusantara as seen from the rooftop of Rusunawa Marunda, on May 30, 2022. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

Meanwhile, Jeni’s family still struggles with the pollution in Marunda. She said she hopes for KCN and the government to resolve Marunda’s air pollution crisis. She added she’s deeply worried about how long-term exposure to coal particles will affect the well-being of her four children.

“We have the right to a healthy air and living environment,” she said. “Our hope is for our air to be cleaner, and [as such] our health would also be assured, because indirectly we all must have taken in the dust, breathing it. Or the dust sticks to our food. It gets mixed up in our meals.”

*Names have been changed to protect the privacy of minors.

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Featured image: Adam, one of the residents of Rusunawa Marunda, North Jakarta, shows dust residue from KCN’s coal load and unloading activities which is located less than 500 meters from Rusunawa. Image by Wienda Parwitasari for Mongabay.

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Abstract

The success of the Meiji regime elite in placing Japan on the road to unprecedented rapid economic development is for all to see in the public history displayed within the port districts of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki. Silence marks the history of how important these port-rail-communications developments were to the restoration of Japan’s own sovereignty and the simultaneous stripping away of others. This work explores the state and left-unstated reasoning behind Meiji Japan’s elevation to become the first non-western power utilising the authors photography of the public history of Japanese ports and their indispensable rail and communications connections.1 

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It has been observed that technological change is a political process, and while this certainly is often the case, in Meiji Japan, the inverse could be argued: political change was a technological process (Free, 2008: 40).

Introduction

Contemporary visitors, domestic and foreign, to Japanese ports such as Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki and others are able to spend several days exploring the public history of these gateways between Japan and the world. The focus of the public history, of these cities, centres primarily on their emergence during the Meiji period (1868-1912) of Japanese history. The story of Meiji Japan’s rise to modern governance and the establishment of the foundations for a modern national and global economy has been thoroughly explored by others and will not be retold in full here. As works by Najita (1974, 1993), Giffard (1994), Fallows (1995), Morris-Suzuki (1994), Samuels (1994), Beasley (1995), Sims (2001), Andressen (2002), Miyoshi (2005), Schuman (2009), Studwell (2013), Tang (2011, 2014), Kasza (2018) and others highlight, this technological revolution on Japanese soil required the upheaval of almost every aspect of society. Free (2008: 15) in his seminal study on Japanese railroad development states:

Henceforth, the transfer of western technology to Japan would become a notable aspect of Japan’s interaction with western civilization: small initially, but accelerating at an amazing pace during the Meiji period.

The accumulative effect of which would be to transform Japan under Emperor Mutsuhito’s reign (1868-1912). This work will examine, through both writing and a selection of photographs taken by the authors, the economic and international trade history of Meiji Japan as exercised in the port cities of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki and now only partially reflected through public history.

This paper will show how this public history opens avenues for the exploration of in what ways the historic ports of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki offer a means of understanding how the Meiji men of Japan learnt about the world they wished to catch up with, and, simultaneously drove seismic changes within Japan. More specifically, Japan’s advancements included: political, governance, agricultural reforms, infrastructure development; and the establishment of banking facilities to accommodate greater foreign trade, policy reforms in adherence with adoption of the global default ‘gold standard’, and the introduction of foreign human capital and others public policy initiatives (Hoshi & Kashyap, 2001; Plung, 2021). Ultimately, however, the ports and their development (including that of their essential partners in the form of rail and the telegraph), highlights the central driving force behind the Meiji Restoration: the elevation of Japan to full sovereign, strategic, economic and social equality with the very same international powers (Great Britain, continental European and the United States of America) that had denied Japan such status through the unequal treaty system imposed upon the nation from the 1850s onwards (Najita, 1974; Sukehiro, 1988; Auslin, 2004; Holcombe, 2011; Iokibe and Minohara, 2017).

The most significant expression of this national transformation through adoption, adaptation and development of a modern industrial nation’s systems took place in the form of an unprecedented (in both scale and scope) mission abroad, the Iwakura Embassy which took place from late-1871 to 1873 (Kume, 1871-1873; Miyoshi, 2005; Caprio, 2020). The Embassy fulfilled the fifth element of The Charter Oath (Gokajo no Goseimon) with outlined the core objectives of the Restoration of the Emperor: 5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to invigorate the foundation of Imperial rule (Hane Mikiso as cited in Sims, 2001: 11). The Embassy, as with either a single individual Japanese person or a large collective of the ruling elite, then had one specific purpose: to accumulate knowledge that would strengthen the emperor’s rule not only domestically, but within any other territory acquired under his banner. Knowledge acquisition was to be on empirical studies with a high level of transferability that built the Japanese state that operated under the emperor. For any other purpose, personal aesthetics, pleasure or other, knowledge acquisition was for-all-intent-and-purposes a treasonable act. One of the two chroniclers of the Embassy, Kunitake Kume (1871-1873, Vol 1: 4) would come to recognize that the Embassy was both the product of and captured forces changing not only Japan’s trajectory, but the concert of nations:

When we consider what has happened, we realize that everything was related to changes in the trend of world affairs.

Whatever knowledge was beyond the shores of Japan that could position the emperor to consolidate his domestic rule and elevate him and his nation to new predominance amongst the league of nations, it was the duty of those sent abroad in whatever capacity to acquire it.

The Embassy would see current and future Meiji leaders travel across the United States of America, Great Britain and continental Europe. Initially, the mission held the aim of revisions to the unequal treaty system, and, to empirically examine and document the political, policy and developmental processes taking place in the advanced nations that would enable Japan to begin its ascendancy (Chang, 2002). However, the Iwakura men would come to conclude during their early-1872 time in Washington D.C. through extensive diplomatic dialogues (with U.S. Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, European diplomatic figures present in the national capital, and through communications with Meiji diplomats in London), that that unequal treaty revisions at this time were undesirable. Instead, the travellers moved concertedly and energetically to focus the purpose of the Embassy to extensively documenting the politics, governance, agrarian, financial, industrial, educational and socio-civic advantages that the western powers held over Japan (Kume, 1871-1873; Caprio, 2020). The Iwakura Embassy’s contemporary prominence in Japanese public memory is highlighted by the establishment of a park on the foreshore of Yokohama Port area that pays tribute to the execution of this extraordinary accomplishment.

Image 1. Iwakura Embassy Departure Image (author supplied) 

Image 2. Japanese and English language description of the Iwakura Mission “Departure point of modernization of Japan” (author supplied)

Early Meiji Period

Domestically the powerful merchant houses that had been established during the earlier Tokugawa Period (also known as the Edo Period 1600-1868), like the nation itself, had split in their support/opposition to the Meiji elite’s Restoration of the young Emperor Mutsuhito in 1868, and so, not surprisingly, the new rulers of the nation felt no universal obligation towards enhancing this classes’ advancement (Cohen, 2014). As it would prove the Tokugawa merchant class was either reluctant to, or simply incapable of, supplying the vast levels of finances and human capital required for the new industrial infrastructure projects (such as railways and port-harbour facilities). These investment demands rendered short-term returns unlikely and further accentuated the gap between the new regime’s nation building industrial requirements and the private sectors capabilities (Sims, 2001:6-7). As a result, the Ministry of Public Works was established by the Meiji regime in the year of its founding, 1868, to promote the introduction of western technology into Japan and a loan was floated in the City of London, Great Britain’s center of banking finance, for the building of Japan’s first railroad-telegraph line – from Yokohama to Tokyo (Free, 2008). At this time any dialogue on railways, ports, the telegraph and others, like so much of the Meiji regime policy agenda, was in fact a proxy for the deep political domestic divisions centered on differing visions of the nation’s future, inclusive of the importation of ‘the foreign’ to secure modernity (Free, 2008; Walthall, 2018). As a result, a highly secretive meeting on the question of Japan’s first rail line was held at the house of Prince Sanjo Sanemtomi (1837-1891), Minister of the Right and acting-Premier, on December 7, 1869 (Vlastos, 1995). It would be between the very top echelon of the Meiji ruling elite, including Iwakura Tomobi (1825-1883) who as a long-time confident of the Meiji Emperor and future head of the famous 1871-1873 Embassy in his name (Caprio, 2020), and the British Minister to Japan, Sir Harry Smith Parkes (1828-1885: formal title Her Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and Consul General for the United Kingdom to the Empire of Japan from 1865-1883) to decide the route options between: Tokyo-Yokohama; Kobe-Kyoto and Tokyo-Kyoto. At this time, and until the first decades of the next century, Great Britain was by-far Japan’s most important economic and industrial partner, a position Parkes vehemently promoted at every opportunity and that left neither the Japanese, the Americans, nor the continental Europeans, in any doubt of their own relative status (Keene, 2002). In the end, the Tokyo-Yokohama route was selected due to the rise of Tokyo as the political center of Japan, its commercial predominance, and the critically the flat alluvial geography that favored rail development (Free, 2008 Ch 3; Tang, 2014).

Irrespective of the route chosen, there remained deep concern within the government over hostility to the recruitment of the many foreigners needed for their expertise in rail projects development and execution (Plung, 2021). Reactionary forces made no secret of the fact that their tolerance of the modern and the foreign was limited. The ports, and the essential rail and telegraph developments, would be the most visible physical expression of the national changes taking place under the new regime, and hence ripe for both verbal and physical attack upon them. A rail spike hammered, even more so than in the West, was in Japan an avowedly political act (Chang, 1996, 2002; Low and Gooday, 1998; Tang, 2011; Ferguson, 2017; Kasza, 2018). Whilst in the former ports, rail and ocean-going steam vessels represented superiority in the form of the industrial revolution taking place, in developing nations like Japan which had yet to initiate such advancements this state-of-affairs represented an inferiority of their very being as both a people and a nation (Chang, 2002). The very fact that the Meiji state was able to successfully achieve national industrialization, development, and colonialism both disproved Social Darwinist European thinking, and rhetoric, and enabled the Meiji regime to project Japanese racial superiority and these same limitations upon their Asiatic neighbors (Sukehiro, 1988; Iriye, 1995; Zohar, 2020). The Meiji men never possessed doubts that they as Japanese could achieve the developmental levels of the Western powers; the 1860 exploits of the Kanrin Maru under the leadership of Admiral Yoshitake Kimura and his first Japanese-only crew to cross the Pacific having been a significant act of self-reinforcement. The only real question challenge in their mind was how fast they could catch up, and in doing so dispense with the unequal treaty system, so as to be on a fully equal sovereign-developmental footing with the European industrial powers.

To oversee not only the development of rail, but also the ports, mines and agrarian developments to complete the supply chain, and to secure the foreign expertise needed, the new Meiji government established a Ministry of Industry in December 1870 with the increasingly powerful figure of Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909) becoming its vice-minister in 1871 (Yoshitake, 1986; Takii, 2014; Caprio). Ito who had already travelled overseas as a student in London (1863) and to the United States of America to study currency (1870) would serve as one of Iwakura’s deputies throughout the Embassy. Based on the experience of Ito and others, young members of the Embassy would remain in the United States of America and European nations it would visit to undertake continuing formal studies on a wide array of areas identified as essential to the advancement of their nation (at institutions such as Rutgers College and the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis). These individuals, or others who had made their way to the America and Europe as individuals or within smaller missions and also stayed on, often for years, to study, would return to Japan in time to take up leading roles within the Meiji regime (for example Tanaka Fujimaro who after the United States would spent time touring several European countries examining education reform before returning to Japan in March 1873 to execute the resulting reforms through the Ministry of Education). Despite the new Ministry of Industry’s technical assistance, easy credit, and subsidies, the Meiji regime’s initial private-sector development drive throughout the early 1870s was a failure. Japan at this time was in every sense of the word a severely underdeveloped agrarian state in relation to the western powers, with the industrial structures and manufactures being defined as basic and of poor quality (Sukehiro, 1988; Sugiyama, 1994; Andressen, 2002; Cameron, 2007; Ferguson, 2001, 2004, 2017; Green, 2017). Many private sector enterprises simply went bankrupt due to a lack of human capital, financial management skills and broader knowledge of international industry and trade requirements. This private-sector failure left the Meiji elite with little choice other than to take an increasingly state-interventionist approach, including dramatically increasing its technical transfer commitments (Morris-Suzuki, 1994; Schuman, 2009; Studwell, 2013).

Building upon the already considerable skills of the Tokugawa artisans, technology was acquired and learned by the Meiji regime members through numerous other study missions abroad. Eighteen sixty had seen the first official Japanese mission of the Tokogawa regime to the United States of America and in particular the national capital of Washington D.C. to ratify a treaty on May 22 (1860), but it had been sent in near total secrecy, consisted of only a few members, and had very little impact domestically or internationally. The Iwakura Embassy of 1871 to 1873, in stark contrast, consisted of 70 members of the new regime, many of whom were already or would become significant figures within the Meiji regime for decades to come. Envoy Extraordinary Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Prime Minister Iwakura Tomomi, who as stated was a long time confident of the young Mutsuhito, was supported by four vice-Ambassadors who would themselves become national figures: Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909), Kido Koin (also known as Kido Takayoshi (1833-1877)), Okubo Toshimichi (1830-1878); and Yamaguchi Naoyoshi (1839-1894) (Kume, 1871-1873; Gluck in Miyoshi, 2005; Takii, 2014; Caprio, 2020). Far from being a secret mission, the Iwakura Embassy’s departure from Yokohama Port was openly celebrated by the regime (and as evidenced by Images 1 and 2, is still acknowledged as a seminal event in Japanese public history) as reflecting the nation’s moves towards sovereign equality and modernity. Indeed, the mission’s size, scale and duration abroad, unlike the Satsuma and Chosun secret missions to England in 1865, made any hope of keeping it secret from the regime’s enemies fanciful.2

The Iwakura Embassy would quickly come to recognize in Washington D.C. in the early months of 1872 just how unprepared they themselves and their nation were for any substantive revisions to the unequal treaty system (Kume, 1871-73; Auslin, 2004). In relation to the latter, obtaining vast amounts of information and knowledge on questions of economic modernity, such as the development of modern internal improvement such as ports and rail, the mission was an undeniable success. Visitors to the port of Yokohama can learn of the Iwakura Embassy’s departure through a small public park with several information boards, but that in no way can tell the whole story. As is the nature of any port the full story encompasses both those who have left, either permanently or to return, and those foreigners who either entered and remained, or themselves would depart Japan for other shores (Plung, 2021).

The obtaining of foreign knowledge through the mission would be insufficient, as a lone measure, and the Meiji regime had to at a very heavy cost import foreign technicians as educationalists rather than permanent advisers. For example, by 1879 the Ministry of Mines employed 130 foreigners whose salaries accounted for three-fifths of the ministry’s expenditure (Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 146-148; Miyoshi 2005: 178). The emphasis placed on the foreign advisers as educationalists-trainers made clear the Meiji leadership’s intent: those Japanese benefitting from the education-training were to take over these foreigners’ roles as soon as practically possible to avoid dependency (as evidenced in Images 3, 4, and 5 the influence of foreigners was, and remains, quite clearly visible against the traditional Japanese architecture). Such a stand fell within the broader political economy context of the regime itself with Japan having lost substantial elements of its sovereignty under the unequal treaty system and the Meiji leadership’s extensive knowledge of European and American colonialism in broader Asia3 (Iriye, 1995; Auslin, 2004; Pilling, 2014; Green, 2017; Zohar, 2020).

The monumental cost of the foreign advisors and the pressing need to establish economic development as a counterweight to the loss of sovereignty did result in substantive national development progress. For example, through the establishment of Regional Development Boards, most notably the Hokkaido Development Board (Kaitakushi) in 1871, the Meiji State undertook agricultural, fisheries, timber and mineral developments. All required the development of a national network of rails, ports, all-weather-roads, and communications developments in the form of the telegraph across both land and seas to secure these gains.4

Image 3. Kobe Akarenga Souko Red Brick Port Warehouses (author supplied)

Image 4. Yokohama Akarenga Souko “Red Brick Warehouse” (author supplied)Image 5. First Foreign Settlement Site (Yokohama) (author supplied)

Image 5. First Foreign Settlement Site (Yokohama) (author supplied)

During this era of small government, the period of 1885-1889 saw investment in fixed capital increase above 15 percent of total government expenditure, and 1.7 percent of the GNP. By the end of the period, 1910 to 1914, with the Meiji reign coming to an end in 1912, investment in fixed capital would rapidly expand to 27.7 percent of total government expenditure and 4.5 percent of the GNP (Yasuba and Dhiravegin, 1985: 21-25). This change was not ideologically driven but instead a pragmatic response on the part of the Meiji government elite to both domestic and international political, strategic, and economic imperatives (Cameron, 1997; Bix, 2000; Pyle, 2007; Teramoto and Minohara, 2017).

The Meiji Governing Elite

Substantial studies of the contemporary Japanese elite bureaucracy acknowledge that its key characteristics were all formed in the Meiji period (Beasley, 1988; Beasley, 1995; Koh, 1989; Johnson, 1982, 1995). The Ministry of Finance (MoF), established in 1868, the year of the Restoration, and the Ministry of Industry, established in 1881, have been the most-thoroughly internationally documented.5 Having observed through the seminal Iwakura Embassy and a series of smaller missions of the British, American, and German administrative elite, and in particularly those responsible for the national budgetary process, the Meiji regime framed its substantive reforms within the context of embracing the Confucian tradition. The Meiji elite moved to institute national civil-service examination system in 1880. For the Meiji elite this selection into their ranks via rigorous examination legitimised public officials with moral authority as servants of the Emperor to promote the public good including the development of internal improvements, state enterprises and the harnessing of ‘private’ enterprises deemed central to securing the nation’s sovereignty and prosperity (Johnson, 1982, 1995; Muchlhoff, 2014).

Having removed the samurai as a class and abolished their daimyo provincial loyalties, the Meiji elite redirected loyalty ties to the central bureaucracy as separate fiefdoms in themselves (Miyoshi, 2005: 91). Traditional clan loyalty based on geographic locations was, over the duration of the Meiji Emperor’s reign, to be replaced with another form of clan loyalty; one based on educational attainment, and which transcended government and found its way across all the nation’s major corporations in state banking, finance, rail, ports, manufactures and others (Fingleton, March/April 1995: 77). The Meiji state requirement to build the internal improvements needed to secure Japan’s rise in international stature saw the bureaucracy almost double between 1880 and 1890. Further from 1890 to 1903 administrative expenditure grew from 31 million to 121 million and government employees grew from 79,000 to 144,000 (Sims, 2001: 65 & 91-92). The continuity of Japan’s bureaucratic structures can be traced accurately (Johnson, 1995).

Under the 1890 Constitution’s diffusion of power, the system by which every ministry jealously guards its nawabari (sphere of influence) and all ministry members develop nawabari ishiki (territorial consciousness) was formally instituted. The primary vehicle for this institutionalisation of bureaucratic divisions were (and remain) intense competition over the national budget. At the apex of this new clan loyalty was the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the guardian of the nation’s finances through its control of the state budget. The 1890 Constitution institutionalised this MoF bureaucratic elite predominance as it placed a decisive limitation upon the powers of the Diet, one borrowed from Berlin in that if it failed to pass the national budget the government could continue its operation based on the preceding year’s budget (Storry, 1978). The MoF, in practice, held the whip hand over the Diet and would maintain the 1890 budgetary constitution to control the Meiji government apparatus with all other bureaucratic institutions and agencies required to pass their own ministry budgets through MoF scrutiny. All nation building projects, including the development of ports, rail, the telegraph, all-weather roads, the establishment of trade financing and logistics entities, all were either driven from, or required, the explicit approval and financing of the MoF. Critically, though it is important to understand that whilst the MoF stood at the apex of the Meiji regime bureaucratic hierarchy, it was ultimately under the authority of the Emperor. Mutsuhito more than once would show a willingness to reign-in his senior governing elite, including those overseeing the MoF, when he felt the state revenue-expenditure balance had reached a precipitous. This was particularly so during the first decades of his reign (1870s-1890s) (Keen, 2002). The MoF, nevertheless, went further than mere mastery over the bureaucracy and established its grip over the national economy through embedding its alumni into the nation’s major state and ‘private’ corporations, inclusive of the banking and trade entities that drove Japan’s engagement with the world, as a continuation of their loyalty to their Emperor and by extension their MoF clan (Patrick, 1965; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001).

The rise of the MoF was not ideological but strategically pragmatic as it was only utilised when it was deemed essential to the national interests, with the Meiji elite preferring to use the private sector where applicable and to engage in state intervention through the MoF and other Meiji agencies for the building of rail and ports only when the market proved itself incapable of delivering nation-building. A working model of private-driven rapid nation-building economic development, however, did not present itself. The MoF’s direct control over an economic base independent of the private sector, including the banking sector and a vast array of state-owned enterprises, provided the bureaucratic elite with strategic control over capital, materials, labour and national economic planning (Chu, 1994:118). Ex-officials from the MoF would come quickly to dominate the executive level within both public and ‘private’ financial, internal improvements, rail, ports, roads, the telegraph, and other institutions (institutions such as the Japan Development Bank (JDB); Export-Import Bank of Japan (EIBJ); Tokyo Stock Exchange; Bank of Tokyo; Yokohama Bank; and others). Japan’s action in fact mirrored those of London, Berlin and Washington D.C., in that they pragmatically evaluated their own contextual environment and circumstances and adopted, adapted and developed old and new policy and practice models and behaviors to achieve eventual success. As this study has detailed the Meiji men observed and extensively documented first-hand through the Iwakura Embassy and other smaller missions the development of the advanced western states public policy-financial-industrial-trading practices and institutions, and quickly came to conclude that far from being the product of Adam Smith’s invisible hand of the market, the international powers’ predominance in arms, finance and trade was in fact the product of the long-term concerted actions of the respective state-activist elites driving these respective nations (Kume, 1871-1873; Fukui, 1992; Iriye, 1995; Takii, 2014).

Ports, Shipping, Railways and Communication

In recognition of their military importance to Japan, the Meiji elite developed railways, shipping and communication services (domestic and international postal services/telegraph) through the use of both government-and-private enterprises to achieve projects of national significance. For example, Emperor Mutsuhito himself took a deep personal interest in every aspect of Japan’s development of a deep-water navy, with Japan’s first western battleship being purchased from the United States of America. This was hardly surprising when one considers that it was the naval power of the United States of America, Great Britain and other western powers that completely discredited the Tokugawa regime’s capacity to protect the nation and therefore its legitimacy to rule. Mutsuhito’s studies extended to undertaking extensive personal studies of both western powers’ battleship developments and the required internal improvement, such as corresponding deep-water ports and the rail networks needed to supply the coal, iron ore, timber and other resources, along with the construction and maintenance of these colossal state investments (Keene, 2002). In this, the Meiji Emperor and his leading men were systematic in following the actions of the United States, Britain and continental Europe, actions many themselves had witnessed first-hand through extensive study tours (Kume, 1871-1873). The Railway Construction Act of 1892 coordinated a national network which rose in the 1883 to 1903 period from 245 miles to 4,500 miles, with 70 percent being constructed by private-enterprise, and, in 1906, state ownership was secured through the Railway Nationalisation Bill (see Table).

Image 6. Cornerstone/foundation stone of the Port of Yokohama (author supplied) 

Along with this rapid development in internal improvement, a similar pattern of incentives and penalties was used in ports, rail, shipbuilding, communication, electrical industries, textiles, low-end tool manufactures, steam-machinery and later chemical, metal products, and machinery. Through the direct import and development of British technology, the textile sector (at first silk production and exportation), in particular, expanded to occupy nearly 30 percent of value-added manufactures throughout the 1890 to 1930 period, the next largest, at 16 percent, was food and drink (Beasley, 1995: 110; Reischauer and Craig, 1989: 149). Under the new Meiji policy-loan scheme the increase in the share of total manufacturing output in the GDP grew from 13.7 percent in 1873-1874 to 43.7 percent in 1930-1939. Furthermore, through sustained technological importation and innovation, manufacturing rose from 6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) by 1900 to 30 percent by 1945. Fukui, 1992: 202.

Image 7. Public history of Yokohama’s original railway service between Yokohama and Shinagawa, displayed at Sakuragicho Station (author supplied)

Image 8. C11 292 steam locomotive outside Shimbashi Station, Minato (author supplied) 

Table: Meiji Infrastructure Development 1868-1912: Transportation (Rail, Ports and Steam Vessels) and the Communications Revolution (the Telegraph) takes shape Japan.

  • National-Political: Rail, Ports and the Telegraph would tie the nation together and enabled the Meiji regime through a network of rail-telegraph to expand its reach into the most remote of villages. The Meiji elite coming from isolated regional provinces themselves fully understood the political importance of rapid and effective communication from the centre to the periphery, and vice versa to the permanency of their regime.
  • The first railway link, from Tokyo to Yokohama, was solely government-funded under the Japan Railway Company (Nihon Tetsudo Kaisha) which itself was under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, with material-and-technical services provided by Great Britain. The budget was a truly astronomical £300,000 with British technology and expertise predominant, yet construction quality was often poor because of the inexperience of the Japanese workforce who would learn-by-doing. It would be an outright success with its first full year of operation 1873 (indecently 43 years after rails introduction in Britain): 1, 223,071 passengers: ¥395,988 in revenue with costs of ¥117,879. Frequency increased from 6 to 9 times daily: Freight was introduced in September 1873 (Free, 2008).
  • The Tokyo-Yokohama would see travel and transportation times in Japan go from 20 miles a day to 20-35 miles an hour. Japan had moved from the human-horsepower era that had existed for millennia into a new era of steam. In contemporary terms it was the equivalent to the quantum advancements taking place in relation to private enterprise space travel. An American R. P. Bridgens would be the foreign specialist architect who designed the original Shimbashi and Yokohama stations (Free, 2008).
  • The Kobe-Osaka-Kyoto line would be next and by December 1871 the survey line had been staked-out. In December 1873 authorization to begin construction of the line was given and involved extensive infrastructure development within the Kobe port itself and a series of through wrought iron river crossing bridges to be constructed. The Kobe-Osaka link was finalized in May 1874 and was extended further to Kyoto in September 1876.
  • National-Strategic: The rail-ports-telegraph nexus would enable the movement of Imperial troops, arms and other military resources across the nation in the most efficient manner possible to crush any domestic uprisings. The Meiji men were more than aware through extensive studies of the decisive role rail had played in delivering the Union military victory over the Confederacy in the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the increasing role of rail in continental European conflicts, including Bismarck’s decisive use of rail in the Franco-German War of 1870.
  • The critical role of rail-ports-telegraph in delivering strategic power would come to full fruition domestically when it proved decisive in crushing the Satsuma rebellion in 1877. The Meiji regime victory, and in particular the capacity of the Imperial Army and Navy to deliver unprecedented levels of men, arms and other resources to the battlefield through rail, ports and the telegraph, ended internal rebellion.
  • The crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion was to be the logistical schooling the Meiji regime would utilise for Japan’s movement of troops and resources via the development and advancement of rail, ports, the telegraph and steam-powered ocean-going vessels to Taiwan, Korea, Southern Manchuria, and China in the coming decades (Chang and Myer, August 1963). The port-rail-telegraph developments that had taken place throughout the 1870s-1780s would be replicated by Meiji men in these new colonial territories for the advancement of their nation’s interests.
  • In 1887, private capital was attracted by extending State assurances of capital return through railway-monopoly licenses, and re-nationalisation after twenty-five years.
  • The Railway Construction Act of 1892 saw the national network rise from 245 miles (1883) to 4,500 miles (1903), with 70 percent being constructed by private enterprise.
  • In 1906, state ownership was secured through the Railway Nationalisation Bill (Crawcour. 1988: 394).

The Telegraph

  • Commodore William Perry on his second trip to Japan in 1854 (Iokibe and Minohara, 2017) presented the Tokugawa shogunate with an embossing Morse Telegraph transmitter:

“After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, government leaders quickly decided to make the establishment of a telegraph service one of their top priorities. Two years later, a telegraph service between Tokyo and Yokohama was provided for the general public. The telegraph service expanded rapidly, and a nation-wide network was completed by 1878. Members of the Embassy (1872) were eager to meet and honour Morse; to their deep regret, he was taken ill and died while they were in Washington” (Editors in Kume, 1871-1873 Vol. 1: 80).

  • In mid-1872 a new telegraph line from Nagasaki to Shanghai to London to New York meant that news from Tokyo was quickly transmitted to Nagasaki and onto the rest of the world. An event in Tokyo could now be reported within a New York or Dutch newspaper 2 days later and vice versa. The Meiji Emperor and his inner circle were now able to be fully informed of events globally, most importantly strategic and military events amongst the great powers, like never before and would respond to these with new policies and initiatives reflective of the new speed of information.
  • Between 1883-1913 post offices rose from 3,500 to 7,000; 2.7 million telegrams in 1882 rose to 40 million in 1913; telephones which were introduced in 1890 with 400 subscribers and only two exchanges, by 1913 reached 200,000 subscribers with 1,046 exchanges. The government backed Tokyo Electrical Company expanded from 21,000 lamps in 1890 to 5 million in 1913 (Sydney, 1988: 394).

Image 9. Plaque commemorating the centenary of the commencement of international postal service from Yokohama Port (author supplied); 5-3 Nihonodori, Naka Ward, Yokohama, Kanagawa 231-8799, Japan.

Meiji International Trade Policy

Japan’s international trade policy, as an extension of its national elite’s ideology of Kokutai and broader industrial policy, has enjoyed continuity. Japan’s Meiji leaders and their successors have been “well aware that the country’s power and prestige were hostage to its ability to promote foreign trade” (Duus, 1988: 25). Unless Japan could undertake expansion of its manufacturing industries and sell its goods in the world market, it could not acquire the armaments and materials needed to secure its hold on power, and in time its expanding empire. The Japanese elite pragmatically acknowledged that they operated in a mercantile international environment dominated by the trading powers of Great Britain, The United States of America and continental Europe (Young, 1877-1879). Following the precedent set by Prussian/German administrators, export credit secured primarily through special banks operating under the purview of the MoF was utilised by the Meiji elite to achieve rapid trade development. The Meiji regime instituted export associations, establishing the Yokohama Specie Bank (1892) to facilitate foreign exchange transactions, subsidise export industries, strengthen consular economic reporting and construct an ocean-going merchant marine.

The Meiji elite divided trade strategy and the world into two separate spheres: one for trade and one for conquest. From the industrial world (Britain, Europe and the United States), it sought to acquire manufacturing technology and semi-manufactured goods and, in return, export primary goods (silk and tea) and labour-intensive craft products (Chang 1996, 2002). To the non-industrial world, primarily their Northeast and Southeast Asian regional neighbours, the Meiji elite in the early years of the regime sought to export inexpensive light-industry products, such as cotton, textiles and other assorted manufactured goods, and, in return, purchase raw materials and foodstuffs. In time through its colonial actions against it near-neighbours this process would be one of forced distribution and acquisition (Chang, 1963; Duss, 1995; Zohar, 2020; Tinello, 2021). While introducing importation regulations that assured technological transfer in relation to value-added products, the Meiji state advocated the open importation of raw materials for manufacturing. This is hardly surprising, as, with its limited-resource base, Japan found it imperative to maintain an open raw-material trade/forced acquisition (Yoshitake, 1986; Iriye, 1995; Teramoto and Minohara, 2017). Images 10 and 11 represent enduring examples of the early infrastructure through which the Meiji trade strategy was made possible. The Meiji men would make full use of their predecessor’s connections with the Dutch trading empire, utilising this knowledge as a platform upon which to build relations with the British Empire, United States of America, and continental European powers (as Image 11 depicts).

Image 10. Pictograph along the Nakashima River of the Nagasaki Canal Trading and Warehouse system (author supplied); 8 Uonomachi, Nagasaki, 850-0874, Japan.

Image 11. Current construction HSBC, built 1904, Former site Dutch Trading Quarters Nagasaki Dutch Trading House (author supplied); 4-27 Matsugaemachi, Nagasaki, 850-0921, Japan 

Japanese shipping would begin regular trade throughout East and Southeast Asia in the 1880s and with it came the Keiretsu, state banks and consular offices, all supported by the State Japanese Associations (Nihonjinkai). The easy-credit terms Japanese banks extended to Chinese enterprises ensured that, unlike their western counterparts, Japanese enterprises secured the Chinese-business networks throughout Southeast Asia. At the same time (1880s-90) the international-trade climate saw the major developed countries, including the United States, Britain and Germany, turn their backs on the limited free trade regime in existence and instead engage in increasing levels of mercantile public policy. This macroenvironmental shift in global trading conditions in turn forced the Meiji regime to maintain state finance-trade intervention in the form of extending finance across state-owned port, rail, telegraph, merchant marine and other trade-oriented development (Hoshi, 1995; Bix, 2000).

Japan’s Meiji leaders, having come to power as a direct response to their Tokugawa predecessor’s failure to maintain trade sovereignty in the face of the western imposed unequal treaties (1854 onwards), were “well aware that the country’s power and prestige were hostage to its ability to promote foreign trade” (Duus, 1988: 25). The Meiji elite having been the subject of western superior naval arms understood that unless Japan could sell its goods in the world it could not acquire the arms (modern rifles, artillery and shipping) needed to protect itself, enact its own sovereignty, and when possible, establish a future East Asian empire designed to enable a mass expansion of manufacturing and heavy industries. Only a network of domestic and regional port-rail-telegraph and other internal improvement infrastructure could secure this, and so, they were deemed to be nation-building projects by the Meiji men who cared little if they were enacted under either state or private activism but cared entirely that they come to timely fruition.

Image 12. Pictograph of the second arrival of Commodore Perry to Yokohama, located outside of the ‘Yokohama Archives of History’ Building (author supplied)

The Meiji elite divided trade strategy and the world into two separate spheres. From the industrial world (Britain, the United States and continental Europe), it sought to acquire manufacturing technology and semi-manufactured goods and from the non-industrial world (primarily its Asian regional neighbours) it purchased raw materials and foodstuffs. Even before it established itself as colonial ruler of Taiwan in 1890, and later Korea in 1910, through state-financing Japanese shipping began regular trade throughout East Asia in the 1880s. Doing so through its forced acquisition of the Loo-Choo Islands (incorporated into the Okinawa Prefecture) in the late-1870s (Shuman, 2009; Studwell, 2013; Pilling, 2014; Ch’oe, 2015). With the Meiji-elite-driven expansion of East Asian shipping trade came further state-support for the Keiretsu trade enterprises via State banks, extensive consular offices and officials and a network supported through the State Japanese Associations (Nihonjinkai). The Japanese elite from 1868 until 1912 and onwards then pragmatically acknowledged the obvious; that they operated in a mercantile international environment dominated by the trading powers of Great Britain, the United States of America and an expansionary Germany, all of whom had either taken colonies or trade-concessions in the East Asian region (Tinello, 2021; Caprio, 2020; Zohar, 2020).

Conclusion: Meiji Japan’s Emergence as a World Economic Power

The images presented in this paper highlight and corroborate a public historical analysis enshrined in the enduring physical manifestations of the efforts of the Meiji government’s concerted nation building. These physical manifestations are critically important to understanding the history of Japan’s rise to developed nation status, but do not in of themselves tell the entire story of domestic political power struggles that themselves derived from the international powers’ dynamics, inclusive of being both subjected to and the executor of colonialism, occupation, and coercion, and eventually efforts toward full sovereignty. Contemporary Japanese society would not be possible without the efforts represented by the physical manifestations of Meiji history, which remain visible if even presented as a largely silent history to the citizens of Japan and its many visitors.

Japan, like all the other colonial powers, in extending its imperial ambitions defined its self-serving actions as very much within the ‘norm’ of international affairs (Ch’oe, 2015). Unlike the other colonial powers, however, it did so whilst it itself was the subject of colonialism in the form of the western state imposed unequal treaty system. Under such an international paradigm, the full restoration of national sovereignty stood at the apex of all state thinking and policy activity. The physical creation of import-export banks, ports, railways, postal and telegraph networks and vast internal improvements across the Japanese landscape being not an economic imperative in themselves but instead were the manifestation of the core national geo-political strategic directive: the restoration of the full sovereignty of the nation under the Emperor’s rule.

Even with Meiji-European powers treaty revisions in the first decade of the twentieth century, that restored much of the sovereignty Japan had long been denied, equality between the rising Asian power and the established international powers would prove elusive. The western powers, even after the Japanese Navies’ defeat of Russian forces in 1905, held firm on the belief that they held ascendancy within the international realm in perpetuity (Kowner, 2022). To do otherwise was to acknowledge that it was not their race and their belief in the inherent superiority, it bestowed upon them, that made colonialism a legitimate act of international public policy but simply their current position within the industrial revolution that delivered to them superior arms: and this the western powers simply could not do. Their entire domestic and international regimes, inclusive of political, economic and social structures, relied upon this self-perception of racial superiority. This race-developmental advancement nexus would be no less the case than with the Meiji men as they commenced Japan’s construction of its East Asian sphere of influence, and their successors drive towards war across Asia and ultimately unconditional defeat in 1945 (Chang and Myer, 1963; Duus, 1995).

The success of the Meiji regime elite in placing Japan on the road to unprecedented rapid economic development is for all to see in the public history displayed within the port districts of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki. Silence marks the history of how important these port-rail-communications developments were to the restoration of Japan’s own sovereignty and the simultaneous stripping away of others. As stated above these developmental achievements were the product of the larger goal of national sovereignty and crucially were the product of the Meiji elite being left to its own domestic reform agenda. Whilst limited in key areas because of the western powers imposition of the unequal treaty system, the Meiji men were able to implement public policy that was ultimately pragmatic, quickly altering policies when they proved to be detrimental to state building and economic development and pursuing with vigour those deemed essential to national sovereignty and security (Kume, 1871-1873; Yoshitake, 1986). In the international realm the ports-rail-telegraph nexus would prove critical to enacting colonialism over Taiwan and Korea largely uninterrupted from western power interference, and further into Manchuria and China which in stark contrast met with fierce western powers resistance (Ch’oe, 2015; Teramoto and Minohara, 2017).

International events would be critical to the Meiji regime’s thinking, and as military men themselves they keenly observed success in this field, so they took particular interest in the European powers’ colonial actions towards China from the 1840s onwards, the Union victory over Southern secessionist during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and Bismarck’s Prussian army’s crushing of France (1870-1871). In fact, the lesson of western might and power came to these men on their own shores. Whilst the industrial superior Union was at war with its rebellious southern countrymen it also made time in 1864 to join a flotilla of western naval power consisting of Britain, France, the Netherlands and itself to comprehensively dismantle the defences of the Choshu domain through sheer superior arms. In the year prior (1863) the British Royal Navy alone had bought the Satsuma domain to a position of forced negotiation. It was no accident that it was from these two domains, Satsuma and Chosun, that the majority of the Meiji regime men heralded from. The clear and unequivocal message from the western naval submission of Satsuma and Chosun and international events such as China’s humiliation at the hands of the industrial western powers and the Lincoln-led industrial northern victory over the southern plantocracy was the same: to remain an agrarian society was for Japan to be in perpetuity a mere pawn to the western financial-industrial nation-states. Put simply they acknowledged that you either became a power within the international realm, or you became a vassal state: with no real space in-between (Yoshitake, 1986; Morris-Suzuki, 1994; Fallows, 1995; Caprio, 2020; Zohar, 2020; Tinello, 2021).

The Meiji regime, therefore, would forge a trading system of export-financing, port infrastructure, rail and postal services/the telegraph celebrated today in public memory, that itself relied on the development and the strengthening of the state institutional capacity (governance, public policy execution, financial institutions, legal structures, private incentive systems, human-capital development and others) to ensure that this fate did not befall the Japanese nation (Masuyama, 1999: 16). The Meiji men did not require any theoretical exploration as to the essential nature of infrastructure development to their nation and their regime’s future. They themselves had been subjected to the power that the western industrial states could extend globally through their development of ports, rail and the telegraph, whilst their massive near regional neighbor, China, was experiencing its nineteenth century fate of being picked apart by the European powers precisely because of the collective failure of that nation’s leadership to execute effective internal improvements that would have enabled a large modern Chinese army and navy and resources through rail, port and communications (telegraph and other) developments to strategically counter this foreign encroachment.

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Dr Ian Austin is a Senior Lecturer at the School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia. He is the author of four manuscripts and two co-authored works on East Asian public policy and economic development. He has worked extensively in Asia for two decades.

Alexander Best is a PhD student and Sessional Academic at the School of Business and Law, Edith Cowan University in Perth, Western Australia. He holds a Bachelor of Event, Sport and Recreation Management (Hons), and a Diploma of Language Studies (majoring in Japanese), which he completed as an Australian Government-awarded New Colombo Plan Scholar (2016) based in Kyoto, Japan.

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Notes

The authors of this work would like to thank Professor Mark E. Caprio of Rikkyo University, Japan, for his review of the paper which contributed to its improvement in every sense.

Under the Tokugawa regime unauthorised travel abroad saw the death penalty applied to anyone who returned home. Even those who made no conscious decision to leave, like fishermen swept away from Japan by vicious storms found themselves having to reside on foreign soil, never able to return under fear of execution.

On July 29th, 1858 the Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States had been signed on the U.S. Frigate Powhatan in Edo Bay with the inequity in military power between the two actors being abundantly clear to all.

Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kobe, Yokohama, Aomori, Hokkaido and other ports development, and Japan’s connection to the international trans-oceanic telegraph cable all proceeded apace under Meiji governance.

Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and Ministry of Finance (MoF).

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Sri Lanka was braced for more unrest after newly appointed president Ranil Wickremesinghe vowed to crack down on the protests that toppled his predecessor, condemning them as “against the law”.

Speaking after being MPs picked him as successor to Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Wickremesinghe made it clear he would not tolerate those he perceived to be stirring up violence.

“If you try to topple the government, occupy the president’s office and the prime minister’s office, that is not democracy; it is against the law,” he said.

“We will deal with them firmly according to the law. We will not allow a minority of protesters to suppress the aspirations of the silent majority clamoring for a change in the political system.”

Wickremesinghe is expected to name the leader of the parliament and old schoolmate Dinesh Gunawardena as prime minister on Thursday. Gunawardena is known as a strong Rajapaksa loyalist, and served as a cabinet when Mahinda Rajapaksa was president, and then again when Gotabaya Rajapaksa was president.

In recent days, Wickremesinghe, who declared a state of emergency this week, had made statements calling protesters “fascists” and indicating he would not be afraid to crack down on the demonstrations.

Less than an hour after he was declared president on Wednesday, a court order was issued prohibiting anyone from congregating within a 50-metre radius of a statue that stands at Galle Face in Colombo, where protesters spurred by the country’s economic collapse have been camped out for months.

People Defy Order

However, people defied the order and dozens gathered on the steps of the president’s offices, which are still occupied by the protest movement, to shout rallying cries of “deal Ranil” – a reference to Wickremesinghe’s reputation as a scheming politician – as well as “Ranil bank robber”, referring to a bank bond scam he was implicated in. Hundreds of police and military stood on the periphery but did not interfere in the rally.

After being selected by MPs as president, Wickremesinghe called on the opposition parties for an “end to division” and said he wanted to “bring everyone together so that a national consensus is formed as to the way forward”.

But questions remain over whether Wickremesinghe would be able to put together a cross-party unity government acceptable to the people, after the major opposition parties had pledged their support for the presidential candidate he defeated.

Wickremesinghe has been prime minister six times and is close to the Rajapaksa family. Protesters fear that he will protect the Rajapaksas from being held accountable, as he has been accused of doing in the past, and would not instigate the constitutional change being demanded by the protest movement, including an end to the system of executive presidency.

Wickremesinghe is due to serve for the rest of Rajapaksa’s term, until November 2024.

Ranil Does Not Have Mandate

“Ranil will be chased away, he is a crook and he does not have a mandate,” said Anura Goonaratna, 53, a toy exporter. “This protest movement is going to get worse. There has to be an end to this and the only ending we will accept is throwing Ranil out, whatever it takes.”

China’s Loan

Analysts have disputed the China debt-trap narrative in Sri Lanka. China only accounts for 10% of Sri Lanka’s debts, most of which were concessionary loans and the repayments only accounted for less than 5% of the country’s annual foreign debt servicing.

US: High Interest Rate

A much greater drain on the country’s foreign exchange reserves were international sovereign bonds, much of which are from the US, which were borrowed by the country at high interest rates. It was these bond repayments – which were due to total over $1.5bn in 2022 – that drained Sri Lanka’s reserves and ultimately forced them to default in May, as the country was virtually bankrupt.

People Are Unhappy

Ranil Wickremesinghe’s election as President could again plunge Sri Lanka into another round of political unrest and instability.

Ranil has little credibility with the general public. In some places, protests called for Ranil Wickremesinghe to quit ahead of today’s elections but these were not mass rallies.

According to some analysts it may not be as easy to mobilize protests.

Anticipating possible demonstrations, the Colombo Port Magistrate’s Court issued an order Wednesday preventing anyone from reaching within a 50 meter radius of the S.W.R.D. Bandarnaike statute which is located at the protest site at the Galle face green in the capital.

Neither Ranil nor the members of parliament have credibility with the voters.

The fear is that this may lead to another round of street protests, calling for Ranil to quit.

Sri Lanka at the moment can ill afford another political turmoil when the President and the new government he appoints has to focus on getting the economy back on track. That won’t be an easy job. Much will depend on whether the protesters are back on the street and how the President tackles the fresh volley of unrest.

Rumor mills in Sri Lankans are now pointing fingers at New Delhi for ensuring Wickremesinghe’s victory.

Denying these charges, the Indian High Commission in Colombo tweeted : “We have seen baseless and purely speculative media reports about efforts at political level from India to influence political leaders in Sri Lanka regarding elections in the Sri Lankan Parliament to the post of the President of Sri Lanka.’’ And again “(We) categorically deny these media reports as completely false. They are clearly a figment of someone’s imagination.” Another tweet said that India   “does not interfere in internal affairs and democratic processes of another country”.

Numbers in Parliament Do not Depict True Composition On The Ground: Says AKD

Claiming that the composition of Parliament did not represent the true desire of the people, NPP leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake reiterated that an opportunity should be given for a new mandate as there was no genuineness for any form of government established in the current Parliament.

He told Parliament that the composition which is shown through numbers in Parliament was not the real composition on the ground.

“There is a huge contradiction between the desire of the people outside and the Parliament,” he said. He said they always stood for an interim government for a short period of time headed by a President and a Prime Minister who had no future political agendas.

He said however, they failed to come to a consensus despite discussions with several political parties. Dissanayake alleged that MPs had been bought over this time also just as in the past.

“When I saw the number of parties extending support for Dullas Alahapperuma, I thought he would received more than 113 votes. It is now clear that the members in the political parties do not always stay with the policies of the parties. We have a past where MPs were sold for money. This situation has not changed,” he said.

Our Candidate Could not Win: Rajapaksa

Former President Mahinda Rajapaksa said that his party’s candidate was unable to win the Presidential election in Parliament yesterday.

“We presented Dullas. We voted for him, but lost. Somebody has to win,” he told media in Parliament.

“He (Ranil) got more votes, so he became the President. That’s what has happened. We are waiting to see what will happen in the future. Whatever the government is, it must work for the people of the country,” he said.

“There are different opinions. Some say this is the opinion of the people. We say this is not the opinion of the people,” he also said.

Commenting about the protesters, the former President said “I think the struggle is over now. The youth who are engaged in the struggle at Galle Face must understand that now. They must now leave and get on with their work,” the former Premier said

Arson Attack On Ranil’s Private Residence: Four Suspects Remanded

Four suspects arrested over the incident of setting fire to Acting President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s private residence in Colombo were yesterday remanded till July 27 by Colombo Fort Magistrate’s Court.

These four suspects are to be produced before an identification parade on  the next hearing date.

Defence Counsel appearing for the suspects alleged that police have failed to arrest the main suspect involved in the incident. In reply, the CID informed Colombo Fort Magistrate Thilina Gamage that an individual named Ivan Perera wanted for questioning over the incident has already fled the country and further said the airport authorities have been informed in this regard.

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Inside Australian Labor’s Assange Game Plan

July 20th, 2022 by Kellie Tranter

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“Quiet diplomacy”, a “soft approach”, a “loud approach” and “avoiding megaphone diplomacy” have all been floated as strategies to “bring to an end” the case against WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange. In situations like his, the best form of diplomacy is that which produces results most favourable to the citizen involved and at the same time keeps them safe and in good health.

But government documents obtained this week by Declassified Australia under the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act from the Attorney-General’s Department, indicate the new Labor Government does certainly not rule out the physical extradition of Assange from the United Kingdom to the United States, nor does it give any hint about how it might deal with possible fallout from that.

On 15 May 2022, Senator Penny Wong told the National Press Club, “Certainly we would encourage, were we elected, the US Government to bring this matter to a close, but ultimately that is a matter for the Administration.” Daniel Hurst, journalist at the Guardian Australia, attempted to seek clarity on what ‘bring this matter to a close’ meant but the question went unanswered.

The FOI documents obtained include ‘Talking Points’ prepared for the Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus on 2 June 2022 titled, ‘Julian Assange – International Transfer of Prisoners process – talking points and background’. They point out that:

Prisoner transfers cannot be agreed between governments in advance of a person being a prisoner (after a criminal trial, conviction and sentencing) in a particular country, and require the consent of the prisoner;

International prisoner transfers to Australia are initiated by an application from a prisoner after the prisoner has been convicted and sentenced;

If surrendered, convicted and sentenced in the US, Assange could apply under the ITP scheme to serve his sentence in Australia;

After some redactions the document continues: However, the UK High Court’s judgment does note that the US has provided an assurance that they will consent to Mr Assange being transferred to Australia to serve any custodial sentence on him if he is convicted.

This document is a list of Talking Points and Background information on Julian Assange and the International Transfer of Prisoners Scheme, prepared for Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus. It outlines conditions for the potential transfer of Julian Assange from the US to Australia, following extradition from the UK, trial, conviction, and sentencing in the US. (Image: Document provided through FOI, Attorney-General’s Department)

The FOI documents also show that on 8 June 2022, the Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, signed a ‘Ministerial Submission’ titled ‘Julian Assange – extradition request from the United States to the United Kingdom’ which recommended that the Attorney-General note the current status of the Julian Assange extradition proceedings in the UK, including that:

  1. The matter is currently with the UK Secretary of State for the Home Department for a decision on the extradition by 20 June 2022 (that deadline can be extended on application to the Court).
  1. The UK Supreme Court determined in March 2022 that Mr Assange is eligible for surrender to the US by refusing him leave to appeal against the High Court’s decision of December 2021.
  1. If Mr Assange is extradited, convicted and sentenced in the US, he may apply for transfer to Australia under the International Transfer of Prisoner’s Scheme. This will require the consent of the US and Australian authorities.
  1. The UK High Court’s judgment notes that the US has provided an assurance that it will consent to Mr Assange being transferred to Australia to serve any custodial sentence imposed on him if he is convicted.

Under the heading ‘Key Issues’ the document notes:

‘The UK Home Secretary is due to make a final decision on Mr Assange’s extradition to the US by 20 June. Mr Assange will have one final avenue of appeal with the leave of the High Court, otherwise he must be extradited within 28 days of the Secretary of State’s decision.’

This document is a Ministerial Submission on the International Transfer of Prisoners Scheme prepared for the Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus, and signed by him on 8 June 2022. (Image: Document provided through FOI, Attorney-General’s Department)

Furthermore,

‘If Mr Assange is convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in the US, it will be possible for him to apply under the ITP scheme to serve the remainder of his sentence in Australia. A transfer would also require the consent of the US, the Australian Government (through you as Attorney-General), and the relevant minister in the state into whose prison Mr Assange would be transferring.

In making any such decision, the department would provide you with advice on factors such as the extent to which the transfer would assist the prisoner’s rehabilitation, sentence enforcement, community safety and any relevant humanitarian considerations, in addition to any conditions of transfer required by the US.’

Information under the headings ‘Government representations and consulate engagement’ and ‘Key risks and mitigation’ are heavily redacted so one cannot tell whether the Australian Government has specifically asked the United States to drop the case against Assange or taken into account things like Assange’s medical condition. A review by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) has been sought to try to get access to the redacted information.

Presumably, one of the key risks that must be considered by the Australian Government is the risk of suicide.

In the judgment of presiding UK District Judge, Vanessa Baraitser, she outlines the evidence provided by Professor Michael Kopelman, emeritus professor of neuropsychiatry at King’s College London and until 31 May 2015, a consultant neuropsychiatrist at St Thomas’s Hospital, who carried out a comprehensive investigation of Assange’s psychiatric history.

He considered there to be an abundance of known risk factors indicating a very high risk of suicide including the intensity of Mr Assange’s suicidal preoccupation and the extent of his preparations. Importantly, he stated:

“I am as confident as a psychiatrist ever can be that, if extradition to the United States were to become imminent [emphasis added], Mr Assange will find a way of suiciding.”

It is worth noting that the District Judge, Vanessa Baraitser, accepted the medical opinion of Professor Kopelman and found him to be ‘impartial’ and ‘dispassionate’.

If the extradition in and of itself is a trigger for suicide, then any discussions about where Assange may be housed on US soil pre- and post-trial and under what restrictive measures becomes completely immaterial.

The presence of large redactions in the documents may suggest that, despite the medical evidence, the government has not ruled out the extradition of Assange to US soil.

The imprecise language of the Labor government statements on using “quiet diplomacy” to “bring the matter to a close”, rather than clearly saying what they are seeking, may be giving false hope to the Australian public. Without putting forward its “quiet diplomacy” in non-negotiable terms to the US, it may be that the dropping of charges will not even be considered.

On 17 June 2022 a Joint Statement of Foreign Minister, Senator Penny Wong, and Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, was released. It noted that:

We will continue to convey our expectations that Mr Assange is entitled to due process, humane and fair treatment, access to proper medical care, and access to his legal team.

The Australian Government has been clear in our view that Mr Assange’s case has dragged on for too long and that it should be brought to a close. We will continue to express this view to the governments of the United Kingdom and United States.

On 28 June 2022, the Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, told ABC Radio National’s Law Report that:

The United States has long legislated in an extraterritorial way and I think that all other countries have understood that for a long time.

What we have in the case of Julian Assange is an Australian citizen, who is presently held in a British jail, who is subject to an extradition request made by the United States of America, which has an extradition treaty with the United Kingdom. It is not open to the Australian Government to directly interfere with either the jailing of Mr Assange in the United Kingdom, or the extradition request that’s been made by the United States to the United Kingdom.

What is available to an Australian Government, and the Prime Minister has made this very clear, and I’ve said this as well, we think that the case of Julian Assange has gone on for far too long. What is available to the Australian Government is making diplomatic representations.

But as the Prime Minister has said, those diplomatic representations are best done in private…. it’s about what we can put to the United States Government, which is the moving party here.

If extradited from the UK, and then tried and convicted in the US, Assange faces a cumulative total of up to 175 years imprisonment. His charges attract a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison on each count of violating the US’s Espionage Act of 1917and a maximum penalty of five years for the single count of conspiracy to commit computer intrusion.

The ‘International Transfer of Prisoners Statement of Policy’ states – among other things – that:

A parole eligibility date will be determined as part of the sentence enforcement in Australia. The earliest possible release date in the sentencing country will be enforced as the parole eligibility date. If an earliest possible release date has not been determined by the sentencing country, Australia will propose a non-parole period that is 66 per cent of the original sentence imposed by the foreign country.

However, if the original sentence imposed by the foreign country significantly exceeds the maximum head sentence that could be imposed in Australia for a similar offence, Australia will propose a non-parole period that equates to 66 per cent of the maximum sentence that could be imposed in Australia for a similar offence.

Release on parole will be discretionary in accordance with the relevant Australian processes and laws. Where possible, the parole eligibility date will be at least 12 months before the sentence expiry date.

Some draw parallels to the case of David Hicks, an Australian who had received militant training in Afghanistan before being detained by US forces in December 2001, and who was subsequently incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay detention camp from 2002 to 2007.

But they place no weight on the fact that Hicks did not want to plead guilty to any offence, in any plea deal to free him. In his book, Guantanamo: My Journey, Hicks wrote:

If I refused to sign these new extra documents the Australian government would not take me. The consular official threatened me with this himself and [lawyer Michael] Mori agreed and said I had no choice. I did not want to sign anything or have anything to do with the commissions or plea deals, but my fear of being left behind was great. Once again I was forced into doing something I did not want to do.

Julian Assange will no doubt take a similarly principled approach in any negotiations and may well refuse to agree to any plea deal.

One can see why a plea to an offence carrying a lower maximum term such as conspiracy to commit computer intrusion, with a non-parole period and sentence to be served in Australia, would be attractive to a new Government which wants to avoid offending an ally and says it is eager to ‘bring the matter to an end’ on negotiated terms without Government pronouncements.

But this requires the Australian Government to accept assurances contradicted by everything the United States has done to Assange for over a decade, and by its previous failure to comply with its own assurances in other cases, to ignore the medical opinion of Professor Kopelman and risk of Assange’s extradition-related suicide, to turn a blind eye to the fact that the US has not adopted or incorporated into its domestic law the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court against the ‘crime against humanity’ of ‘torture’, and to assume that Assange himself will co-operate in the process.

Moreover, Greg Barns SC, Adviser to the Australian Assange Campaign, makes a critical point. He told Declassified Australia that, “The Assange case is unique. One of the ways in which that is the case is the attempted extraterritorial use of the US Espionage Act. The US is seeking to establish a precedent where it could seek to extradite any journalist anywhere in the world for disclosure of US information.

“If Australia were to sanction a ‘deal’ whereby Assange pleaded guilty to a charge in exchange for an Australian served sentence, it would be endorsing that approach.”

At the end of the day, the Australian Government should come clean with the Australian people about what the representations made to the United States, or ‘quiet diplomacy’, actually involve.

Surely we are entitled to see that the Government has done as much for securing Assange’s freedom from our alleged ‘great ally’ as it did for other ‘political detainees’ of non-allied regimes, like Peter Greste jailed in Egypt, and Kylie Moore-Gilbert jailed in Iran.

“Quiet diplomacy” does not mean weak diplomacy.

Is Australia urging the United States in non-negotiable terms to give priority to human rights and press freedom over any intelligence service-based vendetta or US domestic political considerations, and drop the case against Assange completely?

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KELLIE TRANTER is a lawyer, researcher, and human rights advocate. She tweets from @KellieTranter View all posts by

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On July 12, Philippine Vice President and Education Secretary Sara Duterte (daughter of former President Rodrigo Duterte who employed a militaristic approach to combatting COVID-19) mandated a full resumption of face-to-face classes in all public and private schools in November 2022. To say that the last two years of pure distance learning (self-learning modules) is problematic and likely ineffective is reasonable, for without literate guardians, school-age children struggle in the process of individual learning. Therefore, the decision to transition to full face-to-face classes soon is only necessary for the development of well-rounded Filipino children.

Several critics lambasted the decision amidst the current surge in COVID-19 cases in the country. However, Dr. Mary Ann Bunyi, president of the Pediatric Infectious Diseases Society of the Philippines, said in 2021 that children who contracted COVID-19 accounted for “less than 10 percent of the country’s total cases.” She added that children have strong resistance to the coronavirus disease, where those infected only manifest mild symptoms. Against this scientific evidence, VP and EduSec Duterte maintained that pediatric vaccination is not mandatory and “co-mingling of vaccinated and unvaccinated learners will be allowed in the classrooms.

In conjunction with the VP’s pronouncement, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared that overall mandatory vaccination is not necessary and that a law is not required, acknowledging the public’s right to self-determination. Nonetheless, he still advocates for vaccination and the benefits one gets from getting vaccinated, essentially turning a blind eye to cases of adverse events and deaths. His administration also plans for a massive vaccination campaign to be spearheaded by the Department of Health, Department of the Interior and Local Government, and the Department of Education.

The “mandatory vaccination” buzzword is often denied by the national administration but is de facto implemented in systemic levels, giving workers in both government agencies and private sector[1] two options: get vaccinated or get terminated. If President Marcos Jr. is straightforward in his non-mandatory vaccination strategy, he must shape a more rigorous policy that penalizes employers pursuing mandatory vaccination. After all, didn’t he say, “We don’t really need to pass it into a law because we can still choose what’s best for our own health”?

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Jezile Torculas has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science. She is an Assistant Editor at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Note

[1] Does not refer to the entire private sector

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On Thursday, the Sri Lanka government announced a curfew in the capital Colombo and its suburbs that would run until 5am on Friday. To stop demonstrators from accessing the Parliament on Thursday, the Sri Lankan Army stationed tanks close to the building. Troops in green military uniforms and camouflage vests arrived by armored personnel carriers on Thursday to reinforce barricades around the parliament.

Organizers of the protest fear a crackdown could be imminent after Prime Minister Wickremesinghe branded some protesters “fascists” in an address the previous evening.

The government has imposed a curfew in Colombo from noon on Thursday to early morning on Friday in a bid to prevent further unrest. Local media showed armored vehicles with soldiers atop patrolling the city’s streets.

The military said troops were empowered to use force to protect people and public property.

Protesters were withdrawing from the presidential palace after taking hold of it over the weekend.

Do Whatever Necessary, PM Tells Military

PM Wickremesinghe has told the military to do “whatever is necessary to restore order” after protesters stormed his office on Wednesday.

In a television address, Wickremesinghe called on protesters to leave his occupied office and other state buildings and co-operate with authorities.

Outside the president’s office armed soldiers stood by impassively watching the protesters celebrate inside the office.

Demonstrators earlier ignored the PM’s calls for the office to be emptied.

Wickremesinghe said he had formed a committee including the police and military chiefs to de-escalate the situation.

Rajapaksa Leaves the Maldives

Sri Lanka’s embattled President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, has left the Maldives after fleeing his own country amid mass protests demanding he resign over his country’s economic collapse.

Rajapaksa boarded a Saudia flight on Thursday bound for Singapore.

Sri Lankans are in political uncertainty, anger and confusion on Thursday as they find president of the country is yet to resign although he fled the country.

Earlier, demonstrators clashed with security officers who fired tear gas into the air.

On Wednesday, even as Ranil Wickremesinghe took over as acting president, he faced protesters’ anger amid chants of ‘Go Ranil, Go!”, reports said.

The protesters have demanded that the planned interim government must only consist of politicians acceptable to them.

Politicians from other parties have been talking about forming a new unity government but there is no sign they are near agreement yet. It is also not clear if the public would accept what they come up with.

The crisis-hit island nation is in political flame over an economic meltdown leading to political chaos and confusion. Millions are struggling to buy food, medicine, fuel and essentials.

Political instability has intensified in the country facing the worst-ever economic challenge in seven decades.

President Rajapaksa and his wife fled to the Maldives on Wednesday aboard an air force jet. The absconding president made the PM acting president in his absence — a move that has further escalated the political crisis, angered the public, which has triggered a fresh wave of protests. The decision to leave him in charge sparked further protests demanding that the PM must also go. Many blame Wickremesinghe as part of the problem.

On Wednesday, protesters, undeterred by multiple rounds of tear gas, scaled the walls to enter the office of PM Wickremesinghe as the crowd outside cheered in support and tossed water bottles to them.

Protesters took turns posing at the PM’s desk or stood on a rooftop terrace waving the Sri Lankan flag after the latest in a series of takeovers of government buildings by the demonstrators — who see the political maneuvers as delaying their goal of a new government for a nation of 22 millions.

Late on Wednesday night, crowds also gathered outside the Parliament.

Resign, Yet To Be Materialized

Over the weekend, the president and the PM promised they would resign.

The protesters are furious both to the president and the PM. The protesters accuse the PM Wickremesinghe of protecting the president.

Wickremesinghe has said he will not leave until a new government is in place. He has urged the speaker of parliament to find a new PM acceptable to both the ruling and opposition parties.

On Wednesday the Parliament Speaker said that the President in a telephone conversation had informed that he would tender his letter of resignation during the day, before midnight.

Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena said that he informed the President to submit his letter of resignation as soon as possible, citing that he too is under pressure.

He said that since an Acting President has been appointed, the Office of the Speaker is exploring the legal provisions to consider the option of ‘have vacated his post’ if the President does not tender in his letter of resignation.

A Spokesperson from the Sri Lanka Parliament said that given that the President had not yet tendered his letter of resignation, it is uncertain if Parliament would be convened tomorrow, July 15.

The PM’s Media Division on Wednesday said that the Acting President has informed Speaker Abeywardena to nominate a Prime Minister who is acceptable to both the Government and Opposition.

Rajapaksa could send his resignation to the speaker of the Sri Lankan parliament after landing in Singapore.

Leadership In A Bankrupt Country

Last week, PM Wickremesinghe said Sri Lanka is now a bankrupt country.

The main opposition leader Sajith Premadasa told he would be tilting for the presidency. But he, like Wickremesinghe, lacks public support. There is also deep public suspicion of politicians in general.

The protest movement which has brought Sri Lanka to the brink of change also does not have an obvious contender for the country’s leadership.

It is unclear when that might happen since the opposition is deeply fractured. But assuming that Rajapaksa resigns as planned, Sri Lankan lawmakers have agreed to elect a new president on July 20 who will serve the remainder of Rajapaksa’s term, which ends in 2024. That person could potentially appoint a new prime minister, who would then have to be approved by Parliament.

As per Sri Lanka’s constitution, Rajapaksa’s resignation would only be considered official once the speaker of the parliament receives a letter stating it.

The political confusion continues threatening the bankrupt economy’s collapse since the absence of an alternative government could delay a hoped-for bailout from the International Monetary Fund. In the meantime, the country is relying on aid from neighboring India and from China.

Nominations for the top post will be presented before parliament starting July 19, then a vote will be taken to elect a new president a day later, according to the speaker.

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Jayantha Jayasuriya will then swear in the next president. The date of the swearing in is typically chosen by the new elected president.

Key Administrative Buildings Occupied

On Wednesday, for the second time in less than a week, protesters broke into a highly secure state building. This time it was the prime minister’s office.

The protesters continued to occupy the key administrative buildings they had seized since Saturday.

The protesting people in the PM’s office lounged on plush sofas snapping photos, while others stood on chairs and desks waving the Sri Lankan flag.

The protesters stressed that they would only hand over the properties to authorities after an interim government would be in place.

At the colonial-era PM’s office, people could be seen on the balcony, lighting firecrackers and waving the Sri Lankan flag.

Demonstrators outside demanded that neither the President nor the Prime Minister “be spared.”

As tensions ran high, the national broadcaster went off air after it was seized by agitators, according to a Bloomberg report.

In Colombo, a handful of protesters also entered the premises of state broadcaster Sri Lanka Rupavahini on Wednesday, negotiating a “deal” with broadcast staff to not give airtime to politicians such as Wickremesinghe. The broadcaster instead played history and culture programs.

1 Dead 84 Hospitalized

Media reports said one person died during clash with security forces.

At least 84 people were hospitalized when protesters clashed with the security forces at the PM’s office and at the main access junction to Parliament since mid-afternoon on Wednesday after Rajapaksa fled the country.

The police fired tear gas and water cannons at the mob who were trying to break barriers and enter the restricted zone.

A nurse at the hospital told CNN that many people were brought in due to tear gas inhalation, while others had cuts and bruises likely received when trying to jump over fences. The nurse did not confirm any gunshot injuries.

A police spokesman said protesters had grabbed a T56 firearm and 60 bullets from a Sri Lanka Army soldier.

Wednesday’s protests were more directed at Wickremesinghe. Calls for his resignation intensified after he was appointed the acting president.

Political party leaders are asking him to step down so that Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena can take control as acting president.

President Rajapaksa was likely to send his resignation letter only after reaching his final destination on Wednesday evening, Sri Lanka’s The Morning news portal reported.

General’s Call For Calm

With the country in disarray, Chief of Defense Staff Gen. Shavendra Silva called for calm and for cooperation with security forces.

Similar comments have rankled opposition lawmakers, who insisted that civilian leaders would be the ones to find a solution.

Buddhist Clergy Chiefs

The influential Buddhist clergy chiefs in a statement called for an end to violence. They said the country’s security was in grave danger and Parliament must be summoned immediately to work out a political solution.

Rajapaksa’s Family Members

After the president fled to the Maldives the whereabouts of other Rajapaksa family members who had served in the government were unclear.

Protesters accuse the president and his relatives of siphoning money from government coffers for years and Rajapaksa’s administration of hastening the country’s collapse by mismanaging the economy.

The family has denied the corruption allegations, but Rajapaksa acknowledged some of his policies contributed to the meltdown, which has left the country laden with debt and unable to pay for imports of basic necessities.

Negotiation On Escape

Rajapaksa’s escape to the Maldives was negotiated by the Maldivian Majlis (Parliament) Speaker and former president Mohamed Nasheed, sources in the Maldives capital Male said.

Gotabaya, his wife and two bodyguards were the four passengers aboard a military aircraft, news agency AFP reported, citing military sources.

Maldivian air traffic control refused the plane’s request to land until an intervention by Mohamed Nasheed. A spokesperson for Nasheed did not confirm or deny the intervention.

Sri Lanka’s Air Force on Wednesday confirmed Rajapaksa’s departure, saying in a statement: “Pursuant to the request of the government and in accordance with the powers vested in a President in the Constitution of Sri Lanka, the Sri Lanka air force provided a plane early today to fly the President, his wife and two security officials to the Maldives.”

Rajapaksa was previously blocked from departing Bandaranaike International Airport, on Monday after refusing to join a public immigration queue, a high-ranking military source told CNN.

Aides for Rajapaksa arrived at the airport in Colombo on Monday with 15 passports belonging to the President and members of his family — including First Lady Ioma Rajapaksa — who had booked seats on a Sri Lankan Airlines flight leaving for Dubai at 6:25 p.m. local time, according to the military source.

But immigration officers declined to process the passports given to them by presidential aides, as Rajapaksa and his family were not physically present for cross checks. Eventually, the flight departed without the President and his family on board, the source added.

Another attempt was made to get the family on an Etihad flight scheduled to leave Colombo for Abu Dhabi at 9:20 p.m. local, according to the source, however the same problem occurred, as the Rajapaksas refused to join the public immigration queue for the flight.

In both instances, the Rajapaksa family was in a nearby airport lounge, waiting for confirmation they could board without queuing among members of the public, the source said.

On Tuesday, a video released by a former police officer claimed that Rajapaksa was staying in a private house belonging to a top air force commander. The Sri Lanka Air Force has denied the claim, describing it as propaganda intended to tarnish the image of the corps and its chief.

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APR Editor’s Note

While the current energy and food crisis contributed greatly to Sri Lanka’s economic collapse, it must be emphasized that the COVID-19 pandemic has already crippled the global economy, resulting in the impoverishment of people worldwide.

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The people’s movement in Sri Lanka that converged in the last three months achieved its main objective on July 9 with President Nandasena Gotabhaya Rajapakse’s offer to resign.

On this historic day, about 100,000 people gathered in Colombo in a mass mobilisation. They engaged in non-violent direct action against a heavily-armed military and police force and occupied Rajapakse’s office, his official residence, as well as Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s official residence. This was an organised expression of popular frustration and anger, due to electricity cuts, fuel and gas shortages, and the rising costs of essential consumer goods.

The night before the main mobilisation, police enforced a curfew on Colombo and surrounding districts. The Bar Association of Sri Lanka immediately issued a statement claiming the curfew was “blatantly illegal and a violation of the fundamental rights of the people”. On the morning of the mobilisation, the station masters were ordered by the defence department — which sits under the president — to suspend train services. The railway unions, including the Station Masters’ Union opposed the suspension of services, but were duty bound. However, when crowds of protesters agitated at the stations, the station masters agreed to resume services.

Many people couldn’t travel to Colombo because of fuel shortages, which have paralysed public buses as well as rail transport. Some people held protests in their own towns. Many walked from different parts of the country and some used bicycles. Some started their journey the previous day from their towns. There were numerous walking caravans and rallies organised in the days leading up to the July 9 mass mobilisation.

This was a mobilisation of citizens emphasising diversity and solidarity, without the intervention of any political parties, and built by a range of dispersed protests that began nearly three months ago.

Convergence of spontaneous protests

The movement emerged in early March with people engaging in non-violent silent protests, holding placards and candles in the evening, as electricity cuts and other shortages were affecting their daily lives. In late March, a collective of activists occupied a struggle zone, known as the Gota Go Gama (Gota Go Village, GGG) in Galle Face, adjacent to the president’s office in the commercial and public administrative centre of Colombo. This followed a peaceful protest in front of the president’s private residence, during which the police used tear gas and water cannons, escalating the struggle.

The activists at GGG articulated the struggle as a non-violent, peaceful protest, independent of political parties. Among the activists were citizen journalists, social media activists, artists, students, religious leaders, lawyers, civil society activists and labour activists. These activists also overlapped with a range of feminists, environmentalists and human rights activists. Some activists were informed by the Arab Spring struggles against authoritarian regimes, global anti-austerity struggles since 2010, and the 2011 Occupy Wall Street movement.

The concept of the GGG soon spread to other urban centres, mainly around Colombo, and the Western Province, the most densely populated part of the island. These were generally led by local youth protesting in a town, in some cases with permanent tents as a gathering point, with loose coordination with other GGGs.

The activists’ target was the president, who is accused of war crimes, assassinations of dissenters, theft and waste of public funds and fomenting patriarchal Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. Elected in 2019, Rajapakse’s three brothers and nephew joined him in the government formed after the 2020 parliamentary elections. Following the 2019 Easter Sunday Bombing, his promise to strengthen national security was a key strategy to gain political power. A former military officer, Rajapakse was also considered a “war hero”and commanded the respect and authority of his supporters.

However, within less than three years, this authoritarian kleptocrat has endured a humiliating defeat by an organised popular peaceful protest movement.

Patrimonial culture engaged in state capture

Rajapakse was the target because he represents a regime that has undermined access to basic goods and remained insensitive to the suffering of the masses. His regime represents an authoritarian patrimonial culture engaged in state capture, where private firms gain access to profit-making activities sold by public officials and politicians. With the pretence of representing the people, the regime fostered a patron-client culture that used public resources to gain the loyalty of bureaucrats, business owners, Buddhist monks, artists, social media users and civil society actors, as well as voters.

After coming to power, Rajapakse passed a constitutional amendment (the 20th amendment) in October, 2020. This enabled him to appoint his allies in the military and business community into public institutions. He also reorganised a range of public institutions, bringing them under his authority.

Rather than direct privatisation, commercial activities were established within public services, including the military, with opportunities to profit from commissions. The president’s allies, with little experience or knowledge of the subject or field, were appointed to positions of power.

Although the regime was promoted as a system based on knowledge and professionalism, the regime directly undermined professions and the integrity of the public sector by restricting any dissent. It was strengthened through chauvinist Sinhala Buddhist ethno-nationalist tendencies that marginalised other ethnic and religious communities.

Rajapakse was a product of an authoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist military institutional setting. He joined the army in 1971, at the time of a youth insurrection. It was in response to this Sinhala youth insurrection and Tamil youth agitations in the North in the mid-1970s that the anti-democratic Prevention of Terrorism Act was introduced in 1979.

Nearly 35 years later — from 2005 to 2015, under the presidency of his elder brother, Mahinda — Rajapakse headed the Ministry of Defence and Urban Development. In 2009, he was involved in the military offensive that ended the anti-Tamil war in a blood bath, massacring 40,000–70,000 innocent Tamil civilians.

Rajapakse is directly accused of a range of crimes, including the assassination and disappearance of two journalists, Lasantha Wickrematunge and Pradeep Ekanaligoda. The images of the journalists, who were killed under Mahinda’s regime, are displayed in large posters at the GGG. Wickrematunge’s assassination is directly related to his reporting on a defence contract for fighter jets that involved the misappropriation of public funds for personal gain by Rajapakse.

Activism: Non-violence and democracy

The GGG activists maintained their non-violence strategy despite a range of violent and subversive strategies used by the regime. These included police shooting people protesting delayed petrol deliveries and fuel price hikes in April, which left one person dead and dozens injured. Police also arrested a range of activists in late May, claiming they were involved in retaliatory attacks on the private residences of parliamentarians, following the attack on the GGG on May 9 by supporters of the regime. There were also arrests of key activists in June, on false allegations of damaging public property during protests.

From the inception of the GGG, the mainstream media, as well as social media, sided with the regime, devaluing and belittling the protests as an apolitical carnival. Some critiques described the GGG as a potential plot by foreign actors to create unrest. There were dissenting views among the GGG activists, with some — mostly driven by individual self-interest — encouraging alliances with political parties or entering into negotiations with the regime.

The GGG activists were also committed to a democratic culture that avoided hierarchies. This horizontality enabled a broader participation with transparency and accountability. The GGG received support from a range of people within and outside the country. The GGG was also openly critical of those who tried to commercialise the event through various promotional gimmicks. They established a People’s Library, a People’s Cinema and conducted discussions on a range of issues. Attendance at these events varied, with crowds often dwindling towards the end of June. Nevertheless, the activism remained lively with discussions over strategy and how to enable more protests actions, especially in rural towns.

The GGG decided in early July to escalate the protest movement with a broad mobilisation into Colombo. The trade union movement, student movement and civil society organisations, along with Frontline Socialist Party (FSP) activists and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples Liberation Front, JVP), began engaging in a range of protest actions while promoting the mass mobilisation on July 9. They were also vocal about the regime’s attempts to infiltrate and create violence in order to delegitimise the movement.

Meanwhile, artists and social media activists engaged in maintaining momentum through Facebook, blogs and YouTube videos. Their interventions also created new cultural identities, as active citizens encouraging new democratic practices.

A key part of the GGG non-violent activism was to engage with the frontline security forces, mainly police and the army, in non-confrontational ways, emphasising shared interests. The protesters kept reminding the frontline security personnel that they were not the target of the protests and that the people they were protecting had stolen from the people and plunged them into collective suffering. They also reminded the security forces that those at the top would abandon them to take the fall, if they faced legal charges — an enduring trend to protect and preserve the ruling regime.

Despite tear gas and water cannon attacks by police, protesters refrained from retaliating with rocks and stones, which is the usual reaction.

Protesters committed to a non-violent creative language used to spread the word and contain others who were getting ready for violent reactions. There were numerous instances when the police and the military personnel in the frontlines did their duty without provoking protesters and the people recognised and applauded these actions. At the barricades, protesters continued to engage with the security personnel even when they were being attacked with tear gas and water cannons. At times, the protesters even helped members of the military and police who had been affected by tear gas.

This dynamic between the security forces and the protesters was possible because of the commitment to non-violence that was reiterated through multiple modes of communication. They openly communicated, avoiding any property damage, since the target was reclaiming public property. Containing an escalation of violence was also possible, because the shortages were affecting the lives of security workers, too. Their relatives, like others, were in queues for days. This enabled some of the security forces to empathise with the suffering of the people, particularly when the regime was incapable of doing so.

More than 100 people were critically injured in the protests and occupations and more than 40 are still in hospital. Others suffered multiple minor injuries. Tear gas and water cannons were used against the protesters many times. At the president’s residence, live ammunition was fired towards the crowd as well as into the air. The protesters would disperse, but then regroup after a few minutes. They kept demanding the security forces disengage from violence.

The people occupied the presidential secretariate, the president’s official residence — located next to the GGG — and the PM’s official residence nearby.

Just who was responsible for setting fire to parts of the PM’s private residence remains a mystery, although it is blamed on the protesters. This incident happened later in the evening, after dark. The security forces had beaten up a media crew and the crowds were relatively dispersed. The fire also coincided with a power cut that plunged the neighbourhood into darkness.

Thousands of protesters peacefully occupied public buildings, without engaging in any property damage — even returning a large sum of money found inside the president’s residence — so a small group engaging in this act of violence, under the cover of darkness, remains suspicious.

The GGG put out an Action Plan for the Future of Struggle on July 5 articulating a set of six demands. The main demand is the resignation of the president, followed by the PM and the government. Next is the demand for an interim government that “subscribes to the economic, social and political aims and aspirations of the janatha aragalya (peoples struggle)”. This demand includes several other concerns such as “a programme for the provision and distribution of essentials such as food, fuel, gas and the provision of facilities such as education, health, public transport and energy”. The next two demands focus on a new constitution that endorses people’s sovereignty to be established through a referendum and a timeframe for the implementation of the proposals. The final line of the statement notes that “Until such time as all the above are achieved, the janatha aragalaya will continue in new ways”.

The July 9 struggle in Sri Lanka was a historic, democratic people’s movement and a citizen’s movements to transform a militarised authoritarian regime.

The GGG activists transferred some of the books from the Peoples Library to the occupied Presidential Secretariat on July 10. The main aim was to encourage an informed educated citizenry, which can deepen democratic values in order to recognise and refuse authoritarian regimes. Given the president’s resignation will not take place until July 13, there is some apprehension among activists.

This democratic people’s movement emerged in response to the degeneration of representative politics (political parties and the electoral system) that have failed to respond to public demands. Along with the sheer size of the mass gathering, the commitment to non-violence, independence from political parties and a culture of internal organic democracy were the movement’s strengths. An organised people’s movement, built on dispersed spontaneous protests, was able to achieve its mission of removing an authoritarian leader on July 9.

The lessons learnt from this moment will remain significant for deepening democratic practice locally, regionally and globally.

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Featured image: Masses of people converging on the presidential buildings on July 9 in Colombo. Photo: @UnionProtect/Twitter

India to Boost Sakhalin-1 Oil Output

July 12th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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After Sakhalin-2, Moscow also plans to nationalise Sakhalin-1 oil and gas development project by ousting US and Japanese shareholders. But Moscow will make an exception for India so that OVL which holds 20% stake will remain & continue to work. Moscow grapevine is that while Rosneft will continue to hold controlling share, more Indian companies may be inducted to replace US & Japan and thereby also ensure a sales market in India. 

The Sakhalin-1 is located off the coast of Sakhalin Island in the Russian Far East. It comprises three offshore fields — namely, Chayvo, Odoptu, and Arkutun-Dagi. Until recently, the Sakhalin-1 project was operated by a Russian subsidiary of the American major ExxonMobil known as Exxon Neftegaz, which owns 30% of the shares. In addition, 20% is owned by the Russian state, 30% by the Japanese company Sodeco, and 20% by the Indian ONGC Videsh. Whereas Sakhalin-2 specialises in the export of liquefied natural gas, Sakhalin-1 is in the export of Sokol oil.  

The capacity of Sakhalin-1 is quite impressive. There was a time before OPEC+ set limits on production level, when Russia extracted as much as 400,000 barrels per day, but the recent production level has been about 220,000 barrels per day. The abrupt departure of the Americans following the US sanctions against Russia has caused the  production to plummet to just 10,000 barrels. Russians hope that with the replacement by more Indian companies, the production level can be restored to the previous level. Indeed, the hope is that Indian ONGC Videsh will pull up the production level of Sakhalin-1 project relatively quickly by bringing in own technologies.

The overall trend of nationalising the holdings of American, British, Japanese and European capital in Russia’s strategic sectors of economy is crystallising as the new policy — the Russian version of India’s AatmaNirbhar Bharat (“Self-reliant India” campaign.) The cleansing of Russian economy, freed of Western capital, is expected to accelerate in the period ahead. India has seamless opportunities here to make investments and reap windfall profits. In strategic terms, India’s energy security will also be guaranteed for decades to come. 

Moscow was well aware of the predatory character of Western capital in Russia’s oil sector — a legacy of the Boris Yeltsin era — but had to live with the exploitation as it didn’t want to antagonise other potential western investors. But that is history now. The souring of relations with the West to almost breaking point rids Moscow of such archaic  inhibitions.  

Indeed, the new policy to replace western capital from the commanding heights of Russian economy is not without risks, but Moscow is confident that it is on the right track and must do what it takes. Also, the decrease in production in the Sakhalin-1, unless addressed soon, may negatively affect the very characteristics of the oil fields in the Russian Far East, if the oil recovery factor decreases over time and a lot of oil is left to remain in the reservoirs. 

The development of the fields had depended on Western equipment and technologies. Now Russia has lost both. On the other hand, the departure of the Americans will leave Russia with no easy route but to have its own technologies. 

On balance, however, Americans stand to lose heavily too, as the production sharing arrangements dating back to the Yeltsin era had been forced out of Russian government when it was in dire economic straits during the transition from the Soviet period and was in no position to negotiate optimal deals. Come to think of it, something like 262 such so-called production sharing agreements (PSAs) were squeezed out of the Russian government by western oil companies by the time Yeltsin retired. 

After coming to power in 1999, President Vladimir Putin set about the mammoth task of cleaning up the Aegean stables of Russia’s foreign collaboration in the oil sector. The “decolonisation” process was excruciatingly difficult, but Putin pulled it through and got rid of as many as 260 (out of 262) PSAs. In fact, Sakhalin-1 and Sakhalin-2 are the very last remaining two PSAs harking back to post-Soviet Russia’s decade of humiliation under Yeltsin. 

Any surprises why the Biden Administration hates Putin so much and wants him out of power in Moscow? 

Legend is that when the Soviet Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev paid his pathbreaking visit to India in 1955, then Prime Minister Nehru, amongst other “talking points”, referred to Soviet Union’s great reservoir of expertise in the oil sector, while complaining that the West refused help for anything in India’s state sector. 

The folklore is that Khrushchev instinctively reacted in positive terms to Nehru’s request for help and no sooner than his return to Moscow, deputed a famous Soviet expert / geologist to India to prospect for oil — whose fame was such that he could apparently smell oil lying untapped deep in the bowels of the earth! Thus was born the ONGC in 1956, which is now heading for Sakhalin Island on a similar mission!

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By pointing to dramatic footage of recent events in Sri Lanka and telling everyone that President Putin was personally responsible for provoking chaos in a far-away land, Blinken is scaremongering by getting Westerners to fear that their country might be the next to go bankrupt and subsequently descend into disorder unless they support all of their government’s efforts to preemptively “thwart this tyrant”.

US Secretary of State Blinken flipped reality on its head over the weekend by blaming Russia for Sri Lanka’s bankruptcy crisis. According to him, “We’re seeing the impact of this Russian aggression playing out everywhere. It may have contributed to the situation in Sri Lanka; we’re concerned about the implications around the world.” There’s no basis whatsoever to his claim, which is nothing more than a propagandistic talking point that’s intended to smear Russia’s regional reputation as it “Returns to South Asia”. This process is geo-economically driven and led by the energy assistance that Moscow’s extended to its partners in this part of the world, especially geostrategically positioned Sri Lanka.

Far from being responsible for that country’s crisis, which the author explained last week is actually attributable to a confluence of policymaking mistakes, Russia was recently asked by the Sri Lankan authorities to scale up the support that it’s been providing to alleviate it. This is proven by Prime Minister Wickremesinghe asking for that to happen earlier this month in an exclusive interview that he gave to TASS. It’s unbelievable that he’d have done this if he felt that Moscow was responsible for the mess that Sri Lanka’s found itself in over the past few months. To the contrary, its premier appreciates the support that Russia’s since extended to it and is eager for the Kremlin to do more to help his people.

Blinken knows this, yet he’s shamelessly lying through his teeth for reasons that will now be explained. There’s no way that he expects anyone in South Asia to listen to what he said since everyone is aware that it’s nothing but a blatant falsehood, which suggests that his targeted audience is actually the Western one. Without reliable access to Russian media due to its flagships either being officially censored there or put under such state pressure that they could no longer properly operate, most people in this part of the world only receive their information from the US-led Mainstream Media (MSM).

Everything that they’ve been told thus far is that Russia is supposedly holding the entire Global South hostage by depriving it of much-needed fertilizer and food. It should be mentioned that these same developing countries don’t believe that one bit and are aware of the artificially manufactured origins of this crisis, yet most Westerners don’t doubt that weaponized information warfare narrative for a second. In their mind, President Putin is either a “monster” or a “madman” who simply wants to kill as many people as possible just for the fun of it, especially non-Caucasians, since they’ve been indoctrinated into ridiculously imagining that he’s the reincarnation of Hitler.

The only reason why the Secretary of State would say something as bonkers as President Putin being responsible for Sri Lanka’s crisis when that second-mentioned country’s Prime Minister and even its recently resigned President both publicly requested Russia to scale up its support for their people is because he expects his targeted Western audience to believe it. This is all part of the US’ unprecedented propaganda campaign against that Eurasian Great Power, which in this context is intended to convince Westerners to back whatever means their governments say are required in order to “stop Russia and save the world.”

By pointing to dramatic footage of recent events in Sri Lanka and telling everyone that President Putin was personally responsible for provoking chaos in a far-away land, Blinken is scaremongering by getting Westerners to fear that their country might be the next to go bankrupt and subsequently descend into disorder unless they support all of their government’s efforts to preemptively “thwart this tyrant”. This isn’t just limited to restricting more civil liberties at home or plotting a provocative naval operation in the Black Sea under the false pretext of “protecting Ukrainian grain exports”, but can also be extended to further pressuring those South Asian states like India that continue closely cooperating with Russia.

In sum, Blinken blatantly lied about Russia’s alleged culpability in Sri Lanka’s bankruptcy crisis in order to manipulate Westerners, not anyone in South Asia who knows better than to believe this easily debunked falsehood. It’s an insult to everyone’s intellect that he’d say something that’s so obviously unbelievable, but that just goes to show how little he thinks about his own people’s intelligence that he didn’t even think that they’d google what he just claimed. Those that do so will learn that the Sri Lankan Prime Minister and President both publicly requested that Russia scale up the assistance it’s providing to alleviate their country’s crisis, which in turn exposes Blinken as a bald-faced liar.

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This article was originally published on OneWorld.

Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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Australia Whistleblower Relief: Dropping the Collaery Case

July 11th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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The Anglo-Australian legal system has much to answer for.  While robed lawyers and solemn justices proclaim an adherence to the rule of law, the rule remains a creature in state, more fetish than reality.  Had the farcical prosecution of former ACT Attorney General Bernard Collaery gone on, all suspicions about a legal system slanted in favour of the national security state would have been answered.

Collaery, a sagacious and well-practiced legal figure, has been the subject of interest under section 39 of the Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth), which covers conspiracies to reveal classified information.  It all began when he was, in the natural order of things, consulted by former intelligence officer Witness K. Witness K has been convicted for revealing the existence of a 2004 spying operation conducted by the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) that led to the bugging of cabinet offices used by the Timor-Leste government.

The operation was instigated at the behest of Australia’s corporate interests.  At the time, Canberra was involved in treaty negotiations with Timor-Leste on the subject of accessing oil and gas reserves.  East Timor’s crushing poverty and salivating need for hard cash did not interest Australia’s own resource companies and the desk bureaucrats in Australia’s capital.

In 2013, both men lent their services to the East Timorese cause before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.  Australia’s illegal operation was finally going to make it into international law proceedings, thereby invalidating the original agreement reached between Dili and Canberra.

Alarm bells sounded and raids in Canberra made, though the nothing stirred the prosecutors till 2018.  Wishing to stake his claim to protecting national security, Attorney General Christopher Porter, in contrast to his predecessor, thought it appropriate to commence legal proceedings against Collaery and Witness K.  As matters proceeded, Porter’s fascination, and obsession with secrecy, became evident.  Attempts were made to hold the trials in utter secrecy and out of the scrutinising mischief of the press. The Attorney General also imposed a national security order that prevented the parties from divulging details of the prosecution to the public or press.

With Witness K’s conviction, Collaery was left standing to counter five charges alleging that he communicated information to various ABC journalists prepared by or on behalf of ASIS and allegedly conspired with Witness K to communicate that same information to the Government of Timor-Leste.

The efforts against Collaery began to resemble those of a smug and doltish inquisition keen to draw out proceedings and fritter away accountability.  There were efforts made to restrict the accused from actually seeing the evidence that might be used against him in trial.  There were attempts to prevent the release of the full published reasons of the ACT appeals court, which found that various “identified matters” in the Commonwealth case against Collaery should be made available to the public.  Open justice can be such a nuisance.

Lawyers and observers covering the case noted how the proceedings against the barrister had descended into a charade.  Kieran Pender of the Human Rights Law Centre, attending the sessions with almost religious dedication, compared it a “lottery – would I be permitted into court today, or would the secrecy shrouding the case win out?”

With the election of the Albanese government, a change of approach was aired.  Australia’s new Attorney-General, Mark Dreyfus, decided to call an end to matters.  “I have had careful regard to our national security interest and the proper administration of justice,” he claimed in making the decision.  The “decision to discontinue the prosecution was informed by the government’s commitment to protecting Australia’s national interest, including our national security and Australia’s relationships with our close neighbours.”

Dreyfus did all he could to suggest that this case was not a sign of future leniency to whistleblowers.  It was “an exceptional case.  Governments must protect secrets and our government remains steadfast in our commitment to keep Australians safe by keeping secrets out of the wrong hands.”

Independent MPs who had protested against Collaery’s treatment expressed relief.  Rebekha Sharkie, in welcoming the decision, condemned the previous Attorney General for pursuing a “politically-motivated prosecution” which was “an embarrassment to the rule of law in Australia.”

East Timorese notables long enchanted by the good grace of Collaery and Witness K were relieved by the decision.  Xanana Gusmão, in a statement, commended the decision to discontinue the prosecution.  Collaery had been “prosecuted for alleged breaches of Australian national security laws by disclosing that the Australian intelligence services bugged Timor-Leste’s cabinet room during oil and gas negotiations.”  Such bugging for commercial purposes had been “illegal and unconscionable.”

The Dreyfus decision does not end the matter.  Prosecutions against whistleblowers in Australia, encouraged by weak and vague protections, remains current fare.  The whistleblower David McBride, who revealed the extent of alleged war crimes by Australian special forces in Afghanistan, still faces the prosecutor’s brief.  As does Richard Boyle, the Australian Tax Office whistleblower who revealed ill-doings at the tax office.

Pender suggests that these prosecutions should also be dropped.  For the sake of the rule of law, his arguments are hard to fault.  But the national security state clings and claws, preventing reforms.  Even Dreyfus finds it hard to escape its embrace.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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***

Most Australians welcomed the defeat by Labor of the mendacious, corrupt, incompetent, climate criminal, and racist Australian Coalition Government in the 21 May 2022 elections. However the Australian Albanese Labor Government, while vastly better than its predecessor, is egregiously neoliberal, cowardly, pro-Zionist, US-beholden and pro-fossil fuels, and has so far failed on nuclear weapons, poverty and climate change that are the 3 key existential threats to Humanity.

The website “Nuclear weapons ban, end poverty and reverse climate change” summarizes what Humanity needs to do in the present worsening crisis. A nuclear winter from nuclear war will decimate Humanity and the Biosphere. Poverty already kills about 7.4 million people each year, and worsening  famine in the global South due to the US-provoked but nevertheless war criminal Russian invasion of Ukraine surely demands urgent aid and systemic change from the rich global North to end deadly poverty in the global  South and the ongoing Global Avoidable Mortality Holocaust. It is estimated that in the absence of requisite action on climate change, the Biosphere will be devastated, and about 10 billion people will die this century in a worsening Climate Genocide en route to a sustainable human population in 2100 of only about 1 billion people.

Professor Stephen Hawking: “We see great peril if governments and societies do not take action NOW [my emphasis]  to render nuclear weapons obsolete and to prevent further climate change”. Summarized below is how after a mere 6 weeks in office the Australian Albanese Labor Government is already abjectly failing on the key existential threats to Humanity and the Biosphere of (1) nuclear weapons, (2) poverty, and (3) climate change.

(1) Labor is failing on nuclear weapons.

(i) Under Labor Australia blindly backs US nuclear terrorism through key communications bases crucial for US nuclear strategy (Pine Gap and Harold Holt), helping encircle China, hosting thousands of US military, and hosting nuclear-armed warships.  

(ii) Labor ignores continuing UK nuclear contamination of Australia (notably at Maralinga) that threatens both Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.

(iii) Labor supports anti-China Australian alliances with nuclear powers, namely the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) Alliance and the Quad (Australian US, India and Japan).

(iv) The circa $200 billion Labor-supported Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) nuclear submarines deal locks Australia in with US militarism, threatens an arms, risks nuclear proliferation, and will subject millions of  Australians to deadly poverty.

(v) The US lackey Australian Labor Government  strongly backs US hostility to peaceful but nuclear-armed China. China is Australia’s biggest trading partner, but the Coalition Government insulted China in 14 areas, and Chinese investment has slumped. Despite China overtures, the new Labor Government  is following the counterproductive and insulting “megaphone diplomacy”  of its predecessor. Ignoring border spats with India, Russia and Vietnam,  China has invaded and occupied only 2 countries in the last millennium (Tibet in the 12th century and Xinjiang in the 18th century). In contrast, as UK or US lackeys, Australians have invaded 85 countries in 234 years (30 of the invasions being genocidal), and in the last 80 years Australians have violated all Indo-Pacific countries variously  through war, climate criminality, subversion, and covert US-backed regime change in Indonesia (1960-1965), Laos (1960), Cambodia (1970), Chile (1973),  Australia (1975, 2010) and Fiji (1987, 2000).

(vi) Australia is second only to the US in fervently supporting nuclear terrorist and serial war criminal Apartheid Israel that has 90 nuclear weapons with submarine-based and other missile delivery systems. Apartheid Israel has invaded the territory of 13 countries, has annexed the territory of 4 countries, and routinely bombs Syria, Iraq and the Gaza Concentration Camp. The WW1 onwards  Palestinian Genocide has been associated with 2.2 million Palestinians deaths from violence, 0.1 million, and deprivation, 2.1 million. Of 15 million Palestinians, 8 million are Exiled from Palestine, 5.2 million Occupied Palestinians have zero human rights under military rule and cannot vote for the government ruling them (apartheid), and about 2 million Israeli Palestinians can vote, albeit as Third Class citizens under 65 race-based discriminatory laws. Despite a century of genocide, 7.2 million Indigenous Palestinians represent 50% of the Subjects of Apartheid Israel (Jewish Israeli 47%). Pro-Apartheid Israel and hence pro-apartheid Labor  supports the all-European, anti-Arab anti-Semitic, anti-Jewish-anti-Semitic and holocaust-denying International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) of which Australia is a member, and which has been condemned  by over 40 anti-racist Jewish organizations.

(vii) Australia’s alliance with nuclear terrorist America  makes Australia a prime nuclear target. If the US uses nuclear weapons against another country, any nuclear response  on Americans would likely precipitate  all-out nuclear war (and the end of Humanity and the Biosphere). However  a graded nuclear  response would target Australia.  

(viii) Labor has yet to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). However US lackey Australia would violate the TPNW by continuing intimate involvement in US nuclear terrorism. It is therefore unlikely that  the US lackey Australian Labor Government will sign and ratify the TNMW.

(2) Labor is failing on poverty.

(i) Australia has an obscene role in the Global Avoidable Mortality Holocaust (7.4 million deaths from poverty annually) through low development aid – 0.22% of GNI compared to 1.05% (Luxembourg), 1.02% (Norway), and 0.99% (Sweden).

(ii) Serial war criminal  Australia’s defence spending will be 15 times greater than development aid by 2030. Fourth Geneva Convention-violating Australia was involved in all post-1950 US Asian wars that resulted in 40 million Asian deaths from violence and deprivation.

(iii) Labor will tolerate massive domestic poverty – over 3 million people, including 1 million children, live in poverty in rich Australia in which the property-owning rich are getting vastly richer and the excluded poor (including the working poor) are getting poorer. 

(iv) Labor will ignore huge preventable deaths in Australia preventive measure inadequacies mean that 85,000 Australians die preventably each year due to “lifestyle choice” and “political choice” reasons ranging from adverse hospital events and smoking to suicide and homicide.

(3) Labor is failing on climate change.  

(i) Climate criminal Australia is among the worst in the world for climate policy and climate action (in 2022 it ranked worst for climate policy).

(ii) Australia has 0.3% of world’s population but is responsible for 5.4% of global greenhouse gas pollution (including Exported as well as Domestic pollution).

(iii) Under Labor 114 new coal and gas projects will start, but science, the International Energy Agency (IEA)  and the Greens demand no new fossil fuel projects for a global “net zero carbon pollution by 2050”.

(iv) Labor pledges only 43% off 2005 greenhouse gas pollution by 2030 and the Coalition 26-28%, but the Greens demand “net zero or net negative Australian greenhouse gas emissions by 2035 or sooner”.

(v) Like the Coalition Labor rejects  any true costing of pollution via a Carbon Tax based on a Carbon Price ($200 per tonne CO2-equivalent but a global applied average of only $2 per tonne CO2-equivalent). The World has an inescapable  Carbon Debt in USD of $200-250 trillion that is increasing at $16 trillion per year, and Australia has a Carbon Debt of $5 trillion that is increasing at $400 billion per year and at $40,000 per head per year for under-30 year old Australians.

(vi) Australia is committed to continue leading the world in coal and gas exports, and is among world leaders in 16 areas of climate criminality variously impacting Humanity, the Biosphere, and a worsening biodiversity loss.  

(vii) Coal-exporting Australia is complicit  in air pollution deaths totalling 75,000 overseas and 10,000 domestic. 9 million people die from ait pollution each year from burning carbon fuels.

(viii) Climate criminal Labor will be complicit in worsening  Climate Genocide. It is estimated that in the absence of required action on climate change, the Biosphere will continue to be devastated, and  about 10 billion people will die this century in a worsening Climate Genocide en route to a sustainable human population in 2100 of only about 1 billion people (see Gideon Polya, “Climate Crisis, Climate Genocide & Solutions”, and “Body Count. Global avoidable mortality since 1950”).

Labor has already commenced a big diplomatic blitz from London to the South Pacific to falsely convince the world with spin that  it means business. However, small, cosmetic  improvements on the disastrous policies of the previous Coalition Government  are grossly insufficient. Labor spin will not alter the reality that a plus 2 degree Centigrade temperature rise is now effectively unavoidable, and that the world needs to urgently do everything it can  to make the future “less bad” for future generations.

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When will this nonsense on familial connection between Australia and the Pacific end?  In 2018, Australia’s then Pentecostal Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, drew upon a term that his predecessors had not.  On November 8 that year, he announced that Australia’s engagement with the region would be taken to another level, launching a “new chapter in relations with our Pacific family.”

In an address to Asialink prior to attending the G20 Leaders’ Summit in Osaka, Morrison was again found talking about the Indo-Pacific, which “embraces our Pacific family with whom we have special relationships and duties, our close neighbours, our major trading partners, our alliance partners and the world’s fastest growing economies.”

Such language had all the resonances of white European paternalism, ever watchful over the savage dark races who would only ever advance with the aid, and management, of civilised powers.  It was a sentiment reflected in the views of British explorer and anthropologist William Winwood Reade, who opined in his 1872 work The Martyrdom of Man that, “Children are ruled and schooled by force, and it is not an empty metaphor to say that savages are children.”  While he accepted slavery as “happily extinct”, he thought it wise for a European government “to introduce compulsory labour among the barbarous races that acknowledge its sovereignty and occupy its land.”

The language of the family imputes the existence of stern, guiding parents and wayward, mischievous children who might dare show some disobedience.  The parents, in the “Pacific family”, are never assumed to be any of the Pacific Island states, who are seen as merely squabbling siblings in need of control.

Morrison’s coining of the expression had the benefit of unmasking a Freudian truth.  Pacific Island states had long been considered charity cases and laggards in development, useful only as a labour source for Australian markets or security outposts.  Concerns about climate change had barely been acknowledged.  When needed, Australian police and military forces had also intervened to arrest any supposed sliding into instability.

The term became even more problematic in the wake of independent security decisions made by Pacific Island states with China.  A central premise of the charity-child relationship between Canberra and its smaller neighbours has been of one compliant behaviour.  We give you money and largesse from the aid budget; you stay loyal and consistent to Australian interests.  Of particular concern, even terror, was the Solomon Islands-China security pact which had, on the face of it, the potential to facilitate the establishment of a Chinese military base.

In his April visit to Honiara, Senator Zed Seselja, Australia’s Minister for International Development, proved unsparing in reiterating the familial script.  He told the Solomons Island Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare that, “the Pacific family” would “always meet the security needs of our region.”  He would be wise to “consult the Pacific family in the spirit of regional openness and transparency, consistent with our region’s security frameworks.”

The concern from Australian security wonks at Honiara’s willingness to go so far with Beijing caused an outburst of neo-imperial candour.  The parent should take full control of the situation and initiate an abusive, punitive invasion, ostensibly in the name of protecting the sovereignty of another state.  A rattled Solomon Islands Prime Minister rebuked such views in parliament, claiming that “we are treated as kindergarten students walking around with Colt .45s in our hands, and therefore need to be supervised.”

Australia’s then opposition Labor Party, vying for government in the May elections, quickly fell in with the language, extending it and bending it to suit.  In fact, it went so far as to scold the Coalition government for sending a junior minister to the Solomon Islands to argue against Honiara’s signing of a security pact with Beijing.  Instead of sending Seselja, Labor campaign spokesman Jason Clare argued, Foreign Minister Marise Payne should have been on that plane.  “What happened instead, the foreign minister went to a business function and some bloke called Zed got sent there.”  Then savages were simply not wooed.

Building on the theme of coaxing and pressuring Pacific neighbours to do the right thing by Australia’s security interests, Clare insisted on a more aggressive pose.  “You can’t sit back on the deck chair in the Pacific and just assume that everything’s going to be okay.”  The dark children, in other words, might play up.

The new Labor government of Anthony Albanese revelled in the same language of paternal condescension, letting Pacific Island states know that Canberra was keeping watch on any errant behaviour while still claiming to respect them.  Just prior to visiting Samoa and Tonga in early June, Foreign Minister Penny Wong boasted of embarking on her second visit to the Pacific since assuming her cabinet post.  “We want to make a uniquely Australian contribution to help build a stronger Pacific family – through social and economic opportunities including pandemic recovery, health development and infrastructure support, as well as through our Pacific labour programs and permanent migration.”

Pacific states were also assured that parent Australia had heard their concerns about climate change in a way that the previous parent had not.  “We will stand shoulder to shoulder with our Pacific family in addressing the existential threat of climate change.”

The persistent use of the term “Pacific family” has not gone unnoticed among some Australian critics.  Julie Hunt is unimpressed.  “If someone tries to inveigle themselves into our family, or continually tell us that we are part of their family, how would we feel?  Isn’t it a bit presumptuous?”  The utterance of such familial terminology brought with it a range of unpleasant neo-colonial connotations.  For Hunt, the term would remain meaningless till “we show by our actions that we understand their perspectives and respect them.  Dare I suggest that we wait until they return the feelings, and wait until they call us family?”  And a long wait that may prove to be.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Australian troops, as part of the RAMSI peacekeeping mission, burn weapons confiscated from or surrendered by militias in 2003 (Licensed under CC BY 2.0)

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***

For all of the rhetoric, the underlying reason for Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s venture into world diplomacy was more about trying to save the G20 summit in Bali next November and address a growing world food crisis than any overly-ambitious mission to try and end the war in Ukraine.

It says a lot about Widodo that he would go to such lengths, but the summit has come to symbolize a major milestone in his presidency which he hopes will bring the added bonus of more foreign investment to an economy battered by the Covid-19 pandemic.

While nothing of genuine substance came from his two back-to-back meetings with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, pulling off a peace-making miracle was hardly on the cards as the war rages on into its fifth month.

The president has shown little interest in foreign policy before now unless it pays economic dividends, but his efforts to salvage the G20 has seen Indonesia forced into playing a more constructive role on the world stage rather than acting as a mere bystander.

Widodo may have been stung by a comment from legislator Effendi Simbolon, a member of his ruling Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P), who told him last April he should be more proactive and not simply act as an “event organizer.”

Widodo renewed his invitation to Zelensky to attend the G20 meeting, which he may only do so remotely, and carried a message from the Ukrainian president to Putin, the contents of which were not disclosed.

His talks in Moscow mostly appeared to center around the invasion’s impact on energy and food prices, telling reporters that the new harvest in Ukraine would leave 77 million tonnes of wheat trapped in the embattled country’s storage facilities.

In that, Widodo may be able to claim at least some credit for helping push a United Nations-brokered effort to reopen a trade corridor through the Black Sea, currently sealed off by Russian navy vessels and Ukrainian defensive mines.

As Widodo flew to Moscow on June 30, Russia claimed it had ended its occupation of strategic Zmiinyi (Snake) island as a gesture of goodwill, but Putin has told the UN he will only allow the safe passage of Ukrainian grain if the West lifts its sanctions.

That was described by one US official as “extortion diplomacy” and there was no immediate sign the withdrawal from Zmiinyi will lead directly to an agreement. Ukrainian officials instead insisted their forces pushed the Russians off the island.

Captured by the Russians last February, the rocky outcrop guards the approaches to Odessa, Ukraine’s largest deep-sea port which normally handles 40 million tonnes of cargo a year, or 65% of its trade.

Widodo has a stake in freeing up wheat shipments. The longer the war drags on, the greater the danger that a shortage of flour will compel local firms to raise the politically-sensitive price of instant noodles, a hugely popular Indonesian staple.

Image on the right: Ukraine’s wheat crisis is having inflationary ripple effects in Indonesia. Image: Twitter

Widodo’s government has only recently faced protests over a war-related increase in the domestic price of palm oil, which led to a brief export ban on the commodity and the removal of trade minister Muhammad Lutfi in a June 16 Cabinet reshuffle.

Kremlin officials indicated the Moscow talks touched on the prospect of more Russian wheat exports to Indonesia, which last year amounted to only 2,955 tonnes, compared to the three million tonnes imported from Ukraine, partly to make up for an Australian shortfall.

Russia and Ukraine account for a third of the world’s wheat exports and Ukraine alone grows enough of the grain to feed 400 million people. But Moscow’s blockade means Kiev can only move two million tonnes a month, 60% less than usual.

Officials say a fifth of Ukraine’s grain elevators have either been damaged in the war or are now in Russian-occupied territory, while a backlog of 20 million tonnes of last season’s harvest remains trapped in storage just when farmers are bringing in the winter crop.

As an invited guest at the G7 summit in Germany’s Bavarian Alps, Widodo got a taste of what he might expect at the G20 – if it goes ahead – with US President Joe Biden and allied leaders focusing squarely on Ukraine and the impact of sanctions on Russia.

The Indonesian government has condemned the war, but in walking a fine diplomatic line it has refused to dissuade Putin from showing up for the Bali gathering, which in a worst-case scenario could lead to a boycott by a majority of the group’s pro-Western members.

Although Moscow was part of what was then the G8 when it was formed in 1997, it was suspended indefinitely following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and ultimately announced its permanent withdrawal three years later. That is unlikely to happen with the G20.

Widodo feels the need to step carefully, not only because of Indonesia’s historic non-aligned status, but also because many conservative Muslims support Russia – a consequence of the West’s perceived hostile attitude towards the Islamic world.

But critics point to Jakarta’s initial response to the invasion, which avoided naming Russia as the invader and called on the parties to pursue a “peaceful resolution through diplomacy,” as if Ukraine was a willing participant in the war.

“A generous interpretation of the mission would define it as an exemplar of Indonesia’s cherished ‘independent and active foreign policy,’” wrote retired diplomat David Engel, head of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s Indonesia program.

“Jakarta has never tired of reprising the ‘independent’ or non-aligned part of this phrase from the moment Russian troops began their brutal rampage,” he said, pointing to the visit to the two warring capitals as corresponding to the “active” part of the doctrine.

Most analysts believe Putin will stay away from the summit and Zelensky has said he won’t attend if the war is still on. That rules out any chance of face-to-face peace negotiations in Bali, particularly when the Russian president’s ultimate objectives are still unknown.

According to news reports, Widodo told Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi during a meeting on the sidelines of the G7 that Putin would not be coming either. But Moscow said a decision had still not been made.

Diplomats are now more optimistic the summit will go ahead intact, with new Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese reversing predecessor Scott Morrison’s position and saying he will go to Bali without any conditions attached.

Other G20 countries appear to have changed their stance as well, notably Germany, whose chancellor, Olaf Scholz, the host of this year’s G7, telling German television: “There is a common conviction … that we don’t want to torpedo the G20.”

The head of the 27-nation European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, even went further, saying she did not rule out sitting down with Putin. It was important, she said, “to tell him to his face what we think of him.”

Widodo was positioned front and center in the official G7 photograph, standing between Scholz and Biden, who at one point hugged the Indonesian leader in a gesture the Jakarta media saw as recognition of his new world stature.

Former Australian ambassador to Jakarta John McCarthy says if Putin does make an appearance in Bali, it will take considerable skill on the part of the Indonesians to ensure the meeting stays on track and doesn’t collapse into acrimony.

That may be put to the test on July 7-8 when the G20 foreign ministers, apparently including Russia’s Sergey Lavrov, gather in Bali’s heavily-guarded Nusa Dua tourist haven to lay the groundwork for the 17th summit of the West’s economic powerhouses.

An Indonesian Foreign Ministry spokesman says it is still not clear whether Lavrov will be able to attend, but If other G20 preparatory meetings are any guide, many of the ministers will simply walk out when his turn comes to speak.

Putin’s flying visit to Turkmenistan on June 29 was his first overseas trip since the start of the war, but the prospect of walking into a near-empty room in Bali will not appeal to someone now widely labeled as a war criminal.

A Russian missile strike on a central Ukrainian shopping mall, which killed 18 people on the second day of the G7 meeting, is being seen as further evidence Moscow is deliberately targeting the civilian population in an effort to break its spirit.

Aside from his almost abnormal fear of catching Covid, there may be another important reason for Putin wanting to stay at home. As economic sanctions begin to bite, he may fear that any extended absence could lead to a palace coup.

Although he had little to show for his efforts at shuttle diplomacy, Widodo’s final call on the United Arab Emirates was aimed at extracting a renewed promise from President Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan to help finance the US$32 billion plan to move Indonesia’s capital from Jakarta to Kalimantan.

Maritime Coordinating Minister Luhut Panjaitan flew from Jakarta to Abu Dhabi to prepare for the visit, seen as yet another indication of Widodo’s determination to get the ambitious project off the ground before his second term ends in 2024.

The government has often claimed the UAE is ready to provide $20 billion in investments, which would be channeled through the Indonesia Sovereign Wealth Fund. It would fill a financing hole left by the withdrawal of Japan’s Softbank earlier this year.

More than the G20 summit, the new capital, to be known as Nusantara, is a potentially key part of Widodo’s legacy-building, cementing his place in the history books and serving to rebalance the archipelago’s development away from the dominant island of Java.

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Featured image: Indonesian President Joko Widodo and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at a recent official meeting. Image: Supplied

Route 501 – Australia’s Deportation Shame

July 1st, 2022 by Janet Parker

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Australia’s migration policy is abysmal on so many levels. While Green Left has focused on the abhorrent treatment of asylum seekers and refugees, another element is now coming to the fore.

The Coalition government under former Prime Minister Scott Morrison tightened Section 501 of the Migration Act that allows the cancellation of visas on “character grounds”. The 2014 change enables the minister to revoke a person’s visa if they have been sentenced to 12 months or more in prison. New Coalition leader Peter Dutton, not known for his compassion, famously referred to this policy as “taking the trash out” to make Australia a safer place.

The number of visa cancellations has risen nearly tenfold since then. The greatest impact has been on New Zealand nationals: about 2300 Kiwis have been deported since 2014.

In response, the advocacy group Route 501 was established in New Zealand in 2016. It seeks “to hold the Australian government accountable for human rights injustices concerning the treatment of Deportees & Detainees (and their children where applicable) who have fallen victim to Australia’s hard-line approach”. Indeed, Route 501 launched a class action in April last year.

Many of those deported have spent most of their lives in Australia, arriving with family when they were children. They have made the country their home, including attending school, gaining employment and establishing relationships and families.

It is worth looking at the stories of a couple of individuals to understand just how wrong this policy is.

Larice Rainnie moved to Australia in 1964 and spent the next 55 years here. She worked as a public servant and had never considered that she wasn’t a citizen. When Rainnie returned to Australia following a drug-related sentence in Finland, she was held in immigration detention for more than a year, without access to legal aid before being deported in 2019.

Rainnie was 70 at the time: she had no family in NZ and arrived with just a bag of clothes and $200 in her bank account. She described herself as “just existing”.

Tuala, 42, moved to Australia with his family as a 17-year-old. He was charged with attempted murder after he shot at a group of Hells Angels gang members. Despite being convicted of a lesser charge of excessive self-defence — his first offence — he was deported. Tuala left behind a wife and four children. The deportation meant he spent almost nine years in prison, including at Melbourne Immigration Transit Accommodation in Broadmeadows.

He arrived in NZ and spent the first 48 hours in custody. After that he was handed $120 and sent to a backpackers’ hostel where his first three nights in a dormitory were paid. After that, he was on his own. He had no phone, no bank account and no family in the city; he ended up sleeping in train carriages at the railway station.

Tuala’s wife and children moved from Melbourne to join him some time after. “They are the ones who paid the full price,” Tuala said. “I understand that I made the mistake and I went to prison, but my family went to prison and detention with me.”

Rachael Ngatai of the Prisoner’s Aid and Rehabilitation Society, which supports deportees arriving in NZ, said they see people who are “really anxious, really angry or really depressed”. Unsurprisingly, about one third of the 1865 people deported between January 2015 and August 2019 have been convicted of at least one offence since arriving in NZ.

How is setting people up to fail to anyone’s advantage?

In a majority of cases, those deported have lived in Australia for most of their lives. Surely their “character” is a product of their lives and experience here?

Why are people being punished not once but for eternity? It is not about rehabilitation. It is about continuing the punitive bipartisan migration policy. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has told the NZ government that he continues to support Section 501, but would take NZ’s concerns into consideration.

The real test of character is going to be whether the Labor government will review this cruel policy that sentences people to a life of isolation, poverty and, in some cases, almost guarantees reoffending.

Route 501 poses the foundational question: He aha te mea nui o te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata or What is the most important thing in this world? It is people, it is people, it is people.

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Featured image is from Alex Bainbridge

Creating Cold War Conditions in Asia Isn’t Easy

June 30th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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Only three weeks remain for the summit meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Madrid, which is expected to unveil a new Strategic Concept aimed at redefining “the security challenges facing the Alliance and outline the political and military tasks that NATO will carry out to address them.”

The NATO and the European Union are in unison that the world has fundamentally changed in the past decade and strategic competition is rising, and security threats in Europe and Asia are now so deeply connected that the two continents become a “single operating system”. 

The past week saw some “finishing touches” to the new cold war agenda — the US President Joe Biden hosting Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern of New Zealand; three tiny NATO countries in the Balkans blocking their air space to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to visit Serbia; and, Japan hosting the NATO Military Committee chief Rob Bauer. 

The first one was about Washington stepping in to draw New Zealand, the reluctant Pacific partner standing in the shade, towards the Indo-Pacific centre stage. (Biden actually invoked memories of the landing of US troops in World War II in New Zealand.) The second was an unprecedented act of diplomatic taboo, like dogs marking territory — “Serbia belongs to the West.” And Japan and NATO have messaged a new level of cooperation. 

To be sure, in the US’ struggle with China and Russia, Japan is emerging as the anchor sheet of its strategy in Asia. An agreement was reached in Tokyo on Tuesday during Bauer’s visit that Japan and NATO will step up military cooperation and joint exercises. (In May, Japanese Military Chief of Staff Koji Yamazaki had joined a meeting of NATO counterparts in Belgium for the first time.) 

The Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said after meeting with Bauer that Japan welcomed NATO’s expanded involvement in the Indo-Pacific region. He said, “The security of Europe and Asia are closely intertwined, especially now with the international community facing serious challenges.” Bauer also spoke of “shared security challenges” for the NATO and Japan. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has been invited to the NATO summit in Madrid, which would make him the first Japanese leader to do so. 

Japan’s case is that Russia’s special operation in Ukraine distracts the US, which may embolden China to unify Taiwan with military force. In reality, though, the Biden Administration does not seem to share Japan’s paranoia. The defence ministers of the US and China are slated to meet in Singapore on the sidelines of the annual Shangri-La conference. The US defence secretary Lloyd Austin has expressed cautious optimism that his forthcoming meeting will contribute to regional stability. Reportedly, the US State Department changed its Fact Sheet over Taiwan this week, reinserting a line “We do not support Taiwan independence,” which had been removed a month earlier.  

Japan’s eagerness to play an important symbolic and practical role in the West’s struggle with Russia stems from a complex set of motives. The alacrity with which Japan became one of the most active countries in implementing strong sanctions against Russia in support of Ukraine is striking. Almost overnight, Prime Minister Kishida swung to an openly negative stance towards Russia. 

Within a fortnight of the Russian operation in Ukraine on February 24, Kishida stated that the “Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) are inherent territories of Japan” and on 8th March, Foreign Minister Hayashi followed up that the territories are “unlawfully occupied by Russia.” On 9th March, Kishida already referred Russia to the International Criminal Court. And on 16th March, Japan revoked Russia’s status as a “most-favoured trading nation”, froze Russian assets and excluded selected Russian banks from the SWIFT bank messaging system. Since the end of World War II, Japan had not sent military matériel to another country in the midst of fighting a war, but in in early March, the country’s Self-Defense Forces loaded up a Boeing KC-767 tanker aircraft with materials bound for the battlefields of Ukraine. 

In sum, Japan eagerly demonstrated its willingness to become a proactive partner in the US–Japanese alliance. Japan discarded the equity painstakingly garnered through the past four decades of negotiations to settle the territorial issue and negotiate a post-World War II peace treaty with Russia. In effect, Japan–Russia relationship has been turned into a potential flashpoint in Northeast Asia. 

The US-Japan mutual apprehension over the economic and military rise of China and North Korea’s increasingly capable missile and nuclear capabilities could be a motivating factor for both Washington and Tokyo, who no longer regard a split between Russia and China, as happened in the 1970s, to be a plausible near-term prospect. But, fundamentally, there is a shift in Japanese foreign policy.

Japan’s alliance with the US and the emergent coupling with the NATO go far beyond a focus merely on the country’s survival, but offers vistas for Japan to transform as a leader in the Indo-Pacific region. No doubt, the understanding with the US on the latter’s support in the long-standing dispute over Kuril has emboldened Japan. 

Suffice to say, the Ukraine crisis has revealed that Asian states have much more diverse interests than many had been prepared to recognise. Now, this would act as a breaking mechanism on the path of the new cold war proponents in Asia. While the US, Australia and Japan have been at the forefront of countries opposing Russia, others have more mixed views.

A large bloc of non-aligned countries in Asia, including India and Indonesia, insist that Ukraine is quintessentially a regional conflict, notwithstanding its fallouts exacerbating global energy and food supplies. Basically, the vision of the Asian countries is of regional integration and modernisation and only a handful agreed to impose sanctions against Russia, while several — indeed, the big majority — have either openly opposed the sanctions regime or have refrained from sanctioning Russia. 

The point is, Russia is a resident power in Asia and is a member of all the key bodies that constitute the region’s multilateral architecture — APEC, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting,  East Asia Summit, etc., apart from being a Dialogue Partner of the ASEAN since 1996. Russia has had an uneven engagement with Asia’s institutions, but most of the region’s participants prioritise their relations with Moscow.  Unless Russia were to reduce its presence voluntarily, which is inconceivable, Asia’s multilateral architecture remains a hurdle for the US’ efforts to assemble a “coalition of democracies” to isolate Russia.

The Achilles heel of the US’ cold war strategy is that it lacks an inspiring economic agenda. The Biden administration dare not contemplate a return to free trade, given the entrenched protectionist sentiments  in the domestic politics. Even the tariff waivers issued by the Biden Administration on Monday on some solar panels for a 2-year period from four ASEAN countries — Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam — needed to be carefully couched as part of efforts to address “the urgent crisis of a changing climate… to ensure the US has access to a sufficient supply of solar modules to meet electricity generation needs while domestic manufacturing scales up.” Herein lies the contradiction: US’ cold war strategy is primarily in military terms, whereas, what impresses Asian countries is economic clout.

Meanwhile, while many in the West tend to see China as firmly in Russia’s corner, the reality is more nuanced. China has sought to position itself as neither critic nor supporter of Russia, which, arguably, in the given circumstances, favours Russia, and has shown no signs of shifting its position in the face of Western criticism. Without doubt, China finds itself in an advantageous geopolitical situation. 

That said, will China’s current stance hold the duration of the war in Ukraine which some predict could spill over to next year? The Russian military operation has not proceeded as successfully as Moscow would have wanted or expected. Yet, the military operation will not end without achieving the Russian objectives. And those objectives contain variables. On balance, Beijing would weigh in what the US’ international standing is going to be at the end of it all, which would, of course, have great bearing on China’s future position in the world. 

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Featured image: Military equipment given by Japan to Ukraine being loaded in an aircraft at Yokota US Air Force Base, Japan (File photo) 

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The British International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) has hosted the “Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore since 2002. It is billed as “Asia’s premier security summit,” all while being almost entirely Western-centric in agenda and design. To help illustrate this, since the format was created, the first plenary meeting has always been centered around the US Secretary of Defense – the United States being a nation not even located in Asia.

This year was no exception, the West and its interests took center stage. Opening remarks by IISS Director-General and Chief Executive John Chipman centered around the conflict in Ukraine and the notion that “it is essential for the West to prevail.” Chipman also ensured that it was clear that the West prevailing in Ukraine is just one small part of the West’s “rules-based order” prevailing globally, including over the Indo-Pacific region.

While the opening and keynote address was given by Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, it might as well have been given by US President Joe Biden or another senior representative from Washington. Prime Minister Kishida’s “vision” was indistinguishable from that of the US State Department or the US Department of Defense’s, it consisted of various objectives for the region identical to American interests right down to the fact that nothing PM Kishida proposed would actually benefit the people of Japan and instead would be pursued on Washington’s behalf at the Japanese public’s expense.

This includes Japan adopting NATO-standard defense spending, something clearly aimed at China, a fellow East Asian state with which Japan does a considerable and growing amount of trade. This increased military spending will create opportunities for Washington to box Beijing in, but at the cost of Japanese-Chinese relations reaching their full potential as well as at the cost of regional stability.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s speech at the first plenary meeting contained nothing novel. It was a reiteration of decades of US policy in Asia, a policy of maintaining primacy over the region, its people, and its resources, all under the guise of upholding what is continuously refers to as the “rules-based international order.”

Like Chipman, Secretary Austin placed Washington’s proxy war with Russia at the heart of the discussion – accusing Russia of violating Ukraine’s sovereignty. Secretary Austin made these comments without any apparent sense of irony considering the United States currently illegally occupies large swaths of eastern Syria, continues its military occupation of Iraq against the desires of Iraqi representatives, and has only just recently withdrawn from Afghanistan, a Central Asian country left in ruins after 2 decades of US occupation.

Worse still, was the emphasis Secretary Austin placed on Taiwan, officially recognized by the US as part of China under the “One China Policy,” and with Secretary Austin himself clearly stating, “we do not support Taiwan independence,” but still placing it on Washington’s agenda for the region up to and including, “assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability,” through the shipment of arms to Taiwan against the wishes of Beijing.

The United States condemning Russia for violating Ukraine’s sovereignty while blatantly violating China’s in regards to Taiwan is a continuation of American exceptionalism – the creation and adherence to rules when convenient, and the wholesale trampling of those rules when inconvenient.

Secretary Austin made several other paradoxical claims, the most troubling being the US supposedly not desiring “an Asian NATO” all while repeatedly declaring America’s intent to expand military exercises across the region to build up military cooperation and expand military interoperability – in other words – the pursuit of “an Asian NATO” in everything but official title and treaty.

At one point Secretary Austin would claim:

Next year, our Coast Guard will also deploy a cutter to Southeast Asia and Oceania. That will open up new opportunities for multinational crewing, training, and cooperation across the region. And it will be the first major US Coast Guard cutter permanently stationed in the region.

The US deploying its military thousands of miles from its own shores, and in this case, deploying the US Coast Guard on the opposite side of the planet from where America’s actual coasts exist, is done as a means of attempting to integrate regional military forces into a US-led military presence. It is being done precisely to threaten, constrain, encroach upon, and contain China in Asia.

This is what China is responding to, and yet China’s reasonable reactions to US military encroachment in Asia is depicted by the US as “the People’s Republic of China adopting a more coercive and aggressive approach.”

And while Secretary Austin condemns Russia for its alleged violations of Ukrainian sovereignty while clearly threatening China’s sovereignty regarding the Taiwan question, the US is also infringing on the sovereignty of its supposed “partners” across Asia and especially so in Southeast Asia.

It does this because while Secretary Austin claims America’s Asian partners share Washington’s vision regarding the region, this is not entirely true. They do so only to a point – and that is the point at which US coercion and interference is minimal.

The notion of “ASEAN centrality” as defined by the US is Southeast Asia’s leading role in defining regional architecture. This is so simply because the US refuses to recognize China’s natural leadership role in Asia as the region’s largest nation by geography, population, and economy. It is also so because the United States feels that its influence over ASEAN is greater than any influence it could exercise over China. In many ways its is similar to the way the US influences or in many ways outright controls the European Union versus Russia.

As part of this process the United States funds and directs political opposition groups throughout ASEAN – groups that are anti-China, pro-West and more specifically, pro-American and seek to seize power in their respective nations, sabotage ties with China and fall into a US-led regional front against China. And just as it is similar to what the United States has constructed in Europe versus Russia it will likewise have a similarly destabilizing and destructive impact on Asia as a whole.

The United States, through political interference across ASEAN, is blatantly violating the individual sovereignty of ASEAN member states as well as creating a destabilizing effect on Asia as a region. The protests in Hong Kong, continued aspirations toward separatism in Taiwan, ongoing protests still taking place in Bangkok, Thailand, and persistent armed conflict in Myanmar are all the result of US political interference in Asia and Washington’s desire to disrupt the peaceful Chinese-led rise of Asia in order to maintain both its own, and Europe’s historical primacy over the region instead.

When Secretary Austin accused Beijing of “adopting a more coercive and aggressive approach,” he was actually projecting. While China will continue to assert itself against US encroachment, it will be the US, for a lack of a better alternative, who becomes increasingly aggressive in its political interference in the region, unable to compete with China in the material terms China increasingly excels at.

In the months and years to come, we will see a race between a Chinese-led rise of Asia economically, politically, and militarily, versus Washington’s attempts to disrupt and undermine it through engineered political strife just as it engineered in Eastern Europe from 2014 onward, or the Middle East from 2011 onward.

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Brian Joseph Thomas Berletic, is an ex- US Marine Corps independent geopolitical researcher and writer based in Bangkok, writing under the pen name “ Tony Cartalucci ” along with several others.

Featured image is from TheAltWorld

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***

A broke and extremely cash-strapped Sri Lanka halted all fuel sales except for essential services in a desperate attempt to manage a severe fuel shortage — allowing the government to buy some time and send two government officials to Russia to negotiate a fuel deal. 

From midnight today, no fuel will be sold except for essential services like the health sector, because we want to conserve the little reserves we have,” government spokesman Bandula Gunawardana said in a pre-recorded statement, obtained by AFP News.

The Sri Lankan government announced only essential services would operate and be allowed access to fuel until July 10 because of a fuel shortage

 “Sri Lanka has never faced such a severe economic crisis in its history,” Gunewardena added.

The move comes less than a week after Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said the debt-laden economy of the island nation has “completely collapsed:”

We are now facing a far more serious situation beyond the mere shortages of fuel, gas, electricity, and food. Our economy has faced a complete collapse.

It is no easy task to revive a country with a completely collapsed economy, especially one that is dangerously low on foreign reserves,” ” Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe told parliament on June 22.

“The country is also facing record-high inflation and lengthy power blackouts, all of which have contributed to months of protests — sometimes violent — calling on President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to step down,” AFP said.

While the government said talks were held with the IMF, India, China, and Japan for new credit lines, negotiations to purchase heavily discounted Russian crude oil are set to begin this week.

Power and Energy Minister Kanchana Wijesekera said the two ministers would arrive in Russia early this week to continue talks about directly purchasing Russian fuels, according to AP News.

“There is an advantage for us if we could buy oil directly from the Russian government or the Russian firms. There are talks going on,” Wijesekera told reporters Sunday.

Earlier this month, Sri Lanka turned to Russia for cheap oil to purchase crude roughly $30 below the international spot price. The South Asian country said it received 90,000 tons of Russian crude but will need a lot more.

Sri Lanka’s move to take Russian oil raises Western eyebrows as the country has remained neutral since the Ukraine war began. The country is in collapse as foreign exchange reserves plummeted by 70% in the last two years and have suspended foreign debt repayments — 10% of the $51 billion of the external debt owned is owed to China.

The government’s mishandling of the country’s economy and suspension of fuel sales could exacerbate social unrest.

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Fukushima’s Dueling Museums

June 28th, 2022 by Jeff Kingston

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Abstract

In Fukushima there are two museums that present different narratives of the 3.11 natural disaster and nuclear crisis. TEPCO’s Decommissioning Archive Center focuses on the nuclear accident, what its workers endured and provides rich details on the decommissioning process expected to take three to four decades. The Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster Memorial Museum focuses on how the lives of the prefecture’s residents were affected by the cascading 3.11 disaster. The Archive elides many controversial issues that reflect badly on the utility while the Memorial conveys the human tragedy while addressing some of the controversies not covered in the Archive. TEPCO presents an evasive narrative at the Archive, but it is slickly packaged and casts the utility in the best light possible. The Memorial is impressive in scope and conveys the extent of the various tragedies with updates that responded to patrons’ criticisms about controversial issues.

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Museums are important sites for shaping public memory and promoting desired narratives, especially concerning controversial issues and events. The goal is to influence how visitors think about and remember what have become collective memories, and thereby shape public discourse. Thus, much is at stake in how the past is selected and represented at sites that commemorate the divisive past and assert interpretations of it. It’s important to examine museums like texts, read between the lines and see what is marginalized, ignored, emphasized and distorted in the displays. Two distinctive narratives about the Fukushima nuclear disaster feature in two museums in Fukushima Prefecture, the TEPCO Decommissioning Archive and the prefectural government’s Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster Memorial Museum. The contrast is stunning if not predictable.

The strategy of the TEPCO facility is to elide awkward details and emphasize how its dedicated workers, at great personal risk, saved the day and how the utility is committed to cleaning up the mess and acting responsibly. It was never going to be easy for TEPCO to burnish its reputation, but with this slick facility and some artful spin the Archive makes the best of the poor hand the utility dealt itself. The prefectural museum focuses on the human element and how the natural and man-made nuclear disasters of 3.11 wreaked havoc on communities and families, endangered the health of evacuees and children, assigning blame for what was and what was not done while also trying to suggest that a brighter future for Fukushima is emerging. The Memorial Museum is more engaging and visceral while TEPCO presents a more dispassionate narrative that works to normalize and routinize the trauma while highlighting progress. Museums are moving targets, as exhibits and panels are updated and revised, owing to public pressure in the case of the Memorial Museum and the evolving process of decommissioning for the TEPCO Archive.

TEPCO Decommissioning Archive Center (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

The TEPCO Archive opened in late 2018 in the town of Tomioka, about 10 km south of the stricken reactors. Its stated purpose is to “preserve the memories and records of the nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, and to share the remorse and lessons learned, both within TEPCO and with society as a whole.”(Nippon.com 2020) Up to a point this is correct, but the remorse and lessons learned is overshadowed by the detailed exhibits and explanations about nuclear energy technology and the decommissioning process. The archive’s pamphlet suggests that “TEPCO has a keen sense of its responsibility to record the events and preserve the memory of the nuclear accident”, but this is a selective memory that is more evasive than forthright about the causes and unfolding consequences of the three meltdowns. One exits the museum knowing more about how TEPCO and its workers were affected by the nuclear accident than how it affected the people living in the vicinity.

There is a collage of TEPCO workers specifying the number of people currently employed in Fukushima, 4,170 as of mid-April 2022. This display is there to underscore how important TEPCO remains to local communities, generating jobs in a depressed region. The company has kept faith with its employees while betraying their hometowns. Good jobs are one of the inducements offered when TEPCO began building the nuclear plant in 1967. The government and utilities selected remote, depressed towns for siting reactors, offering lavish subsidies and well-paid jobs that were a lifeline for these communities. (Onitsuka 2012) They also promoted the myth of 100% safety to reassure locals that there was nothing to worry about until they discovered it was a fairy tale with an unhappy ending.

TEPCO’s Fukushima employees (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

The Fukushima Daiichi workers on site at the time of the meltdowns had to cope with fears of radiation contamination and uncertainty about how to bring the situation under control in a cascading disaster that began with total loss of power on March 11, 2011 due to the massive 13 meter tsunami triggered by the magnitude 9 earthquake. This station blackout caused a cessation of reactor cooling systems and precluded automated venting of the hydrogen accumulating in the reactors’ secondary containment buildings. As the zirconium clad fuel rods heated up, they emitted hydrogen, but the staff had never practiced manual venting and had to spend valuable time figuring out how to do so due to poor training. (Cabinet 2012; Hatamura 2014; Akiyama 2016) Sato Hiroshi, one of the men in the control room during the crisis, confirmed that nobody knew how to operate the venting manually and when they eventually tried the venting system proved inoperable. (Interview April 16, 2022)

The hydrogen explosions that ripped apart secondary containment structures in Unit 1 (March 12), Unit 3 (March 14) and Unit 4 (March 15) spread radioactive debris and injured some workers, hampering the emergency response. The crisis atmosphere was also heightened by several powerful aftershocks that left staff worried about another tsunami and wondering what else might go wrong. High on that list was the possibility that the water in the spent fuel rod cooling pools adjacent to the reactor vessels might evaporate, causing a catastrophic explosion; this was the nightmare scenario because the hydrogen explosions had shredded the secondary containment housing, leaving the pools exposed to the elements. This worst-case scenario of a massive eruption of radiation with no containment would have forced any surviving emergency workers to flee the site and might have forced the evacuation of Tokyo. The plant manager Yoshida Masao had another nightmare scenario, referring to what he called a China Syndrome involving a “nuclear fuel melt through” penetrating all containment of the crippled reactors and releasing vast amounts of radiation exceeding the 1986 Chernobyl accident. (Asahi 2014) The situation was so dire he testified he felt he was likely to die. The TEPCO Archive doesn’t delve into these worst-case scenarios about what might have happened.

One can only imagine how stressful and traumatizing this on-the-job training experience was for these professionals, part of the trauma narrative of 3.11 that is not prominently featured in public discourse because they are not seen as victims of this disaster but rather those responsible for the accident. At the TEPCO Archive, I spoke with Sato Yoshihiro, one of the Fukushima 50 (actually 69 workers) who stayed on to manage the crisis while hundreds of others evacuated. (McCurry 2013) He was a control room deputy manager and involved in the failed venting efforts. There is a video interview with him at the facility recalling just how harrowing the nuclear accident was, but nothing about the manual venting. When asked, he said that the venting system failed even when they tried manually operating it and that there had not been adequate crisis emergency training. (Interview April 16, 2022) Plant manager Yoshida Masao reached the same conclusion; he and other plant workers were insufficiently trained and that was a key factor in the nuclear accident. (Asahi 2014) The Cabinet Investigation into the causes of the accident also highlights this deficiency. (Cabinet 2012, Hatamura 2014) As the sign below attests, TEPCO acknowledges this critical shortcoming.

Display at TEPCO Decommissioning Archive Center (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

Since 2011 there have been significant upgrades of reactor safety hardware, but doubts linger about how well workers are trained in crisis management and operation of disaster emergency systems. Given TEPCO’s extensive institutionalized flaws and lax culture of safety along with dysfunctional internal and external communication that exacerbated the crisis, it is hard to be optimistic that sufficient improvements have been enacted in the ensuing decade. (Akiyama 2016) The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has issued robust safety guidelines on restarting reactors, but has been lax on enforcing compliance, not rejecting any applications for extending the operating licenses of forty-year old plants, after asserting that this would be exceptional, and issuing approvals in cases where all safety upgrades had not yet been completed. (Kingston 2021) This appears to be yet another lesson from the 3.11 disaster about the dangers of wishing risk away that has not been taken to heart. This institutionalized insouciance about safety is why citizens have sought and won lower court injunctions blocking restarts because judges agree that the review process has been inadequate; on appeal these injunctions have been overturned but even so, the lawsuits demonstrate that the nuclear energy industry has not yet regained public trust. (Johnson, Fukurai and Hirayama 2020)

As the nuclear crisis grew increasingly dire, many plant workers drove away from the site and retreated to the Daini Plant about 12 km away, a sensible response to the evident dangers even as it raises questions about the broader implications for managing the risks of responding to a nuclear accident. The causes of this exodus are controversial, but it appears that the plant manager’s instructions may have been misinterpreted or garbled as they passed down the line. (Asahi 2014) However, Yoshida believed that the workers who decamped to safety at the Daini Plant made the right call, although he maintains he intended they retreat to the rear area of the Daiichi Plant. It’s important to note that the site is massive, about the same size as Central Park in New York. At any rate those that stayed on have been immortalized as the Fukushima 50 in an eponymous hagiographic film that focuses on how their heroic self-sacrifice saved the nation from what could have been a much more serious calamity.

It is striking how in the film Fukushima 50 (2018) the nuclear accident has been transformed into an uplifting story of bravery rather than a sordid saga of lax safety practices, regulatory capture and corporate cost cutting at the expense of public safety. (Diet 2012) It’s a deeply flawed and biased account of the nuclear accident, perpetuating myths that PM Kan Naoto was responsible for an accident that was largely the utility’s fault abetted by slipshod government oversight. (Diet 2012, Cabinet 2012, RJIF 2012) TEPCO was widely reviled following the accident and even years afterwards employees I knew were not keen to let others know where they worked. Given how important one’s job is to one’s identity in Japan, this too has been traumatizing. When the mandatory evacuation order was lifted in 2016 for Odaka, Sato’s hometown, he recalls worrying about whether he would be blamed for an accident that had transformed a once prosperous community into a ghost town. Apparently, those worries proved unfounded.

Previously, in an ill-advised act of hubris that generated a harsh public backlash, TEPCO issued a self-exonerating report about the accident in mid-2012, asserting it was a Black Swan event that was sotegai (beyond what could be anticipated) although in house researchers knew of the tsunami risk and in the 1990s TEPCO had been alerted to the dangers of a station blackout potentially leading to a nuclear accident. (Kingston 2012) However that position became untenable following three major investigations into the accident published in 2012 that emphasize TEPCO’s failure to improve disaster countermeasures despite numerous warnings, in-house and from government regulators. (Lukner and Sasaki 2013). Until October 2012 TEPCO tried to evade responsibility and muddy public perceptions by falsely implicating PM Kan but was pilloried for doing so and retracted this whitewash and issued a mea culpa at the insistence of an international team of experts brought in to review internal documents and the utility’s initial investigation. Although the Archive doesn’t explore this chapter of shirking, TEPCO’s employees probably feel victimized by the backlash generated by the attempted cover-up and the lingering image of skullduggery.

While sympathetic to the story of traumatized plant workers, the Archive is perhaps most noteworthy for what is missing. The collective and ongoing trauma of the nuclear refugees forced out of their homes, and the gutted communities and abandoned towns left behind, are not covered in the exhibits. The shared sense of betrayal among the displaced is not on display nor are the profound human consequences experienced by them and by Japanese throughout Japan who are now anxious about living in the shadow of nuclear power plants. People assumed that the scientists and officials knew what they were doing and would act responsibly to ensure safe operations, but that trust has been shattered.

Wandering into the Archive visitors encounter a progress report on decommissioning and the challenges of doing so. However, there is no reference to the spiraling cost to taxpayers now estimated to exceed $600 bn over the next four decades. (JCER 2019) Delays are expected and may extend that timeline and boost costs. The imposing F Cube in the center of the spacious first floor presents a video explaining what decommissioning work is and the status of that effort while other panels assert that there is steady progress day-by-day. It is an encouraging message that contradicts a steady stream of media reports about limited progress a decade on and various setbacks in decommissioning efforts. (Yamaguchi 2021)

Still on the first floor, we see photos of the workers engaged in decommissioning and learn about what measures they are taking at the reactors. The display on waste treatment and storage of radioactive waste overlooks the government’s so far fruitless quest to secure a permanent waste storage facility. A video panel discusses measures for treating contaminated water that TEPCO keeps in over 1,000 large storage tanks on the plant site. There is considerable controversy associated with this radiated water and what to do with it. Back in 2013 when Tokyo was bidding for the 2020 Olympics, PM Abe assured the International Olympic Committee that the water situation at Fukushima was under control, but it was untrue then and continues to be misleading now. The notorious $325 million ice wall installed to halt the flow of water passing down from adjacent hills through the reactors into the ocean has not worked as planned. (Sheldrick and Foster 2018)

There have also been numerous problems with the ALPS water decontamination system that is supposed to remove all but trace amounts of tritium so that the water can be safely dumped into the ocean. In 2018 TEPCO suddenly announced that the treatment of stored water had to be redone because the system had malfunctioned, a confidence sapping measure that further undermined confidence in TEPCO and its touted technologies. (Brown 2021)

Water Storage Tanks at Fukushima Daiichi (Credit: TEPCO)

Fukushima’s beleaguered fishermen are unhappy about the government approved plans to dump TEPCO’s treated/contaminated water into the ocean starting in 2023 because the 2011 accident has dashed consumer confidence in the safety of their fish. Hopes that these concerns would ebb over time have now faded with the high-profile dispute over ocean dumping that includes criticism from many Japanese citizens and domestic NGOs, international environmental experts and the governments of South Korea and China. (Brown 2021) The government has allocated JPY30 billion (US$245 million) to support the local fisheries industry and promises to buy seafood if demand declines due to consumer concerns, but these inducements have not convinced fishermen that the discharge of treated water won’t further tarnish the brand and reduce their income. (Kyodo 2022) It is common to hear locals rhetorically ask,“If the water is so safe why not dump it in Tokyo Bay?”

Visitors ascend the staircase to the second floor where there is a clock shaped pedestal of 3.11 remembrance commemorating the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami. It is part of the exhibit: “Memory and record/Reassessment and lessons”. The video displayed nearby does open with an apology and dispassionate acknowledgement of responsibility that is an attempt to convey a level of remorse not evoked effectively by the other exhibits. But much of the video focuses on the seismic event and TEPCO’s response to the accident, conveying the sudden rupture of routine and the tensions of taking countermeasures. On a curved wall display there is a timeline of the first eleven days of the accident, another panel summarizes the countermeasures taken to manage the accident while a time series chart sketches the disaster from the time of the tsunami until cold shutdown was achieved in December 2011. Visitors also get a reactor-by-reactor review of how the accident unfolded and recreated scenes from inside the main control room for reactors 1 and 2 during the station blackout. There is also an animation including water injection efforts by fire engines at the various reactors as depicted below, a point we return to in discussing the prefectural museum.

The exhibit on the second floor that focuses on reassessment and lessons learned is striking for its brevity and breezy boosterism. Visitors learn that, “Faithfully facing up to the accident we were unable to prevent, we are determined to increase the level of safety, from yesterday to today and from today to tomorrow.” Left out is any discussion of the reasons why TEPCO was unable to prevent the accident and scant detail on how TEPCO is increasing safety other than expressing an ostensibly earnest desire to do so. Media reports about continued safety lapses and submission of falsified data in relation to TEPCO’s application to restart its Niigata nuclear power plant cast a shadow over the utility’s commitment to learning from, and acting on, the lessons of Fukushima. (Nikkei 2021). TEPCO has lost public trust (Rich and Hida 2022) and has shown limited capacity to regain it, even earning a stunning public rebuke from the NRA chair Tanaka in 2017 when he proclaimed the utility was unfit to operate a nuclear power plant. (Japan Times 2017)

Just before one descends the stairs to the exit there is an illuminating message from TEPCO asserting that, “We will pass on the genuine feedback received from the staff members who worked for the response to the accident, as ‘real voices,’ to future generations.” Here the museum is positioned as a site commemorating the trauma experienced by TEPCO’s employees and its mission of ensuring that their experiences are not overlooked. Sato is one of several employees who are featured in on-demand videos in which they share their experiences during the crisis. By highlighting the difficulties endured by plant workers, and the trauma they share with local residents, the Archive encourages a more sympathetic view of TEPCO. It is a sanitized and selective narrative that elides the damning findings of public investigations and the media, but creates the basis for “reasonable doubt” in the court of public opinion, especially as the details fade from collective memory.

Credit: Jeff Kingston

In contrast to TEPCO’s facility, Fukushima Prefecture’s Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster Memorial Museum opened in 2020 highlights the wider human consequences of the events of 3.11, including the tsunami devastation and nuclear accident. This sleekly designed glass-walled facility located on a barren tsunami-swept area close to the coast is part of the government’s lavishly funded Fukushima reconstruction and recovery effort. Between the museum and the ocean is a derelict ruin of a house, preserved as a reminder of what the massive tsunami wrought. Inside, the spacious three story museum features displays about the derailment of people’s lives, the gutting of once vibrant communities, and the fear and uncertainty generated by the nuclear disaster. It too emphasizes lessons for the future but draws different ones than TEPCO and emphasizes the upheaval people experienced at the time, and dispiriting aftermath that lingers.

Derelict ruin and new embankments in front of museum. (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

Just past the entrance an introductory short video on a large screen shows the tsunami sweeping through towns and pulverizing communities with footage of the hydrogen explosions at the Daiichi Plant that reminds visitors just how serious the situation was. In terms of public memory, the radioactive plumes bursting from the reactor buildings launched the Fukushima nightmare. The day after the third explosion, Emperor Akihito appeared in a televised address on March 16, perhaps as a gesture of reassurance but also, given how extremely rare such appearances are, ramping up anxieties. The footage of the hydrogen explosions and tsunami is repeated elsewhere in the museum. Prominent symbols of the radioactive consequences of 3.11 are also displayed such as a hazmat suit typically donned by workers where there are high levels of radiation and one of the large black plastic bags where contaminated soil is stored. As of 2022, these remain ubiquitous in the prefecture.

Credit: Jeff Kingston

As one ascends the ramp to the second floor the wall features a series of photographs and text that provide a chronology from the safety agreement between the prefecture and TEPCO in 1969, commencement of operations in 1971 to the 13 meter tsunami that struck at 15:37 on 3.11 and the loss of AC power at 15:41 with a detailed timeline of the expanding evacuation zone that evening and the next day on March 12, including bewildering and contradictory requests for evacuations within a 10 km radius of the plant at 5:44 AM on 3.12 and about 2 hours later a shelter in place order for a 10 km radius. The next image shows Unit 1 after the hydrogen explosion at 15:36 PM later that day, a reissue of the evacuation order for those living within the 10 km radius at 17:39 PM, expanded to 20 km at 18:25 PM. One can only imagine how local residents were processing these disconcerting, rapidly shifting directives. Then on March 14 there was a second hydrogen explosion at Unit 3 followed by another early on the 15th at Unit 4, a reactor that was not even in operation at the time. Later that morning a shelter in place order was issued for a 20-30 km radius from the reactors. The chaotic government response to the unfolding compound disaster of earthquake, tsunami and major nuclear accident amplified the trauma, conveying uncertainty and incompetence at a time when the anxieties of affected people were already spiking.

March 11 Timeline of Disaster

Timeline of evacuation orders on March 11 & 12, 2011.  (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

The museum exhibits trace the origins and unfolding of the disaster in a more visceral and emotive set of displays than at the TEPCO Archive. The combination of video, animation, photographs, dioramas, graphs and captions provides a thoughtful assessment of what happened, how lives were affected and what lessons can be gleaned to prepare for and mitigate future disasters. The timeline of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident shifts the focus to the broader impact and draws on documents, investigations and testimonies that add detail and credibility to the grim narrative. The voices, thoughts and feelings of locals are conveyed powerfully, especially the ordeal of long-term displaced evacuees. Although not at the museum, readers interested in this subject can watch Funahashi Atsushi’s powerful documentary Nuclear Nation (2013) that follows a group of nuclear refugees from Futaba to an evacuation site in Saitama, detailing the demoralizing experience.

Visitors learn about the power of rumors to distort reality and how these have been the basis for continued stigmatization affecting the lives of those engaged in agriculture and fisheries. Tackling this problem, some displays try to counter negative perceptions of Fukushima food products, and also present graphs showing increasing sales and prices.

Trends in Fukushima rice, peach and beef sales. (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

Unlike the TEPCO center, the museum provides a harsh assessment of the response to the nuclear accident as residents were given conflicting information and instructions, and relocated from evacuation centers several times, adding to the stress and trauma that still haunts the nuclear refugees. There are touch screen panels that visitors can use to better understand what Fukushima’s residents have been dealing with in the aftermath of the meltdowns and the lingering impact on the psyche of people who suddenly lost everything and have had to contend with dislocation, discrimination and anxieties about potential health problems, triggering PTSD and physical ailments. Visitors see the ultrasound machine used for thyroid examinations and replicas of other devices used in monitoring food safety.

Mother and child getting medical check. Photo on display at the Greater East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster Memorial Museum. (Credit: Jeff Kingston)

The museum was opened in September 2020 and updated in March 2021 just before my first visit. The updated displays were in response to criticisms from local residents and the media. The enhanced exhibits modify information on four specific issues: 1) the use of the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI); 2) the botched evacuation of the Futaba Hospital and related deaths, 3) mandatory euthanasia of livestock, and; 4) inadequate precautions and a poor emergency response due to radiation. The updates were based on feedback from questionnaires filled out by visitors, opinions of prefectural residents and issues raised in media reports. Altogether more than 70 panels, photos and display items were added. (Asahi 2021) A new panel mentions that government officials failed to utilize SPEEDI data for residents’ evacuation, an oversight that relocated many evacuees to the hot zone of Iitate Village for an entire month, raising their radiation exposure and anxieties. The Fukushima Prefectural Disaster Response Headquarters is accused of failing to make use of the data on radiation dispersion in any systematic way and of deleting 65 of the 86 emails it received with SPEEDI updates. However, in a spiral file folder just in front of that sign there is an added explanation entitled: “SPEEDI Not Usable in Evacuation”, casting doubts on the usefulness of SPEEDI. Elsewhere I met a retired prefectural official who was closely involved in the disaster response, and he too questioned how useful SPEEDI really is and said it was not possible to use the data to plan evacuations.

There is also added text about the problems of long-term evacuations, including isolation, loss of community, fears of “dying alone” in temporary housing and the ongoing process of restoring lives and livelihoods. Another panel compares health surveys in 2014 and 2019-2020 indicating that radiation related health anxieties are abating. Parents also seem less worried about letting children play outdoors; in 2011 67% were opposed to letting them play outside compared to 3% in 2015. However, the museum did add text about the failure of the central or prefectural governments to order the distribution of iodine tablets to lessen absorption of radiation, leaving it to local initiative.

Evacuation problems. Credit: Jeff Kingston

Perhaps the saddest addition refers to the “harsh evacuation” at the Futaba Hospital that caused the deaths of at least 40 patients during and after the ordeal due to delays and miscommunication. (Nakagawa 2021)

Citing the 2012 Diet investigation report into the accident, there is a panel added in 2021 about, “the collapse of the safety myth: a man-made calamity caused by failed measures.” This safety myth was why evacuation drills had not been deemed necessary, ensuring a chaotic response when it was crucial to act effectively in a timely manner.

Disaster-related deaths in Fukushima. Credit: Jeff Kingston

Taking measure of the nuclear crisis in ways that the TEPCO archive avoids, the museum’s misery index also includes panels on “living with anxiety everyday” due to radiation concerns and restrictions on rice planting and the shipping of vegetables and the “collapse of communities”. Another claims 2,329 disaster-related deaths as of September 30, 2021 due to radiation impeding rescue efforts and delaying evacuations, and the negative health effects of evacuations and prolonged living in shelters. In addition, there is a panel on the “agonizing decision” to accept the construction of Interim Storage Facilities on the Daiichi site. Agonizing because the prefecture was given little choice and because locals resent that they endured a nuclear disaster as a consequence of hosting a plant that only existed to generate electricity for Tokyo. Now Fukushima is left with ghost-towns, a battered economy and reputation in tatters. It is now also saddled with TEPCO’s nuclear waste for at least two to three decades to come, if not longer, perhaps becoming the de facto radiation dump.

Also added in March 2021 is a replica of the iconic pro-nuclear sign that once spanned Futaba’s main street, declaring “Nuclear Power: Energy for a Bright Future”. It became a fixture of reporting on the nuclear accident, an ironic rebuke to the nuclear village of nuclear energy advocates. The sign was removed from Futaba in 2016 partly because the pillars had rusted but also because it was an awkward reminder that seemed to mock TEPCO, the government and the townspeople who had naively embraced nuclear energy. It now serves to remind visitors of how strong pro-nuclear sentiments were, and the appalling risks of their blind faith in TEPCO and official reassurances of 100% safety, something unthinkable in contemporary Fukushima. Oddly, the sign is displayed on an outdoor terrace at the rear of the museum, ostensibly because of its size, but staff acknowledge there are places inside or in front of the building where the sign would fit. Whatever the reason, placing this iconic symbol on a back terrace that is difficult to see from inside the museum is curious curation.

Pro-nuclear sign from Futaba and fire engine Credit: Jeff Kingston

The mandatory evacuation order for Futaba was finally lifted in June 2022. It is a ghost-town bustling with construction projects. In early April 2022, next to the still deserted street where the iconic sign had been located is a small poster of an abandoned Futaba featuring Onuma Yuji, the student who came up with the winning catchphrase in praise of nuclear energy back in 1987. In the poster he is wearing a hazmat suit with his arms stretched upward holding a placard that blocks part of the original sign. The placard declares Radioactive Ruins, featuring the symbol of radioactive flanked by the red kanji for ruins, an indictment of the naïve boosterism of his youth and the bright future based on nuclear energy that he and other townspeople had once believed in. Now, as depicted in the poster, the truncated iconic sign reads: “Nuclear Power: Radioactive Ruins Future”. Superimposed on the image is a poem expressing Onuma’s anguish about the great betrayal, and what was lost. He laments,” Oh, if only there was no nuclear accident.”

Poster in Futaba April 2022 Credit: Jeff Kingston

Until 3.11 the sign had been a source of personal pride. Although the 1986 Chernobyl accident was fresh in Onuma’s memory when he submitted his entry for the town competition in 1987, he says that living in a small town of just under 8,000 where many residents were employed by TEPCO and related to someone who was, criticizing nuclear power was a taboo. But after the reactor meltdowns he had a change of heart and in 2016 Onuma protested the removal of the pro-nuclear sign, wanting it to remain as a stark reminder of the misguided policy and wishful thinking that prevailed. (Tanaka 2016)

Visitors may wonder if the crushed mini fire engine displayed next to the sign is a metaphor suggesting TEPCO’s inadequate disaster emergency preparedness or the government’s undersized safety countermeasures. The bright red twisted heap was found in the vicinity of the museum and serves as a reminder of the heroic first responders who paid a heavy price in lives lost in the effort to rescue others along the tsunami-pulverized Tohoku coast. I was told that the Japanese Self Defense Forces offered one of their full-size fire engines that provided water for cooling the reactors and spent fuel pools during the Fukushima crisis. Apparently under pressure from TEPCO, the museum declined to display this reminder of the nightmare that almost was. As noted above, however, a display at the TEPCO Archive does show fire engines at work in the crisis response so it is not clear why it would oppose having one displayed at the museum. Perhaps the more critical context of the Museum shifts the fire engine from being a positive symbol of collective effort in managing the crisis to an indictment of TEPCO’s poor crisis response and putting fire fighters lives at risk to save the nation from the utility’s lax safety culture.

Controversially, the media has reported that the local storytellers at the Memorial Museum who relate their experiences during and after the disaster are told, at the risk of losing their jobs, not to criticize TEPCO or the prefectural or central governments when talking to visitors. (Asahi 2020) A prefectural official told the Asahi, ““We believe it is not appropriate to criticize a third party such as the central government, TEPCO or the Fukushima prefectural government in a public facility.” Some of the guides are puzzled and angry at being muzzled since these organizations have been implicated in investigations into the nuclear disaster. Guides are asked to submit scripts of the remarks they intend to give that are reviewed and edited by museum staff. Reportedly, any changes to the script, and media interviews, must be cleared with museum staff. For example, if directly asked by a visitor about TEPCO’s responsibility for the accident, guides were told to avoid directly responding and refer visitors to facility staff. The Asahi points out that, “Committees set up by the Diet and central government to investigate the cause of the Fukushima nuclear disaster issued reports that called it a “man-made disaster” and said TEPCO never considered the possibility that the Fukushima plant would lose all electric power sources in the event of an earthquake or tsunami because it stuck to a baseless myth that the plant was safe.” (Asahi 2020) In addition, there are displays at the museum that present critical information about these institutions, so it is strange to prohibit guides from expressing opinions that are documented in the exhibits. I was unable to confirm this censorship in April 2022 but did chat at length with staff who were forthright in expressing critical opinions of TEPCO and government organizations.

Conclusion

The two museums present quite distinctive narratives of the nuclear crisis. Visitors inclined to support nuclear power will exit the TEPCO Decommissioning Archive Center feeling validated, but the exhibits are unlikely to persuade critics of TEPCO or skeptics about nuclear energy safety. The Archive offers a clear and detailed explanation of what happened inside Fukushima Daiichi during the first eleven days of the accident but does not probe into the institutionalized causes of the accident highlighted in the three main investigations. (Diet 2012, Cabinet 2012, RJIF 2012) There is acknowledgement that workers were not adequately trained to deal with the cascading disaster and expressions of remorse about the consequences without explicitly detailing the nature or extent of those consequences. There is also considerable focus on decommissioning efforts but no examination of related controversies such as the more than $600 billion estimated costs over the next 30-40 years or local opposition to the building of a “temporary” nuclear waste storage facility. Similarly, there is no acknowledgment of problems with the ALPS decontamination of radioactive water, or fishermen’s anger about the planned ocean discharge beginning in 2023, the equivalent of some 500 Olympic-size pools worth of treated water now stored in over 1,000 water tanks at the plant site. The Archive diverts attention away from such problems towards a more positive outlook. TEPCO has invested lots of money in this facility and other PR efforts to improve its image and shape the 3.11 narrative. This was never going to be easy, and challenges remain, but the Archive makes the best of a difficult situation and is what one would expect. It’s one of the Fukushima tour sites, not far from the Museum and a new memorial at the Ukeda Elementary School that will attract visitors and as such an opportunity to provide different information, challenge damning narratives and influence public attitudes and memories. Given how low TEPCO’s image sunk post-3.11, over time the Archive can achieve PR goals of improving the corporate image and how its role in the disaster is remembered.

As of March 2022, the Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Disaster Memorial Museum has welcomed over 100,000 visitors since the museum opened in late 2020 but the pandemic has limited numbers that are only now beginning to recover. Unlike the Archive it is a stunning building in an expansive space that is more appealing for tourists and school excursions. In addition to providing extensive coverage of the tsunami’s impact, it engages various nuclear-related controversies that the Archive does not cover. Among these are the botched evacuations, especially of elderly hospital patients, the frequent evacuations and lingering trauma of the nuclear refugees, the transformation of communities into ghost towns, the daily anxieties of living with radiation, and the disaster-related deaths of over 2,300 residents. Overall, the displays convey a damning indictment of TEPCO and government institutions and as such will powerfully influence collective memories of the traumas experienced and perceptions of the organizations responsible for the man-made nuclear crisis that blighted livelihoods, families and communities in Fukushima while etching its place in global memory alongside Chernobyl.

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Jeff Kingston is Professor of Asian Studies at Temple University Japan where he has taught since 1987. He has written and edited a dozen books on Japan and Asia, including Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan (2012) Press Freedom in Japan (2017), Japan’s Foreign Relations in Asia (2018), The Politics of Religion, Nationalism andIdentity in Asia (2019), Press Freedom in Contemporary Asia (2019) and Japan in the Heisei Era (1989-2019).

Sources

Akiyama, Nobumasa, (2016) “Political leadership in nuclear emergency: institutional and structural constraints” in Sagan, Scott and Edward Blanchard, eds, Learning from a Disaster: Improving Nuclear Safety and Security after Fukushima. Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, pp. 80-108.

Asahi (2022). “TEPCO pushes back timeline for storage tanks at Fukushima plant”, Asahi Shimbun. April 28.

Asahi (2021a) “3/11 museum updates displays of nuclear crisis to give truer pictureAsahi Shimbun, April 10.

Asahi. (2021b) “Editorial: Public’s distrust of TEPCO runs deeper than its water tanksAsahi Shimbun.April 14.

Asahi (2020) “Don’t criticize government or TEPCO, guides in Fukushima told” Asahi Shimbun, September 23.

Asahi (2014). “Reality of the Fukushima 50 Special Report”, Asahi Shimbun.

Brown, Azby. (2021) “Fukushima Daiichi water: The world is watching or should beSafecast, May 6.

Cabinet(2012). Cabinet of Japan Investigation committee on the accident at Fukushima nuclear power stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company. Final Report. 23 July. (accessed April 30, 2022).

Diet. (2012) The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission. Executive Summary.Tokyo: National Diet of Japan.

Hatamura, Yotaro, et al. (2014) The 2011 Fukushima Nuclear Power Accident. Sawston, UK: Woodhead Publishing.

JCER. (2019) “Accident cleanup costs rising to 35-80 trillion yen in forty yearsJapan Center for Economic Research, July 3.

Tanaka, Miya. (2016). “Creator slams removal of pro-nuclear signs from Fukushima ghost town” Kyodo News reprinted in Japan Times. March 3.

Japan Times. (2017) “Editorial: NRA’s nod for a Tepco restartJapan Times. Oct 8.

Johnson, David, Hiroshi Fukurai and Mari Hirayama (2020). “Reflections on the TEPCO trial: prosecution and acquittal after Japan’s nuclear meltdownAsia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 18:2(1) January 15.

Kingston, Jeff. (2021) “The development state and nuclear power in Japan” in Kyle Cleveland, Scott Knowles and Ryuma Shineha, eds., Legacies of Fukushima. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Kingston, Jeff. (2012) “Mismanaging Risk and the Fukushima Nuclear Crisis The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10: 12 (2) March 12.

Kyodo. (2022) “Fisheries group conveys to PM opposition to Fukushima water releaseKyodo News. April 5.

Lukner, Kerstin and Alexandra Sakaki, (2013)”Lessons from Fukushima: An Assessment of the Investigations of the Nuclear Disaster,The Asia-Pacific Journal, 11:19 (2), May 13.

McCurry, Justin. (2013) “Fukushima 50: ‘We felt like kamikaze pilots ready to sacrifice everythingGuardian. January 11.

McCurry, Justin. (2012). “Fukushima disaster could have been avoided, nuclear plant operator admitsGuardian. October 15.

Nakagawa Nanami. (2021) “Evacuation complete with 227 patients left behind during Fukushima disaster”, Tansa (Tokyo Investigative Newsroom. March 10.

Nikkei (2021). “Japan bans TEPCO from restarting nuclear plant over safety flaws.Nikkei, April 14.

Onitsuka, Hiroshi. (2012) ‘Hooked on Nuclear Power: Japanese State-Local Relations and the Vicious Cycle of Nuclear Dependence,’ The Asia-Pacific Journal10: 3, 1 (16 January).

RJIF. (2014) Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Disaster: Investigating the Myth and Reality. (Expanded and updated English edition of the Report by The Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation originally published in Japanese on 1 March 2012) London: Routledge.

Sheldrick, Adam and Malcolm Foster. (2018) “Tepco’s ice wall fails to freeze Fukushima’s toxic water buildupReuters. March 8.

Yamaguchi, Mari. (2021) “Fukushima Chief: No need to extend decommissioning target” The Diplomat, March 4.

Featured image is from APJJF

The Brutality of “Bulldozer Justice” in India

June 27th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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It looks all too eerily similar as a method: the expulsion of individuals from their home, the demolition of said home and the punishing of entire families.  All excused by a harsh reading of local regulations.  But this method, used by Israeli authorities for years against vulnerable Palestinians, has become a weapon of choice for the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Gujarat.

On June 12, Muslim activist Javed Mohammed, a member of the Welfare Party of India, tasted such retributive justice in witnessing the family home demolished by the Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA).  The actions were also inflicted on two other homes belonging to individuals accused of throwing projectiles after Friday prayers.  Similar measures have been implemented in Saharanpur and Kanpur.

As with all such brutal, state-sanctioned BJP thuggery, the measure is given a legal gloss in victimising the occupants.  They are the ones in the wrong, without the valid construction permits, or paperwork.  The PDA insists that Javed was notified on May 10 to have his illegal construction razed by June 9. But this claim was only made in a rude note that demanded he vacate the premises by 11 am on June 12.

Beyond the imputations associated with dubious paperwork, the religious credentials of the victims are what bothers the authorities the most.  They are also the ones deemed in the wrong when protesting the reprehensible conduct of BJP officials, notably in the context of inflammatory remarks made against the Muslim faith.

Such “bulldozer justice”, as it is grotesquely termed, has become fashionable against Muslim leaders accused of participating and stirring protest in response to remarks on the Prophet Mohammad made by former BJP leaders Nupur Sharm and Naveen Jindal.  This month’s protests organised in Prayagraj and Saharanpur subsequently turned violent.  Thirteen police were injured and 300 people arrested.

Law enforcement authorities and the PDA have taken a particular interest in Javed’s activities, arresting him and detaining his wife and second daughter, Somaiya.  Afreen, his firebrand daughter and student at Jawaharlal Nehru University, has also piqued the interest of the authorities for her role in inspiring protest.  Her pedigree as a marcher and organiser was already assured in her role in protests against the nasty Citizenship Amendment Act.

What, then, of the response to such brutal, extra-judicial punishments?  The demolition of Javed’s home and other activists did not exactly see opposition politicians voice concerns about natural justice and the right to shelter.

In fact, outrage against such acts has been in short supply.  Some television networks even went so far as to express delight at treatment they regarded as appropriate against mischief makers who had masterminded protests in Prayagraj.  Rahul Gandhi of the Congress Party preferred to focus on the unwanted attention of the Enforcement Directorate regarding money-laundering claims connected with the sale of the National Herald newspaper.

Added to the specious justification that the homes were illegally constructed, UP Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath would revel in applying the brutal treatment.  His media adviser, Mrityunjay Kumar, showed little reluctance in celebrating the use of the bulldozer and promising more demolitions with this heralded weapon. “Unruly elements remember,” he tweeted, captioning a picture of a bulldozer doing its dastardly work, “every Friday is followed by a Saturday.”

Some members of the legal fraternity have begged to differ.  “Even if you assume for a moment that the construction was illegal, which, by the way is how crores of Indians live” explained former Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, Govind Mathur, “it is impermissible that you demolish a house on a Sunday when the residents are in custody.”

A number of lawyers have written to the current Allahabad High Court Chief Justice, pointing out that Javed’s home was actually in his wife’s name.  Neither had received earlier notices of illegal construction, as claimed by the PDA, suggesting that due process had been denied.

The courts have become the logical, if only battleground for victims to seek redress.  Challenges have been launched in the Supreme Court, the Allahabad High Court and the Madhya Pradesh High Court, though these cases remain in legal limbo.  The delay in judicial action has drawn criticism from legal commentators, with twelve figures including former Supreme Court and High Court justices urging Supreme Court Chief Justice NV Ramana to uphold its role as “custodians of the Constitution”. “We hope and trust the Supreme Court will rise to the occasion and not let the citizens and the Constitution down at this crucial juncture.”

The nature of judicial intervention in these cases has certainly preoccupied some Supreme Court justices, though they claim to eschew activism.  Supreme Court Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, set to become Chief Justice come November, recently delivered a lecture at King’s College, London observing a “growing litigious trend in the country” that indicated “the lack of patience in the political discourse.  The result is a slippery slope where courts are regarded as the only organ of the State for the realisation of rights – obviating the need for continuous engagement with the legislature and the executive.”

Fearing judicial overreach, Justice Chandrachud accepted that the Supreme Court, while entrusted to “protect the fundamental rights of the citizens”, should not decide “issues requiring the involvement of elected representatives.”  In so doing, the court would deviate from its “constitutional role” and “not service a democratic society, which at its core, must resolve issues through public deliberation, discourse and the engagement of citizens with their representatives and the constitution.”

This noble depiction of democracy is admirable and politically hard to fault in instances where the rule of law reigns in all majesty.  But in cases of executive or legislative overreach, particularly when it comes to “bulldozer justice”, it seems sterile and non-committal.  In the context of such savage retribution, it would only be fitting for the judges to consider that any dialogue between the authorities, the electors and the victims who have lost, and will lose their homes, is at an end.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: The house of activists Javed Mohammed, Afreen Fatima was demolished by municipal bulldozers on Sunday. | Twitter/ Abu Sheezu

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In the run-up to Pakistan prime minister Imran Khan’s April ouster in a parliamentary no-confidence motion, the elected leader explosively claimed that the United States was orchestrating a “foreign conspiracy” to drive him from power.

Those claims were rejected by the political opposition that toppled Khan and elevated Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif as well as the military top brass that previously backed the cricket star turned politician in what many saw as a civil-military hybrid regime.

Washington also denied the conspiracy allegations, which Khan claimed were the upshot of his refusal to allow the US access to Pakistan military bases after its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Khan was also notably in Moscow for talks with Vladimir Putin the same day Russian tanks rolled across the Ukrainian border.

So when Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy chief Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum met this month in Washington with top officials including National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director William Burns, some observers wondered if the US is indeed starting to have its way again in Pakistan.

According to Pakistani diplomatic sources, Anjum’s visit focused on Afghanistan’s security situation under nine months of Taliban rule, including in regard to the emergence of new, low-scale anti-Taliban armed resistance led by Ahmad Masoud’s National Resistance Front and a host of other groups.

ISI’s Lieutenant General Nadeem Anjum and US CIA head William Burns reportedly see eye-to-eye on Afghanistan. Image: Screengrab / NDTV

Those same sources say Anjum’s top-level visit consolidated a new “Pak-US convergence” around Afghanistan – a merging of interests driven in part by Pakistan’s own deteriorating ties with the Taliban over its unwillingness to contain the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an insurgent group also known as the “Pakistan Taliban” that has recently ramped up attacks on Pakistani security forces from Afghan soil.

Anjum was in Washington just days before new Pakistan Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari’s visit on May 17, where he met with US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and attended a food security conference organized in response to the chaos and inflation Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has wrought on global grain markets.

The Bilawal-Blinken meeting, where Afghanistan also reportedly dominated the agenda, marked a more symbolic show of warming US-Pakistan relations in the wake of Khan’s departure. It also raised new hope in Islamabad that Washington will lend its support to a new International Monetary Fund (IMF) financial package to avoid a national default.

Pakistan’s flagging ties with China, which has made major investments in the country via the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a key plank of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has provided the US a diplomatic opening for re-engagement, the same Pakistani diplomatic sources say.

Bilateral relations have foundered largely over the CPEC, with Pakistan repeatedly asking Beijing to no avail for restructured terms on infrastructure-related loans, and China raising concerns about insurgent attacks on its nationals and in-country interests, including in restive Balochistan province where it holds a 40-year lease on the port at Gwadar.

Relations reportedly hit a new low when three Chinese tutors attached to a Beijing-sponsored Confucius Institute at Karachi University were killed in a suicide bomb attack on April 26. China has since withdrawn its nationals from all Confucius Institutes across the country due to security concerns.

“Chinese confidence in Pakistan’s security system’s ability to protect their citizens and their projects is seriously shaken,” said Pakistan Senator Mushahid Hussain Syed, chairman of the Senate’s Defense Committee, after the Karachi attack. “It has caused serious concern and understandable indignation in China.

“More so, the pattern of attacks is so recurring and it’s clear the Pakistani promises of ‘foolproof security’ are mere words, not matched by countermeasures on the ground,” he told local media. Mushahid recently led a Pakistani delegation to the Chinese Embassy in Pakistan to address China’s growing security concerns.

China has withdrawn all of its staff from Confucius Institutes in Pakistan in reaction to rising attacks on its nationals. Image: Twitter

Tensions with top investor China come as Pakistan’s economy teeters towards collapse. On May 17, the Pakistani rupee hit an all-time low of 196 to the US dollar due to fast-falling foreign exchange reserves and big debts due to international lenders including Chinese financial institutions who refuse to reschedule the credits.

Recently snubbed by Pakistan’s traditional benefactors in Saudi Arabia and China, Sharif’s government is looking again to the US-influenced IMF for financial succor.

In one of his first acts in office, Sharif sent Finance Minister Miftah Ismail – who holds a PhD degree in public finance from the University of Pennsylvania – to Washington to revive Pakistan’s IMF program.

Miftah not only revived the IMF program, which stalled due to Khan’s refusal to meet its terms on fuel and other market-distorting subsidies, but also convinced the fund to expand its lending from $6 billion to $8 billion.

“The IMF program is crucial since we are not expecting any more help from the Chinese or the Saudis at the moment,” said a Pakistani diplomat who requested anonymity.

Significantly, Pakistan’s top brass are also reportedly supportive of improved ties with the US, its long-time partner until relations cratered over the Afghanistan war.

That’s in part because the Pakistan military, which backed the Khan regime for years and is now also being blamed for pushing the economy to the brink of bankruptcy, recognizes a US-backed IMF bailout is the likely the only way to avoid collapse.

That pro-US signal was loud and clear in early April when Chief of the Army Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa said in an early April speech delivered at a security conference in Islamabad that Pakistan’s ties with the US were “long and excellent.”

Bajwa reminded his audience that the “best equipment” possessed by the Pakistan military comes from the US, spelled not China, and that Pakistan’s largest export market is the US, likewise not China.

“Pakistan – including the Pakistan military – has multiple reasons to rebuild its ties with the US,” the Pakistani diplomatic source said.

For the US, Pakistan’s troubled ties with the Taliban, its rising tensions with Beijing and its acute need for IMF financial assistance present a sudden and unique opportunity to recalibrate ties with Islamabad and develop a new, mutually beneficial strategy vis-a-vis the Taliban.

With the emergence of a low-scale armed resistance against the Taliban in Afghanistan by fighters – namely Ahmad Masoud and Amrullah Saleh – with past strong ties to the West, Pakistan could serve as a conduit for extending direct support to these resistance groups in hopes of destabilizing the Taliban.

As Bilawal stressed in an interview with US media, Pakistan has been pressing the Afghan Taliban to eliminate the TTP – which seeks to overthrow Pakistan’s secular government and establish an Islamic emirate as the Taliban has in Kabul – with no meaningful progress made so far.

Pakistan’s and China’s interests in Afghanistan diverge on the point.

Unlike the US, China supports the Taliban’s exclusive dominance in Afghanistan. That’s largely because its leadership has vowed not to allow the anti-China, Uighur-led East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to launch attacks on Chinese interests in Afghanistan and across the border in Xinjiang, China – where Beijing holds one million-plus Uighurs in so-called “vocational camps” some rights groups see as a campaign of “genocide.”

While the Taliban has assured Beijing it will contain ETIM, the militant group in Kabul has made no such assurances to Islamabad on the TTP. Instead, the Taliban acted as an intermediary in brokering a short-lived ceasefire between Khan’s government and the TTP.

With China’s interests increasingly aligned with a strong and stable Taliban, and with Pakistan’s ties with Beijing stressed and strained, it is logical for Sharif’s new government to look towards the US to bolster its security and save its economy as it teeters on the brink on both fronts.

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Featured image: New Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has the opportunity to reset Pakistan’s foreign relations. Image: Screengrab / NTV

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Southeast Asia’s largest economy Indonesia has been increasingly intimate in various sectors with the world’s second-largest economy, China.

China-Indonesia ties not only occur between governments and businesses. Several Indonesian political parties and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), China’s founding and sole ruling party are also forging ties. This phenomenon is quite interesting given the world’s most populous Muslim majority has held a strong anti-communist position since the mid-1960s.

My ongoing research about the actors involved in China-Indonesia relations reveals the mutual benefits the Chinese Communist Party and Indonesia’s political parties gain from these collaborations.

From secular to Islamic parties

Indonesia banned communism in 1966; it was considered a threat following an alleged coup attempt by the country’s Communist Party (PKI). In the early 2000s, Indonesia’s fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid, failed in his attempt to revoke the ban. The stigma against communism in Indonesian society remains.

This is why most political parties in Indonesia do not want to be associated with China due to its communist ideology.

Unlike China’s one ruling party system, Indonesia is a multi-party country. There are two broad camps: secular and Islamic parties.

The first camp includes the current ruling party PDIP (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat), Golkar (Party of the Functional Groups), Gerindra (Great Indonesia Movement Party) and NasDem (National Democrat).

The Islamic parties include PKS (Prosperous Justice Party), PAN (National Mandate Party), PPP (United Development Party) and PKB (National Awakening Party).

However, even Islamic parties that have had a long, tense history with communism since the early 1950s are reportedly pursuing ties with the Chinese Communist Party.

At least five Indonesian political parties have established ties with the CCP.

These include the country’s major parties the PDIP, Gerindra, the Democratic Party, Golkar, and the PKS.

The involvement of parties like the PKS and Gerindra is quite interesting, given these parties often regard China’s growing power as a communist threat.

It’s also been reported the Islamic party PPP (United Development Party) has developed a relationship with the Chinese Communist Party, although it has rejected such claims.

Wide scope

As early as 2008, Golkar’s members and Chinese Communist Party officials held a meeting to share experiences on party management. Since then, the two parties have been organising follow-up meetings between their high-ranking officials in Beijing and Jakarta.

Golkar politician Ace Hasan Syadzily said that many parties in Indonesia, not only Golkar, have cultivated collaborations with the Chinese Communist Party.

The scope of this party-to-party cooperation ranges from meetings, exchanges on party organising, to regeneration.

Golkar and the Chinese Communist Party’s meeting in 2008 resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) covering all aspects related to the regeneration and party organising.

Meanwhile, the PDIP and the CCP have organised several meetings to discuss cooperation to increase human and financial resources.

In 2013, the PDIP sent 15 of its cadres to visit Shanghai, Guiyang and Beijing to observe children’s health care centres and learn about the development of agricultural sectors in China’s rural areas.

In their visits to Guiyang, delegates from the PDIP learned about how local governments fostered the development of Small and Medium Enterprises in the health industry. They also attended a number of workshops on political party management.

In 2015, PDIP’s chairwoman and Indonesia’s former president Megawati Soekarnoputri visited Shenzhen to inaugurate the Indonesia-China Cooperation Center building. The building is named after her father, Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. This visit further enhanced the PDIP’s relationship with the CCP.

During the visit, Megawati spoke on a panels titled “Political Leadership: New Consensus for Political Party”, at the International Conference of Asian Political Parties forum in Beijing.

Chinese authorities also invited the PKS, the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB) to conduct comparative studies, especially on the Hui Muslim Ethnic Autonomous Region in Ningxia, in an effort to maintain a positive image of China’s Xinjiang policy.

The supporters of Islamic party PPP (United Development Party) stage a rally in Bandung, West Java. ANTARA/Rezza Estily/ss/ama/09

Mutual benefit

Political experts on the Chinese Communist Party, Julia Bader and Christine Hackenesch, argue that from the CCP’s perspective, strengthening party-to-party relations with Indonesia could be part of its soft-power approach to increasing the legitimacy of its growing economic interests in the country.

There have been criticism of China among certain parties’ members and supporters in Indonesia.

China sees this party-to-party cooperation as a way to improve its standing and a gateway for expanding its foothold.

The harmonious relationship will also bring opportunities for future Chinese investment in the country.

China wants to build a good relationship with Indonesia’s ruling coalition party, especially in the lead up to Indonesia’s 2024 general election.

From the perspective of Indonesian parties, the aim is more than just to maintain good relations but also to bring about projects in various sectors.

This also opens up opportunities for the Indonesian parties to become grant distributors, enabling them to gain political support from Islamic boarding schools and educational institutions.

With the 2024 election coming soon, collaborating with China may help them receive funding for their political activities and ensure Chinese investments in Indonesia in the future.

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 is Assistant Professor in International Relations, Universitas Islam Indonesia (UII) Yogyakarta.

Featured image: Megawati Soekarnoputri, the chairwoman of Indonesia’s ruling political party, PDIP delivers her speech. OTO ANTARA/Alina/hp/08.

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Australia’s new ALP Government has gigantic green energy plans to be funded by electricity consumers and taxpayers.

They promise (with a straight face) that Australia’s electricity will be 82% renewable by 2030. They predict 43% reduction in emissions and “on track for net zero by 2050”. They threaten to litter the landscape with 400 community batteries, 85 solar banks and a $20B expansion of the electricity grid. This gigantic “green” electricity plan will need at least 150 million Chinese solar panels covering outback kingdoms of land, plus thousands of bird-slicing metal-hungry wind turbines, plus never-ending roads and powerlines – not friendly to grass or trees and with no room for native birds, bees, bats or marsupials – not green at all.

See our sterile future being constructed.

The whirling triffids are also invading our coastal seas. Sea birds are advised to migrate.

The ALP has also revived the hoary plan to run an extension cord to Tasmania. Naturally some greedy green Tasmanians want to keep all that wind, solar and hydro energy for themselves. Others dream of sending NT sunshine up a long cable from Darwin to Singapore.

With enthusiastic support from the new Parliament full of Climatists, Net Zeros, Teals and Greens (but very few engineers) we can expect a disorderly rush to plaster a mess of electrical machinery and appliances all over the face of Australia. They will also promote more demand for electricity for electric cars, many seeking overnight charging (despite having zero solar power and intermittent wind power at night). So we will need giant fire-prone batteries to recharge small fire-prone batteries.

When there is no sun on a single solar panel for 12 hours, no one notices; when all wind turbines sit idle for days under a slow-moving winter high, no one cares; but when one aging under-maintained coal plant falters, we notice; when three coal generators fail, we have a power crisis.

Yet we have green millionaires urging quicker closure of our few remaining 24/7 coal-powered generators.

The ALP/Green/Teal plan will clutter the countryside with solar panels, wind turbines, transmission lines, access roads (some bitumen), giant batteries and fire-prone National Parks.

Eastern Australia recently had several very windy days, which caused many blackouts as trees and powerlines were blown down. Imagine the outages and repair costs after a cyclone slices thru this continent-wide spider-web of fragile power lines connecting millions of wind/solar generators, fire-prone batteries and diverse markets. Picture the green energy network after the next big flood or bushfire.

Source: saltbushclub.com

Europeans can pretend to run a modern society with intermittent energy from windmills and sunbeams because they have life-lines to reliable energy from French nuclear, Scandinavian hydro, Polish and German coal, Iceland geothermal, North Sea natural gas and (sometimes) Russian gas, oil and coal.

Australia has no extension cord to neighbours with reliable energy – we are on our own.

We can have Renewable Energy, or Reliable Energy, but not both.

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Viv Forbes has technical and financial qualifications and experience. He has solar panels on his roof, but no vested interests in coal, oil or gas apart from diesel farm equipment and a diesel generator in the shed.

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There’s a lesson to be learned from Sri Lanka’s experience, which is that the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the enhanced sovereignty that it leads to enables countries to keep the largest number of options open during times of crisis.

The Indian Ocean island nation of Sri Lanka is being crushed by the worst economic crisis in it history, but it’s managed to survive this far due to its principled neutrality towards Russia’s ongoingspecial military operation in Ukraine. Instead of jumping on the US-led Western bandwagon by voting against Russia at the UN and subsequently sanctioning it like could have been expected from such an economically desperate country that’s urgently in need of IMF aid, its leaders wisely rejected that counterproductive path by instead abstaining twice from doing so.

Shortly after, it was revealed that it purchased a 90,000-metric-ton shipment of Russian oil in order to restart its refinery, after which Prime Minister Wickremesinghe told the Associated Press in an exclusive interview this weekend that he’s interested in buying more from it if he can’t find other suppliers and is also exploring the purchase of Russian wheat too. These two literally live-saving options might not have been available to his country had it compromised on its position of principled neutrality by submitting to the US-led West at the UN.

There’s a lesson to be learned from Sri Lanka’s experience, which is that the pursuit of strategic autonomy and the enhanced sovereignty that it leads to enables countries to keep the largest number of options open during times of crisis. Apart from its principled neutrality towards the Ukrainian Conflict, this island nation’s efforts to balance between China and India have also been beneficial for its interests since both Great Powers are trying to help it to varying extents as was predicted early last month. Had it chosen one over the other, then its options would have been limited.

That said, none of its multipolar partners are going to bail Sri Lanka out for free. What they’ll likely do, however, is offer it privileged support such as discounted resources in Russia’s case or grants and low-interest loans in China’s and India’s. Nevertheless, it’ll also probably turn out that this country will have to inevitably seek support from the US-led IMF at some point or another, though hopefully the support it’ll receive from its partners before then will reduce the amount of aid that it’ll be compelled to request. That can in turn result in the most minimal erosion of its sovereignty.

The Sri Lankan case is instructive for many Global South countries like Pakistan, which might soon find themselves in similar situations. The lingering economic consequences of the international community’s uncoordinated response to containing COVID coupled with the latest shocks caused by the US-led West’s unprecedented anti-Russian sanctions and the artificially manufactured food crisis that’s connected with them will deal a heavy blow to many developing countries’ economies. If they abandon their principled neutrality, then they’ll be entirely dependent on the US-led West for survival.

There’s no doubt that this bloc will exploit them by attaching political strings to the aid that they’re offered, which will inevitably lead to them losing their sovereignty and thus becoming neo-imperial colonies. By retaining their principled neutrality, however, these Global South states can reduce the amount of aid that they’ll request from the US-led West, which will lead to them preserving as much of their strategic autonomy and state sovereignty as possible. Considering this, while Sri Lanka is just a tiny developing country, the precedent that it establishes carries outsized influence among the Global South.

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This article was originally published on OneWorld.

Andrew Korybko is an American Moscow-based political analyst specializing in the relationship between the US strategy in Afro-Eurasia, China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity, and Hybrid Warfare. He is a frequent contributor to Global Research.

He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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An Appalling Slur on the Civilisation State That Is India

June 8th, 2022 by M. K. Bhadrakumar

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The outrage in the Muslim world over the transgression of the red line in anti-Muslim politics in India is understandable, although the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party acted swiftly for damage control. The point is, the world has taken note that anti-Muslim politics has reached a crescendo in India and is undermining the country’s democratic foundations.

The US state department last week flagged the gravity of the situation in India under the watch of the Modi government. Therefore, the big question is, whether the BJP’s damage control in the present case absolves the government of responsibility. That remains a grey zone.

True to a pattern, top government officials have disappeared. The Indian public is by now used to such a drama where the government distances itself ostentatiously in the downstream of the abhorrent behaviour of the ruling party’s cadres (“core constituency”), and life moves on.

But in this age of the Internet, the international community is erudite enough to form own opinions and would know that the Indian state and the Party do not live in different planets. 

The Indian establishment is in denial mode while it has been discernible that In West Asia, the tide of public opinion has perceptibly changed unfavourably for India in the recent years. This has profound geo-strategic implications that would be felt in due course inevitably, and could only be to the detriment of Indian interests and regional influence in the medium and long term. If that happens, do not sit upon the ground and lament that China has outpaced India in “soft power” in its extended neighbourhood.

The West Asian regimes have traditionally taken a pragmatic outlook. The UAE even allowed Prime Minister Modi to solemnise the opening of a Hindu temple in the Emirate. But then, the UAE is a strange country with only something like 7 or 8 percent of the country’s population comprising native Arabs and has nothing by way of “public opinion.” Suffice to say, the actual feelings in the hearts and minds of the Arab ruling elite toward India in the recent years are hard to tell. 

The entrenched opinion in India is that the Arab elites are rank opportunists and have scant regard for Islam themselves. Indians generally, including the expert opinion, viewed the Abraham Accords as a manifestation of the political chicanery of the ruling elites in the Muslim Middle East. This is of course a complete misunderstanding of the actual situation, as it basically confuses the Palestinian issue with the religiosity of the Muslim nations. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to join the UAE to recognise Israel signals the high level of sensitivity of the ruling family to domestic public opinion.

No doubt, such misunderstanding has wrought havoc with sections of the foreign and security policy elite and impacted the Indian policies over time. There is even a body of opinion that India should align with Israel and participate in its divisive politics in the Gulf region.

It stands to reason that such excessive behaviour by two BJP top officials last week would only have reflected a common perception in the high echelons of the party circles that so long as India does “win-win” business with the sheikhs, it can get away with anti-Muslim bigotry at home.  

But that is sheer naïveté. Pan-islamism is a fact of history. Thus, the government has been caught on the wrong foot by the strong backlash in the Muslim world. Most countries in the Gulf have reportedly made demarche at the diplomatic level. Even Jordan which has a stellar record of “moderate Islam” has denounced. The social media reports say the West Asian nations demand “public apology” from the Indian government. 

Surely, the stance of Saudi Arabia and Iran will be the key templates here. Both countries have not minced words in their condemnation. That said, it is also significant that the Saudi Foreign Ministry “welcomes the action taken by the BJP to suspend the spokeswoman from work.” Equally, Iran’s foreign ministry has taken note after a meeting with the Indian ambassador in Tehran that the latter “expressed regret over the issue and described as unacceptable any affront to Islam’s Prophet.”

It underscored, “The Indian envoy said this is not the stance of the Indian government which has utmost respect for all faiths. He added that the person who insulted the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him) holds no government post and only had a position in a party from which he was sacked.” 

Clearly, both Riyadh and Tehran have gone the extra league to contain the acrimony from exacerbating at the hands of irascible or radical elements in the “Ummah”. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has jumped into the fray with alacrity. 

Iran’s Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian was due to arrive in India later this week. Hopefully, the visit goes ahead as planned. India and Iran have an urgent need to reset their relationship against the backdrop of the high turbulence in the world order and the increasing fragility of the international system. 

Without doubt, Tehran has an obligation to speak up on Muslim issues anywhere in the world, per the country’s 1979 constitution embodying the legacy of the Islamic Revolution. But, that said, Iran has no record of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of India. On the contrary, Iran has been a willing partner in trying times. 

Even in 1992, following the events in Ayodhya and the downstream developments and communal violence, Tehran voiced its strong concerns and disquiet at the diplomatic level while the inter-state relationship continued to run its course. In fact, in August 1993, then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao undertook a historic visit to Iran during which he addressed the Majlis — first leader from a non-Islamic country to do so — and was accorded a reception at the Qom Seminary by the leading Muslim clerics and was received by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.  

Of course, the present situation is different since it crossed all the parameters of permissiveness and touched the most sacred strings of the Muslim psyche, but this also leaves a slur on India’s heritage as a “civilisation state.” Words are not sufficient to condemn the incident. The government should, without reservations, speak up. 

And that is best done by actions. First and foremost, this moment must be taken seriously as a wake-up call as regards the dangers of the BJP nurturing bigotry for reasons of political expediency. Second, India’s unique status as a country with one of the largest Muslim populations in the world (and yet its exclusion from the OIC) poses severe challenges to Indian diplomacy.

Our approach is insufficient and archaic — and episodic. Such excessive attention to Europe and America in South Block’s diplomacy is not only unwarranted but also risks neglect of India’s “near abroad” where India has vital interests. Surely, there must be some way India can take advantage of the Saudi and Iranian goodwill? Emulate Chinese and Russian diplomacy. 

Third, in such situations, the government must continue to act with the same decisiveness against the rogue elephants in the BJP tent. Alas, the buck stops with PM Modi. No matter his visions for a future India, the plain truth is that India cannot progress optimally so long as almost one-fifth of the country’s population stands excluded from development and alienated from national mainstream. Modi only can cut this Gordian knot.

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Featured image: Prime Minister Modi (R) and Jordan’s King Abdullah addressed the conference ‘Islamic Heritage: Promoting Understanding and Moderation’ in New Delhi on February 28, 2018 (Source: Indian Punchline)

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Ferdinand Marcos Jr., or commonly referred to as Bongbong Marcos, will take office as president of the Philippines on June 30. His accession to the presidency comes amid simmering debate over which way he will take his country’s relations with China. Many in the Philippines expect Marcos Jr. to pursue the same policy of relations with China as his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte, but it is likely that he will actually be much tougher against Beijing.

Outgoing Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte improved relations with Beijing, projecting his country to enter a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation” with China. Despite the Chinese-Filipino territorial dispute, Duterte did not rely on the ruling of the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague, which even ruled that Beijing’s sovereign ambitions over the Spratly Islands were illegal. Duterte behaved as if there had never been any ruling from the International Court of Arbitration and took bilateral steps to improve relations with Beijing instead.

It is recalled that in 2017, the Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea was agreed upon. Then, in 2018 during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Manila, the two sides signed “The Philippines-China MoU on Cooperation in Oil and Gas Development.”

Now in the final months of Duterte’s presidency, the Filipino Foreign Ministry sent a protest note to Beijing against their ban on fishing in the South China Sea and against the Chinese coast guard violating the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone. Most recently, there have been three new Filipino coast guard outposts on these islands.

Despite this, these issues are miniscule in the context of the friendly relations that the leaders of the Philippines and China currently have. The majority of Filipinos are not enthusiastic about such friendly expressions as there is a distrust for the Chinese, as well as strong patriotic sentiment. In this way, Marcos Jr. will have to take a tougher stance than Duterte against Beijing’s expansionist policy in the South China Sea.

However, some observers say that under Marcos Jr., the Philippines will become even closer to China as his family has a special relationship with the Asian Giant. Marcos Jr.’s father was the one to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1976, and his parents even met with Chairman Mao Zedong.

Chinese leader Xi Jinping congratulated Marcos Jr. on his victory shortly after the election. In his congratulations, Xi honored the new president-elect as “a figure in the creation, support and promotion of the China-Philippines friendship” and expressed his wish that the two sides would continue to develop close ties.

However, it does appear that his parents’ special relationship with Beijing will not interfere in his policy of maximizing Filipino demands in the South China Sea. On May 26, speaking to television reporters, Marcos Jr. vowed to rely on the 2016 International Court of Arbitration ruling to assert “our territorial sovereignty against Beijing’s ambitious claims in the South China Sea.”

At the time, he stressed: “Our sovereignty is sacred, and we will not give in in any way. We will not allow anyone to trample on even a square millimeter of our maritime sovereignty.” The president-elect added that he would resolve the issue through diplomacy, “consistently and firmly.”

Manila has always been a military ally of the United States, despite all of Duterte’s sometimes harsh statements against Washington. In this way, the Philippines enjoys a unique position where it can once again simply pivot back toward the United States in some global and/or regional issues. It is no coincidence that there are now hints from Beijing to Manila reminding of their previous methods of discussing territorial disputes whilst boosting economic cooperation.

As Beijing would rather minimize the importance of the territorial dispute in its bilateral relations with the Philippines, it could allow the US to re-establish its influence in the country as Manila finds far more importance in the issue. Whereas China can offer economic opportunity and benefit at the price of sidelining differences in maritime territory, the US could offer strong diplomatic support on the territorial dispute, something that would surely spark Manila’s interest.

It is clear that economic cooperation and joint exploitation of resources in the South China Sea is a good way to develop relations between countries. Although China could blame nationalist ambitions in the Philippines as hindering a long-term sustainable peace, stability and economic development in the region, Manila does have a right to make use of what it is entitled to. By ignoring such a major issue for the Philippines, Beijing is allowing a space for the US to exploit and therefore have a greater say in South China Sea matters.

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Paul Antonopoulos is an independent geopolitical analyst.

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The United States is openly talking about its arming of Taiwan no longer in general terms of ensuring “sufficient self-defense,” but rather specifically to “win against China,” thus confirming Beijing’s longstanding claims that Washington has been provoking conflict in what is China’s internal political affairs recognized as such by even the US and its official recognition of the One China Policy.

The New York Times in a May 7, 2022 article titled, “US Presses Taiwan to Buy Weapons More Suited to Win Against China,” would claim:

The Biden administration is quietly pressing the Taiwanese government to order American-made weapons that would help its small military repel a seaborne invasion by China rather than weapons designed for conventional set-piece warfare, current and former US and Taiwanese officials say.

The article also claims:

The US campaign to shape Taiwan’s defenses has grown in urgency since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine ordered in late February by President Vladimir V. Putin. The war has convinced Washington and Taipei that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan in the coming years is now a potential danger — and that a smaller military with the right weapons that has adopted a strategy of asymmetric warfare, in which it focuses on mobility and precision attacks, can beat back a larger foe.

In reality, after 8 years of intense training of over 23,000 Ukrainian forces and the transfer of billions of dollars worth of arms, Ukraine is no more able to repel Russian military operations amid the current conflict there than Taiwan will be able to do in any future conflict with the mainland even with Washington’s “re-examination” of Taiwan’s military capabilities and the adjustment of arms shipped to the breakaway island province.

The New York Times, like the vast majority of the Western media, claims that Ukraine has “defeated” Russia in critical battles, citing Kiev. In reality, the same Ukrainian military the US and NATO spent 8 years arming and training was unable to stop Russia from securing cities from Kherson in Ukraine’s south all the way to the Donbas region, creating a land bridge from Crimea to the Russian Federation’s borders. Among these cities includes Mariupol, presenting another example of Ukraine’s military failing in combat despite the extensive training and arms transfers the US military and its Western allies provided Ukraine since 2014.

Ukraine’s military is also clearly unable to prevent Russia from shaping the battlefield across the Donbas region, preparing for the encirclement and either destruction or capture of tens of thousands of Ukrainian forces along the line of contact between them and the militias of the Donbas region.

Taiwan is a fraction of the size, population, and military strength of Ukraine. Nothing the United States and its allies can do will ever change that nor the fact that each passing year the Chinese mainland’s military capabilities grow by leaps and bounds not only in terms of securing their own domestic objectives, but obtaining or surpassing military parity with the United States.

While Western publications like the New York Times claim that Washington’s strategy of arming and training Taiwanese forces is meant to defend the island, in reality it is merely meant to bleed China at Taiwan’s expense and entirely on Washington’s behalf – not unlike what is playing out in Ukraine right now.

While the White House publicly denies it is waging a proxy war with Russia through Ukraine it is abundantly obvious that from 2014 onward, that is precisely what Washington prepared for and exactly what Washington is doing now. This has been openly admitted by sitting US representatives.

US Congressman Daniel Crenshaw, for example, in response to criticism for his vote on $40 billion in aid to Ukraine openly claimed:

Investing in the destruction of our adversary’s military, without losing a single American troop, strikes me as a good idea.

Thus, just as Washington attempts to fight Russia to the last Ukrainian in Eastern Europe, the US is openly preparing the battlefield in the Indo-Pacific region to fight China to the last inhabitant of Taiwan.

Washington’s Shifting “One China Policy” 

In May of last year and for many years before that, upon the US State Department’s own website (archived) regarding US-Taiwan relations, the US State Department would explicitly note:

The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The 1979 U.S.-P.R.C. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Joint Communique, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

The same webpage would also note:

The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong, unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive capability. The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and encourages both sides to continue their constructive dialogue on the basis of dignity and respect.

Washington’s recognition of the One China Policy in 1979 was key in securing Beijing’s support against the Soviet Union. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union the US has incrementally backtracked on the agreement, blatantly violating it including through the placement of US troops on Taiwan.

The US government’s Voice of America platform in 2021 would report in their article, “US Nearly Doubled Military Personnel Stationed in Taiwan This Year,” that:

The United States has doubled its unofficial military presence in Taiwan over the past year in what specialists describe as the latest signal to China that Taiwan’s future remains a priority.

More recently, the US State Department has deleted key facts regarding its One China Policy. The edited version claims:

The United States has a longstanding one China policy, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three US-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances.   Though the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we have a robust unofficial relationship as well as an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.  Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States makes available defense articles and services as necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. The United States continues to encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences consistent with the wishes and best interests of the people on Taiwan.

Deliberately omitted is any admission or explanation as to what “the three U.S.-China Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances” actually represent or any explicit denouncement of US support for Taiwanese independence, creating both greater “ambiguity” regarding Wasington’s policy toward Taiwan and the mainland, as well as creating more diplomatic room for the US to eventually shift over to promoting Taiwanese independence.

The blatant provocation and deliberate threat America’s recent activities in and around Taiwan represent to Chinese national security is part of a familiar pattern of US encroachment – a similar pattern the US demonstrated along Russia’s peripheries in the aftermath of the Cold War ultimately leading to the conflict now unfolding within Ukraine’s borders.

Washington Preparing Asia’s “Ukraine War” 

A similar conflict with China either directly fought by the US or by proxy (or both) is more than mere speculation. It is the product of years of US foreign policy laid out in papers produced by and for the US government and its military.

One such paper, published in 2016 by the RAND Corporation titled, “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable,” commissioned by the Office of the Undersecretary of the Army and carried out by the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program noted:

We postulate that a war would be regional and conventional. It would be waged mainly by ships on and beneath the sea, by aircraft and missiles of many sorts, and in space (against satellites) and cyberspace (against computer systems). We assume that fighting would start and remain in East Asia, where potential Sino-US flash points and nearly all Chinese forces are located.

The window of opportunity for the US to fight a conflict with China and potentially win stretches from 2015 to 2025. Among the flash points mentioned in the paper is Taiwan.

The paper is confident that such warfare would not turn nuclear:

It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used: Even in an intensely violent conventional conflict, neither side would regard its losses as so serious, its prospects so dire, or the stakes so vital that it would run the risk of devastating nuclear retaliation by using nuclear weapons first. We also assume that China would not attack the US homeland, except via cyberspace, given its minimal capability to do so with conventional weapons. In contrast, US nonnuclear attacks against military targets in China could be extensive.

However, because of China’s growing military capabilities and the likelihood that fighting would grind into a stalemate, the paper examines non-military factors it anticipates would benefit the US over China:

The prospect of a military standoff means that war could eventually be decided by nonmilitary factors. These should favor the United States now and in the future. Although war would harm both economies, damage to China’s could be catastrophic and lasting: on the order of a 25–35 percent reduction in Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) in a yearlong war, compared with a reduction in US GDP on the order of 5–10 percent. Even a mild conflict, unless ended promptly, could weaken China’s economy. A long and severe war could ravage China’s economy, stall its hard-earned development, and cause widespread hardship and dislocation.

Regarding Taiwan specifically, the RAND Corporation paper notes:

China might regard the price of losing a war with the United States over, say, Taiwan as so high that it would endure the costs of an intense, and perhaps lengthy, conflict. Broadly speaking, as prospects of either side clearly winning decline, as might be the case in coming years, both sides ought to place greater weight on the costs of fighting—a key reason why both must rigorously think through what consequences a war could have.

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine provides a living laboratory to do precisely that, “rigorously think through what consequences a war could have,” especially in regards to a proxy war fought by the US through Taiwan.

The US government and the Western media claim that the unfolding conflict in Ukraine serves as a warning for China. They claim the conflict demonstrates Western resolve and the military potency of Western-trained troops. However, in reality, the only fact demonstrated is the danger Western proxies pose to the national security of targeted nations like Russia and China and the absolute necessity to decisively and completely eliminate those threats.

The Western media continues to portray Ukraine as “winning” when clearly it is not. This is done to continue hostilities and dissuade Kiev from pursuing peace long after any feasible chance passes of defeating Russia militarily (which passed before the conflict even began).

Upon careful examination of the above-mentioned New York Times article, there is no logical or convincing explanation as to how Taiwan would ever in any conceivable way “repel” a potential military operation launched from the mainland. What the US and its partners are preparing Taiwan for instead is a similarly vain proxy war meant to do as much damage to China as possible without the US ever having to get directly involved. Taiwan as it is known today, would disappear in the rubble of modern warfare.

Even if the US does eventually get involved, it hopes Chinese military capabilities will be significantly degraded when that happens because of the immense amount of military hardware transferred to Taiwan. An additional bonus for the US is the immense profits this will make its arms industry. As Washington continues pushing Taiwan closer and closer to conflict with the mainland, it is able to pressure other nations in the region, namely Japan and Australia, to likewise purchase a larger amount of US weaponry.

Ultimately, and as the conflict in Ukraine illustrates, the US is not underwriting peace and stability around the globe, it is undermining it. It is almost universally recognized, even across the West, that the current conflict in Ukraine stems from the US-led expansion of NATO after the Cold War ended. It is likewise obvious that Washington’s insistence on violating its own One China Policy agreement with Beijing, the flooding of Taiwan with weapons, and now a growing US military presence on and around the island, that it is the US raising the likelihood of war, daily, by deliberately and increasingly threatening Chinese national security in ways that if reciprocated would never be tolerated by Washington.

Only time will tell what final lessons the conflict in Ukraine will teach both the West who provoked it, or Russia who was dragged into it, and how it may shape US provocations in the Indo-Pacific region and more specifically, in regards to its Asian “Ukraine,” Taiwan.

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Extreme weather events are the new normal. The use of nuclear weapons by Vladimir Putin’s Russian military is now an unthinkable possibility. And Xi Jinping’s China, our largest trading partner and rising superpower is pulling down the shutters.

So no pressure then, for our freshly-minted 31st prime minister as he flies into the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in Tokyo this week.

The immediate challenge facing incoming Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Foreign Minister Penny Wong is to reassure allies and friends of continuity and certainty. But more than that, the change of government presents an opportunity to build confidence in Australia’s capacity, once taken for granted, for visionary leadership and humble decency.

The Quad involves India, Japan, the United States and Australia. It began in 2007, under George W Bush and John Howard, but during Kevin Rudd’s time, Australia pulled back because of concerns about America’s approach to China.

Prime Minister Turnbull revived the arrangement in 2017 as concerns mounted about China’s military expansion in the South China Sea. In March 2021 the Quad leaders issued a joint statement. “The Spirit of the Quad” spoke of a “rules-based maritime order in the East and South China seas” that supported a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

At this week’s meetings, Japan and India will be looking for signs Australia is serious about engaging with Asia. Another old friend with deep and long-established links in Asia, France, will be looking for signs of a reset.

The US will be reviewing its expectations of what Australia, under a Labor government, is prepared to contribute to both the Quad security dialogue and to the AUKUS trilateral security pact.

Albanese and Wong share much in common with US President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinken. Their face-to-face meetings this week in Tokyo have the potential to reset the allies’ approach to China and the Indo-Pacific well beyond what was ever likely or possible under Donald Trump and Scott Morrison.

The China question

One of the greatest challenges of our time is to reverse the slide in relations between China and the West. The stakes are immense, not just for defense and security, or trade and the economy, but also global responses to climate change, and the future course of Chinese society and the lives of 1.4 billion people.

Biden and Blinken will also be looking for signs that the new Albanese Labor government is as committed to AUKUS as was the Morrison government. The revelation last week that, contrary to expectations in Washington DC, Labor was not consulted about AUKUS, raised doubts about the functioning of the security pact.

The operational details of how AUKUS could transform our immediate security environment, have also not been fully spelled out. As with the Quad, the potential benefits, and threats, to Australia go well beyond hard-core defense and security issues.

New opportunities with Wong

For decades, Australia’s engagement with Asia has lacked the sustained investment of financial, political, and social capital that is needed. Albanese says that he wants to change this, singling out Indonesia as a key priority for his government.

Despite living on the edge of the largest and fastest developing economies and societies on the planet, Australia has been far too lazy, shortsighted, and miserly about truly engaging with Asia. Our current woes with Chinese trade bans point to a failure to engage more broadly with both China and the rest of Asia.

Under Penny Wong, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has the potential to play a critical role in securing Australia’s broader security interests. Wong’s personal backstory, as well as her formidable intellect, will be key assets in our engagement with Asia.

The challenges facing the new defense minister – understood to be Richard Marles – intersect tightly with those facing Wong. The shocking invasion of Ukraine by Russia, and the unexpected course of the war, contain many lessons for Australia.

The first is the importance of international alliances and institutions, such as NATO and the European Union. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it was easy to be critical of NATO and the EU, and question their utility and substance. Not any more.

The Quad, AUKUS, ANZUS, and the Five Eyes intelligence alliance, together with ASEAN, are very different entities to NATO and the EU, but the war in Ukraine casts them in a fresh light. Diplomacy, trust and relationship-building are as critically important to defense and security as tanks, trucks and planes.

Other lessons from Ukraine

Australia’s next Defence White Paper, likely to be released in 2023, is going to be shaped by both the rise of China and the decline of Russia. The experiences of the war in Ukraine, the critical role of logistics, the utility of certain kinds of equipment such as tanks, and the impact of organizational culture will be closely studied.

In all of this, there are challenges as well as great opportunities for Australia. Already it is clear that intelligence, IT and drones have played a critical role in defense of Ukraine. Australia has considerable capacity to innovate and develop related critical systems, hardware and technology, to the benefit of both national and regional security.

It should go without saying that Australia needs to both prepare for war and to do everything that it possibly can to avoid war. The latter depends very much on the former, together with diplomacy and relationship building.

Don’t forget climate change

War, in the worst-case scenario, constitutes an existential threat. So too does climate change.

The remarkable outcomes of the 2022 federal elections point to the realization of millions of Australians that more frequent and severe, fire, flood, drought and intense heat events represent an immediate security threat.

Neither the LNP nor Labor intended for this to be a climate election. But it clearly was. This was an instance of ordinary voters being well ahead of the leaders of the two larger parties.

The impacts of climate change will contribute directly to political and social stability in our region. Crises in food and water security, rising sea levels and severe weather events, and an increased impact of animal-to-human diseases such as Covid-19, mean that responses to climate change are integral to managing national and regional security.

The nation and the region are watching and looking to the new Australian government for leadership on security and this includes climate change.

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Greg Barton, Chair in Global Islamic Politics, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University.

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Abstract

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) occupies an integral position in the memory politics of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In recent years, dominant representations of the war create a memory discourse which portrays the heroic triumph of the Chinese people led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over Japan. This article shows how the war has been remembered from the victory of the Communist revolution in 1949 to the present in the PRC. It contributes to the debate on the effectiveness and limitations of the monopoly of war memory by the CCP. 

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Introduction 

On 27 February 2014, China’s national legislature, the Standing Committee of the National Congress reached a landmark decision in the history of Chinese memory politics. It designated 13 December as the National Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre Victims. Since 2014, memorial ceremonies have been held annually on 13 December in the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall, in which top members of the CCP leadership participate. On the same day, themes of war appear in national and regional newspapers, urging readers to carry on war memory by never forgetting the pain and suffering that Chinese went through in the war years. Throughout the same month, audiences can find similar themes in documentaries, television dramas, and films. The commemoration of the war through national ceremonial practices and media representations indicates that the PRC is committed to shaping a sense of victimhood in Chinese identity. At the same time, it also shows that the memory of the war is deeply embedded in the social discourse of the PRC.

This article analyzes the development of official discourse of the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War from 1949 to the present in the PRC. The official memory discourse is defined as ways in which certain images, people and events associated with the war are remembered by performing official rituals or through official representations. In the PRC, as in most countries, the construction of official state discourse of war memory is a practice of political engineering, in which narratives are selected, institutionalized, legitimized, and delegitimized by state agents and individuals. In this process, state agents aim at establishing and maintaining the monopoly over the narratives of war, but also actively prevent the development of counter narratives. Individuals construct alternative ways of remembering the war that tend to question the accepted narratives, but they have not been successful in establishing counter memories of the war that deviate from the dominant narratives. The official state discourse ends up as closely controlled narratives that consist of heroic resistance and nationalist victimization. Alternative memory of the war largely falls into the scope of the controlled narratives. By surveying the evolution and structure of state war memory, this article contributes to our understanding of the dominant role of the state in shaping the official discourse of war memory in the PRC.

The article is structured into four main sections: state control, narrative, themes of war memory, and private memories of the war in the PRC. The article first introduces memory theory and presents a survey of existing scholarship as the basis of analysis, and it presents the ways in which the Chinese state extends its control over public commemoration and memorialization of the war. Then, the article outlines the structure of war memory, analyzing three types of narratives: the narrative of resistance, the victor narrative, and the victim narrative. The article continues to illustrate how the Communists, the Nationalists and Japan have been remembered in the public and the private spheres. The remainder of the article turns its attention to the memoirs and oral histories of Chinese veterans, and it discusses how these mechanisms function as a variation of the official memory of the war.

 

Theory and Literature

Memory studies has recently become a burgeoning field in the West and scholarly attention to the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War is gathering momentum. In the field of memory, the French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs in the 1920s developed the concept of “collective memory” which he defined as a shared perception of the past formed through the communication and interaction among members of social and cultural groups (Halbwachs 1992). The German Egyptologist Jan Assmann and the cultural studies scholar Aleida Assmann have introduced the term “cultural memory” into the debate. According to the Assmanns, cultural memory is determined by social conditions, political institutions, and power structures (Aleida Assmann 2011; Jan Assmann 2011). In this context, the study of the memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the PRC has attracted some academic attention. Chan Yang assesses how the war memory evolved over time in the PRC, drawing particular attention to the roles of state and non-state actors in developing the discourse of war memory in the period between 1949 and 1982 (2018). Rana Mitter and Zheng Wang, among others, have explored the links among war memory, nationalism, and politics in the PRC (Mitter 2020; Wang 2012). Other studies focus on specific aspects of war memory in the PRC. Aaron William Moore’s study, though not exclusively focused on the PRC’s war memory, examines letters, postcards and memoirs written by Chinese servicemen in the war from 1937 to 1945 (Moore 2013). Kirk Denton analyzes the narratives of war and their political and ideological implications in the PRC’s state museums (Denton 2014). While these studies illustrate the extensive literature on the Chinese memory of the war, there remains, so far, no study that specifically examines the structure of the official state discourse of war memory in the PRC from 1949 to the present.

This article utilizes the theories of memory reconstruction by Halbwachs and the Assmanns to approach war memory in the PRC. It shows how central themes of the PRC’s war memory are sustained by the media and institutions, among which are artifacts like textbooks, memorial museums, and oral histories. This article contributes to the discussion of the PRC’s official state discourse of memory relating to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Since the Communist takeover of China in 1949, the discourses of war memory have been constantly subject to a high level of political manipulation, and war memory has been used as a political tool for the CCP to consolidate its legitimacy. This article also contributes to illustrating the periodization of war memory in the PRC. It suggests that the Chinese official discourse of war memory is divided into the Mao era (1949-1976) and the post-Mao era (1976 to present). In the Mao era, the CCP established a discourse of war memory that emphasized the victory of the Communist revolution and the anti-Japanese resistance led by the Communists. In the post-Mao era, the newly-emerging victim narrative that emphasized Japanese atrocities developed in parallel with the victor narrative of the Mao era in the discourse of war memory. The victim narrative tended to overshadow the victor narrative for thirty years from the 1980s to the 2000s. Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, the victor narrative has made a strong comeback in the official discourse of war memory in the PRC.

 

State Monopoly of War Memory

The Second Sino-Japanese War is a major catastrophe and national struggle in Chinese history. The tragic and heroic nature of the war explains why it has been important for the PRC to commemorate and memorialize the war. On the one hand, the war is one of the most destructive episodes in modern Chinese history. It is estimated that during the war, approximately 100 million people were forced to become refugees and at least 20 million civilians were killed (Larry and MacKinnon 2001, 6). The human rights abuses during the war were so catastrophic that even after seventy years the scars have not yet been healed in contemporary Chinese society. On the other hand, the war was the most heroic moment in Chinese history. It reminds us of the victory of the Chinese people to liberate themselves from the exploitation of foreign imperialist powers. The CCP claims to have played a leading role in the war. Therefore, how the war is publicly remembered becomes relevant to the construction of Chinese nationalism and to the consolidation of the CCP’s legitimacy.

The PRC government uses a nationalist rhetoric to define the nature of the war. The official discourse refers to the war as the “Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese War of Resistance,” rather than using a more neutral term such as the Second Sino-Japanese War. As indicated by the term “resistance,” China’s involvement in the war is framed in a nationalist fashion, emphasizing the defense and sacrifice of Chinese people for national liberation. The term “resistance” also serves to downplay Chinese collaboration with Japan, which widely existed as part of everyday life in many areas of wartime China.1

The PRC government has been seeking ways to create official memories of the war that serves to stabilize Communist rule. In this process, political considerations predominate in the efforts of constructing war memory. The processes of constructing war memory in the PRC impose exclusiveness. The official memory of the war should never be challenged, amended, or overturned. While the opportunities to generate memories of the war abound, the government spares no effort to suppress memories that deviate from the official memories, because this raises questions that are difficult for the government to answer. To be sure, the state is unable to completely deter alternative memories that exist in the private sphere. Alternative memories will inevitably coexist and compete with official memories. However, alternative memories are closely monitored by the government, and it is unlikely that they will prevail in the public domain and become an established way of remembering.

The state monopoly on the official discourse of war memory prescribes rules for what is to be remembered and what is to be forgotten. The commemoration and remembering of the war are repeatedly articulated through mass media, which facilitate public identification of China as the victor/victim and of Japan as the perpetrator. Stories of Japanese wartime atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and Unit 731 are retold in television dramas, films, and documentaries, reminding the Chinese public to never forget national grievances, deprivation, and humiliation at the hands of Japanese aggressors, as well as the hard-earned national liberation. Meanwhile, the state’s significant attention to remembering this war overshadows the collective remembering of other wars that China fought in the twentieth century, from the Sino-Soviet War (1929) and the Civil War (1945-1949) in the Republican era to the Korean War (1950-1953) and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979) in the Communist era. The Sino-Soviet War and Sino-Vietnamese War, especially, have been almost forgotten in the social discourse of the PRC. While these military conflicts are certainly significant events that have received public attention, their legacies have not been remembered in the same way as the Second Sino-Japanese War.

The PRC facilitates memories of the war that clearly distinguishes between “self” and “other.” The Communists are always the “self.” The “other” could be the Nationalists as an internal foe or the Japanese as an external adversary. For much of the postwar period, both the Nationalists and the Japanese have been blamed for causing sufferings to the Chinese during the war. In the Mao era, the Nationalists were stigmatized as counterrevolutionaries who had oppressed the Chinese people. It is only since the 1980s that the PRC has begun to rehabilitate the Nationalist “other” and publicly acknowledge their contribution in the war. The reason for this change was that after the death of Mao, the PRC policy towards Taiwan shifted from confrontation to engagement, which was designed to woo the Nationalists in Taiwan to negotiate a reunification treaty. However, this gesture of rehabilitation avoided acknowledging the Nationalists’ critical role in the war. The Nationalists were still regarded as an internal “other,” rather than part of the “self.” For their part, the Japanese have been demonized as “devils” who committed appalling crimes against the Chinese. This model of dichotomy between self and other in the PRC’s war memory demonstrates the state manipulation of war memory, which honors the Communists, dismisses the Nationalists, and condemns the Japanese.

While the war occupies a significant position in the PRC’s national memory today, memories of the war have evolved from partial oblivion to full revival. In the first thirty years of Communist rule, the war was publicly remembered as a revolutionary victory of proletarian over imperialist exploitation. The “liberation” narrative dominated the official discourse of war memory, highlighting heroism and avoiding expressions of suffering. Representations of the war were limited to heroic triumph in the public sphere. After the death of Mao, the CCP abandoned Mao’s political line of class struggle, and loosened its control over narratives of the war memory. Accordingly, war memory entered the public sphere under the auspices of the state, and a discourse of suffering and humiliation evolved in this process.

The trends in the development of war memory in the PRC are most evident in the state initiative of building war and military museums across the country. In the Mao era, the state made only limited efforts to preserve war memory, and a very small number of museums were erected to commemorate the war. In the 1950s, the Chinese government established a military museum in Beijing to exhibit the victory of Chinese revolution under the leadership of the CCP. The narratives of museum exhibitions portrayed the war as a heroic triumph in the course of China’s revolutionary history. Due to the domestic political chaos, the museum remained closed for much of the 1960s and 1970s (Denton 2014, 121-132). The Chinese government set up another museum dedicated to Japanese war crimes in Fushun in1986. This museum served to preserve the memory of Japanese atrocities and to implement the political “re-education” of Japanese prisoners of war after 1945 (Mitter 2020, 112).

In the post-Mao era, public museums dedicated to the Second Sino-Japanese War mushroomed across the country. The Museum of War of Resistance against Japan was erected in the Beijing suburb of Wanping where the war had broken out in 1937, in July 1987, which soon became the national center for remembering and commemorating the Second Sino-Japanese War. The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall was completed on 15 August 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the war. The Nanjing Museum of the Site of Lijixiang Comfort Station opened as its branch in December 2015, housing the archival evidence of Chinese “sex slaves” (aka “comfort women”) who were forced to serve the Japanese military in Nanjing under the Japanese occupation. Other museums that the state has constructed to memorialize the war include the Museum of the Criminal Evidence of Japanese Imperial Army Unit 731 built outside of Harbin in 1985, and the September 18 Historical Museum built in Shenyang in 1991 to commemorate the 1931 “Mukden Incident.”

Figure 1: The Museum of the War of Chinese People’s Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.
Photo by Fanghong, CC BY-SA 3.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

After Xi Jinping took office in 2012, the CCP strengthened its control of the official war memory discourse. This is evident in the CCP’s initiative to redefine the nature of the war in textbooks. In January 2017, The Ministry of Education announced that the Second Sino-Japanese War would officially be dated as lasting for fourteen years instead of eight years, starting with Japan’s invasion of Manchuria on 18 September 1931 in what is known as the Mukden Incident (Zhao 2017, 12). The war had long been defined as an eight-year struggle lasting from 1937 to 1945, in which the start date is the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on 7 July 1937. The 2017 government edict declared that official interpretations of the war from now on would have to use the “fourteen-year” definition. Textbooks referring to the war would have to go through a comprehensive amendment. It is remarkable that not just history textbooks but also textbooks of other subjects such as Chinese and ethics would have to update the wording wherever the war is mentioned (Huanqiu, 2017).

 

Narrative: Resistance, Victor, and Victim 

The PRC’s war memory discourse consists of narratives of resistance, victor, and victim. The resistance narrative emphasizes national unity and solidarity in fighting for national liberation. Its focus is on the memorialization of heroes and battles. The government has designated many personalities as heroes for their contribution in the war. The officially designated heroes include not only civilians and Communist and Nationalist servicemen, but also foreign military officers, doctors and journalists who assisted China in fighting the Japanese. The battles fought by the Communists and Nationalists in the war are another theme in the war memory. In recent years, Chinese newspapers have reported numerous stories of battles during the war. For example, in 2014 the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), the mouthpiece of the CCP, reprinted documents relating to thirty battles that the Communists and the Nationalists fought during the war. The documents were temporarily published online by the National Archives Bureau in 2014. They are selected from many written records about the war in numerous historical archives across the country. These documents detail the course of the battles, the number of casualties and the intensity of resistance.

The resistance narrative is further consolidated by the CCP’s directive to redefine the length of the war in textbooks already touched upon. It has constructed a way of remembering the war that gives prominence to the resistance in China’s struggle against Japan. According to the People’s Daily, this decision aims to establish a way of remembering that the war is a long-term nationalist struggle led by the CCP. The revisionism is justified on the grounds of characterizing the war as an “uninterrupted” historical process and a “continuous” struggle. In this view, the “total” war of resistance at the national level (1937-1945) evolved from the “partial” war of resistance at the regional level (1931-1937). During this period, the CCP made unremitting efforts to mobilize national unity to resist Japanese aggression. The “partial” war of resistance is both the basis and preparation for the subsequent national struggle. These two periods are inseparable, forming an uninterrupted “historical chain” (Zhang 2017,11).

It must be pointed out, however, that Chinese resistance as such during 1931 to 1936 is a myth, and its significance should not be overestimated. From 1931 to 1936, the resistance activity was concentrated in Manchuria where Japan established a client state known as Manchukuo as early as 1932. The overall resistance during this period was relatively weak and sporadic. The highest estimate for membership in the resistance is around 300,000, accounting for approximately one percent of the 30 million population of Manchuria in the early 1930s (Mitter 2000, 200). When Manchukuo was established, the Japanese Kwantung Army launched a series of large military operations to eliminate resistance activity, and as a result, by 1933 the resistance had been largely suppressed. The anti-Japanese resistance cannot be simply understood through nationalism either. This has to do with the complex structure of resistance membership. The resistance members included Chinese and Korean Communists, soldiers of the reorganized army of the local warlord Zhang Xueliang, and former “bandits” who indulged in extortion and raids. The number of “bandits” is notably large, accounting for almost half of the total number of resistance fighters in Manchuria. Most resistance members were not motivated by nationalism. While it is true that the Communists took a nationalist stance in their resistance against Japan, it is debatable whether other resistance forces which had no particular political allegiance were motivated by nationalism and dedicated themselves to a nationalist cause (Mitter 2000, 190-203).

The victor narrative depicts the war as a Communist victory against Japanese imperialism. In the Mao era, the Communist leaders did not use the narrative of national humiliation; rather, they used a Marxist theory of class struggle to explain the national proletarian struggle against foreign imperialist foes. The victory of the Communist revolution was glorified as the great liberation of Chinese people from the oppression of Japanese imperialism and the counterrevolutionary Nationalist government, and Mao therefore became the great savior of the Chinese nation (Wang 2015, 229). The theory of class struggle enabled the development of a narrative in the PRC’s war memory that defined China as a victor and the war as a struggle that transcended the boundaries of race, nation, and state (Gao 2015, 81). The narrative of “China as a victor” continued into the post-Mao era. On 7 July 1987, the 50th Anniversary of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Yang Shangkun, a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee, reiterated the position that China was a victor in the war: the war is a “great turning point in the historical development of the Chinese nation from decline to rejuvenation,” China “for the first time achieved a complete victory against imperialist aggression,” and the Chinese “as a semi-colonial weak nation created a miracle of defeating an imperialist power” (Ren min ri bao 1987, 1). After Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, this victory narrative was re-articulated as an integral part of the “Chinese Dream,” a discourse actively promoted by the CCP to reconstruct Chinese nationalism. To fulfill the “Chinese Dream,” China must take three steps of “standing up,” “growing rich,” and “becoming strong.” As the first step in the direction towards Chinese rejuvenation, the victory of the war takes on a symbolic significance.

Yet the death of Mao in 1976 not only marked the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, but also the beginning of the transition from class-based revolutionary ideology to nation-centered patriotism in China. One locus of this new patriotism has been an emphasis on China’s wartime victimization at the hands of the invading Japanese Imperial Army. This victim-centric view of history is not limited just to China but is also part of broader post-colonial and post-Cold War trends globally. In post-Mao China, narratives of victimization and national humiliation by the Japanese are often found in history textbooks and media coverage. And in textbooks approved after 1992, the “victim narrative” was expanded even further to blame Japan (and the West) for China’s traumatic and humiliating experiences in the past hundred years lasting from the First Opium War (1839-1842) to the end of the Second Sino-Japanese War. In newspapers, too, reports about Chinese victimization far exceeded those on China’s victory in the war which prevailed in previous decades. The data of reports in newspapers from 2005 to 2015 shows that the number of reports about Chinese victimization such as the Nanjing Massacre was almost six times as many as reports about battles in the war (Wang 2016, 32-33). The victim narrative focuses on quantifying Chinese suffering in detail. Coverage of Japanese atrocities in the war tends to concentrate on the process of determining the number of victims, resembling what Coble has called “a numbers game,” in which the goal seems to maximize the number of victims (Coble 2007, 404). In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek announced that the war had killed 1.75 million Chinese. The official number of estimated casualties increased dramatically under Communist rule. In the Mao era, the CCP declared that 9.32 million Chinese were killed in the war. That number remained unchanged for many years. Then, in 1995, Jiang Zemin, the general secretary of the CCP, raised the death toll to a rough estimate of 35 million, and this has been the official Chinese figure ever since (Gries 2004, 80). It should be noted that identifying the number of victims by the Chinese government reflects continuities between the pre- and post-1949 periods. The official number of 300,000 Nanjing Massacre victims claimed by the Communists, for instance, was not their own invention, but rather emerged from the war crimes trials conducted by the Nationalists in the late 1940s.

 

Thematic Focus: Communists, Nationalists and Japan in the War

The Communists, Nationalists and Japan are the main actors in the war, and each has been remembered in specific ways in the PRC. The Communists have been remembered as the national savior. This way of remembering the Communists is particularly evident in the “bulwark” (zhongliu dizhu) discourse that was first proposed by Mao in 1945 and is today actively promoted by the CCP. The CCP has so far produced numerous reports, books, and documentaries to construct a myth that the Communists served as the backbone force in the war. The “bulwark” narrative distinguishes between a front dominated by the Nationalists and a rear in which the Communists were dominant. It claims that these two battlefields are interrelated and interdependent. The rear outweighs the front in terms of the long-term outcome and significance of the war. The essential role of the Communists in the war is justified on the grounds of the political position that it took. This narrative asserts that the Communists actively proposed and defended the United Front, which was formally established in 1937, with the Nationalists throughout the war. Without their relentless efforts to unite with the Nationalists to fight Japan, it would have been impossible for China to eventually win the war (Liang 2005, 37-43). It appears that the “bulwark” narrative attributes the Communists’ contribution more to its political position and less to its military engagement during the war. There is no doubt that the Communists fought guerrilla warfare with Japan at the “rear,” but a comparison of the military engagement by the Communists and the Nationalists would indicate the prominent role of the Nationalists on the battlefield. The Communists launched one major military operation against Japan (Wang 2000, 166), while the Nationalists fought twenty-three campaigns between 1937 and 1945 (Van de Ven 2003, 210; Wang 2000, 166). To be sure, the “bulwark” narrative politicizes a way of remembering the war that honors the Communists for its contributions.

In contrast to the role of the Communists as national savior, the Nationalists have been remembered much less positively in the political discourse of the PRC. This was particularly the case in the Mao era when the central government systematically delegitimized memories of the Nationalists’ contributions to the war effort. The Nationalists were stigmatized as a class enemy that had betrayed the United Front, and their contribution in the war was dismissed as insignificant. Beginning in the 1950s, the government obstructed the public commemoration of the Nationalists by demolishing shrines, cemeteries, and monuments. These commemorative sites were initially built by the Nationalist government during the war in commemoration of the Nationalists’ soldiers who died during the war (Chang 2012, 1-46). Under the Communist regime, these sites were classified as counterrevolutionary relics and became immediately subject to systematic demolition. In consequence, cemeteries of Nationalist soldiers suffered severe damage. The tombstones of thousands of soldiers were vandalized, and the ashes were exhumed and thrown away (Tsui 2020).

Beginning in the 1980s, the CCP discarded the old narrative, which mainly focused on the purported Nationalist betrayal of the United Front. Instead, the new narrative gave a more positive evaluation of the Nationalists’ contribution in the war. This narrative no longer emphasized the ideological and political conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists, but it redefined the Nationalists as an indispensable force in the resistance that had made sacrifices for national liberation. Some Nationalist figures were rehabilitated, including Chiang Kai-shek and many generals who had been discredited by the CCP during the Mao years (Coble 2007, 402; Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 120). Textbooks published in the late 1980s for the first time included the Nationalists-led military campaigns against Japan. New war films also portrayed the Nationalists in a more positive light (He 2007, 57). Museums exhibited photographs and historical relics of former Nationalist generals and soldiers. One major reason for the change in narrative can be attributed to the PRC’s policy on Taiwan since the 1980s. Beijing adopted a conciliatory strategy to lure Taiwan into an agreement of reunification with the PRC. The Nationalists, then the ruling party in Taiwan, were regarded as an ally rather than a foe for Beijing as Taiwan emerged as a multiparty democracy. The reunification with Taiwan had now become a question of national pride. This strategy also aimed to forge a shared historical consciousness between mainland China and Taiwan and to counter the tendency among Taiwanese nationalists towards disconnecting Taiwan’s history and culture from that of the Chinese mainland.

The change in the PRC’s remembering of the Nationalists is also evident in the representation of the Nationalists in museums. In general, the exhibitions in public museums pay only limited attention to the role of Nationalists in the war. One of the few public museums in the PRC that acknowledge the Nationalists is the Museum of War of Resistance against Japan in Beijing. The hall of the museum acknowledges the role played by the Nationalists in the key battlefields of Taierzhuang, Taiyuan and Wuhan. Zhang Zizhong, Li Zongren and other lesser-known Nationalist generals are commended, and the Nationalists are praised for their participation in Burma. There is also a large Nationalist flag in one of the main halls right next to the picture of Chinese premier Zhou Enlai (Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 120). A museum dedicated specifically to the Nationalists’ war effort is one of the many museums included in the private Jianchuan Museum Cluster. It is located in a historic small town on the outskirts of Chengdu, in southwestern China. Among its thirty individual museums dedicated to a particular theme, the “Frontal Battlefield Hall” is built to honor the legacy of the Nationalists. However, this hall is overshadowed by the “Mainstay Hall,” which is built specifically for honoring the Communists’ war efforts. The space of the “Frontal Battlefield Hall” is only half of the “Mainstay Hall.” The latter has a much richer variety of exhibits than the former, housing historical photographs, documents, and materials in the war.

Memories of Japan’s role in the war have gone through a process of partial oblivion to resurrection in the PRC. In the Mao era, the state discouraged memories of the war and Japanese war atrocities in general. Instead, the CCP constructed a heroic narrative of the war in which revolutionary martyrs and the victory of the revolution were worshipped. Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre were rarely mentioned in popular publications such as textbooks and newspapers. Even Mao’s writings and speeches made no specific reference to the Nanjing Massacre (Seo 2008, 382). The government also discouraged serious investigation into it. In 1962, historians at Nanjing University completed a manuscript on the Nanjing Massacre, which put together photographs, statistics, and interviews with survivors. The Chinese authorities immediately classified the manuscript instead of allowing it to be published (Eykholt 2000, 25). It was not until 1979 that the authorities released the manuscript as an internal document that was circulated, but only among a small number of high-level government officials (Li and Huang 2017, 15). Yang holds a different view that the Nanjing Massacre was widely presented in such platforms as memoirs and museums in the Mao era (2018). While the Chinese government did not completely erase the Nanjing Massacre from public memory in the Mao era, it is true that they avoided explicitly exposing Japanese atrocities in public. There were hardly any published records of memoirs about the Nanjing Massacre during this period and the government did not build any museum to commemorate the victims of the Nanjing Massacre either. Further, it remains unclear whether the Nanjing Massacre was widely remembered in the private sphere. This is because many survivors of the Nanjing Massacre were killed by the persecution in the Mao era, and their cemeteries were demolished. It is plausible that in the first three decades of the Communist rule, the Nanjing Massacre was largely neglected, if not forgotten, in public memory.

In the Mao era, the PRC policy towards Japan was designed to shelve the question of Japan’s aggression. In the 1950s, the PRC was working to counteract the threat of the American containment policy against the Communist government in mainland China and its support for the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Beijing implemented “people’s diplomacy” towards Japan, a semi-official diplomatic campaign which was aimed to change Tokyo’s non-recognition of Beijing and undercut its security alliance with Washington (He 2007, 47). Towards the end of the 1960s, the PRC began to cooperate with Japan as part of Mao’s strategy to confront the Soviet Union (Reilly 2011, 469). Following the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations in 1972, Beijing avoided historical disputes and reached a compromise with Tokyo over the issue of Japanese war responsibility-at least temporarily.

During this period, it appears that the Chinese government was reluctant to confront Japan with the question of Japanese war responsibility. Discourses of war memory drew a clear line between “a handful of Japanese militarists” and ordinary “Japanese people.” School textbooks never denounced Japan and the Japanese people, but instead used the terms “Japanese imperialism” or “Japanese militarism” to refer to the bearer of Japan’s war responsibility in an attempt to develop a favorable impression of the PRC in Japan (He 2007, 47). To be sure, the differentiation between “good” Japanese and “bad” Japanese is a diplomatic tactic used by Beijing to facilitate the normalization of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Japan. It also corresponds to Mao’s lines of class struggle which denounced Japanese militarists as a class enemy and sympathized with ordinary Japanese and their status as victims of their government’s misguided imperialist ventures.

It was only the emergence of historical revisionism in 1980s Japan that triggered a change in the PRC’s policy. When the Japanese textbook controversy erupted in 1982 and again in 1986, Beijing condemned what they perceived as the revival of militarist tendencies among Japanese leaders, and pressed Tokyo to correct the historical interpretations of textbooks in question. The official visits by Japanese prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985, 1996 and 2001 also triggered vehement criticism from Beijing (Saito 2016, 62-67). From the 1980s on, Beijing contended with Tokyo over Japan’s approach to the commemoration of the war. Beijing’s confrontational approach to historical issues with Japan is clearly a departure from the conciliatory policy that the Chinese government pursued in the Mao era.

The PRC’s collective remembering of Japan’s role in the war fully revived in the post-Mao era. In the 1980s, the Chinese government lifted the restrictions on the memories of Japanese war atrocities. Debates over Japan’s war atrocities began to appear in academic research, in general publications and in popular culture. Many academic works on Japan’s aggression in wartime China were published to expose Japanese brutality in the war. Research on the Nanjing Massacre, in particular, has developed rapidly with generous government sponsorship. In 1984, a large-scale investigation of survivors and witnesses of the Nanjing Massacre was conducted for the first time, and several research institutes were set up in Nanjing to advance this research. A research institute was established in 2011 in Shanghai to investigate the Tokyo Trial and Japanese war crimes. Numerous books intended for the general readership have also been released to promote the memory of the Nanjing Massacre, including translations of works by the American journalist Iris Chang, Japanese historian Kasahara Tokushi, a leading authority of the Sino-Japanese War, and German businessman John Rabe, a witness of the Nanjing Massacre. Japanese veterans’ trips to China for confession have been frequently covered in Chinese television. The rejuvenation of remembering Japan’s role in the war in Chinese academia and mass media indicates the end of the class struggle-oriented policy adopted by the CCP during the Mao period. The CCP now no longer favors a class-based memory of the war that distinguishes between the Japanese people and the Japanese imperialists, but instead promotes a way of remembering Japanese war responsibility that transcends class boundaries. In other words, this new form of war memory assumes the unity of Japanese nation along national lines and transfers Japan’s war responsibility from the Japanese imperialists to the entire Japanese people.

 

Memoirs and Oral Histories of Veterans

The memoirs and oral accounts of Chinese veterans are private memories that describe the cruelty of the war and the human experiences in the war. This alternative form of memory is markedly different from the official war memory, which tends to emphasize heroism and nationalism and to neglect the personal experiences of ordinary people as well as their attitudes towards the Chinese wartime regime. While the discourse of veterans’ memoirs retains nationalist elements that emphasize collective sacrifice for national salvation in the war, it records some voices of family relationships and human affection. These narratives deviate from those of the official war memory, but they should not be viewed as a marginalized form of alternative memory that fundamentally challenges the official state discourse of war memory. It is true that these alternative narratives contradict the monolithic images of war portrayed in official memory discourses, but they are mostly products of state sponsorship that supports the official view of the war. Therefore, the accounts of memoirs and oral histories of veterans are essentially a variation or adjustment of the official war memory, which do not necessarily constitute counter memory that is produced to resist the official state discourse of war memory. In this sense, these private memories of the war are unreliable representations of war experience. They neither honestly reflect how veterans remember the war now nor truthfully record what happened on the battlefield in the war years.

Memoirs of veterans were absent in the PRC’s public sphere until the early 1980s. The lack of veterans’ memoirs in the early period of the Communist rule can be attributed to state repression. Since the victory of the Communist revolution in 1949, veterans, especially those who previously fought with the Nationalists, were not motivated to have their memoirs published because they were ostracized by the state. In the 1950s, the CCP launched nationwide campaigns to eliminate Nationalist veterans from public life, labeling many of them “rightists,” “counterrevolutionaries” and “enemies of people.” As a result, veterans suffered from persecution, discrimination, and contempt. Many of them were humiliated and tortured to death, or committed suicide (Diamant 2001, 162-163; Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 127-130 and 133-134). The veterans were in extremely difficult political circumstances, so it was highly unlikely for them to publish what they had been through in the war years.

After the death of Mao in 1976, the CCP gradually permitted state agencies to record the wartime experiences of veterans. Many institutions began to invest resources to collect testimonies of veterans. In the 1980s, compiling war testimonies of veterans was not an endeavor of national coordination, but mainly the work organized by local officials. Most compilations focused on the provincial or municipal experience of the war, so testimonies reflected more of a localized remembering of the war (Moore 2011, 411-412). In recent years, the CCP has emphasized the importance of unifying national identity and has come to regard the war as a historical turning point shifting the trajectory from national humiliation to national rejuvenation. Veterans’ testimony of the war would help build a common national narrative and help shape a shared national identity. Since 2015, the Chinese government has funded various government projects to collect and publish the testimonies of veterans. Thus far, the National Office of Social Sciences under the Ministry of Propaganda has funded numerous research projects of this sort, including an extensive project on the oral history of veterans, which was approved in 2016 and is expected to be completed in 2025. This project involves a wide range of government agencies, including the Historical Research Center of the Central Committee of the CCP, the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television, and the National Archives. Various propaganda departments and the history offices of the CCP in central and local governments also support these investigations.

Meanwhile, academic and cultural institutions across the country have put the collection of the oral testimonies of veterans on their research agenda. In 2015, a scholar from Nanjing Normal University launched a project that records veterans’ oral histories of the war. Two other similar projects were also launched in 2015 and 2018. These projects include forms of social engagement as part of their research agenda. The Nanjing Civil Anti-Japanese War Museum in collaboration with the research projects sponsored public participation through a series of workshops organized to teach the public how to collect oral histories (Li 2020, 33). Many students have been recruited as volunteers from universities across the country to interview veterans. This is not to say, however, that the voices of veterans are accurately reflected in the recorded findings of these projects. The state still closely monitors the research process, from selecting which veterans to interview to what interviewees are supposed to say for these projects (Li 2020, 33).

The state-sponsored oral history projects of veterans have also facilitated the publication of war memoirs. Since the 2000s, many former servicemen have published their war experiences. These works range from personal accounts of generals and soldiers to recollections of specific battles (Bai 2013; Fang 2013; Wen 2005; You 2011; Zhu 2010). There are also some works which record the experiences of veterans in specific provincial areas, such as Shanxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, and the northeastern provinces (Fang 2012; Hu nan tu shu guan 2013; Li 2012; Zhang 2005). It is worth noting that many of these works are written not by the veterans, but rather by members of the oral history projects on the behalf of veterans. While the Chinese government has lifted the ban on the publication of war memoirs, the narrative of memoirs is still subject to tight government censorship. Censors do not allow veterans to portray the war as they experienced it, but instead require them to toe the official line, which construes the war as a heroic struggle against Japanese imperialism. As a private form of war memory, however, the narratives in the memoirs of veterans inevitably clash with official historical narratives. Some memoirs lack accounts of the “heroism” of the Communists and the “cowardice” of the Nationalists which are often described in official war memories, and even express sympathy for the Nationalists (Moore 2011, 412). Such narratives have often been extensively edited or even excised altogether by the publisher. The censored memoirs tend to avoid descriptions of the effects of war on people, as well as expressions of veterans’ grief of personal loss and deprivation during the war. Thus, while the memoirs reflect to some extent the war experiences of the veterans, they are by no means genuine accounts that truthfully record how veterans remember the war, and even less so how they experienced the war.

In addition to the government efforts, the sense of urgency of the public to record and preserve wartime experiences resulted in an oral history documentary film project titled My War of Resistance (wode kangzhan) in the early 2010s, a period when some limited space became available for mild critical views of the official war memory to appear in Chinese media. The documentary was produced by Cui Yongyuan, a popular host who had worked for national television. My War of Resistance documents personal stories of many individuals during the period from 1931 to 1945. The project constitutes an enormous investment of time and energy. Cui Yongyuan spent eight years and more than 130 million yuan to produce the documentary. In the eight years since 2002, Cui interviewed more than 3,500 people with direct war experiences, including 400 Nationalist and Communist veterans (Weatherley and Zhang 2017, 124). The documentary has two seasons with a total of sixty-two episodes. The first season (thirty-two episodes) was screened on the Internet first, which allowed it to attract widespread attention. Then it was broadcast simultaneously on eighty-five TV stations across the country. The second season (thirty episodes) was released in 2011. Each episode has a thematic focus and lasts about thirty minutes.

My War of Resistance attempts to reproduce the overall situation of the Second Sino-Japanese War for the audience. The unique feature of the documentary is that it records the experiences of “little men,” or the ordinary individuals in the war. It tells the stories of different social groups such as veterans, civilians, and Chinese local collaborators who worked for the Japanese military in Japanese occupied zones. The focus of the documentary is the stories of Nationalist veterans, most of whom were soldiers and low-level officials. The documentary covers the daily life of Nationalist veterans in the war, including their love stories and suffering on the battlefield. The documentary reveals the veterans as unhappy men when they recount their painful experiences. In contrast to the heroic narratives of the official war memories, veterans’ memories of the war experience in My War of Resistance are invariably imbued with feelings of helplessness, frustration, and anguish.

 

Conclusion

Memory of the Second Sino-Japanese War in the PRC is an endeavor of myth-making. The main components of the myth are ways of remembering the Communists, the Nationalists and Japan. The Communists are the backbone force of anti-Japanese resistance; Japan represents evil; and the role of the Nationalists has gradually changed from evil to positive, but still subordinate to the CCP. The myth-making of the war is particularly evident in recent years when the PRC redefined the nature of the war by extending its time frame from eight years to fourteen years in school textbooks. The PRC’s war memory is a mix of narratives of resistance, victim, and victor. In the Mao era, the victor narrative dominated war memory. Narratives of resistance and victimhood gradually developed in the post-Mao era. The resistance narrative is constructed to cultivate a sense of national belonging and establish national identity. The victor narrative is essentially a revolutionary narrative of class struggle which often appears in official speeches at commemorative events. The victim narrative often appears in popular culture, newspapers, academic publications, and discussions in intellectual circles. It promotes a way of remembering Chinese suffering from the Japanese war atrocities in the war. The victor narrative is based on class struggle, while the resistance and victim narratives are based on nationalism. The PRC strictly controls the remembering and commemoration of the war, and the articulation of the war memory through media and institutions closely follows political conditions. In the Mao era, the state implemented a policy of amnesia about the war, which discouraged collective remembering of Japanese atrocities. The state banned the publication of research on this subject and silenced many veterans through political persecution. Since the 1980s, the ban has been lifted to a certain extent, but the narratives of war memory still largely conform to the official line of the CCP.

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Mo Tian is a lecturer of Japanese studies at Anshan Normal University, specializing in Sino-Japanese relations. He holds a Ph.D. in history from the Australian National University.

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Notes

Various short-lived regimes existed as collaborators in wartime China. The most well-known cases are the Wang Jingwei government which was established in Nanjing in 1940 and collapsed at the end of the war in 1945, and Manchukuo which was a client state set up by the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in 1932 and ended with Japanese surrender in 1945. For a general survey of Chinese collaboration with Japanese, see Barrett and Shyu 2011 and Brook 2005.

Featured image: Japanese landing near Shanghai, November 1937 (Licensed under the public domain)

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Imran Khan, a cricketer-turned politician, former Prime Minister of Pakistan is found openly alleging the US administration for the fall of his elected government. In his interview to numerous national and international TV channels, he claims that his visit to Russia amid the Ukraine crisis in the month of February, 2022 was not fully digested by the US administration. On the other hand, he was found getting closer to China, an arch enemy of the USA. Liu Zongyi, secretary-general of the Research Center for China-South Asia Cooperation at the SIIS, also believes the West, and particularly the US, doesn’t want to see Khan remain in power since he has gotten tougher on them.

Imran Khan debunks allegations of corruption by the ruling coalition partners against him and his party men. Imran Khan claims that his government was receiving a good amount of foreign remittances, collected taxes and necessary reforms were instituted to uplift the poor people from poverty. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Pakistan`s economy under the leadership of Imran Khan was moving in the right direction. Imran Khan also told the media that under his Government export reached a historic high of 25.3 billion. Imran Khan also claims that he tried hard to repair bilateral relations with India minus the Kashmir issue. Despite all this, the US administration hatched a conspiracy and toppled his elected Government and handed over the reins of the Government to the current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Imran Khan`s ouster through no-confidence motion is, no doubt, a black spot on the political career of Imran Khan.  Since the fall of the Government, Imran Khan is clamoring for early National Assembly elections which are valid till next August (2023). Can Imran Khan win National Assembly elections with a thumping majority? Will the US administration allow the current Government under dynastic Shehbaz Sharif to continue? These questions are circulating in Pakistan as well as in other parts of the world.

At the domestic level, Imran Khan along with his party (Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf) workers, sympathizers and supporters is seen mobilizing the masses against corrupt political dynasties through rallies and public speeches. People are coming to his rallies en masse and listening to him attentively assuring him that they will vote for him and his party. The current government is advancing its vicious agenda against Imran Khan`s domestic and international policies which are responsible for the worst condition of Pakistan. The current Government with the help of pro-government media houses are found flashing these points and trying hard to build anti- Imran Khan Propaganda. It is also a fact that Pakistan’s economy is suffocating and inflation is running high at 10%.

At the international level, Khan is seen coaxing Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and other like-minded Middle East countries to support him in winning back Pakistan. As of today, Russia is busy winning Ukraine. The Russia- Ukraine war is prolonging as the West is assisting the Ukraine President by supplying modern weaponry and financial assistance so in such a situation, Russia`s priorities would be different than helping Imran Khan to occupy the seat of power in Pakistan.

China – Pakistan are tied up with the progress of USD 60 billion China- Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Newly appointed foreign minister of Pakistan – Bilawal Bhutto Zardari made a maiden visit to China in May 2022 and discussed economic coordination, industrialization and speeding up of the USD 60 billion CPEC. Nevertheless, the US administration under various US Presidents are against the CPEC. The reality is that the CPEC would remain  a stumbling block between the new government under Shehbaz Sharif  and the US administration under US President Joe Biden. So in such a situation when the US administration is against the CPEC, China would not be that helpful to Imran Khan in winning back the seat of power. The countries in the Middle East including Saudi Arabia might transfer their loyalty to the Sharif family as the former Prime Minister of Pakistan and his brother Nawaz Sharif still enjoys cordial relations with Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries. So in such a situation Imran Khan might not get full political, financial support as it is expected. Above that, the US administration is so powerful as to put political pressure on the monarchies of the Middle East and would try hard to weaken personal relations of Imran Khan with the top leadership of the Middle East countries.

The current Government in Pakistan is run by a dozen multi-party coalition which are ideologically diverse. Imran Khan believes that this partnership is weak and surely breaks up sooner or later.  It is his  illusion. This is not going to happen. Money, power binds the enemies together. Imran Khan would not be able to bring back defectors to his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party as they are given assurances by the current government of plum posts. Another weak point with Imran Khan is that his relations with the powerful army of Pakistan have worsened and there is no chance that Imran Khan would ever become the darling of the Pakistan Army.  The friendship between the US administration and Imran Khan is broken now and US President Joe Biden thinks that he is no longer useful to the national interests of the USA. The CIA of the USA might pump funds to undermine the credibility of Imran Khan among the voters of Pakistan and influence the election . Therefore, Imran Khan and his party would not be able to win national assembly elections and form the next government. Possibly, Imran Khan might face consequences at the hands of the Pakistan Army. Imran Khan might be sent to prison sooner or later.

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Dr. Rahul Kumar, Ph.D. in Sociology from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi (India), is an independent researcher. His area of interest encompasses diplomacy, foreign policy and international relations. The views expressed in this article are personal. 

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As one of the world’s largest greenhouse gas emitters, Indonesia has pledged to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.

However, rising living standards, population growth and massive electrification will increase Indonesia’s electricity demand 30-fold, to 9,000 Terawatt-hours (TWh) per year. This rapid increase in electricity consumption raises concerns about energy security and affordability, and environmental sustainability.

Our previous study shows the country could meet its energy needs by relying on its abundant solar energy. By installing billions of solar panels Indonesia could harvest about 190,000 TWh of solar energy per year. This amount of energy is larger than world’s electricity consumption in 2020.

However, relying on solar energy means Indonesia must be able to deal with the risk of shortage because the sun doesn’t shine all the time. To balance a solar-dominated electricity system overnight and during rainy periods, Indonesia will need large amounts of energy storage.

Fortunately, Indonesia has a nature-based solution to this problem: the country can use its enormous potential for off-river pumped hydro energy storage (PHES).

PHES is a technique to store energy by using excess power produced from solar panels during sunny days to pump water uphill to a higher reservoir. When power generation is low during cloudy weather or at night, electricity can then be dispatched on demand from PHES by releasing the stored water downhill to the lower reservoir through the turbine.

In our latest study, we have identified that excellent sites for PHES reservoirs are available all over the country, including the heavily populated islands of Java, Bali and Sumatra.

Off-river PHES for energy balancing

To develop an off-river PHES, we need two closely spaced lakes or reservoirs of about one square kilometres each that have an altitude difference of about 600 metres. They are connected by a tunnel containing a pump-turbine.

Pumped hydro energy storage in pumping mode. Image from pumpedhydro.com.au

Pumped hydro energy storage in generating mode. Image from pumpedhydro.com.au

Unlike conventional (river-based) PHES, we don’t need to build dams on rivers because the water flows through tunnels connecting two reservoirs. We can also use old mining sites, as well as existing lakes and reservoirs. This means off-river PHES systems can have low environmental and social impacts.

Two types of pumped-storage hydropower: river-based (left) and off-river (right). Image from NREL

The area of land required for an off-river PHES is also relatively small. A typical 150 gigawatt-hour (GWh) off-river pumped hydro requires about 8 hectares of land per GWh. In comparison, the river-based Upper Cisokan PHES project in West Java with 7 GWh of storage requires a flooded area of 340ha (50ha per GWh).

With a lifespan of 50-100 years, off-river PHES systems also could reduce our dependency on conventional batteries, which typically have a storage lifetime of 10-15 years. Batteries also contain materials that are in short supply such as lithium and cobalt.

How large is the potential?

Indonesia has 26,000 potential pumped hydro sites, which is far more than needed. We narrowed it down by choosing the best possible resources all over the country with the highest storage quality and the lowest cost with potential of 321 TWh.

Eastern Indonesian regions (Sulawesi, Maluku Papua, and Kalimantan) have the most potential, with low storage requirements. This contrasts with the western Indonesia region (Java and Sumatra), which is expected to have substantial future storage demands.

The following figure illustrates the size of best PHES potential in each Indonesian region compared with the requirements in 2060 for an affluent, decarbonised Indonesia.

Regional off-river PHES potential in Indonesia. Green and red circles represent PHES potential and required storage respectively.

In our future work, we will examine whether Indonesia needs to build strong electricity transmission links from east to west for a low-cost power grid or whether the system is better operated independently in each region.

Off-river PHES is affordable

Pumped hydro storage is by far the cheapest way of storing solar energy overnight, and has by far the largest share of the global energy storage market.

In our recent paper, we modelled a hypothetical 150 GWh site in Wonosobo Regency in Central Java with power capacity of 7.5 gigawatts – which is a large storage system. This system could run at full generating power for 20 hours. The site has a height difference between the reservoirs of 741 metres, a tunnel length of 4km and requires 4ha of flooded land per GWh.

We estimated a capital cost of US$9.4 billion to develop this site, including the cost of the initial water filling and land acquisition. For comparison, a Tesla utility-scale battery pack will require a capital cost of US$60 billion for the same capacity (150 GWh) – US$1.2 million per 3 MWh.

Hypothetical 150GWh PHES site in Wonosobo Regency, Central Java. Image from Australian National University Global Pumped Hydro Atlas

By knowing Indonesia’s off-river PHES potential, the government could plan to develop very large-scale solar generation with confidence. Thus, an energy transition towards carbon neutrality is a realistic target to achieve.

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Phd Candidate, School of Engineering, Australian National University.

Professor of Engineering, Australian National University.

Featured image: Menjer lake in Wonosobo, Central Java. (Anis Efizudin/Antara)

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China is preparing to launch the country’s third aircraft carrier, called the Type 003, amid increasing fears of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. 

Last week, the Maritime Safety Administration announced a notice requesting that berths at the Jiangnan Shipyard on Changxing Island, where Type 003 has been under construction since 2017, be cleared, according to South China Morning Post (SCMP).

SCMP spoke with Lu Li-shih, a former instructor at the Taiwanese Naval Academy, who said the launch would end dry dock work and then begin tests and equipment installations for sea trials.

A military insider suggested the launch of the new aircraft carrier could be seen as soon as this Friday, coinciding with Dragon Boat Festival

“The aircraft carrier needs to go into sea trials as soon as possible – it may take several years to achieve initial operational capability,” said the insider.

Beijing-based naval expert Li Jie explained that “time is precious” for Type 003, adding, “the installation of all of the weapon systems and the activation of its propulsion system will only start after the hull is proven to have no leaks once it goes into the water.”

Type 003 was supposed to be launched last month to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the Chinese Navy, but the event was postponed due to the widespread outbreak of COVID in Shanghai.

At 320 meters long, the new carrier will be outfitted with a high-tech electromagnetic catapult system, launching China’s stealth fighters with heavier weapon loads and more fuel. Here’s how the new aircraft carrier compares with others:

Sea trials and installation of equipment could take at least two years. The Pentagon doesn’t expect the carrier to become operational until 2024.

China is modernizing and expanding its maritime capabilities for dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and, more specifically, in the Taiwan Strait.

News of Type 003 about to launch comes as Beijing sent a massive group of fighters into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone on Monday.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Command recently denounced “collusion” between Taiwan and the US after President Biden pledged the West would defend Taiwan if under attack by Chinese forces; however, the White House was quick to follow by saying there’s been no change in the One China policy or its approach of “strategic ambiguity.”

And now, there will be three Chinese aircraft carriers the West and allies have to worry about. There are plans for a fourth carrier that could be nuclear-powered. This is an attempt by Beijing to project power and dominate the Indo-Pacific region as Thucydides Trap between China and the US inches closer.

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When Peter Dutton confirmed his candidacy for the leadership of the Liberal Party the public relations campaign to “soften” his image went into overdrive.

The so-called “hard man” says he is keen to show the public “the rest of my character, the side my family, friends and colleagues see”.

As traditional Liberal voters turn away from the party, Dutton wants us to know what he believes in. “We aren’t the Moderate party. We aren’t the Conservative party. We are Liberals. We are the Liberal party. We believe in families – whatever their composition”, he said.

Dutton’s leadership of the Liberal Party is a concern given his demonstrated commitment to eroding democratic principles including: the separation of powers; basic civil rights such as privacy; personal freedom and free speech; government transparency and accountability; as well as suppressing dissent and prosecuting state crime and corruption.

It would require a thesis to adequately detail the dozens of pieces of rights-eroding laws and hundreds of amendments to existing laws championed by Dutton in his various portfolios as minister for immigration, home affairs and defence.

Below is a thumbnail sketch of the slippery slope into authoritarianism, in which Dutton has played an instrumental part.

Building the surveillance state

Supporters of civil liberties, such as Edward Snowden, sometimes use the phrase “without privacy, there is no freedom” when discussing the proliferation of state surveillance in modern societies.

The ability to freely communicate without arbitrary monitoring and a fear of prosecution is essential to a healthy democracy.

However, supporters of privacy-eroding laws, under the guise of protection against perceived and, often exaggerated, threats will often use phrases such as “you have nothing to fear if you have nothing to hide”.

The “need” to protect us against terrorists has been used to justify many laws which have turned Australia into one which has the most pervasive surveillance laws of any Western democracy.

When Snowden exposed the United States National Security Agency’s illegal surveillance of its own citizens, the Coalition government passed many draconian laws giving the state and its agents more powers. Dutton played an integral role in their formulation, advocacy and passage into law.

Without a national bill or charter of rights there has been little to stand in the way of these laws being enacted.

These laws include:

1. Compelling internet service providers to store user data and hand it over on request.

The meta-data retention laws, passed in 2015, were marketed as necessary to protect against the threat of terrorism.

They require internet and phone service providers (ISPs) to store your personal data for two years and make it available to a range of law enforcement agencies without those agencies having to obtain a warrant.

Similar laws were proposed, but rejected, in Britain due to their arbitrary and pervasive nature. They have not been enacted in any other Western country.

You don’t have to be suspected of an offence for authorities to access and monitor at least two years of a range of your personal data.

Meta-data includes: telephone records; the time and length of phone calls; the internet protocol addresses (IP addresses) of computers from which messages are received or sent; location of parties making phone calls; to and from email addresses on emails; logs of visitors to chat rooms online; status of chat sites — whether they are active and how many people are participating; chat aliases or identifiers (the name a person uses in a chat room online); start and finish times of internet sessions; the location of an individual involved in communications, and the name of the application someone uses online and when, where and for how long used.

Meta data does not encompass the actual content of communications and ISPs have made it clear that filtering content, such as text in SMS transmissions, and emails for such a large number of users would be a mammoth and potentially impossible task.

The concern is that all of a user’s requested data would be provided to authorities and there is currently no information regarding whether or not this is happening.

There is no evidence to date that the laws have proven to be an effective mechanism against terrorists. There is, however, evidence that the laws are being used by a range of agencies not involved in the detection or prosecution of terrorism; agencies that can apply under the laws to access the personal data.

It was revealed that in 2018 more than 60 government agencies applied to the Attorney-General for metadata access. The list included the Australian Taxation Office, Department of Human Services and even local councils. Bankstown Council applied for metadata access in an attempt to catch illegal rubbish dumpers and those who breach by-laws. That access was granted.

The Queensland Police Service used the scheme to access the metadata of cadets in an attempt to determine whether they were sleeping with one another, or faking sick days.

The Australian Federal Police (AFP) has used meta-data laws to access information given to journalists and even doctors  to identify their sources — whistleblowers who expose crime and misconduct within government agencies.

Indeed, the AFP admitted in 2019 to accessing the meta-data of 20,000 people over the previous 12 months — without having to inform its targets, let alone justify its conduct.

2. Compelling technology companies to provide encryption keys to access user data

In another unprecedented move, Dutton championed laws enacted in 2017 which compel technology companies, such as Facebook, Google and Apple, to surrender their encryption keys to the accounts of Australian individuals and organisations upon service of a warrant and to even alter, or delete, the information.

The laws were passed with little public scrutiny, and have since been used to access the accounts of not only individuals, but news organisations.

The laws were condemned here as well as overseas, with ABC News executive editor John Lyons tweeting during the 2019 raids of its Sydney office: “I’m still staggered by the power of this warrant. It allows the AFP to ‘copy, delete or alter’ material in the ABC’s computers. All Australians, please think about that: as of this moment, the AFP has the power to delete material in the ABC’s computers. Australia 2019.”

A group of United Nations special rapporteurs expressed concern the law would “disproportionately chill the work of media outlets and journalists by exposing human rights campaigners, activists and academics to criminal charges and, in doing do, contravene the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”.

3. Increased search, seizure, detention and compelled disclosure powers at the border

Dutton played a pivotal role in the enactment of the Australian Border Force Act in 2015, which gave officers of the Australian Border Force (ABF) frighteningly broad and indeterminate powers “to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of his or her duties”. This includes broadened powers to search and detain travellers and to seize their personal items.

Dutton oversaw amendments in 2018 which made it a crime, punishable by up to five years in prison, for such persons to decline to provide passwords to their smartphones, computers or other electronic devices – enabling access to all the private information.

That same year, Australia made headlines when dual British and Australian citizen, 46-year software developer Nathan Hague, was detained for 90 minutes and had his devices seized at Sydney Airport, without being given a reason.

The devices were returned weeks later without further action being taken against him. Authorities refused to provide information about whether the digital data was copied and stored as the legislation permits.

An incensed Hague told the media at the time: “I have nothing to hide, but I value my privacy”.

4. Accessing overseas data

Home Affairs Minister Dutton in 2020 ensured the enactment of laws to empower the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) to access the data of Australians stored overseas while, at the same time, allowing other members of the Five Eyes Alliance to have access to that data.

The laws established a regime of international production orders, which allow agents to directly require foreign designated communication providers to hand over stored communications and data, and even enable direct wiretapping.

According to Civil Liberties Australia CEO Bill Rowlings: “We’ve had nearly 20 years of draconian laws — many totally over the top – and most absolutely slashing personal privacy … Dutton and the henchmen have all the laws they need already. This is overkill … Without a federal charter of rights, there has been nothing protecting the basic rights of individual Australians.”

That’s the overriding problem: Australia is the only Western democracy without a national bill or charter of rights that could obstruct such intrusive invasions of privacy.

5. Identify and disrupt – power to hack accounts and delete, add or alter data

Described as “the nail in the coffin of democracy”, so-called “identify and disrupt” laws enacted last December 3 are perhaps Dutton’s pièce de résistance in terms of surveillance legislation.

The laws give the AFP and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission the power to collect intelligence online, including over the dark web, disrupt online activity by manipulating data and even to take over a person’s online account – locking them out of it –to “gather evidence”.

Again, this is unprecedented in the West. Authorities can now legally hack and enter accounts and essentially do whatever they please with the data contained therein — including delete, add or alter content.

The potential implications are frightening.

Rowlings said: “The new laws allow faceless federal agents to ‘target and destroy’ people, under what is officially called the Identify and Disrupt Bill. This awful law multiplies tenfold the powers and reach of government intrusion. Police have such an appalling record throughout Australia of planting evidence and wrongly locking up people for years and decades. Why wouldn’t they plant more ‘evidence’ to suit themselves now they are permitted to do that officially?”

Slippery slide into authoritarianism

These are just five of many surveillance laws overseen by the Liberal Party’s new leader.

The rapid degeneration into such a pervasive regime of surveillance — often under the threat of criminal sanctions — would have been the envy of past dictators.

It could not have been foreseen by authors such as George Orwell. Indeed, the “Thought Police” in Orwell’s iconic novel 1984, published in 1949, would have relished the ability to arbitrarily monitor and intercept information transmitted through and recorded on devices as integral to our daily lives as mobile phones and computers have become.

As Rowlings said: “The police and spooks of Australia now have more powers and can reach further inside people’s lives and minds than the notorious Stasi of East Germany ever could.”

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Ugur Nedim is a partner of Sydney Criminal Lawyers where a longer version of this article first appeared.

Featured image is from Green Left

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Pakistan, a nuclear power with at least 165 warheads from short range to medium range, is facing potential economic collapse according to the country’s Finance Minister, Miftah Ismail.

With an official inflation rate of over 13.37% (double the official CPI to get a more accurate picture of true price inflation), the 2nd fastest rising rate in Asia, Pakistan has sought relief from foreign debt obligations and an IMF bailout deal. Initial arrangements for a three year deal with the IMF began in 2019, but Pakistan says that deal, originally for $6 billion USD, is ‘outdated’ due to the covid pandemic and new global financial pressures. The nation now says it is in ‘dire need’ of at least $36 billion in order to stay afloat.

Pakistan is slated to pay back over $21 billion USD in foreign debt within the next fiscal year. It is also struggling with extensive food inflation and supply chain disruptions as the government seeks to import at least 3 million tons of wheat and 4 million tons of cooking oil to alleviate shortages.

This is yet another example of the spread of global inflation/stagflation that is going largely ignored by western media outlets. Nations like Pakistan with already weakened economic conditions are canaries in the coal mine; leading indicators of what is likely to happen throughout more affluent first world nations should current conditions continue.

With globalist institutions like the UN, the IMF, the BIS, World Bank and the WEF all predicting major food shortages this year, the mainstream media has been noticeably quiet when it comes to nations where the crisis is already bubbling to the surface.

The reason the instability in Pakistan is particularly concerning is because it is one of nine countries in the world (officially) with a nuclear arsenal, not to mention an ongoing border conflict with India which sparked two wars in 1947 and 1965, as well as a limited war in 1999. As economic instability rises so does public discontent and rebellion. By extension, political elites commonly offer war as a “release valve” for public anger and a distraction from financial pain. Otherwise, the potential for widespread civil unrest grows daily.

To be sure, Pakistan is not the only country facing these conditions today, it is one of many. However, unlike many African or South American nations where the effects of inflationary collapse remain mitigated to domestic concerns, a collapse in Pakistan could have international implications.

Beyond the threats associated with sinking economies and regional conflicts, the IMF has become the go-to loan shark, circling struggling nations when it smells blood in the water. As more and more countries face declines associated with inflation/stagflation, it is not conspiratorial to suggest that the IMF greatly benefits. As the world breaks down, more nations become beholden to the IMF debt structure until eventually they are owned lock, stock and barrel by a handful of banking elites.

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When it comes to the tawdry, hideous business of politicising the right to asylum, and the refugees who arise from it, no country does it better than Australia.  A country proud of being a pioneer in women’s rights, the secret ballot, good pay conditions and tatty hardware (the Hills Hoist remains a famous suburban monstrosity) has also been responsible for jettisoning key principles of international law.

When it comes to policy Down Under, the United Nations Refugee Convention is barely worth a mention.  Politicians are proudly ignorant of it; the courts pay lip service to the idea while preferring rigid domestic interpretations of the Migration Act; and the United Nations is simply that foreign body which makes an occasional noise about such nasties as indefinite detention.

It should therefore have come as no surprise that, in the dying days of the Morrison government, another chance to stir the electorate by demonising refugees arose – somewhat conveniently.  As voters were, quite literally, heading to the polls, the commander of the Joint Agency Task Force Operation Sovereign Borders, Rear Admiral Justin Jones, revealed that a vessel had “been intercepted in a likely attempt to illegally enter Australia from Sri Lanka.”

The Rear Admiral’s statement insisted that Australian policy on such arrivals had not changed.  “We will intercept any vessel seeking to reach Australia illegally and to safely return those on board to their point of departure or country of origin.” Shallow formalities are observed: the implausible observance of international laws, consideration of safety of all those involved “including potential illegal immigrants”.  Nothing else is deemed worthy of mention.  “In line with long standing practice, we will make no further comment.”

With only a few more hours left being Australia’s most jingoistic Defence Minister in a generation, Peter Dutton tweeted a warning, referring to the statement from Jones: “Don’t risk Australia’s national security with Labor.”  In another comment, Dutton decided to peer into the minds of those aiding the asylum process.  “People smugglers have obviously decided who is going to win the election and the boats have already started.”

The Minister for Home Affairs, Karen Andrews, was also mining the message for its demagogic potential, raising the spectre of emboldened people smugglers.  They, she squeaked, “are targeting Australia.”  The “people smuggling vessel” had been intercepted “off Christmas Island.”

Andrews might as well have been using the same language to condemn drug traffickers and their commodities which, in terms of analogy, Australian politicians have implicitly done for decades. But for the occasion, the obvious target was the opposition vying for government.  “Labor’s flip flopping on border protection risks our border security.  You can’t trust them.”

The Liberal Party’s electioneering machinery picked up on the Sri Lankan connection, bombarding voters in marginal seats with text messages about this newfound discovery.  “Keep our borders secure by voting Liberal today,” came the prompt.  As things transpired, the entire operation, from Cabinet to the distribution of phone messages, had the full approval of Prime Minister Scott Morrison.

Revealing the existence of ships moving on mysteriously convenient schedules (another, according to the Saturday Newspaper, was also intercepted by Sri Lankan authorities) raised two burning questions.  The first goes to the troubling relationship with Sri Lanka, which the Australian government had gone some ways to promoting as a safeguard against asylum seekers.  Canberra has tended to skirt over issues of human rights, not least those associated with that country’s long civil war.  In fact, Australian officials have done their best to encourage Colombo to prevent individuals leaving Sri Lanka with a view of heading to Australia by boat.  In 2013, 2014 and 2017, Bay-class naval vessels were gifted to the Sri Lankan Navy to aid the interception of smuggling operations.

During his time in office, Dutton has made more than the odd trip to Colombo.  In May 2015, he made a visit as then Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to discuss “continued cooperation regarding people smuggling and to further strengthen ties between our two countries.”  He duly rubbished people smugglers – they had been “cowardly and malicious” for aiding individuals to pursue their right to asylum – and praised the success of Operation Sovereign Borders.  “Since we started turning back boats there have been no known deaths at sea.”

In June 2019, he paid another visit to shore up the commitment.  It was prompted by a report that a vessel carrying 20 Sri Lankan asylum seekers had been intercepted off Australia’s north-west coast, with the possibility of six others on route.  Then, as now, Dutton could only blame his Labor opponents for somehow encouraging such journeys while reiterating the standard, draconian line.  “People are not coming here [to Australia] by boat and regardless of what people smugglers tell you, the Morrison government, under the Prime Minister and myself, will not allow those people to arrive by boat.”

The second question goes to the supposed success of Operation Sovereign Borders.  This military grade, secretive policy had supposedly “stopped the boats” and remains a favourite Coalition mantra.  But why reveal a chink in the armour, a breach in the fortress unless it was manufactured with the aid of the Sri Lankan authorities or a failure to being with?  As comedian and political commentator Dan Ilic observed in a pointed remark to Dutton: “This happened on your watch dude.”  The Sri Lankan revelation demonstrated, when it comes to such matters, mendacity oils the machine of border protection.

No side in Australian politics has been able to avoid politicising the issue of refugee and asylum arrivals via boat.  The moment Australia’s Labor government made the arrival of individuals without formal authorisation a breach of law warranting mandatory detention, the issue became a political matter.  It took the Liberal National Coalition led by Prime Minister John Howard to turn the issue into a form of feral, gonzo politics.

That form remains unforgettably marked by the use of SAS personnel against 400 individuals, rescued at sea by the Norwegian vessel, the MV Tampa, in August 2001.  In defiance of maritime conventions and in blatant disregard for human safety, the Howard government held the asylum seekers at sea off Christmas Island for almost ten days.  Those on the vessel were accused of piracy and economic opportunism.  From this barbarism issued the Pacific Solution, a tropical concentration camp system which has had a few iterations since.

Governments, both Coalition and Labor, have drawn political capital from harsh policies against unwanted naval arrivals, smearing the merits of asylum and ignoring the obligations of international refugee law.  The new Albanese government has the chance, however unlikely it is to pursue it, to extract the political and replace it with the humanitarian.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

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The devastation wrought on Australia’s Coalition government on May 21 by the electorate had a stunning, cleansing effect.  Previously inconceivable scenarios were played out in safe, Liberal-held seats that had, for decades, seen few, if any challenges, from an alternative political force.  But the survival of one figure would have proved troubling, not only to the new Labor government, but to many Liberal colleagues lamenting the ruins.  The pugilists and head knockers, however, would have felt some relief.  Amidst the bloodletting, hope.

As he has done before, Peter Dutton, former Queensland policeman and failed university student, high priest of division and shorn of compassion, the face of Fortress Australia, survived the electoral challenge.  Earlier in the night, it did not seem that he would hold on to the Queensland seat of Dickson.  His opponent, Labor’s Ali France, looked ready to assume the reins.  But survive, he did, as he has done previously at several ballots.  His rival and obvious successor to take over the Liberal Party, Josh Frydenberg, did not.

Dutton, Australia’s new opposition leader, is a reactionary, though he must couch his ascent to the leadership in more accommodating terms.  He is a reminder of a brand of politics that Australia’s conservative Prime Minister John Howard made the norm: callous, self-centred, free of vision and hostile to outsiders. Under Howard, illegal wars were launched, a national security state created, and torturous offshore detention centres established in Pacific outposts.  His time in office was characterised by an oleaginous, ignorant smugness.

It was Dutton who seemingly wanted to stay on this mummified path.  In the tribal wars affecting his own party, which saw an ongoing battle between Tony Abbott and Malcolm Turnbull, both eventually having spells as Liberal Prime Ministers, Dutton played his dagger’s hand. Towards Turnbull, he was particularly vicious, cultivating hard line support for his own leadership credentials.

It was Dutton who finally saw off the meeker and more moderate Turnbull in August 2018, signalling his own leadership challenge with the subtlety of a hangman and the graciousness of a prison escapee.  But his time to be leader had not come.  Within the Liberal Party, Dutton was seen as electoral bile in various seats in Victoria and New South Wales, an extreme and extremist’s choice.  He may have engineered the assassination in favour of conservative values, but the profits of leadership would go to Scott Morrison and his deputy Josh Frydenberg.

In his autobiography, A Bigger Picture, Turnbull explained why, in the palace coup, he preferred Morrison as his replacement.  “Dutton, were he to become prime minister, would run off to the right with a divisive, dog-whistling, anti-immigration agenda, written and directed by Sky News and 2GB.”

Turnbull’s reading of politics, for all his qualities as a legal advocate, seemed cock-eyed.  Morrison had his own penchant for division, dog-whistling and anti-immigration.  And the former merchant banker, intellectually superior as he was, never saw Dutton as a viable threat, having “assumed people have a reasonable amount of self-awareness”.  Given such awareness, Dutton never struck the defeated Turnbull “as being so self-delusional and narcissistic as to imagine that he could successfully lead the Liberal Party. More relevantly, it had never occurred to me that others would think he could either.”

Under Morrison, Dutton became all that is terrifying about the national security state and corrosive to democratic accountability.  He ruled over Australia’s new super Department of Home Affairs and showed every sign of loving it.  More national security legislation was passed, privacy protections eroded, surveillance encouraged.

Dutton also became the dour face of anti-China jingoism and bellicosity, often making spurious historical comparisons.  (The 1930s has been something of a favourite.)  When he found his way to the role of Defence Minister, he began trumpeting arguments for war, making it clear that Australia would unconditionally commit troops to a conflict against Beijing over Taiwan.

The process now is one of cosmetic tinkering: a nip here, a tuck there.  Unlike other leaders who speak of discovering inner steel, Dutton is keen to promote an inner, non-existent softness.  In a statement released to the press, he threatened to show Australians “the rest of my character, the side my family, friends and colleagues see.”  His wife, Kirilly, irrelevantly informs us of his remarkable skills as a father, his “great sense of humour” and his “incredible passion”.  His defenders claim to know a New World of intellect lurking like newly discovered permafrost.

West Australian premier Mark McGowan, and former Australian prime ministers Kevin Rudd and Paul Keating, see things rather differently.  For McGowan, Dutton is an “extremist”, incapable of listening, “extremely conservative” and not “that smart”.  Rudd sees an “idiot” who believes that more shouting and stitching of hair on the chest in the morning somehow improves “your overall strategic circumstances with China and the United States”.  Keating detects a “dangerous personality” intent on “injecting Australia into a potentially explosive situation in North Asia”.

In terms of where he sees his party going, Dutton is proving gnomic and unconvincing.  “We aren’t the Moderate party. We aren’t the Conservative party.  We are Liberals.  We are the Liberal party.  We believe in families – whatever their composition.”  He tautologically claimed to back businesses “small” and “micro’”, while standing for the “aspirational, hard-working ‘forgotten’ people across cities, suburbs, regions and in the bush.”

Media hacks are doing their bit to suggest a more nuanced man behind the thuggish visage.  Miraculously, veteran journalist Michelle Grattan can spot a “complicated” figure.  There are “two Peter Duttons: the public sword carrier and the mask-like face and the non-public person, who is routinely described as charming, with a sense of humour, and politically more granular than you think.”

Such a profile could be applied to many: the dedicated war criminal with a love of family, sunsets and fine wines; the concentration camp guard who went about his work with diligence and returned back to hearty stews and his rare stamp collection.  Look more closely, and there are always two sides.  But which one wins out, in the end?

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Defence Minister Peter Dutton. Image: Viv Miley/Green Left

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Free Antonio Tolentino

May 27th, 2022 by Dalena Tran

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Barangay captain and environmental defender Antonio Tolentino has been detained on trumped-up criminal and administrative charges for protecting farmers’ rights against Ayalaland’s land-grabbing for eight years. 

Tolentinto chaired the Aniban ng Nagkakaisang Mamamayan ng Hacienda Dolores (Association of the United Citizens of Hacienda Dolores, ANIBAN) under the nationwide organisation Kilusan Para sa Repormang Agraryo at Katarungang Panlipunan (Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice, KATARUNGAN).

He mobilized the community despite increasing violence. Together, they documented more than 30 cases of property destruction, victimisation, illegal arrests, trumped-up charges, threats and intimidation, forced surrender and waiver signing, and forced recruitment of local indigenous Ayta people to serve as guards and thugs.

Farming

Ayalaland Logistics Holdings Corp is associated with widespread violence against locals fighting for their land rights in Hacienda Dolores, including the imprisonment of village leader Antonio “Apung Tony” Tolentino.

The contested land is in Hacienda Dolores, a barangay in Porac, Pampanga. The site is ecologically important and sensitive, as it is in a forest upstream from a river.

Real estate developers including Ayalaland began buying and taking over farmers’ land as early as 2005. Ayalaland wanted to develop a luxury mixed-use commercial center branded as the next Makati, which is currently the Philippines’ top financial hub.

Locals requested protection for their land rights under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), but their land was ordered exempt without any prior consultation and notice.

A former Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) regional director granted the exemption because the land was allegedly unsuitable for farming despite Dolores having been farmed for nearly 200 years.

Killing

Developers took complete control, forcefully denying access and ownership to the farmers despite their long history of tillage. Forcing their way onto the farms, corporations cleared out the land with heavy machinery with assistance of private armed security guards and hired thugs.

The police are also accused by protesters of physically harassing and criminalising land rights defenders. More than 300 farmers were forcibly evicted and many homes were burned down. Developers destroyed crops and livestock.

Security guards blocked farmers who were on their way to their farm lots on 13 January 2014. The guards, provoked, shot at the farmers, killing 34-year-old ANIBAN secretary Arman Padino and wounding two others – Noel Tumali and Antonio Tolentino.

Tumali and Tolentino had arrived on scene to support the farmers and were able to capture one of the security guards in a citizen’s arrest, but the others fled.

Then 30 combat personnel arrived at the barangay hall to arrest Tolentino under false charges because of his intervention in the killing on 16 April 2014.

Fear

The guards and Ayalaland conspired against Tolentino, filing kidnapping and carjacking cases against him, both non-bailable offenses, as well as other false charges. This also covered up one of the guard’s citizen’s arrest. Consequently, Tolentino was unable to put up bail.

Security guards also falsely charged 30 ANIBAN members with grave threats, grave coercion, and usurpation of real rights in real property.

Tolentino did not have due process because he was not informed of any charges and thus could not file a counter-affidavit. He is facing three cases for car-napping and malicious mischief, kidnapping with attempted murder, and administrative charges for misconduct.

But the violence continued to mount. Two hitmen riding tandem on motorcycle also shot 57-year-old ANIBAN leader Menelao “Ka Melon” Barcia on 2 May 2014, killing him instantly and injuring his wife Maria.

Barcia had been monitoring the administrative charges against Tolentino. Witnesses are afraid to speak for fear of further violent retaliation.

Terror

Farmers and their families have continued to protest and petition for years against the now-completed luxury development and its injustices despite forced displacement, criminalisation, and harassment by employees and security guards over the dispute.

However, no one is publicly informing the people about Tolentino’s continued imprisonment because Ayalaland is also one of the Philippine’s main advertisers and suppresses the news locally. Mainstream media does not want to cover Ayalaland’s secrets.

Tolentino, now more than 70 years old and unwell, is still detained in Angeles City Jail, unsure if he will ever be granted freedom by the Philippine justice system.

The need to condemn the entire elitist justice system is long overdue. It is important for the people to get their leader back because he sustained and encouraged the movement from the ground.

They are waiting for him and even re-elected him as leader while still behind bars. We must spread word of the story of this jailed leader so that terror does not continue to divide the community.

A spokesperson for AyalaLand Logistics Holdings Corp told The Ecologist: “We wish to clarify that Ayala Land, Inc. (ALI) and ALI subsidiary, AyalaLand Logistics Holdings Corp (ALLHC) have no participation in the alleged activities stated in the article. We are not involved in any case concerning Mr Antonio ‘Apung Tony’ Tolentino.”

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Dalena Tran is a PhD candidate at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and a researcher with the Environmental Justice Atlas. She specializes in violence against environmental defenders during ecological conflicts.

Featured image: Environmental defender Antonio Tolentino with his family.  (Source: Environmental Justice Atlas)

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Recent elections in the Philippines have paved the way for Chinese-Philippine relations to continue growing. Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has expressed a desire to work with China more closely and resolve disputes bilaterally without US interference.

Already, the US is backing attempts to question the outcome of the election which saw its candidate of choice, Leni Rebredo lose.

The Philippines is one of America’s primary targets for militarization in both a proxy war with China as well as a direct US war with China.

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Brian Joseph Thomas Berletic, is an ex- US Marine Corps independent geopolitical researcher and writer based in Bangkok, writing under the pen name “ Tony Cartalucci ” along with several others.

Featured image is from TheAltWorld

All Global Research articles can be read in 51 languages by activating the “Translate Website” drop down menu on the top banner of our home page (Desktop version).

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Abstract

Articles in this special issue re-examine Asia-Pacific War memories by taking a longer and broader view, geographically, temporally, and spatially. A diverse, global team of thirteen authors highlights subjects across a wide geographical area spanning the Asia-Pacific region especially. In the process, articles question common assumptions and narratives surrounding Asia-Pacific War memories by highlighting crucial, in-between spaces and remembrances. These range from Japanese military cemeteries in Malaysia, to the experiences of Filipino residents living near a Japanese POW camp, and to Japanese veterans’ personal narratives of guilt, trauma, and heroism. Articles also draw attention to the ongoing significance of Asia-Pacific war memories, partly as personal struggles to confront and to find meaning in the past, and partly through memory’s political instrumentalization in Cold War and post-Cold War power struggles.

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This special issue emerged from a conference titled “Re-examining Asia-Pacific War Memories: Towards a Cross Textual, Global Dialogue” held in December 2020 at the International Research Center for Japanese Studies (Nichibunken) in Kyoto. The year was notable not only for witnessing the worst pandemic in a century but also for being the 75th anniversary of the conclusion of the Asia-Pacific War (1931–1945). The simultaneous mandatory isolation in response to the virus, juxtaposed with the global nature of COVID-19 made the conference organizers and participants acutely aware of the paradoxical presence of national boundaries on the one hand and the urgent need for transnational cooperation on the other. This realization also mirrored conference presenters’ thoughts on the concurrent necessity for dialogue on the transnational nature of Asia-Pacific War memories.

Prior studies have noted the impossibility of grasping the consequences of a global war from purely national standpoints (Fujitani et al. 2001). Similarly, past research has shown how the effects of past and present empires and the memory regimes they engender continue to linger on long after conflict has officially ended (Yoneyama 2016). Articles in this special issue build on these findings by exploring the making of Asia-Pacific War memories as a complex trans-national, trans-Pacific and ongoing process of negotiation between private individuals, nation-states, and larger geopolitics. The editors were especially cognizant of three main re-examinations that essays in this special issue undertake.1

The first of these is geographical. Namely, the articles widen the scope of the war beyond just the United States and Japan, two hegemonic players who have tended to dominate postwar memory largely due to Cold War politics and maneuverings. The end of the Cold War and onset of a “transborder redress culture” wherein previously marginalized victims, groups, and regions have increasingly pressed for recognition and compensation for past historical injustices has gone a long way toward building a more transnational memory of the war (Yoneyama 2016, viii, also Frost, Schumacher, and Vickers 2019). Consequently, English-language scholarship has increasingly come to incorporate memories beyond Japan and the US, including China and South Korea and a range of other countries throughout East and South-East Asia and the Pacific (for example, Fujitani, White, and Yoneyama 2001; Morris-Suzuki et al. 2013; Saaler and Schwentker 2008; Twomey and Koh 2017). Articles in this special issue continue this trend by focusing on previously overlooked areas including Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, and the Philippines. They also examine the cross-border movement of people such as Japanese war brides to New Zealand in the immediate postwar, and marginal spaces including the perspectives of residents living near prisoner of war (POW) camps in the Japanese-occupied Philippines.

The second re-examination is temporal; specifically, it entails taking the Asia-Pacific War beyond the narrow confines of the years of combat and re-framing it in the longer process between the pre- and postwar continuum. Contrary to popular belief, the end of the Asia-Pacific War was in no way a radical rupture from the pre-war era. For many around the Asia-Pacific, rather, the war never really ended, but carried on in various forms such as anti-colonial struggles, personal battles with the scars of war, and ongoing civil war and democratization processes. Neither did empires disappear overnight—the process of decolonization was long and slow for many, while, speaking more generally, hegemonic dominance in the Asia-Pacific entered a period of neo-imperialist struggle between America and China especially. The history of colonialism and Cold War alliances provides an apt lens for observing historical continuity and the transforming utility of Asia-Pacific War memories. Though this special issue does not claim to be an extensive account of the history of decolonization in the region, individual papers do implicitly grapple with the issue. For example, Arnel Joven’s discussion of the changing contours of war memory at a Japanese POW camp in the Philippines reflects the country’s sometimes fraught relationship with both Japan and the United States. His findings especially resonate with scholars who have shown how US and Filipino elites utilized the idea of America as liberator from Japanese occupation to downplay its own history as colonizer there (Woods 2020).

Cognizant of these facets, articles in this special issue by Mahon Murphy, Mo Tian and Collin Rusneac tease out the changing contours of national and imperial commemorations of wars over decades. Similarly, the lasting memories of the war make central themes of several of our contributors. Justin Aukema and Ryōta Nishino highlight Japanese veterans’ writings as attempts to make sense of the war retrospectively from the present-day standpoints of Western (-inspired) civilization and liberal-capitalism while pitting them against putatively primitive forms of civilization. The long war in the minds of the veterans manifested itself in different guises in public realms such as commemorative sites whose exhibits and significance altered to meet the demands of the present as well as shifting geopolitical alliances (see articles by Arnel Joven, Daniel Milne and David Moreton, and Alison Starr). At the same time, Japanese veterans returning to former battlefields in New Guinea nearly twenty-five years later illustrated that processes of mourning and repair work were ongoing, lifelong projects for many (see Beatrice Trefalt’s article).

The third re-examination is spatial – in the sense of re-examining the nature of specific spaces of commemoration. Namely, the articles move discussion of war memory beyond traditional binaries and divisions that persist in the spaces of commemoration and narratives and propose interrogating the in-between spaces. In this way, too, they interrogate established dichotomies of “us vs. them” or “victim vs. perpetrator” to highlight problematic, often thorny grey areas and points of overlap and contention. In terms of memorial sites, as recent Japanese scholarship has argued, the point is not just to show how alternative sites of memory in Japan functioned simply as “mini-Yasukunis” (Shirakawa 2015, 8, 13).2 A more pressing concern is to examine how memorial sites expressed their own unique histories and problems vis-à-vis official, state-sanctioned ideology. Thus, building on this observation, essays in this special issue highlight cemeteries containing the bodies of Japanese and non-Japanese in the Asia Pacific (Rusneac, Starr), and of a privately built, ostensibly Buddhist site of memorialization for the war dead (Milne and Moreton) as examples that awkwardly juxtapose with the rather linear narrative of heroic glorification promoted by the state’s premier site of war-dead worship, the Yasukuni Shrine. Regarding narratives, another novel strategy that essays utilize is to focus on veterans’ experiences. Veterans are the key players in war, but their views in discussions of postwar memory are often glossed over because their actual experiences and trauma of seeing the effects of violence and death do not mesh well with beautified and sanitized narratives of the war. On top of this, veterans are often both victimizers (having committed acts of violence and killing) as well as victims (of the state-military apparatus and other institutional or social forms of exploitation) in war. But this can make their experiences problematic for monolithic or revisionist accounts which try to reframe the war as purely a black-and-white contest between “good” and “evil.” Thus, articles in this special issue examine how veterans maneuvered the complex landscape of competing ideologies and justifications of war (Aukema, Nishino); they examine veterans as active agents in shaping national narratives of mourning which both complemented and contradicted state attempts to use their sacrifices to beautify war (Trefalt); they show how veterans’ narratives can make uneasy bedfellows with state instrumentalization of war memory (Tian); and they demonstrate how past commemoration of military sacrifice often competes with contemporary notions of how to remember the war dead (Rusneac).

The Structure of this Special Issue

With these themes in mind, and in order to better flesh out important points of convergence and divergence between them, the articles in this special issue are not ordered geographically, chronologically, or according to well-established sites and binaries, but within three general, though overlapping, themes: (1) sites of mourning, (2) personal narratives, and (3) commemoration and memorialization.

Sites of Mourning

Jay Winter popularized the term “sites of mourning” in his pioneering study of personal grief and thecommemoration the First World War (2000; 2014). Modern nation states were unique in that they mobilized individual civilians to fight and die in their wars. To justify these actions, states created the “myth of the war experience” which often beautified and gave meaning to private citizens’ war deaths for the nation (Mosse 1990, 7). But the task from the outset was beset by an inherent tension and contradiction: the dual competing desires to publicly commemorate and to privately mourn. By managing memories of the war dead through publicly constructed monuments and memorial institutions, states were partly able to instrumentalize and channel private grief over lost loved ones into patriotic affect and nationalism. Yet personal sadness and suffering (Acton 2007; Choi 2001), including that expressed through resistance (Figal 2018; Fryer et al. 2021), often clashed with states’ inherent need to beautify and heroize war in support of national aims. As contributions in this special issue reveal, this tension has been most clearly apparent when bereaved family members and veterans negotiated with the state over how to handle the physical remains of the war dead. The arena for such negotiations, moreover, have included numerous “sites,” especially cemeteries for the war dead and at former battlefields where slain soldiers’ remains lay fallen. Articles in this special issue highlight such sites of mourning not only as spaces where personal grief becomes highly politicized, but also as potential transnational sites of either geopolitical dispute or reconciliation.

First, Collin Rusneac explores the notion of the national war cemetery as a transnational space of mourning, education, and memory. He concentrates on two Japanese war cemeteries, one within Japan’s national borders in Osaka, and the other outside, in Malaysia. Through his focus on these two sites, he posits an alternative to Japan’s national memorial landscape which is often dominated by the Yasukuni Shrine. While Japan has an official commemorative infrastructure, it is relatively decentralized and disjointed. Accordingly, Japanese war cemeteries built either inside Japan or elsewhere rely on local operational infrastructure. As Rusneac shows, this has allowed for a variety of commemorative practices and created spaces to discuss Japan’s wartime and imperial past away from the hegemonic narrative and political controversies of Japan’s more well-known sites of mourning.

The role of war cemeteries as sites of transnationalism and diplomacy is further developed in Alison Starr’s discussion of dual Japanese and Australian war cemeteries in Cowra, Australia. These cemeteries were originally built to inter over two-hundred Japanese and five Australians who died due to a breakout by Japanese prisoners from the nearby POW camp but were extended to include civilian and military Japanese who died in Australia during the war. As Starr explains, town leaders and visiting Japanese officials have developed these cemeteries and a series of interlinked memorial spaces and events to transform Cowra more widely into a space of grief and reconciliation for veterans, locals, and diplomats, and as a site of domestic and international tourism and binational diplomacy.

While cemeteries are emblematic sites of mourning for grieving veterans and public, Beatrice Trefalt’s article reminds us that former battle sites present another realm of mourning with immediacy especially to veterans and the bereaved. In teasing out the various symbolic meanings in visual representations of sites of mourning, Trefalt highlights acts of collective remembrance that help us understand what groups of people are trying to achieve, both politically and personally, when they act in public to conjure up the past. At the heart of her analysis is a photographic book compiled by a group of Japanese veterans who embarked on a bone collecting trip to New Guinea in 1969. Exploring how the book is designed to elicit emotional responses in the reader, Trefalt highlights the role of affect in war memory, specifically in efforts to arrest the forgetting of the war dead and of campaigns in the war not canonized in collective memory.

Personal Narratives

Articles in this section explore how the personal narratives of wartime survivors attempt to reconcile their experiences, memories, and senses of “self” against officially sanctioned remembrances. Various studies have highlighted both the importance of cognitively ordering individual experiences, i.e., memories, into coherent narratives for the construction and assertion of self-identity (Hunt 2010), and the necessity of transforming memories into narrative form to convey them to others and facilitate their cross-generational transmission (Assmann 2008). Moreover, wartime survivors have often been compelled by a “need to narrate,” not only to repair a psyche and identity fractured by traumatic past experiences, but also from various feelings of either obligation to the dead or other forms of “survivor guilt” (Aukema 2016). Working their experiences into coherent narratives frequently allows wartime survivors to make sense of and provide meaning to the past.

One of the most common ways wartime survivors have narrated their experiences has been through writing. For centuries literature, fictional or otherwise, has provided a means for individuals to articulate and represent the subjective and emotional aspects of war that are often masked by official histories and impersonal statistical data. In the modern era, diary writing became a nearly universalized tool for soldiers to record their battlefield experiences. These often provided the raw material for many subsequent veterans’ literary writings and tales (senkimono in Japanese) in the postwar (Moore 2013). Soldiers’ written narratives were highly complex, many times mixing platitudes and other common lingo from the era which seemingly glorified war on the one hand, with often brutal and horrifically vivid descriptions of battle, and at times probing accounts of personal responsibility on the other (Takahashi 1988; Yoshida 2005; Yoshida 2011). The mass-mobilization of total war meant that civilians also wrote about the Asia-Pacific War. Japan’s atomic-bomb literature as well as “war experience writings” (sensō taiken kiroku) are notable examples. The diversity of war experience writings makes generalized statements about a singular “war literature” difficult. Yet, as essays in this special issue remind us, it is perhaps more helpful to investigate each individual work as a unique attempt to situate the authors’ personal experiences in the context of the broader social construction of memory.

Not all wartime narratives are written down or published, however. Oral narratives voiced within familial or friendship groups or in public, such as when wartime survivors and victims give speeches or open testimony, are also significant forms of war narrative. Stories told within families, for instance, have formed a key part of the intergenerational transmission of wartime memories, and have enabled generations of “post-memory” wherein survivors’ children internalize their parents’ or relatives’ memories as their own (Hirsch 1992). Post-memories of war and atrocity, some have argued, can remain so strong in society that they even live on as kinds of cultural trauma (Hashimoto 2015). Oral histories can also shed invaluable light on hitherto unexplored or neglected aspects of the past, and can either challenge or reaffirm dominant, hegemonic historical narratives and memories of the past (Perks 1998). The academic researcher, too, through the process of recording and documenting oral histories, shares in this production process, and published oral-history compilations continue to inform our understanding of the Asia-Pacific War (e.g., Cook and Cook 2000).

Essays in this section explore these and other multifaceted aspects of Asia-Pacific War memories as expressed through personal narratives and literature. First, Justin Aukema’s article compares war-themed literary works written by two Japanese veterans Furukawa Shigemi and Kamiko Kiyoshi. In searching for hope in defeat and their Cold War-era presents, both authors deployed what Aukema identifies as a kind of literary “modernization theory” whereby they attributed the Japanese defeat to the pervasive feudal mindset of the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA). This message is symbolically emphasized and illustrated by the stories’ protagonists, Japanese soldiers whose disgust with what they see as the IJA’s outdated tactics and ethos leads them to desert mid-battle. In this way, Aukema argues, the novel’s protagonists function as what he calls “anti-hero heroes,” since, while their military desertion would have been considered shameful during the war, they were justified post hoc in the postwar when Japan’s military apparatus and empire were thoroughly disgraced and denounced. The ultimate objective of the anti-hero hero, therefore, in this milieu, is not to decry the horror of war, but rather to recast Japan’s substantial wartime defeat as a symbolic victory of the forces of “modernity” over those of a discredited feudalism-militarism.

While Aukema focuses on the political utility of modernization to support a proposal for national rehabilitation, Ryōta Nishino’s article illustrates the potential of the memoir to bring psychological healing to an individual veteran. Nishino, in his analysis of the writings of the Japanese veteran and memoirist, Ogawa Masatsugu, traces the personal trauma of war. For Japanese troops and other defeated soldiers coming to terms with the shift from winning to losing a war in which psychology, war memoir and life history converge was a difficult undertaking. Through tracing his initial personal trauma in China to his war experience in New Guinea, Ogawa’s memoir highlights an inner struggle between that of victim and perpetrator that troubled many veterans in Japan and elsewhere.

Meanwhile, Matthew Allen looks at another personal struggle: this one a veteran-author’s grudge against the cynical ethos of the IJA. His source for textual analysis is Maetani Koremitsu’s 1962 comic, Robotto tokkōtai, whose protagonist, Robotto, is a clumsy robot who unwittingly joins Japan’s infamous unit of “kamikaze” Special Attack Force (tokkōtai) pilots. While these pilots were glorified and even deified during the war and by nationalists in the postwar, Maetani critically mocks this image through his humorous portrayals of Robotto’s follies. Namely, Robotto proves time and time again, often quite humorously, incapable of carrying out his “sacred” duty to sacrifice his life for nation and emperor. Yet the humor works because this military ethos was indeed discredited in the postwar period. In this way, Allen shows how Maetani’s Robotto character was not only an “anti-hero hero” but also how the comic compromises notions of “post-memory” by portraying the war itself as a tragic farce. Thus, he proposes the idea of “counter-post-memory” instead to characterize such works as Maetani’s.

Additionally, Elena Kolesova and Kanazawa Mutsumi highlight important aspects of women’s experiences of war and its aftermath. The authors ask how Japanese war brides in New Zealand responded to the challenges of international marriage in an era in which prejudice to a former foe lingered. The stories they told generally follow the arc of triumph over adversity in which the women found confidence as they gained more skills, expanded their social networks, and climbed the career ladder. Furthermore, the authors show how a few war brides were highly instrumental in the rapprochement and the reinvention of the New Zealand-Japan relationship, and that their new environment allowed them to exercise agency beyond the confines of the domestic realm. However, behind their “success stories,” the testimonies underline the internalization of Japanese gender expectations to be “good wives and wise mothers” (ryōsai kenbo) and of equivalent expectations in New Zealand. Most significantly, perhaps, the article points to the residual ambivalence beneath the veneer of putatively successful migrant stories told and heard across generations.

Commemoration and Memorialization

The third theme of the special issue pertains to commemoration and memorialization. While both these terms indicate the preservation of memory, here “commemoration” refers especially to intangible ceremonies and practices, and “memorialization” refers particularly to tangible objects such as memorial markers, monuments, and statues. Each indicates a form of what Maurice Halbwachs called “collective memory,” meaning that they extend beyond the individual, subjective psyche and contain public aspects as means of social remembering (1992). They are also forms of what Jan Assmann and John Czaplicka termed “cultural memory,” wherein memory becomes crystallized around objects, texts, and rituals as a prerequisite of its intergenerational transmission (1995). Additionally, they can serve as what Pierre Nora referred to as “sites of memory” (lieux de mémoire), specially designated spaces and places of remembrance that serve as loci and focal points of group memory and identity (1989). Commemoration and memorialization are closely related to mourning. Yet, unlike private gravestones or expressions of grief, commemoration and memorialization are especially and explicitly public expressions of remembrance. Moreover, memorials and rituals once they enter the cultural realm can facilitate the transmission of shared remembrances long after the actual events have passed and far beyond any single individual. Furthermore, while, for some, commemoration and memorialization may occur in tandem with expressions of grief, they are distinguished at the same time by their overt emphasis on honoring and celebrating the past.

Commemoration and memorialization are also highly contested. This is because they are commonly markers to reaffirm self-identity, celebrating and remembering either the pain or heroism of typically a single memory group, e.g., the heroism of the victors, or the suffering of the victims (Gillis 1996). Modern war monuments and ceremonies, for instance, have been especially tied to the nation-state and have therefore tended to focus on remembering only the national war and military dead rather than the transnational and civilian victims of conflicts (Mosse 1990). And commemoration and memorialization often reaffirm the nation as an “imagined community,” through shared remembrances (Anderson 2006). Within this process, nation-states wield their inordinate power to exercise what Ashplant et al. called a “hegemonic framing of memory,” wherein selective historical remembrances themselves are used to include or to preclude equal membership rights within the national body (2000, 53).

At the same time, commemoration and memorialization can also be sites of “counter-memories” used by civic or marginalized groups to challenge dominant narratives and discourses of the past (Misztal 2003, 64). Similarly, it has been the function of “counter-monuments” “not to console but to provoke” and “instead of monumentalizing […] rather encourage people to think for themselves and motivate them to constantly remember” (Young 1992, 276, 274). Furthermore, as John Bodnar noted, memorials always beautify and aestheticize the dark and painful aspects of war; yet at the same time they can never completely hide that fact that real people nevertheless died, a facet often reflected in the names of the dead that are carved on many memorials (2010, 123).

The essays in this special issue dealing with the general topic of “commemoration and memorialization” deal directly with these and other prescient questions and features as they relate to public remembrances of the Asia-Pacific War. First, Daniel Milne and David Moreton investigate Ryōzen Kannon, a giant statue of the Buddhist goddess of mercy built in Kyoto in 1955 by business entrepreneur Ishikawa Hirosuke to memorialize war dead of the Asia-Pacific War. Through the lens of Ryōzen Kannon, Milne and Moreton trace the shifting landscape of Japanese war memory and commemoration of the war dead, identifying points of convergence and divergence between the pre- and postwar eras, and tracing the complex relationship vis-a-vis memorialization between civic and state actors. In the authors’ analysis, Ishikawa and his pet project, Ryōzen Kannon, are a mini-drama for a larger transformation in Japanese nationalism and patriotism in general. On the one hand, Ishikawa and Ryōzen Kannon carried over from the prewar the desire to worship the war dead and to absolve them of wrongdoing via religious purification. Yet on the other hand, Ishikawa strove to distinguish his memorial from earlier forms of Yasukuni nationalism and to achieve a broader view that emphasized Japan’s commitment to postwar liberal internationalism. As the authors show, however, sites of memory such as Ryōzen Kannon are temporally bounded not only by the lifespan of their memory communities, but also broader geopolitical memory regimes, here specifically that of the Cold War.

Next, Arnel Joven shifts the focus to commemoration in the Philippines. Namely, he zooms in on the shifting historical remembrances of an American-Filipino POW camp, Camp O’Donnell, run by the Japanese military on Luzon Island. Like other articles in this special issue, Joven’s essay highlights the dominant role of Cold War geopolitics in shaping memories and narratives at the site. Namely, this was the construction of a “canonical narrative” which focused on the shared suffering of Filipino and American prisoners at the camp, a facet that resonated nicely with the ruling-class characterization the Cold War Philippine-American alliance as a joint and “equal” partnership. Yet as the Cold War geopolitical dynamics shifted and the regime of Ferdinand Marcos lost its popular legitimacy, local activists called for greater recognition of the suffering of Filipinos, who had outnumbered US POWs at the camp. But the influence of the geopolitical maneuverings of trans-Pacific empires had not yet dissipated. This was evidenced in 1991, when the pro-US Philippine President Corazon Aquino opened the Capas National Shrine to commemorate the Allied soldiers who died at Camp O’Donnell. As Joven shows, this too indicated the ongoing instrumentalization of historical memories and narratives for contemporary political purposes, since the construction of the shrine was partly used to silence widespread popular anti-America and anti-US-base sentiment.

Meanwhile, Mo Tian shows how the instrumentalization of Asia-Pacific War memories has been a trans-Pacific affair, and subject to neo-imperialist desires on both sides of the Asia-Pacific. Tian focuses on the ways in which Cold War and contemporary geopolitical alliances have influenced changes to official war remembrances and narratives in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). One is the way that the PRC has characterized the war, initially portraying it as a Communist-led “war of resistance” and victory of the proletariat class over imperialism, only later to abandon this in favor of an emphasis on shared national humiliation and suffering at the hands of the Japanese. Along with this, Japanese war crimes, which had initially been largely downplayed in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remembrances, eventually came to receive much more attention and to gain prominence amidst growing regional nationalism. And, in the same way, the representation of the role of the Kuomintang nationalists went from negative toward positive, reflecting the CCP’s desire to win support for Taiwanese reintegration with the Chinese mainland.

The last article in the special issue, by Mahon Murphy, points to future paths for research about commemorating the Asia-Pacific War through comparison with the twentieth century’s other “World War.” While most of our contributors reflect on the future of Asia-Pacific War memory, Murphy provides a vital intervention by urging us to look back in time to alert us to what we might have overlooked. Murphy’s article explores some common themes between commemoration of the First and Second World Wars, and the potential for linking historiographical developments in studies of both conflicts. The shift in the geographical lens of studies of the First World War away from the Western Front in France ushered in new ways of thinking about war, empire, and its impact on the so-called peripheries of the globe. Looking at modern commemoration practices from a comparative perspective of both world wars helps to not only understand the broader development of these practices but also to re-integrate the peripheries into a truly global narrative.

Conclusion

We began our introduction to this special issue under the heading of “re-examination” and highlighted three ways in which contributing essays go about this. We, therefore, would like to close by making a final appeal for the process of re-examination itself. Perhaps the main reason for re-examination is that once is never enough: memory is always changing and never static. We are constantly updating and revising our memories to meet contemporary needs and desires (Hunt 2010, 116; Lowenthal 1985, 348; Munslow 2006, ix). Moreover, as Viet Thanh Nguyen astutely noted in the title of his 2016 book on memories of the Vietnam War, with memory “nothing ever dies.” That is to say, battles for the ownership of the past continue on long after the original conflicts have ended. And this phenomenon is not limited just to recent events either; remembrances even of ancient events often continue to inform contemporaneous notions of identity and global geopolitics today. Much of this is tied up with social context, and what we remember and forget is constantly changing as generations pass and political regimes rise and fall. Yet still nothing is ever really “finished” nor even forgotten in this sense. As St. Augustine observed one and a half millennia ago, memory is a “vast, immeasurable sanctuary” whose depths can never be fully plumbed (1961, 216). It is the very present-day utility of memory in combination with its sheer limitlessness that makes it so: insofar as they have needs and desires to fulfill, future generations and groups will always find something to remember.

Still, the passage of time makes a difference for how we remember. In particular, time has the tendency to smooth over memory’s rough edges, and its most contested and problematic elements, into a generally simplified and easily condensed narrative. As memory scholars, thus, we must be particularly attentive to the granular details and to what precisely is lost along the long route of remembrance. Added to this, today, we can also note shifts in the ways in which remembrance occurs. For instance, Pierre Nora mused on the effects of modernity and technology on memory which he thought had led to an abundance of preservation and proliferation of memories (1989). Supercomputers, to take one contemporary example, enable us to preserve and record vast amounts of information. But we can also observe the opposite effects and trends. Globalization and technology have not just led to an abundance of memory but also a memory deficit. Just as capital and power are centralizing around a few tech giants, memories have undergone a process of centralization, concentration, and simplification. Twitter feeds for example amplify some messages to astounding proportions but the actual number of messages in fact decreases. We can see the same trend with Asia-Pacific War memories and narratives, which center around a few hot button issues that fan the Twitter flames. The effects of this mnemonic centralization are the marginalization and even erasure of alternative memories and narratives, especially ones which occupy complicated gray zones or are not easily reduced to simple messages such as “good vs. bad” or “us vs. them.”

Memory work, therefore, is a never-ending, infinite process that necessitates continued critical examination as contemporary technology, society, ideology, and geopolitics shift and transform. This is the salient point that we wish to highlight through this introduction and the broader special issue, as contributing essays open new avenues for exploration and highlight the ever-shifting contours of Asia-Pacific War memories.

Acknowledgements

The editors would like to thank, first and foremost, all the special issue contributors for their continued patience with us throughout the editing process. We also extend our deep gratitude to Nichibunken for letting us use its space and facilities to expand our conference to a global reach. Additionally, we greatly appreciate the assistance of editors at the Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, especially Tessa Morris-Suzuki for her expert advice, Sven Saaler for his insightful and detailed feedback, and Mark Selden for his early interest in our project and for helping us get it off the ground. Also, we are grateful to the help of outside reviewers including Morris Low, Kirk Denton, Jessica Jordan and others who cannot be named here but who provided invaluable comments and suggestions.

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Justin Aukema is an Associate Professor in the Faculty of Economics at Osaka Metropolitan University.

Daniel Milne is Senior Lecturer at Kyoto University’s Institute for Liberals Arts and Sciences (ILAS).

Ryōta Nishino is Designated Assistant Professor at the School of Law, Nagoya University, Japan.

Mahon Murphy is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Law, Kyoto University.

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Notes

Of the twelve papers presented at the conference, two could not be included in this issue. One was on war memorials in Thailand by Nipaporn Ratchatapattanakul and another by Caroline Norma on wartime Australian and Japanese sexual violence in New Guinea. We thank the vital contribution the two presenters made to the conference and to the evolution of this special issue and look forward to their future publication.

Shirakawa, in fact, uses, variously, the phrases “local versions of Yasukuni” (Yasukuni jinja no chihōban) and “village Yasukunis” (mura no Yasukuni) (2015, 8, 13). However, in keeping with Shirakawa’s original nuance, we have translated these together as the slightly more natural-sounding “mini-Yasukunis.”

Featured image: An image of Ryōzen Kannon in Kyoto’s Higashiyama area. The imposing structure is largely overshadowed by nearby World Heritage sites such as Kiyomizu Temple, while its function and history as a war memorial are perhaps even less well known. The complexities of the site are examined in detail in the essay by Daniel Milne and David Moreton in this special issue. Photo by David Moreton, 2017.

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On a dreary April day, agroforestry worker Jimmy Tablason frowns in the sweltering heat as he trudges through the ruins of forests protected for decades by his community.

Typhoon Rai, known as Odette in the Philippines, had struck almost four months ago, and the towering trees it toppled was still blocking trails, impeding access to forest resources that sustain villagers here in the community of Macatumbalen in the western Philippines’ Palawan province.

“In our agroforestry site, we had planted different species like banana, bamboo, breadfruit, lanzones and rambutan,” Tablason says. “Most of them fell down.” The sounds of birds and other wild animals that once greeted him in the forest have also gone, replaced with an eerie silence reminiscent of the heydays of commercial logging in the area.

As the Philippine government transitions to a new administration, no help seems to be coming from Manila, forcing the people of Macatumbalen to rely on themselves to  get back on their feet and restore the forests and their livelihoods. Once a logger himself, 53-year-old Tablason leads men in clearing debris from trails using a government-registered chainsaw.

The area’s natural forests were massively degraded by commercial logging that started in the 1980s. Respite came in 1991 when logging was banned across the entire country. In 1997, locals began organizing themselves into the Macatumbalen Community-Based Forest and Coastal Management Association, and in 2002 they were granted a 25-year agreement to conserve, protect and sustainably use 1,850 hectares (4,571 acres) of forest.

This agreement came under the Philippines’ Community-Based Forest Management (CBFM) program, an approach formalized by executive order in 1995 as part of a national strategy for achieving sustainable forestry and social justice.

“When the area was awarded to us [two decades ago] under the CBFM program, forest safeguarding commenced,” association president Nida Collado says as she sits beside the community nursery where seedlings are raised until they are ready to be transplanted in the mountains.

Maintaining the Macatumbalen nursery and reforestation sites has been part of association’s commitments since its inception. These efforts ramped up after 2010, when the association received financial support though publicly funded reforestation programs under  the CBFM-Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and the National Greening Program. The local office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office said these NGP-funded projects posted at least 85% survival rates, rehabilitating more than 200 hectares (500 acres) of denuded forestland in Macatumbalen.

Although project funding ended in 2019, the Macatumbalen community, nationally awarded for its exemplary forestry practices, continued enriching the forests with indigenous tree species, especially in the area where its watershed sits.

“We’ve also self-initiated reforestation, aside from the ones we implemented with the local and national government, so that helped in forest regeneration,” Collado says. “The old logging roads closed as a result. The denuded forestland was restored and became intact again.”

But that all changed on Dec. 17, 2021, when Typhoon Rai made its ninth and final landfall in the Philippines, hitting northern Palawan. The storm struck a blow not only to the forests the villagers had worked to revive, but also to the forest-dependent enterprises that had sustained them for decades.

Hitting the restart button

For the Macatumbalen villagers, this large swath of forestland, the size of nearly 3,500 football fields, is a wellspring of life. The forests provide clean air and water, and also sustain the community with non-timber forest products (NTFPs) such as honey, rattan, fruits and dammar resin, known locally as almaciga, which they sell at local markets to support their families.

Their access to these forest products is enshrined in the CBFM agreement the community association has with the DENR. “By protecting our forest resources, we’ve been able to reap all these benefits,” Collado says.

“With NTFPs, you’re not cutting down trees for its timber, because you’re just collecting, for instance, resins, leaves and fruits,” says Norli Colili, Palawan coordinator of the nonprofit NTFP-Exchange Programme, whose group provides Macatumbalen and other community organizations with knowledge and capacity-building support, as well as access to funding to scale up their forest-based enterprises.

“That way, the forest ecosystem health is maintained, while the Indigenous peoples and local communities that protect the forests continue to benefit,” Colili says.

But when the typhoon ravaged Macatumbalen’s forests, the once flourishing NTFPs were wiped out as well. According to an assessment by the local DENR, 70% of the sites reforested with support from the National Greening Program were damaged by the typhoon. Gloom fell over the village upon knowing that their fruit trees and other crops due for harvest had not been spared from the destruction.

“Families here struggle to make ends meet,” Tablason says. “Our household income was once good, but now it has declined. We’re starting all over again. As typhoon survivors, we’re going back to number one, as we don’t have livelihood options other than this.”

Village leader Nida Collado has been leading a community-initiated reforestation effort at Macatumbalen since the late 1990s. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Macatumbalen village leader Nida Collado sits at the government-funded honey processing house as she measures honey moisture content with a refractometer to ensure it meets market quality standards.

Macatumbalen village leader Nida Collado sits at the government-funded honey processing house as she measures honey moisture content with a refractometer to ensure it meets market quality standards. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Satellite images generated by USAID’s Sustainable Interventions for Biodiversity, Oceans and Landscapes project confirmed that the hardest-hit areas were the secondary forests in northern Palawan.

“The forests left in Palawan are the natural forests,” says ecosystem integration specialist Neil Aldrin Mallari, from the Center for Conservation Innovations. “The heavily damaged ones were second-growth forests or those planted by people, including the CBFMA areas, which had been reforested after logging.”

This, Mallari says, only suggests that the “forests made by nature not by people are more resilient,” and that the government should consider continuing its support to communities that engage in assisted natural regeneration of denuded forestlands.

Community-initiated reforestation at Macatumbalen gets a much-needed boost through the financial assistance from the government's flagship reforestation programs from 2010 to 2019.

Community-initiated reforestation at Macatumbalen gets a much-needed boost through the financial assistance from the government’s flagship reforestation programs from 2010 to 2019. Photo courtesy of CENRO Roxas.

Support slow, but conservation work continues

On March 2, the DENR issued an order allowing its field offices to issue permits for communities to exploit the wood from uprooted trees, in an effort to boost community rehabilitation efforts. “We did an inventory of fallen trees,” says Diogenes Esquillo, a forester with the local DENR office. “The report was already made and their recovery permit application is in process … We further wanted to help them rebound by conducting another inventory for their rattan, so that they can use it as an additional government livelihood assistance.” As of the time this article was published, however, no permits had been issued.

The delay, Esquillo says, is due to lack of staff in the local office, and difficulties in reaching remote community forests. “Our appeal to the national government is to increase our manpower for us to better respond to the order and swiftly deliver the services that the CBFM partner people organizations deserve,” he says.

Any hopes of hiring new staff or receiving funding to help restart reforestation efforts were further delayed by a nationwide ban on public spending during the election period, which ran from March 25 to May 8.

Despite the lack of support from outside, the community is continuing its conservation efforts.

“Even if we’re suffering from a lack of funds, we’re rising to the challenge because, in the end, we know we can survive this,” Tablason says.

Clearing paths has been a priority. Without clear trails, trips to monitor forests and water systems that previously took an hour can take as long as five hours. Obstructed trails also hamper forest patrols, putting forest resources at stake.

A man operates a government-registered chainsaw to clear a trail blocked by a fallen tree at the typhoon-hit forest of Macatumbalen.

A man operates a government-registered chainsaw to clear a trail blocked by a fallen tree in the typhoon-hit forest of Macatumbalen. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

“It’s important to guard the forests against people who want to do illegal activities there,” Tablason says. Over the past two decades, his group has seized 28 chainsaws from suspected illegal loggers and helped prosecute violators.

Back in the lowland, where the community nursery sits, the association has started remobilizing its members. Elders, mostly women, pot tree seedlings. Their children help by watering the seedlings to ensure their growth and survival. These seedlings are later transferred to holes dug by men in the mountains.

“Although we were hit by a typhoon, we have great hopes of recovery,” says Collado, who also serves as the provincial and regional president, and national vice president, of the federation of people’s organizations participating in the CBFM program. “We as people’s organizations don’t stop working.”

Signs of forest recovery keep the Macatumbalen villagers going. “We’re not losing hope because when we went up the mountain, we saw how the trees we had planted were standing up amid big tree debris. We geotagged them. We know they’re alive and will recover as long as support from the government continues,” Collado says.

‘Start forest rehab now’

The Philippine government, in its Master Plan for Climate Resilient Forestry Development, recognizes the adverse impacts of climate change on the country’s forest ecosystems and communities. Despite this, the CBFM program, a key element of the country’s strategy for sustainable forestry development, covering around 1.7 million hectares (4.2 million acres), has received only limited funding.

A bill on sustainable forest management that would ensure consistent government support for forest restoration and rehabilitation programs in partnership with nearly 2,000 community associations, has been proposed since the 2000s. At present, the bill is languishing in the Senate, largely due to lobbying by the real estate and miningindustries.

“Resources should be channeled toward making nature resilient,” says Mallari, who is also a professor of biology and ecology at De La Salle University. This, he adds, is especially urgent in Palawan, which has the most extensive forest cover in the Philippines.

“When another big one comes … having lost more than 60% of the natural forests in the northern Palawan puts us in a really precarious situation,” Mallari says. “So as much as possible, our fervent prayer to the government is to start rehabilitation now.”

A young man carries a bundle of rattan on his shoulder; for each pole collected from Macatumbalen's forest, he earns 5 to 12 pesos ($0.09 to $0.23) to support his family.

A young man carries a bundle of rattan on his shoulder; for each pole collected from Macatumbalen’s forest, he earns 5 to 12 pesos ($0.09 to $0.23) to support his family. Photo by Keith Anthony S. Fabro for Mongabay.

Delaying rehabilitation efforts would only make things worse for forest-dependent rural communities, which are among the country’s poorest, according to scientists and advocates.

“If their forests and fields are not stable, the cycle of pushing them even further to the margins becomes vicious,” Mallari says. “They will be further mired in poverty, because without forests, there’s no water and they will eventually lose their farms.”

A report published earlier this year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change states with high confidence that agriculture and forestry are among the most climate-exposed sectors. In the context of the Philippines, Mallari says, this means the government should not be looking at frontline communities as mere victims, but as potent partners in the fight against climate change.

“The most powerful, effective and sustainable  solution is to let the communities strengthen and fortify their environment for them, for us,” Mallari says. “That’s the solution to secure our future, because we will not be OK if nature is not OK.”

Community-based forest management, Palawan.

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Featured image: A once-thriving agroforestry site, photographed before it was wiped out by Typhoon Odette. Photo courtesy of CENRO Roxas.

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***

Rarely in Australian history has a governing party suffered such loss in the face of an opponent unable to claim complete victory.  It said much about the disillusionment, and plain disgust, from that nebulous centre of the country’s politics.  That centre roared on May 21, consuming sitting government members and inflicting a bloody reckoning.

That reckoning was made in traditional inner-city seats that have never known anyone other than conservative members.  It was part of a “teal” electoral tsunami, comprising candidates who would not necessarily wish to vote for Labor or the Greens, but who had found the Liberal-National government of Scott Morrison impossible to stomach on matters ranging from gender equality to climate change.

In the Melbourne seat of Goldstein, held by the Liberal Party’s Tim Wilson, former ABC journalist Zoe Wilson stormed through.  It was a showing most fitting: the electorate is named after Vera Goldstein, feminist and women’s rights campaigner who, in 1903, was the first woman to stand for election in a national parliament.

“She ran as an independent several times,” Wilson said in a telling reminder, “because she was so independent that she couldn’t bring herself to run for either of the major parties.”

In the same city, the treasurer, Josh Frydenberg, was overwhelmed by Dr Monique Ryan in Kooyong.  (Postal votes are currently being tallied, but it does not seem likely that Ryan will lose.)  This loss for the Liberals will be keenly felt, given Frydenberg’s leadership aspirations.

The story was repeated in Sydney, with the same narrative directed like a dagger at the Morrison government: You, fossil fuel devotees, mocked climate change, disregarded gender equality, and sneered at policing corruption in federal politics.  Wentworth went to businesswoman Allegra Spender, who had, during the course of her campaign, managed to assemble an army of 1200 volunteers.

Spender’s team, comprising a number of company directors, many women, is a revealing sign that movements can take root in the arid soil of caution that is Australian politics.

“You said you were standing for the community, not the party,” she told supporters, “for taking responsibility, not blaming, for compassion, not division and for the future, not the past.”

In the seat of North Sydney, held by the mild-mannered Liberal Trent Zimmerman, a victorious Kylea Tink reiterated the laundry list issues that had motivated the teal revolution.

“The majority things for me,” she told Crikey, “are climate action, integrity and addressing inequality.”

The victory of the various independents was the Liberal Party’s version of the Trojan Horse, one that had found itself parked in their heartland seats and released on election night.  It was a triumph of community organisation, not rusted party politics, despite Wilson’s fulminations about sinister external forces at work. It was the apotheosis of a movement that began with Cathy McGowan, the Victorian independent who won the rural seat of Indi in 2013.

This was also an election which delivered the highest Greens vote ever.  Queensland, almost always the deciding state, may well furnish two, possibly three Greens members in the House of Representatives.  The Greens leader, Adam Bandt, put much it down to the turbulent, vicious weather of recent times.

“We’ve just had three years of droughts and then fires and then floods and then floods again and people can see that this is happening.”

Remarkably for the group, they managed to win the Liberal-held seat of Ryan in the process.  They are also on the hunt in the Labor-held Melbourne seat of Macnamara.

“We are now on planet Greensland,” exclaimed the Greens candidate Elizabeth Watson-Brown on realising her triumph in Ryan, “and we are taking it forward.”

While the Labor opposition have good reason to cheer the prospect of forming government in almost a decade, other facts are impossible to ignore.  The Greens continued their now established historical trend of eating away at Labor’s vote in inner suburban areas, notably in Queensland.

Across several states, the party actually suffered, along the Liberal National coalition, a precipitous fall in the primary vote.  To form government on such a low primary return is staggering and says much about the loss of appeal of the established parties.

“It would be an unusual win for Labor,” noted a sour editorial from the Australian Financial Review, “with no grand policy ambitions or sweeping difference from the incumbent Coalition government.”  Only Western Australia, keen to punish the Morrison government, arrested that tendency, and may end up giving Anthony Albanese a majority.

Labor also bungled in the previously safely held south-west Sydney seat of Fowler, where Kristina Keneally, who had only lived in the electorate for a brief spell, missed out to local grassroots independent, Dai Le. The swing of almost 18 per cent away from Labor shows that Keneally, when she suffers defeat, does so in grandly catastrophic fashion.  The story of this debacle is also salutary to major parties who parachute heavy weight politicians into seats as part of party and personal ambition, rather than the interests of voters.

While the bruised LNP will lick their wounds and rue their ignorance of the community movement that gathered pace under their noses, Australia’s major parties will have to consider a new phenomenon: the non-career parliamentarian, one who enters parliament, not for party allegiance and faction but for voter representation and change.  For the Westminster model of government, this is indeed a stunning novelty.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University. He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: Anthony Albanese (Source: Republic World)

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***

 

A month after popular protests began in Sri Lanka, the government deployed its party members, loyalists and thugs to attack peaceful protesters on May 9 in Colombo. The protesters were demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, under the “go home Gota” slogan, and the removal of the corrupt ruling family regime that has led to mass suffering due to shortages and increases in the cost of basic necessities. 

Following a meeting with Rajapaksa at his official residence, his Sri Lanka People’s Front (Podujana Peramuna) party members, including elected officials in provincial councils, launched a violent offensive against the protesters. They assaulted protesters and destroyed the protesters’ stalls in front of Rajapaksa’s residence. Thugs — paid and provided with alcohol — with the tacit support of the police force, proceeded towards the main protest area, Gota go Gama (Go home Gota village), about a kilometre away.

The thugs destroyed stalls and tents and physically assaulted protesters. This act of state-supported violence was met with outrage from the masses who sympathised with the protesters. Local people surrounded party members, and destroyed some of the buses they were transported in with. This anger spread to other regional areas and local protesters targeted some elected officials’ personal residences.

Within hours, all-powerful Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa resigned.

Attacks condemned

Amidst the protests were former cricketing stars Kumar Sangakkara and Mahela Jayawardene, who condemned the attacks on the peaceful protesters.

Jayawardene tweeted:

“These thugs was [sic] assembled at prime minister’s official residence this morning and walked in numbers to assault innocent peaceful anti-government protesters. How can this happen? Police and others just watching this.”

When Mahinda Rajapaksa tweeted:

“While emotions are running high in #lka, I urge our general public to exercise restraint & remember that violence only begets violence,” Sangakkara responded, “The only violence was perpetrated by your “supporters” — goons and thugs who came to your office first before going on to assault the peaceful protestors”.

Former Sri Lankan national cricket captain Sanath Jayasuriya tweeted:

“I never thought that this type of thuggery will be unleashed on innocent protesters at Galle face in broad day and outside temple trees. The police must remember they are here to protect the PUBLIC of this country not corrupt politicians. This is the end of the Rajapaksas.”

Jayasuriya was also an elected party member from 2010–15.

The support of the popular protests from cricket celebrities overlaps with support from other national level athletes. Despite the merger of popular sports cultures with the media and entertainment industry, particularly since the mid-1990s, there is an institutional and cultural gap between popular athletes and artists. There is a significant difference in the exchange value of labour between artists and athletes. Unlike artists, the life of an athlete in the realm of competitive sports is limited and so are opportunities for alternative careers.

Military control

The expansion of neoliberal markets and the military over the past 40 years has transformed sports cultures. The integration of the military with sports institutions took place through authoritarian “security state” strategies under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1978 (PTA), which enabled torture and disappearances along with criminalising dissent and enforcing multiple forms of censorship.

While local business elite run the mass spectator sport of cricket and some popular sports — male football, rugby and basketball — the state coordinates all others. The Ministry of Sports is integrated with the military, subsidising national level sports workers and national level elite disabled athletes, who are mostly war veterans. The state coordination of sports, through the sports ministry and the military, links media and markets which shapes sports consumer culture and articulations of “sportive nationalism”. The links between the military and sports were strengthened after the anti-Tamil war in 2009.

As defence minister, Gotabhaya Rajapakse gained control of urban development after the Urban Development Authority — the agency responsible for planning and construction in urban areas — was brought under the purview of the military in 2011. The military expanded into commercial activities, such as tourism, especially in colonised Tamil and Muslim lands in the north and east.

The sports ministry targeted sports venues with its new urban development powers. It outsourced three international cricket stadiums, mainly in rural areas, to the Sri Lankan Armed Forces for maintenance in 2011. However, the military also contract out development projects to private firms, creating commissions for a range of deal-makers and middle-men.

More importantly, the military subsidises elite athletes in multiple sports, enabling the military to participate in and influence sports organisations. In the context of a lack of funding from the government for sports associations, many are reoriented by male oligarchies to build business networks, political alliances and short-term profits.

In the Sri Lankan professional football league, four teams out of the top 20 are from the military — army, navy and air force — and police. Most of the national women’s football team are enlisted in the military.

The military subsidises many track and field athletes. The Olympic silver medallist for the 200-metre race in the 2000 Summer Olympics in Sydney, Susanthika Jayasinghe, began her athletic career through the army. She also briefly joined Rajapakse’s party.

The institutional integration of sports with the military has reproduced authoritarian sports cultures. Most sports cultures are grounded in subordinating and silencing any dissent among sports labour. There is no union of sports workers. Male cricketers have a relatively weak players association, mostly focused on their wages. Multiple forms of violence and abuse of sports workers are maintained under these authoritarian sports cultures.

The absence of most athletes and sports labour from showing solidarity with the Galle Face protests highlights the need to demilitarise sports and the state.

Tamil communities in north and east Sri Lanka have struggled with the lack of essential goods under conditions of war for over 30 years. The military still occupies their homelands. Families of the disappeared continue to demand information about their missing loved ones. May Day rallies held across the Tamil homeland demanded the abolition of Sri Lanka’s PTA, demilitarisation of the North-East, the release of Tamil political prisoners and an international justice and accountability mechanism.

The popular protests demanding regime change are also about demilitarising the state, which can address the demands of the Tamil and Muslim communities in the north and east, as well as regain sports as a public civil democratic institution.

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Featured image: The meeting site for peaceful protesters, ‘Go home Gota’ village, was attacked. Photo: gohomegota.online

Cause to Fear a Remilitarized Japan

May 16th, 2022 by Ra Mason

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Japan is proposing to double its defense budget to around US$106 billion, or 2% of its gross domestic product (GDP). This move – like recent pledges by Germany to massively increase its military spending in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – brings the country full circle since it was militarily neutered following defeat in the second world war.

Japan’s Liberal Democrat government said the decision, which it announced at the end of April, had been prompted by the conflict in Ukraine, but also reflected growing regional pressure from China, North Korea and Russia. Defense minister Nobuo Kishi said the increase in spending was designed to give Japan “counterstrike capabilities” to defend against aggression in the region.

The US has been pressuring Japan for some time to increase its defense spending to share the security bill in the Asia-Pacific region. Doubling its defense budget brings Japan in line with the benchmark for NATO countries’ military spending and positions Japan increasingly more as a genuine ally, rather than dependent, of the US in the region – a position it has held since American occupation forces drafted a “pacifist” constitution to prevent any recurrence of Japanese imperial ambitions.

The constitution prohibited the use of force and the maintenance of armed forces, despite the later creation of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). This was thereafter combined with a notional 1% of GDP cap on defense spending, as well as three non-nuclear principles banning nuclear weapons being “produced, possessed or permitted entry.”

To this day, the constitution and its anti-militarist Article 9 remain unchanged. But Japan is pacifist in name only. The process of Japan’s remilitarization has been going on since the immediate postwar period. But the timing and rationale behind this latest move are significant.

Since its rise to international prominence after the Meiji Restoration and victory in the first Sino-Japanese war (1895), Japan has gone through a series of foreign policy shifts. These have fluctuated dramatically, from imperial aggressor (1930s) to pacifist (1950s) and middle power (2000s).

In the current era, relations with Washington have been paramount. But with America seemingly overstretched and in decline, Tokyo’s move to strengthen its military and deepen the alliance poses questions about Japan’s security identity.

It also raises concerns of entrapment into American proxy wars and increasing economic involvement in the US “military-industrial complex”, the system by which the defense sector encourages arms spending and war.

Dubious motives

The latest rise in defense spending is combined with deepening interoperability between US military units and the JSDF. It also paves the way for Japan to contribute billions of dollars to an arms and security infrastructure industry that is booming in the wake of Russia’s invasion into Ukraine.

All this while Article 9 of the constitution remains unaltered in Japanese law. On paper this supposedly maintains a so-called “cap in the bottle” of militarisation. But since changes to the constitution’s interpretation ratified in 2015, Japan’s foreign policy has increasingly resembled that of a great power.

Japan’s Special Defense Forces could become more offensive with a change of the constitution. Image: Facebook

Today, Japan is fervently supporting the Biden administration’s package of punitive sanctions against Russia and increased aid to Ukraine. This includes further attempts to justify what already seemingly amount to violations of Article 9.

Japan’s military spending (already the ninth-highest on the planet) itself evidently contradicts the clause. Remarkably, the JSDF also now has permanent operations bases as far away as the Horn of Africa. And the Japanese defense ministry is effectively supplying logistical materials to Ukrainian forces in a combat zone.

Regional relations and US alliance

The key point of concern here is that Article 9, the 1% GDP defense budget cap and non-nuclear principles combined to allay the fears of regional powers that Japan might attempt to return to its colonial past.

Domestic debate over whether the clause should be reformed or scrapped has intensified, but Japan’s former Asian conquests, including China, resolutely oppose constitutional reform.

Article 9’s malleable reinterpretation, therefore, reflects Japan’s tricky position between Asia and the US. This is compounded by the political capriciousness of prime minister, Fumio Kishida. Touted as a liberal, his foreign policy has become almost as hawkish as his conservative predecessors. And he now leans towards a relationship so close to the US that it risks entanglement in overseas conflicts.

Tokyo’s increasingly well-funded military, backed by a coastguard that rivals many national navies, leaves no doubt as to the robust transformation of Japanese forces in material terms. But the question remains as to whether China’s rise and North Korea’s saber-rattling really amount to the “dangerous” and “dynamic” security environmentbeing used to justify these changes.

This is a question of identity as well as practicality. Japan should be clear about its regional and global roles. It has the third-largest economy, the ninth most expensive military and significant influence across many leading international institutions, such as the UN and IMF.

Yet almost half the Japanese public are against revising Article 9. They are proud of Japan’s peaceful society and certainly do not seek expansion or entanglement in American wars.

That was, at least, until now. By invoking suffering in Ukraine, Japan’s government and mainstream media appear to have hit upon a means by which to transform sympathy into action backed by popular support.

Tokyo has ramped up refugee intakes to unprecedented numbers, donations to Ukraine have dramatically increased and military spending has reached a level comparable to western allies.

Intuitively, this may seem like a positive indicator of how Japan would respond to a contingency closer to home, such as Chinese aggression directed towards Taiwan. In reality, however, this shift in Japan’s foreign policy should be cause for concern, for it risks stoking future conflicts.

As Beijing stalks Taipei in the wake of Moscow invading Ukraine, Japan should be thinking earnestly about restoring its pacifist identity before the faded pages of its aging constitution are torn up altogether.

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Ra Mason is Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia.

Featured image: Japan is moving to remilitarize despite its pacifist constitution. Image: Shutterstock via The Conversation

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As the war intensifies between Russia and Ukraine, United States President Joe Biden and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison have demanded Russia be excluded from the Group of Twenty (G20) annual meeting in Bali in November this year.

This demand has put host country Indonesia in hot water; since the beginning of the military invasion, Indonesia has taken a soft stance on Russia.

Until now, Indonesia has not imposed any sanctions against Russia, nor is it likely to do so. The country has clearly and firmly announced its position: to invite all G20 country leaders, with no exception, to come to Bali for the meeting.

Despite mounting criticisms, we believe Indonesia has taken the right decision to still invite Russia and resist demands from the US and its allies; excluding Russia from the G20 forum does not appear the best course of action. Here is why.

Russia has been expelled before

This will not be first time for Russia to be expelled from an international forum. The Group of Eight (G8) – now the G7 – expelled Russia from the forum over its annexation of Crimea.

In 2014, Russia took over the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine with Putin saying this was to protect the well-being of eastern Ukrainian citizens. This stirred global condemnation, Russia was hit with economic sanctions and subsequently removed from the G8.

These sanctions apparently did not deter Russia; Crimea remains under its control.

Russia doesn’t seem to be bothered about violating international law.

Violating international law typically leads to two types of sanctions: direct sanctions (such as economic sanctions) and reputational sanctions (targeting the reputation of the offender).

Exclusion from the G20 would mostly be a reputational sanction for Russia, not a direct sanction, as the country has been mostly cut off from the global economy anyway.

Any exclusion from the G20 would only function to further deteriorate Russia’s already tarnished global reputation, and will only have limited economic impact. While direct and reputational sanctions may be useful to deter potential offenders, they are less useful for punishing repeat offenders, particularly if they have proven to be ineffective in the past.

Like employing economic sanctions (which tends to be unsuccessful), expelling Russia from the G20 is merely doing the same thing over again but expecting different results.

Furthermore, since the G20 is a forum, not an international organisation, it has no specific regulations regarding formal membership.

The expulsion of a member state needs to be collectively agreed by all members. Thus, it may be difficult to expel Russia from the forum considering China, India and South Africa’s continued soft stance on Russia.

Forcing Russia’s exclusion could threaten the group’s harmony.

Where does Indonesia stand?

As host of the G20 summit this year, the Indonesian government has decided to still invite President Putin and has said it would maintain impartiality. This may come as a surprise given Indonesia’s disapproval of military action in Ukraine and its support for the UN General Assembly’s resolution for the withdrawal of Russian troops.

However, Indonesia’s disapproval of Russia’s actions does not mean Indonesia supports the position of the Western nations. Rather, it shows Indonesia has been consistent to implement its “free and active foreign policy”. Free means Indonesia is independent and does not side with any world powers, while active means Indonesia would take the initiative in a peace settlement.

This is a high-level task, and it is the responsibility of President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo to reach out to world leaders from both camps and convince them of Indonesia’s impartial position.

Indonesia has experience as a regional facilitator and mediator in Southeast Asian conflicts and can use this expertise to mediate the group’s polarisation.

Even if Indonesia cannot manage to handle this polarisation by November, it can still offer a side-line meeting for Russia-Ukraine peace talks during the summit, as President Biden has suggested.

G20 as Russia’s way out

In a way, the G20 forum can function as Russia’s way out to avoid prolonging the war, without losing face.

Russia has continuously claimed this war as a special operation to demilitarise and de-Nazify Ukraine. Demilitarisation of Ukraine may be plausible, but de-Nazification seems a bit far-fetched; Ukraine is not a fully democratic country, but it is hardly an autocratic one.

Russia is in a tight spot and pushing Putin to the limit may not end well. Russia is stuck in a dilemma of continuing the war, with human loss, material damage and economic recession. Yet, admitting defeat can also mean the weakening – and perhaps even downfall – of Putin’s regime. Neither scenario is favourable for him.

Therefore, President Putin can use the G20 forum to hold meetings with other world leaders. This could be a gesture to the world that he wants to end the war and focus on more crucial issues, such as economic recovery and climate change.

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 is a Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Universitas Brawijaya.

 is Head of department of Politics, Government, and International Relations of Universitas Brawijaya, Universitas Brawijaya

Featured image: Indonesia received the G20 presidency from Italy. Laily Rache/Antara Foto

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May 7 marks the last day of the campaign period. Presidential and vice-presidential candidates held the last round of their nationwide campaign rallies to secure votes for the May 9 elections. Of the ten presidential candidates, one man consistently leads in surveys: son of the late dictator Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. (BBM).

BBM gained popularity largely due to his (in)famous father and namesake, Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who ruled the Philippines from 1965-1986 under a dictatorship and placed the country under almost a decade of martial law, starting a year before the end of his second term in 1973. From 1972 until his ouster by People Power in 1986, the Marcos regime oversaw at least 11, 103 victims of human rights violations. His clan also amassed an ill-gotten wealth amounting to PHP299B, of which PHP174B has been recovered while the remaining PHP125B is yet to be returned.

But these historical facts were later on subject to modification as orchestrated by BBM himself through the expertise of Cambridge Analytica. By rebranding the family image on social media coupled with myth-making, accounts of the country’s worst case of corruption and disregard for human rights are essentially downplayed. Many people are buying this electoral propaganda which is being perpetuated on Facebook, Twitter, TikTok and YouTube by an army of trolls allegedly paid by the Marcos camp.

Screenshot from the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board

Besides being a direct descendant of the now-admired and celebrated Marcos Sr., BBM is closely linked to outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte whose authoritarian characteristics have been inspired by the late dictator. Trial awaits the incumbent president for extra-judicial killings resulting from his war on drugs. Like his political inspiration Marcos Sr., Duterte, by virtue of the concept of political incorporation, purged from society the “rotten apples” of the Filipino population, i.e. small-time drug dealers and rival drug lords. The strongman rule is also marked by excessive military and police authority which bolstered police brutality and killings in the last six years. Moreover, the US-Philippine relations is at its worst as Duterte pursued a flawed “independent” foreign policy which basically only entails realignment to China and Russia. Apparently, he has not directly endorsed a successor but insinuated support for BBM through the endorsement from his political party, PDP-Laban, of which he is a chairman.

BBM’s electoral ploy such as non-attendance in almost all presidential debates, refusal of media interviews, utilization of fake news and historical revisionism is characteristic of authoritarianism where accountability is nonexistent. A new era of corruption, reminiscent of the 70’s, is imminent. And by viewing a BBM presidency as an extension of the Duterte regime, supporters commit to another six years of strongman rule that threatens further democratic backsliding and marginalization of the poor and indigenous groups. Hostility towards the West is foreseeable given his ideological affiliation and unpleasant history with the US. Disengagement from the hegemon essentially resonates with many Filipinos who criticize its cold war mentality and warmongering activities. Consequently, his supporters welcome his expression of intent to continue Duterte’s pivot to China; but too much comfort will be detrimental to the Philippines’ claim in the South China Sea.

Much is at stake with a Marcos in power. The Philippines cannot afford a 70’s redux. But man can only do so much. May 9 will determine the trajectory of the country and its population.

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Jezile Torculas has a bachelor’s degree in Political Science. She is an Assistant Editor at the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image is from Wikimedia Commons

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Children should not pay for the sins of their parents.  But in some cases, a healthy suspicion of the offspring is needed, notably when it comes to profiting off ill-gotten gains. It is certainly needed in the case of Filipino politician and presidential candidate Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr, who stands to win on May 9.

Bongbong’s father was the notorious strongman Ferdinand Marcos, his mother, the avaricious, shoe-crazed Imelda.  Elected president in 1965, Ferdinand Marcos indulged in murder, torture and looting.  He thrived on the terrain of violent, corrupt oligarchic politics, characterised by a telling remark from the dejected Sergio Osmenã Jr, whom he defeated in 1969:

“We were outgunned, outgooned, and outgold.”

In 1972, martial law was imposed on the pretext of a failed assassination attempt against the defence secretary, an attack which saw no injuries nor apprehension of suspects.  It was only formally lifted in 1981.  Under the blood-soaked stewardship of the Marcos regime, 70,000 warrantless arrests were made, and 4,000 people killed.

The Philippines duly declined in the face of monstrous cronyism, institutional unaccountability and graft, becoming one of the poorest in South-East Asia.  While Marcos Sr’s own official salary never rose above $13,500 a year, he and his cronies made off with $10 billion.  (Estimates vary.)  When revolutionaries took over the Presidential palace, they found garishly ornate portraits, 15 mink coats, 508 couture gowns and over 3,000 pairs of Imelda’s designer shoes.

Fleeing the Philippines in the wake of the popular insurrection of 1986 led by Corazon “Cory” Aquino, the Marcoses found sanctuary in the bosom of US protection, taking up residence in Hawaii.

Opinion polls show that Bongbong is breezing his way to office, a phenomenon that has little to do with his personality, sense of mind, or presence.  A Pulse Asia survey conducted in February showed voter approval at an enviable 60 percent.  This would suggest that the various petitions seeking to disqualify him have had little effect on perceptions lost in the miasma of myth and speculation.

All this points to a dark concatenation of factors that have served to rehabilitate his family’s legacy.  For the student aware of the country’s oligarchic politics, this is unlikely to come as shocking.  For one, the Marcoses have inexorably found their way back into politics, making their way through the dynastic jungle.

Imelda, for all her thieving ways, found herself serving in the House of Representatives four times and unsuccessfully ran for the presidency in 1992.  Daughter Imee became governor of the province of Ilocos Norte in 2010, and has been serving as a senator since 2019.  Marcos Jr followed a similar trajectory, becoming a member of congress and senator and doing so with little distinction.  In 2016, he contested the vice presidency and lost.

Bongbong has already done his father proud at various levels, not least exhibiting a tendency to fabricate his past.  On the touchy issue of education, Oxford University has stated at various points that Marcos Jr, while matriculating at St. Edmund Hall in 1975, never took a degree in Politics, Philosophy and Economics.  According to the institution’s records, “he did not complete his degree, but was awarded a special diploma in Social Studies in 1978.”

A statement from the Oxford Philippines Society remarks that,

“Marcos failed his degree’s preliminary examinations at the first attempt.  Passing the preliminary examinations is a prerequisite for continuing one’s studies and completing a degree at Oxford University.”

The issue was known as far back as 1983, when a disturbed sister from the Religious of the Good Shepherd wrote to the university inquiring about the politician’s credentials and received a letter confirming that fact.

Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte, whose own rule has been characterised by populist violence and impunity, has played his role in the rehabilitative process.  In 2016, almost three decades after dying in Hawaii, Duterte gave permission for Ferdinand Marcos to be buried with full military honours in Manila’s National Heroes’ Cemetery.  The timing of the burial was kept secret, prompting Vice President Leni Robredo to describe the ceremony as “a thief in the night”.

A coalition of Jesuit groups claimed that the interring of Marcos in Manila “buries human dignity by legitimising the massive violations of human and civil rights… that took place under his regime.”  Duterte would have appreciated the mirror-effect of the move, a respectful nod from one human rights abuser to another.  Under his direction, thousands of drug suspects have been summarily butchered.

Bongbong has also taken the cue, rehabilitating his parents using a polished, digital campaign of re-invention that trucks in gold age nostalgia and delusion.  Political raw material has presented itself.  The gap between the wealthy and impoverished, which his father did everything to widen, has not been closed by successive governments.  According to 2021 figures from the Philippine Statistics Authority, 24 percent of Filipinos, some 26 million people, live below the poverty line.

Videos abound claiming that his parents were philanthropists rather than figures of predation.  The issue of martial law brutality has all but vanished in the narrative.  Social media and online influencers have managed the growth of this image through a coordinated campaign of disinformation waged across multiple platforms.

Gemma B. Mendoza of the Philippine news platform Rappler has noted the more sinister element of these efforts.  Even as the legacy of a family dictatorship is being burnished, the press and critics are being hounded.  The only movement standing in the way of Family Marcos is Vice President Robredo, who triumphed over Marcos Jr in 2016.  Her hope is a brand of politics nourished by grassroots participation rather than shameless patronage.

The same cannot be said of the political classes who operate on the central principle of Philippine politics: impunity. This, at least, is how the political scientist Aries Arugay of the University of Philippines sees it.

“We just don’t jail our politicians or make them accountable … we don’t punish them, unlike South Korean presidents.”

The opposite is the case, and as the voters make it to the ballot on Monday, the country, if polls are to be believed, will see another Marcos in the presidential palace.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from Wikimedia Commons

Noise Matters: Wind Farms, Nuisance and the Law

May 4th, 2022 by Dr. Binoy Kampmark

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For years, the Australian wind farm has been reviled as ugly, noisy and unendearing by a certain number of prominent figures.  Former Prime Minister Tony Abbott pathologized them, calling wind turbines the “dark satanic mills of the modern era”, being not merely aesthetically problematic but damaging to health.

The latter view has been rejected by the National Health and Medical Research Council, which found “no consistent evidence that wind farms cause adverse health effects in humans” though it accepted at the time “that further high quality research on the possible health effects of wind farms is required.”  Literature examining the nature of wind farm complaints also notes “large historical and geographical differences in the distribution of complainants in Australia.”

Current Deputy Prime Minister Barnaby Joyce is another figure who never misses a chance to question the broader use of wind power.  In New South Wales, where his electorate is based, he has warned the NSW government to “be careful” about using more turbines.  “It’s not a bowl of cherries in this space,” the Nationals leader gnomically observed, “and that’s why you’ve got to keep your base load power going.”

This has placed him at odds with the State government and its renewable energy agenda.  Criticism of the New England renewable energy zone as turning his electorate “into a sea of wind farms” did not impress NSW agriculture minister Adam Marshall in December 2020.  In The Land newspaper, Marshall, who is also a member of the Nationals, regarded such criticism as “banal and binary and prehistoric”.

On March 25, the Victorian Supreme Court gave private citizens some cause for joy, and policy makers and corporations a potential cause for concern, in challenging the way such farms operate.  The judgement found that the noise from the Bald Hills Wind Farm based at Tarwin Lower in South Gippsland, “caused substantial interference with both plaintiffs’ enjoyment of their land – specifically, their ability to sleep undisturbed at night, in their own beds in their own homes.”

There had been a sufficient nuisance to warrant the awarding of damages and an injunction on the company from continuing to cause the noise at night, Bald Hills having failed to establish “that the sound received at either [the plaintiffs’ houses] complied with noise conditions in the permit at any time.”  While the relevant Minister for Planning might “initiate enforcement action”, it was up to the court or tribunal to determine whether compliance had taken place.

The two individuals in question – John Zakula and Noel Uren – sued the wind farm in 2021 claiming the infliction of “roaring” noise by the wind turbines.  It transpires that Bald Hills had form of the most condescending sort.  Since commencing operations in 2015, it had received “many complaints from neighbouring residents and landowners about noise from wind turbines.”  In 2015 alone, the Bald Hill complaints register recorded 50 complaints, some from Uren and Zakula, and all about noise disruption.

The company’s behaviour in responding to the complaints did not impress the court.  Justice Melinda Richards decided that awarding aggravated damages was entirely appropriate.  “The manner in which Bald Hills dealt with the plaintiffs’ reasonable and legitimate complaints of noise, over many years, at least doubled the impact of the loss of amenity each of them suffered at their homes.”  The judge decided that Uren should receive $46,000 in aggravated damages, with Zakula to pocket $84,000.

Justice Richards was not amiss to the implications of such a decision.  Unlike the Australian Deputy Prime Minister, she showed no signs of pre-historic tendencies in her reasoning.  Wind power generation, she accepted, was “a socially beneficial activity”.  There was no reason, however, why it was not “possible to achieve both a good night’s sleep and power generation at the same time.”  The evidence presented to the court “did not suggest […] that there is a binary choice to be made between the generation of clean energy by the wind farm, and a good night’s sleep for its neighbours.”  The company could well have responded to the complaints of Uren and Zakula adequately “while continuing to generate renewable energy.”

When seen in its more specific context, the decision furnishes the renewable energy sector with a critical lesson.  Even when engaged in socially responsible activities – in this case, renewable energy production – companies must be mindful of the implications of their behaviour to neighbouring residents.  Being green and environmentally sound are noble ventures, but hardly enough when it comes to inflicting a nightmare upon residents.

Dominica Tannock, representing both plaintiffs, suggested after her clients’ victory that, “The implications are corporate Australia will have to be very careful about complaints.”  It was incumbent on the company to behave reasonably, fairly and “protect people’s sleep and if they don’t there is a precedent [now that] they can be shut down.”

The owner of the Bald Hills Wind Farm, Infrastructure Capital Group, said little in a statement response to the ruling, merely that it was “currently absorbing the judgment and its implications”.  They will not be the only ones.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image: A July 2017 holiday at Walkerville allowed me to explore South Gippsland and views of Wilsons Promontory, the Bald Hills wind farm and Cape Liptrap coastal reserve. (Source: John Englart/Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0)

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He has been seen, not always accurately, as the more moderate in an otherwise conservative Liberal Party, which has governed Australia since 2013 in an at times troubled alliance with the Nationals.  He has served as party deputy to Prime Minister Scott Morrison, and proudly promotes his role as the country’s treasurer during the COVID-19 pandemic.

But Josh Frydenberg is nervous.  There is also reason to suggest that he might even be panicking.  The electorate he represents – that of Kooyong – is not quite so warm towards the sitting member as it has been in the past.  The sitting MP has resorted to his home party base for comfort.  “Incredible sea of Liberal blue at our Kooyong Campaign Launch, with more than 1,000 people present,” he tweeted on May 1.  “So much energy in the room.”

The sitting member was certainly correct about the energy, in so far as it went to the head of one of his supporters in attendance.  After voicing public approval for Frydenberg (“Liberals will win because of Josh”), volunteer Phil Elwood proceeded to become an impromptu “birdman”, imitating the sound of a Kookaburra and Sulphur-crested Cockatoo with gusto.  Many political candidates have feared the distractions of the eccentric, dedicated supporter.

The seat has also been given licks and lashings of Liberal blue, with posters, placards and paraphernalia saturating the suburb. But all this extravagant expense of reminder in a seat traditionally held by the Liberals, there is a nagging feeling that a rude shock awaits on May 21.

That rude shock comes in the form of independent candidate Monique Ryan.  “A vote for Dr Monique Ryan,” runs the standard line, “is a vote for climate action, integrity and a strong economy.”  From her perspective, and those of similar candidates in other safe Liberal Party seats – Goldstein, Wentworth, North Sydney – the first two priorities, which have tended to find their way at the bottom end of the government’s list, stand out.

The Morrison government has made a name for itself in the field of corruption and a lack of accountability verging on the grotesque.  Its members have shown little contrition on being exposed.  In December 2020, when it was revealed that Morrison and Frydenberg had run up a bill of almost $5,000 for using the PM’s jet to attend Lachlan Murdoch’s 2018 Christmas party, it barely stirred a murmur.

Writing with some disgust about the episode, Nick Feik asked the relevant question: “How did we get to the point where the misuse of public money by our two most senior politicians provoked neither contrition nor embarrassment, and it scarcely even registered as a scandal?”

This is certainly not the case for the “teal independents”, who are insisting that the Liberal Party account for its sins and call out scandals and sleaze.  They also support the establishment of an integrity commission with fangs, something which, according to a poll conducted by The Australia Institute, is endorsed by three in four Australians.

The momentum of such candidates has caused an outbreak of sweat among the sitting members.  Frydenberg, for one, has resorted to attacking Ryan in a coarse, personal way.  A central strategy, one fabulously juvenile and ill-informed, is to assume that an independent candidate can never, by definition, be independent.  She would, for instance, have been incapable of flirting with various sides of politics in the past, to have voted for different and differing parties at different elections.  She could not have been a swinging voter, but instead an unwavering member of a tribe from the outset.

This ossified veneration of the unchanging political mind came to the fore in remarks made by Frydenberg about Ryan’s own alleged lack of independence, telling his supporters that he was not “up against a true independent.  I’m up against a political party.”  Dark forces, he insinuates, lurk, and he risks being a victim of puppetry – the workings of the Climate 200 group created by clean energy advocate Simon Holmes à Court, or the “Voice of” movement.

He has even gone so far as to throw in anecdotes of desperation, including a chance meeting with the independent candidate’s mother-in-law, whom he had apparently bumped into at a “local café”.  On receiving the good news that she would be voting for him, he recalled the answer: “Because you know what you’re doing and you’re a nice person.”

This march of the independents has terrified other former politicians such as John Howard, Liberal Prime Minister of Australia between 1996 and 2007.  He has made it his personal mission to convince voters that the independent candidates are “anti-Liberal groupies” who do not represent the “middle ground”.

Showing a total lack of understanding as to how reactionary his own party became, largely due to his own demagogic handiwork, Howard could only wonder why the independent movement had not expressed an interest in running candidates against the Labor Party.  “The only consequence of a victory for one of these will be to reduce the prospects of the Liberal Party forming the next government.  It’s as simple as that.”  That, you would think, is the point of the matter.

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Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from @JoshFrydenberg/Twitter

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The hysteria in Canberra and Washington over the Sino-Solomon Islands security pact has shown, again, how irrelevant the individual affairs of Pacific Island states are in the chess game of geopolitics. The one thing conspicuously missing has been the issue of climate change, near and dear to those whose lands are gradually being inundated by rising sea levels.

In a desperate attempt to understand why Honiara courted Chinese interest in defiance of Australian wishes, opposition Labor figures pointed the finger at climate change.  Australia’s sniffly approach to such a vital issue was key in pushing the country into the arms of Beijing.  According to the Shadow Education Minister Tanya Plibersek, Canberra had “left a vacuum” on the matter.  Senator Penny Wong stated the obvious in remarking that Pacific leaders had been less than impressed by the Morrison government’s indifference to climate change as the “number one economic and national issue”.

The indifference, even contempt shown by Canberra to that most existential of concerns has made itself present on several occasions.  In September 2015, banter ensued between Immigration Minister Peter Dutton waiting alongside Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Social Services Minister Scott Morrison.  Abbott recalled the rather casual approach to punctuality that had taken place at a Pacific Islands Forum meeting the previous day in Papua New Guinea.  “Time doesn’t mean anything,” remarked Dutton, “when you’re about to have water lapping at your door.”

In August 2019, Fiji Prime Minister Frank Bainimarama was already giving signals that a turning might well be in the offing.  After the Pacific Island nations summit held that month, Bainimarama noted how Morrison had been “very insulting, very condescending”, behaviour that had hardly been “good for the relationship” with Pacific Island states.  The Chinese, on the other hand, “don’t insult us.”  They did not “go down and tell the world that we’ve given this much money to the Pacific Islands.  They don’t do that.  They’re good people, definitely better than Morrison.”

Australia’s then Deputy Prime Minister, Michael McCormack, had also caught the attention of the Fijian PM for less than flattering observations.  In remarks published in the Guardian, Morrison’s deputy made light of the environmental threats posed to the region’s states.  They would continue to survive, he suggested, “because many of their workers come here to pick our fruit, pick our own fruit grown with hard Australian enterprise and endeavour”.  Such states would also “continue to survive on large aid assistance from Australia.”

The comments drew criticism from the former Australian Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull, who stated the matter in terms the most simple, coal-loving politician could understand.  “If you are a Pacific Islander and your home is going to be washed away from rising sea levels caused by global warming then this is not a political issue, it’s an existential one.”

Despite such remarks, the Morrison government remained deaf.  In 2020, it was still hostile to the idea of committing to net zero carbon emissions by 2050.  Fourteen Pacific leaders responded by penning an open letter to the Prime Minister.  Made up of former presidents, prime ministers, archbishops and church leaders, the authors took issue with Australia’s “current Paris Agreement emission reduction target” as “one of the weakest among wealthy nations.”

The letter condemned Canberra’s practice of using Kyoto Protocol carryover credits “which legally cannot, and morally should not, be used to meet Australia’s 2030 Paris Agreement target”.  As the children and grandchildren of the region faced “unprecedented risks due to climate change, now is the time to stand together and work together to secure their future safety and prosperity.”

Wilful blindness to the region on the subject of climate security has persisted, with Dutton, now Defence Minister, adamant that Canberra had “a fantastic relationship with the Solomon Islands”.  Using the ugly, infantilising language of “the Pacific family,” which presumably is made up of hectoring parents and obedient children, who the children are is never in doubt.  “As part of the Pacific family, it is obvious we want to work together and we want to resolve the issues within that family, within our region.” Some issues are just bigger than others.

While Wong and Plibersek are trying to squeeze every bit of critical comment about the Sino-Solomon Islands pact, it was only one aspect of the broader condescension that powers have shown to the smaller states in the region.  In all the fuss and angst about the Honiara-Beijing agreement and whether it would permit the stationing of Chinese military personnel, the Pacific Elders’ Voice had to reiterate “that the primary security threat to the Pacific is climate change.”

The group also recalled the content of the 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security: “We affirm that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods, security and wellbeing of the peoples of the Pacific and our commitments to progress and the implementation of the Paris Agreement.”

For the elders, the major powers “including the US, Japan and Australia, are developing strategies and policies for the ‘Indo-Pacific’ with little, if any, consultation with the Pacific Island countries.”  The Pacific region comprising states – known as the Moana – faced “a set of unique challenges.”  It was primarily those countries, not external powers, who should determine the security and future of the region.  Accordingly, all nations were called upon “to respect the sovereignty of all Pacific Island countries and the right of Pacific peoples to develop and implement their own security strategies without undue coercion from outsiders.”

The observation is well-reasoned and well-meant; but those same external powers, goggle-eyed about nuclear-powered submarines, the establishment of rival military bases and geopolitical strutting, have long ignored the sovereign wishes of those in the Pacific.  It is a nasty habit that persists, even as sea levels rise.

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Note to readers: Please click the share buttons above or below. Follow us on Instagram, Twitter and Facebook. Feel free to repost and share widely Global Research articles.

Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge.  He currently lectures at RMIT University.  He is a regular contributor to Global Research and Asia-Pacific Research. Email: [email protected]

Featured image is from USGS